Paper Submitted to the 2005 EPUNet Conference, June30th-July 2nd, 2005, Colchester, United Kingdom.
Temporary Contracts – the new European inequality? Comparing men and women in West Germany and France Vanessa Gash, (Max Planck Institute for Human Development) Fran McGinnity, (Economic and Social Research Institute)
Abstract: This paper seeks to reveal whether temporary contracts are the new European inequality and does so in a comparative analysis of two countries typically regarded as eurosclerotic: Germany and France. We compare the wages, wage growth and labour market outcomes of fixed-term contract workers relative to a matched sample of permanent workers with similar characteristics. Using seven waves of the ECHP we find evidence of wage penalties, increased exposure to unemployment and repeat spells of temporary employment. However, these tendencies vary significantly by country and by gender. The main finding of this paper is the extent to which temporary contract employment is of considerable disadvantage for French women. This is important, as previous research on female employment in the United-Kingdom and in West-Germany (Booth et al 2002; Giesecke and Gross 2003), two countries with intermittent female employment, did not find evidence of temporary worker disadvantage. Our findings, however, suggest that in countries where female employment tends to be full-time and continuous, women will experience disadvantage on the introduction of temporary contracts. The impact of temporary contract employment was not as damaging for our matched male sample, however, and contrary to our expectations, we found a slight tendency for greater male disadvantage in West Germany relative to France.
Correspondence: Vanessa Gash, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzealle 94, D-14195 Berlin. Email:
[email protected] or Frances McGinnity, Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin 4. email:
[email protected]
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1. Temporary contracts - the new European inequality? Recent research has highlighted the dramatic rise in wage inequality in the United States, in stark contrast to most of Europe. Blau and Kahn’s Unified theory (2002) offers an explanation for this, claiming that US market management has allowed the US economy to respond to macro-economic shocks by increasing wage inequality, while the structure of EU economies have prevented them from responding to these shocks, resulting in high unemployment. This explanation has been challenged in a series of recent papers by DiPrete and others in Work and Occupations (2005). These papers argue that European markets have responded to macro-economic shocks by facilitating inequalities in job security, rather than in earnings inequality as has been the case in America. Temporary contracts, in reducing employment security, represent a crucial new source of inequality in Europe. This paper investigates how important these contracts are as a ‘new source of inequality’. It does so by analysing the consequences of temporary contracts for two key labour market outcomes: wages and subsequent employment security. DiPrete (2005) also highlights that European labour markets are not homogenous, and if they are inflexible, they are inflexible in different ways and with different consequences. Both France and Germany are frequently regarded as sharing similarly rigid institutional features, and introduced temporary contracts in the mid-1980s in an effort to make their labour markets more flexible. However, they also differ on a range of institutions – employment protection, industrial relations, education, support for working parents – and our premise is that these will affect the consequences of temporary contracts for labour market outcomes. We also know from previous research that men and women’s labour market engagement is fundamentally different. Women, on average, work in occupations dominated by women (Charles, 1992; OECD, 2002), they earn less (Rubery et al, 1998; OECD, 2002) and their employment histories/career stability shows considerably less continuity than those of men (Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2001). What is the role of temporary contracts in gender differences in employment outcomes – do they provide new employment opportunities for women or do they simply contribute to perforated work careers? Do temporary contracts exacerbate or ameliorate women’s labour market disadvantage?1 We also expect cross-national variation in the extent of gender differences
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in the impact of temporary contracts, given the variation in women’s employment and the institutional context in which it takes place. For example, full-time, continuous employment is more common among women in France than West Germany, in the context of greater support for the employment of mothers there. How do we assess the consequences of temporary contracts? A key component of the paper concerns the application of propensity score matching to ensure that temporary workers outcomes are compared with the outcomes of other workers who share their characteristics. This statistical technique allows us to establish the difference in outcome had the temporary worker never been employed on a temporary contract. In addition we exploit the panel nature of the ECHP data by using information on previous work experience in this matching, and follow the individuals to evaluate their subsequent labour market performance. We address three empirical questions: (1) What are the consequences of temporary contracts for wages and employment stability – are they a crucial new source of inequality? (2) Is the impact of temporary contracts different in France and Germany, and if so, how? (3) Are there gender differences in the impact of temporary contracts in these two countries?
In section 2 we review competing theories concerning the degree to which temporary employment is expected to damage wages and employment security. Section 3 summarises the institutional features and macro-economic conditions of Germany and France, and presents our hypothesised outcomes for Germany and France. Section 4 reviews the data used, outlines the propensity score methodology applied as well as the rationale for the research design. The results of the propensity score matching are described in section 5. Section 6 presents the outcomes of temporary contract employment in an analysis of wages, wage growth and future labour market status. Finally, in Section 7, we offer some conclusions as well as avenues for future research.
2. Theory and Expectations Broadly, there are two different viewpoints concerning the implications of temporary contract employment for workers. These two perspectives offer us competing expectations concerning the degree to which temporary contract employment could be regarded as the new European inequality. Most simply, theories which describe temporary contract employment can be classified into good or bad. We start with the first series of propositions which suggest that temporary employment is
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positive for workers. There is the belief that temporary contract employment provides a bridge to the standard employment contract (Wang and Weiss 1998), as well as a means of obtaining work experience. For these two reasons it is also hailed as a means of (re)integrating labour market outsiders back into paid work. Examples include the following; Zijl, van den Berg and Heyma (2004), using Dutch data, find that temporary employment shortens durations in unemployment and increases the portion of unemployed workers who make transitions to permanent contracts. There is also the suggestion, though rarely empirically examined, that temporary contract employment provides some workers with a chosen alternative to continuous labour force attachment. (Booth et al 2002; Giesecke and Gross 2004). Working mothers, for instance, are theorised to want discontinuous employment so they can manage their childcare responsibilities with market involvement. The second viewpoint underlines the risks associated with temporary contract employment. From this perspective temporary contract work is inferior to the standard employment contract, with lower pay, less job security and reduced access to training all contributing to a secondary labour market where temporary workers’ disadvantage is perpetuated by repeated spells of unemployment and little to no opportunity for career progression. There is also the claim, that women on temporary contracts will be less disadvantaged by the lower pay and employment insecurity associated with these contracts given women workers general tendency for intermittent employment (Booth 2002; Gieseke and Gross 2002). Blanchard and Landier (2002) establish a deterioration in the working conditions of temporary workers over the 1990s, in their analysis of French data for those aged 20-24. Young French temporary contract workers experienced a wage penalty which increased in the early 1990s and decreased somewhat in the late 1990s. They found decreasing probabilities of moving from temporary work to permanent work over the 1990s while the probability of remaining in temporary employment increases for the same time period. They conclude that provisions to ‘flexibilize’ the market through the generation of temporary employment have had a negative effect on the working conditions of young people. In Germany the evidence is more mixed. Giesecke and Gross (2003) point to the fact that, compared to permanent contracts, fixed-term contracts carry a higher risk of subsequent unemployment or another fixed-term contract. However, Mertens and McGinnity (2004) note that while many fixed-term contract workers may start with lower wages, many catch up with their permanent counterparts. These authors also highlight the 4
considerable heterogeneity of temporary contracts and their effect on wages, with the wage penalty being higher for low-skilled, low-earning workers (Mertens and McGinnity, 2005). Thus this distinction between “good” and “bad” temporary contract employment does not, of course, negate the heterogeneity of temporary contract employment. What is argued here, nonetheless, is that the institutional settings within which temporary contract workers find themselves are likely to mediate the influence of temporary contracts on both current and subsequent labour market outcomes like wages and employment security. The institutional structure of the French and German labour markets is the topic of the next section.
