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487957 2013

NMS16310.1177/1461444813487957new media & societyGabriels et al.

Article

Morality and involvement in social virtual worlds: The intensity of moral emotions in response to virtual versus real life cheating

new media & society 2014, Vol. 16(3) 451–469 © The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1461444813487957 nms.sagepub.com

Katleen Gabriels

iMinds – SMIT, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Karolien Poels

University of Antwerp, Belgium

Johan Braeckman Ghent University, Belgium

Abstract Our focus lies on moral emotions in the social virtual world Second Life (SL). Based on media equation theory we could expect that moral emotions regulate social virtual interactions in a similar way as they do in real life (RL). However, emotions are also linked with involvement, and SL residents presumably are more involved in SL compared to non-residents. Via two quasi-experiments, we tested to what extent moral emotions felt when being cheated on by a love partner are comparable in intensity when this happens in SL versus RL. Results show that for SL residents the intensity of moral emotions did not differ between SL versus RL situations, whereas for non-residents a SL situation triggered less intense emotions. Further, for SL residents the level of involvement in SL had a significant impact on the moral emotions in response to a SL situation. In social virtual worlds, media equation thus seems to depend on involvement. Keywords Moral emotions, morality, moral psychology, Second Life, virtual worlds Corresponding author: Katleen Gabriels, iMinds - SMIT, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, Brussels 1050, Belgium. Email: [email protected]

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Introduction Since the 2000s, the development and rapid growth of online three-dimensional virtual worlds is one of the most remarkable tendencies in the new media landscape. Numerous people nowadays have avatars in virtual surroundings like, amongst others, Second Life (SL) (Linden Lab, 2003) and World of Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment, 2004). World of Warcraft currently has over 10,000,000 subscribers (Activision Blizzard, 2012). Depending on the time of day one logs in on Second Life, there are between 30,000 and 60,000 people logged in simultaneously (Dwell on it, 2012). Studies show that users take virtual environments such as Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPGs) very seriously and place intense emotional energies into them (Yee, 2006). In addition, substantial evidence exists that the norms of actual life interactions regulate interactions in virtual environments (Miller, 2007). In this context, Williams (2010) writes about the mapping principle, which is the extent to which human behaviours occur in virtual space in the same way as they occur in offline environments. Other similarities in verbal and non-verbal behaviour between the virtual and the physical world have been found in numerous social studies (for an excellent summary of this line of research, see Fox et al., 2009). Miller (2007) elaborates on empirical studies that provide evidence for the prolongation of actual individual behaviour into virtual settings. In doing so, he refers to a study of Bailenson and Yee (2007) on virtual interpersonal touch in which research participants were asked to clean dirt spots from virtual objects and virtual others. Results demonstrate the persistence of actual behaviour as more force was used on virtual objects than on persons; informants were also softer to faces (as opposed to torsos) and more careful to virtual females (as opposed to males) (Miller, 2007: 1342). There is thus ample evidence that in virtual environments human behaviour follows the same rules and patterns as in non-mediated contexts. Findings show that this continuation is also the case for mediated moral responses. Slater et al. (2006) extrapolated the Milgram experiment to a virtual setting. Although the research participants knew that neither the stranger nor the shocks were genuine, they reacted to them as if they were factual, which is in line with the results of the original non-mediated Milgram study (Slater et al., 2006). The performance of (im)moral acts in virtual environments also seems to affect subsequent offline behaviour. For example, Segovia et al. (2010) focused on the self-importance of online moral identity and its flexibility. Participants had to watch a virtual scene that involved either their own virtual self or another participant that was acting either morally or immorally. Participants whose virtual selves experienced immoral behaviour had the tendency to compensate for that behaviour. In addition, participants with morally questionable behaviour online rated themselves less moral than other participants. Navarrete et al. (2011) simulated the classic ‘trolley problem’ in a virtual reality environment to study the relationship between moral judgments and moral actions. Their findings indicate that virtual environments are a valid platform to research and simulate moral behaviour. In current literature, the issue of morality and moral responses in social virtual worlds like Second Life has only received scant attention, however. The above-cited studies on mediated moral responses mainly focus on non-social virtual environments created for the study’s objectives with research participants who have no previous experience and thus no involvement in the particular virtual surrounding.

