between "little potato" obedience, token obedience, and undercover disobedience. ... and four) predominated in dilemmas of obedience. Findings imply that.
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN HONG KONG COMPANIES
Robin S. Snell
Abstract: This paper reports a phenomenological sub-study of a larger project investigating the way Hong Kong Chinese staff tackled their own ethical dilemmas at work. A special analysis was conducted of eight dilemma cases arising from a request by a boss or superior authority to do something regarded as ethically wrong. In reports of most such cases, staff expressed feelings of contractual or interpersonally based obligation to obey. They sought to save face and preserve harmony in their relationship with authority by choosing between "little potato" obedience, token obedience, and undercover disobedience. Only where no such obligation existed was face in relation to authority unimportant, and open disobedience chosen. In Kohlbergian terms, ethical reasoning at the conventional stages (three and four) predominated in dilemmas of obedience. Findings imply that if corruption were to originate at the top, codes of conduct recently introduced into Hong Kong may be of limited effect in stalling it.
O
bedience is seldom advocated as a virtue in the West. Milgram's (1974) experiments revealed how USA subjects obeyed the cold commands of an impersonal "expert" authority figure in the name of science and progress, in the face of signs that they were causing severe pain and endangering a person's life. Milgram (1992: 157) wrote: "The results . . . raise the possibility that . . . the kind of character produced in American democratic society cannot be counted on to insulate its citizens from brutality and inhumane treatment at the direction of malevolent authority." Accordingly, a normative literature on leadership has developed, discouraging reliance on deference to authority, and emphasising instead the need for leaders to respect individual human rights, to enact universal principles of justice (Burns 1978), to encourage participant democracy (Srivastva and Cooperrider 1986), and to foster independent reasoning and problem solving among staff (Graham 1995). While actual practice tends to fall far short of idealistic aspirations of openness, managers are urged to invite open criticism, doubt, and disagreement (Argyris 1990; Bird and Waters 1989); to encourage the negotiation of value conflicts and differences of interest within a constitutional framework of checks and balances (Keeley 1995), and to be aware of the dangers of blind faith among followers (Lichtenstein, Smith, and Torbert 1995).
©1999. Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 9, Issue 3. ISSN 1052-150X.
pp. 507-526
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Obedience and deference are more explicitly valued in the cultures of Southeast Asia (including Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, and the Philippines), which Hofstede (1980) found to score high on measures of Power Distance and Collectivism., and relatively low on Uncertainty Avoidance. High Power Distance in a society reflects the widely held expectation and acceptance that power is distributed and exercised unequally. High Collectivism reflects the tendency for individuals to identify with the groups to which they belong, and to attach more importance to group interests than to strictly personal interests. Consensus within the group is valued much more than self-expression, but the group provides protection in exchange for members' conformity. On the other hand, the relatively low Uncertainty Avoidance in these cultures reflects a considerable tolerance for ambiguity, a preference for loosely exercised controls, and a dislike of strict regimentation and formal rules and procedures. The typical business organisation in overseas Chinese communities and societies is modelled on a "family," run by an autocratic hut benevolent patriarch (Hofstede 1980: 216). Subordinates are expected to be loyal, obedient, respectful, submissive, supportive, and deferential to superiors (Wong 1989), just as in filial piety the son defers to the authority of the father (Chan, Ko, and Yu 1996; Chang 1976). There is, however, less of the strict regulation, bureaucratic orderliness, and intolerance of deviation that would be sought after hy the out-and-out Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford 1950). Martinsons and Hempel (1995) observe that Imperial China was administered through government of man rather than government by law, depending on a system of asymmetrical rights and mutual obligations between rulers and ruled, rather than on written regulations. Redding (1990: 131) notes that in Chinese management there is a state of mutual dependency between boss and subordinate, where the superior is obliged to refrain from issuing exploitative or self-centred commands, otherwise cooperation is subtly resisted. The need to preserve harmony and maintain "face," rather than formal bureaucracy, regulates conduct in Chinese business management (Martinsons and Hempe! 1995: 6). Bond and Hwang (1987: 247) portray the dynamics of face behaviour thus: If a person is judged by others as somebody who is ready to obtain benefits in defiance of moral standards, he or she will be severely condemned as "not wanting face"( pu-yau lien) or "having no face" (mei-yu lien). Both claims imply that the actor has set aside all claims of being a person. They also (Bond and Hwang 1987: 248) point out that: Every person has to concern himself or herself with "right conduct in maintaining one's place in a hierarchical order" (Stover 1974: 246). He or she must pay attention to preserving others' face in social encounters, especially the face of superiors. Ko (1995: 19-20) observes: In superior-subordinate relationships, [the subordinate is] expected to be docile and must not challenge his superiors' ideas openly. If he does so, his
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS
509
boss might consider it a deliberate attempt to make him lose face by challenging his presumed superior knowledge that... a leader should have. . . . If the subordinate feels strongly about making a suggestion or counter-argument, it would be best to do so in private with the boss. He should also emphasise that the idea is actually consistent with the general principles or ideas put forward by the superior in thefirstplace. Ko (1995: 21) adds that in Chinese management, the boss would normally allow room for face saving by not being too precise about his wishes, and by being sensitive to subordinates' views. The importance for Chinese subordinates of not directly questioning or challenging a boss's command, because of the requirements of face giving and face saving, is noted also by Chao (1990); Chen (1995); Kirkbride, Tang, and Westwood (1991); and Pye (1985: 199). Redding (1990: 156-160) argues that Chinese subordinates are naturally inclined to give their bosses the benefit of the doubt if, on the surface, there appears to be some deviation from the straight and narrow. All of these aspects of behaviour in the typical overseas Chinese business organization—reciprocity of relationships, respect for hierarchy, concern for saving and giving face—combine with the members' collectivist outlook to support a major cultural value, that of maintaining harmony. Indeed, Westwood and Chan (1992) have argued that a distinctive form of leadership, which is better described as "headship," is found in Hong Kong organizations and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. As in other parts of the world, leaders have to establish order and compliance among their subordinates, and the unquestioning acceptance of authority (Power Distance) facilitates this requirement. But the emphasis that is placed upon harmonious relationships imposes a second requirement on leaders. Thus management behaviours that might be criticised as paternalistic or patronising by Westerners are often acceptable and effective in Asian businesses because they simultaneously meet the requirements for obtaining compliance and sustaining harmony. The shared values that support such an approach to being a boss, and being a subordinate, are so deeply ingrained in the region that they are likely to influence relationships in larger and non-local organizations as well as in the typical small family business. One implication of such a deeply embedded sense of moral obligation to obey, and to avoid friction in the work group, is that a Chinese subordinate may find it extremely difficult to refuse a request from higher authority, even when what is asked for may breach moral standards held by the subordinate and widely shared within the culture at large, for to refuse means loss of face, and disharmony. The present paper analyses the reported behaviour and emotions of Hong Kong Chinese staff who faced moral dilemmas of that type.
