On Depicting Indexical Reference - CiteSeerX

On Depicting Indexical Reference Tomis Kapitan Thought, Language, and Ontology: Essays in Memory of Hector-Neri Castañeda, edited by Francesco Orilia and William Rapaport (Kluwer, 1998): 183-215

1. Quasi-Indexical Attributions According to Hector-Neri Castañeda, indexical reference is our most basic means of identifying the objects and events we experience and think about. Its tokens reveal our own part in the process by denoting what are "referred to as items present in experience" (Castañeda 1981, 285-6). If you hear me say, "Take that box over there and set it next to this box here," you learn something about my orientation towards the referents in a way that is not conveyed by, "Take the red box and set it next to the blue box." My indexical tokens express what they do not only because they issue from a unique spatio-temporal perspective that I happen to occupy, but also because they reflect my encounter with referents that are differently situated in that perspective. From your perspective, my here might be your there, my you your she, and within my own, a this differs from a that and one this diverges from another. Encounter and orientation within a perspective are the essential ingredients in indexical identification without which particular 'this's, 'that's, 'then's, 'here's, and 'beyond's would be denuded of individuating powess.1 There are several consequences of this description. First, indexical reference is ephemeral because perspective is constantly changing, rendering the indexical status of an entity relative to a given perspective temporary:

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A this quickly turns into a that, and soon enough it is lost to experience and is not even a remote that; a you goes away and is replaced by another . . . Nothing is really an enduring you -- except God perhaps for the abiding mystic. (Castañeda 1989a, 69) Second, indexical reference is irreducible since non-indexical mechanisms of reference fail to express the subject's involvement or encounter with the referents that indexicals convey. Nor can the various indexicals be reduced to each other.2 Third, because each perspective is unique, indexical reference is essentially subjective. One person's 'I', 'this', or 'over there' expresses, in part, what is private to his or her perspective, making it impossible for another to gain a cognitive fix on the very same item in precisely the same way (1990b, 127). Consequently, no one can entertain the exact indexical thoughts of anyone else--the very same indexically expressed contents--and even one's own indexical contents must differ over time.3 These features give rise to a question. We communicate quite well with indexicals--we just did--in which case their ephemerality, irreducibility and subjectivity do not sanction a wholesale skepticism about what others express or think. For example, I understand what Andrea is saying with, (1) I am clever. but, not sharing her perspective, I cannot access her indexically-expressed content. So how can I state what she thinks or accurately attribute first-person reference to her?4 The question has practical significance. Attributions of indexical usage permeate social life; not only do we explain behavior by reference to the thoughts of people, but many of our deepest emotional reactions are responses to our interpretations of what others think, believe, intend, and feel, attitudes they would most likely express

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indexically. In criminal courts, for instance, lawyers, judges and jurors try to determine the precise intentions with which a defendent acted, yet intentions are saturated with indexical references, from the first-person thoughts about what I shall do to the demonstrative references used in guiding action, e.g., I will shoot the guard standing there.5 Our respect for a person's moral character might depend upon our judgment that he or she acted from duty, precisely, what he or she took to be his or her duty--where 'his' and 'her' are used to mark first-person commitments. Our empathic feelings for one who has tried and been unsuccessful, or our resentment over an undeserved triumph, involve not only our recognition of another's situation but also of the sentiments he or she might convey through "I have failed again" or, alternatively, "Veni, vidi, vici!" These recognitions anchor our reactive attitudes--respect, sympathy, resentment, blame, and the like--states that are vital to our social interaction and perhaps lacking in beings whose perceptions and communications are otherwise replete with indexicality.6 For this reason, attributions of indexical thoughts deserve to be undertaken with care. Natural languages provide little means for perspicuously ascribing indexical thoughts, but Castañeda found that certain linguistic types have some such use. Hearing Andrea's (1), for example, I would not describe the content of her thought with 'I am clever' or 'Andrea is clever'. These words, when appended to the indirect discourse prefix 'Andrea thinks that', are inaccurate because she did not say that I am clever and my third-person designation 'Andrea' is unlikely to capture what she meant by 'I'. To ascribe what I take her to think I offer instead, (2) Andrea thinks that she herself is clever.

