Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and ...

Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security Donald N. Kovacic and Ana Raffo-Caiado1, John McClelland-Kerr, Matthew Van Sickle2, Mo Bissani3, Kenneth Apt4 1 Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA 2 U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, D.C., USA 3 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 4 Support Contractor ABSTRACT Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope development and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach must be taken to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security— sometimes referred to as the “3S” concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of nuclear safeguards infrastructure in countries with credible plans for nuclear energy as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. Developing an adequate safeguards infrastructure is critical to becoming a responsible “owner” of nuclear power. The 3S concept is the optimal path forward to achieving this goal BACKGROUND Requests for nuclear energy assistance from the IAEA have grown significantly in the last year. This is due to the sharp increase in states that are either considering nuclear power for the first time or that are looking to restart dormant programs. In response to this, the IAEA has undertaken a series of steps to address this need, such as publishing a series of technical reports including Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power1. This series 1

Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, No. NG-G-3.1, 2007 International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna ISBN 978-92-0-107707-3.

provides guidelines to states on the basic elements that must be in place to responsibly implement nuclear power. In these guidance documents, it is well recognized that an appropriate infrastructure is essential for the safe, reliable, and peaceful use of nuclear power2. To help meet their need for infrastructure development, many so called “newcomer states” have entered into bilateral relationships in order to transfer knowledge and technology in this area. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA’s) International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In response to the need for nuclear safeguards infrastructure development and as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, INSEP is undertaking a series of collaborative projects with states that are planning to introduce nuclear power. Some of these projects are being implemented as part of existing safeguards cooperation agreements and some under newly created bilateral arrangements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The purpose of these projects is to help build indigenous safeguards cultures through technical infrastructure support projects. These newcomer states have limited nuclear infrastructures, usually consisting of research reactors and the associated activities, but with stated plans to develop nuclear power in the next 5 to 20 years. The goal is to work with these countries that have specific operational and programmatic needs to help them develop the core competencies that will facilitate more safe and secure nuclear operations. Establishing these kinds of collaborative arrangements is important because newcomer states have many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other pressing needs that are their primary considerations. As a result, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation, and their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program will be limited. SAFEGUARDS INFRASTRUCTURE So what exactly does it mean to develop a “safeguards infrastructure”? While in actuality safeguards infrastructure cannot really be separated from the overall nuclear infrastructure, it is nevertheless useful to talk about the elements of safeguards that fit into the larger infrastructure of a state’s nuclear program. At its foundational level, safeguards infrastructure can be considered the organizational and institutional elements needed for the operation of an effective system of nuclear material accounting and control within a state. It also includes verification of the design of its nuclear facilities. Its purpose for international safeguards is to provide assurance on the non-diversion of nuclear material by the state and the prevention of misuse of its facilities. The requirements are driven by a state’s legal obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreements, the Additional Protocol if it is in force, and the verification aspects of those agreements. Included in this are both the national authority and the nuclear facilities within the country. A number of elements are important to the creation of an infrastructure that supports this, including national legislation, a State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC), written procedures, technical competency of personnel, adequacy 2

Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-T-3.2, 2008 International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna ISBN 978-92-0-109808-5.

of instrumentation, and human resources. Effective safeguards infrastructures incorporate guiding principles such as detecting and preventing unauthorized use, independence between safeguards staff and operational staff, and the use of audits—both domestic and international—to promote transparency. To obtain a more complete understanding of safeguards infrastructure, however, consideration must be given to how it exists within the broader context of nonproliferation. Nuclear material accountancy and control, as well as verification of the design of its nuclear facilities, not only satisfies a state’s obligations under its comprehensive agreements but also enables compliance with relevant aspects of UNSCR 1540. The application of export controls on nuclear material and related equipment is also a critical component of the nonproliferation regime and is mutually supportive of safeguards. Annex II of the Additional Protocol requires reporting of the exports of equipment and material specially designed and prepared for nuclear facilities, also known as the “Trigger List.” Therefore, development of safeguards infrastructure exists within and strengthens the larger nonproliferation mission. Now that the importance of developing a safeguards infrastructure has been established, what is the best approach for newcomer states to begin developing it? Does it make sense to develop it early in their programs or wait until later, when they are closer to commissioning a nuclear power plant? The IAEA milestones document identifies 19 issues that should be considered for the development of a state’s nuclear infrastructure. The IAEA does not distinguish between the relative importance of these issues but, instead, stresses their interconnectedness and suggests countries carefully consider each issue to make sure that they are prepared for the next step in the process. Some of the milestones issues, such as management, legislative and regulatory frameworks, human resources development, security, and physical protection, are generally understood to play a role in safeguards infrastructures. It is imperative that when supporting safeguards infrastructure development in newcomer states, the states providing the support help address both the foundational requirements of a safeguards infrastructure as well as the integrated elements of safety, security, and safeguards—referred to as the “3S” concept. This thinking is evident from the outcome of the 2008 G8 Summit in Hokkaiado, Tokyo where the G8 members put forth the following shared principle of the international 3S initiative3: …peaceful use of nuclear energy accompanied by commitments to implement 3S is a sound basis for international transparency and confidence in the sustainable development of nuclear energy. Implementation of 3S constitutes an indispensable objective for the development of the infrastructure necessary for the introduction of nuclear power generation; From the experience gained as part of the INSEP safeguards infrastructure collaborative projects, it has been determined that this approach best meets the needs of newcomer states. Newcomer states 3

