Of choices, changes, and challenges: the ...

Philippine Political Science Journal

ISSN: 0115-4451 (Print) 2165-025X (Online) Journal homepage: http://tandfonline.com/loi/rpsj20

Of choices, changes, and challenges: the Philippines in 2016 Jan Robert R. Go To cite this article: Jan Robert R. Go (2017) Of choices, changes, and challenges: the Philippines in 2016, Philippine Political Science Journal, 38:1, 48-73, DOI: 10.1080/01154451.2017.1330022 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2017.1330022

Published online: 13 Jun 2017.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 220

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpsj20 Download by: [Jan Robert Go]

Date: 09 October 2017, At: 05:16

Philippine Political Science Journal, 2017 VOL. 38, NO. 1, 48–73 https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2017.1330022

Of choices, changes, and challenges: the Philippines in 2016 Jan Robert R. Go Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City

Downloaded by [Jan Robert Go] at 05:16 09 October 2017

ABSTRACT

In the Philippines, the year 2016 can be characterized in terms of choices, changes, and challenges. As an election year, the people once again chose a new set of leaders from the president down to the local level. From the five candidates for the presidency, Rodrigo Duterte of Davao emerged as the victor. His rise to the top has led to several changes in terms of presidential style, management, and politics. His war on drugs received both acclamations and criticisms from various sectors in the Philippines and abroad. The first six months of the Duterte administration is not without its share of issues and controversies, ranging from domestic issues such as the Marcos burial to international ones like the perceived anti-United States and proChina and Russia foreign policy. But challenges, like the federalism campaign and peace talks with the rebels, remain as the Philippines end the year and move forward to 2017.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 16 April 2017 Accepted 30 April 2017 KEYWORDS

2016 Philippine elections; Rodrigo Duterte; war on drugs; change is coming; Philippine executive; challenges; choices

Introduction For some, the year 2016 brought certain changes in the political arena, both local and international, which for the most part could be considered less than what is “desirable”. In the United States, 2016 saw the rise, and eventual election as president, of Donald Trump. In the United Kingdom, 2016 was the year a majority of the British people decided to part ways with the European Union. Elsewhere, the year featured the rise of either more populist or more right-wing politicians to political power, which definitely changed the appreciation of how the social, political, and even economic dimensions of human life will be shaped. The Philippines in 2016 follows this worldwide trend of changes. As an election year, political leadership, especially at the top, was replaced by a “new” set of elites.1 The transition from the Benigno Aquino III to the Duterte administration has also brought changes in domestic policies and international relations, which caught the attention of various groups within and outside of the country. Thus, many commentators and scholars argue that 2016 has been one of the most controversial years in the post-1986 Philippine political landscape. In this essay, I propose to examine 2016 using the ideas of choices, changes, and challenges. It is obvious that 2016 as an election year revolves around choices. For better or for worse, having choices in a democratic system, albeit a very minimalist view, is essential and

CONTACT Jan Robert R. Go

[email protected]

© 2017 Philippine Political Science Association (PPSA)


PHILIPPINE POLITICAL SCIENCE JOURNAL

49

important. The elections that were conducted in 2016 reflected the choice of the people—i.e. how they wanted to be ruled. By extension, using the lens of “choice”, it can be said that people opted to move away from the traditional elites that have occupied powerful positions in government. At the same time, and quite ironically, this may also be reflective of the nature of the choices available, i.e. it is simply between different sets of elites and not really a wide array of “actual choices”. In any case, such choices can bring about changes, in more ways than one. Then candidate Rodrigo Duterte ran under the promise of change. Changes can either be positive change, i.e. resolving the problems of society and reforming the old system, or negative change, i.e. worsening the existing conditions. Either way, the idea of “change” can be a matter of perspective. Indeed, 2016 opened a lot of avenues for changes in the way the country is run. But it also allowed certain changes on issues and personalities previously held sacred or otherwise by the people. A new leadership brought in a change in perspective, which has both desirable and adverse outcomes. Lastly, as in any year, challenges are part of politics and political life. Given the “new” direction set out for the country, “challenges” remain an integral part of governance. 2016 welcomed these challenges, either as a continuation of the 2015 challenges or a new set of challenges: from the continuing problems of disaster rehabilitation, the perennial issue of corruption, the negotiations for peace in Mindanao and with the communist rebels, to the promise of a new federal system. Using the above framing, I proceed as follows. The next section deals with choices, which includes the 2016 elections, the campaign, and the presidential and vice presidential races. The third section talks about the changes in 2016. It highlights the changes in domestic policies and international relations following the change from Aquino to Duterte. The fourth section features the challenges faced by the new administration. The last section concludes this essay by looking at the trajectory of the Duterte presidency in relation to the president’s promise of change.

Choices 2016 general elections As earlier mentioned, 2016 is an election year, or what Teehankee (2016a) might be referring to as “the political storm”2 in his 2015 year-end country report. An overview of the 2016 general elections is: up for election in 2016 were one president, one vice president, 12 senators,3 238 district representatives, and 59 party-list representatives,4 81 governors and vice governors, 776 provincial board members, 1634 mayors and vice mayors, and 13,540 local councilors. The Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) also held its election in 2016, where the positions of governor, vice governor, and 24 regional assembly members were up for election. In total, there were 18,083 seats up for election in 2016.5 There were 44,872 candidates for these positions: six candidates for president, six for vice president, 50 for senator, 115 party-lists, 634 for district representatives, 275 for governor, 206 for vice governor, 1813 for provincial board member, 4158 for mayor, 3796 for vice mayor, and 33,737 for councilor. In the ARMM, four ran for regional governor, four for regional vice governor, and 68 for the regional assembly.


50

J. R. R. GO

Running unopposed has become an increasing trend. From a little over 400 in 2010, the number of unopposed candidates has increased by over 100: 545 candidates6 ran unopposed, the majority of whom were bidding for re-election. According to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 39 candidates for district representative, 14 each for governor and vice governor, 222 for mayor, and 256 for vice mayor were running without an opponent, making them sure winners in their respective races. On the one hand, unopposed elections mean that elections can be relatively peaceful. Since there is no contest, particularly in key positions at the local level, there is little reason for politicians to resort to violence, vote-buying, or other similar mechanisms.7 On the other hand, having unopposed candidates limits the choices of the electors. As one scholar notes, “elections are meaningful only when voters have a choice”.8 Nevertheless, the 2016 general elections registered the highest voter turnout since 1987. Of the 54,363,844 registered voters in 92,509 clustered precincts, 44,549,848 voters or 81.95% actually voted. The 2013 midterm election turnout comes second at 77% and the 2010 general elections third at 74%. COMELEC chair Andres Bautista attributes the high voter turnout to the “quality of candidates”,9 particularly in the presidential race, which is usually the highlight of elections. The candidates were Vice President Jejomar Binay, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, Senator Grace Poe, Interior and Local Government Secretary Manuel Roxas, and OFW (Overseas Filipino Workers) Family Club Representative Roy Señeres.

The campaign and social media However, unlike in previous presidential races where the would-be president has been very clear, the 2016 presidential elections became a four-way battle among Binay, Duterte, Poe, and Roxas. Aside from the quality of the candidates, the campaign and the various strategies of the different candidates definitely affected the increase in voter turnout. In this case, the use of social media became an important platform for the candidates and their supporters. In fact, some commentators regarded social media as one of the game changers in the 2016 elections10 (Buenaobra 2016). From a generation of television viewers to one of mobile phone users, campaigning has totally changed and entered a different landscape in 2016. Politicians have assumed celebrity status as they ventured into social media. Aside from the typical TV advertisements, Facebook, Twitter, and even Instagram11 were popular social networking sites used by both national and local candidates. One of the presidential candidates popular in social media is DefensorSantiago. With more than 3 million followers on Facebook and almost 3 million in Twitter as of November 2015, Defensor-Santiago has been considered a social media darling.12 The transformation of social media, which is initially a platform for sharing information about personal lives and experiences, to a political machine has been seen positively and negatively. On the one hand, people have become more politically aware regarding situations, issues, and events. With some mobile networks offering free social media services, anyone can access news reports. The prominence of social media also led to the rise of “ordinary individuals or supporters”, like Mocha Uson and her Facebook blog.13 Arguably, the use of social media in the 2016 elections helped, in one way or another, in the development of a more involved electorate as they are exposed to the political realities, issues and controversies.