3. The Comparative Perspective: Institutions and Labour Markets France and Germany are frequently grouped together as examples of rigid economies (Grubb and Wells, 1993; OECD, 2004). Both countries introduced temporary contracts in the mid-1980s. This was very much ‘flexibility at the margin’, in that it did not fundamentally challenge existing high levels of employment protection for permanent workers. By 1995-2000 in an around 1 in 10 workers were employed on temporary contracts in France and Germany, accounting for 13-14% of total employment in France and approximately 10-12% of total employment in Germany (OECD, 2002). Unlike some other European countries, there is no tendency in either Germany or France for temporary contract work to be disproportionately female (Eurostat 2002). While France and Germany share the character of a ‘policy experiment’ with regard to fixed-term contracts, they differ on key institutional features likely to structure the outcomes of temporary contract workers. The institutional features expected to influence the character, and therefore the consequences of temporary contract employment, are reviewed below.
3.1 Employment Protection Legislation Dismissal regulations and high firing costs for permanent workers are generally believed to play a key role in the use of fixed-term contracts in Europe (e.g., OECD, 1993). By international standards, both French and German legislation afford a relatively high level of employment protection for permanent employees as seen in a wide range of measures from legislation through to employer
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attitude surveys (Grubb and Wells, 1993; Büchtemann and Walwei, 1996)2. On closer inspection, however, some differences emerge.
Dismissal regulations in both countries stipulate notice periods based on measures such as tenure, age and type of job and the employer needs to specify a reason for dismissal. In Germany, however, the works council (Betriebsrat) typically plays a role in the procedure3, whereas in France this is not necessarily the case4. While German employees are not automatically entitled to redundancy pay, French employees are, though the amount is quite low being equal to 3 days pay for each year of service, or 24 hourly wages per annum. In France, fixed-term contract workers are also entitled to redundancy pay, though the rate of redundancy pay is higher than the permanent worker rate at 6% of the total salary received for the duration of the contract5. It should be noted, nonetheless, that there are exceptions to this rule with certain forms of temporary contract, such as seasonal work contracts or workers whose jobs have a training component not entitled to redundancy pay (DAGEMO-BECI 1996). In both countries employees can challenge the legality of their dismissal and similar proportions of employees bring such cases to court, accounting for 22% of all dismissals in Germany and 25% in France (OECD 2004). In both countries the employer is liable for considerable amounts if the employee wins their appeal, with legal minima of at least six months pay in France (Schömann et 2
Employment protection for those in employment usually refers to the difficulty in firing people and is measured as a combination of firing costs (such as severance pay), notification period, priority rules (such as seniority) and procedural obstacles. 3 Dismissals are regulated by the Dismissal Protection Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz) of 1951, as amended in 1969 (see Schömnann et al, 1998). The description of regulations described here excludes the period from 1996-1999, when dismissal protection was somewhat modified. In addition, in January 2004 new legislation raised the minimum number of employees from 6 to 11, and new regulations have been introduced to facilitate redundancy payment settlements without going to court. 4
Since the 1986 reform of the Code du Travail, the statute governing employment in France, there have been two separate procedures specified for dismissal of employees. These are divided into dismissals for economic reasons (licenciement pour motif économique) and for individual reasons (licenciement pour motif disciplinaire,/personnelle). Previously a labour inspector was required to witness the meeting between an employer and an employee concerning their dismissal, now this is only the case for dismissals for economic reasons. Dismissals for economic reasons are generally those concerning firms’ financial inability to continue the individuals post. In these instances the employer is required to offer their former employees re-training contracts (Schömann et al, 1998). 5
If we assume the average worker works; 22 days per month, for a 12 month period, with two weeks holiday a French permanent worker will be entitled to 3 days redundancy pay after a 12 month period, while the temporary contract worker will be entitled to 15 days pay.
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al 1998). 6 While we have no comparative figures on the outcomes of these challenges, we do know that French employees win 75% of challenged dismissals (OECD 2004) suggesting that French employers face considerable costs in their management of worker turnover. This section suggests that there are greater bureaucratic and financial costs surrounding the dismissal of permanent contract workers in both countries. However, it also reveals the greater rigidity of French employment law relative to German law, with French employers provided with greater incentives to use temporary contracts. Not only do certain forms of fixed-term employment allow them to avoid the payment of redundancy pay, it also relieves them of the bureaucratic impediments surrounding the dismissal of permanent contract workers and protects them from the possibility of a payout in the instance of a contested dismissal.
3.2 Educational Systems Educational systems which provide durable and easily recognised skills are expected to decrease the scarring effect of temporary contract employment. If temporary contract workers are endowed with the skills to make successful transitions to permanent employment, differences in wage growth and or future labour market outcomes are expected to be minimal between a matched sample of temporary and permanent workers. The German educational system has been described as highly co-ordinated with a strong vocational component. In Germany, vocational training provides a good match between the skills provided by vocational training courses and the skills demanded by employers. As many authors have noted, in this way the German system facilities a smooth transition from education to work, stable occupational careers and low youth unemployment (Müller et al, 1998; Gangl et al, 2003).7 Low youth unemployment should reduce the risks for young temporary contract workers and one would expect that this credentialism – the strong coupling of qualifications and jobs – would also protect
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In Germany there is no legal minimum, though evidence from microdata suggests considerable variation in severance pay. Since January 2004 there is a new severance pay option incorporated in German employment protection legislation (KSchG § 1a). Employers may offer dismissed workers the choice between taking the case to court and receiving severance payments. Severance payments must be at least half a months earnings for each year worked. 7 While this remains true for the period in question, the transition has become less co-ordinated in recent years (Ryan, 2001).
