Obstacles to Empowerment: Local Politics and Civil ... - SAGE Journals

Urban Studies, Vol. 37, No. 12, 2357 – 2375, 2000

Obstacles to Empowerment: Local Politics and Civil Society in Metropolitan Manila, the Philippines Gavin Shatkin [Paper rst received, September 1999; in nal form, March 2000]

Summary. In recent years, the Philippine government has undertaken a number of reforms for decentralising urban governance and increasing the role of community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations in urban policy and programme development and implementation. Popular interpretations see these changes as an outcome of the ‘people’s power’ movement against centralisation and authoritarianism and stress the potential for increased civil society participation in government in the future. This paper critically examines these interpretations with reference to the situation of CBOs in informal settlements in Metropolitan Manila. Speci cally, it argues that decentralisation re ects the interests of a variety of politically powerful social groups, including not only organisations of civil society, but also local political families and international and domestic business interests. In addition, a number of factors continue to inhibit meaningful civil society participation. These include the lack of local government capacity in many cities and municipalities and the existence of powerful economic interests at the local level that compete with civil society organisations for in uence.

In recent years, many developing countries have adopted reforms for decentralisation and increased citizen participation in urban development programmes and policies. In the area of tenure regularisation and infrastructure delivery in informal settlements, central governments have in many cases devolved responsibility to local governments and have enhanced the role of nongovernmental and community-based organisations (NGOs and CBOs) in organising residents for improvement projects. Two justi cations are generally given for implementing reforms for decentralisation and participation. First, participation by community residents supposedly enhances community improvement programmes and projects by

reducing their cost and increasing their ef ciency. Secondly, local governments are supposedly more responsive to CBOs because of their proximity and greater accountability to communities. In practice, however, studies have shown that CBOs and NGOs continue to face obstacles to participation in local governments and that these reforms have had a limited impact on access to shelter among low-income urban residents (Burgess et al., 1997). This paper will examine some of the reasons for the limited success of reforms for decentralisation and participation in shelter delivery, with reference to the case of Metro(politan) Manila, the Philippines. Speci cally, it will argue that these reforms

Gavin Shatkin is in the College of Design, Art, Architecture and Planning, University of Cincinnati, PO Box 210016, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0016, USA. Fax: 513 556 1274. E-mail: [email protected]. 0042-0980 Print/1360-063X On-line/00/122357-19 Ó DOI: 10.1080/00420980020002841

2000 The Editors of Urban Studies

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have a limited impact largely because they do not address one of the main causes of the lack of legal access to housing among lowincome groups—the high cost of urban land due to speculation and development pressures caused by urbanisation (Strassmann and Blunt, 1994). The lack of legal affordable housing for low-income people is a serious problem in Metro Manila. Approximately 37 per cent of the city’s population of 10 million live in informal housing that often lacks basic services and is severely overcrowded (PCUP, 1998). Since the overthrow of the authoritarian government of Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippines has undertaken a particularly dramatic experiment in decentralisation of government and recent reforms have institutionalised a role for CBOs and NGOs in urban development. Yet many of the reforms have not been fully implemented and local governments have often been unwilling to undertake politically sensitive initiatives, such as raising property taxes or large-scale government acquisition of land, that would make land available for lowincome housing. Intense developmental pressures due to rapid urbanisation and an in ux of foreign investment have forced land prices up, thereby exacerbating the problem. CBOs have experienced limited successes in some parts of the Metropolitan area, particularly where there are large amounts of vacant land and where informal settlers constitute a large potential constituency that somewhat offsets the political in uence of land-owners. In other cases, however, they have had very little in uence. The paper will begin with a brief review of recent literature on the role of civil society in urban development in developing countries. Next, it will examine the historical antecedents to the recent decentralisation of urban government in the Philippines and the impact of the recent reforms on urban politics. The paper will then examine the changing nature of Metro Manila’s relation to the global economy and how these changes are impacting on local political economies in the Metropolitan area. Finally, it will examine current relations between government and

civil society in Metro Manila’s cities with respect to the issue of urban poverty and informal settlements, highlighting case studies of three localities. Cities, States and Citizens in a Globalising World The increased appeal of reforms for decentralisation and community participation in urban development in recent years is largely attributable to cynicism regarding the capacity of government to deliver effectively goods and services. Such reforms are often depicted as a means to overcome the perceived shortcomings of government, namely their inef ciency and lack of accountability (Pugh, 1994; Schubeler, 1996). This view is succinctly summarised by Tendler (1997) According to these accounts, public of cials and their workers pursue their own private interests rather than those of the public good. Governments overextend themselves in hiring and spending. Clientelism runs rampant, with workers being hired and red on the basis of kinship and political loyalty rather than merit. … Badly conceived programs and policies create myriad opportunities for bribery, in uence peddling and other forms of malfeasance. All this adds up to the disappointing inability on many governments to deliver good public services and to cope with the persistent problems of corruption, poverty, and macroeconomic mismanagement (Tendler, 1997, p. 1). Decentralisation and the formation of partnerships between government and corporations and organisations of civil society are therefore seen as a means to take goods and service provision out of the hands of central governments and provide a role for more ef cient, accountable entities. There are two main perspectives on the recent spate of reforms for decentralisation and participation, which differ in their political perspective and in their interpretation of why the reforms have taken place. One view, put forth by the World Bank (1993) and