51

On the other hand, campaigns in social media have produced a culture of hate and bullying. Since profiles and identities can be easily changed and modified in cyberspace, there is no blanket security or protection for users. Likewise, fake news reports, fake and edited photos, and other concocted accusations and rumors also proliferated in social media. Some supporters have resorted to name-calling and use of derogatory and inflammatory language, thereby compromising a healthy discourse and fruitful debate. Hashtags14 such as #yellowtard or #Dutertard were used to label one as a follower or supporter of either the Liberal Party’s Roxas or PDP Laban’s Duterte, respectively.15 However, the reality is: there is no guarantee that the political game will be won in the social media arena. While some of the candidates chose to engage in the various platforms, they are preaching to the same audience. The popularity of politicians in social media may not really translate into actual votes (see, for example, Defensor-Santiago). Whether social media can actually change the political landscape and affect voter’s choice is not yet fully explored by empirical research. In reality, despite the free data provisions of mobile networks, access to the internet and social networking sites is limited. Television remains the main source of news and information among Filipinos.16

Reviving the national debates One of the innovations of the COMELEC for the 2016 national elections is the revival of the national debates for presidential and vice presidential candidates. Called the “PiliPinas” Debates,17 it aims to give the public a chance to scrutinize more closely the candidates’ platforms and positions on issues, as well as their personalities. The last COMELEC-sponsored presidential debates were in 1992, when Fidel V. Ramos emerged as the victor with a very slim margin.18 Three debates were scheduled in three different universities in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao, and broadcast by the three largest television networks. Aside from the three presidential debates, one was scheduled for the vice presidential candidates. The first debate, the Mindanao leg of the debate, was held in Capitol University in Cagayan de Oro City on 21 February 2016. It was co-organized with the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP [Association of Broadcasters of the Philippines]), the broadsheet Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the GMA Network, with anchors Mike Enriquez and Jessica Soho hosting the event. With five of the six candidates present,19 the first debate was supposed to focus on the issues of agricultural development, poverty reduction, charter change, and peace and order.20 However, the three rounds of questions and answers dealt with track record, poverty and development, and Mindanao issues. Also, the candidates were not able to address the questions properly. For the most part, the questions asked by the hosts were either trivial or would elicit obvious answers. This meant that the first debate was dry despite the well-prepared set. The Visayas leg of the debates was held at the University of the Philippines Cebu in Cebu City on 21 March 2016. Co-organized with KBP, network TV5, broadsheets Philippine Star and Business World, and moderated by Luchi Cruz-Valdes, the debate only had four participants. Defensor-Santiago was not able to attend the second debate as she was undergoing clinical trials for anti-cancer drugs. The issues supposed to be covered in the second debate were climate change, education, women’s rights, and health. But similar to the first debate, some of the issues were not properly discussed, and candidates tried to veer away from the questions. Aside from this, the debate did not start on time. There was an issue about rules and bringing notes to the floor by one candidate. The backstage discussions set the mood on


52

J. R. R. GO

stage, where candidates started to attack and insult each other, which clearly revealed the personalities of the candidates. The second debate added a taas-kamay (raising of hands) segment, when candidates were asked about their positions (yes or no only) on divorce, re-imposition of the death penalty, and the burial of deposed former President Ferdinand Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (Heroes’ Cemetery). The third and final leg of the presidential debates was held in Dagupan City’s University of Pangasinan on 24 April 2016. Broadcasters Karen Davila and Tony Velasquez hosted the debate, which was co-organized with KBP, TV network ABS-CBN, and broadsheet Manila Bulletin. All five candidates for president were present. Adopting a town hall format, the questions answered by the candidates came from ordinary Filipinos, covering various topics such as traffic and public transport, job security, health, foreign policy, basic public education, the plight of overseas Filipino workers, and peace for the Mindanaoans in conflict areas.21 Compared to the first two debates, the candidates were able to focus on the issues presented to them. The fast talk and face-to-face segments were able to elicit direct answers from the candidates. Whether these debates actually helped in the decisions of the electorate is something that cannot be clearly asserted. However, given the TV ratings for the debates,22 it can be said that the debates gained attention for the candidates and the presidential election itself.

The rise of Duterte to the presidency As early as March 2015, Duterte was considered one of the contenders for the 2016 presidential race. As the mayor of Davao City, the largest city in Mindanao, for more than two decades, Duterte has gained the reputation of being a strong local executive with rather unorthodox methods. While he consistently denied having intentions to run for president even after the filing of candidacies had ended, support for him within and outside Mindanao continued to rise. He eventually ran under the Partido ng Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban, or Party of Democratic Filipinos-Power of the Nation). His rise, however, was at the expense of the other contenders. Binay of the United Nationalist Alliance (UNA), who before the end of 2015 parted ways with the Aquino administration, was one of the leading candidates for president. In fact, as early as 2014 Binay was the choice for president. But the issue of the Makati City Hall parking building, which was the subject of a series of hearing conducted by the Senate, and other allegations of corruption when he was Makati City mayor, supposedly advanced by the Aquino administration allies, affected his popularity and led to his decline and eventual defeat. As early as March 2016, Binay already lost his lead (see Figure 1). The other leading contender, independent candidate Poe, was rattled by a citizenship case filed before the Supreme Court (SC). As a foundling and a former American citizen, critics of Poe tried to disqualify her first as a senator, and second as a candidate for president. However, these efforts proved to be futile as the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)23 and SC24 both sided with Poe. But the damage was done. Aside from this legal battle, Poe also lacked solid machinery or party to back her up. By April 2016, she had lost her lead in the surveys. In fourth place was Roxas of the Liberal Party. Being the “anointed one” of President Benigno Aquino III, he carried with him both the benefits and the burden of being the administration’s choice. In the Social Weather Stations (SWS) and Pulse Asia surveys (see Figures 1 and 2), Roxas never got to the top spot. He only led in the last survey of Pulse Asia,



53

where he landed second. In a last-minute panic, Roxas called for an alliance between his camp and Poe’s in order to secure the presidency away from the new leading candidate, Duterte. His efforts were to no avail since Poe did not yield and it was too late to call for the unification of camps. Defensor-Santiago of the People’s Reform Party (PRP) was always at the bottom. While she won students’ surveys in different universities, these were not reflective of the national sentiments. It even came to the point when the undecided voters were more numerous than her voters. Nevertheless, despite her illness, she tried for the third and last time to run for president. What is interesting is the change from mid-March to early April. From the fourth and second place in SWS and Pulse Asia surveys, respectively, it became clear that Duterte was the number one candidate and this lead was maintained since. The four-way fight which was apparent in the first few months of 2016 developed into a single lead. Different scholars offer different, but related, explanations. One reason put forward is Duterte’s populist style (Curato 2016; see also Magcamit and Arugay 2017a, 2017b, on Duterte’s performance of political populism as president). Another reason is the failure of the Aquino administration to realize its reformist agenda (Teehankee 2016b). Still, combined with his personal charisma, Duterte’s victory can be attributed, in one way or another, to his stance against drugs and criminality (Abinales 2016). Thus, on 9 May 2016, all these translated to more than 16 million Filipinos casting their votes for Duterte. Table 1 shows the results of the 2016 presidential elections.

Figure 1. Social Weather Stations survey from January to May 2016 for presidential candidates. Source: SWS (2016).

J. R. R. GO


54

Figure 2. Pulse Asia survey from January to May 2016 for presidential candidates. Source: Pulse Asia Research, Inc. (2016).

Battle for the vice presidency If, in the weeks closing into the elections, the presidency was clearly Duterte’s, the vice presidency was not so clear-cut. In fact, it became the more contested race after Duterte’s


55

Table 1. Election results for president, 2016. Candidate Rodrigo Duterte Mar Roxas Grace Poe Jejomar Binay Miriam Defensor- Santiago Roy Señeres (withdrawn)

Party PartidoDemokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) Liberal Party (LP) Independent United Nationalist Alliance (UNA) People’s Reform Party (PRP) Partido ng Manggagawa at Magsasaka

Votes 16,601,997 9,978,175 9,100,991 5,416,140 1,455,532 25,779

Share 39.01% 23.45% 21.39% 12.73% 3.42% 0.06%


Source: Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, 16th Congress of the Philippines (2016); COMELEC (2016).

lead solidified in the first week of April 2016. Early in the race, Senator Francis Escudero was the clear frontrunner for the vice presidency. However, Escudero’s ratings weakened, while those of Senator Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, son of the former president, who was initially second, strengthened. After Escudero and Marcos tied in mid-March, Escudero’s rating never went up. What was interesting was the steady rise of Leni Robredo, congressional representative of Camarines Sur and widow of the popular former Interior and Local Government Secretary and Naga mayor Jesse Robredo, from late March onwards. These changes in the vice presidential race can be partly attributed to the debates held on 10 April 2016 at University of Santo Tomas, Manila. It was co-organized with CNN Philippines and hosted by Pia Hontiveros and Pinky Webb. All six vice presidential candidates attended the debate, which focused on corruption, poverty, political dynasties, human rights, traffic and other urban issues, Internet connectivity, foreign policy, and the issue of the vice president as a “spare tire”. Escudero was quiet, while Senators Alan Cayetano and Antonio Trillanes attacked Marcos. Interestingly, while Cayetano was the running mate of Duterte, the latter made a pronouncement supporting Marcos’ bid for vice president. In the same debate, Senator Gregorio Honasan showed his maturity and knowledge, and Robredo outshone the men who were consumed by bickering and mudslinging. The momentum Robredo gained after the debate was sustained until the final stretch, when she tied with Marcos in the final surveys of SWS and Pulse Asia (see Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 3. Social Weather Stations survey from January to May 2016 for vice presidential candidates. Source: SWS (2016).

