Norms of Rural Conduct and Public Good Provision

RURAL FUTURES: DREAMS, DILEMMAS, DANGERS Compilation © 2008 University of Plymouth, UK

Unwritten, Unspoken: How Norms of Rural Conduct affect Public Good Provision Jilly Hall and Jules Pretty Abstract Rarely does a valued common resource, such as countryside, not have social norms which prescribe its use. In England, government agencies have often updated the 'Countryside Code', but local unwritten codes of conduct have never had the same attention. Local codes ("the way we go about things") tend to be tacit and exclusive. Newcomers often lack the social capital to learn the rules of good conduct and unwitting breaches jeopardise their inclusion into the rural community. Farmers' narratives of conflict (such as trespass) in Mid Norfolk reveal that breaches of local codes cause resentment and feelings of powerlessness, and thus provoke the withdrawal of privileges once provided freely to local people they trusted. Falling trust significantly increases the transaction costs associated with the provision of new public goods. Over a period of five years, the Norfolk Arable Land Management Initiative (NALMI) explored conflict involving broken norms and ineffective sanctions (notably trespass by incomer-riders and retaliation by farmers). Firstly bonding and then bridging social capital were built by creating safe platforms for social learning in people's homes. New rules, norms and sanctions were jointly developed by riders and farmers leading to the voluntary provision by four farmers of a 2.5 km offroad riding route to improve rider's safety. This 'localised Countryside Code' emerged from conflict, and once it had been agreed, social sanctions successfully curbed freeriders, thus reducing friction and building trust. Economic links between farmers and riders also developed through the new social networks. Farmers regained feelings of control over their land and public goods were provided at minimal cost to the public purse. Collaboration between farmers and riders is continuing, three years after the end of the NALMI.

Keywords Countryside Code, farmers, riders, social capital, trust, norms and sanctions

1.

The Norfolk Arable Land Management Initiative (NALMI)

Between 1999 and 2004 the Countryside Agency established nine Land Management Initiatives (LMIs) to demonstrate how England's farming systems could respond to the changing demands on agriculture by providing a range of public goods (CA, 2002). Thirty one farmers (16 arable and 15 mixed) in the 13 parishes of the NALMI area (see figure 1)

RURAL FUTURES: DREAMS, DILEMMAS, DANGERS

were chosen as a representative sample in this mainly arable area. Farm size varied from 4.5 to 1105 ha, and totalled 12,149 ha, with an average of 392 ha per farm. Over five years, the NALMI team explored how the presence or absence of social capital affects farmers‟ provision of public goods. Four aspects of social capital, defined by Pretty and Ward (2001) were explored, notably i) relations of trust; ii) reciprocity and exchanges; iii) common rules, norms and sanctions; and iv) social connectedness, networks and groups. Local demand for (and parish provision of) public goods was assessed through a series of Planning For Real Workshops held in each village to which all stakeholders were invited. Farmers‟ feelings towards public good provision were examined through in-depth semistructured interviews, participant observation and family engagement. Detailed coding of responses followed a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

2.

Social Capital: Rules, Norms and Sanctions

Rarely does a valued common resource, such as countryside, not have social norms which prescribe its use (Ostrom, 1990), and in England, government agencies have repeatedly updated the generalised Countryside Code to form countryside citizenship (Parker, 2006). These 'Rural Cultural Competencies' (Cloke et al., 1998) or 'Unwritten Rules of the Game‟ (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004; Pretty, 2005) are described by NALMI farmers as 'the way we go about things'; 'our standards of behaviour' and 'the unwritten code of conduct'. Rules, norms and sanctions are complex aspects of social capital, essential because they underpin trust and therefore social cohesion (Coleman, 1988). Norms are most effective when they are developed, legitimated and understood by everyone whose behaviour they need to influence. Effective norms must be underpinned by sanctions (Pretty, 2005). These social controls arise from, and are dependent on, social capital, particularly the regular face-to-face contact described as 'closure', which provides social monitoring and subsequently publicises deviant behaviour (Coleman, 1988). In modern societies, however, where distant social contacts may be valued more highly than local networks, social disapproval, ostracism and the loss of reputation at the local level have become less effective sanctions (Marshall, 2004). For farmers this general decline in local social control has coincided with challenges to their authority in rural society and their legitimacy, as landowners, to arbitrate in cases of conflict (Lobley et al., 2004).

3.