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Here, 'she herself' is used as a quasi-indicator, a mechanism for reporting the indexical references of others, in this case, Andrea's first-person reference to herself.7 Pointing out the existence of such devices is a preliminary answer to the question posed above. We are still at the beginning of our quest. What sort of expressions are quasiindicators and what are their governing principles? From the outset Castañeda noted that the quasi-indexical uses of terms have the following properties:

Q1 Quasi-indicators are used only within the scope of the psychological verbs of indirect discourse to attribute indexical references (Castañeda 1989a, 106).

Q2 Quasi-indicators are anaphorically dependent upon antecedents occuring outside the scope of psychological verbs within which they themselves occur (Castañeda 1989a, 1067, 218).

Q3 Quasi-indicators are not replaceable by their antecedents salva veritate let alone salva propositione (Castañeda 1989a, 107).

Q4 Quasi-indicators express what is interpersonal and repeatable (Castañeda 1989a, 207; 1981, 315; 1989c, 41).

Q5 Quasi-indicators are referential mechanisms (Castañeda 1989a, 4-5, 106; 1980, 796).

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Q6 Quasi-indicators are not themselves indicators (Castañeda 1989a, 218). At times, he wrote as if quasi-indicators are also characterized by the following:

Q7 Quasi-indicators are singular referring terms (Castañeda 1983, 365; 1989a, 5; Jacobi and Pape 1990, 86).

Q8 Quasi-indicators allow their users to ascertain the indexical content of subjects (Castañeda 1989a, 93, 106).

Q9 Quasi-indicators are embedded in that-clauses expressing propositions (Castañeda 1989a, 151).

Q10 The propositions expressed by the that-clauses containing quasi-indicators are identical to the ascribed indexical propositions (Castañeda 1989a, 151).

However, while retaining Q1-Q6 throughout, he wavered on Q7-Q10, eventually rejecting Q10 outright when he realized that a quasi-indicator like 'she herself' expresses a third-person element that is lacking in the first-person content (1983, 307; 1981, 312). For this reason also, Q8 needs qualification. That Q7 cannot stand is evident for two reasons. First, quasi-indicators with quantifier antecedents are variables (1989a, 218), not singular referring terms. Second, even those with singular antecedents do not reproduce the attributee's indexical references but, instead, merely depict them by ". . . putting before one's eyes a replica of the others' indexical references" (1989a, 5; 1981,

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314). If so, not only is coreference with an antecedent insufficient to explain the attributive function of quasi-indicators but "depicting" must fall short of exhibiting exactly, reproducing, or revealing another's contents (1989a, 89-90; 1990b, 124). At best, I allude to Andrea's indexical content with (2), represent it through the anaphoric chain 'Andrea . . . she herself' that only approximates her content and renders the thatclause but a partial expression of the proposition she believes. Q9 must be abandoned, consequently, and a more accurate version of Q7 sought.8 Questions remain about how quasi-indicators "depict," how they enhance ascriptional accuracy, and to what linguistic categories they belong.9 These cannot be answered without an account of what depiction is, but Castañeda left no detailed account and no simple formula for understanding how Q5 holds if Q7, as stated, fails. Despite his pioneering efforts, the relations between the attributee's indexicals and the attributor's quasi-indicators, and between a quasi-indicator and its antecedent, remain to be clarified. Without this, it is difficult to assess two further claims he made about quasi-indicators: Q11 A quasi-indicator expresses, in part, what its antecedent expresses (Castañeda 1989c, 38-41).

Q12 Quasi-indicators are unique among devices for attributing reference in that there are no expressions which merely depict uses of non-indexical singular terms, i.e., names and definite descriptions. "In short, there are no quasi-proper names and there are no quasidefinite descriptions." (Castañeda 1981, 316)

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The first of these makes explicit what is already implied by Q2, but the second is not implied by any of the others and it is worth noting that he left open the "important question" whether we should "invent" quasi-names and quasi-descriptions. In the course of developing his theory of depiction I will argue that there is no need to invent such expressions because they are already there. Hence, while Q11 can be retained, Q12 should be relegated to the dustbin along with Q9 and Q10. To motivate these decisions and accommodate Q1-Q6, Q11, and a modified Q7 and Q8 within an account that does justice to what Castañeda regarded as his "most precious philosophico-linguistic discovery" (Castañeda 1983, 326) is the concern of this paper.

