Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
23 142 and Reform Pension Public Information in Poland __________
Agnieszka
Chlon
August 2000
Public Disclosure Authorized
Public Disclosure Authorized
NO.0019
PAPER
SP DISCUSSION
tion
rot OR MARKETS,
T H E
PENSIONS,
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
W O R L D
B A N K
Pension reform and public information in Poland 0
AgnieszkaChlon
100
Preface Consumersin most countriesare often not well informedabout pensions. Both generalfacts about the structureof the pension systemand specificdata on their own pension entitlementsare lacking. Manypeople,as a result,might have unrealisticexpectationsof their retirementincomes. But apathyand indifference to pension planning (and personalfinancesin general)form a large barnrerto improvingpeople's knowledgeof the pension systemand how it affectsthem. Indeed,many people form no expectationsof their retirementincome at all. These problems are probablygeneralto pensionsystemsof alltypes. Pension systems involving privately managed retirement savingsaccounts place greater responsibilityon individualsfor planningtheir retirementincome. At the very least,peoplemust choose which of a range of competingfunds should manage their pension assets. In many,they have a choice over whether to join the defined-contribution pension schemeor to remainin a public, defined-benefitscheme. In some countries,there is alsoconsiderablechoiceover how muchto contributeto retirement accounts. Moreover, defined-contributionpensions, becauseof the compound-interesteffect, reward early pension planningmore than defined-benefitschemes. Somegeneraldegree of financialliteracyand involvementwith financialservices wouldseem an essentialpre-requisitefor a fundamentalpension reform (involving a move to individual funded pension accounts). The project on public informationand pension reform will explore these issues by examnininga range of countries' experience. This, the second paper in the series,looks at the experienceof Poland. It assessesthe effectivenessof public informationactivitiesduringthe design and implementationof the pension reform, the prior degree of financial sector development,the marketingcampaignsof the pension funds. The first paper in the series looked at the United Kingdom: other studiesareplanned. Ro-t Palacios EdwardWhi Editors, World BankPensionReformPrimer
2
Table of Contents 1.
The pension systemin Polandbefore and afterreform...................................... .
6
.......................... 1.1. Basicfeaturesof the old pension system................ 1.2. Publicopinionof the old pensionsystem..........................................
6
1.3. Basicfeaturesof the new pensionsystem..........................................
9
1.4. Publicopinionof pensionreforrn......................................... 2.
3.
Financialmarketdevelopment
7 11
..................................
12
2.1. The Warsawstockexchange......................................... 2.2. The bankingsystem...............................................
13
2.3. Investmentfundsin Poland......................................... 2.4. Householdsavingsbehaviour.........................................
17 17
......................................... Publicinformationand pensionreform 3.1. Publicrelationsandthe case for reform................ .........................
20
14
20
3.2 Publicinformationandthe implementationof the reform .............................. 27 3.3 Pensionreform andthe media......................................... 3.4. The resultsof the publicinformationcampaign ......................................... 29 4. Pensionfunds'marketingand salesactivitiesin 1999......................................... 32 4.1. Pensionfunds' marketingcampaigns......................................... 4.2 Pension funds'salesnetworks......................................... 5. Individualchoicesin the new system............ .......................... 5.1. Choiceof the fundedpillar......................................... 5.2. Choiceof pension fund......................................... 6. Issuesfor thfuture e ........................................... 6.1. Voluntaryretirementsavings......................................... 6.2. Retirementage......................................... 7.
Conclusions..........................................
60
Bibliography.......................................... Appendix1. Detailedresultsof surveydata ......................................... Appendix2. Regressionanalysisof pensionfundmembership. . . Appendix3. Pensionfunds'marketingcampaigns
3
32 36 ... 37 38 44 55 56 58
.
.
62 65 66
......................... 67
Table of figures and tables Figure 1. Public opinion of the pension system, 1997..................................................... 8 Figure 2. Public opinion of the pension system, 1995-1997............................................. 9 Figure 3. Public opinion of pension reform strategies................................................... 12 Figure 4. Stock market capitalisationand turnover: Poland ........................................... 13 Figure 5. Stock market capitalisationand turnover: international comparison................ 14 Figure 6. Financialdepth: bank's provision of domestic credit per cent of GDP ............ 15 Figure 7. Adults with a bank account, per cent of total ................................................. 15 Figure 8. Retail banking in Poland: market share of leading institutions......................... 16 Figure 9. Attitudes to different investments........................................................ 19 Figure 10. Letter from the Plenipotentiary ......................................... 24 Figure 11. The Office for Pension Reform web site home page . . 26 Figure 12. Consumer ratings of the degree of information they have received about the pension reform ........................................................ 30 Figure 13. Assessment of accessto information on the new pension system.................. 30 Figure 14. Main sources of information........................................................ 31 Figure 15. Media spending by pension fund........................................................ 35 Figure 16. Intended choice in the new pension system................................................. 38 Figure 17. Intended choice in the new pension system by age....................................... 39 Figure 18. Cumulative number of members of private pension funds, 1999................... 40 Figure 19. Participation of 1949-68cohorts in private pension funds............................ 41 Figure 20. Reasons given for different pension choices................................................. 43 Figure 21. Pension funds' market share in Poland ........................................................ 44 Figure 22. Concentration of pension fund managers: Poland, United Kingdom and four Latin Amenrcancountries........................................................ 45 Figure 23. Sizeof pension fund sales force and market share........................................ 49 Figure 24. Factors influencingthe choice of pension fund from a consumer survey....... 50 Figure 25. Factors influencingthe choice of pension fund from a consumer survey....... 51 Figure 26. Projected replacement rates, averagewage earners ....................................... 55 Figure 27. Means of planning for financialsecurity in retirement .................................. 57 Figure 28. Proportion drawing a pension and proportion retired by age cohort ............. 57 Figure 29. Attitudes to equalisingpension age by sex ................................................... 59 Table 1. A comparison of the old and new pension systems......................................... 11 Table 2. Type of investments, 1994-1999........................................................ 18 Table 3. Press releases from the Office for Pension Reform, 1997-1999............. ........... 21 Table 4. Marketing strategies of the pension funds....................................................... 33 Table 5. Number of pension fund agents and number of agents per thousand members, Poland and eight Latin American countries........................................................ 36 Table 6. Pension funds in Poland ........................................................ 46 Table 7. Summary of influences on choice of particular pension funds.......................... 54
4
Pension reform and public information in Poland AgnieszkaChlon'
Polandintroduced its pension reform in 1999. The need for changewas readilyapparent both to experts- who pointed to huge system deficits and the rapid demographic transition- and to the public, who, as we shall see, wanted a more transparent and comprehensibleretirement-incomescheme. The old schemehad been very unstable, sometimesamended severaltimes in a singleyear. Changeaffectedevery part of the system,includingthe benefit formula,pension age, eligibilitycriteriaand indexationniles. Even the staff of the socialsecurityadministrationfound it hard to keep track: eventually, there wereten differentlawsaffectingthe system. The new pension schemeaimedto offer a more transparentregime,with benefits more closelyrelatedto individualcontributionsin both the public,pay-as-you-goand the private, funded components. This paper beginswith a descriptionof the old and new pension schemes from the point of view of the contributorsduringthe working period and after retirement. In particular,it highlightsthe featuresof the new scheme that increasethe responsibilityof individualmembers. The discussionis deliberatelykept brief: the interestedreader is referredto Chlon,Gora and Rutkowski(1999)for more details. The subsequentsectionchartsthe developmentof Poland'sfinancialsector. Until the 1990s,this was practicallynon-existent. Retail bankingwas undeveloped,as most people preferred to keep their money 'under the mattress',often in foreign currency. Inflationhad wipedout savingsin domesticcurrency. Insurancewasmonopolisedby two state providers mainly offering car and home-contentsproducts. During the 1990s, I Theauthoriscurrentlyaffiliated withthe GdanskInstituteforMarketEconomics andis an advisor to thePlenipotentiary forSocialSecurity Reformin Poland.Shewasformerly a memberof theOfficeofthe GovernmentPlenipotentiary for SocialSecurityReform(1997-99) anddeputydirectorof the Officefrom September1998.The authoris gratefulto RobertPalaciosfor hissupportandto EdwardWhitehouse for hiscommentsandfor editingthepaper.Contactbye-mail:
[email protected]. 5
however,the financialsector developedrapidlyand the financialliteracyof the population improvedin its wake. Yet the questionremainswhetherpeoplewere readyfor a modem pension schemeandthe choicesthey hadto make. The following two sections describe the government's public-information
campaignboth during and after the reform's implementation. They also look at the marketingand sales strategiesof the new pension funds. A concludingsecticn draws out the lessonsfor other countnres.