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The objectives of our study are, first, to examine the extent to which morality in social virtual worlds functions in the same way as it functions in the actual world, and second, by doing this, to give some much-needed research attention to the fairly under-explored area of morality and moral responses to virtual others and situations in social virtual worlds. The specific focus lies on the intensity of moral emotions in response to events that take place in a three-dimensional social virtual world and on what factors may or may not cause users to experience morally intense virtual interactions differently than morally charged actual world interactions. In two online quasi-experiments, we test the intensity of moral emotions when being cheated on by a love partner in a virtual world and its comparability to a similar real life (RL) situation. We focus on Second Life as one specific example of a three-dimensional social virtual world. It may seem plausible that moral emotions experienced in reaction to virtual cheating are not as intense as they are in response to cheating in the material world, since these virtual activities and interactions do not physically occur in the actual world. However, even though the cheating is not physically occurring, virtual world residents frequently invest actual life personal resources such as time, energy, money and so forth in the virtual world. In addition, the time that one spends in the virtual surroundings is time that is unavailable to spend with an actual life partner, friends, or relatives, so it is very likely that there might be actual life consequences, costs, and effects. Consequently, the investment of personal resources may lead to deeply intense moral emotions experienced in reaction to virtual cheating as one has invested much in the virtual world. Furthermore, as human perception and emotions were created during the evolutionary process for real life environments and face-to-face communication, one could posit the question if and to what extent perception and emotional and moral responses deviate in virtual environments (Steuer, 1992). In this context, Reeves and Nass (1996; see also Barkow, 1992) state that the human emotional brain is not adapted to a mediated context, and as such interprets behaviours taking place there as if they were actual. Following this reasoning, we could expect that perceptions and emotions in reaction to virtual events will be equally intense compared to those experienced in reaction to real life events. However, since emotions are closely related to involvement, people need to be sufficiently involved in a situation in order to experience intense emotions (Frijda, 1988). We posit an additional, alternative hypothesis that for people who repeatedly engage in SL and thus show substantial involvement in this medium, the nature and strength of moral emotions will be comparable between the virtual and the real world, whereas for people who have no involvement in the medium (e.g. non-SL residents) moral emotions in response to virtual-world cheating will be less intense compared to emotions in response to real life cheating. We further elaborate on involvement as a precondition for media equation in social virtual worlds by investigating whether for SL residents the intensity of moral emotions is also dependent on their involvement in the virtual medium.

Theoretical background Moral emotions Morality and moral emotions are often framed within an evolutionary perspective (see amongst many others Cartwright, 2000; Haidt, 2003; Ledoux, 1996; Lieberman et al., 2003; Öhman and Wiens, 2003; Rolls, 1999; Trivers, 1971). Emotions evolved since

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‘quick and reliable emotional responses were adaptive to individuals’ (Haidt, 2003: 853). For example, in a dangerous situation, sudden fear immediately prepares the body for actions such as running away or hiding oneself. This occurs rapidly, even before one has processed the situation (Ledoux, 1996). In the academic literature on emotions, authors usually distinguish between basic and more complex emotions. Although there is debate among scholars on how to classify and conceptualize basic emotions (for discussion, see e.g. Ekman, 1992; Ortony and Turner, 1990), the following six emotions are generally treated as basic: anger, disgust, fear, sadness, joy, and surprise (based on Ekman and Friesen, 1971). Basic emotions arise more spontaneously than do the more complex emotions such as empathy, revenge, guilt, pride, embarrassment, and shame, which require more active cognitive processing to develop (Power and Tarsia, 2007: 20). Whereas most emotions directly affect the interests of the self, there are emotions that do not immediately touch the self, although it is probable that they have indirect, longterm benefits. For instance, being able to feel compassion, guilt, and shame, and therefore act altruistically or show remorse when crossing moral borders, is beneficial for reciprocal altruism (Haidt, 2003). These are moral emotions, which are ‘those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent’ (Haidt, 2003: 853). Haidt asserts that moral emotions are rather a matter of degree than are well-demarcated emotions (2003: 864). He further identifies moral emotions by two components: disinterested elicitors that do not directly touch the self and prosocial action tendencies (Haidt, 2003). Although it can be difficult to distinguish moral emotions from other emotions, Haidt defines four joint families: one self-directed and three other-directed. First, the self-conscious emotions, namely shame, embarrassment, and guilt, which became adaptive to individuals, as it is essential for human beings to belong to groups. This family of emotions is ‘designed to help people navigate the complexities of fitting into groups’ (Haidt, 2003: 859). The second group contains the other-condemning emotions of contempt, anger, and disgust. This family consists of ‘the negative feelings about the actions or character of others’ and can be considered as a reaction against social violations (Haidt, 2003: 856). The third family is the other-suffering emotions, which include distress at another’s distress (DAAD), sympathy, and compassion. Finally, there are the otherpraising emotions; they consist of gratitude, awe, and elevation. All these moral emotions have an important share in the daily functioning of human morality (Haidt, 2003). It is widely accepted that the most prototypical moral emotion is compassion or empathy. To be able to feel compassion for someone in a difficult situation makes ‘people want to help, comfort, or otherwise alleviate the suffering of the other’ (Haidt, 2003: 862). Negative emotions can also have a strong connection with morality. For instance, several forms of injustice and repression towards the self, but also injustice towards others can invoke anger. This way, anger serves a social function to defend what is right and just for the self and the community. Therefore, situations that invoke anger can benefit the group. Another example is that of guilt: a person who feels guilty is motivated to help the victim and to repair the harm that has been done, which is beneficial to both the victim and the community. Further, someone who is acting morally can invoke feelings of awe and elevation in others, which motivates them to do good.