2. Immediate and Vicarious Thinking Reference To understand Castañeda's views on quasi-indicators something must be said about his theories of indexical reference and attitudinal ascriptions. My rendition here varies somewhat in terminology from his own, but I have tried to capture what is essential in his novel approach to indexical ascriptions. By expressing "reference to items present in experience as so present," indexicals represent a type of thinking reference, the conscious act whereby one "picks out" something for the purposes of thinking something about it--where thinking encompasses all episodes of awareness, including conscious states of perceiving, imagining, planning, intending, believing, etc. Referring terms might be used to express one's act, as when one thinks out loud, but thinking reference must be distinguished from (i) what a thinker intends to communicate with a given token (communicational reference), (ii) what the hearer is caused to refer to upon perceiving the token (hearer's thinking reference), (iii)

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what a hearer attributes to the speaker (hearer's attribution of reference), and (iv) the denotation associated with the linguistic type (semantic reference) (Castañeda 1989a, 9, and see Castañeda 1977a). The sense in which linguistic tokens "refer" is wholly derivative. Thinking reference includes a sense of contrast--of what the selected item is not--and, hence, presence of background material much of which is unstructured so far as experienced content goes.10 Picking out and predicating are ways of making things explicit, and indexical reference has an important executive function of bestowing upon entities a place in experience (Castañeda 1986, 111; 1989a, 68, 75). Referents are never grasped in isolation but always as connected to other items, thus, as components within propositions or proposition-like contents (interrogatives, intentions, recommendations, etc.), specifically, as individuals (logical subjects). This classification is important. Thinkable individuals are units of content and, as presented, must be graspable in finite episodes of thinking and identifiable through finite sets of accessible differences (Castañeda 1989a, 62-63, 77). They are not the distant, massive, complex objects posited to account for the unity of one's experience: "the total physical object is never before the consciousness of the perceiver, nor before his belief-rehearsing consciousness" (Castañeda 1977, 300; and see 1989a, 16-17 and 1989b, 134). Each time I think about the Pentagon building, say, I confront a thinking referent I might express with tokens of 'the Pentagon' or 'that building'. I believe that there is a external physical object, a continuant, to which my referents are somehow correlated, but that continuant is not what I am aware of; rather, if my belief is true, it is my doxastic referent (1986, 117; 1989b, 125), at best, the semantic value of the type 'the Pentagon' in my idiolect.

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Castañeda spoke of the thinking referents picked out indexically as confronted "in propria persona" and as "internal to the content of the thinking episode" (Castañeda 1989a, 68, 77; Jacobi and Pape 1990, 301-302). Whether he meant that one is immediately aware of the indexical referents themselves or that their representations portray them as immediately experienced is unclear, but either interpretation is compatible with what he says about quasi-indicators. The option is also neutral with respect to a further contrast between immediate and vicarious thinking referents. When I observe two colors and think that This one is darker than that one, for instance, my demonstratives pick out immediate referents, entities I am directly aware of. But I make only a vicarious indexical reference to items not immediately present (Castañeda 1989a, 78), for instance, when I look at a photograph of the Dome of the Rock and think That building is in Jerusalem. Here I am thinking of the Dome of the Rock and predicating something of it even though that building itself is not present to my immediate consciousness. My reference to it is vicarious, parasitic upon something else I am directly aware of, the photograph. Though my thought That building is in Jerusalem does not explicitly embody a thinking reference to the photograph, I am at least disposed to make such reference in virtue of my commitment to the proposition The building pictured in this photograph is in Jerusalem. Perhaps the latter is the complete thought, and perhaps all vicarious indexical reference can be resolved in terms of indexical descriptions whose constituents express immediate referents. This matter is left open here, as is a choice between Castañeda's referential reading of indexical descriptions (that allows for vicarious thinking referents) and a Russellian reading that treats the Dome of the Rock as a doxastic referent at best.

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Vicarious reference can also be expressed through pure indexicals. In announcing that the exam is tomorrow, for instance, 'tomorrow' does not express my immediate referent-that duration is not present to my consciousness--but only a vicarious referent. The same is true of 'today' and some uses of 'now' depending upon how extensive a single state of consciousness actually is. Perhaps the first-person pronouns 'I' and 'me' have vicarious uses as well, e.g., in 'Last year she sent me a book I didn't want.' Indexical reference is thoroughly transcategorical. Tokens of 'now' and 'then', 'here' and 'there', for example, pick out durations and places, respectively, whereas 'I'-tokens appear to refer to individuals or states of individuals. Again, if I think that this is a lovely color or that that is a very high note then 'this' and 'that' appear to refer to sensory qualities, perhaps best classified as individual property-instances or tropes. But sometimes the referent is the abstract quality itself, say, a particular pitch that your singing instructor asks you to hit or a function that graces your calculations.11 Perceptual illusions can also be referred to indexically as can events like a twitch, a hearing, or perhaps "external" occurrences which are transmitted to perceivers through physical fields.12