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other international aid and lending organisations since the early 1990s, holds that reducing central government intervention will result in the more ef cient and cost-effective provision of social services. This view is premised on a neo-liberal economic perspective that holds that markets are inherently more capable of delivering goods and services than government. In this view, governments have begun to undertake such reforms out of enlightened self-interest. A second view is premised on political economy theory, which stresses the capacity of community groups to produce development outcomes that are more sustainable and more appropriate to local socioeconomic and cultural needs (Friedmann, 1992). Political economists tend to emphasise the resistance of economic, political and bureaucratic interests in the state to community participation in planning and see reforms for decentralization and participation as a victory of social movements for local autonomy. This paper will argue that neither of these explanations of the genesis of the recent reforms is suf cient. Rather, reforms for decentralisation and participation are largely the result of changes in the nature of urban politics in developing countries resulting from globalisation and rapid urbanisation. Speci cally, these reforms re ect the impact of two trends that are common to many developing countries—increased pressures on governments for scal austerity in the era of globalisation, which has caused many central governments to retreat from a role in social welfare and the increased political in uence of social groups who have a vested interest in political decentralisation and liberalisation. In order to understand these changes, it is necessary to discuss brie y the impacts of globalisation on developing countries. Since the 1960s and 1970s, advances in transport and telecommunications technologies have resulted in rapid industrial growth in many developing countries, as multinational corporations have taken advantage of their increased mobility to seek out lower production costs and new markets. Between

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1980 and 1993, developing countries increased their share of world industrial output from 10 per cent to 22 per cent (Burgess et al., 1997). At the same time, many countries that had adopted economic development strategies based on import-oriented industrialisation or basic commodity production were experiencing economic dif culties, as falling commodities prices and borrowing to nance industrialisation had led to debt crises. Pressured by international aid and lending institutions to repay their loans, many countries agreed to undergo structural adjustment programmes which involved the freeing of markets, the reduction or elimination of subsidies and price controls and decreased government expenditures on social services (Walton and Seddon, 1990). Such reforms were part of an overall effort to restructure developing economies to re ect the neo-liberal economic ideals of decreased government intervention in economic matters, scal austerity and liberalised markets. These measures were for the most part backed by export-oriented industrial interests in developing countries, who were becoming increasingly in uential due to their increased importance in national economies. During the 1980s, however, declines in standards of living caused by the retreat of national governments from redistributive and social welfare roles led to increased poverty and civil strife (Walton and Seddon, 1990). Wary of the economic and political impacts of these developments, international organisations such as the World Bank began to formulate a framework for the role of the state in urban planning and management and social service delivery, that was consistent with neo-liberalism and the need for scal austerity. The result was ‘enablement’ theory (World Bank, 1993). In the enablement framework, cities are seen as important generators of economic development and government attempts to control urban development through regulations, land-use controls or government provision of housing are generally seen as misguided and counterproductive. Rather, the primary roles for government are in providing trunk infra-

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structure, ensuring economic stability and formulating policies and programmes that will ‘enable’ the for-pro t private sector and civil society to deliver social services. Speci c measures include the deregulation of land markets, the privatisation of certain services and improved governance (Pugh, 1994). In enablement theory, NGOs and CBOs represent the interests of urban residents in relations with other actors and foster popular participation in order to pool resources to reduce costs and to ensure the sustainability of improvement projects (Schubeler, 1996). The imperative for countries to participate in the global economy and the incentives provided by international organisations, have led many governments to implement enablement reforms. These reforms have led to a limited convergence of interests among various actors in urban development. As a result of such reforms, national governments are able to cut expenditures while also accessing the resources of international organisations, local governments gain increased autonomy, the for-pro t private sector gains freedom from much central state regulation and civil society organisations are provided with opportunities to in uence decision-making. Yet there is a contradiction in enablement theory with respect to the situation of informal settlements. While the enablement model encourages governments to co-operate with organisations of civil society, it also stresses that governments should refrain from intervening in land markets. Yet these objectives may be in con ict. Speci cally, efforts by CBOs to access urban land at prices affordable to low-income residents are often in con ict with the objective of land-owners to increase the value of that land. Governments must therefore choose between conceding to the interests of informal settlers and maintaining the primacy of market forces in land allocation. In practice, governments often align with land-owning interests, thereby limiting the space for participation by CBOs. Two questions emerge from the above analysis. First, given the contradiction stated above, to what extent can local governments

be expected to provide channels for meaningful political participation by organisations of civil society? Secondly, what capacity does civil society have to take advantage of this political space? I would argue that two main factors in uence local governments’ inclination and capacity to incorporate popular participation in decision-making. The rst of these is simply the relative capacity of local governments to address the demands of civil society. Economic development is inherently uneven in cities and high-value land uses tend to be concentrated in certain parts of the city. There is consequently a disparity in the revenue-generating capacity of local governments. Likewise, cities differ in the availability of other resources, most notably vacant land. Thus, in a decentralised system, even where there is the political will to cooperate with civil society, local governments may lack basic resources, such as personnel, funding or land, to do so. The second factor is the nature of relations between the state, the for-pro t private sector and communities in localities. Speci cally, the degree to which CBOs can in uence decision-making is likely to be strongly affected by the interests of politicians and politically in uential private-sector actors in local land markets. In many localities, the bond between the state and capital is especially strong and governments may have strong economic incentives to discourage CBO and NGO participation in government. This is particularly true in highly urbanised areas, where land is scarce and valuable. Governments have been reluctant to empower grass-roots organizations in inner city areas, because they create obstacles to the exercise of politically and economically sensitive planning powers … required to facilitate not the poor, but the commercial property interests linked to urban renewal, gentri cation and the conversion of residential to commercial and public land uses (Burgess et al., 1997, p. 157). In addition, government of cials themselves often have a direct interest in the local econ-


