Multiculturalism and Minority Rights

Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: Serbia and the EU By Margarita Neibauere

Submitted to University of Amsterdam Identity & Integration Program

Supervisor: Claske Vos

Margarita Neibauere 5950252 Master Thesis Identity & Integration Supervisor: dr. Claske Vos Second reader: dr. M.E. Spiering Amsterdam: The Netherlands July 2014 E-mail: [email protected]

Inhoud Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2 1 Theoretical Framework: Multiculturalism and Minority Rights ................................................. 7 1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 7 1.2 Three Stages of the Minority Debate .................................................................................... 8 1.3 Kymlicka’s Group Differentiated Rights ............................................................................ 13 1.4 Three Arguments for Group Differentiated Rights ............................................................. 16 1.5 Nation-building and Minority Rights.................................................................................. 18 1.6 Implications of Kymlicka’s theory for the Implementation of Minority Rights in Serbia . 19 2 Minority Rights in the Context of the EU.................................................................................. 23 2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 23 2.2 Emergence of ‘Respect for and protection of minorities’ in the EU Accession Context .... 25 2.3 EU Minority Rights Instruments and Allegations of Double Standards ............................. 27 2.4 Tensions between Liberalism and Communitarianism in the internal and external EU approach to Multiculturalism .................................................................................................... 30 3 Minority Rights in Serbia: Policies and Perceptions ................................................................. 34 3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 34 3.2 Historical look at Minority Policies in Serbia..................................................................... 36 3.3 Serbian Perceptions of Minorities ....................................................................................... 42 3.4 Serbia and the EU: Two Disparate Accounts of Multiculturalism ...................................... 46 4 Minority Rights in Sandžak ....................................................................................................... 48 4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 48 4.2 Bosniak Communities in Sandžak: Involuntary Incorporation ........................................... 49 4.3 Illiberal Nation-State Building in Serbia ............................................................................ 52 4.4 The Implementation of the FCNM in Sandžak ................................................................... 55 4.5 Group differentiated rights in Sandžak ............................................................................... 62 5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 65 5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 65 5.2 The case of Sandžak: Just claims for Group-differentiated Rights ..................................... 66 5.3 The Role of the European Union ........................................................................................ 68

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Introduction Ever since the fall of Communism, post-socialist countries have been pressured by the international community to adopt Western standards regarding multiculturalism and minority rights. In fact, respect for and protection of minorities is heralded as a core EU value and is therefore part of the accession criteria that the newly democratizing countries of Central and Eastern Europe must meet in order to gain EU membership. International frameworks and minority and human rights instruments are utilized by the European Union in order to export their guidelines and norms to countries such as Serbia. The underlying assumption is that Western liberal values and standards are equally applicable to Central and Eastern European and Western Balkan countries and would function well if endorsed by these communities. However, as this thesis will show, Western countries differ not only amongst themselves when it comes to managing cultural pluralism but they differ significantly from Central and Eastern European countries, both in terms of their approach to ethnocultural diversity as well as various other underlying factors such as e.g. the socio-political climate, history, demography and regional stability. In light of these differences, Western models of multiculturalism may not be appropriate or applicable and as a consequence more contextual methods may be necessary in order to guarantee a meaningful and sustainable minority rights implementation. In accordance with this theme, this thesis will address the following question: How do the discrepancies between the European and Serbian approach to multiculturalism obstruct a meaningful and durable implementation of minority rights in Serbia’s Sandžak and what is a possible meeting ground that could facilitate further progress? In order to answer the question of why minority policies in Sandžak have only been moderately successful when it comes to achieving a durable scope of minority rights implementation, it is necessary to look at the larger debate surrounding multiculturalism and how it is interrelated to policies pursued by both Serbia and the European Union. Therefore, a theoretical discussion, illustrating the various accounts of multiculturalism will serve as a point of departure in this thesis. Separate chapters will then more elaborately deal with the strategies pursued by the EU and Serbia as well as address the underlying value systems guiding these strategies. The discussion will show that both the EU and Serbia adhere to disparate accounts of multiculturalism, which as a result thwarts any progress regarding minority rights. Will Kymlicka’s theory on group differentiated citizenship will then be introduced as a 2

potential middle ground and will be applied and tested in the case of Sandžak. The following sections will address the focus on Serbia and Sandžak as well as demonstrate the relevance of Kymlicka’s theory to this research. The discussion will then be followed by a succinct chapter outline and close with the preliminary outcome. There are several reasons to observe the rights of the minorities in Serbia and to do so specifically in Sandžak. First, Serbia is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in South East Europe, with notable populations of Hungarians, Roma and Bosniaks among many other. The wars that were waged on the territory of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, accompanied by mass violence against civilians and the continuous migrations of the refugees caused by successive waves of ethnic cleansing, have had tragic consequences for all minority groups in the region. In addition, the post conflict egregious human and minority rights violations under Milošević only served to heighten the already present atmosphere of mistrust. After the democratic changes in 2000, Serbia , then part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, started changing its discriminatory practices and passed several appropriate laws for protection of its minorities. On May 11, 2001 Serbia joined the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), which was ratified by the Federal Parliament, on September 1, 2001. This development indicated that Serbia has been willing to undertake the responsibility to enforce the requirements of the FCNM. Due to this complexity of ethnic relations in Serbia and the intricacy of minority-state relations, Serbia presents an interesting case for the evaluation of minority related progress. The second reason to pay attention to this specific region is related to the minority group in question. The Bosniak minority communities of Sandžak are among the most disadvantaged and underprivileged groups in Serbia and their situation, therefore, offers a good benchmark by which minority rights progress can be measured in Serbia. In many ways the current Serbian government remains deaf to the region's numerous problems regarding a wide variety of issues and continues to discriminate in both obvious and subtle fashion against the regions majority population, a problem that is stalling Serbia on its further path towards the EU. Concurrently, the Bosniaks are increasingly asserting their unique societal identity: The preservation of their cultural heritage and Bosnian language related issues among other things play a central role in this ethnocultural revival.

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There are furthermore several reasons for the application of Kymlicka’s theoretical framework of multiculturalism for the discussion of the Bosniaks in Sandžak. First of all, Kymlicka is one of the leading advocates of national and ethnic rights in liberal political philosophy. His work has helped to shape the debate on the rights and status of ethnocultural minorities in liberal democracies. In addition to providing various arguments in favor of group differentiated rights, Kymlicka offers a meaningful framework for assessing the rights claims of various cultural groups and as a consequence his theory has a wide range of applicability. Furthermore, Kymlicka’s theory and the associated recommendations are generally in agreement with the provisions of the Council’s Framework Convention and is therefore capable of justifying its objectives. Moreover, his typology helps to differentiate between the different types of societal cultures, as well as their associated group rights. Considering the persistent problems stemming from cultural diversity and the growing importance of international norms for minority rights in Serbia, applying Kymlicka’s theory and additionally evaluating some of its drawbacks can furthermore contribute to an educated discussion about whether or not these international norms can and should be applied in the specific case study. The structure of this thesis will be outlined below. A succinct discussion of the course of the minority rights debate will serve as a point of departure in the first chapter, introducing various key interpretations in the theoretical debate on multiculturalism. Afterwards, central elements of Will Kymlicka’s liberal theory on minority rights will be introduced, followed by a section elaborating on the implications and significance of his theory for the implementation of minority rights in Serbia, as well as on its relation to the FCNM, a human and minority rights instrument which has increasingly become a key point of reference in the EU’s assessment of candidates’ minority policies. Considering the importance of ‘’Europeanization’’ of minority rights in Serbia’s enlargement policy, the second chapter will briefly discuss the emergence of minority rights on the European political agenda, as well as introduce some of the legal instruments for protection of minority rights that currently serve as key reference points when assessing minority policy implementation within states that are queueing for membership. In addition, the chapter will relate the current EU policy approach to its associated theory of multiculturalism, as well as address some of the difficulties facing the European Union’s internal approach when dealing with diversity. The discussion will show that while the EU uniformly promotes strategies of

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liberal multiculturalism in its external agenda, internally diverging trends can be perceived in the form of both assimilation and multiculturalism. Additionally, certain criticisms will be raised along the way. The third chapter will provide a historical look into some of the more general characteristics of the Serbian minority policy to see how far the country has come in furthering the protection of minorities and nurturing cultural diversity. The discussion will then determine what current legal frameworks are in place for the protection of minorities as part of the preaccession negotiations. In addition, the chapter will address some of the factors that to this day continue to shape the Serbian perceptions on national minorities, as well as relate the discussion to theories on multiculturalism in order to shed light on some of the discrepancies between the EU and Serbia when it comes to dealing with minority groups. The last part of this thesis will discuss the situation and rights of Bosniak minorities in the Serbian Sandžak within the framework of Kymlicka’s theory of group-differentiated citizenship. It will be the tentative assumption of this final chapter that in the case of Sandžak, the opposing values of the EU and Serbia can be sufficiently reconciled, through the application of Kymlicka’s contextually focused approach. The discussion will identify the Sandžak Bosniaks as national minorities and elaborate briefly on the involuntary incorporation of their communities into the Serbian nation state. A different section will address the relationship between state nation-building and minority rights. The discussion will show that the Serbian state is engaged in nation-building that potentially disadvantages members of minority communities. The current rights of the Bosniak minorities in Sandžak will then be discussed within the framework of the FCNM. Based on the findings in the earlier discussion, this thesis will then assess the reasons behind some of the difficulties in implementing FCNM and will additionally explore several ways in order to more effectively meet the demands of the Bosniak minority in Sandžak and in turn, move ahead with the negotiation process. Moreover, both the applicability and limitations of Kymlicka’s theory within the Sandžak regional context will be evaluated. The conclusion is that Kymlicka’s theory on minority rights presents a meaningful groundwork that allows for an effective analysis of the cultural landscape in Serbia's Sandžak. In accordance with his theory, this thesis subscribes to the idea that effective measures in the form of special representation rights and self-government rights are needed in order to allow these groups to preserve and

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develop their unique cultural identities. However, due to practical considerations, as well as the nature of the Serbian state the research deviates from Kymlicka’s concept of a multinational federation as the answer to the ethnonational problems facing Serbia. Instead, it proposes a less radical solution of meaningful regional autonomy, which will provide sufficient framework to accommodate minority needs.

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1 Theoretical Framework: Multiculturalism and Minority Rights 1.1 Introduction The increasingly multicultural framework of contemporary societies has given rise to a number of issues and matters of contention, as both ethnic and national minority groups demand acknowledgment and support in order to preserve their cultural identity. There are a number of scholars who have addressed various conceptions on the rights and status of minority cultures and presented what they argue are proper ways to respond to both religious and ethnic diversity. Multiculturalism, then, is a term that describes one particular way of responding to this reality. “It is a position that rejects assimilation and the “melting pot” image as an imposition of the dominant culture, and instead prefers such metaphors as the “salad bowl” or the “glorious mosaic”, in which each ethnic and racial element in the population maintains its distinctiveness”.1 Like with many other concepts in political theory, there exists no consensus about what constitutes multiculturalism and as a consequence it continues to be a highly controversial and debated issue. For some, multiculturalism necessitates the realization of social and institutional changes in order to enable cultural and religious minorities to preserve and develop their distinctive customs. For others, multiculturalism is about removing both overt and subtle racism and cultivating, rather than rejecting or tolerating difference. Despite of the various forms it assumes, multiculturalism is generally placed in opposition to the assimilationist strategies prevalent in the past. As a political philosophy and policy approach, the concept of multiculturalism suggests that in an attempt to structure a cohesive society from various distinct cultural, ethnic and religious communities, ‘’it is better to acknowledge and value that diversity and not seek to minimize diversity, or to cast various groups within one single cultural mould’’. 2 An indispensable realization is that multiculturalism means different things in different places. More than this, multiculturalism can assume various forms and be understood very differently within the same country. That being said, both the European Union and Serbia adhere to different interpretations of the concept of multiculturalism. A succinct discussion of the course of the minority rights debate will serve as a point of 1

Gerald F. Gaus & Chandran Kukathas. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE, 2004. Pp. 251. Jeffrey G. Reitz. Multiculturalism and Social Cohesion: Potentials and Challenges of Diversity. New York: Springer Publishing, 2009. Pp. 1. 2

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departure in this chapter, introducing various key interpretations in the theoretical debate on multiculturalism. Afterwards, central elements of Will Kymlicka’s liberal theory on minority rights will be introduced, followed by a section elaborating on the implications and significance of his theory for the implementation of minority rights in Serbia, as well as on its relation to the FCNM, a human and minority rights instrument which has increasingly become a key point of reference in the EU’s assessment of candidates’ minority policies.

1.2 Three Stages of the Minority Debate The modern day debate over the rights of minorities during the 1970s and 1980s essentially began in the form of a critical reaction to John Rawls book A Theory of Justice (1971) which reignited the old controversy between liberalism and communitarianism. Drawing primarily upon Aristotelian and Hegelian insights, political philosophers such as e.g. Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer contradicted Rawls' suggestion that the central task of the government is to guarantee and distribute fairly the liberties, wealth and income individuals need to lead freely chosen lives.3 For liberals the primary aim of human rights was to bring about freedom and autonomy for individuals. Communitarians on the other hand stressed the importance of shared values and communities and therefore the necessity to recognize and respect the identity of individuals as members of groups.4 For instance, in his famous essay, The Politics of Recognition, Charles Taylor emphasizes the crucial role society plays in the formation of an identity and the importance of a community to be recognized. He states that: “Identity is formed by others recognition, or the absence of it, and often its misrecognition of it, so that one person or a group of people can suffer inconsiderably, suffer from a real distortion, if the people or the society surrounding them reflect a restricted or a degrading image of them.”5 The debate on whether human rights should mostly protect individual freedom or group identity was one of the more pronounced expressions of a much larger controversy between individual and collective rights within the human rights theory. At the earlier stage of the debate, supporting minority rights was inevitably tied to the communitarian criticism of liberal 3

‘Communitarianism.’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2013. Web. June 25, 2014. David Kindley. Human Rights: Old Problems, New Possibilities. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013. Pp. 201. 5 Charles Taylor. ‘Politics of Recognition.’ Hiram Meléndez Juarbe: Portal Académico. Pp. 1. Web. July 10, 2014. 4

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individualism, and to the perception of minority rights as a defense of minority groups against liberalism. The advocates of minority rights generally agreed with communitarians that the concept of minority rights stood in stark contradiction to liberal individualism and as a consequence saw in it the inherent failure of liberalism. However, for as long as this liberal-communitarian, autonomy-identity controversy has existed, there have been various attempts to create a connection between the two disparate accounts of human rights. Various theorists have both contributed to and strengthened the position of liberal culturalism, which is essentially framed around the crucial importance of cultural identity and national membership for the autonomy of individuals. For instance, Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, emphasize the value and importance of communities and successful relationships to the overall well-being of their individual members.6 Certainly one of the most influential of these theories is presented by Will Kymlicka, who believes that liberals should value group attachment, because it provides a ‘context of choice’ which allows individuals to make independent choices about what constitutes ‘the good life’ for them. 7 Kymlicka’s first theory was developed in his two major works: Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989) and Multicultural Citizenship (1995). Kymlicka’s work was developed out of his dissatisfaction with the political theory of post-war liberalism, which was based on the assumption that the issues surrounding minority rights could be resolved by guaranteeing the protection of individual rights, as codified in the UN Charter. In his influential work, Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka claims that individual rights are not enough to protect minorities from majority oppression and provides a liberal theory in favour of minority rights. However, he does emphasize that no uniform formula can be applied to all groups and that the aspirations of immigrant communities are generally different from those of indigenous peoples and national minorities. More precisely, he contends that liberal democracies must accommodate such diversity in a morally defensible way and that safeguarding group-specific rights requires the development of the concept of "group-differentiated" citizenship. 8 For instance, he advocates self-government rights for indigenous peoples and national minorities because their minority status is unchosen. In other 6

Joseph Raz. ‘Multiculturalism. A Liberal Perspective.’ Birkbeck University of London. Pp. 177. Web. July 10, 2014. 7 David Kindley. Human Rights: Old Problems, New Possibilities. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013. Pp. 203. 8 Julie Sunday. ‘Minority Rights.’ Globalization and Autonomy. Web. June 28, 2014.