3. Indexical Modes There is no cognition of an object per se, devoid of a sense of its qualifications (1989a, 55). In contemporary parlance, acts of thinking reference are accomplished through modes of presentation or referential modes, each being a manner of cognizing an item with at least one functioning as an identifying mode whereby the item is distinguished from everything else.13 Thinking of the Sears Tower, for example, I consider it as the

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tallest building in Chicago, or as that monstrous skyscraper over there, or, simply, as that. Modes can operate in conjunction with each other, e.g., as I identify the Sears Tower as the monstrous skyscraper over there might I also refer to it as the building over there, the former mode implying the latter. Not all modes individuate, nor is knowledge of an individuating or identifying mode sufficient for one's thinking reference to any item via that mode. Thinking reference requires both the operation of modes and presentation of the referent--recalling that presentation is either representation or direct awareness. That referential modes are "guides" for articulating the data of conscious experience has led some philosophers to view them as properties of thinkers, as ways or manners of apprehension. This judgment is appropriate for understanding how indexicals reflect a thinker's "confrontation" with the items of experience, but it is not the whole story. If a mode enables one to cognize something then there must be an appropriate fit between the two, and this is as true for indexical modes; I cannot identify something as the object there unless it is there. However, some caution is needed. What I identify as the woman across the street might be a cross-dresser. While the mode, being the woman across the street, is not satisfied by that referent it nonetheless enables me to pick out what I do. How so? Only because it is utilized in a context wherein it implies a mode the referent does satisfy, say, being the person (living thing, etc.) there across the street. Any such successful mode corresponds to a certain status or property of the referent, typically, a relational property. Being this blue pen in my hand, for example, may be a mode through which I refer to an object, but 'this', 'in my hand', and perhaps 'blue' apply to the item only in virtue of its relation to myself, an experiencing subject. This allows us to speak of the status an item must have to be picked out indexically--its indexical status--and that can be

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treated as a relational property, noting that to utilize a mode in referring is not to predicate the corresponding property (Castañeda 1989a, 74-76). It is in his account of indexical modes or "mechanisms" that makes Castañeda's theory of indexical reference distinctive, particularly, the following three features. Indexical modes of application differ from indexical modes of interpretation If "indexicality is simply the general involvement with experience that indicators denote" (Jacobi and Pape 1990, 68), then such "involvement" should be integral to the meaning of indexical types and characteristic of every indexical mode. This is not so in currently popular accounts of indexicals. Impressed by the fact that with recourse to the indexical modes associated with indexical types--their characters--hearers can determine the speaker's referents, these accounts hold that the key to understanding indexicals lie in token-reflexive analyses. The character associated with 'I' for example is that of being the speaker or writer of an 'I' token (Kaplan 1989, 505) as stated in the rule: (I) A token of the first-personal indexical 'I' refers to the speaker of the utterance in which it occurs. whereas that of 'now' is given by (N) A token of the temporal indexical 'now' refers to the time of the utterance in which it occurs. Once one identifies relevant features of the context of an utterance, then such rules provide the modes that permit accurate interpretations of the corresponding tokens. Hearing you say, 'I am now going to throw the ball over there', for example, my grasping the characters of 'I', 'now' and 'there' and knowing that you uttered the sentence, when you uttered it, and what region you demonstrated, enable me to determine what your referents

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are.14 As long as focus is directed to the interpretation or consumption of language the foregoing rules are fine. Once concern shifts to linguistic production, however, rules like (I) and (N) do not yield a proper analysis of the modes speakers utilize in applying indexicals (Recanati 1993, chp. 4). These rules are useful only if the interpreter already has sufficient knowledge of context to allow independent identification of the relevant indexical tokens, the speaker, and whatever else is needed. They do not govern the process of indexical production since the generating of indexical tokens cannot rely upon antecedent cognition of those very tokens. Indexical reference often occurs autonomously, without independent identifications, as when I don't know how to classify something that suddenly looms into my visual field, say, other than by the modes that, or the thing over there. The speaker's application of an indexical cannot require an independent identification of the referent. Further, a token reflexive rule like (N) reveals nothing about the speaker's involvement or encounter with the referent. It specifies how I, the hearer, can determine a referent when I hear you utter a 'now' token, but it does not inform me how you picked out a time you referred to. It says nothing at all about how one is to apply the indexical 'now' in the first place. Consequently, rules for the application of indexicals must differ from those guiding their interpretation (1983, 323), and correlated indexical modes of application or production must be sharply distinguised from those of interpretation. If rule (I) does not specify the productive mode that the speaker himself employs in making first-person reference then what other description is available? The irreducibility arguments block a simple rule of reflexivity on the order of,