The NALMI Unwritten Code of Conduct

The existence of an unwritten code of conduct became clear during discussions on farmers‟ changing levels of trust in their non-farming neighbours. NALMI farmers hold moderate levels of generalised trust regarding their local non-farming community, with 56% of farmers agreeing that “Most people who live in this village can be trusted”. Newcomers to the village were trusted less, with two-thirds of farmers believing that they were less likely to behave well in the countryside and only 13% believing they might behave better. In addition, nearly 90% of farmers disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement „People would never take advantage of my land or abuse it‟. 84% of farmers had suffered some form of land-abuse in the previous 12 months (e.g. flytipping, 84%; trespass 81%; personal abuse 42%). Over half of the NALMI farmers had received complaints from local people suggesting their own behaviour did not match the expectations of non-farmers.

HALL AND PRETTY: NORMS OF RURAL CONDUCT AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION

The grounded theory approach was used to focus on the contents of the NALMI code and the consequences of code adherence (or code breaking) for the provision of public goods. Five key principles were referred to by farmers; i) honesty and good manners (i.e. ask permission before you take or use something that belongs to another); ii) understanding and tolerance of farming and the rural way of life; iii) directness when solving complaints; iv) taking responsibility for the action of children and pets and v) active community engagement. Farmers were clear that the code had never been followed by everyone, but in the past, miscreant families were known in the community. As small arable farmer Fred recalls "there were always the bad boys….. but we knew who they were". Today, farmers often have no social contact with non-farming neighbours and no knowledge of their reputation for trustworthiness. Indigenous (and especially older) local people were considered to be more likely to understand and follow codes, together with a minority of newcomers (for whom shooting or service to the community provided „fast-track‟ entrées). Generally, NALMI farmers were convinced that the code was breaking down. Three distinct responses to code breaking were apparent; 14 farmers (45%) used a proactive/managerialist approach to de-escalate issues; 10 farmers (32%) ignored or tolerated breaches; and seven farmers (23%) adopted a reactive/emotionalist approach, retaliating and escalating the issues. Managerialist farmers typically had higher levels of generalised trust and occupied what estate owner Charles described as “the moral high ground” having already provided public goods on their land. At moments of tension they could point out landscape and habitat improvements and could direct trespassers to prior access provision on the farm. In contrast, emotionalist farmers had lower generalised trust and fewer contacts with non-farmers. None provided additional access, often as a consequence of low trust and they thus found it more difficult to defend the sustainability of their land management.

4.

Consequences of Code Breaking

Breaches of the unwritten code of conduct in the NALMI provoked responses from farmers that eroded social capital and perpetuated sub-optimal public benefits from farmland. Unpredictable behaviour that broke all norms of reasonable conduct shocked farmers, reduced trust and increased feelings of suspicion towards non-farmers. Narratives of the public‟s poor behaviour were energetically circulated amongst farmers and further eroded feelings of goodwill. Trespass in particular caused resentment and feelings of powerlessness, and farmers were especially unwilling to legitimize access already taken through trespass. As pig farmer Terry put it "I'm not giving them something they've taken already". Many farmers felt loathe to invest in public goods for people seemingly disinterested in farming, as arable contractor Nick explains: "They have no knowledge, they have shown no interest, they treat it [the land] with no respect - they don’t deserve anything from this land. They don’t do anything for me. People who move in don’t understand - they are just take, take, take. Why bother ". Low social capital significantly increased both real and perceived transaction costs associated with the provision of public goods. NALMI farmers avoided creating field margins for fear of trespass by riders and motorcyclists, costly flytipping on private land or


incursion by travellers. Entry into agri-environment schemes had been delayed in case capital works were stolen. Direct environmental impacts associated with code breaking were also noted, for example the rapid post-harvest ploughing of cereal stubbles to prevent riders from using fields for galloping and jumping. Referring directly to the first principle of the code, Bob had concluded "I just wish that they had come and asked me first before they just assumed that they could do it. It's easier to plough the stubbles straight away and then there will be no agro".

5.

The Failure of Unwritten Codes in the NALMI

The NALMI is not unique in the failure of unwritten codes; the breakdown of social norms has been seen elsewhere in modern society (Campbell et al., 1999). NALMI farmers‟ own analysis of the reasons for failure focused on changes in social capital in the 13 villages and more generally in society. Falling social capital had removed the networks, face-to-face contact and trust essential for creating, updating, transmitting and sanctioning the code. Childhood socialisation was impossible for adult newcomers with different (or no) codes of conduct. Inconsistent responses from neighbouring landowners were also seen as unhelpful to people‟s understanding of the code. No farmer had ever seen any written form of the code, although the core values were shared by the farming community. No village 'elder' had the task of teaching the code but of the 14 farmers who took a managerialist approach to breaches, eight felt that they were having to teach the code. Only three farmers deliberately taught aspects of the code not directly related to the protection of their private property rights. Farmers also feared the development of new codes by communities of trespassers on their land, as Gerry explains; "Well - if you have one dog walker - alone they have no power but if you have twenty five dog walkers then they have got power. If some dog walkers meet others also walking without permission, then it becomes acceptable to do it".