omy, or in local real estate markets. Thus the assumption that there is greater space for civil society participation at the local level is questionable—local governments may be more accountable to land-owning interests than to civil society. The remainder of this paper will focus on the case of Metro Manila. First, the recent reforms will be placed in the historical context of local– national government relations in the Philippines. Next, the paper will discuss how global economic forces are impacting on the politics of space in Metro Manila and on the role of civil society in government. The paper concludes with a discussion of some speci c cases of local government – civil society interaction around the issue of informal settlements. Case Study of Metro Manila The proliferation of informal settlements in Metro Manila is largely a consequence of the relatively high cost of land in the city. Studies have shown that the ratio of land costs to incomes is high in Metro Manila as compared to most large cities in developing countries (Strassmann and Blunt, 1994). Two factors are largely responsible for the high land prices. The rst is rapid urbanisation— the metropolitan area’s population grew from approximately 4 million in 1970 to close to 10 million currently—an average annual growth of 200 000 (NSO, 1998). The second is speculation in urban land. Much privately owned land is vacant, held for speculative purposes. A study conducted in the early 1980s found that 44 per cent of land-owners in Metro Manila held 300 square metres or more and some held plots large enough for 5000 home lots (Mendiola, 1983). Due to the high cost of land, residents must cut their housing costs by reducing oor space and cutting back on services. A study conducted in 1991 found that over 80 per cent of families in Metro Manila occupied dwellings of 2 rooms or less and that approximately onethird of dwellings lacked indoor piped water, with a similar number lacking a water sealed toilet (Strassmann and Blunt, 1994). The

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high cost of land also leads to the growth of informal settlements, as many low-income urban residents are shut out of the legal housing markets. Political reforms have signi cantly changed the Philippines’ urban development framework in recent years, with signi cant implications for housing markets. The 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of city and municipal governments and calls for participation in government by the country’s exceptionally mobilised civil society (Busto, n.d.; Siliman and Noble, 1998a). The Local Government Code of 1991 devolves important planning powers, including zoning and land-use planning, to city and municipal governments. It also dictates that NGO and CBO representatives constitute 25 per cent of local development councils (LDCs), the entities responsible for the formulation of development plans. Governance in Metro Manila has also changed signi cantly. The powerful Metro Manila Commission, which had been headed by a strong governor appointed by the President during the Marcos period, has been replaced by a weakened Metro Manila Development Authority governed by a board of mayors whose chair rotates every six months (Berner, 1997). According to the Constitution, the national government has no authority to merge existing cities and municipalities into metropolitan political subdivisions without the consent of the populace through a plebiscite (Busto n.d.). Recent programmes and policies in housing have also emphasised the role of local government, CBOs and NGOs. Under the government’s current housing framework, established by the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) of 1995, national government agencies generally focus on nancing housing programmes, while implementation is largely left to partnerships between local governments, organisations of civil society and the private sector. Under UDHA, local governments are also required to set aside land for relocation of informal settlers and to compile lists of informal settlers who are eligible for relocation. The law also stipulates that sub-division developers

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must set aside 20 per cent of project costs for socialised housing. The Community Mortgage Programme (CMP), the main government initiative for low-income housing, entails community organisations in informal settlements taking loans from government to purchase land, usually from private owners, at market prices. While organisations of civil society are granted an enhanced role in recent programmes and policies, in practice CBOs and NGOs have often encountered signi cant dif culties in in uencing local governments and the reforms have had a limited impact on access to legal housing for residents of informal settlements. Local governments have been slow to comply with certain politically sensitive provisions of UDHA, such as the identi cation of vacant land for socialised housing and developers have largely ignored the provision for setting aside part of project costs for socialised housing (Racelis, 1998). In addition, provisions for the rights of informal settlers in cases of eviction are often not observed. The Urban Poor Associates, an NGO that works with urban poor communities, recorded 105 demolitions affecting 20 110 families between July 1992 and December 1995. Only 43 per cent of affected families were provided with relocation (Karaos, 1996). Civil society participation on local development councils has sometimes been dominated groups like the Rotarians or the Lion’s Club, which do not represent the interests of marginal groups. Finally, CMP projects have only reached a small minority of communities and some projects have resulted in the displacement of poorer residents, as they are unable to afford to make payments on their loans (Berner, 1996). In sum, while reforms have theoretically provided the potential for the political empowerment of CBOs, in practice their role continues to be limited. I would argue that two factors have limited the role of CBOs. The rst is the persistent in uence of local economic e´lites in political processes in Philippine political culture, a phenomenon related to Philippine history. The second is the increased development pressure on urban

land in the Philippines in recent years, which is largely a consequence of the integration of Metro Manila into the global economy. The next two sections will explore how these factors have shaped government – community relations in the Philippines. Historical Foundations of Contemporary Local Politics in the Philippines Family plays a critical role in the Philippines’ economic and political organisation. Family-owned enterprises constitute a large part of the economy—as indicated by the fact that over 90 per cent of the top 1000 corporations in the Philippines are not publicly listed (McCoy, 1993). In the political realm, in uential families have passed political power down through the generations. One study indicated that 169 of the 200 House Representatives elected in the rst postMarcos elections, held in 1987, were either from pre-martial-law political families or related to these families by marriage (Anderson, 1988). An extensive literature has documented the historical development of these e´lite families (Anderson, 1988; McCoy, 1993; Sidel, 1997). These accounts usually trace the origins of this phenomenon to early Spanish colonial times, when religious orders consolidated large tracts of rural land into agricultural estates. Later, the Philippines turned to the production of tropical agricultural products, such as sugar, tobacco, abaca and coffee, to meet increasing demand in the industrialising countries (Anderson, 1988; McAndrew, 1994). Export-oriented agriculture led to rising land values and entrepreneurial families, often of mestizo Chinese heritage, began to acquire rural land either by leasing from the religious orders or by engaging in money-lending to small cultivators. When the Americans took over colonial rule of the Philippines, these families dominated agricultural production and trade. Hoping to diminish the in uence of the Spanish religious orders, the Americans soon undertook a land reform programme that allowed