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(I') A token of the first-personal indexical 'I' is used by the speaker to refer to himself (herself). Referring to oneself is necessary for a first-person use of 'I' but it is not sufficient. Instead, Castañeda offered, (I*) A token of the first-personal indexical 'I' is used (by the speaker) to refer to oneself qua self. (Castañeda 1989c, 42; 1990b, 126) As stated, this rule illuminates only when accompanied by some explanation of the 'qua self' locution, and Castañeda did elaborate (1990b, 127-139). But even if 'qua self' is primitive the point is that a rule like (I*), unlike (I), shows how the speaker thinks of or "encounters" the referent of an 'I' token, namely, through the "self" mode. Generalizing, rules for the application of indexicals must be distinguished from rules for their interpretation and, similarly, indexical modes of production should not be confused with interpretive modes. It is another matter to investigate the meaning of particular indexical types.15

Indexical reference requires individuating productive modes. If thinking reference requires individuating modes and autonomous indexical reference is a type of thinking reference, then there must be individuating indexical modes of production. However, those associated with indexical types are not rich enough to individuate referents. Take Andrea's statement, (1) I am clever. The character of 'I' as given in (I) is an interpretive mode that allows us, as hearers, to establish reference given enough knowledge of context. Andrea does not make a first-

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person reference through that mode. Even when we understand that she made a selfreference and we think of her as an I--as someone who is aware of herself qua self--we do not thereby grasp her identifying mode or think her first-person thoughts. We access only the generic indexical mode specified in (I*) and through it understand that she refers in a first-person way. Since all thinkers utilize that mode in referring to themselves it is not individuating; she needs additional information if her first-person use of 'I' is referential. If reference to oneself qua self is autonomous then the mode expressed by an 'I' token is a particularized mode--a determinate of the generic self mode--that embodies the speaker's perspective. Similarly, my demonstrative in 'this is beautiful' expresses my particular perspective on an item, say, the Hope diamond pictured in a magazine. I might also use 'this' to refer to that very diamond which now appears as a dirty stone before me, subsequently learning, to my own surprise, what I could express by 'this is this' (Burge 1977, 355). Not only is the significance of each 'this' token bound to my perspective, they differ in significance because each reflects a distinct orientation or position within my perspective that corresponds to a distinct relational property of the referent. Hence, each referential use of 'this' is associated with a determinate of the character of the type 'this'. All indexical references occur through some such particularized indexical modes or perspectival properties that serve as identifiers (Castañeda 1989a, 76, 214; Searle 1984, 222). Indexical status is not only a matter of orientation within a perspective; it is also a function of the thinker's cognitive encounter with the referent. The latter is the agent's active contribution as when I address someone and thereby create a you within my

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experiential frame. In another act of indexical reference I identify the same person as a she, utilizing a distinct type of encounter. In neither case does identification occur ex nihilo; the addressee must also be there, positioned somewhere in my perspective in a certain direction and distance from the point of origin. There may be several yous each differing not in the mode by which I encounter them but in their orientation within my perspective. A you reference, like any demonstrative reference, also includes locating the referent and thereby acknowledging its orientation within one's perspective. Various types of orientiation and encounter can be considered in the abstract apart from a particular perspective, but it is their combination that constitutes a generic indexical mode of production. For example, the orientation-type association with the generic I mode is location at the perspective's point of origin, and the encounter-type is one of reflexive awareness qua self. Thinking of someone as you is to encounter them as an addressee located in a place distinct from the point of origin but within which the subject's utterance can have causal influence, but a person with the same orientation may also be the object of a demonstrative encounter expressed through 'he' or 'she'. Indexical modes are not monadic properties because neither orientation nor encounter can exist apart from a relation of thinker and referent. Let i be the position of an indexical referent X within Y's perspective p; the orientation of X is that of i-from-the-standpoint-of-p, a description with information about the relative distance of X from p's point of origin as well as direction. To accommodate dynamic indexical thoughts like This is moving fast where this retains its identity though not its spatio-temporal position, then i can be conceived as an ordering of positions within p. Adding to this the encounter-type k (whether of the type I, you, it, he, there,

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now, and so forth) yields this schematic formula for particularized or individuating productive modes: Orientationi,p + Confrontationk = individuating indexical mode of production Hence, three factors are involved in the analysis of any individuating indexical mode of production: (i) the ordering i of positions of the referent within (ii) the agent's perspective p, and (3) the type k of encounter. None of these factors is a separate referent in an indexical thought, though each is part of the background constituency. The irreducibility of indexicals is due to both orientation and encounter-type; their subjectivity is due to the uniqueness and privacy of the p factor.

