5th MIMA Conference on the Straits of Malacca: Present and Future Perspectives Prince Hotel, Kuala Lumpur
PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY COMPANIES IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA: ARE THEY HERE TO STAY ?
Capt. Noor Apandi Osnin Research Fellow, Centre for Ocean Law and Policy Maritime Institute of Malaysia Unit B-06-10, Megan Avenue II, 12 Jalan Yap Kwan Seng 50450 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia. Tel: + 603-21612960 Fax: + 603-21614045
[email protected] July 2006 1
PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY COMPANIES (PMSC) IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA: ARE THEY HERE TO STAY ? Capt. Noor Apandi Osnin Research Fellow, Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA)
ABSTRACT
As a waterway used for international navigation transporting substantial amounts of the world’s cargo, the Strait of Malacca is of concern to numerous maritime players. Recently, maritime security issues in the Strait have been in the limelight. Statistics highlighting the risk of piracy faced by shipping in the Strait of Malacca and the possibility of a terrorist attack have led to an enhanced awareness of the need for heightened security. The declaration by Lloyd’s Joint War Committee (JWC) of the Strait as a “war risk area” has strengthened the perception that the littoral states have not done enough to make the Strait secure for international trade. Taking advantage of this situation, private maritime security companies (PMSC) have begun offering security services for merchant ships transiting the Strait. But their presence in the Strait raises many legal and political issues for the littoral states such as its impact on sovereignty. This paper examines options and implications for the Malaysian government in managing this situation. Finally, attempt to answer the question posed in the title “are they here to stay ?”
Keywords: Strait of Malacca, private maritime security companies, sovereignty, merchant ship security.
2
1. INTRODUCTION
Recently security issues have been in the limelight with a particular focus on maritime issues and the Strait of Malacca. The risk faced by shipping in the Strait of Malacca and the possibility of a terrorist attack has led to an enhanced awareness of the need for heightened security. This is all the more so in the Strait of Malacca where official statistics provided by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) identifies it as having one of the highest
reported
incidence
of
piratical
attacks
globally 1 .
This
has
strengthened the perception that the littoral states have not done enough to make the Strait secure for international trade. As an internationally recognised strategic sea lane 2 , its users are concerned with the preservation of its safety and security.
Responding to this situation, private maritime security companies (PMSC) have begun offering security services for merchant ships transiting the Strait. However, their presence in the Strait raises many legal and political issues for the littoral states such as its impact on sovereignty and the legality of such operations in territorial waters.
2. SECURITY ON A MERCHANT SHIP
A merchant ship is mainly concerned only with safely conveying its cargo and nothing else. Its main nemesis is the weather and other natural forces that 3
influence the environment in which it operates. To a lesser extent, pirates have been considered as pests that must be avoided. Ships are designed based on this premise. In other words, the concern of the naval architect has been the structure of the ship itself. Can it withstand the impact of nature ? Can it load and unload its cargo efficiently ? Is it sufficiently watertight for its intended use ? Is its fuel consumption economically optimised ?
This contrasts with the design of a naval vessel which has security as the utmost consideration. Survivability, weaponry and speed take precedence over cargo manipulation and fuel economy. Comparatively, a merchant ship is a ‘sitting duck’. It moves through the water at an average speed of 11 to 15 knots, has no in built defence mechanisms and is manned at the minimum possible level. It thus presents an opportunity for those bold enough to steal its valuables.
Security is not a prime feature of modern merchant ships. Safety is the highest priority. The IMO, in its circular providing guidance on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships 3 , recommends among others that a high level of security surveillance is necessary for early detection of security breaches which it deemed the most effective deterrent. Ships operating in high risk areas are advised to travel blacked out and to establish secure areas. Water hoses should be used to deter and repulse attackers. Distress flares, the closest thing to a gun on board a merchant ship, should not be used for this purpose and is only to be used if the ship is 4
in imminent danger of sinking. It is also mentioned that where there is a conflict between safety and security, safety requirements should be paramount. The circular further states that the carriage and use of firearms is strongly discouraged.