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words, such groups have often been forcibly incorporated into the larger state. This as opposed to immigrant communities, who in his opinion are composed of voluntary economic migrants who have chosen to give up the access to their native culture by migrating to a different country. He understands immigrant multiculturalism mostly as a demand for fairer terms of integration, e.g. funding for bilingual education or exemptions from dress codes, and not a rejection of integration.9 The individualism versus collectivism controversy, that marked the discussion at its primary stage soon provoked another debate on multiculturalism which was primarily preoccupied with the question as to how state neutrality was to be interpreted within the framework of liberal culturalism. Advocates of liberal culturalism support the idea that certain minority rights may advance liberal values. However, the very idea of granting special rights to minority communities stands in stark contrast to the concept of a ‘neutral’ liberal state. As a consequence, liberal culturalists aimed to meet the burden of proof by demonstrating the importance of cultural adherence in advancing and protecting individual autonomy. In short, their aim was to prove that special rights supplement individual autonomy and equality. However, the extent of special group rights within liberal theory remains highly disputed. 10 One of the difficulties facing liberal culturalists is separating minority rights that supplement individual rights, from those that restrict them. Kymlicka aims to tackle this problem by differentiating between ‘internal restrictions’ and ‘external protections’. Internal restrictions are those that a community wants imposed against members of the community. These restrictions may impinge upon basic and political liberties of a groups individual member. External protections, on the other hand, are designed to reduce the restrictions that are imposed upon a certain community by external pressures.11 The veiled assumption that had characterized the second stage of the debate in the late 80s and 90s, was the ethnocultural neutrality of the liberal state. Generally, liberals have strongly supported the idea of a secular state and the privatization of religion, for that reason many have assumed that the concept of state neutrality could be equally applicable to cultural diversity. Many theorists furthermore frame the concept of the separation of state and culture within the 9

‘Multiculturalism.’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2014. Web. June 26, 2014. One example is Brian Barry’s Culture and Equality. His criticism will be elaborated below. 11 Jeff Spinner-Halev. Surviving Diversity: Religion and Democratic Citizenship. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000. Pp. 58. 10

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(liberal) civic and (illiberal) ethnic debate.12 While ethnic nations have a genuine interest and take an active part in safeguarding a particular culture and identity, civic nations define their membership in terms of common political values. It should therefore come as no surprise that minority rights, in liberal states, have often been rejected based on the ideal of a civic nation and a neutral state. The third stage constituted a radical departure in the sense that the very idea of liberal ethno-neutrality had grown increasingly contested. For instance, according to Kymlicka, no civic (liberal) state can possibly hope to be neutral in determining which ethnic groups’ language, culture and national holidays to advocate at the national level. Equally, communitarians such as Charles Taylor disagree with the idea that the state neutral liberalism functions in a culturally neutral manner. He states that: “Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges”. As an “organic outgrowth of Christianity” he states, “liberalism can’t and shouldn’t claim complete cultural neutrality.’’13 As demonstrated above, the debate over multiculturalism and minority rights has intensified over the past few decades, specifically in the Western countries. However, liberal criticism of multiculturalism has also achieved a fair amount of success. One of the proponents of multicultural criticism is the political philosopher Brian Barry, who in his book Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism systematically attacks the concept of multiculturalism. Barry believes that multiculturalism is inconsistent with liberal egalitarianism because it condemns liberal rights, fragments society, and in addition removes the attention from the socio economic inequalities. According to Barry, concepts such as common citizenship or the universal right do not negate the multicultural realities of today's societies. In fact he contends that liberal citizenship does a pretty good job at promoting inter cultural co-existence. 14 In contrast to a number of proponents of multiculturalism, who denounce universality and instead promote politics of difference, Barry views the latter as a formula for manufacturing conflict. He

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William Pfaff. The Wrath of Nations. Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993. Pp. 162. 13 Gerd Baumann The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities. NY: Routledge, 1999. Pp. 111. 14 Pierik Roland. Rev. of Culture and equality : An egalitarian critique of multiculturalism by Brian Barry. Political Theory. Vol. 30, No. 5, October 2002. Pp.751.

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convincingly argues that group specific rights have not proven to be a fruitful enterprise and instead believes that these rights create a larger diversity within a community. He furthermore attacks various proposals advanced by multiculturalists, such as the theory of group differentiated rights (Kymlicka) and public recognition (Taylor), stating that these ideas threaten the fabric of society and justice. In Barry’s view, liberal institutions have provided more opportunities for immigrants than multicultural theorists tend to recognize. As a consequence, he contends that successes need to build upon the expansion of liberal justice rather than its abandonment.15 In contrast to the aforementioned political theorists, Brian Barry argues for a uniform model of citizenship according to which “everybody enjoys the same legal and political rights,” with no differentiations being made between citizens on the basis of group membership, class, or ethnicity.16 He furthermore suggests that those who migrate permanently to liberal democratic societies have the responsibility to act in accordance with the customs of the host nation. He states that “it is an appropriate objective of public policy in a liberal democratic state to facilitate the achievement of a state of affairs in which all immigrants - or at least their descendants become assimilated to the national identity of the country in which they have settled.”17 Brian Barry’s criticism of multicultural advocates takes issue with liberal multiculturalists understanding of what equality requires. In his view, religion and culture may shape one's disposition towards seizing certain opportunities, but they do not affect whether one has an opportunity. He contends that justice is primarily concerned with providing equal opportunities and not with guaranteeing equal access to any particular choices or outcomes.18 Barry believes that neither cultural nor religious affiliations ultimately limit the scope of opportunities one can enjoy. However, they do clearly impinge upon the choices one can make within a set of given opportunities available to all. He also distinguishes between both positive and negative public policies that are involved in equal treatment. For instance, the former refers to policies that

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Pratap Bhanu Mehta. Rev. of Culture and equality : An egalitarian critique of multiculturalism by Brian Barry. The Journal of Politics. Vol. 64, No. 2, 2002. Pp. 681-683. 16 Anna Stilz. ‘Civic Nationalism and Language Policy.’ Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 37, No. 3, 2009. Pp. 261. 17 David Bromell. ‘Ethnicity, Identity and Public Policy Critical Perspectives on Multiculturalism.’ Institute for Governance and Policy Studies. 2008. Pp. 253. 18 Brian Barry. ‘Equal Treatment & Same Treatment.’ The Wilf Family Department of Politics. Pp. 11. Web. July 10, 2014.

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provide subsidies and other resources to minority groups, while the latter grants minority groups exemptions from certain obligations, such as for instance the case concerning crash helmets. All positions taken in the communitarian/liberalism debate ultimately reflect a certain position in relation to sate, society and the characteristics of the minority group. Cultural factors and justifications will often result in the hierarchization of rights and therefore in the prioritization of certain interpretations of the concept of multiculturalism over others. I believe that neither a strict communitarian, nor a liberal concept can provide the answer to the multiethnic realities of today’s societies and therefore a more contextual approach, taking into account the various regional complexities as well as minority and state relations, is necessary in order to meaningfully address the problems emanating from cultural pluralism.

1.3 Kymlicka’s Group Differentiated Rights The majority of the countries in the world are made up of cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities that are different from the majority population. The diverse character of nations creates considerable challenges for countries to accommodate cultural diversity fairly. Kymlicka states: ‘’Minorities and majorities increasingly clash over issues as language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, education, curriculum, land claims, immigration, and naturalization policy, even national symbols, such as the choice of national anthem and public holidays. Finding morally defensible and politically viable answers to these issues are the greatest challenge facing democracies today.’’ 19 Throughout history, many efforts have been undertaken to safeguard the rights of minorities and to resolve minority conflicts. Nationalist conflicts have formed a constant threat to international peace and stability and this encouraged liberals to attend to the rights of minority groups. After the WWII, the codification of human rights was the central principle guiding the UN Charter and the protection of individual rights was considered as adequate in also protecting those belonging to a minority group.20 However, it soon became apparent that the existing arrangements within the framework of human rights could not provide sufficient protection for minorities and as a consequence a new approach was necessary to meet the demands of minority communities. The major issue 19 20

Will Kymlicka. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. 1. Julie Sunday. ‘Minority Rights.’ Globalization and Autonomy. Web. June 28, 2014.

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with the traditional civil and political rights was that they could not address the questions that arose in relation to ethnic and national groups, such as i.e.: ‘’Which language should be recognized in the parliament? Should ethnic or national groups have publicly funded education in their mother tongue? Should political offices be distributed in accordance with a principle of ethnic or national proportionality?’’21 If the state was going to address these questions it needed to supplement individual rights with institutional measures that also represented its multi-ethnic reality. According to Kymlicka, the problem is that these questions were and to this day are generally left in the hands of the majority and this has resulted in increasing vulnerability of minority groups to social injustice, which has only served to aggravate the ethnocultural conflicts. Kymlicka contends that there is little hope to secure peace and respect for human rights until the minority rights issues are resolved. To date the topic of minority rights is too often dealt with in somewhat vague terms, therefore Kymlicka’s attempt to differentiate between certain groups is certainly commendable as specification of the definitions in this debate is often necessary. This, by no means, signifies an endorsement of his specific proposal for differentiation, however it does enable to elevate the discussion beyond the broad definition of minorities. Kymlicka’s complete systematic classification of cultural minorities allows to compare both the nature and claims of the different communities. As mentioned above, Kymlicka divides ethnocultural groups into two general categories: national minorities (in multinational states) and immigrant groups (in polyethnic states). The main reason for the separation of these two groups lies in the often divergent aims of both groups. Whereas the main goal of a national minority is to be independent, the goal of an immigrant is to integrate. Obviously this theory does have its weaknesses. For one, not only does it provide a very one-sided and mostly unrealistic view of especially immigrant minorities, it furthermore points towards a discrepancy within Kymlicka’s own views. Kymlicka is known as a staunch defender of both national and immigrant minorities. However with regards to the latter, he seems to advocate a policy of assimilation, which ultimately entails the abandonment of one's identity. This also appears somewhat at odds with current migrant’s policies in most Western European countries, who despite advocating integration still accept the preservation of one owns identity. Despite of these objections, which are mainly aimed at Kymlicka’s treatment of immigrant 21

Yonatan Fessha. Ethnic Diversity and Federalism. London: Ashgate, 2010. Pp. 18.

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minorities, his group-differentiated theory elaborates rather exhaustively on the main focus of this research, namely, the rights of national minorities, additionally taking into account the minority state relations in post socialist settings. Therefore, when it comes to the assessment of the rights of the Sandžak Bosniaks his theory is still very much relevant and applicable. A multinational state which grants universal human rights to all its citizens, irrespectively of one's group affiliations, may be perceived as neutral. Kymlicka, however, perceives it in a different light and states that a neutral state is neither realistic nor impartial. He describes it as “the myth of ethnocultural neutrality”22 which in essence is a reflection of hegemonic culture, in that it privileges the majority population in fundamental ways. One example of this would be the language of schools, governments and courts. Minority groups are essentially forced to accept the lifestyle that is imposed by a majority group and this in turn may radically decrease the political power and the cultural feasibility of a minority group. As a consequence, this ‘’neutrality’’ is actually a legitimization of discrimination. Because of this injustice Kymlicka proposes a different model, namely a differentiation policy, which is fairer towards minorities, as it grants them group specific rights that may reimburse some of the inequalities and help them integrate into society as well as to retain some of their cultural identity. The group differentiated rights Kymlicka defines are self-government rights, polyethnic rights and special representation rights. Self-government rights are answers to claims put forward by national minority groups, such as those of indigenous peoples and polyethnic rights are those articulated in response to immigrant and religious minority demands, such as for instance anti-racism policies, funding of ethnic associations and exemptions from law. Lastly, special representation rights are described as corollary to self-governmental rights and are used in order to offset the historical exclusion that individuals of disadvantaged communities experience.

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One way to address these

inequalities is to make political parties more inclusive and to reduce the barriers which restrain members from disadvantaged groups from becoming party candidates. In general, much criticism is directed at the very idea of group-differentiated rights. There are generally two types of criticisms. The first is skeptical of the very claim that groups can hold rights, whereas the second criticism is directed at the implications or consequences of ascribing 22

Will Kymlicka. ‘Nation-building and minority rights: Comparing West and East.’ Highbeam Business. 2000. Web. July 17, 2014. 23

George Iordanou. ‘Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship.’ Iordanou. Dec. 2011. Web. 27 June. 2014.

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rights to groups. The common worry is the threat that group rights may pose to individual rights. 24 However, according to Kymlicka, if the group-differentiated rights did not exist, minority communities would be deprived of their rights of learning and working in their own native language, something that the majority group takes for granted. Therefore, despite of this criticism, he offers three arguments in favor of group rights.

1.4 Three Arguments for Group Differentiated Rights Kymlicka offers three arguments in support of group-differentiated rights: the equality argument, the role of historical agreements and the value of cultural diversity. As the discussion will show, the value of cultural diversity and the historical agreements are not particularly appropriate for the purpose of justifying the rights of national minorities. Therefore, the discussion here will primarily focus on the equality argument. According to the equality argument, group-specific rights are necessary to offset the disadvantages that are faced exclusively by members of minority cultures within states that are actively engaged in diffusing a societal culture. It affirms that group-differentiated measures are needed to guarantee that all citizens are treated equally in a society. Group specific rights such as i.e. territorial autonomy or language rights may rectify these disadvantages by for instance ensuring that members of minority communities are granted the opportunity to live and work in their own culture. The realization of historical agreements such as treaty rights of indigenous people, terms of federation, agreement concerning boundaries and use of language is important according to the equality principle. If the integration of a national minority happened on voluntary grounds, the rights may have been written down in treaties, which presents both moral and legal arguments to respects these agreements. However, this may create problems for groups that never relinquished control or that were integrated involuntary. In that case the national minorities have the right to claim self-determination. However, Kymlicka himself is skeptical about the applicability of the historical agreement argument by stating that: ‘’Those people who think that group differentiated rights are unfair have not been appeased by pointing to agreement that were 24

‘Group Rights.’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2014. Web. June 28, 2014.

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made by previous generations in different circumstances, often undemocratically and in conditions of substantial inequality in bargaining power.’’25 The third argument used for special minority rights is the one that is based on the inherent value of cultural diversity. Kymlicka states: ‘’Cultural diversity is said to be valuable, both in the quasi aesthetic sense that it creates a more interesting world and because other cultures contain alternative models of social organization that may be useful in adapting to new circumstances.’’ 26 This argument differs from the previous two in the sense that it appeals to self-interest of the majority, as opposed to justice and obligations. For instance, minority groups can contribute to the mainstream culture through diversity of arts, music and so forth. However, here too Kymlicka seems skeptical about the applicability of this argument to support group specific rights and self-government. First of all, a society could arguably gain more diversity at a considerably cheaper cost, simply by increasing immigration from various countries, as opposed to funding the various projects of national minority groups. The second problem emanates from the same fact, taking into account that the benefits gained by the majority population from diversity are spread thinly and widely. In short, the majority population would be asked to pay a significantly higher price so that others could enjoy a flourishing minority culture. 27 As a consequence, the majority may not always accept diversity as enlightened self interest. Finally, Kymlicka considers that the diversity argument in itself is insufficient to justify the rights of national minorities. The benefits are at best desirable by-products, rather than primary justifications for special minority rights. The argument of the value of cultural diversity is therefore best combined with the former two arguments that entreaty to the obligations of the majority. According to Kymlicka all liberal democratic states generally engage in the process of diffusing some form of societal culture, in the form of e.g. official language policy or national holidays, a process which Kymlicka terms nation-building. As a consequence both multi-nation and polyethnic states will often make decision that favor the majority population and disadvantage minority groups. What Kymlicka essentially proposes, is to both recognize and compensate for these drawbacks and as a consequence provide minorities with an equal 25

Dale Turner. This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy. University of Toronto Press, 2006. Pp. 68. 26 Cecile Fabre. Justice in a Changing World. London: Polity, 2007. Pp. 55. 27 Will Kymlicka. Multicultural citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. 123.

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opportunity to e.g. live and work in their own cultural environment. It is therefore not a matter of preferential treatment, but more an issue of lessening certain vulnerabilities that are strictly characteristic to both national and ethnic minorities in states that are actively engaged in diffusing a societal culture. The next section will address the relationship between state nationbuilding and minorities in the newly democratizing post socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as introduce certain conditions that a liberal state should satisfy in order to justify its nation-building.

1.5 Nation-building and Minority Rights According to Kymlicka the newly-democratizing countries of Central and Eastern Europe are following the model of the ‘nation-building’ state. These countries are not ethnoculturally neutral, but are in fact engaged in projects of nation-building, and of ‘’diffusing a common societal culture throughout the territory of the state’’. Some of the nation building tools that are employed are for instance: school curriculums, citizenship policy, national symbols, official language policy, support for national media etc. 28 Nation-building projects have been quite successful in some states, but have under certain circumstances experienced resistance in multination states, by members of national minority groups who do not view themselves as part of the majority. Precisely because of this, minority groups have often been submitted to assimilation policies, aimed at suppressing their unique cultural identity. Some Western commentators29 have taken this evidence and used it to prove that Central and Eastern European countries are fundamentally different from the Western ‘civic’ states. However, Kymlicka notes that nation-building is not inherently contradictory to Western liberal democracy. In fact, he states that Western states too have engaged in nation building activities in order to give a more national character to public space. Instead, Kymlicka distinguishes between practices of liberal and illiberal nation building. For instance, illiberal nation building will often go hand in hand with more coercive measures and impose greater injustices upon minorities, 28

Will Kymlicka. ‘Nation-building and minority rights: Comparing West and East.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vol. 26, No. 2, 2010. Pp. 195. 29 This notion of fundamental difference in national identities can ultimatly be traced to the Western (civic) and Eastern (ethnic) debate derivational from the works of i.a. Hans Kohn, Friendrich Meinecke and more recents works such as that of Michael Ignatieff.