1.
The pension system in Poland before and after reform
1.1.
BASIC FEATURES OF THE OLD PENSION SYSTEM
The old pension system in Poland was a traditional, defined-benefitsystem, financed on a pay-as-you-gobasis. Employerspaid social security contributionsas a proportionof their total wagebill. So workersoften had littleinterestin the mechanicsof the financingof the schemeand even whether the employeractuallypaid contributions. Moreover, the social security administration (ZUS) did not keep records of the contributionsmade on individuals'behalf. On retirement,the employersubmitteda form to ZUS,whichcalculatedthe pension entitlement. Pensions were not uprated until the 1980s, when inflation rapidly eroded the purchasingpower of benefits. After a period of ad-hocincreases,automatic indexation procedureswere introducedin 1991,with the pensionupratedin line with earnmings. There were many other changesat the same time, some of which were applied retrospectively.This resultedin a recalculationof existingpensioners'benefits, increasing the averagepension from 53 to 61 per centof averageearnings. Therewerethree componentsto the pensionunder the new scheme: * a flat-rateelementof 24 per cent of averageearnings,adjustedby a coefficientranging from 91 per cent in 1991to 100per centin 1999; * an earnings-relatedcomponentof 1.3 per cent of pensionablepay for each year of contributions;and
6
*
a credit of 0.7 per cent of pensionable earnings for each year without contributions, due to bringingup children, participation in higher education eta to a maximum of one third of contribution years.
The introduction of earnings indexation was not favourable for pensioners in the early 1990sbecause prices increased faster than wages. But real wages grew after 1993 and, as a result, pension spending increased sharply. The subsidy to the social insurance fund from general revenues reached 5.7 per cent of GDP in 1993. The government was forced to act. Pensionable earnings were reduced from 100 per cent to 91 per cent of actual pay in 1993 and benefits were indexed to prices from 1995. The rapid spending increase in part resulted from the spread of early retirement. For example,people subject to group lay-offs could retire regardless of age if they fulfilled the contribution criterion (40 years for men and 35 years for women). Restructuring branches were also offered early retirement. Almost a quarter of the workforce was covered by some kind of early retirement privilege, which seemed a convenient way of reducing labour-market pressures. However, there were no projections of the long-term impact of this policy. To conclude, pension legislation changed constantly during the 1990s under two powerful but conflicting pressures: the poor labour-market situation and the increase in the number of pensioners and the value of pensions. 12.
PUBLIC OPINION OF THE OLD PENSIONSYSTEM
Opinion polls showed a lack of public confidence in the pension system in the mid-to-late 1990s (Figure 1). More than 40 per cent told the survey in 1997 that they thought the system was in a bad state and that change was necessary. Another 24 per cent described the system as quite bad. Fewer than 9 per cent thought the system performed well, and even fewer, that change was unnecessary. Mistrust in the old system correlated strongly with education: 72 per cent of people with higher education favoured change, compared with just 37 per cent of people with only primary education.
7
Figure 1. Public opinion of the pension system, 1997 against refomm
favoursreform
system don't good know
system is bad: system quite bad changesnecessary Overallviews of the pensionsystem
don't transparent know
not transparent System
______________________________
transparency good
don't know
poor Knowledgeof pension formula
_______
75
50
25 0 25 per cent of respondents
50
75
Note: Survey conduced in October 1997 on a representative sample of 1,168 adults Soum CBOS (1997) Confidence appeared to be deteriorating over the period 1995 to 1997 (Figure 2). There was little change in the (small) proportion saying that they thought the pension system worked well. There was a decline in the numbers saying that they did not know about the system or that they found it difficult to express an opinion. The major change, however, was an increase of more than one half in the proportion that though the system was working poorly and that change was necessary. This increase drew mainly from the people who though that the system was quite bad (and in part from the 'don't knows').
8
Figure 2. Public opinion of the pension system, 1995-1997 100- percentof respondents 75 -
systembad: 50 -
changes necessary
25-
systemquitebad
0
don'tknow systemgood
25 August1995
April 1997
October1997
Souri CBOS
The surveysalso asked people slightlymore specific questions on their views of the pension system. Again, the results were not encouraging. Almost 70 per cent said that the system lacked transparency and nearly two-thirds reported that they did not know well on what their pension entitlement would depend. These proportions, however, were more stable over time. 13.
BASIC FFATURESOF THE NEWPENSION
SYSTEM
The government began to assess alternative reform options in 1994 but there was litde consensus on the appropriate way forward. Nevertheless, the government appointed a Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform and a supporting secretariat with responsibility for formulating a detailed reform proposal. The result, entitled Seamny ni)t Diwy,
envisageda 'multi-pillar' pension system.
A contribution of 19.52 per cent of earnings pays for the two mandatory components of the new system. Of the total, 12.22per cent goes to finance a pay-as-yougo, public pension, while the remaining 7.3 per cent goes into an individual pension account. The public scheme is based on 'notional accounts', a pay-as-you-go system designed to tie benefit entitlements more closely to contributions and to adjust payouts 9
automatically with individual choice of retirement age changes in general longevity.2 The second mandatory component is fully funded with member choice of pension fund. Contributions and investment returns accrue in individual accounts and the resulting accumulation is used to buy an annuity on retirement. The existing social security administration (ZUS) continues to collect contributions centrally for both components and transfers contributions, where appropriate, to the chosen pension fund. A pension fund supervision office (UNFE) has been established to license pension funds and to monitor their performance. UNFE oversees detailed regulations. These set out,
er aLi, the type of charges that funds can levy and a
guarantee of a minimum rate of return relativeto the performance of all funds over a twoyear period. The legislation also requires both pension funds and ZUS to send members annual statements of their accumulated account values and an estimate of their pension entitlement. The standard pension age remains at 65 for men and 60 for women but, with the withdrawal of early-retirement privileges,this implies an increase of five years in the effective retirement age. The main changes between the old and new systems are presented in Table 1. The new system is relatively simple compared, for example,with the United Kingdom.3 People can choose only one pension fund and the competing funds offer broadly similar products.
Nevertheless, the new system requires what might be described as more
'conscious' participation from members. For example, they must monitor their pension account throughout their working lives and people born between 1949 and 1968 had to choose whether to split their contributions between the two pillars or remain in the public, pay-as-you-gosystem alone.
2
3
See Disney (1999) for a description of such schemes. See Whitehouse (1998,2000a).
10
Table 1. A comparison of the old and new pension systems Old system New system Contributors Employer Both employeeand employer Financing Pay-as-you-go Mixedpay-as-you-go(12.22%of salary)and funded(7.3%of salary) Pension base 10-yearaverageearnings Lifetimeearnings Record-keeping Documentscollectedon Individualaccountswith ZUS for retirement eachmember Pension age Variousearlyretirementprivileges:65 for men and60 for womenfor actualretirementages59 for men nearlyallworkers and 55 for women First contact On retirement On startingfirstjob andreceiptof with ZUS annualreport from ZUS Pension formula Definedbenefit:flat-rate Basedon actuarialannuity component (24%of averagewage) calculation,usingunisexlifetables and 1.3%accrualrate in PAYGpillar
1.4.