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Virtual worlds Situations involving social interactions in virtual surroundings have the potential to evoke moral emotions. For instance, injustice or insults in virtual environments can invoke protest and anger against the developers. In 2006, almost 10,000 Chinese players of Fantasy Westward Journey, a game based on a classical Chinese story, held an online protest against the appearance of the Japanese Rising Sun flag inside the game, which they saw as an insult to their national identity (Qiong, 2006). Moreover, in-world immoral behaviour can also make deceived users angry and emotional, as described by Craft (2007) and Luck (2009). Craft (2007) elaborates on a case of virtual theft and betrayal in Eve Online. Luck (2009) describes a virtual funeral that took place in World of Warcraft, honouring a character’s player who died in real life: ‘when members of an enemy guild heard that their rivals would be gathered together, they decided to ambush the funeral’ (2009: 281). In both cases, the intense reactions of deceived and angry players, who felt very emotional and condemned the actions, indicate that virtual space is a meaningful environment for them. These also illustrate that, contrary to the belief that virtual environments lack morality (e.g. Slouka, 1995), virtual space can be a moral space. Thus moral emotions not only regulate the functioning of human morality in the physical world, they also seem to occur when people interact in virtual reality and could be essential for the regulation of in-world morality. Castronova (2001) defines virtual worlds as computer programs that have interactivity, physicality, and persistence as their most essential features (2001: 5–6). Notwithstanding the fact that virtual worlds are computer-simulated environments, Boellstorff labels them as ‘places of human culture’ (2008: 17). Moreover, every virtual world has to contain three preliminary elements: a virtual world must be a place inhabited by persons and enabled by online technologies (Boellstorff, 2008: 17). Overall, the lack of a common definition in the academic game and virtual world literature often leads to confusion and misunderstandings, because several scholars describe virtual worlds in differing ways. Bell (2008) elaborates on this complexity and tries to converge diverse but useful definitions proposed by Richard Bartle (2003), Raph Koster (2004), and Edward Castronova (2004). As a result, Bell formulates a virtual world in the following way: ‘a synchronous, persistent network of people, represented as avatars, facilitated by networked computers’ (2008: 2). The above-mentioned definitions of Castronova (2001), Boellstorff (2008), and Bell (2008) are broader in comparison to definitions that explicitly reconcile virtual worlds with the lack of a game element. For instance, Ryan (2009: 23) has a more restricted view: ‘Virtual worlds are immersive online environments in which people interact for non-goal-oriented entertainment purposes.’

Second Life One of the most widely known social virtual worlds is Second Life, which was created by Philip Rosedale in 2003. Rosedale also founded Linden Lab, SL’s development company. Users of SL, the so-called ‘residents’, interact with each other through threedimensional avatars. We characterize SL as a three-dimensional, persistent, multi-user, computer-generated social, cultural, and moral space, inhabited by humans and their