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whereas liberal nation building is more inclusive and involves the diffusion of a very thin form of culture, which is primarily centered on a shared language. According to Kymlicka, nationbuilding in a liberal democratic state should generally satisfy the following three conditions: a) nation-building must be inclusive: in other words, no long-term residents should be permanently excluded from membership, and everyone should be able to become an equal member of the nation; b) the concept of national identity and integration must be pluralistic and tolerant, not imposing any particular set of customs, religious beliefs, or lifestyles and should furthermore leave enough room for the expression of individual and collective differences, both in public and private; c) all national groups within a state, not just the majority nation, are allowed to engage in their own nation-building.30 He furthermore proposes to view minority demands in relation to majority nationbuilding, more specifically, he views them as a defensive response to the threats and injustices posed by the majority nation building. According to Kymlicka, in order for state nation-building to be legitimate, it needs to be balanced out with group-differentiated rights, in addition to common rights. For example, granting an official status to local languages can protect against an unfair language policy, whereas granting self-government and special representation rights can safeguard minority communities against division of powers, etc. This framework is broadly applicable to the current situation in Serbia.

1.6 Implications of Kymlicka’s theory for the Implementation of Minority Rights in Serbia As the theoretical discussion in the first half of this chapter has demonstrated, there has been a lot of change, development and reaction regarding the concept of multiculturalism. To this day, there continues to be a great amount of praise for the concept, as well as a fair amount of criticism. Different multiculturalist theories vary greatly in their applicability depending on the country or region and therefore ideally require a contextual and empirically sensible approach. There is certainly no one-size-fits-all approach to dealing with multicultural diversity. That being said, liberal theories on multiculturalism are generally more in line with strategies pursued on a European level and liberal views on multiculturalism are therefore considered more applicable in 30

Will Kymlicka. ‘Liberal Theories of Multiculturalism.’ PostFilosofie. Web. 1 July 2014. Pp. 68.

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the Western democratic context. However, the application of this liberal multiculturalism is predominantly only theorized across borders and many critics, including Taylor, argue against the universality of this model, by stating that the so called state neutral liberalism does not operate from the premise of ethnocultural neutrality. In Serbia on the other hand, the pro-nationalist inclinations tend to fit with the communitarian stance in general. As already outlined above, according to communitarianism some form of community is necessary for the acquisition and preservation of one’s identity. In the case of Serbia, the ethnocultural nation is the type of community that is generally perceived as appropriate for this task by ethnic Serbian citizens. Furthermore, communitarianism is equally applicable to the case of Sandžak, because this model of multiculturalism defends the right to assume a political form of state. That being said, the situation in Serbia is very intricately coiled, in the sense that it exhibits the characteristics from both ends of the theoretical spectrum. The legal frameworks that are in place for the protection of minorities, such as the Framework Convention, are very liberal and individually oriented, whereas, as the case study will demonstrate, the practical implementation is often thwarted by Serbian collective priorities. As already indicated above, the primary theoretical focus will be attributed to Kymlicka’s liberal theory on multiculturalism. There are a number of reasons to use Kymlicka’s theoretical framework for the discussion of minority rights in Serbia and Sandžak more specifically. Kymlicka was one of the first political theorists to systematically theorize the rights of cultural minorities and his theory is generally regarded as the most influential in the field of multiculturalism. In addition, he considers both the theoretical as well as practical dilemmas facing multicultural nations and as a consequence his work is generally empirically sensible and provides an elaborate categorization system for various contextual implementations, limiting the amount of violence to the diversity and complexities of a geographical location such as Sandžak. Moreover, his work in general has focused on minority rights protection internationally, as a consequence his theories should have a broad range of applicability across the European borders, an assertion that I intend to test in the second half of this thesis. Unlike most liberal theorists he does not act from the premise of ethnocultural neutrality, which is an appropriate stance when dealing with a state such as Serbia, which clearly still pursues collective interests. In addition, Kymlicka distinguishes between different sets of minority rights for both national and immigrant minorities and as a consequence sets limits to the claims certain minorities can make

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within a society. In this thesis I propose to focus on the model Kymlicka has designed to deal with the multinational sort of diversity, however, leaving out the issue of immigration, as my focus will primarily be on the Bosniak community in Serbia. Furthermore, applying Kymlicka’s theory on minority rights to Serbia may help to identify and elucidate some of the discrepancies and inequalities underlying the Serbian minority protection. For instance, it would be interesting to find out whether the minority groups in Serbia have been given any group-differentiated rights and if so, whether they have been implemented consistently. Considering the persistent problems stemming from cultural diversity and the growing importance of international norms for minority rights in Serbia, applying Kymlicka’s theory and additionally evaluating some of its drawbacks can furthermore contribute to an educated discussion about whether or not the international norms can and should be applied in the specific case study. The next paragraph will discuss the relevance of Kymlicka’s theory to the Council of Europe’s FCNM. The significance of the FCNM to the debate on multiculturalism, and the reason why it will be used as a benchmark to measure progress later on in the case study, lies in the fact that to some degree the framework of the FCNM and the work of the Advisory Committee parallels the concerns and conceptions as disseminated within the public discourse by the multicultural advocates. This is also reflected in the two most basic tenets of minority protection in the FCNM, namely, guaranteeing equality on the one hand, while protecting the ability to preserve a distinct group identity on the other hand. In addition, the Convention is not restricted in its conception of what constitutes a minority and is therefore applicable to all sorts of religious, linguistic, ethnic and cultural groups who find themselves in a minority position. However, the FCNM does clearly build on liberal foundations of tolerance, which indicates a focus on individual freedom and is therefore more in line with Kymlicka’s theories on multicultural citizenship. The departure from communitarianism does to some extent limit the Framework Convention when it comes to addressing the problems emerging from the collective character of minority rights. Particularly, because in certain circumstances the protection of national minorities can only be effectively guaranteed through collective action. However, for this reason the Framework Convention does require that persons belonging to national minorities should exercise their minority rights ‘in community with others’, in essence identifying a collective dimension within its boundaries. 31 31

Claudia Tevani. Collective Rights and the Cultural Identity of the Roma: A Case Study of Italy. The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012. Pp. 156.

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Despite of its obvious leanings towards a more liberal approach, it does recognize and take into account the significance of the other side of the debate.

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2 Minority Rights in the Context of the EU 2.1 Introduction Minority rights have increasingly become an area of concern for the European Union. Yet despite of the European Union's longstanding commitment to the protection of human rights, the minority question did not arise as a major policy concern until the 1990s. When considering some of the more serious conflicts regarding the minority questions such as inter alia Northern Ireland, Corsica and the Basque separatist movements it becomes obvious, from the lack of an active EU role in the settlement of these disputes, that the member states, since the early European stages have considered these issues as relating to their internal affairs.32 The lack of common policy objectives with regards to the minority issues at the European level has as a consequence resulted in different policy practices being adhered in various member states, which generally do by default comply with international human rights standards as articulated by such bodies as the UN, The Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).33 However, the need for the EU to develop its own policy dealing with minority issues has not been self-evident, and it can be rationalized by the fact that in practice the member-states have been fairly obliging towards their minorities. While questions regarding the harmonization of the community approach were certainly raised on the occasion in the European Parliament, the general attitude on the part of both the Commission and Council could be summarized by the belief that 'what the member-states do with "their" minorities is not the EU's business'.34 Subsequently, the turning point occurred as a matter of external policy process which was reflected in the ongoing enlargement towards Eastern Europe. Gwendolyn Sasse asserts that in the post-Cold War period many of the post-communist countries prioritized the enhancement of central state capacity and the status of the titular nationality, which in turn exposed the minority

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Balázs Vizi. ‘The European Union and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities.’ Hungarian Human Rights Foundation. Web. May 25, 2014. 33 ‘Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection.’ Open Society Foundations. 2002. pp. 18. Web. May 25, 2014. 34 Witte, Bruno, ‘Politics versus Law in the EU’s Approach to Ethnic Minorities’, in J. Zielonka (ed.) Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, London: Routledge, 2002. Pp.9.

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population to potential forms of discrimination and alienation.35 In addition, the violent collapse of former Yugoslavia and the potential danger of intensification of ethnic conflict in the region as a result of the presence of considerable minority populations in many of the post-communist countries brought about an increasing sense of awareness within the EU to deal with the minority problem more efficiently.36 Concurrently, the obvious eagerness on the part of the Central and Eastern European countries to join Europe, granted the EU with a golden opportunity to exert more influence on the matter by incorporating minority rights into EU’s accession conditions. In fact, this aspiration culminated with the adoption of the political criteria for membership at the Copenhagen Council in June 1993, which included “respect for and protection of minorities’’37 as a pre-accession requirement and as a consequence marked a significant turning point in European policy making in the field of minority rights. Opening up to Central and Eastern European countries has presented the EU with numerous challenges and the incorporation of minority rights into the broader definition of EU conditionality has additionally contributed to a rather contentious kickoff in foreign policy. Certainly it has led to allegations of double standards, seeing as how externally the EU does adhere to a unified policy stance, while internally the member states do not act according to a single uniform approach. 38 The lack of a European model in the area of minority rights has additionally left a lot of room for interpretation and this in itself, together with the obvious loss of credibility as a consequence of the perceived double standard, is a reason enough to strive towards a more coherent EU approach.39 Furthermore, given the ongoing project of widening and deepening as a means to operate both the enlargement and integration policies, the EU’s hesitancy and vacillation regarding the minority rights in its own member states may become infeasible in the future. The issue surrounding immigration and minority rights in both member states and third countries has become a conspicuous one, and as a consequence it is safe to 35

Gwendolyn Sasse. ‘Gone with the Wind? Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe before and after EU Enlargement.’ KU Leuven Faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen. April 2006. pp. 2. Web. May 25, 2014. 36 Gwendolyn Sasse. ‘Gone with the Wind? Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe before and after EU Enlargement.’ KU Leuven Faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen. April 2006. pp. 3. Web. May 25, 2014. 37 ‘Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria).’ Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation. Web. July 17, 2014. 38 Regarding issues on ‘’double standards’’see: B. de Witte, ‘Politics versus Law in the EU’s Approach to Ethnic Minorities’, in J. Zielonka (ed.) Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, London: Routledge, 2002. James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse. ‘Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs.’ European Center for Minority Issues. 2003. 39 Amato, Giuliano and Judy Batt. ‘Minority Rights and EU Enlargement to the East.’ European University Institute. September 1998. Pp. 3.

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assume that further expansion, incorporating countries with highly divergent interests and minority approaches, will only exacerbate the issue. At the same time, the supranational integration has further challenged the sovereignty of the member-states and has as a consequence, fueled many debates on national identity and multiculturalism. The resulting regional nationalism, together with the aforementioned widening processes are both developments that are likely to push the issue further onto the European agenda.40 The following sections will address the emergence of minority rights on the European political agenda, as well as discuss the legal instruments for protection of minority rights that currently serve as key reference points when assessing minority policy implementation within states that are queued for membership. In addition, the chapter will relate the current EU policy approach to its associated theory of multiculturalism, as well as address some of the difficulties facing the European Union’s internal approach when dealing with diversity. The discussion will show that while the EU uniformly promotes strategies of liberal multiculturalism in its external agenda, internally diverging trends can be perceived in the form of both assimilation and multiculturalism. Along the way some of the criticisms related to the European external strategies will be addressed.

2.2 Emergence of ‘Respect for and protection of minorities’ in the EU Accession Context Some form of internal consensus with regards to minority protection at the EU level has emerged during the period of time of the Maastricht Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty.41 It was only with the establishment of the Maastricht Treaty that, for the first time in the history of the EU, specific minority concerns were addressed through the inclusion of Article 151 (preciously 128) of the EC treaty, committing the community ‘’to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore’. 42 Additionally, European competencies were introduced in both education (art. 149) and culture (art. 151), hence introducing both social policy aspects and the 40

Giuliano Amato and Judy Batt. ‘Minority Rights and EU Enlargement to the East.’ European University Institute. September 1998. Pp. 4. 41 Tove. H. Malloy. Minority Issues in Europe: Rights, Concepts. Policy. Frank & Timme GmbH, 2013. Pp. 86. 42 Giuliano Amato and Judy Batt. ‘Minority Rights and EU Enlargement to the East.’ European University Institute. September 1998. Pp. 11.

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cultural diversity principle in what had previously been an overwhelmingly economic union. 43 For minority studies in general, this development, as embodied by the Maastricht Treaty, created a major link between EU-policy making and minority rights. In short, the EU discourse throughout the 1990s was increasingly marked by the emphasis on minority rights protection, though this was meant purely for an external audience, in other words, the states queued for accession. Consequently, the Copenhagen Criteria were very explicit as to the conditions that the aspiring members would have to effectuate, and these included in no uncertain terms the protection of national minorities.44 According to the first Copenhagen criteria, as laid down in 1993 European Council in Copenhagen for the purposes of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, in order for a country to be eligible to join the European Union it requires for that state to ‘’preserve democratic governance and human rights, the rule of law, and respect for and protection of minorities’’. 45 Ever since, minority rights have become an integral part of EU political conditionality, a key tool in fostering the spread of norms on human rights and democracy. In addition, the Amsterdam Treaty has further extended the EU potential in this area by referring to ethnicity in their anti-discrimination agenda. Article 19 (previously art 6a) provides that the European Community may 'take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.'46 This was clearly designed to aid immigrant populations. Yet it was the Lisbon Treaty that was far more innovative, as it had officially introduced the term ‘minority’ within the acquis communautaire and moreover, had made the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding, requiring that for the first time in EU history minority and human rights are to be respected. This gradual, yet important evolution of minority rights protection within the EU has been summarized by Bruno de Witte as an ''incipient EU minority rights policy constituted by specific (and often quite limited) activities in a number of different fields.''47 As already mentioned above, the key tool at the disposal of the EU to encourage and ensure compliance with the minority rights criteria is the EU conditionality. Political 43

Tove. H. Malloy. Minority Issues in Europe: Rights, Concepts, Policy. Frank & Timme GmbH, 2013. Pp. 86. Idem, pp. 65. 45 ‘Conditions for membership’. European Commission. Web. July 13, 2014. 46 ‘Fundamental rights and non-discrimination.’ Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation. Web. July 13, 2014. 47 Tove. H. Malloy. Minority Issues in Europe: Rights, Concepts, Policy. Frank & Timme GmbH, 2013. Pp. 86. 44

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conditionality can be described as: “the exercise of policy instruments by one party to secure compliance and shape the actions of another party”.48 The main driving force in EU political conditionality is the incentive of EU membership, while the main danger is that of exclusion. 49 Despite of the varying degrees of achievement in the Central and Eastern European countries, the use of EU conditionality has generally been perceived as successful and as having worked according to its intended purpose. However, there are several authors that have criticized its effect on minority protection, by pointing to the limited EU leverage and to the lack of commitment to the implementation of such criteria by candidate countries. Other inconsistencies can also be found. For instance, by allowing Cyprus to join the EU without having resolved its deep-rooted ethnic problems, it may likely make it difficult to put pressure on other aspirant members to make similar improvements prior to membership.50

2.3 EU Minority Rights Instruments and Allegations of Double Standards The concept of respect for and protection of minorities within the framework of the EU remains highly debated. Despite of the minority protection being increasingly implicit in the growing human rights culture of the EU, much of the focus is clearly directed towards potential members. Bruno de Witte notes that: ‘For the EU the concern for minorities is primarily an export product and not one for domestic consumption.’’51 As a consequence the meaning of the term has been insufficiently developed within the EU law. Will Kymlicka, in a similar fashion, points to the diverging approaches amongst the member states themselves when dealing with ethnic relations, which in turn complicates any attempts at setting common standards and practices. 52 Soft law measures, such as guidelines and declarations have progressively been developed in order to aid the situation, but many are yet to be accepted by all EU member states. Additionally, because the 48

Merve Yildiz. ‘EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: A Comparative Study on Romania and Turkey.’ Academia.edu. 2011. Pp. 11. 49 Simonida Kacarska. ‘Minority Policies and EU Conditionality - The Case of the Republic of Macedonia.’ Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe. Vol 11, No 2, 2012. Pp. 65. 50 Michael Johns."Old" and "New" Minorities within the EU: The Growing Need for Policies on Social Cohesion.’ John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. June 2010. Pp. 16. 51 Helen O'Nions. Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe. England: Ashgate, 2007. Pp. 89. 52 Will Kymlicka. ‘’Language Rights and Political Theory.’’ Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts. 2003. Pp. 1. Web. July 17, 2014.