Filipino farmers to purchase the land they tilled. This resulted in the further consolidation of land in the hands of rural land-owning e´lites, as they used their superior nancial resources to accumulate lands. The Americans also undertook the development of a parliamentary democracy in the country, holding elections for municipal of ce in 1901, for provincial governors in 1902, for the Philippine Assembly in 1907 and for Commonwealth president in 1935 (Sidel, 1997). Elected city and provincial of cials gained power over local law enforcement, taxation and public works, while nationallevel of cials gained in uence over the apportionment of national government funds and loans by the national bank, the appointment of of cials, the awarding of contracts and other powers. Political of ce therefore held considerable potential for personal economic advancement and many landowning families took advantage of their economic position to achieve political power. Thus the stage was set for ‘cacique democracy’, in which family-based political dynasties in localities perpetuated their power in a democratic system through a combination of patronage and violence (McCoy, 1993). Many contemporary political gures are from large land-owning families that amassed wealth from agricultural land holdings and trading during the 19th century and later gained electoral of ce. One example is Corazon Aquino, the icon of the ‘people’s power’ movement, who is from the Cojuangco family, owners of large plantations in Luzon. The dominance of land-owning families at the local level translated into in uence at the national level as well. During the colonial and immediate post-colonial period, their main political concerns at the national level were with the continuation of preferential treatment of Philippine agricultural products in the US market (a legacy of the colonial era) and obtaining ‘pork-barrel’ funds from the national government. Their concern with maintaining hegemony in their areas made them a powerful coalition against attempts to centralise rule in the Philippines.

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The dominance of traditional landed, rural-based elite in the Congress resulted in more attention being paid to local, particularistic legislation compared with national programs such as, for example, the issue of balanced agricultural and industrial development, or income and property tax legislation. Congress enacted local autonomy laws, created new towns and cities, subdivided provinces and increased pork barrel appropriations in order to satisfy local supporters (Caoili, 1988, p. 61). The political in uence of the rural e´lite gradually waned in the post-colonial era, however, as industrialisation created new bases of power and an increasingly urban and educated population sought alternatives to what they saw as the backwardness of the rural e´lite. Their era of dominance ended abruptly with Marcos’ declaration of martial law in 1972. Marcos strengthened and coopted the military and police forces and used them to seize control forcibly of the assets of the rural e´lite and pass them on to his loyalists (Anderson, 1988). Once his authority was assured, Marcos declared his intention to adopt an economic development policy based on export-oriented industrialisation, which was experiencing success in other countries in the region. This earned him praise from the middle class and local industrial interests, as well as foreign investors and the World Bank. The improved security situation, the introduction of tax and duty concessions and the suppression of labour unions brought in a surge of foreign aid and investment, which helped to solidify Marcos’ rule (Thompson, 1995). The Marcos government also used the governance of Metro Manila to consolidate its rule. In 1975, Marcos issued a presidential decree forming the Metro Manila Commission which consolidated 17 municipalities under a uni ed authority responsible for planning and policy-making. Marcos’ wife Imelda was appointed Governor of the new entity. The Marcos government undertook a spate of monumental building projects employing the latest in modernist architecture

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and building techniques (often employing crony companies), designed to project the image of a modern, world-class metropolis. These included the Cultural Centre of the Philippines, the Folk Arts Theatre and the Philippine International Convention Centre (Pinches, 1994). These buildings were the venue for a number of prestigious international events, including the 1974 Miss Universe Pageant and the 1976 International Monetary Fund and World Bank Conference. These projects and the events they hosted, often came at a direct cost to low-income communities. During the preparations for the Miss Universe Pageant, an estimated 100 000 people were evicted, while during the IMF and World Bank Conference, an estimated 60 000 people were evicted. In all, it has been estimated that 400 000 families were evicted between 1973 and 1980 (Pinches, 1994). Opposition to Marcos’ rule gradually mounted during the late 1970s and 1980s. The communist New People’s Army (NPA) had gained control of large parts of the countryside by the late 1970s (Thompson, 1995). The mainstream opposition to Marcos, led by members of prominent preMarcos political families such as former Senators Benigno Aquino and Lorenzo Tanada and the son of former Senate President Gil Puyat, advocated increasingly radical and sometimes violent forms of protest. Some formed alliances with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the political wing of the communist movement. Support for Marcos in the business community also slipped, as extreme corruption and lack of transparency had led to a soaring budget de cit and economic stagnation. Labour unrest and a worsening security situation due to the growing communist insurgency had further limited economic opportunities. By the early 1980s, some in the business community began providing nancial support to the Marcos opposition (Thompson, 1995). The 1983 assassination of political opposition leader Benigno Aquino nally drove these disparate elements—the left, the middle class, landed e´lites and business interests—into a coalition