This is illustrated further by the legal framework that regulates merchant shipping. It emphasises safety, pollution control and operational procedures. It is only since the tragic attack and destruction of the World Trade Centre, New York on 11 September 2001, that security concerns for merchant ships have arisen 4 . Although security on merchant ships is more passive than on naval ships, there has been an increasing emphasis on this factor after the 9/11 incident. So serious was this event that the IMO modified its motto from “safer shipping and cleaner oceans” to “safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans”. The IMO now gives priority to safety and security over operations and pollution issues.
3. RESPONSE OF MERCHANT SHIPS TO SECURITY THREATS
The IMO facilitates agreement on regulatory frameworks, conventions, guidelines and recommendations. In the security arena, IMO has been monitoring acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Between 1984 and 2005, it has recorded 3,787 reports of piracy and armed robbery against ships, some of which include loss of ships and loss of life. The main concern is that the degree of violence in piracy incidents seems to have escalated 5 . 5
Various initiatives have been taken to ensure security on merchant ships including emulating the work of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop detailed and practical technical measures for security standards and recommended practices.
However, the general response to security threats on ships remains passive. Merchant ships are now furnished with security plans and checklists and are under greater scrutiny than ever. However, there has been no move to arm or physically train merchant seamen to respond to security threats. This is in line with IMO’s philosophy that places primary importance on the safety and welfare of merchant seafarers 6 . It considers the use of arms on board merchant ships as an aggressive move which may instigate an arms race that may in turn result in higher casualties among ships’ crew. This view is supported by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), an agency providing support to nations engaged in counter-piracy initiatives by maintaining a database of piracy incidents. Instead of arms, it promotes the use of technology such as an electrified fence system around the perimeter of a ship’s deck and sonic devices to deter pirates.
4. SECURITY IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA
The Strait of Malacca is recognised as one of the worlds most important and vital strategic shipping lanes 7 . It is bordered by Indonesia and Malaysia to its west and east while at its southern end where it narrows into the Strait of 6
Singapore, by Singapore. Much of the length of the Strait of Malacca lies in the territorial waters of Malaysia and Indonesia, however, all three States claim territorial waters and thus a form of sovereignty in the Strait of Malacca.
The Strait of Malacca provides the link between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and facilitates the transport of a substantial proportion of global trade. Vast quantities of raw materials move to the manufacturing centres of South-East and North-East Asia and high value manufactured goods are exported from this region via the same shipping lane. In 2004, 63,636 ships passed through the Strait of Malacca, a 3% increase over the 2003 figure of 62,334 ships 8 . Any disruption of this flow is expected to have widespread and far reaching consequences on world trade. Piracy incidences alone may not disrupt this flow. However, as a consequence to piracy incidence, there is a potential for disaster, the worst case scenario being a collision or grounding as the master lost control of his ship.
It is for this reason that the international maritime community is very concerned about the safety and security of the Strait. It is vital that, as a strategic shipping lane, it be kept secure and open to ensure the uninterrupted flow of world trade. As a state bordering the Strait, Malaysia has taken various measures to ensure that it remains safe for international navigation 9 . Major initiatives include:
7
- The implementation of MALSINDO, a coordinated patrol scheme involving the navies of the littoral states. - The formation of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, a Coast Guard-type outfit providing sea-going maritime constabulary services. It will look after the safety of ships transiting Malaysian waters and is expected to improve policing of the Strait of Malacca. - The launching of “Eyes in the Sky”, a multinational maritime air-patrol initiative over the Straits of Malacca, to achieve maritime domain awareness and to deal with piracy and transnational criminal activities in the area. - The increase in the capacity and scope of several security systems involving sea surveillance, vessel traffic and ship reporting. Due to these efforts, only eight (including one attempted attack) incidents were recorded in the first six months of 2005 by the Malaysian Enforcement and
Coordination
Centre
(MECC) 10 ,
in
Lumut.
