Mission Command Between Theory and Practice: The ...

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Mission Command Between Theory and Practice: The Case of the IDF Uzi Ben-Shalom

a b

& Eitan Shamir

a b

a

Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900, Israel

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Tactical Command College, IDF

Available online: 15 Jul 2011

To cite this article: Uzi Ben-Shalom & Eitan Shamir (2011): Mission Command Between Theory and Practice: The Case of the IDF, Defense & Security Analysis, 27:2, 101-117 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2011.578715

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Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 101–117, June 2011

Mission Command Between Theory and Practice:The Case of the IDF 1

Uzi Ben-Shalom and Eitan Shamir

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Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900 Israel;Tactical Command College, IDF

INTRODUCTION Mission command (or Auftragstaktik) is considered today the command philosophy best suited for war and military operations.2 This philosophy was originally developed by the Prussians as a means of countering the effects of “friction” in war. It is endorsed today by modern militaries as a cornerstone in their command and control doctrine.3 The practice of this philosophy is hindered, however, by a myriad of sociological, organizational and technological constraints that characterize today’s military operations.4 These reasons may limit or render mission command inapplicable despite its historical proven value.

THE ORIGIN OF MISSION COMMAND The theory upon which mission command is structured, stipulates that due to the effects of “friction”, effective decision-making on the battlefield hinges on the comprehension of, and the commitment to, the assigned mission objectives. Mission encompasses both the understanding of the task and the purpose it serves. In the turbulence of war, it serves as the primary – and often the only supervisory and regulatory – means at the disposal of commanders.The Prussian army had a long tradition of subordinates’ independence.5 Moltke the Elder, the Prussian Chief of Staff in the second half of the nineteenth century, enhanced this philosophy as a command approach at the higher echelon all the way down to division level. It continued to evolve in the German Army during the two World Wars. The German doctrine endorsed freedom of action as a general principle to every level of command.6 Scholars have expressed an opinion that mission command significantly augmented German military prowess and effectiveness.7 The Germans also related this to a contrasting, yet complementary, archetype of detailed command (or ISSN 1475-1798 print; 1475-1801 online/11/020101-17 © 2011 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2011.578715

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Befehlstaktik).8 A commander practicing this philosophy of command endeavors to dictate a significantly large portion of the plan to his subordinates. Thus, instead of an emphasis on the purpose – as in mission command – the emphasis shifts to the task and detailed planning. Essentially, sub-units are expected to strictly follow the plan, which leaves no room for deviations.The importance and relevance of detailed command are evident, for example, in situations involving missions that require slow, meticulous movement and a high degree of coordination.9 According to Israeli Defence Forces’ (IDF) doctrine, during an operation the commander has to choose between these two extremes or use combinations of the two alternatives.10 This process results from the commander’s assessment of such elements as the troops’ level of training, time considerations, etc. Mission command depends on a certain organizational culture that includes: trust between commander and subordinate, an offensive orientation, initiative, and risktaking. These qualities rely on a common professional education. Such an organizational culture genuinely encourages exploration and learning.11 The decisive combat skill of officers required for mission command develops through on-going educational processes. Such a foundation was originally laid down by the Prussian-German Kriegsakademie (War Academy).This infrastructure leads a subordinate to view his mission as a distinct part of the overall plan drawn up by his superiors. The idea is that this knowledge would guide both the formation of the initial battle plan and the changes forced upon it by developments on the battlefield.12 Western armies have been gradually adopting mission command since the 1980s. The US Army integrated it into its Air–Land Battle doctrine in support of its maneuver elements,13 and the rest of NATO followed soon after. In Israel, the philosophy of mission command was studied over a long period of time until it was finally formally adopted in 2006.14

CHALLENGES FOR MISSION COMMAND The implementation of mission command is not taken for granted. A review of the literature concerning command reveals certain reasons germane to a number of militaries that pose a challenge to its practice.These causes can be found to be universal in nature and affect all Western militaries that have adopted this command approach.15

The Commander’s Reluctance To Give Away Control Despite the manifest attractiveness of mission command as a philosophy of command, it requires senior commanders to ignore a common basic human tendency for the aversion of risk.This tendency often results in the military needing a tight control over events.16 Senior commanders are often loath to accept risk and they will accept its introduction only reluctantly. An historical perspective demonstrates that the sheer size of his army forced the centralistic Napoleon to allow his corps commanders a measure of freedom of action.17 The same problem was faced by Moltke the Elder, who is associated with this command philosophy more than any other military leader. He was essentially forced to give his senior subordinates a free rein within an enormous theater of operations, the size of the army he had to control and, until a certain point, when his