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against the negative consequences of temporary contracts/insecure employment – at least for those with marketable skills.8 In France the transition from school to work is comparatively more difficult, with the educational system accused of failing to provide workers with the skills required by the market (Goux and Maurin 1998). While some have tried to characterise the French educational system as coordinated (Hancke and Soskice 1998) the locus of coordination is found amongst its upper echelons with very strong links found between the Grandes Ecoles and positions of power in both industry and the civil service. The links for lower skilled workers are rather poor by comparison. Compounding this dynamic is the French training system which has been described as dualistic (DiPrete, Goux, Maurin and Tåhlin 2001). Employers, who carry the responsibility of training workers to their firms requirements, are more likely to provide training for skilled workers than lower grades of worker (Goux and Maurin 1998). A final training component which deserves mention concerns the French state’s investment in active labour market programmes which aim to provide both work experience, and in the majority of cases, on-the-job training for workers in pursuit of standard contract employment. These contracts are largely funded through employers’ exception from social security payments which in France can account for up to 38% of a workers wage (Nickell 1997). However, the ability of these programmes to provide workers with a point of entry to the standard employment contract is unclear (INSEE 1998). What is clear, nonetheless, is that temporary workers transition rates to permanent employment are lower relative to other countries, while their transitions to unemployment were found to be the highest (Gash 2005).9 3.3- Industrial Relations Industrial relations systems can determine how wages are set and can determine the relative quality of temporary employment by adopting policies that support temporary workers. Germany and France are almost always placed in different categories in comparisons of industrial relations: the German model is one of collective, consensual bargaining between state, employers’ organisations and trade unions; while in France trade unionism is more confrontational and the state more dominant (Crouch and Streeck 1997).
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A very small number of German employees have no vocational training, and they are very vulnerable to unemployment (Müller et al, 1998). 9 The sample of French contract workers in this paper differs from the sample in Gash (2005). While the Gash (2005) paper also compares the outcomes of temporary workers to permanent workers, this paper focuses on a matched sample of permanent workers with tenure less than two years.
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Wages in Germany are set by collective bargaining agreements between specific industrial unions and regionally-based employers’ associations. Agreements are binding for employers covered by the agreements. In 1995, 84 per cent of German workers were covered by collective bargaining arrangements (Bispinck, 1997). Those workers not covered by these agreements tend to be found in smaller firms. Collective agreements usually do not allow different wage rates for certain contract types. In Germany works councils (Betriebsräte) within the firm often play an important role in decision-making in the firm, particularly regarding hiring and firing, and often see their aim to ‘keep their employers in line’. In France wage setting is conducted at a combination of industry level and company level with a large portion of employees covered by company level agreements (OECD, 2004). The level of coordination, however, is described as fragmented. Nonetheless, the estimated coverage of workers by collective agreements is 90% (OECD 2004). Comité d’enterprise, the French equivalent to the German Betriebsrat, also play an important role within the firm though have been characterised as comparatively weaker in negotiations. This is attributed to a number of factors the most notable being the relative proportions of trade union members in the Comité d’enterprise; 56% relative to 79% in Germany (Gospel and Willman 2004). While French law does not allow different wage rates for different contract types (DAGEMO-BECI 1996) there could be a tendency in France, given the comparative weakness of trade unions, for fixed-term contract workers to experience a higher wage penalty. 3.4 Women’s Employment: Policies and outcomes Crompton (1999) offers a continuum of gendered arrangements for the gender division of labour – from the traditional ‘male-breadwinner/female carer’ arrangement, to current partial modifications, to an idealized ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model. While West Germany is best characterised as a dualearner/female part-time carer society, France is closer to the dual-earner/state carer model (Rosenfeld et al, 2004; Crompton, 1999). These arrangements are encouraged or supported by different policy configurations. Public provision of childcare has recently improved in West Germany, especially for over threes, but much of this care is part-time (Büchel and Spiess, 2001). In France, public policy has done more to encourage the employment of women. The educational system, with its long-hours, essentially provides free day care from the ages of three onwards. This has allowed working women to follow the male model of full-time work (Daune-Richard 1998). In
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both countries maternity leave provision and benefits are relatively generous by European standards (OECD, 2002) but working-time regulation encourages part-time work in West Germany, to a much lesser extent in France. These policy environments shape women’s employment outcomes: in 2000, women’s employment rates were 56% for women in West Germany, 42% of which was part-time (Rosenfeld et al, 2004). For the same year in France, women’s employment rates were similar at 54%, while a much smaller proportion of women worked part-time: 25% (OECD; 2002). Women’s employment is also more continuous in France, a finding maintained for various different measures of job continuity (Dex, Walters and Alden 1993), while interrupted careers and part-time work is more prevalent in West Germany (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1997). It should, nonetheless, be noted that while French women benefited from the employment system in the recent past, attempts to flexibilise the market have hit female employment disproportionately (Maurani 2000). We also note French women’s disproportionate exposure to unemployment, relative to West German women (see section 3.5 below). Overall, the rate and nature of women’s employment in West Germany is much more sensitive to the presence of children than in France; in France, there is more variation in women’s employment rates and occupational concentration by educational level (OECD, 2002). The gender wage gap is much higher in West Germany than in France, both for all employees and all full-time employees (OECD, 2002 for France; Rosenfeld et al, 2004 for West Germany). We might expect then that because women’s employment is of better quality in France, the disadvantage suffered by female temporary contract workers is greater than is the case in Germany. 3.5 Macro-economic conditions: unemployment. Finally, overall labour market conditions may affect the subsequent transitions of temporary contract workers. From the mid to late 1990’s the French unemployment rate was 12%, while in West Germany it was approximately half that. Female unemployment rates also differ, with the French rate 2.5% higher than the male unemployment rate over the 1990’s while in West Germany the female unemployment rate was typically 0.5% higher (McGinnity, 2004). Finally, there are very strong differences between the youth unemployment rates. In France the male youth unemployment rate is double the German youth unemployment rate, though the difference between young French and German women is even more extreme, with young French women three times more likely to be unemployed than young German women (See table A.1 in the appendix). We can therefore expect 10
our French temporary contract worker sample to be more at risk of future unemployment relative to our German sample, with French female temporary contract workers the most exposed to future unemployment.