PUBLICOPINIONOFPENSIONREFORM
Opinion pollswere used to assessthe public'sviewsof differentreformstrategies as well as attitudesto the old system. The Office of the Governnent Plenipotentiaryfor Social SecurityReform- hereafter, the Office for Pension Reform- used the polls to build supportits proposalsamong keypolicymakers.Nevertheless,many of the questions are rather general and pollsters did not spell out the financial consequencesof the proposedchanges. Figure 2 sets out the main results of a surveyof 1,200 adults from April 1997: more detaileddata can be found in Appendix 1. Most respondentsagreedthat pensions should be accumulatedin an individualaccount:around half agreedstronglyand another third agreed. Only four per cent were unconvincedof this change. The strongestsupport camefrom the self-employed,peoplewith higher educationand white-collarworkers. The least convinced were people who were not working, includingold-age and disability pensionersand housewives. A second question asked whether pensions should depend on the amount and period of contributions. Nearlythree-quartersof respondentsagreed,withjust one in five preferringthat pensions should be more or less equal for everyone. Strongersupport
11
again came from better-off groups, including white-collar workers, the self-employed and people with medium or high household incomes. This might be interpreted as support for defined-contribution provision and for the notional-accounts system.
However,
respondents were offered only two options at the end of the spectrum of possible systems.
Figure 3. Public opinion of pension reform strategies no/ don't probablynot know
maybe yes Shouldcontributions go intoan individualaccount?
pensionsshould don't be the samefor all know
pensionsshould dependon contributions Contributoryor universalbasis
don't PAYG know
funding
Shouldpensionsbe paidfrom own contributionsor by the nextgeneration? 75
50
25 0 25 percentof respondents
50
75
Souwe CBOS, April 1997
The final question asked whether pensions should be provided on a pay-as-you-go or funded basis. A total of 70 per cent agreed that accumulations from individual contributions and investments should pay for pensions, while just 13 per cent thought that pensions were best financed from the next generation's contributions. Education affected views significantly,with 80 per cent of people with higher education favouring funding compared with 59 per cent of those with just primary education.
2.
Financial market development Support for funding might in part be a result of the rapid development of financial
services in Poland in the 1990s. This section looks at the evolution of the banking system,
12
the stock exchange,mutualfunds and the insurancemarket. It also sets out the changing attitudesto savingand investments. 2.1.
THE WARSAWSTOCKEXCHANGE
The stock market and its regulatorwere establishedin 1991. The Warsaw Stock Exchange,the only licensedsecuritiesexchangein Poland, has grownrapidlyover the last few years. From nine listed companies at its launch, the exchange now trades 198 companies.Of these, 117are listedon the mainmarketand 51 on a parallel,juniormarket for firmsthat do not meet capitalor other requirements.Figure3 showsthat this resulted m an increaseimstock marketcapitalisationthat reached20 per cent of GDP by 1999. By the end of 1999,there were 40 brokeragehouses and eight banks carryingout brokerage activities.
Figure4. Stockmarketcapitalisationand turnover:Poland per cent of GDP 25
per cent of GDP
market
20-
E
E#|neerpekPeao 50
100
500
1000
numberof agents,log scale
Sou
IUNFE,
OBOP and ARC data
Attitudinal surveys also shed some light on consumers' choice of particular pension funds and the factors they took into account. Figure 24 shows the results of one survey, which asked people to categorise different factors of primary importance, of secondary importance or not important for their choice of fund. The issues are ranked in the chart by the proportion of people rating them as primarily important. Consumers rated the size of the fund' capital as the most important issue, with 72 per cent givingit the top rating of significance. Levels of service were also rated highly (51 per cent), both in general and in the specific area of the provision of information (66per cent). Given the discussion of the pension funds' various marketing strategiesin section 4.1 above, it is interesting to see that the experience of the pension funds' parent companies- both in the Polish market (63 per cent) and internationally (58 per cent)were mentioned by many consuners. Some consumers also reported that they stuck with a familiar provider of financial services (29 per cent). Fund performance and strategy had the second highest proportion of people rating this factor as of primary importance (68
49
per cent), with another 48 per cent clairmingthat their fund had and/or would give them a better rate of return.' 5
Figure 24. Factors influencing the choice of pension fund from a consumer survey Fund managers capital Investmentstrategy Fund information Shareholders'domestic experience :
fff:
::;
Shareholders' international experience Fund service Fund returns Fund size Charges Recommendation
.....
________________________________ _
t
Advertisements Personal experience of shareholders
I H
Fund office nearby not important -50
-25
0
secondary
primary
25
50
75
100
per cent of respondents
Based on a sample of 1,544 people aged 17 to 50 in April 2000 Sotrm ARC, OFE Monitor, May 2000. Note-
A second survey allowed consumers to name the three most important influences on their choice of pension fund from a slightly longer list. Again, characteristics of the pension fund- that it was perceived as more secure or better performingmost important.
were rated the
This survey allowed rather more candid responses than the first. For
example, a quarter of people said that one of the reasons they joined their specific fund was simply that this was the first agent they had met.
Others reported that they had
shopped around: nearly a fifth said they chose the best offer after meeting several agents and slightly more than a fifth that they had done some personal research of different funds.
A fifth of people said they joined the fund because a friend or relative was an
agent. (Although this number seems rather high, recall that there were 440,000 registered
15 This is, of course, unlikely:very few studies have found any persistence in the perforrmanceof fund managers. These studies are surveyed in Whitehouse (2000a, 2000c).
50
agents, around one per cent of Poland's adult population.) Very few people said that either theiremployeror theirtradeunion'6 had influencedtheir decision.
Figure25. Factors influencing the choice of pension fund from a consumer survey Security Potentialperformance Recommendation First agent encountered Personalresearch Relatedto an agent Followedfriends/relatives Met several agents:chose best offer Fund manager'scapital Advertisements Agent promisedhighestpension Charges Personalexperienceof shareholders Employerinfluence _ Inducementto join U Trade union influence 0
10
20 per cent of respondents
30
40
Note Based on a sample of 1,116adults under age 60 in March 2000 Souts CBOS,March2000 Both surveys show that few consumers claimed that they had been influenced by the pension funds' advertisements. They also show that pension funds' charges influenced only a very few consumers' decisions,despite the potential effect that these levies can have on the net pension value. There is some evidence of potentially illegalactivity. Employers were prohibited from influencing their employees' choice of pension fund, agents were not allowedto offer inducements to join a particular fund or to prormisehigher investment returns than other funds. While the first two transgressions appear to be rare, more than a quarter of people told the second survey that they were convinced their pension fund would offer the best return and nearly half said that the fund's high return was of primary importance in their choice. It must unfortunately remain moot whether people had simply
Ghilarducci and Ledesma (2000)analyseand explain the limited role of trade unions in the pension reforns in Argentimaand Chile. 16
51
convincedthemselvesthat their fundwould out-performor had been led to believethis by advertisementsor agents. It is alsopossibleto look at the reported influenceson fund choiceby membership of differentpensionfunds usingthe secondsurvey(from CBOS). Peoplewho joinedone of the 'big three'- CommercialUnion, PZU, Nationale-Nederlanden-tended to stress the securityof their pension. Some 56 per cent of PZU members gave this response, comparedwith 37 per cent of the wholesample. Another significantresultwasthat one in three CommercialUnion members argued that this choice would assure the highest pension,comparedwith a quarter of all funded pension members. PZU's network of agents- the largestnetwork, nearlya quarter of the total number of agents- seemedto havebeen a success. Its clientswere (slightly)more likelyto saythat they joined this fund 7 Nationale-Nederlandenclientstended to join becausethis was the first agent they met."
that fund becauseof personal recommendation(32 per cent versus 25 per cent for the wholesample)or after personal marketresearch (32 versus 22 per cent). Unortunatelv, the samplesizeswere too small to get statisticallysignificantresults for specificsmaller funds. Markowskiet al. (2000)used this surveyto carry out a multivanrateanalvsisof the membership of particular funds as a function of attitudes and socio-economic characteristics.The resultsshouldbe treated as illustrative,becausethe explanatorypower of the equationsis weak. Table 7 sumrnarisesthe most significantfactors. The contrastbetweenPZU's clienteleand that of CommercialUnion (CU)and,to a lesser extent,Nationale-Nederlanden(N-N), is clear. PZU appealsto people livingin smallertowns and villageswith lower levelsof education. Its membersalso appearto be financiallyunsophisticated:they rate savingas a low priorityand do not intend to join an occupationalplan if offered. CU and N-N members were more likelyto live in urban areas,and the former's clientstended to be better educatedand in managerialjobs. PZU recruitedmore members who 'engagedin frequent religiouspractices',while N-N and AIG appealedto the lessreligiouslyinclined. This variableis probablya goodindicatorof conservativeattitudesin general. PZU's membersappear to be very confidentin their
52
fund:they expectboth a good return and a securepension. Again,there is evidencethat PZU's large salesnetworkpaid off. Many of its clientssaid that they were influencedby their colleagues'choice:PZU's network is based among the personneland accountsstaff of largerenterprises. Also,peoplejoiningits pension fund were more likelyto be clients of PZU already.