2008 G8 Summit in Hokkaiado, Tokyo, International Initiative on 3S-Based Nuclear Energy Infrastructure: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/pdf/0708_04_en.pdf.

have smaller programs and infrastructures and do not have the internal separation that is common in more advanced countries. Therefore, they simply do not have the resources to apply the requirements such as safeguards independently from safety and security. Akira Omoto, the Director of the Division of Nuclear Power at the IAEA, has indicated that the Nuclear Power Support Group (NPSG) was created as an interdepartmental group at the IAEA to ensure coordinated response to member states’ needs4. Thus, the needs of the member states that are requesting technical support should drive the nature of the technical cooperation activities. Based on this, it is most efficient to integrate safeguards from the beginning with the infrastructure being developed for safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear programs. HOW TO INTEGRATE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND SAFEGUARDS Safety principles and safety culture are well understood concepts, and their method of implementation is well established not just in the nuclear industry but in industry in general. Likewise, security is a concept that is relatively well understood, and its application to the nuclear industry is well established. However, safeguards is not as well understood by individuals outside of specialized groups within the nuclear industry primarily because there are no parallels in nonnuclear commerce or industry. In this respect, the concept of safeguards is fundamentally different in that there is nothing equivalent in other industries as there is for safety and security. Safeguards is peculiar to nuclear energy. Therefore, the development of indigenous safeguards capacities must be approached in a fundamentally different manner than safety and security. The lack of parallels for safeguards is a limiting factor in how well the concepts will be understood and accepted by individuals new to nuclear applications. Often, even if the concepts are understood, they can be easily confused with other terms. For example, safeguards in some countries has a very negative connotation if translated literally. It implies that people cannot be trusted, which is not the message management wants to convey to its workers. Thus it is very important to take into account cultural issues and to translate concept-for-concept and not word-for-word. Therefore, when safeguards is implemented in a newcomer state, it must be understood that safeguards may not be accepted as a “standalone” concept. Since there are no analogous models in other industries, the cadre of personnel who can readily understand and accept the concept will be relatively small. Moreover, maintaining effective safeguards within a state’s nuclear facilities will require the establishment of programs that widely disseminate the ideas behind safeguards and nonproliferation and continually remind personnel and management of the importance of maintaining safeguards on materials and technology. The chief argument for integration of safeguards with safety is that the related aspects of safety culture can be used to strengthen the corresponding aspects of “safeguards culture.” Just as safety culture can be defined in terms of the owner’s and operator’s approach to all aspects that can affect facility safety, safeguards culture can be defined in terms of controlling and accounting for nuclear material and technology. As such, safeguards culture can be defines as: “A unifying commitment by an organization and its members to the effective and continuously improving implementation of material control and accounting practices; the prevention of misuse of facilities; and prevention of the dissemination of sensitive technology. It also includes not just the establishment and enforcement of strong regulatory requirements but also voluntary adherence to standards, best practices, and self-evaluation aimed 4

Akiro Amoto, presentation on “IAEA’s Integrated Infrastructure Activities” at the IAEA Technical Meeting on Evaluation Methodology for Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development, Vienna, Austria, December 10–12, 2008.