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authority had not been officially established.18 In contrast to other commanders, however, Moltke understood his limitations; instead of a fruitless attempt to micromanage, he devised a system that could enable him to navigate the system according to his general purpose. Thus, the increasing size and dispersal of units and the resulting communication difficulties required a reliance on mission command. Despite the advances in technology, these fundamental issues have essentially seen little change. In recent years, the tendency to avoid risk has been augmented by Western societies’ complicated attitude towards war and their militaries.19 Politicians and military leaders sought to calculate civilians’ intolerance for casualties and public opinion that urges them to avoid unnecessary collateral damage.20 As a consequence, commanders on the ground are prone to avoid risks and practice caution while on operations.21 This tendency is in contradiction with the calculated risk and high operational tempo that characterizes mission command. Indeed, it seems that, due to its inherent perils, mission command is not always considered preferable by the military establishment. Though certain commanders may practice it regularly, the military establishment to which they belong may accept it only grudgingly.Thus, while the acceptance of risk and an allowance for mistakes are cornerstones of mission command, military organizations fear the proverbial “Pandora’s Box”, wherein excessive freedom can quickly develop into uncontrollable situations. A survey of leaders known for their initiative, risky and aggressive style of command reveals continuous friction between them and their superiors. Nelson, Guderian, Rommel, Patton,Wingate, and Sharon, to name a few, all took the initiative – within the context of their distinct epoch, technology, and fighting – while transcending conventional boundaries and challenging their superiors.

Changes in the Nature of Military Operations Military organizations have been gradually conducting fewer and fewer traditional types of operations; they have mainly been fighting conventional forces in an open allout battle. Alternatively, they are gaining more experience in the conduct of various military operations, such as military operations other than war (MOOTW). The US Army has recently presented the new concept of “Full Spectrum Operations”, which accords these missions a significant importance.22 They include missions such as: nation-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and peace enforcement. Some of them, as currently in Afghanistan, are a combination of pure war fighting operations enmeshed with nation-building and civil support projects. Others, as in certain areas of Iraq today, are more about constabulary, humanitarian and security missions. In these operations, the traditional dictum of the pursuance of mission objectives gives way to restraint, containment and caution. Aggression and determination are often supplemented, if not superseded, by qualities such as empathy, tolerance and dialogue.23 The rejection of these “classic” military virtues indicates a basic unwillingness on the part of senior commanders to risk aggressive and decisive operations. In this context, the term “strategic corporal”24 is a misnomer, for it represents a hesitation with regard to uncontrollable initiative and risk. Both stem from the need to regulate and control violence.25 As Christopher Coker has opined, the warrior ethos itself has given way to self-imposed limitations and risk

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aversion. The notion of a “band of brothers” is substituted by “contracted relationships” and servicemen are discouraged from exercising independent judgment. In a social sense, where risk-taking in the past denoted bravery, it is now a token of irresponsibility. War itself is often considered as a deviation and feelings of vulnerability decrease readiness to accept risk.26

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Command and Control Technology The development of command, control and communications technologies in recent years has posed another challenge for the application of mission command. This technology sometimes cloaks the practitioner of warfare with a false sense of control, resulting in the circumvention of the fundamentals of mission command.27 Copious volumes of information, readily available through digital systems, encourage intervention from higher headquarters, even in combat situations. Moreover, as recent research has demonstrated, these systems cannot substitute for the human factor in command. Though designed as an auxiliary tool for command and control, they have essentially curbed junior command initiative and promoted over-centralized command styles. There are scholars who view that the proliferation of these systems signifies the end of mission command.28 Indeed, they claim real-time information now available to commanders has rendered mission command obsolete. Even the most vehement proponents of mission command recognize that human proclivity for control and centralization will increase with the introduction of the digital command and control systems.29

Organizational Culture There are those who have noted that the very structure of modern military organizations, such as the US military, necessitates tight control procedures.30 Under these circumstances, they consider that it is difficult to implement mission command.31 Others have argued that as the US military failed to grasp the full meaning of mission command as it merely imitated German techniques and procedures.32 Still others reflected on the US military’s propensity for adopting managerial and industrial engineering measures.This practice reached its zenith during theVietnamWar, where it had a negative impact on the development of combat leadership. It remains embedded in US military culture, however, even in the aftermath of the post-Vietnam reforms.33 In sum, mission command can bridge the gap caused by friction between operational plans and the attainment of objectives, even in the current information age. Though its continued relevance remains a universal truism, militaries have faltered in its implementation. The aim of this article is to review the use of mission command in the IDF as a case study for the more general question of its implementation by Western militaries.

THE CURRENT STUDY Varied sources of data have been used in order to allow a comprehensive view of IDF command philosophy. IDF doctrinal statements, historical case studies and the practice

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of mission command have all been used.The information for this article, therefore, has included a review of the official IDF doctrinal publications on command and control. The authors also reviewed relevant articles penned by Israeli officers, printed in the IDF professional journals. Furthermore several case studies from IDF campaigns have been examined. In addition, 15 interviews with IDF officers, IDF college instructors and lecturers were conducted. During the interviews, the interviewees were asked about their own perception of mission command and the boundaries facing its implementation in the IDF.