J. R. R. GO


56

Figure 4. Pulse Asia survey from January to May 2016 for vice presidential candidates. Source: Pulse Asia Research, Inc. (2016).

Given the leads of Marcos and Robredo, which are considered statistical ties, the results of the vice presidential elections were very close. At the outset, Marcos led the unofficial tally based on the transmission of the COMELEC servers to the media. The trend changed in


57

Table 2. Election results for vice president, 2016. Candidate Leni Robredo Bongbong Marcos Alan Peter Cayetano Francis Escudero Antonio Trillanes Gringo Honasan

Party LP Independent* Independent* Independent Independent* UNA

President/Ticket/Tandem Mar Roxas Miriam Defensor-Santiago Rodrigo Duterte Grace Poe Grace Poe JojoBinay

Votes 14,418,817 14,155,344 5,903,379 4,931,962 868,501 788,881

Share 35.11% 34.47% 14.38% 12.01% 2.11% 1.92%


Source: Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, 16th Congress of the Philippines (2016); COMELEC [Commission on Elections] (2016). *Members of the Nacionalista Party, but they were not fielded by the party; they ran independently.

the early morning of 10 May 2017, when Robredo took the lead. This raised doubts, particularly from the Marcos camp, and allegations of cheating started to gain traction among Marcos’ followers, especially on social media. After the canvassing of Congress, which sits as the national board of canvassers for the president and vice president positions, Robredo was proclaimed winner with a margin of fewer than 300,000 votes (Table 2). This prompted Marcos to file an election protest to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). To recap, this section on “choices” looked at the 2016 general elections. It began with a survey of the national and local elections and some of the surrounding issues, including the role of social media in the electoral campaign. Then, the discussion zoomed in on the presidential and vice presidential elections. Highlighted were the PiliPinas debates organized by the COMELEC, as well as the rise of Duterte to the presidency and the vice presidential contest. Of course, choice through elections is a limited form of choice. But there were avenues that assisted the public in making their choice. What is clear is that whatever choices were made in the first half of 2016 brought about changes that affected the other half. The next section talks about “changes” in 2016.

Changes From Aquino to Duterte By noon on 30 June 2016, the Philippines had a new president. President Rodrigo Duterte was formally sworn in. Just like his predecessor, Duterte opted to pick the justice to administer his oath, which is not the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Prior to his oath-taking, many have been concerned about the president-elect, particularly his language and values. On the one hand, his supporters claimed that the president was just being “real”. His supposed authenticity made him the people’s choice in May 2016. This is in contrast to Aquino and earlier presidents, who acted according to the norms of the presidency and were supposedly less “authentic”. On the other hand, Duterte has become the center of attention in the Philippines, the region, and elsewhere around the world for his swearing, unconventional behavior and unorthodoxy, which includes seemingly misogynistic and sexist comments, among others. In any case, the end of the Aquino administration and the beginning of the Duterte administration ushered in changes in the areas of politics and policy. Running on a campaign of “change”, people had set expectations on what a Duterte presidency could bring. His official family, the cabinet, was a mix of different personalities coming from various political persuasions. Initially, the impression given to the public was that the Duterte team would be similar to that of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada.


58

J. R. R. GO

As it turned out, the new cabinet is not necessarily so. The gender and religious diversity that the Trudeau cabinet has is not present in the Duterte cabinet. However, there is a different diversity to be found in the cabinet. For the first time, the president appointed as secretaries of executive departments individuals recommended by the Left: former Anakbayan representative Rafael Mariano for agrarian reform and University of the Philippines (UP) Professor Judy Taguiwalo for social welfare and development. Two other cabinet posts were initially offered to the Left but were given to other appointees: Silvestre Bello for labor and employment and environmentalist Gina Lopez, who is also a member of the prominent business Lopez clan, for environment and natural resources. Lisa Maza, former Gabriela party-list representative, was appointed to head the National AntiPoverty Commission (NAPC). But alongside these progressives are former military men like National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon and Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana. The president also appointed emeritus professors Benjamin Diokno and Ernesto Pernia of the UP School of Economics to head the budget and economic planning portfolios, respectively. Businessman Carlos Dominguez was appointed to the finance department. This mix is reminiscent of Corazon Aquino’s cabinet in 1986 ‒ diverse, but at the same time reveals various points of conflict due to differing interests, ideologies, and preferred programs of the members. One of the criticisms of the president and his appointees is that they are either being rewarded for their support in the electoral campaign or are personal connections of the president. Celebrity Aiza Seguerra and wife Liza Diño, who are avid supporters of the president, were given posts in the youth commission and film board. There was even talk of folk singer and supporter Freddie Aguilar’s appointment to the culture and arts commission, which did not materialize. Justice Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre came from the same law school as the president, while Foreign Affairs Secretary Perfecto Yasay was a roommate of the president. While these caused some stir, particularly among the critics of the president, appointing supporters and classmates was also true for previous administrations.

Shifts and supermajorities The changes were not limited to the executive branch. It spilled over into the legislature, where politicians started to realign according to the changes at the national level. The realignments paved the way for the emergence of supermajorities in both houses of Congress. In the first place, shifts in political allegiance are not new in the Philippines. When a new president is elected to office, members of Congress, particularly in the House of Representatives, move from their party during the elections to the party of the president either to ensure committee chairpersonships or to have leverage in appropriating funds for their respective districts. If not, they form coalitions similar to the rainbow coalition during the time of former President Fidel V. Ramos. This makes the party of the president powerful and the president influential in the crafting of laws. In 2016, the same thing happened. Representatives united to back the president’s choice for speaker. Pantaleon Alvarez of Davao del Norte is one of the three representatives who ran and won under the PDP-Laban party, to which the president belongs. Following the pronouncement from then president-elect Duterte, one by one, party after party signed agreements with PDP-Laban to join the majority coalition in the House of Representatives. These parties include the Nacionalista Party of former Senate President Manny Villar,



59

Nationalist People’s Coalition of business tycoon Danding Cojuangco, and National Unity Party-Lakas of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Even the former powerful Liberal Party and the militant bloc Makabayan party-lists also joined the coalition with the PDPLaban. Aside from the coalition, some representatives changed their parties. From the original three, the PDP-Laban had 60 members before the 17th Congress started.25 By the time the first regular session opened, Alvarez was elected as the speaker with 252 votes. There are currently 292 members of the House. In the Senate, the battle for the presidency was between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano, who was the running mate of Duterte, Franklin Drilon, Vicente Sotto III, and Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III, who is the president of the PDP-Laban. Initially, various camps claimed they had enough support to win the Senate presidency. Unlike in the House, Duterte chose not to meddle in the selection of the chamber’s leader. However, Pimentel, being the lone PDPLaban senator, believed that it was only proper for a PDP-Laban senator to secure the presidency.26 Sure enough, he became the Senate President. After securing an alliance with the Liberal Party, which has six senators in its bloc, along with other senators who initially supported Cayetano, Pimentel received 20 votes strengthening both his bid and the “supermajority” in the Senate. But between the House of Representatives and the Senate, the existence of a “supermajority” is felt more in the lower chamber. For one thing, while 20 out of 24 is a huge level of support for the Senate presidency, the fact remains that there exists a loose coalition in the Senate. Currently, there are only four senators from the PDP-Laban, a figure which cannot drastically change the direction of the Senate. There are five LPs (six, if Risa Hontiveros of Akbayan is counted in their group), three each from Nacionalista and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC), two from UNA, one from the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), one from CIBAC (Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption), and four independents. At any time, the Senate majority can change. This is not necessarily true in the House of Representatives. Right now, 118 of 292 representatives are from PDP-Laban, which is 40% of the House; 266 of 292 are members of the “supermajority”. At the end of 2016, only two laws of national significance were passed by the two Houses: one that postpones the barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections to October 2017, and another appropriating the budget for 2017. Supermajorities can be very functional especially with the Duterte administration’s attempts to revive the death penalty, lower the age of criminal liability, and shift to a federal form of government. Despite denials from the leadership of both chambers, there is concern about the existence of a supermajority in Congress: While the legislature is a separate branch of government, it may also act as a rubber stamp Congress. The president remains popular and Congress may just oblige.

