NATIONALIZATION AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF WATER ...

NATIONALIZATION AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF WATER RESOURCES IN IRAN By Assad Tavakoli1 ABSTRACT: In Iran the government under the Shah's regime nationalized the water resources of the country and legislated a detailed statute concerning the development, allocation, and use of this limited resource. This paper critically examines the Nationalization of Water Resources Act (NWRA) from the standpoint of promoting economic efficiency. A historical study of past water laws reveals a strong philosophical link with the concept of nationalization. The NWRA denounces the market mechanism and centralizes all aspects of development, allocation, and use of this resource. The analysis in this paper reveals that efficiency and optimality in the allocation and use of water cannot be attained through these laws. A review of the performance of a number of water agencies that were established prior to the NWRA shows that they are successful in gaining the advantage of economies of scale, internalization of external effects, and reduction of waste. Under these systems, the farmers have the ultimate discretion with regards to allocation, use, and transfer of water. Recommendations in this paper could be valuable to the current legislators who are engaged in the development of a new body of water laws. INTRODUCTION

Iran lies in the northern hemisphere between the latitudes of 25 and 40 degrees. Precipitation in this band is typically below the world's average of 860 mm. In fact, only the northern and eastern parts of the country receive relatively high rainfall, while the annual precipitation in the remaining regions that comprise approximately 92% of the land surface ranges only between 40-200 mm. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand that management of this limited resource has always been a preoccupation in this country. An example of the perpetual struggle and perseverance of this nation in quest for water is the existence of more than 50,000 hand-excavated underground tunnels (ghanat) with a length of up to 70 km and a depth of up to 300 m. The piecemeal and fragmented water laws that developed down the generations were blamed partly for the inefficiency of irrigation farming in the country (Mohandes 1965). To revive this sector of the economy, the government under the Shah's regime took a radical measure and nationalized all water resources of the country and legislated a comprehensive body of water laws. In the tradition of Posner (1977) and others, this paper appraises the Nationalization of Water Resources Act (NWRA) in Iran from the standpoint of economic efficiency. In doing so, one must be aware of the fact that the ultimate decisions and goals of public policy makers concerning the future water laws, may or may not be achieved concomitantly with economic efficiency. In any event, the cost of deviation from the eco'Assoc. Prof., School of Business and Economics, Fayetteville State Univ., Fayetteville, N C 28301. Note.—Discussion open until December 1, 1987. To extend t h e closing date one m o n t h , a written request m u s t be filed with t h e ASCE Manager of Journals. The manuscript for this paper was submitted for review a n d possible publication on November 11, 1986. This p a p e r is part of the Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, Vol. 113, N o . 4, July, 1987. ©ASCE, ISSN 0733-9496/ 87/0004-0522/$01.00. Paper No. 21666.

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nomically efficient allocation of water should be considered when decisions are made. First, an overview of the historical development of the institutions and regulations governing the allocation of water resources in the country is presented. Next, attention is focused on the NWRA and the economics of the water laws from the standpoint of promoting efficiency in the allocation and use of water. Then, an economic evaluation of the performance of a number of agencies that are primarily involved in the development of water resources is given. Finally, guidelines for the development of water laws that support economic efficiency are proposed. It should, however, be noted that this paper is not meant to provide an exhaustive analysis of the NWRA nor to develop a new body of water laws for the country. The prime objective is to demonstrate that economic efficiency in the allocation and use of water cannot be achieved through the statutes of the NWRA. In fact, the law, due to its complexity, was never enforced in a meaningful way. Consequently, empirical evidence has been scanty. The paper, therefore, is more descriptive than quantitative in nature. The discussion, nevertheless, should be beneficial to the new legislature which is in the process of drawing up a new body of water laws for the country (see Appendix I). HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the long history of civilization in Iran, an adequate supply of water has always been a major concern. Although no documented evidence with regard to procedures for the allocation of water exists prior to the conquest of the country by the Arabs in the seventh century, the importance of water has always been emphasized through Zoroastrianism, the ancient religion of Iran which recognizes water as a source of life and treats it with much respect. Following the invasion of the country by the Arabs, Islam became the religion of the nation, and the teaching of Islam on practical matters and affairs of the state became the basis for allocation and use of scarce resources. This religion recognizes water was the symbol of purity, fertility, and cleanliness to which no price can be attached. Consequently, private ownership and the sale of water was abolished. Water sources became public property available for use by all. Moreover, owners of privately developed water were asked to provide their "surplus" water to the community free of charge (Maktari 1971). However, over the passage of time and the emergence of different sects and branches on one hand, and the growth and complexity of societies on the other, the original doctrine which was based on "brotherly love" was found to be inadequate. For example, the interpretation of "surplus" water was a constant source of conflict and bloodshed (Caponera 1954). A historical study of institutions governing the allocation and use of water by Mohandes (1965) reveals that most sects of Islam have developed their own rules and regulations. However, a few principles underlie them all: 1. The question of ownership is basically decided by the nature and origin of water. In the case of privately developed sources where human 523