3.6 Institution Specific Hypotheses The review of the institutional differences, between Germany and France, would lead us to expect a higher proportion of ‘good’, or non-scarring temporary contract employment in Germany. We base this hypothesis on the following institutional differences established between both countries. 1- French employment law is more rigid than German law, with French temporary contract workers likely to be used as one of the few sources of numerical flexibility in the French market. 2-The German education system which has been comparatively more successful at skilling workers to the demands of the market, whereas France has not (Goux and Maurin 1998). This is likely to render the transition to permanent employment more difficult. 3 -The coordinated nature of German industrial relations with temporary workers’ rights likely to benefit from trade union presence within the firm. 4-The lower rates of unemployment in Germany relative to France, especially for younger workers who are those most likely to be employed on temporary contracts (McGinnity, Mertens, Gundert 2005; Gash 2004). 5-We expect that as German women in general are in a more disadvantaged position in the labour market, the additional impact of temporary contracts may be less negative for them than for French women.
4. Data and Methodology. This study is based on analyses of the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP). The ECHP is a high-quality standardised comparative cross-national survey conducted in the Member States of the European Union under the auspices of the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT). The samples were drawn by each member state as simple random samples, with information collected from respondents in face-to-face interviews in each panel year (1994-2001). The data set contains information both at the individual and household levels relating
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to human capital acquisition, occupation and industrial location as well as variables relating to individual well-being.10 Two particular strengths of the data for the analysis of temporary contracts are firstly, consistent measurement of relevant information across countries and secondly, the panel element of the data, which allows us to follow individuals over time and track their labour market performance. This paper seeks to establish whether the labour market outcomes of temporary contract workers are a function of contract status. The methodology applied, propensity score matching, was chosen to identify a control group for our sample of temporary contract workers. The generation of a matched control group allows us establish whether workers with similar characteristics and labour market experience who were not temporary workers have the same labour market outcomes. Propensity Score matching allows us, therefore, to approximate a natural experiment. As has been described in greater detail elsewhere (Conniffe, Gash and O’Connell 2000) one of the advantages of matching methods is that they are not overly reliant on instrumental variables which make strong and unverifiable assumptions about the source of bias between two sub-samples. Matching procedures, rather, seek to explicitly identify and correct biases between samples. The analysis proceeds as follows. We estimate a logistic regression of the conditional probability of being a temporary contract worker relative to being a permanent worker for those with a tenure of less than 24 months for the third wave of the panel, 1997. We limit our sample to those with tenure of two years or less to exclude permanent workers with considerable tenure whom we believe will be too dissimilar from our temporary worker sample to provide a credible comparison. We also limit our sample to those with tenure of two years or less so we can use information on previous job and labour market history in our estimation of the propensity score without introducing endogeneity to the estimation. Information on previous job and labour market history is obtained from the first wave of the panel where contract status is available, 1995. Once the models have been estimated we analyse differences between our temporary worker sample in the current year and in subsequent years. The panel component of the data is crucial to the analysis, with information on the same individual analysed over a seven year period: we use information on past work history in the matching, and future employment and wages in our analysis of outcomes.
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The data for West Germany uses the German socio-economic panel, GSOEP, while the French data is a new sample.
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The final country-specific propensity score models were chosen on the basis of model fit and the significance of the coefficients. The variables used in the model estimation are the following: The age of the respondent and its square, gender, cohabitational status as well as the highest level of education obtained. Previous labour market status was included as a categorical variable, with previously a permanent worker the reference category. Previous earnings were also included in the model, with previous wages coded as zero if the worker had been in unemployment or labour market inactivity. We also chose models that ‘balanced’, that is models which provided a propensity score that successfully removed the statistical difference in the covariates between the control and the treatment group after matching. The models were also run under the ‘condition of common support’. The condition of common support excludes respondents whose conditional probability of being in the treatment group has no match. The final models from which the conditional probability of being a temporary worker was estimated are presented in tables 1.1 and 1.2 and are briefly discussed in section 5.11
The degree to which the propensity score models presented were
successful at balancing differences between the covariates of the treatment and control groups is revealed in tables 2.1 and 2.2. The matching method applied is nearest neighbour matching, though all tables were also run using stratified matching to check the impact of one type of matching estimator relative to another. The stratified matching analysis can be found in the appendix. Finally, and most crucially, the tables of the average treatment effect, that is the impact of temporary contract status relative to those with the same characteristics but who were not employed on a temporary contract, are presented in a series of tables: Tables 3.1a-3.4b. The outcome variables analysed are current logged gross hourly wages, and wage growth two and four years after matching. The next series of tables present the labour market status of contract workers in time t+2 and t+4 after matching. We look at differences in unemployment risk, and also look at differences in exposure to future temporary contract status. 12 All tables are presented for each national sample by gender.
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The analysis were run on Stata 8.2 using both the psmatch and the pscore software. The psmatch software was written by Edwin Leuven and Barbara Sianesi; while the pscore software was written by Sascha Becker and Andrea Ichino. 12 The analyses exclude those for whom we have no observations in years; 1, 3, 5 and 7. With year 1 used to gather retrospective information on labour market status, year 3 used to estimate the propensity of being a fixed-term contract worker and years 5 and 7 used to establish the long-term implications of fixed-term contract status. Need a brief note here about the consequences of selection.
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5. Matching Tables A1.1 and A1.2 in the appendix present the distribution of our temporary worker and permanent worker sample by gender, country and tenure. The tables present statistics for the temporary and permanent worker samples as a whole and for the temporary worker sample once we exclude those whose tenure is greater than two years. This results in the exclusion of approximately 20% of the temporary worker sample for both countries. A cursory analysis of the tables reveals the following differences. 1- In both countries, temporary contract workers are considerably younger than their permanent counterparts, though this tendency is most marked in France. 2- The French temporary worker sample has lower levels of education than the permanent sample, whilst the opposite is the case for Germany. The occupational grade of temporary contract workers is also lower in France than is true of Germany. 3- Finally, German workers previous exposure to unemployment is much higher than is true of the French sample. The propensity score models controlled for the demographic and household characteristics of workers in 1997 as well as their employment and labour market characteristics in 1995, and are presented in table 1.1. In both countries previous temporary contract status and educational level are strong predictors of current fixed-term employment. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 reveal the impact of matching on the propensity score as well as the distribution of characteristics between our temporary and permanent worker sample. For both our samples we find that the match has decreased the bias between our samples. For instance 58% of permanent workers in 1997 had held a permanent job in1995 in our unmatched German sample, a rate which is reduced to 24% after matching. A notable example for France is found in the reduction in bias by educational group, with permanent workers three times as likely to have third level education prior matching. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 also present variables which were not included in the estimation of the propensity score, this reveals whether we achieve a successful match on variables which could not be included in the model.