that openly opposed Marcos’ rule. Thus the stage was set for the ‘people’s power’ revolt of 1986. Politics in the post-Marcos era has re ected this coalition of interests opposed to authoritarianism and centralisation. Foreign and local industrial interests fear the return of the cronyism and national-level corruption that had driven the economy to the brink of ruin. NGOs, many of which were formed by middle-class activists and former communist organisers, have demanded an increased role for civil society in decision-making. The old land-owning families have partially returned to power and continue to resist efforts of central government to usurp their authority. These interests have in uenced the radical experiment in decentralisation that the Philippines has undertaken. However, the recent political change does not represent a complete return to the preMarcos political order. The current political climate is also in uenced by the fact that the population has become more urban and educated and politicised by the experience of the anti-authoritarian movement. As a result, political candidates from rural land-owning families have often not fared well in national elections. The presidential elections of 1992 and 1998 resulted in the elections of Fidel Ramos, a former general who had Aquino’s backing and Joseph Estrada, a former lm star and populist politician. Metro Manila politics has manifest elements of both the in uence of wealthy families that is the legacy of colonial history and the civil society mobilisation that is the legacy of the anti-authoritarian struggle. Family-based politics has made a comeback in some areas—prominent old political families have returned to power in some cities and municipalities and new families have gained power in others. In the 1998 elections, in which several mayors reached their term limit, many candidates were the sons or wives of the outgoing mayors. While some of these candidates fared well, others did not. In Makati, for example, the wife of outgoing mayor Jejomar Binay prevailed over the son of the Marcos-era mayor, Nestorio Yabut. In


Pasay, several relatives of Pablo Cuneta, who had been the country’s longest-serving mayor, ran for a variety of posts at the local and national levels and all lost. In addition, the strength of NGOs and increased networking among CBOs, have made low-income communities a more potent political force in many contexts and many politicians have courted the votes of the poor by advocating issues of concern to them. Thus local politics has evinced a combination of cliente`lism, populism and grassroots political mobilisation. Organisations of civil society have acquired a degree of political legitimacy, but face entrenched interests in efforts to improve housing in poor communities. State– civil society relations with regard to the issue of housing for the poor have also been affected by the impacts of economic globalisation. Speci cally, the Philippines’ accelerated integration into the global economy as an exporter of manufactured goods has intensi ed competition over urban land, often pitting low-value uses such as housing for the poor against higher-value commercial and industrial uses. Thus, organisations of the urban poor have often found themselves in competition with corporate and landowning interests for political in uence. The impact of globalisation on civil society participation in government is the subject of the next section. Globalisation and the Changing Politics of Space in Metro Manila Eager to make up ground lost to the rapidly growing economies of neighbouring southeast Asian countries during the Marcos years, the Philippine government has worked assiduously to project an image of the Philippines as the next in line in the region to achieve ‘tiger’ status. The government has taken measures further to open the country to global commerce, liberalise the banking industry and deregulate key industries in order to encourage investment. As the security situation in the country has improved, these changes have paid off—Philippine exports grew from $5.72 billion to $25.23 billion

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between 1987 and 1997 (NSO, 1998). The country’s transformation from a primarily agricultural economy to an industrial economy continued during this period, as the share of manufacturing exports rose from 63.6 per cent of total exports in 1987 to 86 per cent in 1997. Of particular note has been the growth in exports of electrical components, from $1.1 billion in 1987 to $13.0 billion in 1997, indicating that the country is moving towards more high-tech manufacturing. A signi cant impact of the growing importance of manufacturing exports in the Philippine economy is the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation that have occurred in areas other than Metro Manila. ‘Growth zones’ have included the provinces immediately surrounding Metro Manila, southern Luzon, Cebu and economic zones created at the former US military bases at Olongapo and Subic Bay, to name some (PADCO, 1992). Nevertheless, Metro Manila’s economic primacy remains unchallenged. While employment in industry in the Philippines grew from 3.08 million in 1987 to 4.45 million in 1998, Metro Manila’s share of this employment remained fairly steady at around 21 per cent and its share of manufacturing value-added remained at around 43 per cent (NSO, 1998). Meanwhile, the city’s share of gross national product rose from 28.7 per cent in 1984 to 34.5 per cent in 1997. Economic growth has enhanced the city’s role as a centre for producer services—the command and control centre of the Philippines. The city has also remained the country’s premier port—67.4 per cent of exports and 60.6 per cent of imports passed through Metro Manila ports in 1997. Economic growth has brought with it changing development pressures on urban land. One study found that the share of industrial land uses in Metro Manila increased from 4.9 per cent in 1985 to 8.5 per cent in 1994 (Urban Research Consortium, 1998). Much of this development has taken place in cities and municipalities on the urban fringe, most notably in Valenzuela, Quezon City, Taguig and Paranaque (Figure 1). There has

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Figure 1. Development of industrial space by city and municipality in Metro Manila, 1990 – 97. Source: NSO (1998).

also been a signi cant increase in the share of commercial land uses in Metro Manila— from 3.8 per cent in 1985 to 6.1 per cent in 1994 (Urban Research Consortium, 1998). Commercial space development has mainly taken the form of malls and high-rise of ce facilities. Particularly noteworthy in the Metro Manila context is the existence of large-scale developments carried out by a single developer and containing a complex of

both commercial and business establishments. The largest of these is the Makati central business district, developed by the Ayala conglomerate, which has been developed since 1945. A largely undeveloped marsh on the urban periphery until the end of World War Two, Makati is now one of the premier business centres in Asia. It is the home of 84 per cent of private commercial banks in the Philippines, as well as 9 of the


country’s 10 largest insurance rms and 48 of its 56 embassies (Gloria, 1995). More recently, the Ortigas district in Mandaluyong has emerged as a potential challenger to Makati’s supremacy, having attracted the of ces of the Asian Development Bank and other prestigious institutions. As in some other Asian mega-cities, malls have become a ubiquitous feature in Metro Manila life. The demand for mall development seems

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endless, as the lack of public space in the city and congestion on roads leaving the city render these establishments one of the few forms of recreation available to most people. Commercial space development has occurred mostly in central city areas, most notably in Makati, but has also been prominent in Mandaluyong, southern Quezon City and Manila (Figure 2). The rapid pace of real estate development

Figure 2. Development of commercial space by city and municipality in Metro Manila, 1990 – 97. Source: NSO (1998).