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Mission Command in the IDF The Command philosophy adopted by the IDF is a result of the operational challenges which it faced, as well as its origins in patriotic, semi-military organizations. Its founding fathers, Brigadier General Charles Ord Wingate and MG Yitzhak Sadeh, instilled a culture of independence and initiative into a younger generation of commanders such as Allon, Dayan andYadin. During its formative years, the IDF had no agencies dedicated to the academic learning of command. In addition, during the mid1950s, the IDF ethos of command was shaped by the demands of the operations that the IDF conducted and were largely characterized by daring raids and punitive incursions.34 Its notable characteristics included boldness and mission orientation.35 For example, following a raid that caused substantial collateral damage, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Dayan defended the Commander on the ground. Depending upon the instance, I prefer excessive initiative and action, even if it involves some mistakes here and there, to the passivity of “sit and do nothing” and covering yourself with paper and seven authorizations for an operation before its execution.36 IDF commanders adopted a decentralized command approach in order to facilitate strategic initiative and maneuver warfare as a means of dealing with Israel’s basic strategic imperatives. Indeed, the sweepings campaigns of 1956, theWar in 1967 and, to some extent, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, demonstrated that the IDF was utilizing a flexible, decentralized and effective command structure. During all of these campaigns, there were numerous examples of senior and junior officers taking the initiative when they either had no orders or no clear orders. It was then that they were motivated to take the necessary risks that came with the decision in order to fight decisively for what they saw as the defense of the nation. A notable example is the speech made by Division Commander MGTal to his subordinates just before the storming into Rafah on the eve of the Six Day War: Now that the plan is clear to us all and the movements drawn on the map are known, I want to say another few words.When the battle will occur, nothing on the ground will be as it is marked here on the script.The lines and roots will be utterly different in reality. However, this should not dread you since battles are never developed according to arrows on a map. But one thing should occur

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exactly as the script – the principal and concept that are the foundation of these lines. Everyone will charge, everyone will penetrate as much as possible into the depth without consideration for the flanks and rear. Should this principle be kept, we then remain forever faithful to this idea and it means that the battle is developing as we have devised. Each and everyone that loses contact or does not see our forces ought to continue and charge, knowing that the rest are doing the same. Should war indeed erupt then our battle is the test for the entire ground forces . . . Since our division composed of the best brigades in the IDF arsenal. And if our division fails in its mission then it implies that the IDF is unable to fulfill its mission.37 Bold and decisive IDF commanders took the initiative time and again without explicit orders. Examples could be the maneuver by the 7th Armored Brigade Commander in the Sinai Campaign in 1956.The Commander on the ground, Colonel Uri Ben-Ari, took the initiative and led the decisive attack that shaped the entire ground campaign.38 Another example is the decision of Brigadier General Moshe (“Musa”) Peled to order a counter-attack up the Southern part of the Golan Heights in theYom Kippur War.39 Both Commanders were operating primarily according to their own understanding of the situation and not according to their superiors’ plans. Knowing that the nation was facing serious threat, these experienced commanders boldly took the initiative. During the 1980s, mission command philosophy was formally studied by Israeli soldier-scholars and later formally adopted with a supplemented Detailed Command.40 Even so, there were questions as to how it would be integrated into the IDF system of command.41 Instead of theoreticians, academies, and research institutions, the IDF demanded that all available resources were concentrated on praxis and stressed achievement and performance (which in Hebrew are often called “Bitsuism”).42 The 1982 campaign, for example, had hinted that the command philosophy used by the IDF was not so similar to mission command. Commanders were slow to respond and the entire campaign had a sluggish spirit that resulted in hesitant progress, rather than swift maneuver. These characteristics were evermore evident in the Second Lebanon War.43

CHALLENGES FOR MISSION COMMAND IN THE IDF As various pundits have observed, the IDF exercised mission-oriented command during the Six Day War. According to one, the unwritten principles of IDF command included the following: If you did not receive orders, you must assume what they would be, “Don’t worry about supplies, they are on their way;” “When in doubt, attack immediately;” “The battle will not take place as you planned and you must improvise.”44 Evidently, these maxims were no longer prevalent among the Israeli forces who participated in the First LebanonWar a mere 15 years later.They did continue to appear in

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particular situations or in the actions of certain individuals. Such was the case of the 74th Armored Battalion in the battle for Kfar Sil: I meet AmosYaron (The Division Commander) on the way . . . I’m in his sector now. He calls me aside and asks me “What do you think?” . . . I take out a map and show him the plan (to attack Kfar Sil). After this, in my opinion, I had already received authorization for the plan and had already proceeded to execute it.45

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A review of operations conducted during the Second Lebanon War reveals that command decisions were not always dictated by operational needs. For instance, fear of casualties was a central consideration in the choice of the commanders to slow down the execution and tempo of operations.This command philosophy was very different from that of Six Day War Commanders. Take, for example, the following citation from a Battalion Commander in the Second Lebanon War: We raid a village and then, after the mission was completed, we saw a site where rockets were launched.We have decided to attack this position and reported that to HQ. And then as soon as we were ready to go over them they have called and said, no.There is no approval for this.You will not do that and then order me to come back.We were frustrated, but we did as we were told. The IDF’s capacity to implement mission command was hindered by the same universal reasons that have been identified above in other Western militaries, namely: risk aversion by senior commanders; counter-insurgency and operations other than war missions; advanced C4I systems; and certain aspects of organizational culture. The challenges were imminent in the Second LebanonWar and manifested by extreme riskaversion. In addition, there were IDF-specific, or “local”, challenges, especially in officer education and social criticism. Entangled with the complexities of non-military operations that are under social controversy, they have shaped the IDF challenges for mission command.