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Finally, we note that the most important variable, the propensity score, is no longer
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In our estimation of the propensity score models it was not possible, due to multicollinearity, to include occupational grade in the estimation. However we find that matching also reduced differences in occupational grade between the treatment and control groups in both countries.
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significantly different after matching, representing a decrease in bias of the order of 99% in both countries. To conclude this section, we suggest that remaining differences in outcome between our matched sample should be considered a function of temporary contract employment.
6.1 Results of Matched Comparison, Wages and Wage Growth. Do employers give fixed-term contract workers a lower wage because they are employed on a fixedterm contract, or are they offered a premium to compensate for the increased insecurity they face? What are the long-term consequences of fixed-term contract employment for earnings? Will employers in one institutional setting be prevented from paying a temporary worker less than a permanent worker? These questions are answered in the following section where we observe the effect on temporary employment on current earnings and on future wage growth. Table 3.1a presents the average treatment effects for the treated (ATT), i.e. the average effect of temporary contract employment for those who have experienced temporary contract employment, for West German men and women. Table 3.1a presents the current wages and wage growth of temporary contract workers with wage growth observed at two different points in time, +2 and +4 years. The number of workers whose wages are observed at each point in time, fluctuates somewhat as not all workers are earning a wage when we observe them at time+2 and time+4. We find that even after matching German male temporary contract workers suffer a wage penalty. This finding is consistent with previous findings for German male temporary contract workers (Mertens and McGinnity 2004). The impact of matching on the wage growth reveals an interesting and unexpected finding. Contrary to previous work on West German male temporary workers’ wage growth (Mertens and McGinnity 2004; Mertens, Gash and McGinnity 2005) we find no evidence of higher wage growth amongst male temporary contract workers. We attribute the lack of significance to two factors. One, the success of the match and two, the slightly different sample, with the aforementioned papers conducting analyses for all contract workers over the mid to late 1990s. Turning our attention to German women, we find no evidence of a female temporary worker wage penalty. Similar findings have been established for female temporary contract workers in the UK (Booth et al 2002) and West Germany (Giesecke and Gross 2004). We do, however, find evidence of
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a wage growth premium for German women at time +2 relative to permanent workers with similar observables. We find no evidence of differential wage growth at time t+4, however. Table 3.2a presents the average differences in the current wages and future wage growth of temporary contract workers relative to permanent contract workers in France. In France we find matching has removed the temporary worker wage penalty associated with male employment (Blanchard and Landier 2002; Gash 2004). The finding for male temporary workers is in line with previous analyses which found that models which removed unobserved heterogeneity removed the penalty associated with male temporary contract employment (Gash 2004). Turning our attention to the wage growth of temporary contract workers, we find no difference in the wage growth of contract workers at time+2 for our male sample. We do, however, find evidence of a slight wage growth penalty at time+4. The significance of this effect, however, is not robust to alternative matching methods, with this result insignificant for our stratified match (appendix table 3.2b). For women workers, temporary contract employment does not determine lower wages nor does it impact on the wages workers receive in the future.
6.2 Results of Matched Comparison, Labour Market Outcomes As we have argued in sections 2 and 3 the risks associated with temporary contract employment are likely to be found in both the quality of the employment encountered as well as the implications of the short-term nature of their jobs for their future job stability. We ask whether workers have considerably higher risks of experiencing unemployment in the future after a temporary contract and also if workers are at risk of experiencing multiple temporary jobs. Tables 3.3a and 3.4a present unemployment exposure as well as the repeated temporary contract risk for workers two and four years after matching. Unemployment exposure is a continuous variable measuring the number of months in the past year the individual had spent in unemployment. Starting with table 3.3a, we look at whether German male temporary contract workers remain more exposed to unemployment and more exposed to repeat spells of temporary contract employment relative to a permanent contract worker with similar tenure and similar characteristics. We find that male temporary contract workers are more exposed to unemployment in time+2 relative to male permanent workers a finding robust to a different matching specification, as can be seen in the stratified match in the appendix (see table 3.3b in the appendix). Four years after the match,
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however, the difference between both groups is no longer significant. Table 3.3a also presents statistics of future risk of temporary contract employment. While the cell sizes for this analysis are quite small, so must be interpreted with caution, they provide an interesting insight into a possible cycle of temporary contract employment. It should also be noted that the analyses are only run for those who are in a new job at time t+x to avoid tautological inference. We find that male temporary workers are significantly more likely to be re-employed as temporary contract workers at time t+2 though this risk is no longer significant at time t+4. Meanwhile, female temporary workers are found to be more similar to female permanent workers, with the risk of extensive unemployment experience in time+2 and again in time+4 similar for both groups. We again find little effect of temporary contract employment on the female sample in our analysis of future temporary employment risk. We now go on to examine differences between our matched samples of French temporary and permanent workers (Table 3.4a). Starting with our male sample we again find a notable difference in temporary workers exposure to unemployment relative to the matched permanent worker sample, though the finding is not robust to our alternate matching specification (appendix table 3.4b). When we measure the unemployment exposure of temporary workers at time t+4 we establish a tendency for male temporary contract workers to be less likely to be exposed to unemployment. This finding is counter-intuitive though it is replicated in the stratified match (appendix table 3.4b). Turning our attention to the risk of repeat spells of temporary contract employment, we find that matching appears to have removed this tendency for our male sample. So, broadly, our French sample of male temporary contract workers, do not appear to suffer considerable disadvantage in their labour market outcomes relative to permanent workers with similar characteristics. For women, however, temporary employment appears to have a more pronounced scarring effect. We find that women on fixed-term contracts are considerably more likely to amass unemployed experience at both points in time; time+2 and time+4 with their matched reference category. They are also considerably more likely to re-entering a temporary contract at both time periods, and while the significance of the result for time+4 is at the .10 level; the findings are robust to the stratified match.