Comparatively,
the
International Maritime Bureau record 12 incidences for the whole of 2005 11 . In the same period, it was reported that 62,616 passed through the Strait 12 . The 12 attacks represent less than 0.02% of traffic volume.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Malaysian part of the Strait has been safely maintained, statistics presented and accepted by the international maritime community at IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) 81st session indicated that the Strait of Malacca was among the most affected (with five incidents reported or more) areas in terms of piracy and armed robbery in 2005, even though there has been a general downward trend worldwide in such cases 13 . 8
5. DECLARATION OF THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AS A “WAR RISK AREA”
In June 2005, Lloyd's Market Association's (LMA), Joint War Committee (JWC) 14 received prominent coverage in the international media for its declaration of the Strait of Malacca as an area that is in jeopardy of “war, strikes, terrorism and related perils” 15 . Lloyd's of London is the world's leading insurance market providing specialist insurance services to businesses in over 200 countries with more than 60 underwriting syndicates. The LMA is an insurance trade association representing its members which are Lloyd's underwriters. It was established in 2001 through the merger of separate, specialist associations serving the market’s sectoral interests. It is currently the only association responsible for representing the interests of all underwriting businesses in the Lloyd’s market.
It is governed by a Board
made up of market practitioners who are elected by the membership, appointed by market sectors or co-opted for their expertise. Its mission is to provide a single voice for the Lloyd's underwriting market and a range of quality services to improve members’ commercial success.
A network of specialist panels and advisory groups provides the market input and expert knowledge necessary for the LMA's day-to-day work, ranging from production of standard wordings and clauses to consultation on risk-based capital models. One specialist panel is the JWC which acts as an advisory body to marine insurers based in London. The JWC represents the interests 9
of the London marine insurance community and is made up of members from the LMA and the International Underwriting Association (IUA). It has a purely advisory role without any rating power. In the case of the Strait of Malacca, members of the committee based their decisions on reports from their staff and from an external consulting agency, i.e., Aegis Defence Services (Aegis). Aegis is a London-based risk management company which provides research and intelligence, security consulting and technical services to a wide range of public and private sector organizations.
It also produces security-related
reports such as the Terrorism Report and the London Bombings Special Report in 2005.
JWC publishes a list of war risk areas around the world based on this report and is regarded by LMA members as an authority on the risk evaluation of war risk areas.
Despite JWC’s undeniable influence, it remains the
prerogative of insurers to impose additional premiums. Nevertheless, ships passing through these areas will in most cases have to pay higher insurance premiums, underlining the committee’s clout. In practice, even when insurers apply the JWC list to their policies, they also use their own discretion in seeking extra premiums by taking into account factors such as the shipowners’ trading patterns.
On June 20, 2005 the JWC issued a list detailing procedures for amending the war risk areas used on marine hull war risk contracts. Since then, the list has been updated every four months, the latest dated 20 April 2006 16 . The list 10
was a sweeping overhaul of its listed war-risk areas and provided new guidelines to underwriters listing a total of 21 areas worldwide in jeopardy of “war, strike, terrorism and related perils”. The areas specified included the Strait of Malacca and adjacent ports in Indonesia.
The Aegis report 17 to JWC described the Strait of Malacca as the key chokepoint for East Asia’s commerce and mentioned that the waterway had historically provided rich pickings for pirates. The report goes on to state that due to the fact that there had been an intensification of the weaponry and techniques used by the pirates in the Straits of Malacca, they are now largely indistinguishable from terrorists. It quoted Osama bin Laden who explicitly spoke about the advantages of hitting “enemy” countries economies via the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group, often linked to the al-Qaeda network. According to Aegis analysts, JI “has absorbed his economic targeting agenda, has had and may be trying to regain a maritime capability and has shown interest in the traffic in the Strait of Malacca”. The report concluded that while this year is likely to see several new security measures being introduced in the Strait of Malacca, the daily threat to ships in transit would remain for some time to come.
The Aegis document has been criticized by experts because of its failure to distinguish clearly between piracy and terrorism 18 .
Piracy is covered by
standard hull or protection and indemnity policies, whereas coverage against terrorist acts comes under war policies and, if an individual underwriter so 11
decides calls for additional premiums.
In many cases, such additional
premiums are passed on to charterers, but in certain circumstances shipowners still bear the brunt.
During a private briefing given by the JWC and Aegis at the International Chamber of Shipping in London in August 2005, the committee members explained that the changes made in the compilation of its controversial list and the appointment of Aegis reflected its desire to provide a “more relevant and professional service to the insurance market”. JWC “confirmed that the list is constantly monitored and reviewed and that the information provided is advisory and available for underwriters to use as appropriate”. Specifically, the committee affirmed that the Strait of Malacca would remain on the list “until it was clear that the measures planned by government and other agencies in the area had been implemented and were effective” 19 .