Officer Education The Israeli Defence Force was never too keen on developing military theory or publishing written doctrine. It lacked the traditions created by military academies such as West-Point or the Kriegsakademie.The IDF faced continuous combat operations, which often required the participation of command course trainees. This led to an emphasis on field experience, rather than learning from educational programs. The decisive combat behavior that seems “instinctive” and the initiative that is required for mission command develops through both education and experience. Intensive theoretical and practical study have led militaries to the creation of a common professional language and terminology.These were expressed in combat doctrine studied and then practiced in the field. Mission command thereby evolved as a framework within which officers who possessed the necessary skills, could be trusted to operate independently in the chaos of war.

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This became a necessary requirement for mission command, as trust was not based on personal relationship but rather on professional competence and the ability of subordinates to fulfill their superiors’ intentions, and relying on minimum instruction, if at all. In contrast, the educational programs of Israeli officers are considerably less intensive than those of their peers in theWest. Promotion in the IDF is dependent upon field experience, rather than on formal study.46 The knowledge base is, therefore, more restricted and not shared by all officers. In addition, and again in contrast to the original German system, few IDF officers have enjoyed the benefits of a higher military education. As a consequence, the IDF system of officer education has been described as “insufficient”.47 Following the Second Lebanon War, the government’s Committee of Inquiry (“The Vinograd Committee”) stressed that the IDF ought to strengthen its officers’ higher education.The Committee found that it was insufficient and left senior officers lacking formal knowledge, which, in turn, has had an effect on the conduct of high-level military campaigns.48 The Agrant Committee had already stressed this claim following theYomKippur War.49 This Committee identified the lack of a common doctrinal knowledge among commanders that had hindered command during the first critical days of the war.50 Whereas certain commanders may adopt a variant of mission command on an individual basis under particular combat circumstances, their experience would not be supported by a professional and common infrastructure. A philosophy of mission command characterized by initiative, offensive orientation and improvisation might, therefore, be adopted for a specific mission by a particular commander. In such a case, local and unique rules of operation would be created, thereby blurring the connection between doctrine and field experience. This process has had a strong effect, since the IDF is usually preoccupied with constabulary missions and protracted counterinsurgency operations, especially since the end of the First Lebanon War.

Social Criticism A complementary IDF challenge for mission command is civilian criticism towards the IDF – something that characterizes Israel civil–military relations. This criticism directed toward the IDF is as a result, inter alia, of training accidents and sexual harassment incidents. It has increased dramatically over the past twenty years.51 In addition, Israeli civilian tolerance for casualties has dropped considerably. Consequently, the IDF was forced to make significant changes. On the positive side, it has improved safety procedures and taken measures to reduce sexual harassment. On the negative side, officers have become more reluctant to delegate and shoulder responsibility and risk, with the resultant effect on the effectiveness of command.The proliferation of internal investigations – sometimes called “judicialization” due to the multiplicity of investigative Commissions and the intermingling of the judicial and military systems – has curbed initiative and fostered alienation. Fear of recriminations has also led to the addition of many layers to the process of planning and execution of operations. It has also led to a gradual, but persistent, process of expropriating authority from junior commanders.

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When military operations end unsuccessfully, the chain of command endeavors to distance itself from the offending subordinate. In a book he wrote detailing his experiences in Southern Lebanon’s Security Zone, Brigadier General Moshe (Chicho)Tamir, offered explanations for this alienation. Chicho compared optimal, actual and all manner of interim situations of field command, which resulted from the factors discussed above.Thus, bringing charges against field officers and the lack of support on the part of the Army were manifest in the functioning of the units. The commanders who understood that they would not receive the support preferred to avoid initiating operations and neutralized the offensive spirit of their units in order to prevent accidents.52 Constant social criticism eventually affects the common trust between commanders, which is a primary requisite of mission command. It seems that the trust necessary for the practice of mission command is fostered through a common professional language and institutional training and not only from personal acquaintances. In lieu of direct supervision, militaries have been forced to seek alternative means of control. It is in this spirit that military academies cultivate internal control and discipline.53 In the IDF, the development and maintenance of the necessary levels of trust in and within senior command were closely related to both the level of threat facing the nation as well as experience shared by senior commanders. As long as both existed, decisive operations were executed. But both sources have suffered since the 1982 First Lebanon War.54 Generally speaking, Israel has gradually been moving away from being existentially threatened and her senior generals have not been as experienced as before. Following the Second Lebanon War, senior commanders clashed openly, staging heated debates over the pages of Israeli newspapers. In this atmosphere, officers willing to shoulder the measure of responsibility necessary for the practice of mission command should not be taken for granted.

TYPOLOGY OF ALTERNATE COMMAND PHILOSOPHIES The formal adoption of doctrine by a military organization does not guarantee its implementation.55 Military command constitutes a social phenomenon and, therefore, exists outside the parameters of the formal doctrinal context. Mission command was developed for High Intensity Conflicts, but since the end of the First Lebanon War in 1982, Israel has been involved primarily with counter-insurgency operations, for which informal cultures of command have evolved within the IDF. In order to explore them, Argyris and Schön’s organizational theory, which differentiates between “espoused theory” and “theory in use” has been used.56 These alternative command philosophies, that is to say, theories in use, stand in contrast to the officially “espoused theory”.Their existence indicates an acquiescence to military and organizational realities. These behavioral patterns usually reflect environmental and military cultural influences, rather than individual idiosyncrasies. Hence, the identification and classification of these command-related behavioral patterns supports a typology of informal command philosophies.