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in Metro Manila presents an opportunity for city and municipal governments. Saddled with responsibility for a variety of services as a result of decentralisation, local governments are under pressure to generate revenue through property and business taxes. Each of these sources of revenue now represents a larger proportion of local government budgets in Metro Manila than the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), the sum provided by the national government to all cities and municipalities. Local government of cials also often have a vested interest in encouraging local economic development, both because in uential businesspeople make powerful political allies and because of cials themselves often come from families with real estate interests. Thus city and municipal governments have increasingly competed to attract investment in the form of commercial development, industrial development, highvalue residential development and development of institutions such as colleges, hospitals or government of ces. The imperative of local economic development for local government—and the consequent competition among them to attract investment—has two major consequences for relations between local governments and CBOs in informal settlements. First, local governments may be inclined to discourage participation by CBOs, as they may see the interests of informal settlements as con icting with the objective of local economic development. Informal settlements often occupy developable land, or land that would be required for infrastructure improvements such as road improvements or the development of mass transit systems. The second consequence is that, because of variations in the ability of localities to attract investment, there is a disparity in their ability to generate revenues. Inner-city areas and large population centres are prime targets for investment in retail and business of ce development, which generate a great deal of revenue. Areas on the urban fringe and those that do not have adequate transport links have greater dif culty in attracting such investment. In 1997, revenue collection of

Metro Manila local governments ranged from 486 pesos per capita in Malabon, to 7656 pesos per capita in Makati (Figure 3). Cities with especially low revenue are likely to lack basic capacities in planning and programme development and implementation, thereby reducing their responsiveness to their constituents. Thus economic changes associated with globalisation have weakened the ability of CBOs to in uence government. Rapid urbanisation has intensi ed development pressures, while uneven access to resources among cities has weakened the capacity of some city and municipal governments. Yet both of these factors vary between cities and municipalities in different parts of Metro Manila and speci cally between central areas and the urban fringe, suggesting that local governments in some areas may be more open to civil society participation than others. The next section will provide a comparative examination of three case studies of state– community relations in Metro Manila, emphasising the differences in civil society participation among them. Local Politics and Informal Settlements: Three Case Studies Large-scale urban community organising in the Philippines can be dated to the early 1970s, when the Philippine Ecumenical Council for Community Organising (PECCO) began training community organisers in confrontational Alinsky-style organising tactics. CBOs experienced a number of signi cant successes in the 1970s in resisting eviction, legalising tenure and improving infrastructure and services in communities. During the martial law period, CBOs and NGOs faced oppression and many organisations formed alliances with the National Democratic Front (NDF), a political front organisation for the Communist Party of the Philippines. In recent years, government repression has eased and the national government has moved from a project to a programme focus in its housing activities. In addition, funding to NGOs for community


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Figure 3. Revenue per capita for cities and municipalities of Metro Manila, 1997. Source: Department of Finance, Makati (unpublished data).

improvement projects has increased. In this context, many CBOs and NGOs have moved from protest activities to service delivery and have increasingly attempted to engage government in improvement projects. It is dif cult to determine the extent of community organising in Metro Manila. Approximately 2000 CBOs in informal settle-

ments are currently registered with the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation, a national government agency that administers housing nance programmes and 906 are registered with the Presidential Commission on the Urban Poor (PCUP, 1998; Housing Insurance Guarantee Corporation, unpublished data). However, these likely represent only a frac-

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tion of the actual number of organisations. A large number of NGOs have formed to provide technical assistance to CBOs in areas such as organisational development, legal training and assistance and the establishment of livelihood and infrastructure improvement projects. Many CBOs also belong to CBO federations that have organised at the city, metro and national levels to lobby for local government compliance with UDHA, for the formation of urban poor affairs of ces in city and municipal governments and for the prevention of evictions. Some federations have also backed political candidates from informal settlements. Experiences of NGOs and CBOs in working with local governments have been mixed. In some cities, these organisations have gained representation in local development councils and other consultative bodies, but they have failed to do so in others. Urban poor affairs of ces have become important channels for demand-making by urban poor communities in some local governments, while in others they have not been established at all. UDHA regulations regarding the provision of adequate relocation in the case of eviction have often not been implemented and some local governments have been slow to comply with the UDHA mandate that they conduct an inventory of vacant lands for relocation of informal settlers. Thus the question emerges as to why CBOs and NGOs have succeeded in in uencing local governments in some areas, while they have failed to do so in others. it is argued here that four contextual factors strongly in uence the degree to which CBOs and NGOs are able to in uence local governments. The rst is the intensity of land development pressures in the locality. A major constraint on the availability of land for housing low-income people in Metro Manila is the fact that land-owners hold large amounts of developable land for speculative purposes. This problem is exacerbated by a property tax system that provides incentives for such speculation. Thus, in heavily urbanised or rapidly developing areas where extensive tracts of land are held by private