Tokhang: Duterte’s war on drugs In his campaign, Duterte was very vocal about the effects of drugs and vowed to initiate a war against it once he was elected president. After winning the elections, he fulfilled this promise. Duterte appointed Ronald de la Rosa, also known as “Bato” (which means “rock”), as Philippine National Police (PNP) director-general, and commanded him to lead the administration’s campaign or war against drugs. The PNP called the operation “Oplan Tokhang” or formally Oplan Double Barrel. “Tokhang” came from the Visayan words “Toktok-Hangyo” which means to knock (toktok) and to talk (hangyo). The idea is for the police to go to every

60

J. R. R. GO

house in a neighborhood and talk about the ill-effects of drugs for the users and society, as well as to give warnings on the drug users and pushers. According to the PNP, for the first six months (July to December 2016) of the president’s anti-drug campaign, they seized over 3.7 billion worth of illegal drugs from the 18 regions in the country. The National Anti-Illegal Drug Monitoring Center (NAIDMC) of the PNP registered a total of 95,000 sachets of shabu seized, of which 8581 sachets came from the National Capital Region. In terms of marijuana, more than 113,000 sachets were recovered, with 111,350 sachets or 98.5% coming from Region III (Central Luzon).27 All in all, the PNP met 70% of its target for 2016. In a statement before the end of 2016, the PNP said that,


[i]ncluded in the 70 percent are the total of 1,049,302 individuals who have surrendered under Oplan Tokhang; 45,041 who were arrested; 2,295 drug suspects who were killed during police operations; 69,647 drug offenders in jails; 54 under counselling with DSWD; and 147,756 drug personalities arrested or killed from 2010 to June 30, 2016.28

In contrast, on several occasions the president claimed that there are around 4 million drug users and pushers in the country. Even the Philippine Development Plan for 2017 to 2022 uses this figure. The president also came up with thick piles of paper containing lists of alleged drug users and pushers and narco-politicians. One of those tagged in narco-politics is the president’s staunchest critic, Senator Leila de Lima, the former justice secretary. The police, for their part, came out with their own drug watch list for the immediate localities and barangays. The war on drugs became widespread in the first few months of the Duterte presidency. Alongside this war, however, is the rising number of casualties. Various sources have figures ranging from almost 2000 to over 8000 deaths associated with the war on drugs and extra-judicial killings. Particular to the deaths related to police operations, the police said that deaths during legitimate operations were primarily caused by the alleged drug users and pushers resisting arrest. Apart from these, vigilante killings and cases of riding-in-tandem shootings have increased alarmingly. Directly or not, critics of the president have associated such killings in the street and by police with the administration’s drug war. The president has been often quoted as saying “I will kill you…” or “it is okay to kill…” in relation to Tokhang operations. From a class perspective, the war on drugs can be seen as anti-poor. As some critics would point out, most, if not all, of the victims of Oplan Tokhang are from poor families living in less than desirable conditions.29 The president admits that the poor are the ones lured into drugs. They are also treated as the main players in the drug trade.30. In contrast, the treatment by the police of alleged drug personalities in wealthy villages is different. For the duration of the operation, no major drug lord has been arrested. Peter Lim, an alleged drug lord and friend of the president, remains free. Cases of mistaken identity have also been reported. The involvement of police personnel in corruption has been raised as well. One issue involving the police was the murder of a Korean businessmen, allegedly involved in a drug syndicate. Jee Ick Joo was killed inside the national headquarters of the PNP. He was initially kidnapped and was later killed and cremated. His ashes were thrown in a toilet. Justice Secretary Aguirre, trying to cover this up, points to a supposed Korean mafia in the country. With everything happening so fast, the case has been almost forgotten. Aside from local agencies such as the Commission on Human Rights, international agencies and organizations have taken notice of the rising number of deaths associated with Duterte’s campaign against drugs. The United Nations rapporteur on human rights, the


61

European Union, then US President Barack Obama, and many other personalities and groups have spoken about the importance of human rights amidst a government’s effort to solve its internal problems. However, these statements of concern were not received well by the president. Instead of taking these as inputs to improving the administration’s campaign, he lashed out at Obama, the EU, and others. This also prompted the president, among other reasons, to try to improve the country’s relationship with China and Russia.


Towards an independent foreign policy? Then US President Obama’s remarks during the G20 summit about the possible human rights violations of the Duterte administration in its anti-drug campaign was a turning point. With this criticism of the centerpiece of his administration, Duterte said that he was cutting ties with the US and refused to have a bilateral meeting with Obama during the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Laos. Furthermore, he also said that he would seek a closer relationship with powers such as China and Russia instead. This is notwithstanding the victory of the Philippines in the arbitration case filed against China in relation to the latter’s alleged occupation of the West Philippine Sea, particularly the Panatag Shoal.31 While the case may have strained relations between the Philippines and China (Quilala 2015; Ronas 2013), the case, and eventually the victory, was supposed to show that countries like the Philippines can fairly and squarely challenge, physically or otherwise, larger countries such as China, especially when the latter refuse to recognize and follow certain international agreements and laws. This also empowers the ASEAN region, where several states also have pending claims in the South China Sea area. Still, supporters of the president and his administration lauded this move against the US and towards China as being towards an independent foreign policy for the country. For the longest time, as Salvador P. Lopez (1988) would note, the Philippine foreign policy has been dependent on the US. Even after Cory Aquino, many of the presidents relied on their ties with the US. Now that Duterte has asserted himself as a possible “power to reckon with”, especially in the first weeks of his administration, he has also gained international prominence, albeit short-lived. Looking at his pronouncements in various speeches he has delivered, Duterte pivoted his attention towards neighbors in Asia. For one thing, the Philippines will be chairing the ASEAN in 2017. Second, Duterte felt that there is more that he can get from countries closer to the Philippines. In his state visits in China and Japan, Duterte was able to secure investments and loan guarantees for the administration’s infrastructure projects. Or, third, he was simply irked by any attempt to interfere with his anti-drug project. The UN and the EU have both been defied by Duterte: he threatens to withdraw from the UN, and tells the EU to mind their own business. Still, others question whether the pivot to China is going to help the Philippines’s cause in the long run. Scholars and commentators have noted the unpredictability of foreign policy under the Duterte administration.32 Not to mention that Duterte’s foreign affairs secretary has been a source of confusion in several instances, such as the government’s position after the arbitration ruling, the consensus between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Duterte, and many others.33 Duterte’s anti-American stance, however, only lasted while Obama was US president. He raised issues of massacres and other threats and oppressions brought by the Americans, particularly during the period of colonization from 1900 to the 1950s. But following the

62

J. R. R. GO

election of Republican candidate Donald Trump as the new US president, Duterte’s anti-US rhetoric softened. In addition, despite all of Duterte’s threats and speeches, no major treaty or agreement with the US has actually been cancelled. Today, we barely hear any of his ramblings about America. As 2016 closed, having an independent foreign policy for the Philippines was no longer talked about much by the administration.


Arroyo, Marcos, and much more Perhaps more striking changes in the political arena were decisions made by courts. The first is the Supreme Court’s decision to free former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The second is the granting of a hero’s burial for former President Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB). These were followed by a number of acquittals and dismissals of controversial cases involving public officials and personalities. On the other side, the president has found an arch-enemy in the person of newly elected Senator Leila de Lima, who was later on tagged by Duterte as a protector of drug lords. Arroyo’s arrest and detention can be considered as one of former President Benigno Aquino’s achievements in line with his campaign of Daang Matuwid or straight path (see Ronas 2013). In 2012, a plunder case was filed by the ombudsman against Arroyo together with nine former government officials including Benigno Aguas, former budget officer of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), for their alleged misuse of agencies’ funds. The ombudsman “approved the alleged diversion of PCSO’s intelligence funds for purposes not related to the core work of the agency, which is to help indigents and sectors working with them”.34 In 2014, Arroyo filed a “demurrer of evidence” in the Sandiganbayan, the country’s anti-graft court, which was eventually denied. The following year, the Sandiganbayan’s decision was challenged in the Supreme Court, citing grave abuse of discretion. Since the case is for plunder, it is non-bailable, and Arroyo spent four years under hospital arrest at the Veterans’ Memorial Medical Center in Quezon City. Despite being under arrest, she was successful in winning a legislative seat for her district in Pampanga. On 21 July 2016, the Supreme Court released its decision: Arroyo and Aguas were acquitted. In a message, Arroyo thanked Duterte.35 Eleven justices voted in favor of the acquittal and four against. Eight of the 11 justices who voted for Arroyo were her appointees to the court, while the other three were Aquino appointees. Among those who dissented, only Associate Justice Carpio was appointed by Arroyo. When the 17th Congress opened, Arroyo was elected as deputy speaker of the House of Representatives.36 After Arroyo’s release, another shocker from the Supreme Court was its decision to allow Marcos’ burial in the LNMB. As early as the campaign period, President Duterte was very vocal about his decision to bury the remains of the former president and dictator. In August 2016, the president ordered the Defense Department and the military to proceed with the preparations for the burial. The decision was based on two justifications: First, Marcos was a former president, and the rule clearly stated that a president may be buried in the LNMB. Second, Marcos was a soldier, and, like any other soldier, he may also be buried in the LNMB. Duterte was consistent in defending his decision until the very end. Civil society groups have questioned the president’s decision and brought the issue to the Supreme Court for adjudication. On 8 November 2018, the court decided in favor of the Marcos burial. With a vote of 8–5 and one abstention, the burial of Marcos was ruled legal, and the process could proceed. Ten days after the decision, everyone was surprised that the