Ship-owners 20 in the region have protested the JWC’s declaration which opened the door for insurers to place additional war risk insurance premiums on ships navigating through the Strait. JWC has maintained that it has done no more than publish a list of areas of the world considered at higher risk of war or war-related perils on the basis of advice received from its consultants. It has denied asking insurers to charge higher war risk premiums for ships transiting the Strait of Malacca. The committee argued that there is nothing to compel insurers to increase premiums and it is open to ship-owners and their broker representatives to negotiate their case on a risk-by-risk basis. 12
Nevertheless, it would be naive to suggest that premiums may not increase as a result.
Lloyd's of London’s underwriting market is now quoting additional premiums, calculated as a percentage of the value of a ship's hull and machinery; 0.05% for base war risk cover and 0.01% for each transit of the Strait. This translates into a potential cost of US$12,500 for the base war-risk premium for a small 1,100 TEU container feeder vessel and US$2,500 for each passage through the Strait. In the case of a VLCC (very large crude carrier), this would rise to about US$63,000 for the base premium and US$12,600 for each transit 21 .
Many smaller operators with ships typically under 20,000 GRT in size and trading solely in regional waters do not have war risk insurance even though they are vulnerable given that their cargo is valuable and comprise of smaller vessels which are easier to board. The owners of these ships, comprising the majority of over 60,000 ships using the Strait each year, largely see themselves as only small players and hence not at risk of attacks 22 .
With piracy now being added to the definition of war risk insurance, in a scenario where a vessel is damaged from what appears to be a pirate attack, it would be possible for an underwriter to refuse to entertain the claim as it could interpret the claim to be a terrorist act. Hence, the burden rests on the insured to prove that his vessel was damaged or lost as a consequence of an 13
insured peril. This will pressure owners to carefully review their insurance coverage.
The governments of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have called on the LMAJWC to review its position on the Strait of Malacca. In an August 2005 joint statement 23 , the foreign ministers of these states urged the committee to "review its risk assessment accordingly". The ministers expressed their regret that the decision was taken without consulting them and failed to take into account their existing efforts to deal with the threats to safety and security in the Strait.
In December 2005, Singapore shippers claimed that members have had to pay about US$5,000.00 or more per trip. This led the Singapore Maritime Foundation (SMF) to commission another London based think-tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) to analyse the threat of maritime terrorism in the Strait. Though its findings have not been made public, they are expected to lead to more pressure on JWC to remove the Strait from its war risk list 24 .
Although it is unlikely that LMA will remove the Strait of Malacca from its list anytime soon despite the protests, some encouragement can be drawn from the fact that LMA will formally review the list on a quarterly basis.
In
addition, when implemented, the enhanced security measures announced by the littoral states may serve to mitigate the perceived threat. On another 14
note, placing the Strait in the list have promoted further cooperation amongst the littoral states and even distanced players such as Japan and India.
6. PRIVATE SECURITY IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA
The confluence of the unique situational, political and legal circumstances surrounding security concerns in the Strait provide a niche that is being exploited by Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) 25 . Incidences of piracy and crime have steadily increased in Southeast Asia since the 1970s. The region has become one of the global `hot spots´ of attacks on commercial ships, barter traders and fishing boats 26 . The alarming trend of violence and the use of heavier weaponry have been accompanied by increasing assaults, injuries to the crew and killings in the region. Of further concern is the increase in hostage taking of crewmembers and of ships for ransom 27 . This has raised serious concerns throughout the maritime community and the IMO. Even though the littoral states claim to have taken measures to secure the Strait, the fact remains that attacks have persisted. Conventional non-lethal ship board methods championed by IMO have not been the hoped for deterrent and merchant ships are apparently still seen as easy prey by the perpetrators. Thus PMSC seek to allay these fears by claiming to provide a secure passage for ships using their services.
PMSC offer a wide selection of services ranging from risk assessment to training including anti piracy and breach exercises 28 to armed escorts 29 . 15
PMSC based and licensed in Singapore claim that they have the authority to carry out their functions in the Strait of Malacca, though not in Singapore waters 30 . They claim that their security functions are sanctioned by Malaysian 31 and Indonesian 32 authorities, however, these authorities or agencies do not agree.