Note that PZU's network was based mainly on the insurance agents in large enterprises- typically people in the personnel or accounting departments- who were well placed to approach potential members early. 17
53
Table 7. Summary of influences on choice of particularpension funds Commercial Union PZU Nationale-Nederlanden Socio-demographic Urban Rural Urban H-ligheducation
Low education More religious
Less religious
AIG
Less religious
Self-employed Managers Few/no children Asset holdings
Life insurance
Attitudes to fund
Better pension
Attitudes to saving
Influences
Gold and antiques a good investment
Better pension Securepension Alreadywith PZU
Less likely:with AIG
Gold and antiques a bad investment No intention of joining occupationalplan Regardsavings as of little value Provide for retirement by buying durables Friends from work
54
Bank deposits a bad investment
Less likely:first agent encountered
6.
Issues for the future The first year of the new pension system has recorded many successes, but there remain
some outstanding issues in the area of public information. The most imnportant is the improvement of individuals' financial literacy: the old system offered a relatively high retirement income without member involvement and there was little or no opportunity for individual long-term saving. The pension system reform changes the situation for two reasons. Firstly, the replacement rates, offered by the two-pillar system will be lower than the ones offered now (Figure 26).
Figure 26. Projected replacement rates, average wage earners
90% 80% -
Women
Men
70% -
co 60%C 50% E
40r OT 30%
*
Secondpillar
o First pillar
-
20% 10% 0%-
n-
_
50
40
31
50
40
31
Age at start of reform
Note: Assumes wage growth of 4 per cent a year, a notional rate of return on contributions to the public scheme of 3 per cent and contributions beginning at age 25. For the private funds, it assume a rate of return of 6 per cent, charges of 5 per cent of contributions and 0.6 per cent of assets, a oneoff fee of 6 per cent of the accumulated balance to pay for an annuity and a 2 per cent rate of return on the investmnents underlying the annuity. Source: Chlon, G6ra and Rutkowski (1999)
55
This means, that those, who would like to maintain the old replacement rate targets, they would have to save for their retirement over and above the mandate. Secondly,new pension formula in
both first and second pillar is based on the defined contribution principle. In such case,the age of
retirement to a large extent determines the value of the pension. Currently, the retirement age in Poland differs for men and women. Women are allowed to retire five years earlierthan men. 6.1.
VOLUNTARYRETIREMENT
SAVINGS
People can, of course, save for retirement using any savings instrument. However, a special plan for additional, voluntary retirement savings has also been established in the form of employerbased occupational pension plans. Surveys show that most of workers- 72 per cent- do not intend to make any voluntary pension savings (CBOS, March 2000). Most people planning additional retirement savingsintend to save themselves. Thus, only 6 per cent of workers plan to save through an occupational pension while 17 per cent intend to use standard, individual-based investments. People planning extra retirement savings are typically better-educated, higher-earning, younger and living in larger cities. Managers and the self-employedare also more likely than other occupations to say that they intend to save voluntarily. Most people do, however, plan to have some precautionary savings during their retirement. For example,37 per cent said that they had some savings in the bank that they would use to ensure their financial security during retirement. This proportion varied from more than half of managers to less than a quarter of people on low incomes and the unemployed.
56
Figure 27. Means of planning for financial security in retirement Bankdeposits Eamings Owner-occupied property Durables Children'ssupport Lifeinsurance Equities Bonds Valuables 0
10
20 30 percentof respondents
40
Source: OBOP, March 2000 A third of people said that they planned to work to support themselves dunng retirement, including 40 per cent of managers.
Indeed, this is currently a commnon strateg-, as evidcnced bv
Figure 28. The upper curve shows the proportion of each age cohort that is drawing
pension,
while the lower curve shows the proportion that is retired. The difference shows the pcoplc that are supporting their 'retirement' by continuing to work. However, the increase in pensionable age as part of the reform will probably reduce the opportunities to combine work and pension receipt. Figure 28. Proportion drawing a pension and proportion retired by age cohort
100% 90% -
80% 70% -
drawing pension/
60%
Retired
50% 40%
30% 20% -
10%0%
45
50
55
60
65 Age
Source: Chlon and Tidner (2000)
57
70
75
80
85
Returning to Figure 27, many people also planned to buy their own home, refurbish it or equip it with durable goods to maintain their standard of living in retirement.
Financial
investments- equities and bonds- and other real assets- valuables ezcthat can easily be sold- were mentioned by only a very few people as means of ensuring their security in retirement. However, the fact that a quarter of students favoured these investments as a means of retirement income provision suggestsa change in attitudes. Some 15 per cent said that they would rely on their children's support.
This was a
particularly common strategy among farmers and people on low incomes: 25 per cent of people on the lowest income said they would use help from their children, compared with seven per cent of the highest earners. It is as yet too earlyto judge the likely development of the occupational pension sector. The legislationwas only finalisedin May 2000 and there are no data on the number of schemes. Surveys of consumers indicatethat few occupational pension schemes will be established: onl- three per cent said that their employerplanned to establish a programme while 41 per cent said they were not aware of any intention on their employer's part. Indeed, two-thirds said that they had not even heard the term 'employeepension plan'. 6.2.
RETIREMENTAGE
Attitudes to retirement, like those to voluntary savings,are deeply rooted in the structure of the current system. Under the old pension regime, the age at which the pension was drawn had little or no effect on the value of the pension. There was thus an incentive to draw the pension at the earliestpossible opportunity.'8 Many people claimed their pension and continued to work part time. Public support for an equal pension age of 62 for men and women was muted. More than half of people disagreed with the proposal, with much more opposition from women than men (Figure 29). This is of course unsurprising: it would mean a lower pension age for men and a higher age for women. Older workers (over 40) were much more likely to be opposed to the change (62per cent against) than younger workers (49 per cent of under 30-year-oldsagainst). Blue-collarworkers
SeeDisneyandWhitehouse (1999)and WorldBank(1999b)for a detailedanalysisof retirementincentives m differenttypesofpensionplan. 18
58
(77 per cent against)and lower-incomeworkers (63 per cent) alsotended to oppose equalpension ages.
Figure29. Attitudesto equalisingpension age by sex pent 100 90-
Men
Women
-
strongly disagree
8070-
strongly disagree
disagree
6050-
don't know
disagree
4030-
agree
don't know agree
20 1
strongly
agreeagree
~~~~~~~~strongly
_____
Sounm CBOS,June 1999 A more detailed examination,however, reveals that most people favour some form of 'flexible'retirement(Fuszara,1999):nearlytwo-thirdsof peopletold a surveythat they thought that retirementshouldbe the individual'sown decision. When pressedfurther, most revealedthat they themselveswould like to retire at the age of 60, but two-thirds said that they might work longer under certainconditions,the most common of which was a higher pension. The second important reason- givenby 41 per centof respondents- wasthe possibilityof financialhelp to the individual's family. Just 12 per cent admitted that they would like to work as short a period as possible, regardlessof anyinducementsfor later retirement. Theseresultsdemonstratethe need for a campaignto inform the public about the effect of the new pension systemon retirementincentives. Under the new public scheme,the valueof the pension is 'actuarially'adjustedwith the age of retirement. In defined contribution schemes,the valueof the pensionautomaticallyincreasewith later retirement,becausethe accumulatedfund eams extrainvestmentreturns and annuityrates risewith age. The populationdoes not seemto be aware of these rewardsfor later retirement. Moreover,there is evidenceof highly negativeviews of the
59
ability of 60-year-oldsto continue working. Both suggest the need for a public campaign to inform the public and to alter people's perceptions.