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EU does not have a single minority protection of its own, its criteria for new members was borrowed from existing Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) norms, because as Hughes and Sasse argue, these were considered to be ‘’the best practice of ‘international standards’.”53 These conventions were therefore integrated into the accession criteria, however, as mentioned before, they are not part of the acquis communautaire. So while it is the EU conditionality that creates an impetus for policy change in the field of minority rights, it is the OSCE and the CoE that often shape the substance of these policies.54 The purpose of the OSCE post of the “high commissioner on national minorities” as laid out at the Helsinki Summit at 1992, is to address ethnic tensions and to prevent inter-state hostilities over minority issues.55 The OSCE furthermore stresses that the position is that of high commissioner on national minorities, not for national minorities. In other words, it acts as a conflict prevention instrument and not so much as a voice for national minorities. 56 By most accounts, the OSCE has been quite successful in encouraging forms of structured dialogue between authorities and minority groups in order for them to resolve issues peacefully. However, it has been pointed out by certain scholars that while reports and analysis are made for the entire OSCE region, the majority of the recommendations that are made are for Central and Eastern European countries, indicating that the threat of crisis and escalation is mostly present in these regions.57 One of the possibilities is that the OSCE has refrained from criticizing the ‘’hand that feeds it’’, mainly the richer Western countries that fund its large scale operations.58 However, also likely is the possibility that the OSCE can exercise more influence in the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As a consequence, its recommendations tend to become rules for accession. It is therefore not surprising that ever since the establishment of the High Commissioner, there has been some tension between the West and the newly independent regions 53

Merve Yildiz. ‘EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: A Comparative Study on Romania and Turkey.’ Academia.edu. 2011. Pp. 11. 54 Ibidem. 55 ‘High Commissioner on National Minorities.’ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Pp. 1. Web. July 13, 2014. 56 Idem, pp. 2. 57 Michael Johns. ‘A fair Price of Admission? Minority Policies In and Out of the EU.’ Archive of European Integration. Pp. 5. Web. July 13, 2014. 58 Michael Johns. ‘A fair Price of Admission? Minority Policies In and Out of the EU.’ Archive of European Integration. Pp. 5. Web. July 13, 2014.

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in Central and Eastern Europe. The countries in the East were and are still in fact held to a higher standard. As David Chandler points out, many of the Western members of the EU “had no conception of how to apply such policies in relation to their own minorities or of accepting such a level of international regulations in the affairs of the state.”59 What becomes evident is that Western countries have continuously ignored such regulations instead of adapting to them. An example would be the involvement of the EU with the treatment of the Roma population as part of the accession criteria. While this EU effort to combat discrimination against the Roma is certainly commendable, the EU does not have the power to impose these same measures upon its own members. The Roma in Italy, for example, face serious discrimination. In May 2008 the Italian government faced international criticism for their legislation targeting the Roma, which involved forcible removal of Roma villages further away from the cities of Naples and Milan. The events culminated in outright violence as the camps were attacked and set on fire by local residents.60 As previously stated, the EU does not have the necessary instruments or standards to verify a candidate's progress in the field of minority rights, let alone guarantee compliance. This absence of EU competences has led to a heavy reliance on external sources such as the OSCE and the CoE, to both articulate and to make operational its accession conditionality and to ensure efficient monitoring. It is in this context that the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) has increasingly become a key point of reference and a normative basis of the EU minority policy. The FCNM is the most comprehensive multilateral treaty dedicated to protection of rights of minorities. It was adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1998, and describes a number of principles according to which countries are to develop certain policies to protect the rights of minorities.61 Flexibility is the very essence of the Framework, as it allows parties to apply the set of principles in various ways. As a consequence the countries are granted a margin of appreciation, which also means that the court is obliged to take into account the ‘’cultural, historic and philosophical differences between Strasbourg and the nation in question’’.62 The central role of the FCNM is crystallized 59

David Chandler. ‘’The OSCE and the Internationalisation of National Minority Rights.’’ David Chandler Professor of International Relations. Pp. 6. 60 ‘Anti-Roma Measures Violate European Law.’ Open Society Foundations. March 2012. Web. July 13, 2014. 61 ‘The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.’ The UN Guide for Minorities. Pamphlet No. 8. Pp. 1. Web 19 June 2014. 62 ' Human Rights Act: How it works.' BBC News. September, 2000. Web. July 14, 2014.

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in e.g. the Agenda 2000, which in its criteria for membership refers to the FCNM as one of the external bases on which the Commission relies in order to assess the countries respect for and protection of minorities.63 In fact, poor respect of human and minority rights as articulated by the FCNM may be used in order to delay accession negotiations, as exemplified by the Commission recommendation to postpone negotiations with Slovakia. 64 The Committee accountable for supplying a detailed examination on minority legislation and practice is the FCNM Advisory Committee, which is composed of up to 18 independent experts and is responsible for adopting country-specific opinions. 65 Just like the OSCE, the Convention too has come under some criticism in the past. Most importantly, due to it not being ratified by all member states of the Council of Europe. As a consequence, the prospect of its acceptance as part of EU law, or acquis communautaire is far away.66 However, due to FCNM’s key role in assessing the minority rights progress in candidate states and because of its comprehensive and advanced nature, this instrument will be used in the second half of this thesis as a benchmark by which to assess the progress of minority rights implementation in Serbia’s Sandžak. That being said, many other NGOs are also involved in both the implementation and the monitoring process. Therefore as Sasse concludes, EU conditionality in the area of minority rights can be expressed as the ‘’cumulative effect of different international institutions’’.67

2.4 Tensions between Liberalism and Communitarianism in the internal and external EU approach to Multiculturalism With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent nationalist mobilization in post socialist countries, there occurred a shift within the EU policy approach that was more geared towards the protection of collective minority rights. For instance, the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 explicitly identify respect for the rights of minorities as a requirement for accession to the EU. Despite of 63

‘Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Slovakia’s Application for Membership of the European Union.’ Europa. July 1997. Pp. 21. Web. July 13, 2014. 64 Christophe Hillion. ‘The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Union.’ Academia.edu. October 2008. Pp. 4-6. Web. July 13, 2014. 65 ‘Monitoring the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.’ Council of Europe. Web. July 13, 2014. 66 Alan Phillips. ‘The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: A Policy Analysis.’ Minority Rights Group International. Pp. 4. Web. July 13, 2014. 67 Plamen Ralchev.‘Europeanizing the Balkans: Imposing a Minority Discourse.’ Allacademic Research. Pp. 14. Web. July 13, 2014.

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this, a few years later a more individualist approach was taken up by the EU in the form of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam refers to the common values of the member states by stating that the European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, while specifically excluding “respect for and protection of minorities”. 68 Such an approach persists to this day and is furthermore apparent from the formulation within the 2008 Lisbon Treaty which refers to the protection of persons belonging to minorities as a fundamental value of the European Union. 69 Similarly, the Council’s Framework Convention too is very individualistic in nature since it does not recognize collective rights but instead protects persons belonging to national minorities as individuals that may exercise their rights individually and in community with others.70 On the whole, many of the legislations tend to embrace the liberal individualist approach to multiculturalism, whereas the development of a group specific approach seems unlikely in the future. Despite of the acceptance of ‘group-specific’ minority rights as central to the accommodation between minorities and majorities in democratic states, such policies are too highly contested and controversial. As a consequence, when it comes to dealing with minority rights the EU policies tend to lean towards liberal multiculturalism, which tends to, in most cases, prioritize individual rights over group affiliations. The perception of the West, as an international beacon of stability and cohesion might turn out to be distorted. Immigration into Europe has contributed to an increasingly pluralist society yet the Western societies in general have been slow to recognize the growing demands of especially the second and third generation immigrants. Immigrant minorities have been expected to assimilate into the majority culture, due to the often high opposition to multicultural policies on the part of the majority group. Particularly in Europe, there is a widespread perception that the policy of multiculturalism has failed as a strategy to integrate immigrants and that countries that once supported a multicultural approach to diversity are turning away and adopting a strong focus on civic integration. Many commentators have argued that contemporary dissatisfaction with and rejection of multiculturalism echoes and preserves stereotypes of immigrants as 68

‘Fundamental rights and non-discrimination.’ Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation. Web. July 13, 2014. Susan Divald. ‘How to Protect Minorities: An Individual or Collective Approach?.’ International Council on Human Rights Policy Blog. Web. July 13, 2014. 70 ‘The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.’ The UN Guide for Minorities. Pamphlet No. 8, pp. 2. Web. June 19, 2014. 69

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threatening and foreign, and cultivates the rise of xenophobic far-right populist parties.71 This rising negative view of multiculturalism, however, has not eradicated the multiculturalism policies pursued by many European states but it has certainly had various other effects, such as ‘’the adoption of more restrictive refugee and family reunification policies, and the adoption of more restrictive rules regarding the access of immigrants to welfare benefits.’’72 Over time, it is possible that anti-multiculturalism rhetoric may have some effect with regards to the impact of certain policies that do remain, even ones ‘’framed publicly in the language of interculturalism or diversity policies’’. 73 While there certainly has been some departure from multiculturalist strategies in a few countries, this is not the dominant pattern within the EU. The larger picture in Europe is one of development of liberal multicultural strategies in the first decade of the 21st century. 74 Nonetheless, maintaining a balance between assimilatory and multicultural policies will clearly be central to the future of cultural diversity in Europe. Additionally, further enlargement will inevitably cause a great flux of internal migrants whose needs may not be sufficiently met by existing EU legislation and whose integration might require more elaborate measures. The simple assumption that the institutional model for the EU according to the principles of liberalism and democracy and individual human rights can by themselves provide an effective solution to minority demands is increasingly contended today by the recognition that the promotion of minority cultures and the securing of their equal rights may in fact require special measures on the part of the state, such as various group-differentiated rights.75 Yet at the same time, these developments succinctly summarize the often unwelcome challenges to both national cohesion and state sovereignty. Accordingly, the consolidation and cohesion that is sought by the Central and Eastern European countries might in itself be a mirage.76

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Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka. ‘Is There Really a Backlash Against Multiculturalism Policies?.’ Stockholms Universtet. 2012. Pp. 16-17. Web. July 14, 2014. 72 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka. ‘Is There Really a Backlash Against Multiculturalism Policies?.’ Stockholms Universtet. 2012. Pp. 16-17. Web. July 14, 2014. 73 Ibidem. 74 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka. ‘Is There Really a Backlash Against Multiculturalism Policies?.’ Stockholms Universtet. 2012. Pp. 16-17. Web. July 14, 2014. 75 Amato, Giuliano and Judy Batt. ‘Minority Rights and EU Enlargement to the East.’ European University Institute. September 1998. Pp. 8. 76 Giuliano Amato and Judy Batt. ‘Minority Rights and EU Enlargement to the East.’ European University Institute. September 1998. Pp. 5.

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The obvious conclusions drawn from these developments point to the increasing importance of the minority issue on the European political agenda. The Eastern enlargement has already brought with it new challenges regarding marginalized minorities in the new members states, while at the same time the promotion of minority culture in the West will increasingly encourage formulation of new demands. The merging of interests of marginalized groups in both East and West will likely strengthen and renew the minority strategies regarding wider recognition and improved status, which may inter alia include greater cultural autonomy or even territorial autonomy. Thus far, the EU has been moderately effective in dealing with minority rights in its external policy, and it has done so by, for instance, promoting dialogue with minorities within the new democracies and monitoring majority-nationalist tendencies. However, it would certainly be premature to abandon these efforts, on the assumption that the minority questions have been solved, once the country is accepted for membership. History most certainly has left some enduring, psychological impact that may take generations to resolve as will be demonstrated in the following chapters.

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3 Minority Rights in Serbia: Policies and Perceptions 3.1 Introduction The ethnic conflicts that were fought on the territory of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s have left disastrous consequences for all minority groups in the region. These minority issues arose primarily as a consequence of a continuation of a long European process of redrawing state borders according to ethnic delineations. Much like the disintegration of the multinational realm of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the collapse of the multiethnic Yugoslavia created a potentially explosive situation for both new nations and minorities in the 1990s 77 and the effects of the bloody collapse are still tangible to this day. Serbia joined the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe on May 11, 2001 indicating that the country was willing to take the necessary steps in order to facilitate the promotion of its minority and human rights record. It was a challenging process, which was furthermore complicated by Serbia’s post conflict status, characterized by unstable democratic institutions and a strong nationalistic atmosphere. In a relatively short period of time Serbia has undergone radical changes in its structures of power, which were furthermore accompanied with recent history of conflict, including the Bosnian War (1992–1995), the Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995) and the Kosovo War (1998–1999). Under the rule of Slobodan Milošević, which lasted from 1990 to 2000, various individual rights, such as civil, political, and mostly economic and cultural rights, were denied to the entire population, so while it is most certainly true that national minorities suffered under Milošević, so too did many Serbs. In Western circles Milošević was often portrayed as a racist. Sabrina P. Ramet argues that “Milošević built his power on a foundation of hatred and xenophobia (...)’’78 and Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State in February 2000, described Milošević as a man “who decides that if you are not of his ethnic group, you don’t have a right to exist.’’79 The ethno-nationalist policy pursued by Milošević in order to create an ethnically homogenous Serbia lead to various minority and human rights violations. As a consequence, the gap between 77

Gale Stokes. ‘The Former Yugoslavia - Independence and the fate of Minorities.’ TransConflict. Web. June 22, 2014. 78 Janine Clark. ‘National Minorities and the Milošević Regime, Nationalities Papers’. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2007. Pp. 317. 79 Ibidem.

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majority and minority population widened and many minority communities felt threatened and alienated. The overthrow of Slobodan Milošević finally occurred on 5 October 2000 and a wide alliance of democratic parties known as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia took over political power. Moreover, promising measures were taken to improve the situation of the national minorities in Serbia. However, the mood of optimism soon dissipated with the assassination of a popular Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in 2003. Most certainly a great deal was accomplished during Đinđić’s tenure. Nonetheless, Serbia faced a reverse trend in the wake of his assassination. Although contemporary Serbia’s minority and human rights record thus presents some progress in theory, it is not always the case in practice. The reasons for the slow implementation of these legislations lies in e.g. the lack of coordination among the involved parties, the lack of human rights culture and a considerable ethnocentrism and nationalism amongst the Serbian population. Specifically the area of minority rights is highly contested in Western Balkan countries as it additionally implies a redistribution of scarce public resources in favor of certain groups.80 Today, some of the more extreme expressions of nationalism have subsided, however ethnic distance and xenophobia are elements that are still highly prevalent in the Serbian society. The efforts that need to be undertaken by Serbia to improve its human rights record are twofold. First and foremost continuous progress in both adaptation and implementation of international human rights instruments needs to be upheld by the Serbian government. Secondly, value changes need to occur at the societal level, which implies not only the citizens but also state officials. 81 Serbia is a society that is marked by traditional conservatism, which is also reflected in its academic environment, often dominated by radical right-wing groups that have a strong influence on younger generations. Not surprisingly, this phenomenon has a major impact on the societal value system as a whole and contributes to xenophobia and intolerance towards all minority groups.82 Provided that such an ingrained value system contradicts contemporary European standards and principles, Serbia is likely to continue to face the dilemma: for or against Europe. 80

Teresa Maria Cierco. ‘Human Rights promotion in Serbia: a difficult task for the European Union.’ Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. Vol. 54, Nr. 1, 2011. 81 Ibidem. 82 Teresa Maria Cierco. ‘Human Rights promotion in Serbia: a difficult task for the European Union.’ Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. Vol. 54, Nr. 1, 2011.

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Below I will provide a historical look into some of the more general characteristics of the Serbian minority policy to see how far the country has come in furthering the protection of minorities and nurturing cultural diversity. In addition, the chapter will address some of the factors that to this day continue to shape the Serbian perceptions on national minorities, as well as relate the discussion to theories on multiculturalism in order to shed light on some of the discrepancies between the EU and Serbia when it comes to dealing with minority groups.