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“Excessive” Mission Command Like other combat organizations, the IDF strongly emphasizes aggressive action and conveys an image of great competency. In the case of the US military, this attitude has been referred to as a “can do” culture.57 The Israeli term for this is roughly translated to “If you want it you can do it!” (Ein LoYahol –Yesh Lo Rotzel!) In both cases, this attitude is strengthened among officers through an evaluation system that focuses on performance and accomplishments. The feeling of competency and a “doer-orientated” evaluation system are insufficient building blocks upon which to structure mission command, the structure of which is based on a comprehension of a given mission’s objectives and parameters. The necessary level of understanding is attained through a profound professional knowledge, one that cannot be substituted by personal motivation, efficiency or technical competence.58 Even a cursory review of IDF history reveals instances in which subordinates were granted considerable latitude to pursue their objectives. Many commanders displayed mission command-related characteristics, such as determination, initiative and risktaking. But do these indicate that mission command was practiced? Often this was not the case. Mission command requires a certain quality of education and a common language. It does not appear magically when commanders find themselves cut off and forced to improvise against the enemy. This command philosophy seems, therefore, to be closely affiliated to the IDF education system. Mission command is fueled by the commander’s understanding of the operational environment. It is also dependent upon his ability to develop systems thinking and/or the ability to grasp the system as a whole and its constituent elements. He must know when to pursue the mission, regardless of difficulties, and appreciate when the higher objectives would be better served by pursuing a new mission. If his actions adhere to these parameters, he is practicing independent, rather than mission, command. As the IDF continues to reward combat and operational experience, rather than a thorough military education, it lacks the necessary foundation for efficient wartime combat command.59

“Chaos” Command Closely related to “excessive mission” command is that of “chaos command”, since both result from the IDF’s system of officer education.The IDF uses many expressions denoting the necessity of responding rapidly to the changing circumstances of war.This characteristic has an enormous (albeit unpredictable) advantage in combat; but it also harbors significant disadvantages. Here are some expressions of senior commanders and soldier-scholars conveying this notion: • • • • •

War is a hodgepodge and that we excel; We are the masters of improvisation; Plans are merely a basis for changes; War is organized chaos; Learning on the move.

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One of the primary purposes of professional military training and education is to construct a system of concepts for the cataloging of the chaotic experiences that often characterize war.60 In the absence of this training and education, the chaotic events that often take place on the battlefield have led commanders to rely mostly on their own personal experience, much of which is often not relevant and also lacks the broader understanding that a military education provides.Within a culture that sanctifies action and instinctive responses, the results will often be those of initiative and decisive action. This is especially relevant for highly motivated commanders. The result is something opposed to mission command, since commanders operating in this spirit would act in accordance with their own understanding, rather than in support of the overall mission. Also, they may act upon a wrong understanding. In this system, subordinates are at times forced to digress from orders and improvise. Instances in which decisions are based neither on military knowledge nor on adherence to the higher objectives, do not indicate the existence of mission command. Though based on essential truths, these catechisms can be misleading. Accordingly, while detailed and thorough planning may very well serve as the framework for changes, these catechisms reflect a belief that planning is unnecessary.Why does one need a plan if it is going to be changed in any case? Mission command will succeed only when based on plans that chart alternative courses of action and develop collective understanding and knowledge with regard to the challenges that are faced collectively. By doing so, these plans promote a common terminology and comprehensive understanding among the different levels of command. The plan is the product of forethought and stringent preparation. Nevertheless, it is prudent to tailor it so that it allows sufficient flexibility for subordinates.

“Success Oriented” Command This style of command signifies (or bemoans) a system wherein commanders extend only limited support to subordinates.This is a reflection of the social criticism and nonmilitary missions and their effect upon the IDF’s organizational culture.The following anecdote is indicative of this style of command.The commander of an anti-terror unit is suddenly notified of an impending terrorist attack. Intelligence indicated that a car of a certain make and color would detonate near a synagogue. Soon after, he identifies a suspect car and proceeds to ram it, severely injuring its occupants. An investigation later determined that the decision had been justified and that the vehicle in question had carried terrorists. However, as he subsequently learned from Defense MinisterYitzchak Rabin, “in the case of failure [i.e. misidentification], they would not have stood behind us.”61 In this style of command, support is contingent upon success.The actions are not judged by the quality of the process, but exclusively by their results. A very common IDF expression is, “Get a medal or demoted to corporal” (Tzalash OhTarash), which points to the way results are governing attitudes towards events. These events are often affected by “friction” and chance, factors that are beyond the control of the commander. Such systems would be marked by increased alienation and detachment between commanders and subordinates. In contradiction of the fundamental princi-

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ples of war, it effectively destroys any measure of trust between the ranks, and thereby compromises the chain of command. During one of the operations, I gave the order to fire on a particular vehicle . . . I approached the vehicle and identified four dead terrorists. My hair turned white, as I was certain that if I found a greengrocer, his wife and their two children instead of terrorists, I’d be in trouble.That’s how it is with us.When an operation is successful – then great, you get a bottle of champagne and compliments and “you’re larger than life”. If it ends differently, then you’re left to face the difficult reality yourself.62