7.
Conclusions Poland introduced a fundamental reform of its pension system ten years after the transition
to a market economy began. Although the financial sector developed rapidly,only a limited number of Poles saves or invests. Many still do not have a bank account. Opinion polls on the state of the existing pension system and the basic philosophy of different reform options were an important input to the design of the new system and building political support for change. The public seemed to accept that pensions should accumulate in individual accounts, that their value should depend on the amount of contributions paid and that they should be financed in part on a funded basis. Nevertheless, the questions in these surveyswere often vague and people were not fully informed of the consequences of particular changes. Focus group interviews, complementing larger opinion polls, provided information on the design of the pension reform and early warning signals of particularly unpopular proposals. Equalisation of pensionable age for men and women was the only proposal that the public rejected. In the end, this reform was dropped. The public- and particularly,trade unions- also opposed the withdrawal of early retirement privileges for particular occupations. The media played an important role in this initial process, and the considerableeffort put into media relations was rewarded with broad and largely favourable coverage. In particular, the use of a professional public-relations company was important in building good relations with joumalists and opinion-formers. The next stage of the government's public information campaignwas to explain the structure and rules of the new system. Surveys from the end of 1999 showed that most people felt that they were well informed and that information on the pension reform was readilyavailable. Nevertheless, there are some grounds for concern: surveys often showed that the knowledge of the pension system was limnitedto slogans rather than a deep understanding. One example is the effect of the choice of retirement age: most said that they would retire as soon as the possibly could, but might delay retirement if this would increase their pension. In fact, both the public and private components of the new scheme would deliver a higher pension for later retirement.
60
It is, of course, very difficult to explain complex, fundamental changes of this sort. Perhaps it was inevitable that the better educated- more likelyto be financiallysophisticated- would rate the
campaign more highly than the less well educated. One early problem with the Polish public information campaign,later corrected, was its lack of distinctiveness relative to the private pension funds' promotions. It did, however, succeed in convincing the public of its impartiality, relative to the pension funds' messages. It was especially important that the public campaign had a free-run for a while. Pension funds were only allowedto advertise well after the public information campaignwas underway. The government's resources will inevitably be less than the pension funds': in the case of Poland, by a factor of 20 to one. The new private pension funds attracted a majority of people aged 31-50, who had a choice between remaining in the reformed public scheme alone or splitting their contribution between public and private plans. Although the pattern of switching behaviour with age is indicative of rational behaviour, there is some evidence that choices were not based on a detailed understanding of the new system. The key factor determining the success of pension funds was the size of their sales forces. Agents- numbering some 440,000- were everywhere,and persuaded a lot of people both to take the private pension option and that their fund was best. Indeed, a significant proportion of people simplyjoined the pension fund of the first agent they came across. The new pension market is highly concentrated: the three largest firms have more than half of members between them. Two of them- Commercial Union and Nationale-Nederlanden- are owned by international financialservices companies- Commercial and General Union of the United Kingdom and ING of the Netherlands- that were already well-established in the Polish life insurance market. They tended to appeal to the better-educated and urban populations. The thirdPZU, Poland's largest insurer- had the largest sales network by far. It tended to recruit less welleducated people living in smallertowns and villages. Public information was therefore a central part of the process of pension reform at every stage from design to building support for change and to implementingthe reform. On balance,the campaign was a success: not least because rmistakeswere quickly corrected. Poland's experience holds some valuable lessons for other countries embarking on fundamental reform of their pension systems.
61
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Ghilarducci, T. and P. Ledesma Liebana (2000), "Unions' Role in Argentine and Chilean Pension Reform", WorlDeLkdonen, vol. 28, no.4, pp. 753-762. Lunt, P. and Disney, R.F. (2000), 'Interpreting financial services adverts', in Beckmann, S.C. and Elliott, R.H. (eds),IntpretizeC onsrResearch,Copenhagen Business School Press. Markowski,R., Czesnik, M., Grzelak, P. and Zebrowska, E. (2000),Rapxrtz badam dot korzystzniaz II fidamrsystem uhzpzen spola2nA, Warsaw. Moleda-Zdziech, M. (1998), Wokolnowegoystememegtalne,go. WtornaanaIi!abadan- proba rekonstrukcj c2mikowpsIxsloey, Profile, Warsaw. Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform (1998), Conmnra Pranotonof PensionRefon in Polmc4Warsaw. -
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(1999a),Analizapublikacji prasowa&natnatprzyiweo
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(1999c),AnaliZapublikacjiprasowych na tematreformyystemuemeytalnego, /eviecien1999r.
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RaportZbadansondapwych,Warsaw. (1999h),Refomraystemu emeytalnego.
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(1999b),Prez
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(2000a), Pension reform, financial literacy and public information: a case study of the United Kingdom', Pension Reform Primer series, Social Protection Discussion Paper no. 0004, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
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(2000b), 'Administrative charges for funded pensions: an international comparison and assessment', Pension Reform Primer series, Social Protection Discussion Paper no. 0016, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
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(2000), 'Administrative charges: options and arguments for controlling fees for funded pensions', Pension Reform Primer briefing note.
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64
Appendix 1. Detailed results of survey data Total
Pensions shoulaccwmdawe in mduaac ns deinitel pyvba dfiite not 52 32 13
Pensions depndonconbutions agte diagrme 73 20
Pensions shouldbefumded agre disagree 68 16
samplesize 1200
Men Women
56 47
29 34
10 15
72 75
22 18
72 64
15 17
568 631
Age -24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-
44 53 59 58 49 40
41 36 29 29 30 26
9 6 9 7 17 30
75 71 74 76 77 70
18 22 19 22 19 18
74 69 71 69 69 56
13 17 16 17 17 17
167 213 241 237 152 189
Education Primary Vocational Secondary Higher
38 52 59 71
36 32 30 19
22 10 8 7
64 71 80 94
25 25 14 4
57 71 73 82
19 14 17 12
376 328 390 106
Emplonent status Mangers White-collar Blue-collar Skilledworkers Unskilledworkers Farmers Self-employed Disabilitypensioners Old-agepensioners Students Unemployed Housewivesetc.