Origins of the Current Sub-study A larger research project, on which the sub-study reported in this paper draws, was based on 39 interviews and 64 questionnaires, focusing on the effects of moral ethos on ethical reasoning and decision making among Chinese managers
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and staff in six Hong Kong companies (Snell, Chak, and Taylor 1996). Moral ethos is the force field of implicit organizational values, norms, mindsets, and expectations regarding ethical matters (Snell 1993). Despite initial difficulties in gaining research access, over 120 critical incident accounts of how members tackled their own ethical dilemmas within their company were obtained. These were transcribed and content-analysed, using a Kohlberg-based typology of ethical reasoning (see Table 1). A separate and distinct analysis was carried out of the relative emphasis of the six Kohlberg stages in the moral ethos of each company, based on other parts of the interviews and on questionnaires (again see Table 1).
Table 1. The Six-Stage Kohlberg Model of Ethical Reasoning, Matched With Moral Ethos Kohlberg Stage
Orientation
Moral Motives
Corresponding Moral Ethos Stage
ONE
Obedience and punishment-avoidance
Exaggerated dread of punishment; fear of those in positions of authority
Fear-driven
TWO
Means to personal pleasure and reward; trade and exchange when needed
Personal gain and reward. Working out whether to risk punishment in pursuit of gain
Instrumental, personal gain oriented
THREE
Interpersonal expectations, approval, and conformity
Avoiding disapproval by others, which would lead to guilt or shame
Membership oriented
FOUR
Maintaining law and order; maintaining the social system
Fulfilling one's formal duties, thus avoiding official dishonour
Orderly and systematic
FIVE
Justice and welfare; prior rights and social contracts, as defined in reasonable debate
Striving to be reasonable, Ethically consistent, and purposeful principled, in pursuit of principles that quality seeking are good for the community
SIX
Universal principles of justice and welfare
Soul searching Firmly applying wellworked-out principles, which one is confident to debate openly and nondefensively with all comers
Model compiled from Kohlberg (1981: 121-122, 128, and 409-412), from Kohlberg and Ryncarz (1990: 193^195), and from Sneli (1993).
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In the company with the moral ethos most oriented toward the lower Kohlberg stages, the ethical reasoning of nnembers was correspondingly oriented toward the lower stages. Across the six connpanies as a whole, however, there was no correlation between moral ethos and ethical reasoning, because of an overall tendency among staff to prefer not to exercise independent moral judgment, and to entrust such matters to their seniors. The question remained whether subordinates would employ independent moral judgment when faced with a request to do something unethical. Further analysis of the critical incident data was therefore carried out for this paper, focusing on those dilemma cases that were of that nature. Selection and Analysis of the Cases Altogether, 49 dilemmas were found in the research that stemmed from instructions by superiors or from superordinate bodies with which the dilemma holder disagreed. Of these, 32 arose from technical and administrative oversights or misjudgments by superiors, rather than from morally disagreeable positions or policies: the superior had simply got things factually wrong. Of the remaining 17 dilemmas, seven entailed demands construed as being unfair to the dilemma holder himself/herself, such as being asked to perform too much work or give up too many resources. This left ten dilemmas where superiors' demands were objectionable on the grounds that they threatened violation of basic ethical principles such as truthfulness, legality, or fairness to other parties. Such principles correspond with conventional ethical reasoning in Hong Kong (Snell 1996: 36-38), The ten dilemmas were further reduced to the eight presented in Table 2 by combining two two-part dilemmas (Steve's and Elaine's), In four of them, the request came from the immediate boss. In the other four cases it came from a superordinate office, such as HQ. Names of individuals and companies have been changed, and their industries camouflaged. The analysis reported in this paper thus focuses on only a small subset of the data obtained in the whole study, covering only around 8 percent of the dilemmas, and involving only 18 percent of the interviewees. Given the sensitivity of the topic, a more pointed and direct attempt to study obedience to authority might have resulted in complete failure to gain research access. As it was, obtaining accounts of such atypical dilemmas required a strong element of trust by respondents in the confidentiality of the research, and in the empathy of the researchers in interpreting accounts of possibly "socially undesirable" conduct. Owing to the selective focus and small sample size, the findings are provisional, and cannot be regarded as firm discoveries. Their value stems from being grounded in the complexities of actual practice in the field setting, rather than being based on mere espousals and generalisations by respondents. The substudy is thus a contribution to research from within the phenomenological tradition (Cassell and Symon 1994: 2-3),
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