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“Authorized” Command As mentioned above, the mission-oriented command philosophy is supplemented by detailed command. In this type of command, commanders are expected to issue mission orders detailing both the prosecution of the operation and its intended results. In addition, subunits are expected to keep headquarters apprized of all changes, thereby enabling timely intervention on the part of their commanders. Superiors are far more involved in the planning and execution of missions. The source of this command philosophy seems to be a result of both advanced C4I systems as well as the risk aversion of senior commanders. Take, for example, the following citation from a battalion commander that focuses on the effect of C4I systems on over-centralization: We educate our young officers to receive a mission and then they decide how it should be implemented. Once you receive your mission, it is your own choice on how to fulfill it. Now, I have a detailed account over your position and the commanders tend to interfere with his subordinate’s decision and not let him work on his own. The extreme application of this style of command is “authorized command” or command contingent upon the authorization of superiors. In this system, all aspects of planning for, and the execution of, an operation require authorization. Advanced information systems effectively create conditions conducive to this style of command, as long as the communication mechanisms remain operative.

“Promotion” Command In this category the emphasis is on behavior that reflects an implicit organizational culture, one that encourages action, which may promote individual or unit interests. In extreme cases, commanders may conceive and execute operations intended to produce private, rather than organizational, capital. Though this philosophy has its advantages and promotes excellence, it does not encourage or reflect system thinking and orientation. It is not, therefore, conducive to the development of mission command-type behavior. This style of command is reminiscent of the American concept of “Toxic Leadership”, or the emergence of selfishness in commanders.The concept denotes the

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emergence of a culture of command wherein personal gain takes precedence over both the good of the group and traditional military virtues, such as honor and even loyalty.63 commanders then feel that in order to secure their continued rise through the ranks, they must stand out, initiate and innovate. For instance, officers were known to have chosen deployment in Vietnam in the interests of “punching the ticket.” This is one of the factors that led to the deterioration of unit cohesion in Vietnam.64 Promotionoriented command in the IDF is also influenced to a great extent by the limitation of an officer education that is being overshadowed by the proliferation of managerial values.

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DISCUSSION Universal versus Local challenge Military doctrine presents mission command as an effective, if not essential, command philosophy. This philosophy is not necessarily compatible with current military operations, and, in any event, is not easily implemented.Though the tactical and operational lessons of the Wehrmacht seem straightforward, putting these lessons into effect has proved difficult. Virtually all Western armies face this challenge and each has encountered its own particular challenges, stemming from each state’s respective unique circumstance. The recent tendency of militaries to shift from conventional warfare doctrine to “Full Spectrum Operations” may foster this challenge, as they embed armies in civilian contexts. These challenges could also be traced from an historical perspective. For instance, when, on the one hand, the British Army was hastily expanded from a small regimental force into a huge mass Army in both World Wars, it was forced to limit the freedom of action of leaders because it had also curtailed their training. The US Army, on the other hand, is partial to large mass armies and therefore has required extensive formulization.This limits commander responses and has led to the adoption of corporate and managerial methods. Conversely, the challenges facing the IDF stem from its military education and the social criticism that have surrounded it in recent years. Though mission- and detailed-command are the only optional philosophies of command prescribed by IDF doctrine, they are not the only philosophies in existence. The diversity of command philosophies stems from the simple reason that the situation facing the IDF is not the one that calls for mission command. In essence, the complexity facing the IDF and, probably, other militaries, does not reflect the conventional “friction” generated by conventional warfare, rather than a myriad of other factors. They lead to more complex decision-making by commanders. According to Argyris and Schön, people construct mental models, which guide their reactions in given situations. It is these models, rather than any formal theory, which affect the manner through which they plan, implement and review their actions. This distinction is significant when attempting to describe the interplay between the official and the actual practice of command.65 Table 1 outlines the arguments regarding the origins of “in-use theories” of command. This analysis is based on three levels: the requisites for command philosophy (i.e. professional education, trust, etc); the commanders’ understanding of the situation; and possible command philosophies. In order to describe the complexity of command philosophies, the right column includes the

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added complexities that eventually lead into “in-use” philosophies. Facing critical or on-going operations, commanders are not only accounting for professional issues such as terrain or time; they also estimate alternative courses of action on the basis of their own experience and practice caution when evaluating expected outcomes.The result is variety of command philosophies that reflects the commander’s own understandings. The command philosophies that are being used do not negate the formal philosophies, rather added to them.