17
7. Discussion The aim of this paper was to match a group of temporary workers with a group of permanent workers in France and Germany, compare their wages and track their subsequent labour market performance. We did not compare them to a group of unemployed workers with similar characteristics, as our aim was not to assess the integration potential of temporary contracts, but rather its potential negative consequences. We also chose to restrict the analysis to a matched subsample of workers with tenure of less than two years to ensure that we really were comparing like with like. The overall question in this paper was: all things equal, are temporary contracts the new European inequality? While temporary contracts do not offer the employment security of most permanent contracts, the evidence in this paper suggests that temporary contracts are not a crucial new inequality in France and Germany – at least not if you compare workers with similar characteristics but with different contract types. In general, we find little evidence of the kind of systematic and consistent damage to wages and employment stability which the proposition of ‘a new inequality’ would lead us to expect. Are there cross-national differences in the extent this is the case? As the impact of temporary contracts is relatively small, so too are the overall cross-national differences in this impact. We found temporary workers to earn 9% less than matched permanent workers in Germany, whilst in France the wage penalty was similar, -10%, though this was only significant for the stratified match. We did, however, find strong between-country differences in the future unemployment risk of temporary contract workers, with greater proportions of the entire French sample in unemployment two years after matching, 13%, relative to 6% of the West German sample. We expected, both from our comparison of labour market institutions and from previous research, that the negative impact of temporary contracts would be greater in France. However, once we disaggregate the analysis by gender, we found our hypothesis borne out for women but not for men. Women in France are more clearly disadvantaged by temporary contracts than either men in France or indeed women in Germany, both in terms of their future risk of unemployment and their risk of getting another temporary job. Indeed, the main finding of this paper is the extent to which temporary contract employment is of considerable disadvantage for French women. This is important, as it identifies the different impact that temporary contracts has on the market outcomes of different forms of female market engagement. Previous research on female
18
employment in the United-Kingdom and in West-Germany (Booth et al 2002; Giesecke and Gross 2003) did not find evidence of temporary worker disadvantage, findings attributed to women’s preferences for reduced market attachment. Our findings, however, suggest that in countries where female employment tends to be full-time and continuous, women will experience disadvantage on the introduction of temporary contracts. The impact of temporary contract employment was not as damaging for our matched male sample, however. So while men in both countries shared higher rates of unemployment experience two years after matching, this disadvantage disappears four years later. We also found a slight tendency for greater male disadvantage in West Germany relative to France. In West Germany men were found to be at greater risk of repeat spells of temporary contract employment than the French male sample and were also found to suffer a wage penalty where French men did not. One avenue for future research is to ask how the findings vary in countries with different institutional settings. Evidence suggests that fixed-term contracts in Spain are concentrated among low-skilled labour market entrants and lead to labour market instability (Iannelli and Soro-Bonmati, 2003). If we matched temporary and permanent workers in countries with more employment protection for permanent workers, like Italy and Spain, would our findings be maintained? Is the disadvantage suffered by French female temporary workers particular to France, or does it apply to other countries with high full-time participation of women like Denmark? Our focus has been on gender differences in the consequences of temporary contracts. Another possible research direction would be to investigate the consequences of temporary employment for low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Previous evidence from Germany suggests that low-skilled, low-earning temporary workers suffer a higher wage penalty than high-earning temporary workers (Mertens and McGinnity, 2005). Is it the low-skilled who have most to lose from temporary employment? Is it this group that is trading off higher (relative) wages for job security? Given the predicted consequences of temporary employment for employment and income security, the impact we found after matching was very modest indeed. These jobs may be at the lower end of the labour market but our results suggest that these individuals would not have been much better off had they had permanent jobs – in either France or West Germany.
19
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
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OECD (2002). Employment Outlook. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD (2004). Employment Outlook. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Rosenfeld, R. A., Trappe, H., & Gornick, J. C. (2004). Gender and Work in Germany: Before and After Reunification. Annual Review of Sociology, 30, pp. 103-124. Rubery, J., Smith, M., Fagan, C., & Grimshaw, D. (1998). Women and European. London/New York: Routledge. Ryan, P. (2001) The School-to-Work Transition: A Cross-National Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 39, pp. 34-92. Schömann, K., Rogowski, R., & Kruppe, T. (1998). Labour Market Efficiency in the European Union : Employment Protection and Fixed-term Contracts. London: Routledge. Wang, R., & Weiss, A. (1998). Probation, Layoff and Wage Tenure Profiles: A Sorting Explanation. Labour Economics, 5, pp.359-383. Zijl, M., van den Berg, G., & Heyma, A. (2004). Stepping-Stones for the Unemployed: The Effect of Temporary Jobs on the Duration until Regular Work. SEO - Discussion Paper, 30.
23
TABLES Table 1.1. West German and French Propensity Score Model. Conditional Probability of being a Temporary Contract worker in 1997 for those with tenure of 24 months or less. WEST GERMANY FRANCE CT3 Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Cohabiting Cohabiting*Sex AGE Age Sq Sex Upper Secondary Education Lower Secondary Education Unemployed Before Current Job Labour Market Status 2 years prior Temporary Worker Unemployed Training/Education Non-active Previous Wage _cons
-0.082
0.568 0.819 0.895 0.693 0.343 0.048 0.000
-0.164 -0.489 0.014 0.000 0.356 0.530 0.847 -0.362
0.432 0.118 0.857 0.780 0.163 0.007 0.000 0.082
0.019 0.000 0.052 -0.186 -0.482 0.543 0.724 -0.645 -0.246 -1.077 -0.437 -0.461
0.001 0.320 0.693 0.096 0.033 0.760
0.833 -0.296 0.170 -1.097 -0.385 0.021
0.000 0.758 0.872 0.254 0.119 0.990
Model Summary Log Likelihood Constant only Log Likelihood with X var Pseudo R2 Observations
-301.380 -259.660
-268.430 -214.850
0.138 692
0.200 421
24
2- IMPACT OF MATCHING ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN TREATMENT AND CONTROL. 2.1- West GERMANY –.