In the Strait of Malacca, PMSC armed escort services are a current point of contention. The littoral states have been very sensitive towards any activity that may jeopardise their sovereignty, and the legality of private armed escort operations has also been questioned 33 . This issue involves the application of international law relating to innocent passage 34 of ships through a State's territorial waters and transit passage 35 . Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) affirms the sovereignty (defined as the supremacy of authority or rule as exercised by a sovereign state 36 ) of a coastal State. As the 1982 UNCLOS dictates, the legitimate monopoly over the use of force in matters of security lies with the State and not with ships passing through those waters.
Thus, the supply of such services by private companies can be viewed as impinging on the littoral states sovereignty. Consequently, in the Batam Joint Statement of August 2005 37 the littoral states of the Strait of Malacca reaffirmed their sovereign rights and primary responsibility over the safety of navigation, environmental protection and maritime security. However, state
16
sponsored armed escorts would be commensurate with a country's legal authority over its waters.
The presence of armed escorts on PMSC ships entering the waters of a state raises certain legal questions. First, the 1982 UNCLOS makes a clear distinction between the manner in which merchant and naval ships are authorised to enter the territorial waters of a state. In facilitating international maritime commerce, nations can grant foreign merchant ships standing permission to enter their waters unless notice is otherwise given e.g. ships must stay clear of marine parks or oil rigs.
Naval ships, however, require specific and advanced permission for entry, unless other bilateral or multilateral arrangements have been concluded or it is absolutely clear that the naval ship is proceeding under innocent passage 38 . It stands to reason that PMSC accompanied merchant ships should be considered to naval ships due to their armed operations and therefore require special permission to enter territorial waters. However, the PMSC claims that they are proceeding under innocent or transit passage. These claims are yet to be challenged by the littoral states.
Second, a private security company licensed by one country (Singapore), which is contracted by a shipping line to escort its ships, may not have the authorisation to carry out its full scope of activities at sea when its ships enter the sovereign jurisdiction of another state (Malaysia and Indonesia). This 17
involves the issue on the right of private citizens to bear arms. Malaysia has very strict laws 39 on this, since the PMSC will inadvertently sail into Malaysian jurisdiction it is clearly in breach of this law unless prior approval has been granted by the Malaysian authorities.
Third, questions arise as to whether PMSC personnel are competent to safely store and handle firearms. It also raises issues of accountability. Unlawful possession of firearms will incur the death penalty; furthermore, armed PMSC ships not sanctioned by the government could technically be viewed as a pirate ship themselves. It is clear to whom state navies and maritime law enforcement agencies are accountable, but this is not so in the case of private armed guards.
7. OPTIONS FOR MALAYSIA
The PMSC appear to be taking advantage of the apparent weakness of Malaysia’s governance over its territorial waters. First they claim that they are licensed to carry out armed escorts in Malaysian waters when in fact no Malaysian authority or agency has provided such a license. Threats of arrest by relevant Malaysian authorities are ignored as the PMSC continue their operations (as claimed by the PMSC 40 ) with no arrests being made by the Malaysian authorities 41 . Therein lies the crux of the problem. Malaysia has been trumpeting the importance of its sovereignty 42 while at the same time allowing PMSC to go unchallenged. 18
Malaysia, as a littoral state of the Strait of Malacca must decide on the best option for dealing with the issue of PMSC companies operating in its waters.
The table below outlines the options and implications for Malaysia in dealing with this issue:-
Table 1. PMSC in the Straits of Malacca and options and implications for Malaysia.
Implications Options Option 1; Do nothing.
Short term Status quo continues, market forces dictate the response. Implies that Malaysia agrees to PMSC being present in its waters.
Option 2; Allow and regulate PMSC companies in Malaysian waters.
Long term Provides historical precedent that foreign forces may use to enter and control the Strait.
Malaysia acknowledges PMSC and implicitly agrees with the need for them in the Strait.
Also provides historical precedent.
Immediate need for a proper and legally sound framework to monitor and regulate PMSC.
Resource intensive and legally exhaustive to implement.
Must arrest rogue or unlicensed PMSC ships and staff or request their flag state to take action. The new Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) would be tasked as the lead agency for regulation and enforcement vis a vis PMSC. Option 3; Ban PMSC companies in Malaysian waters.