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Table 1: A Comparison Between Espoused and “In-Use” Command Philosophies

Prerequisites

Espoused Command Philosophy

In-Use Command Philosophy

Officer education; trust; common language; high level of training

Added complexities: Limited officer education; social criticism; non-military missions; advanced information systems; organizational culture Additional considerations: Cautious; social and political awareness; exposure for litigation and/or media Diversity: Doctrinal and non-doctrinal command philosophies

Commander’s understandings

Terrain; time limitations; level of training; dispersion of units; type of mission; enemy situation Possible command Mission command or/and detailed philosophies command

The Command Philosophy Pendulum It is important to emphasize that mission command may be used in certain situations only to be replaced soon after by a different command style. This shift may occur in complex or protracted missions. It may also be manifest in a general shift in organizational climate. The differences reflect social processes as well as divergent perceptions regarding the degree to which the country faces an existential threat. In addition, mission command also depends on the manner in which the senior commanders choose to educate and to assess the performances, mistakes and successes of their subordinates. Command in war necessitates a combined application of both mission- and directive-control philosophies.They represent a compromise between the desirable and the practicable and define the parameters within which commanders willingly accept risk. This style of command is employed, for instance, in integrated missions that include sophisticated intelligence collection methods. Though complete information may be available for most stages of an operation, there occurs an essential transition to a stage where there is an absence of control. It is then that headquarters must delegate authority to the leading commander. Such methods of intervention should be practiced in peacetime to prevent misunderstandings. It seems that this practice can be facilitated even by local tradition, emphasizing initiative-taking in combat as well as in other related situations. The

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following statements, drawn from different eras, militaries and commanders, reflect a universal educational message for IDF commanders regarding the shouldering of responsibility in the moment of truth: • • • •

Every soldier carries a Marshal’s baton in his pack (Napoleon). You were given your rank so you would know when not to follow orders (Moltke the Elder chastising a Prussian Officer). You are alone, and no one knows your situation – act sensibly (An IAF common expression). Maintenance of mission in light of the objective (The first of ten IDF principles of war).

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RETROSPECT One of the lessons drawn by the IDF from the Second Lebanon War was the need to restore basic military skills and abandon some of the “new” military thinking. This response may encounter the same challenges that so profoundly influenced the building of the Israeli Army over the past decade. It could lead to a false interpretation of the intellectual and cultural root causes of the deficiencies discovered in the performance of the IDF in that war.The past, however, may not necessarily serve as the best source of inspiration. Reform in the IDF should include an investigation of the inherent challenges inhibiting the practice of mission command. As this article has demonstrated, military authorities must recognize the existence of alternative, mutative (and even dysfunctional) styles of command. The IDF should develop organizational mechanisms capable of identifying and diminishing the damage caused by these command styles. Recognition of these issues could facilitate the creation of an internal dialogue that could eventually enable the practice of mission command. It could also support transitions between command styles as warranted by circumstances. In addition, it would enhance the ability of commanders to correctly identify the uniqueness of each instance of battle and the possible outcomes of combat. In real life, this ability is the essence of the military profession.

NOTES 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6.

The ideas and opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ only.They do not necessarily represent the views of the IDF. Jim P. Storr, “A Command Philosophy for the Information Age:The Continuing Relevance of Mission Command,” in David Potts (ed.), The Big Issue: Command and Combat in the Information Age,Washington DC: Command and Control Research Program, 2003, pp. 77–94. James N. Mattis, “USJFCOM Commander’s Guide for Effect-Based Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 51 No. 4, 2008, p. 106. Admiral L. W. Vogelaar and Eric-Hans Kramer, “Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions,” Armed Forces & Society,Vol. 30 No. 3, April 2004, p. 427. Robert M. Citino, The GermanWay ofWar:From theThirtyYears’War to theThird Reich, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005, p. 19. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918, Westport: Praeger, 1989, pp. 172–175.

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8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

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16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22.

23.

24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

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See, for instance, Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance 1939–1945, London: Arms and Armour, 1983, p. 35;Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius forWar:The German Army and General Staff 1807–1945, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977, pp. 268, 307. Christopher D. Bellamy, “Directive Control,” in: Richard Holmes (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Military History, NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 260–261. General Rupert Smith, personal interview, Brussels, June 2006. IDF, Basic Doctrinal Publication, Command and Control, Tel Aviv: Israel Defense Force, 2006 (in Hebrew). Martin van Creveld, The Training of Officers, NewYork: Free Press, 1990, p. 101. Ibid., p. 26. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations, Washington DC, 1982, pp. 2–1, 2–3, 2–7. Basic Doctrinal Publication, Command and Control, Israel Defense Force, 2006 (in Hebrew). Eitan Shamir, Mission Command and Military Culture: A Case of Adoption and Adaptation, PhD thesis, King’s College London, 2009. Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, London: Basic Books, 1976, pp. 277–278. Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art ofWarfare in the Age of Napoleon, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978, pp. 216–217. Jehuda L.Wallach, MilitaryTheories:Their Development During the 19th and 20th Centuries,Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1977, pp. 77–79 (in Hebrew). E. N. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs,Vol. 74 No. 3, 1995, pp. 109– 122. C. C. Moskos, J. A.Williams and R. D. Segal, “Armed Forces after the ColdWar,” in Charles C. Moskos, John A. Williams and David R. Segal (eds), The Post Modern Military: Armed Forces after the ColdWar, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1–13. M. Shaw, The NewWesternWay ofWar, London: Polity Press, 2005. Wilbur J. Scott, David R. McCone and George R. Mastroianni, “The Deployment Experience of Ft. Carson’s Soldiers in Iraq,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 35 No. 3, April 2009, p. 461. Marina Nuciari, “Models and Explanations for Military Organizations: An Updated Reconsideration,” in Giuseppe Caforio (ed.), Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, New York: Kluwer, 2003, pp. 61–86. Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marine Corps Gazette,Vol. 83 No. 1, January 1999, pp. 18–22. Eitan Shamir, “The Strategic Corporal: Implications for Military Organization and Culture,” in Kobi Michael, Eyal Ben-Ari and David Kellen (eds), The Transformation of the World ofWarfare and Peace Support Operations,Westport: Praeger, in press. Christopher Coker, “The Unhappy Warrior,” RUSI, Vol. 150 No. 4, December 2005, pp. 13–16. Vogelaar and Kramer, “Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions,” op. cit., p. 424. Robert L. Bateman, “Force XXI and the Death of Auftragstaktik,” op. cit., p. 16. Paul T. Harig, “The Digital General: Reflections on Leadership in the Post-Information Age,” Parameters,Vol. 26 No. 3, 1996, p. 134. Donald Vandergriff, The Path toVictory: America’s Army and the Revolution of Human Affairs, California: Presidio, 2002, pp. 139, 140–143. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review,Vol. 84 No. 6, November–December, 2005, pp. 2–14. Daniel Hughes, “Abuses of German Military History,” Military Review, Vol. 66 No. 12, December 1986, pp. 66–76. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command:Mismanagement in the Army, New York: Hill and Wang, 1990, pp. 11– 9;Vandergriff, The Path toVictory, op. cit., p. 161, 181.