3.2 Historical look at Minority Policies in Serbia Today’s situation pertaining to the relationship of minorities and the majority in Serbia are often rooted in and associated with the violent collapse of former Yugoslavia. The dissolution of the Yugoslav state and its ensuing transformation into independent nation states had as a consequence the radical and immediate alteration of the status of diaspora groups, who overnight were relegated to the position of minority. The formation of new states was generally based around the idea of ethnic nationalism 83, which by definition tends to be more exclusive and politically intolerant.84 In other words, nations were defined mostly in terms of ethnicity or race, shared heritage and a common faith. The ethnonational principle was most eloquently reflected through the domination of the majority ethnic group over minorities, who in the post Yugoslav states suffered serious discrimination and limited rights to express their linguistic, religious or cultural identity. Finally, ethnic cleansing and civil transfers were employed as instruments to ensure that monoethnic territories could be established without any potential opposition.85 When considering Serbian minority politics today it is important to take note of the three different stages of minority policy development in Serbian history. The first stage, dating post WWII to 1990s, was marked by a rather elaborate set of linguistic, cultural and religious rights. Immediately upon seizing power the communists initiated significant changes with regards to the status of minorities, to the extent that minorities were now able to have free access to schools with instructions in their own language. Additionally, state aid was provided for e.g. newspapers,

83

John K. Cox. The History of Serbia. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002. Pp. 14. Ibidem. 85 John Moore. Security flashpoints : Oil, Islands, Sea Access, and Military Confrontation. The Hague: Nijhoff Publishers, 1998. Pp. 255. 84

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the publication of books in minority languages and other ethnic activities.86 Muslims were able to enjoy religious autonomy and followed the serijat law in questions of property and marital relations. 87 The dominant perception during this time was embodied by ideas of a common Yugoslav identity and this trend persisted until the 1990s. Even though, various political and civil rights violations occurred during this era, respect for minority rights was still upheld as one of the unifying factors that kept the multi ethnic mosaic federation together. The second stage of minority politics, dating from 1990 to 2000, fell under the rule of Milošević and was marked by a lack, and in some cases a total absence of basic human and minority rights. The Serbian politics during this time centered heavily around ethno-nationalism and promoted rather dominant views on minorities, who were often defined as a threat to national identity and sovereignty. This exclusionary model of nationalism, combined with feelings of trauma and victimization on the part of the ethnic Serbian community and a highly negative perception of minorities as potential threat to a state's integrity went hand in hand with large scale human and minority rights violations. Some of the more shocking violations occurred in Sandžak, against members of the Bosniak minority, in Southern parts of Serbia against the Albanians and also in Vojvodina against the Croat communities.88 The crimes committed ranged from expulsion to attacks on individuals and villages by organized groups and paramilitary forces. Furthermore, evidence points to the fact that many of these criminal acts were actually supported and sometimes even organized by official authorities.89 On many of these occasions little to nothing had been done to prosecute and punish those responsible. In addition, Serbia did nothing to help the victims and their families. As a result of the individual and collective suffering associated with the pervasive violence and terrorist attacks in many of these regions, the number of members of the aforementioned communities dropped significantly during the 1990s and has continued to do so as great numbers of citizens have immigrated to the neighboring EU member states.90 As a consequence, the Serbian state nation-building can be said to have been accompanied by a rather successful process of destroying of the historical regional 86

Paul Shoup. ‘Yugoslavia’s National Minorities Under Communism.’ Slavic Review. Vol. 22, No. 1, 1963. Pp. 7475. 87 Munevera Hadžišehović. A Muslim Woman in Tito's Yugoslavia. Texas: A&M University Press, 2003. Pp. 55. 88 Omerovic, Elvedina .’Terrorism, Violence and Organized Crime in Sandžak.’ Bundesheer. Pp. 44. Web. June 18, 2014. 89 Ibidem. 90 Omerovic, Elvedina .’Terrorism, Violence and Organized Crime in Sandžak.’ Bundesheer. Pp. 45. Web. June 18, 2014.

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entities. It should therefore come as no surprise that there has been a long tradition of growing mistrust and a general lack of confidence in the Serbian state on the part of the minority communities.91 In short, the 1990s contributed to a large extent to the widening of social distance and suspicion between the Serbs and the minorities and additionally provided new challenges concerning the radicalization of minorities as well as questions of their re-integration. The third stage of minority politics followed suit the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000 and saw the gradual improvement of the situation regarding minority rights. During the period of democratization, the relationship of the Serbian government towards minority groups began to develop, predominantly under the pressure of the EU. As a consequence, many discriminatory laws were abolished. The federal Ministry for Human and Minority Rights was established and Rasim Ljajić, member of Bosniak national community, was appointed Minister for Human and Minority Rights. Then finally on May 2001 Serbia signed the European Council’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. However, disappointingly not much was actually being done with regards the actual implementation of the Framework and many legal provisions remained but an empty word.92 In 2002, Serbia adopted the Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (LPRFNM) which regulated the respect for individual and collective rights guaranteed to the persons belonging to minorities by Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or by international agreements.93 This law, in addition to protecting minorities from all forms of discrimination in exercising their rights, also created the necessary instruments to implement and guarantee these rights in areas such as e.g. education, media and language, while also providing the communities with an opportunity to form their own state funded National Minority Councils in 2002-2003. This process additionally included the adoption of the Constitutional Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties in 2003, which was a central requirement for Serbia's acceptance into the Council of Europe.94 The law approached minority rights in an exhaustive fashion. Article 52 deals with e.g. the use of minority symbols in public places, access to education in minority language and the preservation 91

Dragan Popovic. ‘Minority and Elections Report on Status of National Minorities in Parliamentary Election Campaign 2007.’ Youth Initiative for Human Rights. February 2007. Pp. 6. Web. June 19, 2014. 92 Dragan Popovic. ‘Minority and Elections Report on Status of National Minorities in Parliamentary Election Campaign 2007.’ Youth Initiative for Human Rights. February 2007. Pp. 7 Web. June 19, 2014. 93 ‘The Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities.’ Serbian European Integration Office. Pp.1. Web. June 19, 2014. 94 Teresa Maria Cierco. ‘’Human Rights promotion in Serbia: a difficult task for the European Union.’’ Rev. bras. polít. int. Vol. 54, No.1, 2011.

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of ethnic and national cultural identity. 95 Since the ratification of the Charter, the status of minorities in Serbia has been continuously observed by international organizations of the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, and various local non-governmental organizations, such as the Helsinki Committee.96 In addition, the 2002 Omnibus Law, which increased and regulated the amount of autonomy in Vojvodina, giving it back more than 200 administrative competences in various areas of social life, and the law on Local Self Government, designed to facilitate the decentralization of the state, indirectly smoothed the way for wider implementation of minority related policies on the local level. Minority groups generally saw the period of 2000-2002 as that of great progress with regards to the development of specifically the minority rights, therefore many communities were highly optimistic during these initial years of democratization.97 However, the tides were turned in 2003 and the assassination of a visionary leader Zoran Ðinđić on March 12 signaled for many the start of a worsening trend in minority rights. It soon became clear that the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, which was an alliance of democratic parties in Serbia intent on ousting Milošević, was ill equipped in achieving reform in the long run. It not only lacked the proper political institutions to actualize many of the socio-political and legislative reforms, it also was not able to transform the general nationalistic political atmosphere which had its roots in the Milošević era and was marked by consistent opposition to reforms. 98 In 2004 the situation took a turn for the worse as minority communities across the state were exposed to a number of physical assaults, in direct reaction to the violence in Kosovo, where cultural and architectural heritage of the Serb people was attacked by crowds of Albanians. In retaliation, the mosques in Belgrade and in Niš were torched and many protestant and Catholic churches were stoned.99 The police, yet again, failed to respond to these situations in an appropriate fashion and this incident only served to further aggravate the situation between the majority and the minorities. Other worrying incidents against minorities included the increasing number of hate-speeches on the Serbian media, with certain dailies and weeklies being used as instruments to incite hatred and prejudice against minority groups. Yet despite of 95

Ibidem. Ibidem. 97 Lenard J. Cohen.‘Democratic Consolidation in Serbia: Pitfalls of the Post-Djindjic Transition.’ Wilson Center. March 2004. Pp. 1. 98 ‘Yugoslavia (the Federal Republic of) Serbia.’ Refworld. Pp. 1. Web. July, 8 2014. 99 Dragan Popovic. ‘Minority and Elections Report on Status of National Minorities in Parliamentary Election Campaign 2007.’ Youth Initiative for Human Rights. February 2007. Pp. 7-8. Web. June 19, 2014. 96

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their prevalence, courts repeatedly refuse to act upon hate mongering charges, in essence legitimizing discrimination within Serbian media. 100 Other forms of discrimination manifest themselves in outright violence towards ethnic minorities and this is mostly evident from the growing number of crimes related to the white power movements, who often target members from a minority community. The period from 2004-2006, generally known for its regression of human and minority rights, was heavily marked by the government’s inability to properly implement and/or develop the necessary legislative changes to meet the demands of minority communities. Moreover, the process of decentralization with the subsequently planned regional reforms was severely postponed and the legal protection of minorities weakened during this same period. For instance, the Omnibus law, which was meant to restore partial autonomous powers to the region of Vojvodina, failed to fully define that autonomy. Another development that had negative consequences on minority rights was directly connected to the disintegration the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006. As mentioned above, the state had adopted an exemplary Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Freedoms, which regulated human and minority rights as described in international law, however it was abandoned by both states after the dissolution of the State Union. The most significant change was reflected in the abolishment of the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights and the transfer of its competences to the newly established Service of Human and Minority Rights in 2006, which was perceived as a degradation of the rights of minorities due to its inferior capability to tackle the issues at hand. 101 After the disintegration of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the LPRFNM, which regulated minority rights at a federal level according to international and European standards, was adopted in Serbia. However, due to its broad federal nature it contained only a very general framework pertaining to the rights of persons belonging to minorities, making it difficult to implement seeing how many institutions required specific definitions. 102 On October 2006 another alarming moment occurred for the minorities of Serbia as the new Serbian Constitution was affirmed in the referendum and officially adopted and enforced on November 8th. The 100

Idem, 8. ‘Alternative Report submitted pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 1 of the FCNM.’ Minority Electronic Resources. Sep. 2007. Pp. 16. Web. June 20, 2014. 102 ‘Alternative Report submitted pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 1 of the FCNM.’ Vojvodina Center for Human Rights. Sep. 2007. Pp. 8. Web. June 20, 2014. 101

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problem emanated from the fact that the Constitution had been passed in the absence of any public discussion and without consultations with minority communities. Moreover, the new Constitution defined Serbia as the state of Serbian people and other citizens, an action frowned upon by minority representatives, and removed ‘’the right to minority representation in the Parliament and the right to equal representation in public institutions and bodies of local selfgovernance’’, thereby significantly setting back the previously attained standard in human rights protection.103 In addition, at the end of 2008 the Advisory Committee on the FCNM assessed that the Serbian government had made no progress in the promotion of the integration of minorities in a broader socio-political context.104 Despite of this period of apparent regression, Serbia was able to slowly reverse the trend and more recent developments emphasize progress. Serbia ratified a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU on 29 April 2008. Conditionality in the SAA was an upgrade from an earlier form of an association agreement, namely the Europe Agreement. The SAA was different, in the sense that it responded to the particularities of the Balkan region as a whole.105 During the negotiations of the Association Agreement, Serbia was not only subject to the Copenhagen criteria but also had to adhere to the prerequisite requirements of the SAA. The Conditions that were specific to the SAA were e.g. a visible commitment to regional cooperation, respect for human and minority rights and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.106 In March 2009 Serbia finally adopted a comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Law, banning discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, gender or other factors. The Anti-Discrimination Law was one of the requirements for Serbia's inclusion on the Schengen White List and essentially formed a huge step towards the implementation of the European standards in the field of minority rights.107 It is also worth noting that initially the draft

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Dragan Popovic. ‘Minority and Elections Report on Status of National Minorities in Parliamentary Election Campaign 2007.’ Youth Initiative for Human Rights. February 2007. Pp. 8-9. Web. June 19, 2014. 104 Teresa Maria Cierco. ‘’Human Rights promotion in Serbia: a difficult task for the European Union.’’ Rev. bras. polít. int. Vol. 54, No.1, 2011. 105 Elena Fierro. The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice. The Hague: Nijhoff Publishers, 2003. Pp. 167-168. 106 Maire Braniff. Integrating the Balkans: Conflict Resolution and the Impact of EU Expansion. London : Tauris Academic Studies, 2011. Pp. 86. 107 Teresa Maria Cierco. ‘’Human Rights promotion in Serbia: a difficult task for the European Union.’’ Rev. bras. polít. int. Vol. 54, No.1, 2011.

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was withdrawn due to objection by the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious denominations who opposed Article 21, barring discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.108 According to the 2013 Progress Report, Serbia has adopted comprehensive new strategies in fighting discrimination and as a consequence Serbia’s anti-discrimination legislation is now ‘’broadly in line with European standards on combating racism and racial discrimination’’. 109 Furthermore, the legal framework providing for minority protection is operational and for the most part complied with. Nonetheless, further efforts are indeed required to ensure its consistent implementation throughout Serbia, particularly in areas such as education and language.110 Certain activities have also been conducted with regards to the protection of the rights of the LGBT community, which is another positive development that signals movement toward increased recognition and inclusion of minorities is, however adequate political support is still lacking and a gay pride march in Belgrade was banned for a third consecutive year due to threats being made by right-wing groups.

3.3 Serbian Perceptions of Minorities The assumption that ethnic conflict arises due to the presence of various distinct ethnic communities is somewhat tautological, however it is safe to assume that deeply divided multiethnic states are inherently unstable. Contemporary Serbia happens to be one of the more ethnically diverse regions in Europe, with an exceptionally complex religious, cultural, and linguistic composition. Although the Serbian Orthodox Church is by far the largest and most influential religion in the country, as a consequence asserting a powerful role in the public sphere, Serbia does remain very heterogeneous in nature, with many different confessions of faith represented within its borders. 111 Serbia’s ethnic composition too is marked by an astounding diversity and this is in large part due to the constantly shifting political boundaries throughout history; a history that was continuously characterized by wars, migration, and influx of refugees. According to the 2011 census the largest ethnic minority groups in the country are 108

‘The Serbian Anti-discrimination law is adopted.’ ILGA-Europe. 26 March 2009. Web. 20 June 2014. ‘Serbia 2013 Progress Report.’ European Commission. 2013. pp. 45 Web. 19 June 2014. 110 ‘Serbia 2013 Progress Report.’ European Commission. 2013. pp. 11 Web. 19 June 2014. 111 Angela Iliƒ. ’Church and State Relations in Present-Day Serbia.’ George Fox University. Dec. 2004. pp. 26. Web. 22 June 2014. 109

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Hungarians, Roma and Bosniaks, followed by smaller groups such as Croats, Slovaks and Albanians.112 Many of these communities are predominantly concentrated near border regions, such as for example Vojvodina and Sandžak, which as a consequence has contributed to the process of the territorialization of minority issues and a growing extremity of collective demands on the part of minority representatives. However, such collective identity crises are fairly characteristic throughout both minority and majority populations in many post-conflict countries undergoing transition, and so while the Serbian majority is presently searching for its identity through various forms of nationalism as well as the return to religion, minorities are largely focused on safeguarding their own ethnic identity. Throughout the 1990s, collective ethnic sentiments have been fiercely propagated by the state media. Instead of addressing Yugoslavia’s rapid economic and political decline, Slobodan Milošević turned to rousing nationalist sentiments and finding ethnic scapegoats in order to achieve power. During this period Serbian nationalists took advantage of a historic sense of oppression and suffering of the Serbian people. In fact, one of the contemporary fathers of Serbian nationalism Dobrica Ćosić expressed this trend of collective victimization quite eloquently by stating that "The Serb is the new Jew, the Jew at the end of the twentieth century."113 This comment was made during a time when the rest of the world started to perceive the Serb as the new Nazi, accountable for setting off almost a decade of Balkan warfare. 114 The relative isolation of Serbia during this period, combined with the Security Council’s decision to impose arms embargo in September 1991, and economic sanctions in May 1992, which led to Serbia’s economic impoverishment only served to further reinforce the culture of victimization already in place, and this in turn has helped to ignite Serbian nationalism. Although the virulent type of ethnonationalism associated with the reign of Slobodan Milošević and with the most catastrophic and violent years of Yugoslavia's bloody disintegration has for the most part faded into history, political elites promoting extreme nationalist sentiments and the accompanying popular support for such views, remain to this day wide-spread phenomena both in Serbia and among Serbs in other areas. It appears that the legacy and practice, as well as the residuum of the once fiery ethno-nationalist policy, have been more or 112

‘Demographics in Serbia.’ Independent News Serbia. March 2013. Web. July 11, 2014. Cristina Posa. 'Engineering Hatred: The Roots of Contemporary Serbian Nationalism.’ Balkanistica. Vol. 11, 1998, Pp. 70. 114 Ibidem. 113

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less transferred into the post-conflict environment, which is marked by a relatively weak democracy, unstable democratic institutions and persistent nationalistic sentiments, as well as to some extent national and territorial interests related to feelings of ‘wounded national pride’ from Serbia’s indirect defeat in i.a. Croatia and Bosnia.115 Several factors may provide reasons for the persistent nationalistic views and the subsequent antagonistic attitude towards minorities that continuously enjoy popular support amongst the Serbian population. One is the inadequate approach to democratic transition after the fall of communism, which was still largely based around the idea of national identity. This as a consequence caused a collision of modern values and pre modern traditions, which were often rooted in myth and feelings of collective victimization. These beliefs to this day continue to be prevalent throughout the Serbian society, whereas the concept of citizenship, which emphasizes individual civic liberties, has not yet been fully developed.116 In the current situation of identity crisis, it is easy to fall back to or find a sense of security in regressive forms of collective identity, such as in the Serbian case, various forms of nationalism, neo-fascism and religious revival.117 The trend of ‘defensive nationalism’ which is firmly rooted within the aforementioned culture of victimhood is especially prevalent. This particular response is the consequence of feelings of humiliation and blame at the inter-group level, accompanied by sentiments of guilt and shame and a desire in post conflict group redefinition in order to appease the battered collective ego.118 In addition to the historical analysis, there are several more recent developments that have had an effect on the perception of minorities and that to some extent have exacerbated xenophobia in Serbian society. For instance, the dissolution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006, during which the minority vote was of a decisive nature, added a contributing factor to outbursts of nationalism and a dominant negative perception of minorities as a destabilizing and threatening element to Serbian cohesion. Equally, the situation related to Kosovo has for the longest time provoked similar reactions, as the Albanian minority, which 115

Lenard J. Cohen. ‘Nationalism, The Kosovo Crisis, and Political Change In Serbia.’ Wilson Center. October 1998. Web. June 25, 2014. 116 Ibidem. 117 Zagorka Golubović. ‘An Anthropological Conceptualisation of Identity.’ Synthesis Philosophica. Vol. 26, Nr. 1, 2011. Pp. 39-40. 118 Izabela Steflja. ‘Identity crisis in post-conflict societies: the ICTY's role in defensive nationalism among the Serbs.’ Global Change, Peace & Security. Vol. 22, No. 2, June 2010. Pp. 235.