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effort is employed in the aquisition of water, ownership is conferred to the developer. 2. The acquisition of water from natural sources (e.g., rivers and streams) is determined by the riparian doctrine, with priority given to the upstream users. In periods of droughts, however, although upstream users are required to minimize the use of water, no mandatory compensation protects the rights of downstream users. 3. The transfer of ownership and the sale of water rights are recognized. Transactions are done in a competitive environment. Water markets are held in particular spots and at set times. Price is determined by the degree of scarcity, and water rights usually go to the highest bidder. In this connection, a detailed study by Caponera (1954) of customary laws concerning the allocation of water in Moslem countries indicates their improvised nature. His findings show that the laws as they were developed through the years were greatly influenced by the geographic and climatic conditions of the different parts of the Moslem world. In addition, he points out that the basic problem with Islamic law, in general, is the lack of administrative policies for the implementation of the principles. In the early 20th century, customary laws were codified into the Civil Law in Iran. Accordingly, many of the principles noted above remain unchanged. However, a careful examination of the water laws reveal their complexity, inadequacy, and in some cases conflicting interaction between the different statutes. There were more than 40 different statutes concerning one or another aspect of the water industry. The conflicting and contradictory nature of many articles contributed to the inefficient allocation and use of water throughout the country. For example, the doctrine of absolute ownership, which was the cornerstone of these laws, allowed the proprietor of the overlying land to make unrestricted use of the available groundwater. The result, as Mohandes (1965) indicates, was a rapid decline of the water table in many parts of the country where pumping of the aquifer was practiced. To alleviate the over-pumping situation, subsequent laws banned new drilling where water tables had been declining. Yet, the problem was not satisfactorily resolved since the ban was primarily concerned with the spacing of the wells and not with the actual pumping of the aquifer. Consequently, the "law of capture" and heavy mining of groundwater continued as before (MWP Annual Report 1971). The lack of a comprehensive water law for the regulation of the industry and protection of private use, combined with inadequate public investment for the development of new sources and the maintenance of the existing water systems, contributed toward the deterioration of irrigation farming in the country. In this connection, Vahidi (1971) showed that from a potential of 200,000,000,000 m3 of available water every year, only 30,000,000,000 m 3 were utilized in agriculture. Further, for every cubic meter of utilized water, an equivalent amount was wasted. These statistics highlight an alarming loss factor of 100%. Vahidi further showed that only 7,000,000,000 m3 of this water reached the aquifer or drained back to streams; the net loss, therefore, was 23,000,000,000 m3. This water 524


could potentially have been utilized to increase the hectarage of irrigated cropland by about two-thirds. NATIONALIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES

To improve the efficiency in the use and allocation of water in the country, the Shah's regime took a radical step and nationalized all sources of water in 1968. The philosophy of the nationalization of water resources stems from the original Islamic doctrine, which declares that "water is a gift of God and, since human effort is not required at the precipitation stage, it therefore cannot be claimed by any individual." This attitude towards water, as noted earlier, is not new in Iran. It is deeply rooted in the minds of most politicians due to historical, religious, and philosophical reasons (Vahidi 1971). Article 1 of the Nationalization of Water Resources Act (NWRA) declares all sources of water, surface or ground, as well as sewage and drainage and those of lakes and marshes, a national wealth resource and the property of the public. As agriculture is the country's largest consumer of water, the focus of the Act is oriented towards the problems of irrigation water, and its gradual implementation is entrusted to the Ministry of Water and Power (MWP). The main thrust of the Act is oriented towards a highly centralized system for the allocation and use of water resources. For example, Articles 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 16, and 17 give unlimited authority to two government agencies, namely the Ministry of Water and Power and the Ministry of Agriculture, to utilize and manage the water resources. Articles 6 and 8 empower a three-man group (two from the MWP and the other from the Ministry of Agriculture) to issue water-use permits to individual users. Decisions on the water requirements for crops are made by the Ministry of Agriculture (Article 17), and upon its recommendation, the MWP grants the necessary permits. Article 7 states that permits are only granted for "beneficial and reasonable use of water." The definition of "beneficial use," according to Article 16, is vested in the hands of the legislators and can vary with time and place. Also, permits are only issued for a particular use, and the holder of a permit cannot use it for any other purpose or transfer it to anybody else without the consent of the MWP (Article 13). Article 14 goes a step further and dictates that the water should be used on an assigned tract of land, or other mandated uses, unless the MWP makes a decision to the contrary or for any other reason finds out that the use is not beneficial or economical. In these circumstances the MWP issues a notice to the holder of the permit to correct this practice. If the instructions of the MWP are not followed within a period of three years, the right of use is withdrawn. ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF NWRA