Must request Singapore to revoke PMSC licenses or at least stipulate that their licenses are limited to Singapore’s territorial waters only.
Need to legitimize action by proposing a ban on PMSC in straits used for international navigation through IMO.
Will require considerable resources to ensure PMSC do not enter Malaysian waters.
Will take decades to institute and to be accepted by the international community.
Will need proper legal framework to uphold the ban.
19
Maritime commerce may not be satisfied with security in the Strait. Option 4; Eliminate the source of the problem.
Must eradicate pirates, hijackers & kidnappers in the Strait. Must expand and enhance recent efforts i.e. “Eye in the Sky” to also include fast response, hot pursuit, arrest and conviction of pirates.
Malaysia could be celebrated as a nation that is responsible and serious in fulfilling its obligations and maintaining its sovereignty.
Must restore confidence of maritime community. Must pressure JWC of Lloyd’s to take the Strait off the war risk list.
8. ARE THEY HERE TO STAY ?
Currently, Malaysia appears to be implementing Option 1. Although many actions are being taken to secure the Strait, they are clearly insufficient. The services of PMSC continue to be used by merchant ships. Indeed, the PMSC are providing services that were once the exclusive preserve of the state military and police. As a result, some believe the time may have come for PMSC to be viewed as another addition to the array of counter-measures against piracy.
As far as the PMSC is concerned, the question of their existence is based on business consideration. Current perception, whether real or imagined dictates that the Strait is infested with threats and it is acknowledged as a war zone. Though, it is common knowledge that Littoral States have done a lot, it has 20
not been formally reported nor acknowledged in the correct forum, namely the IMO. This undermines their efforts. On this premise, demand for PMSC exists, however, PMSC fees are still high hindering their use by majority of ship-owners. If the PMSC can link with insurance providers and structure their fee attractively then the answer would be a resounding YES, they are here to stay.
9. CONCLUSION
To safeguard its sovereignty, it is crucial for Malaysia to decide on, and declare a clear stand or policy regarding the operation of PMSC in its waters. This decision will then need to be broadcast and communicated to the Strait users in order to dispel conflicting views and claims. The appropriate channel would be through a formal submission to the IMO. Malaysia’s election as a Council member of IMO for the 2006/07 term provides an opportunity to bring the issue forward there.
In managing this issue, options 1 and 2 would reflect weakness on Malaysia’s governance of its territorial waters and would provide grounds for other nations to intervene in managing and regulating security issues in the Strait, because letting PMSC operate in its waters would imply that Malaysia agrees to its sovereignty being compromised in the interest of shipping safety and security. It also legitimizes the JWC decision as it seems to support the argument that not enough domestic and trilateral initiatives exists. 21
Options 3 and 4 would be in line with Malaysia’s emphasis on maintaining its sovereignty. However, pursuing either options 3 or 4 would require strong political will and persistent efforts to be successful and they would require the most resources to implement.
This issue needs to be urgently and seriously addressed in order to produce a cohesive, efficient and effective action plan which both addresses the role of PMSC and protects Malaysia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty 43 .
Endnotes 1
MSC 80/24. Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 80th Session. Item 17: Piracy and armed robbery against ships. London: International Maritime Organisation, 2005. 2
World Maritime Day 2004 Background Paper. Focus on maritime security. London: International Maritime Organisation, 2004.
3
MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 Guidance to ship-owners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. London: International Maritime Organisation, 2002.
4
Hesse, H & Charalambous, NL: New Security Measures for the International Shipping Community. WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 2004, Vol. 3, No. 2, 123 – 138.
5
Ibid. p. 95.
6
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/printArticle3.cfm?article_id=11502 [Accessed 13 October 2005].
7
Op. Cit. 2, p. 11.
8
Sazlan, I.: Isu kawalan bersenjata oleh syarikat asing di Selat Melaka: Apakah pendirian Malaysia ? Unpublished report. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2005.
9
Malaysia Indonesia, Singapore & Thailand, Chief of Defence Forces Informal Meeting, 1 – 2 August 2005. Press release. Kuala Lumpur, 2005.
10
Straits of Malacca: Piracy 2005. Lumut: Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Centre, 2005.