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34. Zeev Drory, Israel’s Reprisal Policy, 1953–1956: The Dynamics of Military Retaliation, New York:Taylor & Francis, 2004. 35. Mordechi Gur, “Raid into Gaza: Leadership, Comradeship and Operational Discipline,” Ma’arachot, Vol. 173 No. 3, 1966, pp. 4–5 (in Hebrew). 36. Zeev Drory, “Israel’s Reprisal Policy, op. cit., p. 31. 37. Cited in IDF, Command and Control Manual, 2005, p. 15. 38. Luttwak, Edward and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army, London: Allen Lane, 1975, p. 116. 39. Elyashiv Shimshi, By Virtue of Stratagem, Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1995, pp. 203–209 (in Hebrew). 40. Giora Segal, Mission Oriented Command in LIC, paper presented at MAZI 1st International Conference on LIC Warfare, 22 March 2004 (in Hebrew). 41. Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the US, UK and Israeli Armies, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011, pp. 120–122. 42. Ya’acov Hasdai, “Doers and “Thinkers in the IDF,” The Jerusalem Post Quarterly, Vol. 24, 1982, p. 16 (in Hebrew). 43. Vinograd, National Inquiry Commission into the Second LebanonWar, Part A, April 2007, p. 65 (in Hebrew); Ofer Shelach andYoav Limor, Captives in Lebanon:TheTruth About the Lebanon War, Tel Aviv:Yedioth Ahronoth, 2007, pp. 56–58, 66–76 (in Hebrew). 44. S. L. A. Marshall, Swift Sword:The Historical Record of Israel’sVictory June 1967, New York: American Heritage, 1967. 45. Major General Amiram Levine, lecture at the IDF Command and Staff College, April 2007. 46. Martin Van-Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, NewYork: Public Affairs, 2002, p. 262. 47. Avi Kober, “The Intellectual and Modern Focus in Israeli Military Thinking as Reflected in Maa’rachot Articles, 1948–2000,” Armed Forces and Society,Vol. 30 No. 1, Fall 2003, p. 156. 48. Vinograd, National Inquiry Commission into the Second LebanonWar, p. 585 (in Hebrew). 49. Agrrant, National Inquiry Commission into theYom KippurWar: Part D, 1975, pp. 1341–1347 (in Hebrew). 50. Ibid., p. 1347. 51. Gabriel Ben-Dor, Ami Pedahzur, Daphna Canetti-Nisim, Eran Zaidise, Arie Perliger and Shai Bermanis, “I Versus We: Collective and Individual Factors of Reserve Service Motivation During War and Peace,” Armed Forces and Society,Vol. 34 No. 4, July 2008, p. 569. 52. Moshe (Chicko) Tamir, UndeclaredWar, Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 2006, p. 96 (in Hebrew). 53. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, NewYork: Free Press, 1960, pp. 38–39. 54. Emanuel Wald, The Curse of the BrokenVessels, Tel Aviv: Schoken, 1987, pp. 158–160. 55. Paul Johnston, “Doctrine is Not Enough:The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies,” Parameters,Vol. 30, 2002, pp. 30–39. 56. Argyris and Schön, Theory in Practice, op. cit., 1974. 57. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency,” op. cit., p. 2. 58. Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command, op. cit., pp. 182–185. 59. Avi Kober, “The Intellectual and Modern Focus in Israeli MilitaryThinking,” op. cit., p. 155. 60. John Keegan, The Face of Battle, trans. Baruch Korot, Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1981 (in Hebrew). 61. Avi Tzur and Eti Abramov, “Interview with Commissionaire Uri Bar Lev,” in Warrior, Vol. 198, March 2006, p. 26 (in Hebrew). 62. Ibid., p. 27. 63. George E. Reed, “Toxic Leadership,” Military Review, Vol. 84 No. 4, July–August 2004, pp. 67–71. 64. F. J. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” in Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff (eds), The Handbook of Military Psychology, New Jersey:Wiley, 1991, pp. 453–470. 65. Argyris and Schön, Theory in Practice, op. cit., 1974.

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