It is evident that the NWRA places heavy emphasis on the "reasonable and beneficial use of water." In fact, the term appears repeatedly in many articles of the Act. The concept of "reasonable and beneficial use" is a desirable policy objective, but it could be best achieved through the 525

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mechanism of the market, not legislation. Many authors, including Milliman (1959), Hirshleifer, et al. (1969), and Tregarthen (1983), have shown that the exclusion of market and the prohibition of free transfer not only diverts water from its most beneficial and economical use, but it also hinders the optimal allocation and use of it. They argue that if a potential user is prepared to pay for water and the seller is willing to make the transaction, assuming there are no diseconomies, the transfer should be allowed since the new user has found a more productive use for it. This automatically implies that the water is going to be used more rationally, more beneficially and, still, more economically. Under the NWRA, only those permit holders with negative marginal productivity from the use of water are prepared to report to the MWP for the transfer of their permits. In the absence of a market for the transfer of right-of-use or sale of excess water, no rational farmer is prepared to give his water right or even any excess water away in exchange for nothing. He would not be prepared to make such an irrational decision, for he could, for instance, switch to a more intensive irrigation regime. Assuming that the marginal contribution of water remains positive, his decision would add to his revenue, in spite of the fact that the marginal revenue from the use of the last unit of water is lower than the price that a prospective buyer is prepared to offer him. Another inherent deficiency of the NWRA is noticed in the inadequacy of "security" for the development of irrigation farming. As already indicated, the definition of "beneficial use" (Article 16) and the priority of appropriation (Article 14) are entirely left to the government, which, in turn, could adjust them as circumstances require. Under this uncertain environment, where "beneficial use" is a matter of political determination, an entrepreneur farmer cannot make his investment policies on a long-term basis. This is so because a particular use that is considered "beneficial" today could always be considered "non-beneficial" tomorrow. On the interpretation of "reasonable" and "beneficial" use, Sarmad (1971) states that a provision of water for fish farming when the country is in short supply of necessities such as grain is not "reasonable," though it might be "beneficial." Under the existence of such an uncertain environment where a "beneficial" use in one year could be considered as an "unreasonable" one in the next year, an appropriator could not establish a long-term policy for investment and use of water. Furthermore, the right-of-use, which is always subject to future determination and redefinition of "reasonable-beneficial" use, weakens the transferability of the adjoining or overlaying land, since the prospective buyer does not have the assurance of a regular supply of water. Although the reasonable-beneficial uses of water are given their rightof-use in perpetuity, they may lose the right in the following circumstances: (1) Utilization of water without a license or more than what is allowed by the permit; (2) abandonment through relinquishment or otherwise of a water system for a period of more than four years; (3) failure to utilize the right-of-use for a period of more than three years; (4) transfer of right-of-use without permission of the MWP; and (5) failure to observe the legal requirement of the Act. 526