66 69 50 58 42 49 71 45 45 53 37 35
24 26 38 30 40 42 20 28 30 40 41 37
6 2 4 6 11 7 1 24 22 6 17 26
92 85 71 77 67 72 75 63 78 73 53 70
6 11 23 21 26 28 20 25 17 18 32 17
82 76 71 68 62 68 77 62 63 81 62 54
11 14 18 21 15 19 11 13 18 9 18 21
95 113 73 140 56 65 71 143 209 63 101 70
Househo/d iianperbead -200zl 201-325zl 326-449zl 450-599zl 600zl-
36 59 55 49 60
43 26 27 34 29
17 13 13 10 7
62 75 73 80 90
26 20 21 17 7
60 64 68 74 78
20 19 14 17 12
264 223 210 173 192
Note: resultsshownin bold are significantly differentfrom the rest of the population 65
Appendix 2. Regression analysis of pension fund membership (1) 0.224 0.034
(2) 0.204 0.037
(3) 0.712 0.000
constant
-374.8 (394.5)
-335.8 (229.8)
543.2 (255.4)
capital
11.08 (9.167) -2.630 (3.662) 0.0341
R2
F-test
capital2/100 F-test Media spend/1000 (Mediaspend)2 /1000000 F-test
(4) 0.732 0.000
75.65 (27.15) -1.191 (0.4223) 0.037
TV spend/1000 (TV spend)2 /1000000 F-tesr Radio spend/1000 (Radio spend)2/1000000 F-test Press spend/l000 (Press spend) 2/1000000 F-test Number of agents
F-test
(6) 0.874 0.000
-174.6 (336.2)
-110.7 (449.6)
4.346 (6.643) 1.195 (2.441) 0.6861
3.263 (8.969) -1.454 (3.241) 0.8575
-31.65 (21.91) .4579 (.3012) 0.337 8.204 (45.19) -0.2632 (.7753) 0.3008
-15.71 (34.92) 0.2300 (0.6149) 0.7748
-768.9 (332.0) 157.1 (57.78) 0.0186
-68.18 (244.8) -23.36 (49.26) 0.0722
27.92 (320.6) 26.58 (40.56) 0.0083
-90.45 (94.29) 22.65 (29.13) 0.6089 4.531 (1.878) 0.0024 (0.0016) 0.0000
(Numberof agents)2
(5) 0.747 0.000
4.875 (0.2970) -0.0027 (0.0019) 0.0000
5.147 (1.839) -.0026 (0.0016) 0.0038
Dependent variable: number of members of fund. Sample: 21 funds. Standard errors in parentheses after each coefficient. F-tests are the significancelevel of the joint test of exclusion of both quadratic terms. Standard errors have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity using standard methods. Note:
66
Appendix 3. Pension funds' marketing campaigns
67
AIG Webpage
Marketingcampaign -First
wave: concentrated on security and stability in a
changingworld,accessibility andbeingcloseto the client('We am'awarysclosetoyu -
-
Numberof members(OOs) 1 000
-
-
800 600 400 200 31 V
30 VI
31 VII
31 VIII
30 IX
31 X
30 Xi
31 XII
68
Second wave (end of August): new argumentsinclude experience in managingpensionfundsin manycountriesand experience in the Polishmarket Also,strongradiocampaignin September('Ifyu donotchxx)se, endupinthelottwy machine) Slogan:'Wise choice-[rtterpansion'
2xIl
Allianz We b page ..-
,..
.
Marketingcampaign Basedon buildinga prosperousfuture TVadvertisement showsan elderlycoupleat a petrolfilling station. A groupof 'grungy'teenagersteasesthe old lady. When her husbandreturns,one of the youngstersshouts: needto havefantasies,granddad'.The old mangetsin his car, puts it into reverse gear and ploughs into the teenagrers' vehicle.He drivesaway,saying:'Youneedto have
c-' . ^ .t:.:>S
'~'
a-
"'
$
:.q.t1
"
" @.4. ttt
.ii
Xrtl:s'You
PoWkC'hnR
TOW8r7ystW.(
Allianz PolskaSA
e
l
t-v-ttt-"bfilardw
.1Put."k 19/21 02-5 1 W. - .
fantasies andmoney, son'
1ef (1-2252;4EO hk~: 0-225294649Th
l.ItOFE Alli... Po.Ik.
- The backgroundsong is performed by one of the country's
C
--
f, n.," WOW. P.hsk.
leading pop-singers
O,FEAlli..
0,.,,,,¢,S,,,,,,,,
-
Number of members (0OOs) 300
200
31 V
30VI
31 VIl
31 VIII 30KR
31 X
30XI
31 XII
73
Slogan (V): 'Hane - thefoundations foryour1future'
{ego} Webpage
Marketing campaign
ego
| First wave:a uniquecampaign,it proniiseda prosperous ________________ _f futureby contrasting Its clientswithold peoplepretendingto ski(seeleft),goyachtingortravelto the Far Easttravels.The futurewasshownin a distortingmirror.
Otwarty FunduszEmerytalny
-
Witamy nastronlo OFE{ego)
:
Secondwave:informedpotentialmembersthat the fund's main shareholderswere Eureko,a pensionsspecialistand BIGBankGdanski
Thirdwave:from the end of August,a warm messageon
;.000-
fullfilling dreamsfor retirement 0
Infuc0,e1s o PIE
-
Slogan:'Lifeinetimnoudaix'thaoetopnd
-
Slogan (second wave): 'We earnthemoneyforyourretirennt -
candoudizte youu wt uitdit'
Numberofmembers(OOOs) 350
------------
..-
300 250 200 150 100 50 31 V
30VI
31 Vll
31 VIII
30 I
31 X
30 XI
31 XIl
74
EPOKA Webpage
campaign Marketing campaign.Instead, - Avoidedthe standardadvertising-based
-h; =3Ai '~~~~~
on sponsorship to buid brand-awareness. The fund
~relied
sponsoredmusicfestivals,JamesBondmoviesand eventhe New Year's Eve transmission from the BBC r
i-
G_
J).Mslj*lSlAsOAt.|bt.
This approachwas necessitatedby the fact that the fund was
not licenseduntilJune,whereasotherfundscouldbegintheir _____
campaigns in mid February. It appeared that the
761W'DlFl*uM.tiliFrflo\\lmarketing
,
4
Numberof clients(OOs) 120 100 80 60 40
20
-
31 V
--
30VI
-
31 VII
31 VIII
30IX(
31 X
30Xi
31 XII
75
hadno clearideaof howto focusthe campaign management z
KREDYT BANKU Webpage
Marketingcampaign /1
-
AEDAa4Nfa
wswsZYstks
First wave: another fund that started late, the campaign only began in August. It argued that it is worth thinking about retirement and early (You shouldthink aboutyourfutuw now). The advertisements featured children. Also prormiseda good inestment strategyand better pensions (Youuill beahklto affod nvw)
8o 30 a8
-
3,5018
Il.4l.;
.&Y
infolinia:
0
801-300-700
Number of clients (OOOs) 100
_
_
_
_
_
_
80 60 40 20 31 V
30VI
31 VII
31Vill
30 LX
31 X
30XI
31 XII
76
Slogan: 'Everything in its tine' (his probably relates to the late startl,.",-.w. to the campaign iy as well as to the need to plan for the future.) ftr.
Nationale-Nederlanden Web page
Marketing campaign -
Firstwave:stressesthat N-N is the popularchoice('Lookbow nkfypeoplechoseNN). Subsequently,argues that the choice of fund is an 'Importntchoice'Both adds prominently feature the
colourorange.
_____________
N__on__ _Ned___x
Otwarty FIndusz
_
Llidrytdiiy
IN
advertisements featureda well-known actor,MarekKondrat.
T
Numberof clients (OOOs) 2 000 1 500 1 000
_
500
31 V
30VI
31Vil 31ViII 30 D
31X
30Xi
The pension fund campaignwas supported by concurrent promotion of N-N's insurance products. These
31XII
77
-
There was no TV campaign from September
-
Slogan:(Choose us- trustus'
Norwich Union Webpage
Marketing campaign Po~~~~~~~~~~Yns,zdchvw Iovtar,vsv.woFmerwn>lsw
W11
NorwichUnion of the UnitedKingdom.It stressedthe firm'stwo centunres of experienceand promotedthe fund's logotypebasedon First wave:introducedthe fund's parent -
UJ,,b ,ionl&A
N
Norwichcathedral NORWICH
UNION ll
WdanTy w PTE Nors4ch UnionSA.
-
Secondwave:a verydifferentstyle,basedon Britishsenseof humour.Thisphasestressedthe factthat NU's agentswere bettertrainedbyspecialists fromthe Britishparent. Therewasno campaignfromSeptember. Slogan (firststage): '7hefiutwitha speraz' ofcertainty)'
13U,>,plAwAmiu, 4) IJO)4 44) 1 4(0 Wyb1-.
klb,q .,,q
....
oh V-
Slogan(secondstage):'Thecipanywiththe lxst agcnts'
~h-
glqd.L-
Numberof clients(OOOs) 600
_.
.. ._ .....
500 400 300 200 100 31 V
30VI
31 VII 31 VIII
30 DX 31 X
30Xi
31 Xii
78
PBK Orzd Webpage
Marketingcampaign
iPTEPBKSA
^
~
It" OFE PBK orzet 4 AkcJonarluuze
-
Second wave: images of New York stressed the American
\
°
Weiss.