63

Marcos remains were already in LNMB, buried with military honors. This caused an uproar among civil society and militant groups. Several demonstrations, where university students and millennials who were not yet born during the martial law period joined anti-Marcos and martial law victims and activists, were held in protest at what was considered a sneaky burial. Other cases filed against controversial personalities were either dismissed or are being revisited. In May 2016, one of the cases dismissed was that concerning Benjamin Abalos, former COMELEC chair, related to the NBN-ZTE deal during the Arroyo administration. He was judged “not guilty of violating Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which penalizes having financial and pecuniary interest in the transaction between government and the Chinese corporation ZTE”.37 In December 2016, another case of corruption was dismissed. Jocjoc Bolante, former undersecretary of agriculture, was acquitted after Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against him.38 The reason for dismissal is the lack of evidence to support the allegations against Bolante. He has been allegedly involved in the 723 million peso fertilizer fund scam and pocketing 50 million pesos from the funds. It was later found that private firms and local officials benefited from the scam, rather than Bolante. Being a critic of the president, de Lima has also become one of the favorite subjects of the president’s tirades. She was the chair of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) when it conducted investigations into the alleged Duterte Death Squad (DDS). She was also the secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) when the department looked at the cases of alleged human rights violations by Duterte when he was still mayor of Davao City. As senator chairing the Senate’s justice committee, de Lima launched an investigation against Duterte and the DDS. There, she presented alleged DDS member and hitman Edgar Matobato, who confessed that there is a real DDS and Duterte has ordered it to kill certain individuals. De Lima was eventually removed from the committee. While investigations were happening in the Senate, another investigation has been conducted in the House of Representatives. De Lima was allegedly involved in the drug trade within the National Bilibid Prison and supposedly received protection money and campaign contributions from the convicted drug lords. Alongside this, her personal relationship with her driver-bodyguard Ronnie Dayan was exposed. She never attended the hearings, but the drug lords-turned-witnesses pinned her down. Cases were filed against the senator. In early 2017, she was arrested and imprisoned. Indeed, as in any other year, there were changes in the Philippine political scene, which this section has looked at. Primarily, the changes that occurred in 2016 were brought about by the change in leadership, i.e. the election of Duterte as president. This change led to the surprising but expected formation of a supermajority in both chambers of Congress and the administration and PNP’s narrow focus on the war on drugs. At the same time, there have been changes in perspective: the country’s foreign policy has become unpredictable and long-time allies have at least publicly been set aside in favor of geographically closer ones. Formerly condemned politicians were either set free or given a hero’s burial, and people formerly in power are now being prosecuted. Along with these changes and more, challenges within and beyond 2016 remain.

64

J. R. R. GO

Challenges


Disaster management One of the perennial challenges in the Philippines is natural hazards and disaster management. Three years after super-typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) hit the Philippines (see Cainghog 2014), rehabilitation remains an issue. Before the Aquino administration left power, many of the problems on resettlement remained (Go 2016a, 2016b). These were carried on to the Duterte administration (see Atienza 2016). In the housing sector, Vice President Leni Robredo was appointed to lead the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). One of the priorities set was to fast-track the rehabilitation process in the Yolanda-affected areas. In November 2016, Duterte ordered HUDCC and other national government agencies to redouble their effort. He also pledged 1 billion pesos for the distribution of emergency shelter assistance (ESA) to families in Tacloban City. However, after one month, which was the time within which Duterte promised to deliver the houses, they were not yet built. Robredo initially set the target for full completion of Yolanda rehabilitation by 2018. But following some political issues and differences between Duterte and Robredo, particularly the Marcos burial, the latter decided to resign from the cabinet. Duterte appointed cabinet secretary Leoncio Evasco to lead HUDCC and Wendel Avisado, former Davao City administrator, to lead the Yolanda rehabilitation. The president extended his self-imposed deadline to March 2017, which was likewise unmet. Apart from addressing the Yolanda backlogs, new disasters were faced by the Duterte administration, which challenged its capability and capacity in disaster management. There were five destructive typhoons and strong monsoon rains. The first was typhoon Nida (Carina) in July‒August, which affected the northeastern parts of the Philippines (Region 2 and Cordillera Administrative Region). This was followed by a strong southwest monsoon in mid-August that flooded large portions of Metro Manila and other regions (3, 4-A, 4-B, 6, Negros Island Region, and Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). In September, Typhoon Meranti (Ferdie) badly affected the northernmost province of Batanes. While few people were affected, most of their livelihoods were destroyed, prompting the province to declare a state of emergency. In October, the Philippines was hit by typhoon Sarika (Karen), which affected the Bicol Region, particularly Camarines Sur. Robredo, who went to the US for a family reunion, was criticized by Duterte supporters for her absence during the relief efforts, especially as her home province was badly affected. The typhoon had caused approximately 1 billion pesos worth of damage. Weeks after typhoon Karen, the Philippines was hit by super-typhoon Haima (Lawin). Earlier predictions from the weather bureau said that Lawin would be as strong as or even stronger than typhoon Yolanda. Perhaps learning from the lessons of the past, there were very few casualties recorded. However, the damage was estimated at around 6.9 billion pesos. The Christmas of 2016 was also spoiled by a typhoon. Nock-ten (Nina) hit the Philippines on 23 December and recorded eight landfalls. The typhoon affected the provinces in Southern Tagalog, and caused 5.18 billion worth of damage. Karen, Lawin, and Nina were permanently removed from the typhoon names list of the Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA). In these instances, most of the government agencies were more conscientious in preparing for disasters. However, the president’s earlier pronouncements against the UN and foreign


65

aid, especially from the countries which have openly criticized the war on drugs, pose a challenge to effective international collaboration for disaster management and relief. At one point, Duterte called then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon an idiot.39 and threatened to burn down the UN.40 The president also dared the UN, the EU, and the US to withdraw their funding support.41 His social welfare secretary was likewise quoted saying that foreign aid is not needed by the country,42 after which the secretary backtracked and apologized.43 In the country’s experience, particularly with Yolanda, many international organizations and agencies as well as countries extended their assistance. While it is forward-looking for a country not to want reliance or dependence on foreign aid, making such statements may prevent help being extended in the future.44


Corruption allegations in the new administration Another recurring challenge faced by administration after administration is the issue of corruption in government. While Benigno Aquino III’s administration focused on battling corruption, the efforts were highly criticized. As he ended his term in June 2016, there had been no actual convictions of corrupt officials at the national level and a number have been dismissed (see section above on Arroyo, Marcos, and much more). Similar to Aquino, but with less emphasis, Duterte also campaigned against corruption in government. In his first State of the Nation Address (SONA), the president promised that he would end corruption, saying that “the fight against … corruption will be relentless and sustained”. He also declared that “this will be a clean government”. To this end, Duterte institutionalized under Executive Order No. 6 hotline 8888 where the public can report problems and corruption involving government offices and officials. However, the Philippines under Duterte is seen as more corrupt than before, after the country’s ranking dropped six notches in the 2016 Corruption Index published by Transparency International.45 In the first six months of the Duterte administration, there were already two main corruption issues concerning his appointees. These involved the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) and the Bureau of Immigration (BI). The issue in the ERC came out after one of its directors, Francisco Villa Jr., committed suicide in relation to pressures within the commission. In his suicide note, Villa alleged that the ERC chair, Jose Salazar, pressured him to award contracts to a favored private company without public bidding.46 Salazar denied the allegations. For his part, Duterte called for the resignation of the ERC board under the threat of abolishing the body altogether.47 The commissioners refused to resign and instead demanded an investigation. With its oversight powers, Congress conducted hearings to look into the nature of the allegations in the suicide note. By the end of 2016, no result had been presented to the public. The issue was displaced by another corruption allegation. Two BI associate commissioners, Al Argosino and Michael Robles, who are also fraternity brothers of the president, were allegedly involved in a 50 million peso bribery scandal. The money was payment in exchange for the release of the detained Chinese employees of Chinese business tycoon and online gambling big shot Jack Lam. The employees were said to have violated immigration laws, thus leading to their detention. The commissioners claimed that the meeting with Lam in Clark Freeport, Pampanga was part of an entrapment operation against Lam. Their defense, however, was not convincing. The two were eventually removed from their posts and placed under investigation. Rumors about the possible

66

J. R. R. GO

removal of Justice Secretary Aguirre also circulated. By January 2017, the Senate had started its own investigations to look into the possible involvement of other officials in the scandal. More allegations of corruption emerged in 2017 involving higher Duterte administration officials, mostly among those who staunchly supported him during the campaign, such as the former National Food Authority administrator, the former interior and local government secretary, and an undersecretary in the Office of Cabinet Secretary, among others. The president claimed to have fired at least 92 officials and appointees in early 2017. With all these new issues coming up, the old issues of corruption have been forgotten.