Treated
Control
%bias
Reduction in bias
t
p>|t|
Unmatched Matched
0.26 0.26
0.14 0.26
91.50 0.80
99.10
9.19 0.05
0.07 0.97
Unmatched Matched
30.98 30.98
32.38 30.23
-18.70 10.10
46.20
-1.81 0.68
0.32 0.62
Unmatched Matched
0.45 0.45
0.20 0.35
54.90 24.00
56.30
5.72 1.53
0.11 0.37
Unmatched Matched
0.26 0.26
0.18 0.29
19.10 -6.60
65.60
1.92 -0.42
0.31 0.75
Unmatched Matched
0.58 0.58
0.59 0.62
-2.40 -7.40
-202.10
-0.24 -0.51
0.85 0.70
Unmatched Matched
0.12 0.12
0.21 0.06
-24.10 14.90
38.20
-2.16 1.30
0.28 0.42
Variables NOT used in the Propensity Score Estimation Higher Unmatched 0.24 0.12 Professional Matched 0.24 0.17
31.40 19.60
37.40
3.22 1.24
0.19 0.43 0.45 0.54 0.16 0.32
Variable
Sample
_pscore
age3
Pun3
ed1T
ed2t
ed3T
Manual Labourer
Tenure
Unmatched Matched
0.10 0.10
0.07 0.06
11.90 12.90
-8.80
1.17 0.87
Unmatched Matched
8.87 8.87
11.73 10.73
-44.50 -28.90
35.00
-3.89 -1.83
25
2.2- FRANCE Reduction in bias
t
p>|t|
116.30 1.60
98.60
11.60 0.11
0.06 0.93
36.44 32.95
-27.20 13.00
52.30
-2.66 0.98
0.23 0.51
0.17 0.17
0.13 0.21
11.70 -9.90
14.80
1.15 -0.66
0.46 0.63
Unmatched Matched
0.14 0.14
0.32 0.11
-43.50 8.60
80.30
-4.02 0.79
0.16 0.58
Unmatched Matched
0.35 0.35
0.41 0.31
-10.80 8.80
19.00
-1.04 0.66
0.49 0.63
Unmatched Matched
0.48 0.48
0.26 0.58
47.00 -21.10
55.20
4.65 -1.46
0.14 0.38
Variables NOT used in the Propensity Score Estimation Higher Professional Unmatched 0.06 0.13 Matched 0.06 0.02
-22.50 14.50
35.50
-2.06 1.54
0.29 0.37 0.24 0.52 0.12 0.13
Variable
Sample
_pscore
age3
Pun3
ed1T
ed2t
ed3T
Manual Labourer
Tenure
Treated
Control
%bias
Unmatched Matched
0.49 0.49
0.26 0.49
Unmatched Matched
34.08 34.08
Unmatched Matched
Unmatched Matched
0.18 0.18
0.09 0.23
24.80 -15.20
38.80
2.49 -0.93
Unmatched Matched
8.53 8.53
12.61 13.21
-60.30 -69.20
-14.70
-5.13 -4.72
26
AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS, Nearest Neighbour Matching
1.WAGES and WAGE GROWTH Table 3.1a. Average Treatment Effects for WEST- GERMANY, those with full information on labour force status two and four years after matching. Matching Method: Nearest Neighbour Matching. WEST- GERMANY Logged Hourly Wage - Men Wage Growth+2 – Men Wage Growth+4 – Men Logged Hourly Wage -Women Wage Growth+2 – Women Wage Growth+4 – Women
N-Treat 59 45 47
N-Control 49 42 41
Att -0.135 0.037 0.013
Std.Err 0.08 0.085 0.072
T -1.696 0.442 0.183
49 38 30
47 36 28
0.028 0.347 0.101
0.109 0.107 0.126
0.256 3.248 0.802
Table 3.2a. Average Treatment Effects for FRANCE, those with full information on labour force status two and four years after matching. Matching Method: Nearest Neighbour Matching. FRANCE Logged Hourly Wage - Men Wage Growth+2 – Men Wage Growth+4 – Men
N-Treat 53 31 41
N-Control 24 14 17
Att -0.084 0.067 -0.197
Std.Err 0.130 0.144 0.092
T -0.648 0.464 -2.134
Logged Hourly Wage Women Wage Growth+2 – Women Wage Growth+4 – Women
80 33 44
53 27 33
-0.104 0.078 0.081
0.102 0.169 0.137
-1.016 0.460 0.596
27
2. Labour Market Outcome Table 3.3a. Average Treatment Effects of INSECURE CONTRACT RISK, WEST- GERMANY, Matching Method: Nearest Neighbour Matching. N-Treat N-Control Att Std.Err T WEST- GERMANY UNEMPEXP +2 Men 60 49 0.612 0.423 1.664 UNEMPEXP +4 Men 60 49 -0.025 0.461 -0.054 ‡TEMP RISK+2 Men 25 15 0.320 0.152 2.050 TEMP RISK+4 Men 31 29 0.032 0.089 0.363 UNEMPEXP +2 Women 50 48 0.082 0.395 0.207 UNEMPEXP +4 Women 50 48 0.460 0.403 1.143 TEMP RISK+2 Women 13 7 0.150 0.206 0.748 TEMP RISK+4 Women 12 10 0.083 0.203 0.411 ‡, The analyses of Temp Risk are only run for those who were no longer in the same job +2 and +4 years later. This was identified by different job start dates at each point in time.
Table 3.4a. Average Treatment Effects of INSECURE CONTRACT RISK, FRANCE, those with different job start dates between 1995 and +2 and +4 years later, Matching Method: Nearest Neighbour Matching. N-Treat N-Control Att Std.Err T FRANCE UNEMPEXP +2 Men 60 25 0.950 0.475 1.998 UNEMPEXP +4 Men 60 25 -2.117 1.023 -2.069 ‡TEMP RISK+2 Men 19 9 0.105 0.265 0.397 TEMP RISK+4 Men 31 12 0.032 0.140 0.230 UNEMPEXP +2 Women 81 54 1.469 0.415 3.536 UNEMPEXP +4 Women 81 54 1.778 0.542 3.280 TEMP RISK+2 Women 19 9 0.368 0.203 1.819 TEMP RISK+4 Women 30 16 0.233 0.151 1.545 ‡, The analyses of Temp Risk are only run for those who were no longer in the same job +2 and +4 years later. This was identified by different job start dates at each point in time.