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constitutes a demographic majority in the region, tried to gain territorial independence. To this day, Serbia has not recognized Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Moreover, Serbia’s northern Vojvodina province had triggered a similar national debate after the fall of Slobodan Milošević, by pressing for more regional autonomy, which to many Serbian nationalists conveyed the threat of future separatism and further disintegration of the country. The perception of minorities as a potentially disrupting force was furthermore reinforced in 2001 with the insurgency in the Preševo Valley, during which a separatist militant group consisting of ethnic Albanian insurgents attempted to annex the Albanian dominated Preševo Valley to Kosovo, leading many Serbs to feel that Albanians were disloyal. The ceasefire, brokered by NATO, ended the wave of violence that same year. However, more recently in 2013, Preševo formed a stage to a number of bitter discussions about commemorative monuments and court cases relating to the Second World War, with tensions rising to new, dangerous level.119 The dominant view amongst Serbians has generally been influenced by the media’s and nationalist politician’s portrayals of minority groups as discordant elements and a threat to Serbian unity. However, the complexities pertaining to minority rights often require more contextual resolutions. For one, such conflicts tend to be intractable, if nuanced solutions and situationally appropriate methods are not applied. Instead of viewing minorities as a definite threat to Serbian unity and an element of destabilization in a post-conflict environment, policy makers should take into account the full complexity of the issue at hand. Dealing with minority related conflicts in a uniform fashion would be a fallacy of oversimplification. All things considered, policy and perceptions can be said to diverge in the case of Serbia. Liberal frameworks are often adopted as a formality and often do not correspond to the prevailing conceptions of the national identity, leading to a shallow and inconsistent implementation of minority law. It is therefore crucial to recognize the role societal values play in achieving compliance with minority legislation.

119

‘War memorials in the Balkans: Remembrance of the recent past.’ The Economist. Jan 14 2013. Web. June 18, 2014.

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3.4 Serbia and the EU: Two Disparate Accounts of Multiculturalism The respect for and protection of human rights and democratic principles is one of the central aspects of the European policy towards the Serbian state and has undoubtedly contributed to a more stable social and political climate. One of the indispensable features of the EU approach consists of working towards the acceptance and respect for universal principles in countries with embryonic traditions of human and minority rights, freedom and equality. This is a long lasting commitment, but it forms an essential part in furthering a stable and conflict free environment. As already established in the second chapter of this thesis, from 1993 onwards the EU has increasingly emphasized the significance of securing rights of ethnic and national minorities as a pre-accession standard for further enlargements. The strategy has been quite successful in supporting Serbian efforts of promoting minority rights, however, as already outlined above, the perceptions of minorities in the Serbian society remain negative in general. For one, the culture of victimhood remains pervasive throughout Serbia. In a research conducted by Sabina ČehajićClancy, a Sarajevo-based social psychologist, many interviews were conducted about the Serbian youth’s perceptions on the Srebrenica massacre. Many of the excuses ranged from ‘’explicit denial to various moral justifications’’.120 Contradictory however, was the fact that when asked whether these events should be part of the public discourse, the majority would answer “no, this is in the past, we need to move on”, whereas, at the same time, there was a striking obsession with discussing the atrocities committed against Serbs in WWII. The research in essence substantiates the presence of severe expressions of victimhood across all generations. 121 Blame is still being apportioned, and is in fact a fundamental feature within the Serbian community based distrust. This also relates to what was discussed earlier in this chapter, namely that minorities are still largely viewed in terms of threat to Serbian stability. Furthermore, as evident from the still prevalent ethnic ideology and focus on territory and national pride, Serbia’s perceptions of identity can be categorized, to some extent, as different from those pursued on a European level. The level of identification among Serbian people is very high. This may lead them to pursue different priorities, namely, Serbianhood. Therefore, European notions of ‘’unity in diversity’’ and the human rights and minority culture may be

120 121

Joseph, Bamat. 'A severe pronouncement of Serbian victimhood.' France 24. May 2011. Web. July 8, 2014. Ibidem.

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perceived by some as a direct threat to Serbian national identity. That being said, similar tendencies can be observed in some European countries. As a consequence, the European promotion of a human rights culture faces severe limitations when it comes to amassing respect for the minority policies and their associated norms and values in the Serbian society. Despite of some theoretical progress in the field of minority rights, such as the development of various legal frameworks, the application remains generally weak. All things considered, the changes need to occur, not only at the governmental level through the adaptation of various human rights instruments, but also at a societal level, where it is necessary to change the current Serbian value system in order to guarantee a consistent implementation of minority legislation. In addition, conservatism in Serbia pervades various institutions of higher learning, which contributes to xenophobia and intolerance amongst younger generations. As a result, the minority perceptions as illustrated above, remain largely intact. In short, when it comes to the successful implementation of human and minority rights legislations, the Serbian government has a key role to play in persuading the general public in accepting these changes.122 Applying political strategies of liberalism by itself cannot guarantee the consistent and satisfying implementation of minority legislations. To relate back to what was discussed within the theoretical framework, traditional form of communitarianism proves to be quite tenacious in Serbia, as evident from e.g. the prevalent ethnic ideology, as well as the high level of identification with one’s own community, and forms an obstacle towards achieving a genuine form of civic solidarity in which members of minority groups are viewed as human beings first, and only after as Bosniaks, Roma, Croats etc. Promoting Serbianhood and granting priority to the majority group over the rights of minorities does not attract much sympathy and understanding within the Western cultural tradition. As a consequence, the major conflicting issue between the EU and Serbia involves the rights of the individual and the communal values. Depending on the context, both may be difficult to respect. This is why Kymlicka’s theory, with its emphasis on bridging the gap between the two disparate accounts of multicultural theory will come in handy when looking at the Bosniak communities of Sandžak in the next chapter.

122

Teresa Maria Cierco. ‘’Human Rights promotion in Serbia: a difficult task for the European Union.’’ Rev. bras. polít. int. Vol. 54, No.1, 2011.

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4 Minority Rights in Sandžak 4.1 Introduction So far this thesis has identified the underlying political tendencies of the EU and Serbia that consequently pave the way to a broader contest between two seemingly irreconcilable interpretations of multiculturalism, namely Communitarianism and Liberalism. The value system of the post-Milošević era, with its tangible focus on nationalism, is still pervasive throughout the Serbian society and forms a stumbling block when it comes to the implementation of liberal European policies with their obvious emphasis on individual autonomy and universalism. In their unmitigated form, neither a strict liberalist, nor a communitarian approach look very attractive. While the former pursues a rather unsubstantial conception of a community and ignores important relationships between individuals and their groups, the latter can be said to underestimate and in some cases completely disregard the question of pluralism in contemporary societies. It will be the tentative assumption of this chapter that in the case of Sandžak, the opposing values can be sufficiently reconciled, through the application of Kymlicka’s liberal theory of group-differentiated citizenship. A brief overview will follow on the incorporation of the Bosniak Muslims into the Serbian State. This review will demonstrate that the incorporation of this group generally came about involuntarily, in other words through conquest. A different section will address the relationship between state nation building and minority rights. The discussion will show that the Serbian state is engaged in nation-building that potentially disadvantages members of minority communities. Furthermore, the current rights of the Bosniak minorities in Sandžak will be discussed within the framework of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in order to assess the regional impact of its implementation. As previously established, the FCNM has increasingly filled the normative vacuum affecting the EU minority conditionality and has, as a consequence, become a yardstick against which minority policies in candidate states are assessed.123 In addition, it is a helpful instrument, in that it also focuses on fostering intercultural dialogue and as a consequence has implication for the Serbian society at 123

‘Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: Second Opinion on Serbia.’ Council of Europe. March 2009. Pp. 2. Web. July 2, 2014.

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large and not only for minorities. This is essential in order to overcome prejudice, discrimination and xenophobia that is still prevalent throughout the Serbian society today. The implementation of the provisions is expected to be done strictly through national legislation, which in contemporary Serbia is mainly defined by the Constitution adopted in 2006 and in greater detail regulated by the Law on Protection of National Minorities’ Rights and Freedoms from 2002. The most challenging part remains the implementation of the Framework and it should therefore come as no surprise that Serbia has not managed to implements all of the provisions, as will be demonstrated below.

4.2 Bosniak Communities in Sandžak: Involuntary Incorporation Sandžak is a small former historical trans-border region that is now divided between Serbia and Montenegro and is characterized by a multiethnic population, predominantly composed by Muslims-Bosniaks and Orthodox Slavs. The historical origin of Sandžak refers to the Sandžak of Novi Pazar, which is a former Ottoman administrative district, administratively based in Novi Pazar. This district, which was created in 1878 after the Berlin Congress, was finally abolished when it was conquered by the Serbian and Montenegrin troops during the first Balkan War in October 1912. These same delineations have remained in place ever since and received a new, and somewhat contentious character when the region was again divided with Montenegrin and Serbian independence in 2006. Due to this complex history of conquest and immigration, it should come as no surprise that within contemporary Serbia political borders rarely align with ethnic and religious identities. With the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia and the reappearing nationalism in 1990, a new party appeared on the Serbian political scene which claimed to represent the interests of the Sandžak Muslim population. This new nationalist party was the SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije or the “Party of the Democratic Action”). When the party was founded on August 11, 1990, it was organized as an affiliate of the Muslim party of the same name, which was based in Sarajevo. Therefore, from the very start, the Sandžak political program was closely linked to the one being developed in Bosnia Herzegovina.124 During the existence of the Federal Republic of 124

Dejan Guzina. ‘Nation-Building vs. Minority-Destroying: Majority-Minority Relations in the Post-Socialist Serbia.’ Southeast European Politics. Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2000. Pp. 36.

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Yugoslavia and Serbia and Montenegro the SDA advocated that the region of Sandžak had to become a special autonomous region transcending the boundaries of both Serbia and Montenegro. This position inevitably favored the preservation of Yugoslavia (subsequently Serbia and Montenegro) as a unified political entity, and demanded autonomy with broad selfgovernment rights to the region of Sandžak, which included autonomy in cultural and educational matters. The representatives of the party, whose goals were to represent all Bosnian Muslims in all eleven Montenegrin and Serbian municipalities, proclaimed a "historic Sandžak".125 In October 1991 the Bosniak National Council of Sandžak, composed of the SDA organized a non-official referendum in which Sandžak Muslims were asked whether they were in favor of the regions full political and territorial autonomy, and its right to integration with one of the sovereign republics, presumably Bosnia Hercegovina.126 Muslims in 5 municipalities in the Serbian part of Sandžak voted overwhelmingly in favor of autonomy, with the exception of one Serbian municipality Nova Varos where the SDA failed to set up polling stations. According to the results only 70.2 per cent of eligible voters had participated in the referendum, however, of these 98.9 per cent voted for autonomy. Needless to say, the Serbian officials described the referendum as ‘illegal, unnecessary and senseless.’ 127 The Serbian government furthermore maintained that Sandžak never existed as a political entity in the past, therefore any claims made towards the establishment of an autonomous region were deemed inappropriate. The conflict between Belgrade and the SDA reached its peak on June 6, 1993 when the SDA submitted a joint memorandum to the Federal Parliament and the two Parliaments of the Republics, on the Establishment of Special Status for Sandžak. The Memorandum proposed e.g. the setting up of a regional parliament, as well as the appointment of a governor and a cabinet as the executive body with full authority in the fields of education, cultural policy, the media, health care, local police etc. The memorandum was rejected as a de facto attempt at secession. Furthermore, given the ethnic nature of the conflict in the neighboring Bosnia, the political stance of the Sandžak Muslims enabled Serbian state officials to label them as extremists. The inevitable outcome was a continuation of the state sponsored ‘’politics of fear’’ in the region, which manifested itself in harassment, arbitrary police conduct in Muslim houses, intimidations, 125

‘Serbia’s Sandžak: Still Forgotten.’ International Crisis Group. April 2005. Pp. 19. Web. July 4, 2014. Hugh Poulton. Muslim identity and the Balkan state. N.Y : New York University Press, 1997. Pp. 175. 127 Ibidem. 126

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abductions and forced migrations. The silent ethnic cleansing of Sandžak subsided following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and the Muslims have stopped being the target of military action and cross border violence, however ethnic, political and economic problems have continued to smolder under the surface.128 As this section has shown, with the breakup of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the members of the Bosniak community in Sandžak became citizens of both Serbia and Montenegro and as a consequence their societies were transformed into cultural minorities. This process of the incorporation of their communities into states happened without their consent or consultation and historically, through expansion and conquest. This corresponds directly to Kymlicka’s typology and defines the group in question as national minorities, that is, in contrast to ethnic groups, who migrated voluntarily with the expectation to integrate. Today, the municipalities of Sandžak are among the most underprivileged in Serbia. The region remains economically underdeveloped, with low standards of living, high levels of unemployment and inadequate infrastructure. According to the data published by the World Bank, today’s population of Sandžak is categorized as ‘actively poor’. Around 55 percent of the unemployed live in just two municipalities, namely Tutin and Novi Pazar, of which the former is the largest municipality, as well as the economic and cultural center of the region. Economic and ethnic issues appear to be interlinked in Sandžak. There is a diffuse sense of inequality and even perceptions of discrimination among the Bosniaks. In addition, according to the European Commission 2013 Progress Report, the Bosniak community continues to be underrepresented in the local administration, judiciary and police.129 As one participant of the workshop “Economic Problems and Developmental Prospects of Sandžak” eloquently remarked: ‘’ If the ministers, the Premier and all those officials... want to take Serbia into Europe, they firstly have to take Novi Pazar into Serbia.”130

128

Sandra King-Savic. ‘History and Identity within the Sandžak Region.’ Foreign Military Studies Office. 2012. Pp. 7. Web. July 12, 2014. 129 ‘Serbia 2013 Progress Report.’ European Commission. 2013. Pp. 47. Web. July 1, 2014. 130 ‘Grassroots Dialogues in Sandžak: Helping to Overcome Divides and Articulate the Region’s True Interests.’ Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. Pp. 5. Web. July 12, 2014.