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The idea behind forfeiting for non-use basically stems from, the fact that the most immediate and efficient use of water should be considered. This clause of the Act, in fact, does not leave the decision whether to use the water or not at the discretion of the owner of the permit. This creates a disincentive for conservation, because if someone else can make productive use of water, the solution is not the deprivation of use through legislation. Instead, the potential user could, in the presence of a free market, purchase the right-of-use. If the owner chooses not to sell, he, in fact, forsees the possibility of greater use in the future, i.e., turning the water to a still more profitable use, a use that makes up for the present non-use of it. However, if a market for the sale of water were operative, the loss of income due to the fugitive nature of this resource, especially surface water, would definitely serve as an automatic means of preventing excessive reserves for the future. The question of "waste" has also been given emphasis in the NWRA (Article 15). Waste of water is strictly prohibited, and its practice could lead to the loss of the permit. At first, this clause of the Act appears to be desirable, for water is a scarce resource and, therefore, should not be wasted at all. But, if the rights were saleable, it is difficult to see why people would be so irrational as to waste water instead of using it in the most efficient and productive manner or, alternatively, selling it to someone else who could do so. To deny rationality in the use of water is, in fact, to object to the basis of any private decision making (Milliman 1959). The problem of "spillover" and external economies and diseconomies are also covered by the Act. Articles 35, 38, 42, 44, and 51 are exclusively devoted to problems such as pollution, injuries inflicted by a third party on the holder of a right-of-use, the right of passage, etc. However, the proposed method of compensation for these externalities is to some extent objectionable. For example, according to Article 35, whenever the yield of an existing water system suffers from new drillings, the new user must supply an equivalent amount of water from the new source to the senior user. The senior user, in turn, should contribute to the operating cost of the new source. If, however, the transfer of water is not possible, the junior user must compensate the damaged party by an amount which is determined by the MWP. This is usually the average revenue during the last five years of the beneficial use of the lost water. It is this method of compensation that causes objections. First of all, the old question of the definition of "beneficial use" reemerges. It is quite conceivable to envisage the possibility of conflict that may arise over the interpretation of beneficial use. Secondly, the fixed period on which the level of compensation is based could be questioned, since the value of irrigation in agriculture varies from one region to another. For example, the intensity of irrigation in arid or semiarid parts of the country is high, and its contribution to the yield, in turn, is essential, while in humid regions, irrigation is only used to complement the natural precipitation. Loss of irrigation in the latter case normally reduces the yield and revenue, while in the former case, loss of water usually means a loss of yield, which, in turn, could force the farmer out of business. Under these conflicting conditions, payment of compensation based on a fixed period of time does not appear to be just and equitable. 527

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Considering the fact that land and water can be used perpetually on a sound basis, the calculation of compensation should, in fact, be based on the present value of future uses of water. Accordingly, in arid agricultural regions, the level of compensation, due to the higher contribution of water, would be higher than that of those regions where water is used to complement precipitation (Howe 1971). A related curiosity in the treatment of right-of-use is the notion of preferential use. The NWRA establishes a preference class among the beneficiaries of water. The highest priority is given to domestic, followed by municipal and irrigation, while industrial is given the lowest preference (Sarmad 1971). Giving the highest priority to domestic users is not objectionable during droughts and other emergencies, at least from a social viewpoint, since some water is essential for survival and hygiene. The problem is that the exercise of preference is given without due consideration to the value of water in alternative uses. For instance, considering the relatively high marginal value of consumptive use of water in the manufacturing industry, which according to Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners (1972) is as high as 190 rials (100 rials = approximately one dollar)/m 3 , a fairly good economic argument could be made in favor of a reversal of the current ranking preference against agriculture, which has a marginal value below 10 rials/m 3 (Tavakoli 1985). On the question of the pricing of irrigation water, Article 53 instructs the MWP to fix water charges in all regions where nationalization has been put in force. The water rate in each basin covers current expenses (e.g., management and operation) and fixed charges (e.g., depreciation and interest on capital invested). This water rate fixing appears to be based on the principle of full-cost pricing. In actuality, this is not so, since the same Article stipulates that water rates for a particular crop should gradually become the same throughout the country. The intention of the legislature here is apparently to extract the economic rent accruing to farmers in regions with low water costs, and transfer it to farmers in less fortunate areas where water costs more. The idea of uniform water rates, however, does not necessarily always lead to a more equitable distribution of income. It is quite possible that in one region both revenue and water costs could be high, while in another region the situation could be just the opposite. Accordingly, the proposed pricing policy should proportionally price water more in the latter region (low water cost) than in the former one. But the fact of life is that farmers in the former region could already be better off through physical (e.g., land) and environmental (e.g., market) factors other than water. Under these circumstances, an exact uniformity in water rates would not only aggravate the distribution of income, but also affect adversely the efficient use of the resource. Water rates should, in fact, be based on the benefit accruing to farmers from the use of it. In other words, variation in rates should be allowed to encourage efficiency in the use of water (Gardner, et al. 1974). It could also be argued that under the Nationalization of Water Resources Act managerial efficiency is not rewarded. Article 17 leaves the decision on the water requirements of crops in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture. This simply implies that efficiency in the use of water 528

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throughout an irrigation region is taken to be the same. In practice, however, it is quite conceivable to observe in a given region different levels of managerial efficiency due to various levels of skill, knowledge, experience, etc. In the absence of a free market for the sale of water, the more efficient farmers who cannot dispose of their excess water profitably would presumably work less hard, and would not contemplate employing more efficient irrigation techniques. PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC WATER AGENCIES