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representational avatars. Other important features are a first-person perspective, realtime interaction between actual people, a shared virtual reality, the lack of a general game-oriented goal, and an open-end purpose. Furthermore, SL is ‘an immersive, usercreated online world’ (Au, 2008: x). The ‘user-created’ factor means that Linden Lab confines itself to the production of software and infrastructure and that residents design the virtual world by creating virtual objects. Residents can earn real profit by selling these objects. Linden Lab does not impose a goal on its residents, who are free to choose how they want to spend their time in-world. Because of the lack of strictly controlled scenarios and predetermined objectives, SL is not a game-oriented virtual world. SL is an interesting platform for studies in the field of social sciences (Bainbridge, 2007; Yee et al., 2007), as it can be understood as a collaborative microcosm filled with avatars that interact with each other in various ways. Shelton (2010) differentiates nine SL user motivations, i.e. fantasy, customization, role-playing, relationship, socialization, escapism, relaxation, advancement/challenge, and competition. Clearly, community building and sociality are essential in social virtual worlds. Boellstorff mentions three encoded categories of social relations in SL: ‘friend’, ‘partner’, and ‘group’ (2008: 232– 233). SL is particularly relevant to study social interactions, since it consists of numerous sims (abbreviation of ‘simulators’), virtual land on which avatars can socially bond. Following Ryan, ‘the underlying technical architecture of Second Life’s infrastructure helps shape social and power relations within that virtual world’ (2009: 41). This way, the design of SL stimulates social interaction and networking. On the ‘World Map’ one can see where other residents are in Second Life, as each dot on the map stands for another resident. In this way, one can easily visit or meet other residents by simply clicking on the dots and by teleporting oneself. Moreover, on the destination guide residents can look for in-world destinations, events, people, groups, or places. In addition, there is a friend list on which one can see who is on- or offline; one can offer friendship; one can become a member of various groups, often based on shared interests; and friends can be located online. In addition, Linden Lab offers numerous ways to communicate via chat, varying from voice chat and instant messaging to group chat.

Media equation theory In their pioneering work on media equation theory, Reeves and Nass (1996) provided convincing evidence that mediated communication can trigger equally strong responses as non-mediated communication. They focused on human interactions with computers, television, and new media and conducted several tests regarding the social and physical characteristics of virtual objects. Findings indicated that, similar to interpersonal relations, participants behave reciprocally towards computers and they disclose more information about themselves when the computer also reveals personal information. Reeves and Nass concluded that these interactions are ‘fundamentally social and natural, just like interactions in real life’ (1996: 5, italics in original). As our brain evolved in a world ‘in which all perceived objects were real physical objects’, everything that looked like a real person, place, or object, was real (1996: 12, italics in original). Contrary to cultural, technological, and digital developments, evolution is a slow process. The human emotional brain is not adapted to a virtual or mediated context and as such interprets

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behaviours taking place there as if they were real (Reeves and Nass, 1996). Their findings thus point to the evolutionary nature of mediated or virtual experience, and subsequently to the evolutionary origin of human reactions to physical and social characteristics of virtual objects (Lee and Jung, 2005). In addition, the psychobiological model of Kock (2004), based on evolutionary theory, is worth mentioning within this context. This model indicates a positive link between the ‘naturalness’ (i.e. how similar the medium is to face-to-face communication) of a communication medium and the cognitive effort that is required from the user who is engaged in the computer-mediated communication (Kock, 2004: 341). One can posit that three-dimensional virtual worlds like SL have a high degree of ‘naturalness’, as the activities taking place in-world are analogous to actual life activities and residents can communicate in real time via chat and voice. Based on the media equation theory and Kock’s psychobiological model, we can expect that these factors may cause users to experience morally charged SL interactions in the same way as morally charged actual-world interactions. This leads us to the formulation of the first hypothesis. H1: When people are exposed to an emotion-evoking situation, the intensity of moral emotions will be similar for situations occurring in real life and in SL.

Involvement in social virtual worlds In Second Life, frequent residents presumably experience a higher degree of involvement as they invest more personal resources in the medium compared to people who have no experience with this world (i.e. non-SL residents). For SL residents there are many ways in which they may become (more) involved in the medium. Many residents spend real money to buy land, textures, or scripts, amongst other things. Moreover, the medium itself requires a significant time investment as well: ‘in their current forms, synthetic worlds still require significant investments of time and attention to build one’s avatar, to learn how to participate in the world, and to develop proficiency at moving and interacting within the environment’ (Schultze and Rennecker, 2007: 348). This way, residents may not only devote much time to SL, they may also put a considerable amount of energy and effort into it. In other words, regular users spend substantial personal resources in these worlds. This implies that the world and the related activities are important to them. During his fieldwork in SL, Boellstorff also found that socializing with other residents, developing friendships, and investing ‘time and energy in finding, making, and maintaining friends’ was the ‘most common activity’ (2008: 157, 181). Although SL is not an MMORPG, the significant time investment is similar; Yee’s findings (2006) about time investment in MMORPGs show that users invest on average 22.72 hours on a weekly basis in their preferred MMORPG (10). Yee (2006) already points at the fact that virtual environments ‘encourage both time and emotional investment from the users and that users derive salient emotional experiences from these environments’ (12). In emotion literature, the experience of emotions has been closely linked to the involvement with the emotion-evoking object or event (Frijda, 1988; Frijda et al., 1989). In actual life, (moral) emotions are experienced more intensely when one is deeply involved in a situation or event (Frijda, 1988).