Peace talks with CPP‒NPA‒NDFP and MILF Like the first two, the question of peace is a continuing challenge in the country. Duterte has been very vocal about his vision of peace, particularly in Mindanao where he originates. Primarily, he saw two factions with which the government can start negotiating peace: the Communist Party of the Philippines‒New People’s Army‒National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP‒NPA‒NDFP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). It should be remembered that the Aquino administration made strong efforts to close a peace deal with the MILF, only to be sidetracked after the Mamasapano incident. The proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) was placed on hold and did not see light until the end of the 16th Congress. With the new administration, there is a hope that peace deals will finally be reached between the different parties involved. In order to forward the interest of peace, the president appointed as his adviser for the peace process Jesus Dureza, formerly press secretary of President Macapagal-Arroyo and who once led the government’s panel in the peace talks with the MILF in 2003. To continue the peace negotiations with the MILF, as early as July 2016, Duterte committed his administration to pursuing the BBL, save for the contentious proposals like forming a regional army, and other possibly unconstitutional provisions.48 By November 2016, the president had signed an executive order reconstituting the Bangsamoro Transition Council (BTC). The new BTC will have 21 members, 11 from the MILF and 10 from the government.49 In December 2016, Duterte said that even the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which signed a peace agreement with the government in 1996, will have a slot in the BTC to ensure broader participation.50 However, while the president was very eager to jumpstart the negotiations with the MILF before the year ended,51 he was not able to organize and convene the BTC. The new membership was only named in February 2017.52 Thus, the peace negotiations between the two parties have yet to materialize. This is further complicated by the so-called terrorist activities, mainly by the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) and alleged members of the Islamic State (ISIS), in the region. Unlike in the previous administrations, Duterte has actively sought negotiation with the communist rebels. As early as June 2016, while still president-elect, initial talks between the Duterte camp and the CPP‒NPA‒NDFP in Oslo, Norway had begun. Led by Labor Secretary Bello, who also serves as the chair of the peace panel between the two parties, the June 2016 talks became the springboard for future negotiations and has been seen by both parties as a positive development in improving relations between the government and the CPP. By July, during the president’s SONA, he announced “a unilateral ceasefire with the CCP‒NPA‒ NDF effective immediately and call on our Filipinos in the National Democratic Front and its


67


forces to respond accordingly”. This was in order to “immediately stop violence on the ground, restore peace in the communities, and provide an enabling environment conducive to the resumption of the peace talks”. Alongside this, the government released 11 detained leftist leaders to serve as consultants during the peace talks. However, the unilateral ceasefire was revoked a week later after the CPP failed to immediately respond in a reciprocal manner. The peace talks between the government and CPP officially began in August 2016 with the first round of negotiations also held in Oslo, Norway. According to Rene Sarmiento, a member of the government’s negotiating panel with CPP and former COMELEC commissioner, the following were the agreements during the first round: (a) to reaffirm previous agreements; (b) to reconstitute the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) list; (c) to accelerate the peace negotiations and set the timeline for the completion of the resuming substantive agenda for the talks, namely, socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms; and end of hostilities and disposition of forces; (d) to cause the early release of prisoners (as listed by the NDFP) who are sick, elderly, overly long detained and women based on humanitarian grounds; (e) for the GRP Panel to immediately recommend to Pres. Duterte the issuance of an Amnesty Proclamation, subject to concurrence of Congress, for the release of prisoners who are listed by the NDFP and who have been arrested, imprisoned, charged, and/or convicted for alleged acts or omissions within the ambit of the Revised Penal Code or special laws in connection with alleged crimes in pursuit of one’s political beliefs; (f ) for the CPP and the NDFP to declare and issue an indefinite unilateral ceasefire order to the NPA and its people’s militia, upon the end of their current ceasefire order on August 27, 2016, in response to Pres. Duterte’s unilateral ceasefire which was effective indefinitely from August 21, 2016; (g) for the two Panels to meet again on October 8–12, 2016 in Oslo, Norway.53

Much earlier than the agreed dates, the negotiating team met again on 4 and 5 October, when they discussed the following: updates on the releases of detained prisoners listed by the NDFP, amnesty proclamation and proposed drafts on the framework and outline of the Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms (CASER) … a common outline for the Comprehensive Agreement on Political and Constitutional Reforms (CAPCR) and on a common outline for the Comprehensive Agreement on End of Hostilities and Disposition of Forces (CAEHDF).54

Duterte had hoped that a bilateral agreement between the government and the CPP would be signed before the end of the year. Unfortunately, it did not happen. This led to Duterte’s withholding of the release of the 130 political prisoners demanded by the CPP, arguing that the government had already given too much. The NPA also threatened to end its unilateral ceasefire if the government failed to release the prisoners. The third round of negotiations transpired in January 2017 in Rome. Despite this, many clashes between the armed forces and the NPA persisted.55

Changing the constitution Arguing that national hero Jose P. Rizal and the Philippines’ first president Emilio Aguinaldo were both in favor of a federal form of government,56 Duterte justified his position that only federalism will empower the country. As a candidate, Duterte staunchly campaigned for a shift from a unitary to a federal form of government. For him, only federalism will bring lasting peace to the country in general and to Mindanao in particular.57 The president, who was a local chief executive for 22 years, also argues that federalism will enable regions and local government units (LGUs) to keep their own incomes.58 The current setup, where the internal revenue allotment to LGUs is only a small portion of their

68

J. R. R. GO


total income, is affecting the development of the localities. This in turn forces people to go to Metro Manila to work and earn money. A federal setup, the president argues, will ensure fiscal autonomy. However, the president failed to see how amending and strengthening the current Local Government Code, which was passed in 1991 and devolved certain powers to LGUs, can possibly solve this problem. In his SONA, the president asked Congress to support his plan to change the constitution and pave the way for the transition to a federal system. He said: Napagusapan namin sa likod (we talked at the back) about the Federal system. You know, my advice to you is, maintain a Federal system, a Parliament, but be sure to have a President. Well, hindi na ako niyan (that not’s me anymore), I am disqualified and by that time I would no longer be here. But, I can commit today, to the Republic of the Philippines and its people, if you hurry up the Federal system of government, and you can submit it to the Filipino people by the fourth, fifth year – kasi proseso yan eh (it’s a process) – you call for a referendum and after that call for a presidential election, I will go. Sibat na ako (I’ll escape). But you must have a President. You copy the France system. Huwag mong hayaan yang puro na Parliament, delikado (Don’t let it all be about Parliament, it’s dangerous) (Duterte 2016).

In the 17th Congress, bills and resolutions were filed in both chambers either convening Congress as a constituent assembly or calling for a constitutional convention. In the Senate, proposals were particular to amending the economic provisions as well as calling for a constitutional convention. In any case, the danger in any attempt to change the charter is that, once it is opened for revision, any provision can be revised. The DILG leads the administration’s information dissemination campaign, but a lot of question remains unanswered. Even the president’s proposal of adopting the semi-presidential French system where the president retains substantial powers even with a prime minister is somewhat confusing. On the one hand, he talks about federalism, but France is not federal. On the other hand, he proposes a semi-presidential system, which is not necessarily part of the federalism issue. That said, the door to changing the constitution has been opened. As the Duterte administration took over in mid-2016, it faced most of the perennial challenges that the country has faced over the decades. Disaster management has become an important issue, especially since the Philippines was hit by typhoon Yolanda. Whether involving big or small players, the issue of corruption is a mainstay and has been one of the main issues for every administration. Negotiations for peace have been on the tables of the government and other parties. The Duterte administration opened a new avenue for the promise of peace with the CPP‒NPA‒NDFP and the MILF. And for Duterte, peace in Mindanao can only be achieved through a shift towards federalism. These last two remain challenges in the coming years.