Orzetws r6d Aorigins
dl
Refonrmaemerytalna
is
Prospekt Informacyjny
g
Gdzie przystqpic do OFE PBK Orzel
6
First wave: concentrated on the fund's shareholders:PBK bankand Aetna,the Americaninsurer. Stressedthe latter's 35 million clients world-wide. Used a popular TV presenter, auzWis
Otwarty FunduszEmerytalnyPKJanusz
Kalkulatoremerytalny
6i WARTO§
^
-
of Aetna
Funduszy wi
-
JEDNOSTKIROZRACHUNKOWEJ
Aktualnoici 0801 100400 .
a.l
OtwartyFundusz Emerytalny PBK Orzel
Thirdwave:stressedexperienceof managingpension fundsin the United States,and the securityof pension contributions, backedby the deep capitalof Aetna and PBK. Again,these featuredJanuszWeiss,this time actingas an interviewer
I/
Numberof clients (000s)
-
350 300
250 200
150
31 V
30VI
31 VIl
31 VIII
30 IX
31 X
30XI
31 XII
79
Slogan:'Eagle mngfip7ds'('Orzel'meanseaglein Polish)
Pekao/Alliance Web page
Marketing campaign
921. R.I,-M Number of members (000s)
80 60 40 20 31V
30VI
3VIVB 31VWI 30 VX 31 X
30Xi
31 XUt
80
-
First wave: warm, emotive campaign based on promises of a good future ('Chooseul andIthingsu,19go uwIi) and a good pension ('A retirune"tlike a newr-ending holi.a5y).The spot was directedby one of Poland's most famous directors, Agnieszka Holland.
-
Slogan:'Pekao/Alliax"psionfiayl-
itudlIugoax'
Pioneer Webpage ~~~~~~~~~~~~Marketing campaign
t PioneerPowszechne TowarzystwoEmerytalneS.A.
. *...... ................. Dlaczego Pioneer? Macnv Partner
Reforma emerytalna Po co l filar?
Kalk_ator_emeryt
Inne_fil Twa icwk. a .
Nasze atuty Tradycia Zarz4d
Bezpleczehstwvo Zarzadzanie Wa±nepotccia
DoawiadczenPo i
CezPleczehstYro
l
_
Firstwave:focusedon differencesto competitors('Weare netner a bank nor an insurancecanpany. Imestingmoney is our ptvfession). Stressed 70 years of experience in managing investments. (Pioneer manages the largest mutual and
.
_
_
r.
investmentfund group in Poland.) Second wave: mainly press and billboards
ecid
Jak przysta,pit do.
fumduszu Kontakt Zapvta; ekspertal Nasnludne _ Ofertapracy
_
;
_
__
-
DiategowybralamPioneera Aktualnosic
Number of members (OOs) 160 100 60 20 31V
30VI
31VII 31VIII 30 X
31X
30XI
31XII
81
Slogan: 'A strikingdifferece'
Polsat Web page
Marketingcampaign -
First wave: text and pictures show a secure future ('Poish captal,suregmzexh - thisincresestnmst).The use of the colour green,a staircaseand blossomingflowerwere synonymsfor growth. The advertismentsfeatureda popularpresenterfrom PolsatTV (the fund'smain shareholder).
-
Secondwave:anotherTV spot showingthe numberof agents of the fund. Slogan:'Sazvforthefutire'
-
Number of members(000s) 200
~
------
__
_
__
_
*---
--
--
*--*--*
*-
-
-
-
150 100 50
31 V
30 VI
31 VIl
31 Vil
30 K
31 X
30XI
31 XII
Note: estimatesfor OctoberandNovember
82
Pocztylion Marketing campaign
Web page
PQ(ZIYIIMO N
-
First wave: concentrated on the accessibility of the Polish
-
Post Office, supported by the international experience of Paribas, the French bank. The showed the familiar character of a postman and stressed that information was available at the Post Office. Second wave: focused on Paribas' 100 years of experience in
Otwarty Fundusz Emerttany
_
>
Fundusz Otwarty Emerytalny POCZTYLION ~~~~~~~~~~~Zatohlyciele Zajotyciele U ~~~~~~ Statut t
France,Germanyand Italy.
Z.njdPo 5 ztowoHPnowa~aego > wsuhango
-
Third wave:featurescharactersfroma popularTVseries,plus more on Paribas' size and strength.
-
Slogan:'We bringyoua safefiaure
Tow=nVstwaE.mearnego3A.
Nowy System Emerytalny nowego * Zasedyfnkcjonowanibtzech fites6w systfmu
Number of members (O0Os) 500 400 300
/
200 100
_
_
--
31V
30VI 31VII 31VIII 30 D
31X
30XI
31XII
83
PZU Zlota Jesien Webpage:
Marketingcampaign
rfEf.f-zZZ(iC(f(g(f ~
many houses etc.
_AdIIO
_ U) "i>'~UI1C~JAAL _____________
)
-
'Y"
_________
"'
0(*1 ;;
-
Ct;0"0
Second wave: stressed the number of meibers already " "/""'>"attracted (wewere chosen by ... thousand Poles - '7he chose PZU,soshouldyou).
Thirdwave:from September,the campaigntargetedyounger 1
Poles, concentrating on the dreams that could be fulfilled thanks to a PZU pension ('Secuntyand tranquility,afuture under pabntrees- theidal choki). Number of members (OGOs)
-
2 500
Note that 'Zlota Jesien' means golden autunm in Polish Slogan (first wave): '7herealshapxof ourdreams.A secwrtfutun' Slogan (second wave):'A safetamonrow'
-
2 000 1 500 1 000
500
31 V
30 VI
31VII 31 VIII 30 D
31 X
30 Xi
31XII
20 hliepension fund supervisory agency, UNFE, complained that 1'ZU's campaign, by showing a family growing a tree, was trying to associate itself with the government's promotional activities, which were based around an apple tree. PZU argued that its spot showed a lemon tree, and UNFEI withdre-wits objection.
84
Rodzina No web page
Marketing campaign - First wave: focused on the need for planning for the future.
Number of members (000s)
Featured a story of two young people deciding about their future together in the context of the pension decision faced by all Poles.
80
70 60
-
50 40
_
20
-
10 31V
30VI
31 VII 31VIII 30 IX
31X
30XI
Second wave: added information about the fund's shareholders, which consisted of two of Poland's most dynamic companies - Compensa in insurance and Mostostal in construction - Hamburg Mannheimer, a German financial servicescompanies with over a century of experience. Slogan: 'Yourfutur is the Famil' ('Rodzina' means family in Polsh)
31XII
85
Skarbiec-Emerytura Marketing campaign
Web page
_
_*Z
Z-
i
i
First _fi _wave: fi i- promise of a prosperous future and effective
fi
investment management using images of growing savings and enjoyiment of luxuries. Some light relief provided by two actors from a number of popular comedy shows. The campaign was in the form of, with each spot finishingwith 'to
Number of members (QOOs) 500 400 300 200 100 31 V
30 VI
31 VIl
31 VIII 30 IX
31 X
30 XI
31 XII
86
-
Second wave: from the end of August, focused on the fund's activities,including investment performance and the number of new members.