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4.3 Illiberal Nation-State Building in Serbia As mentioned in the first part of the thesis, Kymlicka suggests that all states, including liberal states, engage in nation building, that is in ‘’diffusing a common societal culture throughout the territory of the state.’’131State nation building, inherently, benefits and privileges the majority population and consequently disadvantages cultural minority groups. In some cases nation building can go hand in hand with minority destruction. So what does the relationship between nation building and minority rights suggest in the Serbian context? According to Kymlicka, liberal principles generally set certain limits on how majority groups go about nation-building. For instance, liberal principles will often avert any attempts at ethnic cleansing or the violation of human rights. Furthermore, nation building upon liberal foundations cannot justify the suppression of minority nationalism while allowing majority nation building, especially in the cases where minorities have been involuntarily incorporated into a larger state.132 It is obvious that the newly-democratizing countries of Central and Eastern Europe are actively engaged in projects of nation building.133 In contrast to Western liberal states however, Serbia is not and does not pretend to be ethnoculturally neutral. The previous chapter has already shown that after the end of Communism, Serbia engaged in nation building practices that were centered on ethnic identity, based on race, language, culture, and a common history. This ethnic nationalism went hand in hand with acts of intolerance, discrimination, repression and ethnic violence. In the case of Sandžak specifically, Bosniaks experienced the regime’s open rejection of their claim to the status of a distinct ethnic group. Furthermore, despite of the existence of minority legislation that e.g. guaranteed the right to education and information in minority languages, the didactic material rarely contained any Muslim historical and cultural information, and various historical and geographical school books often portrayed a negative and damaging image of the role of the Muslims in the area.134 As a result, the nation-building in Serbia has obviously rested on illiberal nationalism. A short discussion of the Serbian Constitution is helpful to establish that the Serbian state 131

Will Kymlicka. ‘Nation-building and minority rights: Comparing West and East.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vol. 26, No. 2, 2010. Pp. 195. 132 Idem, 189. 133 Will Kymlicka. ‘Nation-building and minority rights: Comparing West and East.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vol. 26, No. 2, 2010. Pp. 195. 134 Retrieved from www.refworld.org/pdfid/4670107e2.pdf. Pp. 15. Web. July 12, 2014.

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today still actively promotes the ethnic definition of the state. In the constitution, minority rights are addressed in the section dealing with the general principles, as well as in the section that is concerned with human rights. For instance, the law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of affiliation to a national minority (Art 76), it prohibits forced assimilation, as well as the artificial change of the structure of the population (Art 78). In addition, members of national minorities have the right to express, preserve and develop their own identity and use their own language and script in public spaces (Art 79).135 The legislative framework also allows specific affirmative (positive) measures, with the aim of achieving equal opportunities for all citizens. Summarily, the Constitution approaches the issue of minority rights in quite an extensive way, however, it also preserves the post-communism standardizing character, which is mostly reflected in the definition of the state as a state of the Serbian people, as well as the state of all other ethnicities within its boundaries. This definition signals that the Constitution supports, not the civic, but the ethnic definition of the state and as a consequence reveals a somewhat exclusionary character of the nation-building in Serbia. Before moving on to the current policies towards the Bosniak communities in Sandžak the liberal limits of nation-building as proposed by Kymlicka will be discussed in the Serbian context. Kymlicka argues that nation-building, by itself, is not incompatible with Western liberal democracy. Therefore the central issue is not whether Serbia engages in nation-building or not, but whether the nation-building, today, is of a liberal or illiberal character.136 To recall a central point of Kymlicka’s theory, majority nation-building in a liberal-democracy is legitimate under the following conditions: a) nation-building must be inclusive: in other words, no long-term residents should be permanently excluded from membership, and everyone should be able to become an equal member of the nation; b) the concept of national identity and integration must be pluralistic and tolerant, not imposing any particular set of customs, religious beliefs, or lifestyles and should furthermore leave enough room for the expression of individual and collective differences, both in public and private; c) all national groups within a state, not just the majority nation, are allowed to engage in their own nation-building.137The following paragraphs will briefly reflect on these conditions while the remainder of the thesis will focus on the 135

‘Constitution of The Republic of Serbia.’ World Intellectual Property Organization. Web. July 1, 2014. Will Kymlicka. ‘Nation-building and minority rights: Comparing West and East.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vol. 26, No. 2, 2010. Pp. 187. 137 Will Kymlicka. ‘Liberal Theories of Multiculturalism.’ PostFilosofie. Web. 1 July 2014. Pp. 68. 136

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implementation of minority legislation in the Sandžak region. The first condition of nation-building in Serbia is clearly not met. To give an example: In Serbia, having nationality is not an adequate condition for an individual to be able to access rights that correlate with the status of a citizenship. In fact, for a person to be able to acquire such rights and obtain certain documents such as passport or ID card, citizens are required to register a permanent residence, a precondition that not all members of marginalized groups can meet. A survey conducted for the UN refugee agency states that 3 % of Roma do not have registered residence.138 The second condition also raises certain problems. Despite of the fact that Serbia has no legal regulations which would explicitly refer to a general assimilation policy, lingual, cultural and historical integration of the members of the Serbian state happens nonetheless through non legal infrastructures such as media and educational institutions. For example, in the region of Sandžak, both state and local media use predominantly Serbian language. Due to certain deviations of the Bosnian language from literature norms and standards, ‘’a silent assimilation and elimination of Bosnian language, as national minority language is performed’’.

139

Furthermore, the Constitution guarantees religious freedom, however, other laws and policies limit this religious freedom by differentiating between religious groups. Despite of there being no official state religion, the dominant Serbian Orthodox Church and other "traditional" religious groups receive some preferential consideration.140 As for the last condition, Kymlicka states that for majority nation-building to be ethical, national minorities should be able to engage in their own nation-building and the preservation of their own distinct identity. Because the process of state nation-building often goes hand in hand with minority destruction, national minority groups should be able to receive group specific rights, to counter the unjust nation-building. Due to its complementary nature, the third condition will be discussed within the scheme of the Framework Convention implementation below.

138

Milijana Trifkovic. ‘No Residence, No Rights.’ European Network on Statelessness. March 2013. Web. July 1, 2014. 139 ‘Alternative Report submitted pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 1 of the FCNM.’ Minority Electronic Resources. Sep. 2007. Pp. 26. Web. July 1, 2014. 140 ‘Serbia.’ US-Department of State. Pp. 1. Web. July 1, 2014.

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4.4 The Implementation of the FCNM in Sandžak Before addressing the implementation of the Framework Convention in Sandžak, it is necessary to briefly factor in and address the complexities of the region's political and ethnic situation that may additionally affect the outcome of the implementation of the FCNM. The political situation in Sandžak is highly complex and manifests itself through the fierce rivalry between the Party of Democratic Action in Sandžak (SDA), led by Sulejman Ugljanin and the Sandžak Democratic Party led by Rasim Ljajić. The former unequivocally supports some form of autonomy, whereas the latter is more moderate and therefore open to reintegration of Bosniaks on an equal basis.141 In addition to political rivalry, a split within Islamic community in Sandžak has contributed to a lot of turmoil in an already unstable region and has led to outbursts of violence, however this time drawn between religious divides. Taken together, the underdeveloped economic situation, the perceived neglect from Belgrade and the fierce political and Islamic divisions make progress so much harder to achieve. Considering the Framework Convention in his thesis is used as a benchmark to measure the progress of the regional minority rights implementation, as well as a means to shed light on some of the discrepancies between policies and practice, the paragraphs below will separately address the implementation of specific provisions that cover some of the more central minority rights elements, including those that directly correspond to Kymlicka’s theory on groupdifferentiated citizenship. Prohibition of discrimination and promotion of effective equality (Article 4) The prohibition of discrimination and the promotion of effective equality have not been implemented in the region of Sandžak. National minorities under Article 4 are guaranteed equal promotion of their economic, social, political and cultural life. According to a Council for Inclusive Governance report, composed in 2011, the interviewees indicated a great amount of dissatisfaction with the perceived lack of fairness in Belgrade’s attention to the economic development within the region compared to other underdeveloped regions of Serbia and lack of

141

Christopher H. Smith. Political Turmoil in Serbia. Diane Pub Co, 1996. Pp. 59-60.

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equitable distribution of resources.142 According to the participants, disparities were also striking within the region itself, namely between the cities with a majority Serb and with a majority Bosniak population. For instance, in 2010 investments per capita in the predominantly Serb municipality of Nova Varos, were more than six times of those in Novi Pazar and Sjenica and four times higher than those in Tutin, which are largely Bosniak cities. 143 Unemployment remains a big problem. While the average unemployment rate in Serbia hovers around the 25%, in Novi Pazar around 50% of the working age population is jobless.144 There is a widely shared perception amongst the local Bosniak communities that their problems are caused principally by the Serbian government’s deliberate neglect of this minority dominated region and even perceptions of discrimination. 145 Despite of the anti-discriminatory legal framework being in place, hidden discrimination is still present. For instance, the Act on Underdeveloped Regions in listing underdeveloped neighborhood communities in the cities of Sandžak failed to point out neighborhoods with majority Bosniak population as underdeveloped. A community in Peštera, without phone lines and infrastructure was registered as a developed area. 146 The individual discrimination of Bosniaks in the field of employment, most likely continues to exist in the region, however it is officially denied by the government. As a consequence, no affirmative action programs have been proposed by the Bosniak officials. Lastly, many Bosniaks believe that minority rights in the new Serbian Constitution have been derogated, in the sense that it introduces two types of citizens, namely Serbian and ‘other’. This is generally perceived as a demotion in status compared with the Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, minority communities ultimately do not feel equal before the law.

142

‘Challenges of Sandžak Non-Paper.’ Council for Inclusive Governance. Nov. 2011. pp. 3. Web. July 2, 2014. Idem, pp. 4. 144 Bojana Milovanovic. ‘Sandžak on the road to drawing investors.’ Southeast European Times. March 2013. Web. July 2, 2014. 145 ‘Challenges of Sandžak Non-Paper.’ Council for Inclusive Governance. Nov. 2011. Pp. 2. Web. July 2, 2014. 146 ‘Alternative Report submitted pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 1 of the FCNM.’ Minority Electronic Resources. Sep. 2007. Pp. 14. Web. July 1, 2014. 143

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Right to maintain and develop culture and preserve identity (Article 5) Despite the fact that some improvements regarding the preservation and development of the Bosniak identity have been met, the community is generally displeased and frustrated over the status of their cultural heritage. Almost no attention is dedicated to the Bosniaks' cultural, historical and religious buildings, as a consequence the architecture is endangered and dilapidated. There are hardly any cultural contents presenting Bosniak culture, and there is a considerable negligence for the monuments of the Islamic culture and tradition. For instance, according to a report presented by the Sandžak Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, an amount of 650.000 euros was allocated from the National Investment Plan for the Mileševo Eparchy (one of the eparchies of the Serbian Orthodox Church), however no appropriations were carried out for the Islamic monuments.147 Furthermore the Bosniak cultural heritage has commonly been defined in relation to its occupational Islamic nature, which in Serbia is often characterized as foreign. This representation of the Bosniak culture as occupational has been inserted in the general consciousness and used as an excuse to treat that heritage as something foreign to the region. The resulting attitude towards Bosniak cultural goods has often been marked by a considerable lack of respect and therefore preservation.148 In some cases, the oriental spirit of Sandžak has been forcibly removed by the alteration of buildings. It should therefore come as no surprise that Bosniaks in Sandžak are worried about the destruction of the typical regional architecture in the area and the subsequent erosion of the ‘ethnocultural character’ of Sandžak.149 When returning to the issue of state nation building and its liberal limits in Serbia, it is obvious to observe that with regards to their own nation-building, members of the Bosniak community face considerable problems, which are in some ways very typical amongst all newlyemerged minorities. One of the most salient issues is the shortage and often amateurism of local institutions, which are ultimately necessary for the preservation and development of culture and national identity. This shortfall may be explained in terms of the traumatic experience of the 147

‘Alternative Report submitted pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 1 of the FCNM.’ Minority Electronic Resources. Sep. 2007. Pp. 22. Web. July 1, 2014. 148 Mirella Pejčić. ‘Minority Rights in Serbia.’ Dec. 2007. Uppsala Universitet: Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Pp. 136. Web. July 4, 2014. 149 ‘Minority Rights in the Western Balkans.’ European Parliament. July 2008. Pp. 4. Web. July 2, 2014.

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Bosniak community, for in circumstances of virulent nationalism, fanaticism and ethniccleansing, the survival mechanism minimized any other outstanding issues, even those relating to the preservation and development of the Bosniak identity. Both political and cultural elites play a central role when it comes to the issue of minority nation building. However, the cultural elite of Sandžak can be considered as weak, sidelined, divided and often lacking a stable institutional framework.150 Furthermore, due to the difficult financial situation and the fear of job loss there is a significant amount of self-censorship amongst journalists, who as a consequence do not always critically and freely reflect on the cultural developments within the Sandžak region.151 Promotion of intercultural dialogue and understanding (Article 6) The promotion of intercultural dialogue and understanding has not been established between Bosniaks and Serbs. Compared to the 1990s, the media's attitude towards the Bosniaks has not greatly improved though, generally, small improvements have been achieved. Stereotypes of the Bosniak minority are still highly prevalent and influenced by the media, which often reports on negative developments associated with the Bosniak community, such as e.g. crimes, religious extremism and political conflict. The massive spread of prejudice and stereotypes against the Bosniak community was initiated during the 1990s, when the state media started to represent the region in terms of illicit activities involving drugs, prostitution and religious fanaticism. These new characteristics were often incorporated into more traditional elements of Islamophobia and as a consequence a highly negative image emerged which contributed to the demonization of the entire region of Sandžak. As already established in the previous chapter, the Serbians generally viewed minorities as a destabilizing factor and to some degree this image persists to this day. Nonetheless, several projects and events aimed at combating ethnic hate and intolerance have been organized in the region. For instance, more than 35.000 young people from the region attended the inter-cultural events that were held during the week of culture in 2013. The events included the music festival ‘’Stari Grad’’, a Photo Workshop and a Youth Theatre Festival. The

150

‘Sandžak: Consequences of Repressive State Policy.’ Islam in South East Europe Forum. Nov. 2007. Pp. 2. Web July 2, 2014. 151 Слађана Новосел. ‘Новинари би морали да поштују кодексе професије.’ Удружење новинара Србије. July 2013. Web. July 1, 2014.

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weeks slogan was ‘’Strength in diversity’’. 152 The feedback from participants was generally positive and confirmed that the activities achieved their primary goal, namely to reduce ethnic stereotypes and to release tensions between both Bosnians and Serbs. However, it is worth noting that these activities were implemented under the United Nations Joint Programme, while no actual initiatives were undertaken by the Serbian state itself. Right to freedom of religion (Articles 7 and 8) According to the 2012 Report on International Religious Freedom, the government of Serbia has in practice generally respected religious freedom.153 However, an older 2009 report by Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention shows that individual cases of discrimination within state authority bodies still persist. For instance, the Advisory Committee received information from the Bosniak community that problems are still reported with regard to respecting religious diversity, in particular with regard to the lack of respect for religious dietary rules in the army. 154 In addition there have also been cases of discrimination registered against boys of Bosniak nationality during their military service.155 While Bosniaks in the region of Sandžak are freely able to manifest their religious convictions and establish religious institutions (both in municipalities where they constitute a majority and in those where they are in the minority), generally, Muslims throughout Serbia ‘’express their religious sentiments and exercise religious rituals under aggravated conditions’’.156

152

‘Consolidated Annual Report on Activities Implemented under the United Nations Joint Programme: Improving Human Security of Vulnerable Groups in Southwest Serbia’ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Pp. 15. Web. July 2, 2014. 153 ‘2012 Report on International Religious Freedom.’ U.S. Department of State. May 2013. Web. July 3, 2014. 154 ‘Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: Second Opinion on Serbia.’ Council of Europe. March 2009. Pp. 28. Web. July 2, 2014. 155 ‘Youth Initiative for Human Rights Report no. 6: Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Eight Multiethnic Municipalities and Cities in Serbia.’ HUNSOR. 2005. Pp. 18. Web. July 3, 2014. 156 ‘Alternative Report submitted pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 1 of the FCNM.’ Minority Electronic Resources. Sep. 2007. Pp. 39. Web. June 20, 2014.