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Following this, we can expect that investment of personal resources in, and thus a higher degree of involvement in, a specific virtual world will lead to a deeper intensity of (moral) emotions experienced in social virtual worlds. As people who are not subscribed to SL cannot get involved in the medium, SL residents only are expected to experience morally charged situations in virtual and physical interactions similarly. Furthermore, among SL residents the degree of involvement with the medium can differ as well. This involvement is a precondition for experiencing intense moral emotions in response to virtual events that are comparable to the intensity of moral emotions evoked by an actual life situation. This contrasts with ‘pure’ media equation and thus we formulate the following alternative hypotheses. H2a: When SL residents are exposed to an emotion-evoking situation, the intensity of moral emotions will be similar for situations occurring in real life and in SL. H2b: When non-SL residents are exposed to an emotion-evoking situation, the intensity of moral emotions will be weaker when the situation occurs in SL compared to real life. H3: For SL residents, the intensity of moral emotions to an emotion-evoking situation in SL will depend on their involvement with this virtual medium.

Study 1a Procedure We invited participants to partake in an online study on (moral) emotions in actual and virtual life. The survey related to the study was created on SurveyMonkey (www.surveymonkey.com) and it took participants about 20 minutes to complete it. The online survey was open to participants for about a month on the Internet. The survey had its own website and we spread its URL via the Internet. As two groups of participants were recruited and compared, namely SL residents and non-SL residents, both groups received extra information before starting the online questionnaire: Part of the survey is about the virtual world Second Life (SL) (www.secondlife.com). You do not have to be active in SL to be able to complete the survey. If you are not familiar with SL, here is more information: ‘SL is a three-dimensional virtual community on the internet, accessible for everyone over the age of eighteen. People who are active in SL (‘residents’) interact with each other through avatars. They can explore, meet other residents (for friendship, love, network or business reasons), socialize, participate in individual and group activities, and create and trade virtual property and services with each other.’

Design We used a two by two quasi-experimental between-subjects design. The first independent variable was the participants’ involvement in Second Life, a variable that we just extracted from the population without any manipulation. One group consisted of regular SL residents (n=158) and another group of non-SL residents (n=172). The

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second independent variable was the type of situation to which they had to respond. We randomly assigned participants to one of the two scenarios: (1) you are being cheated on by your love partner in real life (situation RL) or, (2) you are being cheated on by your love partner (i.e. an avatar) in Second Life (situation SL). Both situations were alike; in the SL situation, it was emphasized that it concerned a virtual relationship. We asked participants to imagine as vividly as possible that the situation described in the scenario would happen to them personally. The exact scenarios are presented below. Situation SL For a while you have been an active Second Life-resident. You spend a few hours per day in this virtual world. A year ago, you fell in love with another Second Life-resident and started an intimate virtual relationship with this person. You are taking this relationship seriously. You have just discovered that your partner has repeatedly cheated on you over the past few months. Situation RL A year ago, you fell in love with a particular person and started an intimate relationship with him/her. You are taking this relationship seriously. You have just discovered that your partner has repeatedly cheated on you over the past few months.

Dependent measures We measured the participants’ emotions after they read the scenario using a list of selfdirected and other-directed moral emotions, which they had to rate by means of a five-point intensity scale (Watson et al., 1988). The self-directed emotions are sadness, disappointment, regret, indifference, humiliation, shame, embarrassment, feeling betrayed, and jealousy. The other-directed emotions are anger, disgust, hate, revenge, and forgiveness.

Participants We recruited participants through Facebook and via email invitations. To recruit SL residents, we additionally distributed the link to the survey on Second Life and on various SL blogs and forums. Participants had to be 18 years or older. All participants took part on a voluntary basis and did not receive any money or compensation. A total of 491 people clicked on the link to the study, but a substantial number of people did not begin the actual survey or only filled in parts of the questions. After filtering these incomplete surveys, 330 participants (Mage=36, SD=12) were maintained. This sample consisted of both SL (n=158) and non-SL residents (n=172), and both male (n=128) and female (n=201) participants (+ 1 missing). The division of male versus female participants did not differ between the two sub-samples (Chi2, df 1, n=329, p=.37). The average age of the non-SL resident sub-sample was lower than the resident

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subsample (t(328)=8.25, Mage_nonres=31.11 years, SD=10.45 years; Mage_res=40.96 years, SD=11.23 years; p