owners, the political and economic costs to local governments of enhancing access to land for the poor will be great. Local governments may therefore be inclined to discourage participation by urban poor groups in decision-making. CBOs are likely to be more able to in uence government to legalise housing where large amounts of vacant land are available, where land ownership is in con ict or where much of the vacant land is publicly owned (unless this land is needed for important public projects). The second factor is the local government’s access to sources of revenue. Two of the major sources of revenue for local governments in Metro Manila are business and property taxes and the level of local government revenue is therefore largely a function of the amount of business investment coming into localities and property values. Local government revenues from property taxes may be limited by the speculative holding of undeveloped land. Where local governments lack nancial resources due to limitations in revenue-generating capacity, they will be less able to establish programmes to legalise and improve informal settlements. The third factor is the nature of the local economic base and the relationship between powerful economic actors and local government. Where local of cials have a strong vested interest in local economic development, either because of their direct involvement in the local economy or their ties to local economic interests, they will be less likely to be responsive to the interests of residents of informal settlements. This is particularly true of smaller cities and municipalities, where a few families may dominate local economic and political power. The nal factor is the strength of community organising in the locality. This is dependent on a number of factors, including the presence of NGOs in the locality, the historical development of community organising and relations between communities and local governments. The remainder of this section will illustrate the impact of the factors mentioned above on CBO and NGO participation in


government with reference to two cities (Quezon City and Makati) and one municipality (Navotas) in Metro Manila. The three areas differ considerably in terms of their population density, socioeconomic composition, economic base, historical development and other factors. They also differ in the degree of civil society participation in government. A brief description will be given of how these differences have impacted on the capacity of CBOs to in uence local governments. Navotas. Navotas is a municipality of 229 039 people located on a narrow strip of land on Manila Bay north of Manila. The municipality is ideally located near waters that are well-suited for deep-sea shing and shing has been its major industry since the 19th century. Today, the Navotas economy remains largely based on shing and related industries, such as canning, shipping and the production of sh sauce. It is estimated that 70 per cent of Navotas residents are dependent on these industries (TWSC, 1988). The job opportunities offered by the shing industry have acted as a magnet for a steady stream of migrants from rural areas, mostly from the Visayan Islands in the central part of the country. As most of the limited amount of land in the municipality has long since been developed, most of these migrants have settled in informal settlements built on stilts along Manila Bay. The presence of these densely populated settlements gives the city an astounding population density of more than 88 000 people per square kilometre, or about 6 times the Metro Manila average (NSO, 1998). The Navotas economy is dominated by a handful of families that own large shing vessels, shipyards and food processing plants. This e´lite group also dominates the political scene (TWSC, 1988). The continued importance of shing in the local economy has meant that the composition of the local e´lite has been fairly stable and, as a result, there has been some intergenerational political competition between these e´lite families. In the mayoral elections of 1988, the rst

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after Marcos’ rule, all three candidates were sons of former mayors of Navotas. The eventual victor in the contest, Felipe del Rosario Jr, came from a prominent family that grew wealthy from the shing industry and that has been in uential in local politics since the early part of the century. He was also the director of the Inter-island Deep Sea Fishing Association of the Philippines, a group representing major shing magnates in the municipality who were allegedly instrumental in nancing his campaign. In the 1998 elections, del Rosario had reached his term limit and his wife ran for mayor and was initially declared the winner. However, allegations of fraud in the elections eventually resulted in her losing her position to Efren Bautista, a local entrepreneur who had made a fortune in dry docking, shipping and the restaurant business. Relations between the local government and communities have been shaped by a combination of cliente` lism and populism. Formal channels for representation by informal settlements in the political process have been quite limited. There is no urban poor affairs of ce in the municipality and civil society representation on the local development council is dominated by e´lite organisations. Navotas also has the second-lowest revenue collection for a local government in Metro Manila, thereby restricting its ability to plan for alternative housing solutions for the urban poor. The lack of land for economic development has led the municipal government to pursue the development of a 48 billion peso (US$1.26 billion) business and commercial space development project to be located on land to be reclaimed along the Navotas shoreline. The project is designed to capitalise on Navotas’ proximity to the densely populated cities of Manila and Caloocan. While a recent environmental impact assessment found that the project would not have any major social impact, a local alliance of organisations representing the urban poor, Alyansa at Pagkakaisa ng mga Samahan ng Navotas (ALPASAN), believes the project is likely to displace many of the 26 000 families that it estimates reside along

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the Bay (Gaia South Inc., 1996). Yet the municipality’s consultation with the informal settlers along Manila Bay regarding this project has been minimal. In sum, CBOs exercise very little political in uence in Navotas local government. Resource constraints on local government have limited their interaction with informal communities and the limited availability of land in the municipality has created an obstacle to possibilities for in-city relocation. In addition, demand for centrally located of ce and commercial space from heavily populated and densely built-up areas adjoining Navotas, such as Manila to the south and Caloocan to the east, have created pressures for the proposed reclamation project. Finally, the existence of a political e´lite with economic interests in the locality has created a climate of cliente`lism that has hindered dialogue between the municipal government and communities. Quezon City. Quezon City occupies onequarter of Metro Manila’s land area to the north-east of Manila city. With a population of over 2 million, it is the most populous city in the metro area (NSO, 1998). The city was created in 1939 during the presidency of Manuel Quezon and in 1948 was of cially proclaimed the capital of the Philippines. Since that time, the city has grown rapidly. Many government facilities have relocated to Quezon City and substantial residential and commercial development has occurred as well. In addition, the existence of large tracts of vacant land in the city has attracted lowincome families in recent years and currently over one-half of the city’s population lives in informal settlements. In contrast to Navotas, Quezon City has proved relatively responsive to co-operation with CBOs. The city has an active urban poor affairs of ce that has acted as an originator for 82 Community Mortgage Programme loans, although these projects have bene ted less than 4000 households, or less than 2 per cent of the city’s informal settlers. Channels for NGO and CBO consultation with government exist in the local develop-