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Right to official use of language and symbols (Articles 10 and 11) Bosnian has the status of an official language at the municipal level in the region of Sandžak. However, public and official use of Bosnian language has not been fully implemented and public correspondences remain mainly in Serbian language. Some progress has been achieved in the municipalities of Novi Pazar, Tutin and Sjenica, however in the Nova Varoš, Priboj and Prijepolje municipalities, the official use of the Bosnian language has not been put in practice. 157 Right to education in a minority language (Articles 12, 13 and 14) One of the basic rights, also with regard to the preservation and development of Bosniak identity, is the right to education in the mother tongue in the institutions of preschool, primary and secondary education. According to the Framework Convention the state shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields of education and research to “foster knowledge, culture, language and religion of national minorities, and provide adequate opportunities for training of teachers and availability of textbooks”.158 One of the key parties involved in the implementation of this right in Sandžak, is the Bosniak National Council (BNC), which is a single authority body. The introduction of education in mother tongue has been in process for several years and in accordance with the Model of education for the Sandžak-based Bosniaks in the Republic of Serbia, which was prepared by the BNC in 2009. The teaching of classes in Bosnian in September 2013, was preceded by the introduction of experimental classes in three cities: Sjenica, Tutin and Novi Pazar. The aim of these classes was to gain insight into some of the problems and advantages of the Bosnian programme. During the experimental phase, a set of surveys was furthermore conducted involving both parents and students of primary and secondary schools. In the municipalities of Tutin, Sjenica and Novi Pazar, 68,11 % of the respondents preferred to have instruction in their mother tongue, whereas the remainder chose to

157

Idem, 51. The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.’ The UN Guide for Minorities. Pamphlet No. 8. Pp. 4. Web. June 19, 2014. 158

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have instruction in the Serbian language.159 Several problems did arise during the survey process, especially within the other municipalities such as such Nova Varoš or Priboj. Both students and parents were exposed to pressures and rumors that pupils who attended classes in the mother tongue would not be able to enroll in faculties in Serbian. In several cases criminal charges were actually pressed against both teachers and headmasters by the BNC. In addition, the contents of textbooks on national subjects often provoked disputes. The BNC concluded that the main issue relating to the preparation and printing of textbooks is the poor cooperation with the state administration. Summarily, the introduction of courses in Bosnian was conducted without adequate preparation and without any public debate surrounding the issue of methodology. The schools were generally unprepared for instructing in Bosnian and there was a lot of pressure put on school administrators by the BNC and the ministry of education. There were no curricula for a great number of subjects and there were not enough textbooks to start the school year with. Numerous problems and additionally a chaotic situation were in fact created with the introduction of the Bosnian language in schools.160 Despite of the fact that this development has marked a significant step for minority rights, many problems obviously still remain. For one, the right to education in the Bosnian language must not be left purely in the competence of the Bosniak National Council. The BNC is a single-authority body, which represents the Bosniak community in Serbia without having the legitimacy. 161 Right to participation in public authorities (Article 15) Although the right to public participation is granted to members of the Bosniak community, in reality Bosniaks are generally poorly represented in public authority bodies. According to the findings of the Sandžak Committee for Human Rights, the national and professional structure in some municipalities in Sandžak is highly unfavorable for them, and ‘’does not correspond to the

159

‘Implementation of the Right to Education in the Bosnian Language in Sanjak.’ Policy Center. Pp. 3. Web. July 3, 2014. 160 ‘Implementation of the Right to Education in the Bosnian Language in Sanjak.’ Policy Center. Pp. 9. Web. July 3, 2014. 161 Ibidem.

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ethnic composition of the local population’’.162 The lack of participation is particularly visible in the judiciary, the police, prosecution offices and the army, where the negative tendency to discriminate and employ Serbs is still prevalent throughout the entire region. In addition no steps have been taken to introduce affirmative measures to correct the employment inequality in public institutions.163

4.5 Group differentiated rights in Sandžak As this chapter has demonstrated, the implementation of the FCNM has proven itself to be only moderately successful in the case of Sandžak, an occurrence which repeatedly points to a discrepancy between the legal framework and the actual implementation. Not only is the Serbian state actively engaged in nation-building activities that disadvantage the Bosniak community and thwart any sustainable development, there are various other factors, such as inter-Islamic and political rivalries that block the way towards a meaningful implementation of the Framework Convention. One of the most crucial conditions that Kymlicka sets to majority nation-building is that all groups represented within the state territory should be allowed to engage in their own nation-building and the preservation of their own distinct identity. However, as observed from the implementation of Article 5 of the FCNM, almost no attention is dedicated to the Bosniaks' cultural, historical and religious heritage. To recall one of the central points of Kymlicka's theory, it is necessary for a state to provide minority groups with group-differentiated rights in order to legitimize the process of nation-building and to rectify any potential drawbacks stemming from the diffusion of the dominant societal culture. According to Kymlicka’s typology, the rights that correspond with the Sandžak Bosniak status are self-government rights, e.g. forms of political autonomy and special representation rights, e.g. measures that ensure minority voices are heard in the political environment. For Kymlicka, these rights should be recognized on a permanent basis. That being said, decentralization is one of the most important issues that has not yet been implemented. As a

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‘Alternative Report submitted pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 1 of the FCNM.’ Minority Electronic Resources. Sep. 2007. Pp. 79. Web. June 20, 2014. 163 Mirella Pejčić. ‘Minority Rights in Serbia.’ Dec. 2007. Uppsala Universitet: Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Pp. 134. Web. July 4, 2014.

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consequence, the region of Sandžak has failed in obtaining an autonomous status. The idea of decentralization is in addition promoted by the European Union as a measure that could potentially help respond to the expectations of minorities in, for example, Sandžak, however the conservatives in Belgrade often raise the issue of disintegration, which points to the previously raised issue of Serbian minority perceptions and minorities as a destabilizing factor. Kymlicka’s response to these worries is that ‘’ethnic revival involves a revision in terms of integration, not a rejection of integration’’164 and for that reason, minority demands for increased recognition and visibility are not necessarily sources of division, but rather means for a better and a more just integration based on the principle of equality. Finally, as to the right to special representation, Bosniaks remain under-represented both in public life at the national level, and in state institutions, despite having their own political parties and other associations. In conclusion, while the application of Kymlicka’s theory as a potential meeting point for both communitarian and liberal accounts of multiculturalism does provide several feasible solutions to the ethnocultural situation of Sandžak, taking into account a variety of factors necessary to assess the scope of just minority claims, it does not take into account the possible resistance to the associated solution, which in the case of Serbia emanates from the continual fear of secession as a consequence of its turbulent history, as well as already present demands for autonomy from Sandžak. In addition, Kymlicka’s theory does not consider the possible divisions and splits within national minority communities themselves, therefore neglecting other possible factors that could potentially thwart minority rights development in a region. Nonetheless, Kymlicka’s theory is still commendable in the sense that it rejects the principle of ethnocultural neutrality and therefore requires the consideration of the minority/state relationship in a post socialist environment. Unlike the European Union, that exports pre-packaged solutions to the newly democratizing states, Kymlicka’s theory takes into account the illiberal nature of Serbia’s nation-building and emphasizes the need for a more contextual approach in order to accommodate the needs of minorities. That being said, in order to advance decentralization and local development, it is first necessary to tackle the underlying issues that form an obstacle to the realization of this solution, namely inter-ethnic, as well as inter-religious tensions. As demonstrated in this chapter, negative minority perceptions still dominate regional bodies, as a 164

Montserrat Guibernau. The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration. UK: Polity Press, 2010. Pp. 269.

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consequence frustrating sustainable progress set in motion by minority rights instruments, such as the FCNM. Therefore, promotion of dialogue and tolerance, as well as intercultural cooperation and mutual understanding is necessary, not only through the implementation of various EU instruments, but most importantly through Serbian initiatives.

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5 Conclusion 5.1 Introduction This thesis has identified the underlying dominant political strategies of the EU and Serbia that consequently pave the way to a broader contest between two seemingly irreconcilable interpretations of multiculturalism, namely communitarianism and liberalism. As previously established, the enduring Serbian nationalism and ethnic ideology keep tensions simmering throughout various layers of Serbian society. Consequently, the ethnicity based, racial nationalism, rooted in historical narratives often form a serious hindrance when it comes to the implementation of the more liberal European policies with their obvious emphasis on individual autonomy, humans rights and universalism. In their unmitigated form, neither a strict liberalist, nor a communitarian approach look very attractive. As illustrated in the theoretical framework, liberal accounts of multiculturalism tend to oppose minority rights on the grounds that it violates individualism, whereas the communitarian response pertains to the significance of communal values for the development and growth of an individual. On the normative level, liberal multiculturalists are accused of putting too much emphasis on autonomy, at the cost of community. Furthermore, communitarians additionally object to the liberal view that a state is and should be neutral. In my case-study I mentioned that the opposing values can be sufficiently reconciled, through the application of Kymlicka’s liberal theory of group-differentiated citizenship. Kymlicka argues that collective rights can in fact find a comfortable position within liberal political philosophy, based on the arguments of individual autonomy and social equality, and believes that granting special rights to minorities is necessary even in liberal democracies that uphold high standards of human rights of individuals. An important feature of Kymlicka’s theory is his rejection of ethnocultural neutrality of the liberal state. He argues that a state will always have an established culture that will help some groups, while hinder others. As a consequence neutrality is impossible and equality must be the primary guide. According to the author, liberals must also distinguish between types of cultural diversity, namely polyethnic or multinational, and claims for group specific rights, such as self-government and polyethnic rights, in order to determine the boundaries of group differentiated rights in a society. Furthermore, the extent of claims varies greatly between different types of minorities. 65

Ethnic or immigrant minorities in a polyethnic state are the result of voluntary migration and as a consequence their claims for differentiated citizenship are only limited. Whereas, national minorities who were incorporated into a larger nation by conquest or treaty have a right for more elaborate claims in a society. For Kymlicka, reconciling both communitarian and liberal accounts of multiculturalism therefore requires a contextual focus as well as a close examination of the various claims. Below, Kymlicka’s typology will be summed up in the case of Sandžak.

5.2 The case of Sandžak: Just claims for Group-differentiated Rights As the second part of this thesis has shown, applying Kymlicka’s classification to the cultural landscape in Serbia categorizes the country as both polyethnic and multinational, therefore, consisting of both national and ethnic minorities. Officially there are 19 ethnical groups with a status of national minorities in Serbia, of which the most numerous are Hungarians, Bosniaks and Roma. Kymlicka’s subdivision of national minorities leads to the conclusion that the Sandžak Bosniaks are a national minority, in other words, this group was involuntarily incorporated into the Serbian nation state. In addition, this group has in common its history, language, territory and culture. Therefore, Kymlicka’s theory on national minorities appears to correspond to the actual nature of the Bosniak minorities in question. In addition, Sandžak Bosniaks have resisted decades of virulent nationalism and coercive nation-building, aimed at the eradication of their distinct Muslim identity and to this day retain their own unique societal cultures. All things considered, Kymlicka’s categorization provides a relevant framework which is able to differentiate between various types of minorities in Serbia. The argument in the following paragraphs is that other essential components of Kymlicka’s theory are also to a great extent valid with regards to the Bosniak community in the region of Sandžak. This concerns notably the relationship between state nation-building and minority rights and the various arguments in favor of group specific rights. Based on the discussion conducted in the previous chapter, this thesis generally supports the policy recommendations developed within Kymlicka’s theory on multiculturalism. Kymlicka’s solution to multinational diversity ultimately involves the establishment of a multinational federation, however, given the current situation and attitudes in Serbia this thesis instead proposes a local level of governance for the accommodation of the Bosniaks in Sandžak. 66

Generally speaking, decentralization would be beneficial for every local community, not just for minorities. However, establishing an effective local autonomy would require the Serbian government to proceed with the decentralization reform through the adoption of further measures. Influence and pressure on the part of the EU would be indispensable for reforms to advance and for further decentralization to come. The requirement for greater local autonomy should as a result be encouraged by the EU during in its negotiations with Serbia. Overall, more research needs to be conducted in order to develop a more ‘multinational’ type of decentralization, which takes into account the specific circumstances, interests and above all the needs of Bosniak Muslims in Sandžak. The following paragraph will substantiate the granting of a degree of self-government (i.a. forms of political autonomy) and special representation rights (i.a. measures that ensure minority voices are heard in the political environment), to the Bosniak community in Sandžak, by applying the arguments introduced within the theoretical framework of this thesis. However, the discussion will exclusively focus on the equality argument. The equality argument states that some minority rights actually increase equality, especially in cases where minorities face considerable disadvantages in relation to the majority group. True equality, therefore, requires a group specific approach. As already established, the Sandžak Bosniaks face considerable challenges in various spheres of life. These vary from public participation to education in their own language. Moreover, as shown in the previous chapters, Serbia is currently actively engaged in the process of state nation-building, which involves a thick diffusion of a common societal culture throughout the territory of the state. This process inevitably disadvantages members of minority groups and condemns both their language and their associated cultures to marginalization. Unlike the Serbian majority, who always has the capacity to support its language and institutions and to guarantee the continued existence of its own culture, the minorities are constantly deprived of opportunities to ensure the maintenance and development of their unique societal culture. In order to avoid both negligence and inequities, group specific rights should be granted to the Sandžak communities, so as to provide them with meaningful protection against political and economic decisions made by the majority and to balance out the disadvantages created by the Serbian state nation-building. The establishment of self-government rights and special representation rights in the form of external protection are suitable measures that will advance minority rights in all spheres of life.

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5.3 The Role of the European Union The European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is the most comprehensive multilateral treaty dedicated to protection of rights of minorities. It was adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1998, and describes a number of principles according to which countries are to develop certain policies to protect the rights of minorities. 165 The Framework Convention has played an important role in the EU pre-accession strategy and has increasingly become a central reference point in the Union’s monitoring of candidate states’ respect for and protection of minorities.166 As already established in the first half of the thesis, the implementation of the provisions is expected to be done strictly through national legislation, which in contemporary Serbia is mainly defined by the Constitution adopted in 2006 and in greater detail regulated by the Law on protection of national minorities’ rights and freedoms from 2002. It is difficult to determine to what extent the implementation of these minority rights, as specified by the Framework Convention, can by themselves prevent future conflicts and increase stability in the region of Sandžak. Nevertheless, as the thesis has shown, the implementation of these rights is vital to the preservation and development of the Bosniak cultural identity. Even though the minority rights demonstrate some theoretic progress, the reality and practice is often very different. On the whole, the implementation of the Framework Convention has somewhat improved in post conflict Serbia, however, much more remains to be done in order to attain a more durable scope of implementation, especially on the local and regional levels. For instance, the introduction of Bosnian language instructions in Sandžak is a significant step for minority rights, yet at the same time the process is hampered by the incapacity of the single-authority body of the Bosniak National Council. As this thesis has shown, one of the reasons for the slow and at times reluctant implementation of the Framework Convention appears to be grounded in the post-independence, ethnicity-based type of nationalism, which is currently guiding the Serbian government’s policy. This is furthermore evident from the Serbian Constitution, which supports, not the civic, but the 165

‘The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.’ The UN Guide for Minorities. Pamphlet No. 8, pp. 1-9. Web. June 19, 2014. 166 Christophe Hillion. 'Conference: Enhancing the Impact of the Framework Convention.' Council of Europe. October 2008. Pp. 3.

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ethnic definition of the state. In accordance with Kymlicka’s theory on multiculturalism, it can be said that nation-building in Serbia has generally rested on and to this day retains traces of illiberal nationalism. This illiberal type of state nation-building is to a large extent irreconcilable with the liberal concepts of the Framework Convention, because it promotes a different, ethnic type of identity. That is why the Serbian Government and the Parliament still carry a huge responsibility not only in the establishment and development of various human rights instruments, but also in changing values amongst citizens, as some of the obstacles clearly include being unable to identify with core European values. The Serbian conservatism contributes to a very xenophobic society, which is dominated by right wing groups that often pervade academic institutions and therefore influence upcoming generations. All these things contribute to a highly intolerant society and cause discrimination of minorities. In short, in order to implement these criteria successfully the state must not only implement positive policy measures that deal with the issues of minorities, but also, the government must play a role in the persuasion of the general public in accepting these criteria. However, such a sensitive issue will likely remain a challenge in the future. Another obstacle to sustainable implementation of minority rights in Sandžak is the failure of the Serbian constitution to fulfill the expectations of further decentralization. Instead of strengthening local autonomy, the constitution in fact increased the central government’s influence over local authorities.167 Despite of this drawback, the current decentralization program is the only opportunity for the realization of greater autonomy for the Bosniak minority group. Only the establishment of a form of regional autonomy can enable these communities to determine the course of their own development. In addition, the development of local administrations with key competencies may also enable the economic development of the whole Sandžak region. As already mentioned before, the widespread poverty is one of the most important reasons behind the dissatisfaction of the Bosniak communities. In fact, Kymlicka is right in assuming that some form of regional autonomy is necessary in order to successfully tackle the accumulated economic disadvantages faced by these marginalized groups. As the economic indicators testify, i.e. Sandžak remains among Serbia's poorest and most underdeveloped regions, its municipalities cannot expect much from the state, despite of the urgent need for assistance. This leads to the obvious conclusion that the region of Sandžak 167

Beata Huzska. 'Decentralisation of Serbia – the Minority Dimension.' Open Society Institute. Pp. 12.

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cannot be developed from Belgrade. Furthermore, the effective and sustainable implementation of minority rights is highly dependent on the economic situation. As a consequence it inevitably affects the implementation of the Framework Convention. In addition resources and assistance need to be made available to make self-government effective and lasting. As demonstrated in the case of the implementation of the school curriculum, granting self-government rights should not be an excuse to leave these communities alone to solve their own problems. The central government should be able to provide technical assistance and training where necessary, conducted in the Bosnian language. Assistance is also needed in order to establish competent local and regional organizations and to improve their ability to manage various developments in the area. In short, a stronger regional autonomy will contribute to the development of the rights of minorities, as well as to a more inclusive democracy and active minority cooperation. These measures, according to Kymlicka, are necessary in order to correct the injustices exclusively faced by members of minority groups. The influence and pressure of the EU as well as a more active involvement of the Serbian Government would therefore be necessary in order to achieve a more ‘multinational’ framework of decentralization.

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