at non-tolerance of mistakes or deliberate disregard. Therefore, safeguards culture has to be inherent in the thoughts and actions of all the individuals at every level in an organization and must be supported by top management.” To achieve this level of thinking about safeguards in a nuclear program, the best approach would be to implement it as part of the already understood and accepted safety culture. The goal would then be to develop one overall infrastructure for safety, security, and safeguards. The underlying management and operational practices share a common base so that all three are not only compatible, but mutually supportive and effective. By effective, it means that energy expended in one area will transfer into another. As examples, we can focus on four aspects of best practices in nuclear facility operational safety: reactor operations, radiation protection (RP), low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) management, and environmental monitoring (EM). All four areas are listed as issues in the IAEA milestones document (reactor operations falls under safety). As part of developing their nuclear program, it is well accepted by newcomer states that these four issues will have to be addressed by management. The management, organizational, and technical skills required to effectively protect workers and the public from radiation exposure, to characterize radioactive material, and to monitor the environment all help to build the core competencies and capacity of personnel that can be applied to the safe, secure, and peaceful operation of nuclear facilities. The skills that personnel gain in characterizing radionuclides are directly transferable to measuring special nuclear material (uranium, plutonium, and thorium), which builds the core competencies for the effective application of safeguards. Reactor operations best practices require an advanced level of management commitment, support, and organizational structure. It also requires the application of advanced management concepts such as safety and security cultures, quality assurance, root cause failure analysis, equipment preventive maintenance, risk assessment, configuration management, design control, change control, document control, and records management to name but a few. All of these concepts are already in place in countries with highly developed industries and nuclear programs. They form the basic organizational and management framework upon which an effective safeguards infrastructure is built and which support nonproliferation goals. In the same way, a newcomer state can begin with the building blocks of operations and management in order to build the safeguards infrastructure it will need for its future nuclear power programs. Developing excellence in management and operation of existing nuclear facilities will help with excellence in larger management and operation concerns as a country transitions to a future nuclear power program. The organizational structure and management controls necessary for operating nuclear facilities safely, such as adequately protecting personnel from radiation hazards, include many of the elements necessary for security and control of nuclear material. This demonstrates the direct relationship between safeguards and safety. In addition, a facility cannot be operated safely if access to nuclear facilities and materials is not strictly enforced. This demonstrates the direct relationship between safety and security. This is not to say that operating nuclear facilities safely automatically ensures that safeguards and security will be achieved. It just means that if the underlying infrastructure for safety is in place, it will inherently

support programs that apply safeguards and proliferation controls and thus make them easier to implement. Finally, human resources development is a cross-cutting milestone issue across all nuclear facility operations. Thus, training of personnel in all of the disciplines mentioned above supports human capacity building for the nuclear program in general. This is the model used by INSEP, and it provides newcomer states with the tools they need before they begin their larger efforts in nuclear energy. They can then extrapolate this knowledge in their transition to nuclear power, ensuring better compliance with international nonproliferation norms of safety, security, and safeguards. CONCLUSION It is sometimes said that “culture is what is left when you have forgotten everything.” This is an amusing way to state that culture is a hard-to-define quantity that permeates the fabric of day-to-day activities. Translated to an operating nuclear facility, it includes the underlying theme of how the plant is operated, maintained, secured, and safeguarded. The infrastructure that supports the 3Ss is the most tangible aspect of this culture. The argument made in this paper is that developing the proper infrastructure as early as possible in the development of a nuclear power program is very important for its safety, security, and peaceful use. Safeguards and nonproliferation are part of this infrastructure and have the same standing as safety and security. But because of it peculiarity to nuclear energy, these concepts are sometimes not well understood, and thus effective strategies must be crafted to make sure they are given the appropriate consideration during the nuclear program development period. The integration of safeguards with safety and security and taking advantage of commonalities between them is one such strategy. One such commonality is that safety, security, and safeguards are all “preventive” techniques. Therefore, there is a definite relationship with the legal, regulatory, and operational techniques for how states can organize themselves to achieve these goals. The lessons learned in universal acceptance and adherence to a safety culture can be applied to safeguards culture in order to be efficient and to facilitate understanding and acceptance. Because of the interrelatedness of the 3Ss, effective safeguards implementation is not possible without the basic framework provided by safety and security. Safety culture is well established and security culture is well understood, but safeguards culture is not widely understood outside specialized disciplines. However, safeguards is the lynchpin of a state’s compliance with the global regime and will work best if it is considered from the beginning. Most important, this integration better meets the needs of the newcomer states. And meeting the needs of the newcomer states is of the highest priority for the IAEA and the technical assistance it provides under Article IV of the NPT and advocates to the global nuclear industry. Given the limited resources all states face, finding efficient applications of safeguards and nonproliferation is paramount if states are to achieve sustainable nuclear programs. Finally, one of the most consistent needs expressed by both developed nuclear power states and newcomers alike is the need for increasing human resources in all areas of nuclear operations. Human resources development is a cross-cutting issue in the milestones document and affects all areas of a nuclear power program. Building core technical capacities in operations, safety, security, and safeguards together will all support and complement each other. Building capacity in one area helps build capacity in the other areas as well.