What’s next? Indeed, 2016 has been a year of choices, changes, and challenges. One of the choices that drastically changed the political landscape of the country is the election of Rodrigo Duterte as president. On the one hand, his election signified a break from the traditional elite group, which had access to the top national post. However, although he may be an outsider in the national political arena, but he is still part of the same elite. Duterte’s father was a governor and a member of Ferdinand Marcos’s cabinet and his mother was a supporter of and campaigner for Cory Aquino. The political dynasty of the Dutertes is now solidly based in Davao City, with his daughter Sara as mayor and son Paolo as vice mayor. Still, Duterte, a city mayor



69

in the southern Philippines for decades, and his rise to the presidency is seen by supporters as the people choosing a “real”, “authentic” politician to lead them who can solve the daily problems related to peace and order, transportation, etc. Notwithstanding the criticisms lodged against Duterte, particularly in terms of human rights, he still won the votes of more than 16 million Filipinos who gave him the presidency. On the other hand, his election to the office is also seen as a challenge to the kind of democracy the Philippines has. In the Philippines, three decades after deposing a dictator and trying to consolidate democracy, the authoritarian tendencies of the current president, the unconditional support he gives to the military and the police force, and his disregard for human rights, all evident in the many speeches he has delivered inside military camps and elsewhere, show that Duterte may have a different kind of leadership style. But despite these, there is still high support for the president. In the December 2016 SWS survey, Duterte enjoyed +72 net trust, slightly lower with his +76 (September 2016) and +79 (June 2016) ratings in earlier months. With Duterte in power, a highly rhetorical presidency is on the rise. Though Philippine presidencies since the time of Manuel L. Quezon have been rhetorical in one way or another, Duterte’s is more pronounced and magnified through social media. Filipinos have seen a president who gives impromptu speeches, not to mention a SONA which is full of ad-libs and with cinematic videography; a president who is, as others may consider it, authentic and personal; a president who is supposedly honest about his thoughts. At the same time, we have seen a president who frequently changes his position on issues; a president who is easily swayed by his emotions, which may eventually affect his pronouncements; a president who uses expletives and includes sexist remarks in his speeches; a president who openly and directly criticizes and names his political opponents. On one occasion the president was quoted saying God talked to him in a dream; another time, he said his statements were mostly jokes or half-meant. His war on drugs has been the centerpiece of his administration. But many problems continue to hound the country. Poverty remains a problem. Duterte is pushing for a change in the constitution, while most Filipinos do not really put this as a priority. A number of his campaign promises have yet to see the light. Eradication of drugs, criminality, and corruption has been delayed and extended beyond the three to six months self-imposed deadline. Transportation issues and traffic congestion in the national capital continue despite a seemingly convincing rhetoric of change in strategy. Finally, the fight for the disputed territories in the West Philippine Sea has not progressed as the president tries to please China. In the midst of all these, what change are we expecting? Is change coming? The answers to these questions may unfold during 2017.

Notes 1. Two points: first, I argue that there has been a change in political leadership since there were indeed some changes, i.e. a new president and a new vice president; second, I also argue that there is simply a new set of elites occupying government positions, particularly in the executive branch. Thus, there is no substantive change. 2. His Philippine Political Science Journal article was entitled: “The Philippines in 2015: the calm before the political storm”. 3. Senators are elected for a six-year term. The first half ended their term in 2016. The remainder, with three years remaining for their term, will end theirs in 2019.


70

J. R. R. GO

4. This figure changes depending on the total number of district representatives. According to the 1987 Constitution, party-list representatives should compose 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives. 5. The figures are from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Other statistics can be accessed through this link: http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=2016NLE/Statistics 6. There are actually several different figures. The Philippine Star counts the unopposed candidates at 558, the Philippine Daily Inquirer counts 542. Rappler’s count is 545. ABS-CBN gives two figures: (1) 545, which is similar to Rappler’s, and (2) a higher number, 746, is claimed to be from the COMELEC. I decided to use 545 since there are at least two sources for the figure. In any case, all news organizations claim they got their data from COMELEC. 7. This is according to a COMELEC official in Talisay, Batangas, in an interview with ABS-CBN News. Her statement can be accessed through this link: http://news.abs-cbn.com/halalan2016/ nation/02/08/16/number-of-unopposed-candidates-rising 8. This is according to Professor Alejandro Ciencia Jr. of the University of the Philippines Baguio, in an interview with the Philippine Daily Inquirer. His statement can be accessed at: http:// newsinfo.inquirer.net/776322/arroyo-imee-lead-unopposed-bets 9. This is Bautista’s remark in a chance interview with Rappler. His statement can be accessed at: http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/132483-comelec-voter-turnoutrecord-breaking 10. There are a number of commentaries online. One is by Maria Isabel Buenaobra of the Asia Foundation: http://asiafoundation.org/2016/04/27/social-media-a-game-changer-inphilippine-elections/ 11. This is a photo/video-sharing mobile application available both in Android and iOS. 12. This is according to Carlo Ople, a digital analyst: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/742458/socialmedia-and-the-2016-national-elections 13. While Mocha Uson (born Margaux) was already a celebrity prior to the 2016 general election campaign, she became even more popular after Duterte won the presidency. 14. These are terms or tags used to locate entries in social media. In traditional forms, these are keywords. It is called a hashtag since it is preceded by a hash sign (#). 15. The Liberal Party’s campaign color is yellow; thus, “yellowtard”. “Dutertard” is, obviously, from the surname Duterte. 16. This is according to a survey by Pulse Asia in 2013. It might be quite dated, though. 17. PiliPinas is a play on the word “Pilipinas”, which is the Filipino translation of the Philippines. It is also a compound word for “Pili” which means choose and “Pinas” which is the short name for Pilipinas. 18. There were also allegations of cheating during the 1992 presidential elections. 19. Señeres withdrew his candidacy later, and died before the election. 20. This is based on the report in The Philippine Star: http://www.philstar.com/newsfeature/2016/02/21/1554822/how-watch-mindanao-presidential-debate 21. This is based on the report in The Philippine Star: http://www.philstar.com/ headlines/2016/04/25/1576628/prof-candidates-stood-out-their-own-rights 22. This is for the GMA and ABS-CBN hosted debates. See the reports at: http://www.pep.ph/guide/ tv/23221/empilipinas-debateem-is-highest-rating-gma-7-program-based-on-agb-nutam and http://news.abs-cbn.com/halalan2016/lifestyle/04/25/16/presidential-town-hall-debate-setsrecord-on-tv-social-media 23. SET Case No. 001–15, David vs Poe-Llamanzares. Three member-justices of the SET, Associate Justices Antonio Carpio, Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and Arturo Brion, and Senator Nancy Binay voted to grant the petition. Five senators, Pia Cayetano, Loren Legarda, Cynthia Villar, Bam Aquino, and Vicente Sotto III, voted to deny the petition. Rizalino David, a losing senatorial candidate, filed the petition. 24. GR Nos. 221697 and 221698–700, Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC et al. With a vote of 9–6, Poe was declared qualified to run for president. The nine justices for Poe were Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno and Associate Justices Presbiterio Velasco, Diosdado Peralta, Lucas Bersamin, Jose Perez, Jose Mendoza, Marvic Leonen, Francis Jardeleza and Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa.



71

The six justices who voted against were Associate Justices Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Mariano Del Castillo, Estela Perlas-Bernabe, and Bienvenido Reyes. 25. This is according to the estimates of Alvarez, who at that time had secured a supermajority: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/06/08/1590856/duterte-secures-super-majorityhouse 26. Pimentel’s statement can be accessed at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/06/08/ 1590856/duterte-secures-super-majority-house 27. The figures here are from the PNP press release on 13 January 2017 about their achievements for the second half of 2016: http://pnp.gov.ph/39-press-releases-parent-cat/695-pnp-hauls-37-billion-from-18-regions-in-six-months 28. This portion of the statement was quoted from a news report in the Manila Bulletin: http://news. mb.com.ph/2016/12/28/bato-70-of-pnp-target-in-war-on-drugs-accomplished/ 29. National University of Singapore research fellow Joseph Franco talks about this issue: https:// theglobalobservatory.org/2016/08/philippines-duterte-drugs-extrajudicial-killing-tokhang/ 30. This statement by the president has been documented by various media organizations. Two reports are: http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/03/08/17/drug-war-only-targeting-the-poor-thatshow-it-is-says-duterte and http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/883818/duterte-to-poor-if-you-die-imsorry The presidential spokesperson would eventually backtrack and assert that the drug war is not anti-poor. 31. Greg Rushford of Foreign Policy wrote a short analysis of US‒Philippines and China‒Philippines relations: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/17/what-rodrigo-duterte-is-giving-up-philippineschina-hague-south-china-sea/ 32. Comments by Randy David (http://opinion.inquirer.net/97829/foreign-policy-duterte), Jose Romero (http://www.manilatimes.net/duterte-foreign-policy/296135/), Richard Heydarian (https://amti.csis.org/duterte-trump-changing-foreign-policy/), and reports quoting analysts and former diplomats (http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/588135/news/ nation/duterte-plus-trump-to-create-more-problems-up-prof; http://www.philstar.com/ headlines/2016/10/11/1632561/philippine-foreign-policy-should-be-interdependent-saysanalyst) are available online. 33. Some of the news reports about the confusion over Yasay’s statements can be found at: http:// www.rappler.com/nation/162557-yasay-ownership-west-philippine-sea-islands; http://www. rappler.com/nation/147484-yasay-west-philippine-sea-ruling-united-nations; and http://www. rappler.com/nation/154315-dfa-yasay-duterte-foreign-policy-statements 34. Quoting Rappler’s article on Arroyo’s plunder case: http://www.rappler.com/nation/140200supreme-court-ruling-gloria-arroyo 35. See for more details: http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/07/19/Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo. html 36. See the report in the Inquirer on her appointment: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/804840/arroyonow-a-deputy-speaker 37. Quoted from the Inquirer report: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/785024/ex-comelec-chair-abalosacquitted-from-graft-over-nbn-zte-deal 38. See: http://www.rappler.com/nation/155271-sandiganbayan-junks-joc-joc-bolante-plundercase-fertilizer-fund-scam 39. See: http://time.com/4617309/philippines-duterte-un-rights-chief-idiot/ 40. https://www.rt.com/news/371597-philippine-duterte-burn-un/ 41. See: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/146274/duterte-to-u-s-eu-un-we-wont-beg-for-yourassistance 42. See: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/10/24/1636864/dswd-chief-taguiwalo-foreignaid-not-needed-now 43. See: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/147633/taguiwalo-clarifies-ph-still-welcomes-foreign-aid 44. There were already instances when foreign aid agencies did not provide assistance to the Philippines, such as during typhoon Lawin: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/147530/no-foreignaid-yet-for-victims-of-supertyphoon-lawin