6.

Creating New Codes in the NALMI

Over a period of five years, the NALMI explored a longstanding dispute involving broken norms and ineffective sanctions. The team deliberately focused on conflict in order to maximize the energy provided by serious threats to life and livelihood (Ostrom, 1990). The threats included concern from farmers that poaching of field margins would jeopardise their agri-environment (and later single farm) payments. Riders feared death and injury on roads they perceived to be increasingly dangerous. Low key facilitation built trusting relationships in two farmer and rider groups. Surprisingly, this often involved introductions between near neighbours. During early meetings, the geography of the dispute was mapped providing the basis for discussions of the issue involving both farmers and riders. All participants were challenged to internalise the perspective of the opposing group; role play was attempted. Riders learned about agronomy, falling farm incomes and agrienvironment schemes; farmers listened to compelling descriptions of fear when riding young horses on dangerous roads. Farmers‟ wives who rode horses occupied highly influential strategic positions providing the link between farmers and riders and they emerged as leaders. Their social skills as women helped to mobilize resources and overcome conflict (Westermann et al., 2005). After just three meetings, new rules, norms

HALL AND PRETTY: NORMS OF RURAL CONDUCT AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION

and sanctions had been jointly developed by riders and farmers in the form of a 'localised Countryside Code' designed to meet the needs of both groups.

7.

Outcomes from the Localised Countryside Code

Trusting that newly friendships would result in acceptable behaviour, four landowners together created a new permissive off-road route. This bridleway enabled riders to move between two large agric-environment access schemes avoiding a dangerous road. Farmers provided machinery for free and worked at weekends to create the ride. They also released the land from production for free and paid for habitat improvements. But persistent freeriders who had not engaged with the group continued to jeopardise the rider-farmer relationship. Social sanctions were applied, initially informally, on a one-toone basis. When these failed, sanctions were increased in a stepwise fashion until the final freerider was approached publicly by a delegation of four bridleway group members on her livery yard in front of her customers. This final sanction was successful. As the behaviour of riders improved, farmers regained feelings of control over their land. Any signs of poor behaviour would be reported to bridleway group leaders and would be resolved for the farmer by the group. Economic links developed in the new social networks helped to cement trust. After the NALMI ceased, personal issues did close the bridleway for a period, however, they were largely resolved by group members. Collaboration between farmers and riders continues in the form of an annual event three years after the end of the NALMI.

8.

Policy Conclusions: Using Codes to secure Public Goods

As rural society changes, so do the demands on land use. New stakeholders who have moved to live in the countryside have valid aspirations for public benefits, such as additional access, but often lack the social mechanisms to meet these aspirations in ways that contribute to social cohesion. During 1999-2004 in the NALMI area, dysfunctional norms of countryside use resulted in conflicts which eroded social capital and triggered feelings of resentment amongst farmers. Resentment and distrust limited farmers‟ desire to provide public benefits from their land. As arable farmer Sam concluded “The more you give to the public, the more you are a loser”. CAP reform provides opportunities for change. Threats to the continued existence of the single farm payment are almost certainly sufficient motivation to mobilize farmers to find the missing mandate for CAP, particularly if the debates are conducted at the local (parish or sub-district) level. Local debates on land use to determine a) exactly what public benefits are required and b) the rules, norms and sanctions to guide their sustainable use could potentially offer three benefits to the UK government. First, facilitated debates that build social capital and mediate conflict may overcome barriers (such as resentment) to public good provision and allow facilitators to identify better ways of exploiting social incentives (such as thanks and local prestige allocation) that are cheap and selfperpetuating. Second, by reinstating debates on land management as a central focus of rural life, the environment can be used to recreate functioning rural communities with stronger social cohesion and a focus on health and wellbeing. Finally, localised countryside codes that accommodate the needs of all countryside stakeholders could provide a compelling rationale for increasing Pillar 2 CAP funding.


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About the Author Jilly Hall has worked with farmers in varying capacities for over 20 years. In 1992 she joined the Countryside Commission, where she served as a Countryside Stewardship officer. Jilly has been involved with the NALMI from it‟s inception in 1998; it currently forms the basis of her doctoral research, supervised by Professor Jules Pretty. Her thesis explores the role of social capital in the transition to more sustainable land management. Jilly currently works for Natural England where she is supporting Leader Local Action Groups in the Eastern Region. Jules Pretty is professor of environment and society at the University of Essex, Colchester.