Centralization of decision making, which is strongly advocated in the NWRA, has some definite advantages. In fact, the performance of a number of publicly supported water agencies that had been established prior to the NWRA and are still operating in some parts of the country is worth considering. These agencies are primarily responsible for the development of water resources and the promotion of modern irrigation techniques in a given region. Farmers in these basins have established water rights and pay a fee for the services provided by the agencies. While these agencies provide technical and managerial expertise, the final decisions with regard to the use and allocation of water are left to the actual users. The main factors responsible for their relative success are outlined in the following. Economies of Scale.—The overall responsibility of a water agency for the management of a basin allows for the economies of scale in storing, channeling, and conveyance of water. The Ghazvin Agricultural Development Plan serves as an example of a highly successful irrigation network that has made great use of economies of scale. During the first phase of the Development Plan (1962-72), the agency managed to increase the irrigated hectarage from a mere 3,749 ha to 26,121 ha with a substantial saving in the use of water/ha. Prior to the formation of the agency, each well had been supplying only 62.4 ha of land, while by 1972, the figure increased to 102.89 ha. This substantial saving was obtained through the construction of major and secondary lined canals and also more efficient irrigation techniques. In the second phase, a further 38,703 ha of virgin land was brought under cultivation. This increase was achieved through importation of water, recharge of the aquifer, and more efficient distribution networks (Ghazvin Irrigation Development Agency 1978). Internalization of External Effects.—Another advantage of a centralized water agency is that it internalizes the external economies and diseconomies that the use of water may create. In many parts of the country where fragmented farming is practiced, artificial recharge of the aquifer, which is vitally important to the future of the area, is totally neglected. As the withdrawal is usually more than the natural replenishment, there is a net overdraft. Naturally, under these circumstances, individual members have little interest in the recharge of the aquifer because it is quite possible that their effort, if not done collectively could be recovered by others. This interdependency, as was noted earlier, has created a major type of external diseconomy in many water basins. Since individual pumpers in this situation do not have any security with regard to the 529


future use of the water, they try to maximize their immediate profit by extracting water to the point where the current marginal return just covers their current marginal cost. However, Smith (1983) suggests that privatization of groundwater is possible at reasonable costs, and that efficient allocation is attainable under the assignment of private rights. The practical implication of his model, in this instance, is not feasible due to a lack of geologic and hydrologic data in most parts of the country. In addition, the monitoring and enforcement requirements of this model are extremely limited, if not impossible. In the controlled areas, the water agencies have been shown to regard the side effects of their operation internally rather than regarding them as external effects impinging on outsiders. For instance, in the Ghazvin case, as noted earlier, there is a concerted effort to replenish the groundwater table. This is simply because the water agency can expect to recover much of the water as it spreads for percolation and thus has an inducement for a more efficient overall practice in the use of water. In other words, the water agencies tend to internalize effects that would be external to the individual users. As a result, they act more efficiently in the overall management of a basin. Reducing Waste.—The water agencies have also been shown to be more efficient than a number of independent individuals with respect to the allocation of water and the reduction of waste. In many unregulated areas, most villages have their own independent water courses, free from any upstream interference. As a result, instead of utilizing only one or two principal channels, which is potentially possible, there are sometimes more than a hundred long-distance channels running parallel to each other, each carrying only a tiny volume of water. For this reason, in many cases, the loss of water from evaporation and seepage is more than 3-4 times the actual gate requirements of the crops (Mohandes 1965). In the regulated areas, on the contrary, the irrigation networks are well planned, and, consequently, there is a substantial reduction of waste. The substantial savings of water that are achieved through the development of a modern and comprehensive irrigation network in the Varamin Plain is another example that demonstrates some definite advantages of water agencies. According to a report by the Varamin Development Authority (1978), the diversion of 80,000,000 m 3 of available irrigation water from Latiyan reservoir to Tehran for urban use could have reduced the irrigated hectarage of the Varamin Plain from 30,000 to 26,000. In addition, the control of overdraft of the groundwater basin would have taken a further 4,000 ha out of the present irrigated crop land. The planned integrated irrigation network has restored the original 30,000 ha without any additional water. The net saving in water is approximately 144,000,000 m3. These projects have also been shown to be financially viable. For example, according to a report by the Plan Organization (1973), the internal rate of return for the Varamin project was over 14%, which was 6% more than the bank rate at the time. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper is concerned with the impact of the Nationalization of Water Resources Act on the efficient allocation and use of water in Iran. To 530