72

J. R. R. GO

45. See: https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/01/26/dutertes-philippinesis-getting-more-corrupt/#7859927e5a7f 46. See: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/848748/duterte-i-heard-of-erc-corruption-even-before-villassuicide 47. See: http://www.rappler.com/nation/153427-duterte-abolish-erc-officials-resign 48. See: http://www.mindanews.com/peace-process/2016/12/duterte-meets-with-milf-reiteratessupport-for-new-bbl/ 49. See: http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/11/07/16/duterte-inks-eo-reconstituting-bangsamorotransition-commission 50. See: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/12/04/1650152/rody-wants-peace-talks-milfmove-fast 51. See: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/798425/duterte-ready-to-give-bbl-to-milf 52. See: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/02/10/1670916/bangsamoro-transition-commissionmembers-named 53. http://opinion.inquirer.net/98909/peace-talks-with-cpp-from-impasse-to-breakthrough-tobreakthrough 54. Ibid. 55. For a complete timeline of events, see ABS-CBN’s report: http://news.abs-cbn.com/ focus/02/03/17/timeline-govt-cpp-npa-ceasefire-breakdown 56. See: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/592219/news/nation/duterte-says-nationalhero-jose-rizal-advocated-federalism 57. See: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/849221/only-federalism-will-bring-lasting-peace-says-duterte 58. See: http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/124985-duterte-federalismregions-income

Acknowledgments The author acknowledges the comments and suggestions from Professor Maria Ela L. Atienza and the editorial board of the Philippine Political Science Journal, and some additional insights from Vince Renzo M. Liban. However, he assumes full responsibility for the final manuscript.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor Jan Robert R. Go is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines, Diliman. He teaches courses on Philippine politics, Philippine political thought, and the Philippine executive.

References Abinales, Patricio N. 2016. “The 2016 Philippine Elections: Local Power as National Authority.” Asia Pacific Bulletin 344. https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/41060/1/apb%20no.344.pdf Atienza, Maria Ela L. 2016. “New Administration, New Future: Reducing Disaster and Risk in the Philippines.” Ballots & Bullets. http://nottspolitics.org/2016/07/13/new-administration-new-futurereducing-disaster-and-risk-in-the-philippines/ Buenaobra, Maria Isabel T. 2016. “Social Media: A Game Changer in Philippine Elections.” The Asia Foundation. http://asiafoundation.org/2016/04/27/social-media-a-game-changer-in-philippineelections/



73

Cainghog, Nelson G. 2014. “The Philippines in 2013: Of Trust and Betrayals, Triumphs and Disasters.” Philippine Political Science Journal 35 (1): 98–114. doi:10.1080/01154451.2014.913975. COMELEC [Commission on Elections]. 2016. Commission on Elections. Accessed March 19, 2017. http:// www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=2016NLE/Candidates 16th Congress of the Philippines. 2016. Resolution of Both Houses No. 2: Resolution off Both Houses Approving the Report of the Joint Committee, Declaring the Results of the National Elections held on May 9, 2016, for the Offices of President and Vice President, and Proclaiming the Duly Elected President and Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. June 15. http://senate.gov.ph/lis/bill_res. aspx?congress=16&q=RBH-2 Curato, Nicole. 2016. “Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte and the New Terms of Philippine Populism.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 47 (1): 142–153. Duterte, Rodrigo R. 2016. “State of the Nation Address.” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. http://www.gov.ph/2016/07/26/the-2016-state-of-the-nation-address/ Go, Jan Robert R. 2016a. “Post-typhoon Haiyan: Housing and Water Problems in Resettlement Areas.” Ballots & Bullets. http://nottspolitics.org/2016/09/13/post-typhoon-haiyan-housing-and-waterproblems-in-resettlement-areas/ Go, Jan Robert R. 2016b. “The Continuing Resettlement Issues in Tacloban, the Philippines.” Ballots & Bullets. http://nottspolitics.org/2016/10/21/the-continuing-resettlement-issues-in-tacloban-thephilippines/ Lopez, Salvador P. 1988. “The Foreign Policy of the Republic of the Philippines.” In Government and Politics of the Philippines, edited by Raul P. de Guzman and Mila A. Reforma, 241–264. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Magcamit, Michael I., and Aries A. Arugay. 2017a. “Rodrigo Duterte and the Making of a Populist Demigod: Part 1.” IAPS Dialogue. https://iapsdialogue.org/2017/03/17/rodrigo-duterte-and-themaking-of-a-populist-demigod-part-1/ Magcamit, Michael I., and Aries A. Arugay. 2017b. “Rodrigo Duterte and the Making of a Populist Demigod: Part 2.” IAPS Dialogue. https://iapsdialogue.org/2017/03/17/rodrigo-duterte-and-themaking-of-a-populist-demigod-part-2/ Pulse Asia Research, Inc. 2016. Pulse Asia Research Inc. – Opinion Polling. http://www.pulseasia.ph Quilala, Dennis. 2015. “The Philippines in 2014: Unmasking the Daang Matuwid.” Philippine Political Science Journal 36 (1): 94–109. doi:10.1080/01154451.2015.1026389. Ronas, Malaya C. 2013. “The Philippines in 2012: pursuit of good governance, improved business confidence, strained relations with China.” Philippine Political Science Journal 34 (2): 188–198. doi:1 0.1080/01154451.2013.789169. SWS [Social Weather Stations]. 2016. Social Weather Stations. https://www.sws.org.ph/ Teehankee, Julio. 2016a. “The Philippines in 2015: the Calm Before the Political Storm.” Philippine Political Science Journal 27 (3): 228–238. doi:10.1080/01154451.2016.1259144. Teehankee, Julio. 2016b. “Weak State, Strong Presidents: Situating the Duterte Presidency in Philippine Political Time.” Journal of Developing Societies 32 (3): 1–29. doi:10.1177/0169796X16654594.

Of choices, changes, and challenges: the ...

Of choices, changes, and challenges: the ...

Suggest Documents

Beating Stress: Challenges, Choices, Changes - Virginia Tech

changes and choices - SimpleSend

ChoiCes and Challenges - Institute of Guidance Counsellors

Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices - Google Sites

Changes in Career Choices and Attitude - BioMedSearch

Changes and Challenges - Pearson Australia

Challenges, concerns, and choices Jill Castek - ORCA - University of ...

Challenges, concerns, and choices Jill Castek - ORCA - University of ...

market forces and changes in the plant input ... - Choices Magazine

current challenges in financing agricultural ... - Choices Magazine

Dynamics in farming systems: Of changes and choices

The Changes and Challenges of Secondary Level ... - CiteSeerX

How? - Where To? About the Changes and Challenges of Adult ...

Disjoint and overlapping process changes: Challenges, solutions ...

Combating Obesity: Challenges and Choices - Wiley Online Library

Challenges and choices for post-apartheid sociology - South African ...

Choices and Challenges in e-Government Field Force Automation

Retail logistics: changes and challenges - Semantic Scholar

transformational changes and challenges for human capital

Choices and Challenges in e-Government Field Force Automation ...

Family planning: Choices and challenges for ... - Health Advance

HW/SW Co-designed Processors: Challenges, Design Choices and a ...

[PDF] Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices ... - Google Sites

Cutting checks: Challenges and choices in B2B E-payments (PDF ...