28
Appendix Table A1.1 Analysis of Covariates for Temporary Worker and Permanent Worker Sample by Gender and tenure – WEST GERMANY
Men
Women
TEMPORARY WORKERS with Tenure Less then two years* Men Women
PERMANENT WORKERS with Tenure Less then two years* Men Women
Temporary All
Permanent All
Temporar y All
Permanent All
Age less 25 25-29 30-39 40-54 55+
20.0 21.8 36.2 16.2 5.6
5.15 13.75 35.05 33.76 12.28
18.2 23.14 30.58 21.49 6.61
7.48 16.2 30.9 36.13 9.29
23.3 28.3 40.0 15.8
24.0 24.0 38.0 14.0
15.8 29.7 38.5 15.8
14.0 21.6 39.7 24.5
Mean age
33.2
39.7
34.3
38.7
31.1
30.8
31.3
33.5
University Educated Upper Secondary Lower Secondary
16.7
20.9
19.13
20.9
33.3
16.0
16.8
8.3
52.9
56.5
54.78
56.5
65.0
54.0
59.8
54.5
30.3
22.54
26.1
22.54
21.6
30.0
23.3
33.2
Higher professional Lower professional Cleric Skilled manual Unskilled manual
24.2
18.2
17.6
18.17
26.0
22.0
15.4
8.3
9.56
15.86
27.7
15.86
12.0
30.0
17.7
31.4
7.35 47.06
12.15 47.47
33.6 11.7
12.15 47.47
4.0 46.0
28.0 12.0
14.8 47.7
41.1 9.7
11.76
6.35
9.24
6.35
12.0
8.0
4.3
9.4
Public Sector
35.4
20.04
49.6
20.04
40.0
44.0
14.2
25.0
Prev. Unemployed
39.4
15.64
29.7
15.64
51.6
38.0
20.1
20.9
Mean LN Wage
2.99
3.31
2.829
3.039
2.96
2.75
3.19
2.88
* Actual sample used, excluding cases with missing values for the years of the panel pertinent to our analysis. Those aged less than 54 years are also excluded as there were virtually no older workers on permanent contract with less than two years tenure.
29
Table A1.2 Analysis of Covariates for Temporary Worker and Permanent Worker Sample by Gender and tenure – FRANCE Men
Women
TEMPORARY WORKERS with Tenure Less than two years* Men Women 25.0 9.8 23.5 18.5 30.0 33.3 21.0 38.3
PERMANENT WORKERS with Tenure Less than two years* Men Women 3.3 6.3 24.6 18.9 41.6 36.0 30.3 38.6
Temporary 36.2 25.3 21.3 15.7 2.0
Permanent 3.5 14.25 29.8 45.9 6.4
Temporary 26.1 20.2 26.47 25.0 2.21
Permanent 5.15 12.9 30.6 45.25 6.10
Mean Age
29.8
40.0
32.9
39.7
31.2
36.2
35.7
36.9
University Educated Upper Secondary Lower Secondary
21.0
25.9
23.12
32.9
15.0
13.5
33.6
31.6
44.3
45.8
39.2
40.3
41.6
43.2
43.4
43.6
34.7
28.2
37.7
26.7
43.3
43.2
22.9
24.7
Higher professional Lower professional Cleric Skilled manual Unskilled manual
11.1
17.9
11.6
11.96
5.08
7.5
17.8
9.6
11.1
20.6
14.9
24.2
11.8
3.75
30.5
16.6
11.1 53.11
14.0 41.7
44.9 14.2
47.2 6.84
10.2 57.6
53.7 15.0
14.4 32.2
52.5 8.3
13.38
5.7
14.2
9.27
15.2
20.0
5.1
12.8
Public Sector
30.38
28.6
44.5
41.7
21.6
41.98
21.3
27.2
Prev. Unemployed
17.06
16.7
19.5
19.3
18.3
16.0
11.5
13.9
3.86
4.26
3.75
4.139
3.83
3.69
4.14
3.93
Age less 25 25-29 30-39 40-54 55+
Mean LnWage
* Actual sample used, excluding cases with missing values for the years of the panel pertinent to our analysis. Those aged less than 54 years are also excluded as there were virtually no older workers on permanent contract with less than two years tenure.
30
APPENDIX b- OUTCOMES TABELS using STRATIFIED MATCH Wages and Wage Growth Table 3.1b Average Treatment Effects for WEST- GERMANY, those with full information on labour force status two and four years after matching. Matching Method: Stratified Matching. N-Treat N-Control Att Std.Err T Logged Hourly Wage Men 59 263 -0.124 0.072 -1.732 Wage Growth+2 – Men 45 240 -0.021 0.066 -0.321 Wage Growth+4 – Men 47 234 -0.056 0.072 -0.785 Logged Hourly Wage Women Wage Growth+2 – Women Wage Growth+4 – Women
47
246
-0.048
0.080
-0.601
37
199
0.143
0.077
1.851
29
145
0.157
0.118
1.325
Table 3.3b. Average Treatment Effects for FRANCE, those with full information on labour force status two and four years after matching. Matching Method: STRATEFIED
Logged Hourly Wage Men Wage Growth+2 – Men Wage Growth+4 – Men Logged Hourly Wage Women Wage Growth+2 – Women Wage Growth+4 – Women
NTreat 53
N-Control
Att
Std.Err
T
115
-0.056
0.067
-0.829
31 33
76 47
0.123 -0.144
0.111 0.113
1.104 -1.267
80
135
-0.085
0.098
-0.871
38
88
0.099
0.148
0.671
44
98
0.086
0.119
0.722
31
Labour Market Outcome Table 3.2b. Average Treatment Effects of INSECURE CONTRACT RISK, WEST- GERMANY, those with different job start dates between 1995 and +2 and +4 years later, Matching Method: STRATIFIED MATCHING. N-Treat N-Control Att Std.Err T UNEMPEXP +2 Men 60 263 0.770 0.392 1.963 UNEMPEXP +4 Men 60 263 -0.062 0.035 -0.216 UNEMPEXP +2 Women UNEMPEXP +4 Women
48 48
248 248
0.182 0.353
0.216 0.399
0.841 0.886
TEMP RISK+2 Men TEMP RISK+4 Men
25 31
44 74
0.284 0.073
0.117 0.068
2.429 1.068
TEMP RISK+2 Women 12 42 0.134 0.173 0.776 TEMP RISK+4 Women 10 47 0.121 0.143 0.847 ‡, The analyses of Temp Risk are only run for those who were no longer in the same job +2 and +4 years later. This was identified by different job start dates at each point in time.
Table 3.4.b. Average Treatment Effects of INSECURE CONTRACT RISK, FRANCE, those with different job start dates between 1995 and +2 and +4 years later, Matching Method: STRATEFIED MATCHING. N-Treat 60 60
N-Control 120 120
Att -0.609 -2.066
Std.Err 0.607 1.183
T 1.003 -1.746
UNEMPEXP +2 Women UNEMPEXP +4 Women
81 81
141 141
1.149 1.884
0.481 0.514
2.388 3.668
‡TEMP RISK+2 Men TEMP RISK+4 Men
19 28
15 25
0.041 -0.004
0.211 0.179
0.194 -0.025
UNEMPEXP +2 Men UNEMPEXP +4 Men
TEMP RISK+2 Women 19 16 0.386 0.204 1.892 TEMP RISK+4 Women 30 28 .301 0.141 2.138 ‡, The analyses of Temp Risk are only run for those who were no longer in the same job +2 and +4 years later. This was identified by different job start dates at each point in time.
32