-
Slogan: 'Treasuy of the future' ('Skarbiec-Emerytura' means treasury-pension)
Winthertur No web page
Marketing campaign -
First wave: stressed the parent company's 120 years of experience. Based on the symbol of a St. Bernard's dog with a piggy-bankand focused on the future (Wlx thisadwrt ends, 350 1_) be30 sfnlds closerto rtaitmn
-
Second wave: based around the personality of a popular actor, Boguslaw Linda. He works with professionals that 'know em)ytingaboutpensions'
Number of members (0OOs) 350. 300 250 200 150 100 50
,
-
31 V
30VI
31 VII 31 VIII 30 X
31 X
f
Third wave: focus on young people from September ('Be a n
_ 30XI
31 XII
-
87
cJhoose,beforeothers do itforyou. I cose Wterthur)
Slogan:A friendyou
trst
Zurich-Solidarni No webpage
Marketingcampaign - First wave: emphasised the Swiss origins of the parent company(Zurich), and the qualitiesof experience,security Numberof members (OOOs) and performance associated with Switzerland's financial serviceindustry. Swiss(high)pension. Used actors from a 500 1 well-knowncomedyfilm. 400 Secondwave:similarto the first but featuringnew spots with 300 well-knownactors. 200 Third wave:from September,uses the samepeople but now 100 showspeopleenjoyinga happyand carefreeretirement. ._____________________________ - Slogans:'A pension as secwvas a SwissBank', 'A pension,Swiss 31 V 30VI 31 VII 31 VIII 30 DK 31 X 30XI 31 XII sle' -
0O
Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No.
Title
0019
Pension Reform and Public Information in Poland
0018
Worker Reallocation During Estonia' s Transition to Market: How Efficient and How Equitable?
0017
How Poor are the Old? A Survey of Evidence from 44 Countries
0016
Administrative Charges for Funded Pensions: An International Comparison and Assessment
0015
The Pension System in Argentina: Six years after the Reform
0014
Pension Systems in East Asia and the Pacific: Challenges and Opportunities
0013
Survey of Disability Projects The Experience of SHIA, Swedish International Aid for Solidarity and Humanity
0012.
The Swedish Pension Reform Model: Framework and Issues
0011
Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace
0010
Can Investments in Emerging Markets Help to Solve the Aging problem?
0009
International Patterns of Pension Provision
0008
Regulation of Withdrawals in Individual Account Systems
0007
Disability Issues, Trends and Recommendations for the World Bank
0006
Social Risk Management: A New Conceptual Framework for Social Protection and Beyond
0005
Active Labor Market Programs: Policy Issues for East Asia
0004
Pension Reform, Financial Literacy and Public Information: A Case Study of the United Kingdom
0003
Managing Public Pension Reserves Part I: Evidence from the International Experience
0002
Extending Coverage in Multi-Pillar Pension Systems: Constraints and Hypotheses, Preliminary Evidence and Future Research Agenda
Social Protection Discussion Paper Series continued No.
Title
0001
Contribution pour une Strategie de Protection Sociale au Benin
9934
Helping the Poor Manage Risk Better: The Role of Social Funds
9933
Coordinating Poverty Alleviation Programs with Regional and Local Governments: The Experience of the Chilean Social Fund - FOSIS
9932
Poverty and Disability: A Survey of the Literature
9931
Uncertainty About Children's Survival and Fertility: A Test Using Indian Microdata
9930
Beneficiary Assessment of Social Funds
9929
Improving the Regulation and Supervision of Pension Funds: Are there Lessons from the Banking Sector?
9928
Notional Accounts as a Pension Reform Strategy: An Evaluation
9927
Parametric Reforms to Pay-As-You-Go Pension Systems
9926
An Asset-Based Approach to Social Risk Management: A Conceptual Framework
9925
Migration from the Russian North During the Transition Period
9924
Pension Plans and Retirement Incentives
9923
Shaping Pension Reform in Poland: Security Through Diversity
9922
Latvian Pension Reform
9921
OECD Public Pension Programmes in Crisis: An Evaluation of the Reforn Options
9920
A Social Protection Strategy for Togo
9919
The Pension System in Singapore
9918
Labor Markets and Poverty in Bulgaria
9917
Taking Stock of Pension Reforms Around the World
Social Protection Discussion Paper Series continued No.
Title
9916
ChildLabor and Schoolingin Africa: A ComparativeStudy
9915
Evaluatingthe Impact of Active Labor Programs:Resultsof CrossCountry Studiesin Europe and CentralAsia
9914
SafetyNets in TransitionEconomies:Toward a Reform Strategy
9913
Public ServiceEmployment:A Review of Programsin SelectedOECD Countriesand TransitionEconomies
9912
The Role of NPOs in Policiesto Combat Social Exclusion
9911
Unemploymentand UnemploymentProtectionin Three Groupsof Countries
9910
The Tax Treatment of Funded Pensions
9909
Russia's Social Protection Malaise:Key ReformPrioritiesas a Responseto the Present Crisis
9908
CausalitiesBetween Social Capital and Social Funds
9907
Collectingand TransferringPension Contributions
9906
OptimalUnemploymentInsurance:A Guideto the Literature
9905
The Effects of LegislativeChangeon Female Labour Supply: Marriageand Divorce,Child and Spousal Support,PropertyDivisionand Pension Splitting
9904
SocialProtection as Social Risk Management:ConceptualUnderpinningsfor the Social Protection Sector StrategyPaper
9903
A Bundle of Joy or an ExpensiveLuxury:A ComparativeAnalysisof the EconomicEnvironmentfor Family Formationin WesternEurope
9902
World Bank Lending for Labor Markets: 1991to 1998
9901
ActiveLabor Market Programs:A Reviewof the Evidencefrom Evaluations
* The papersbelow (No. 9801-9818)are no longerbeing printed,but are availablefor downloadfrom our website at www.worldbank.org/sp 9818
ChildLabor and SchoolEnrollmentin Thailand in the 1990s
Social Protection Discussion Paper Series continued No.
Title
9817
Supervising Mandatory Funded Pension Systems: Issues and Challenges
9816
Getting an Earful: A Review of Beneficiary Assessments of Social Funds
9815
This paper has been revised, see Discussion Paper No. 9923
9814
Family Allowances
9813
Unemployment Benefits
9812
The Role of Choice in the Transition to a Funded Pension System
9811
An Alternative Technical Education System: A Case Study of Mexico
9810
Pension Reform in Britain
9809
Financing the Transition to Multipillar
9808
Women and Labor Market Changes in the Global Economy: Growth Helps, Inequalities Hurt and Public Policy Matters
9807
The World Bank Approach to Pension Reform
9806
Governnent Guarantees on Pension Fund Returns
9805
The Hungarian Pension System in Transition
9804
Risks in Pensions and Annuities: Efficient Designs
9803
Building an Environment for Pension Reform in Developing Countries
9802
Export Processing Zones: A Review in Need of Update
9801
World Bank Lending for Labor Markets: 1991 to 1996
Summary Findings The introduction o(f a ne\v pension svstem in Polancl in l was the cUlmination of a lono policy dialogue and yearsof debate. During this period, the role oi pLil)lic opinioin shaped
the reform and \x,asshapepd by the retorm process. Implementation of the reform will also he affected hy the ecualilv
ot intormation availalbleto the public and their financial literacy. In contrastto their passiverole in the Id public, defined-henetit schemes,Poles that ihose to (livert their contributions to individual, defined-contribution asCOLunis must now take an aclive role in the new svsteni.
Thispaper(locumentsthe fascinatin- evolutioniof public opinion antI its atfects on the reformnpro( essas vvellasthe early experiencesof millions of Poleswho, for the first time, are ta(ed wviththe challenge,of choic:e as consumnersin the newvmarket for pension
servi es,.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENTINETWORK
Aboutthis series... The World Bank PensionReform Primer aims to provide a timelv and comprehensiveresourcefor those engaged in the design and implementation of pension reforms around the world. Policvmakers and those who advise them will find useful information on other reform experiences, the current thinking of pension specialistsand a vast array of cross-countryevidence. A flexible and dynamic format ensure that key developments are updated as they occur. The World Bank set out a conceptual framework for fundamental pension reform in Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policiesto Protectthe Old and PromoteGrowth. This study,published in 1994, helped shape the global debate about the impact of population ageing on pension systems.The PensionReform Primer builds on this pioneering work and on the experienceof the World Bank and other international institutions in the last five years. It focuseson practical questions. For more information, please contact Social Protection, Human Development Network, World Bank, 1818 H StreetNW, Washington, D.C. 20433; telephone +1202 458 5267; fax +1 202 614 0471; e-mail socialprotectiontt)worldbank.org. All Pension Reform Primer material is available on the internet at www.worldbank.org/pensions