ment councils, as well as in a number of other committees that provide civil society input into housing policy and speci c housing projects. In addition, Quezon City contains a large number of NGOs, many of which have ties to the many prominent universities in the city. Thus informal settlements are relatively well organised. One of the most well-organised areas is the National Government Centre (NGC), a large piece of land in northern Quezon City. In the 1950s, the NGC was set aside by the national government as the future site of the Philippine capital, but due to slow implementation of the project informal settlers gradually occupied the area. Since the end of the Marcos era, several large CBO federations have persuaded the national government to grant a large part of the NGC for settlement by the more than 50 000 families that now occupy the area. One reason for their success has been the active role of NGOs together with the presence of local government of cials who have generally supported the CBOs. Several factors have contributed to the relatively benign response of Quezon City government to the situation of informal settlers. The availability of large tracts of vacant land, much of which is government-owned, has provided the local government with the means to accommodate at least some informal settlers. The existence of a large population of informal settlements, often in large agglomerations such as that in the NGC, has made housing for the urban poor a populist political issue. Consequently, the mayor and several of the city councillors have taken visibly pro-poor stands on many issues. Finally, NGOs have played a key role as advocates and technical-assistance providers for CBOs. Nevertheless, the efforts of Quezon City government have had a limited impact, largely due to the fact that the government has been unwilling to allocate large sums of money to housing programmes. Makati. As noted earlier, Makati has grown in the past several decades to be the economic centre of the Philippines. However,


while the city’s name elicits of ce buildings, malls and gated sub-divisions, Makati is in fact composed of three distinct parts. The rst is the central business district. This area is largely privately managed and handles its own security, garbage collection and planning. The second area consists of the 17 barangay that surround the business district, which are generally composed of lower- and middle-income residential areas. Finally, there is Fort Bonifacio, an expanse of land to the north-west of the central business district that was formerly a military barracks. In 1995, part of Fort Bonifacio was purchased by the Metro Paci c Group, a consortium of business interests, for approximately $1.4 billion, to develop an of ce and commercial complex (Gloria, 1995). Overall, the population of Makati was 484 176 in 1995 and the PCUP estimated that 44 per cent of that number were residing in low-income families. The presence of a large low-income population in the city has contributed to the populist nature of local politics. Local politicians have undertaken a number of initiatives to foster a political base in low-income communities, utilising the city government’s considerable revenuegenerating capacity to populist political ends. For example, under a plan developed by Marcos-era mayor Nestorio Yabut and expanded under recent administrations, lowincome Makati residents are given free access to medical treatment at the Makati Medical Centre, one of the most advanced hospitals in the country (Gloria, 1995). The city also has an exceptionally well- nanced school system. However, due to the high value of land in the city and the consequent opportunities for graft from land transactions and development, local government has maintained a strong grip on decision-making in local development. Since the end of the Marcos era, Makati politics have been dominated by Jejomar Binay, a man of humble origins who became a prominent human rights lawyer and antiauthoritarian activist during the Marcos era. Binay was chosen by President Corazon Aquino in 1986 to replace Yabut. He was

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subsequently re-elected twice, largely on the power of a political machine built upon Makati’s economic resources. Binay has undertaken a spate of politically popular projects, such as the building of schools and basketball courts, and road paving. He has also developed direct links to low-income communities. For example, he makes it a point to visit personally funerals in such areas and provides cash gifts to relatives of the deceased. Binay was ineligible to run for re-election in 1998 due to term limits. He subsequently sponsored his wife’s successful bid to replace him. While Makati mayors have courted the political support of the poor, they have also been wary of the potential threat CBOs could pose to development initiatives in the city. Thus, city government has discouraged community organising and has attempted to assert in uence in communities through the barangay-level government. There is minimal consultation between the city government and the urban poor and there is no urban poor affairs of ce. There are few NGOs that work with informal settlers or CBO federations in the city and the city government usually only directly interacts with informal settlements when it is planning an eviction. Conclusions The brief case studies outlined above highlight some of the constraints faced by NGOs and CBO federations in attempting to expand legal access to housing for the poor. In Makati and Navotas, CBOs have generally been denied in uence in decision-making due to obstacles posed by political and economic structures in the two localities, as well as the lack of available land that the government is willing to allocate for socialised housing. Quezon City has shown greater openness to civil society participation, but it has as yet not allocated signi cant budgetary resources to urban poor housing. In much of the literature on urban development, reforms for decentralisation and civil society participation in urban governance are

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represented rather simplistically as a transformation from a top-down to a bottom-up model of planning. Democratisation is often represented as an evolutionary phenomenon resulting from popular movements against authoritarian and centralised decisionmaking systems. In this paper, it has been argued that the reality of these reforms is somewhat more complex—a variety of actors have an interest in decentralisation and have attempted to shape the outcome of reforms to their agendas. It has further been argued that recent trends in the reform of urban government and the actual potential for civil society participation created by these changes, must be understood in the context of economic globalisation and of the particularities of historical and social factors in localities. This nding is consistent with a study by Warner and Molotch (1995). In a study of movements for growth control in three jurisdictions in southern California, they found that certain contextual factors, most notably the historical base for organising within the locality, enabled these movements partially to achieve their objectives despite the in uence of developers on local growth coalitions. In the case of the Philippines, decentralisation has been implemented in the context of a political culture in which powerful landowning families have traditionally dominated local politics. As a result, CBOs and NGOs have often had to confront entrenched local interests that have attempted to thwart civil society participation in government. In addition, the Philippines’ growing role in the global economy as an exporter of industrial products—and the consequent increase in investment in Metro Manila—has led to developmental pressure on urban land. This has exacerbated the con ict of interests between local governments and organisations representing the interests of the urban poor. Local governments have often excluded institutions of civil society from participation and such organisations have themselves often exhibited limited capacity to in uence government. Thus, while the current situation of state– civil society relations in the Philippines is certainly an improvement on the Marcos

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