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this end, a brief review of the historical evolution of water laws has been carried out, and it has been shown that the laws and regulations that existed prior to the nationalization have not been entirely satisfactory for promoting economic efficiency in the use and allocation of water. In the discussion of the nationalization of water resources, a strong philosophical link between the concept of nationalization and the original Islamic doctrine is observed. It is noticed that the NWRA gives all the managerial responsibilities, from investment to the allocation of water, to a central body and, at the same time, rejects the market mechanism and implicitly denounces the rationality of farmers. This is found to be objectionable and certainly does not facilitate an efficient allocation and use of water. An overview of a number of water agencies shows some definite advantages that these agencies could bring for a better management of water resources. In conclusion, the main theme of the new water laws should be: (1) To establish well-defined water rights so that individuals have a clear idea of what actions they can take regarding this resource; (2) to enforce the rights, so that the owner enjoys the benefits of ownership and optimizes the use of the resource; and (3) to allow for the sale of water rights so that the owner is fully aware of the opportunity costs of his actions and thus permitting this resource to be consumed in its highest valued use. In addition, the policy maker should encourage the formation and development of water agencies similar to the existing ones mentioned in this paper. The objectives of these agencies should be in the areas of development and maintenance of water resources of a given basin so that the advantages of economies of scale, internalization of externalities, and reduction of waste that cannot be normally attained through independent water users are realized. The final decisions about the actual use of water should be left to the beneficiaries to be solved by the market mechanism. It is hoped that the evaluation of the NWRA and the guidelines discussed here will be considered in the development of the new water laws that are currently under consideration by the legislature. APPENDIX I.—NOTE

This paper does not consider the status of the water laws and allocations of the post-Shah's period (1978-present) due to the unavailability of reliable data. APPENDIX II.—REFERENCES

Caponera, D. A. (1954). Water laws in Moslem countries. Food and Agricultural Organization, U.N., Rome, Italy. "Evaluation of present and possibilities for future development of water resources." (1973). Plan organization, Vol. 9, Bureau of Information and Reports, Tehran, Iran. Gardner, B. O. (1974). "Factors affecting consumption of water in northern Utah." Bulletin 449, Agricultural Experiment Station, Logan, Utah. Ghazvin Irrigation Development Agency. (1978). Annual report. Ministry of Water and Power, Tehran, Iran. 531

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Hirshleifer, J., Dehaven, J. C , and Milliman, J. W. (1969). Water supply economics, technology, and policy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 111., Chapter 9. Howe, C. W. (1971). "Benefit-cost analysis for water system planning: American Geophysical Union." Water resources monograph 2, Washington, D.C. Maktari, A. M. A. (1971). Water rights and irrigation practices in Lahj. University Press, Cambridge, England. Milliman, J. W. (1959). "Water law and private decision-making: a critique." /. Law and Economics, II., 41-63. Ministry of Water and Power. (1971). MWP annual report, 1971, Ministry of Water and Power, Tehran, Iran. Mohandes, A. (1965). "Water resources of Iran." /. Faculty of Law, Political Sci. and Economics, Tehran Univ., Tehran, Iran, 210. Posner, R. A. (1977). Economic analysis of law, 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 111. Sarmad, M. (1971). Water laws, Sekeh, Tehran, Iran, 151. Sir Alexander Gibb & Partner. (1972). Lar Dam and Mazandran irrigation project. Sir Alexander Gibb & Partner, London, England, 40. Smith, R. T. (1983). Water rights: scarce resource allocation, bureaucracy and the environment, T. L. Anderson, Ed., Ballinger Publishers, Cambridge, Mass., 177182. Tavakoli, A. (1985). "A chance constrained approach to the allocation and use of water in Iran." Proc. 13th Conf. Intl. Assoc. Sci. and Tech. for Development, Montreal, Canada. Tregarthen, T. (1983). Water rights: scarce resource allocation, bureaucracy and the environment. T. L. Anderson, Ed., Ballinger Publishers, Cambridge, Mass., 119135. Vahidi, M. (1968). "Water and irrigation in Iran." Plan Organization, Bureau of Information and Reports, Tehran, Iran, 75-79. Vahidi, M. (1973). "Water resources development in Iran," Water for human environment, Proc. First World Cong, on Water Resources, Vol. 2, Chicago, 111., 198. Varamin Development Authority. (1978). Annual report 1978, Ministry of Water and Power, Tehran, Iran.

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