22
11
ICC IMB Piracy and armed robbery against ships annual report 2005. Kuala Lumpur: International Maritime Bureau, 2006. 12
Marine Department Peninsular Malaysia, 2006.
13
MSC 81/25. Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 81st Session. Item 19: Piracy and armed robbery against ships. London: International Maritime Organisation, 2006.
14
http://www.iua.co.uk [Accessed 28 June 2006] “The London Market's Joint War Committee (JWC) has published a list of areas of perceived enhanced risk in relation to hull war, strikes, terrorism and related perils. Ports, places and coasts which feature on the list will have been assessed by an independent consultant to exceed an enhanced risk benchmark established by them. The application of this list, which may be accessed via the link above, on individual contracts is a matter for specific negotiation. For further details contact Neil Smith, Secretary to the JWC, at the Lloyd's Market Association, tel. 020 7327 8333, email
[email protected].”
15
Khalid, N.: Lloyd’s market association joint war committee’s declaration of the Straits of Malacca as a “war risk area”. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2005. 16 http://www.the-lma.com/lma_public/default.asp?id=374 [Accessed 28 June 2006] 17
AEGIS 2005 Terrorism Report. Chapter 5. Global maritime terrorism; and Chapter 6. Maritime terrorism. London: Aegis Defence Services Ltd., 2005, pp. 52 – 130.
18
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=352&language_id=1 [Accessed 13 December 2005].
19
Brewer, J.: Joint War Committee stands by Strait ruling. In: Lloyd’s List International Issue #58978, August 17, 2005. 20
Ship-owners slam Aegis report on Strait of Malacca. In: Business Times, New Straits Times Malaysia, August 15, 2005.
21
Op. Cit. 12.
22
Anuar, C.A., Executive Secretary, Malaysian Shipowners Association, 2006, Personal Communication.
23
The Batam joint statement of the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Batam, Indonesia. 1 – 2 August 2005.
24
Shippers want Strait of Malacca risk premium scrapped. http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg [Accessed 30 December 2005]. 25
Valencia, MJ.: PSC operations in the Strait of Malacca: Legal and political issues and options. Paper presented at Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace 2005, Langkawi, 4 – 5 December 2005. 26
Liss, C.: Private security companies in the fight against piracy in Asia. Working paper no. 120. Perth: Asia Research Centre. Murdoch University, 2005. 27
http://www.icc-ccs.org/main/news.php?newsid=40 [Accessed 14 December 2005].
28
http://www.hartsecurity.com/training_maritime.asp [Accessed 18 August 2005].
29
http://www.backgroundasia.com/pages/703686/index.htm [Accessed 18 August 2005].
30
Statement by Glenn Defence & Hart Securities at International Conference on Maritime Piracy 2005. Singapore. 20 – 21 October 2005.
23
31
Statement by the Malaysian National Security Council, Attorney General Chambers & Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency at the Seminar on Private Maritime Security (PMS) in the Strait of Malacca: Options for Malaysia. 17 March 2006. 32
Priyatna, I., Directorate General of Sea Communications, Indonesia, 2005, Personal communication.
33
Beckman, R.: Legal perspective: how is piracy different from commercial fraud ? Paper presented at International Conference on Maritime Piracy 2005, Singapore. 20 – 21 October 2005. 34
Evans, MD.: International law documents, 6th Edition. Article 19 of UNCLOS: Meaning of innocent passage. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. p. 220. 35
Ibid., p. 224.
36
http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/sovereignty [Accessed 27 January 2006]
37
Op. Cit. 18.
38
Op. Cit. 27, Art. 19.2. a – l. p. 220.
39
Malaysian Arms Act 1960 (Act 206). Regulations & Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (Act 37). Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services, 1999. 40 http://www.piracysuppression.com/pages/2/index.htm [Accessed 28 June 2006]. 41
http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/front/archives/2005/06/06/2003258144 [Accessed 18 August 2005].
42
Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Haji Abd Razak, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Malaysia. Text from Shangri-La Dialogue on Enhancing Maritime Security Cooperation. Singapore, 2005. 43
Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Haji Abd Razak, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Malaysia. Keynote address at the LIMA International Maritime Conference 2005. Langkawi. 5 – 6 December 2005.
24