Productive indexical modes are internal to the contents of thinking. For Castañeda, an individuating indexical mode of production is a means whereby aspects of the impinging environment congeal to constitute an "object" for my thought. His statement that "the grammatical meaning of indexical expressions is part and parcel of those items indexically referred to" (1989b, 131) implies that indexical status is not an external or contingent property of a thinking referent but, rather, constitutive. In this way Castañeda's account differs from the popular "direct reference" views of indexicals (see Kaplan 1989, Perry, 1993) according to which only the referents of indexicals are significant for semantic evaluations of sentences containing indexicals, not their mediating senses, concepts or modes. To be sure, these accounts do not share Castañeda's focus on immediate thinking referents, and in their view of indexical referents as external "objects" it is not surprising that they take indexicality as negligible in semantic evaluations.

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Once focus shifts to immediate referents, however, indexical status gains a new relevance. If immediate referents are not "massive" external objects then the field is open for other candidates constituted by their identifying modes. Thus, when I pick out something through 'this sound' it is the unit, the sound-qua-this, that is a logical subject. One might consider the mode separately as an abstract entity, but to view the "object referred to" in isolation from the mode, the sound itself, is to posit a distinct entity, a universal, an event, or an external object or event taken to be manifested through various thinking referents. An I is a vicarious or doxastic referent at best. Why did Castañeda think indexical modes to be constitutive of immediate thinking referents? His general argument is that this is the best way to account for the data involving indexical thoughts, specifically: (i) indexicals are irreducible; (ii) only through indexical thinking does practical reflection give rise to intentional action; and (iii) indexicals are needed to account for valid reasoning with the immediate accusatives of attitudes such as beliefs and intentions. He argued for (ii) and (iii) with respect to intentions in 1975, chp. 5, and for (iii) regarding indexically expressed beliefs in 1989b, 126-131. The reasoning in the latter is as follows. Suppose I believe, (3) I am obliged, all things considered, to give the annual Medal of Efficiency to Henry at 10 am on May 15. Having this belief together with the intention to comply with my self-avowed obligation is not enough to explain my subsequent action of giving Henry the medal. When the time comes for action, I must also pick out Henry, the medal, and 10 am and link them to the appropriate elements in my commitment (3). How is this achieved? Indexically, of course. I see a medal on the table and think that This medalllion is the Medal of

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Efficiency; my attention is directed to the candidates seated in a row of chairs and I realize that That one is Henry; I glance at my watch and conclude that Now is 10 am or Now is the time to act. In each case, I accept observational statements of the form: i is the same as a, where i is an indexical and a is a non-indexical. By their means I infer from (3), (4) I am obliged, all things considered, to give this medal to that man now. and from this, the intention, (5) I shall now give this medal to that man. My action is explained by my acceptance of (5) and this, in turn, by my acceptance of (4). The inference from (3) to (4) could not be made if the sameness propositions I accept are of the form: a is the same as a. Were (4) the very same proposition as (3) then (3) alone should be sufficient for my inferring (5) and explaining my action. Since it is not sufficient, according to Castañeda, (4) must differ from (3), and it differs in the modes associated with the referring expressions. Consequently, indexical modes are relevant to the implicational behavior of indexically expressed propositions. This conclusion is not based solely on the role of indexicals in action. There are other intuitively acceptable inferences that can also be sanctioned. For example, if it is true that today is March 26 then it follows that tomorrow is March 27, but the latter is not implied by that George's birthday is March 26 even though George's birthday is today. One can make the same point in conditional form: the counterfactual if today were March 26 then tomorrow would be March 27 is true, but if George's birthday were March 26 then tomorrow would be March 27 is not. Again if it is true that I am presently in DeKalb County--as thought by me--then it is also true that Some self-conscious being is

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presently in DeKalb County by the very meaning of 'I'. But the propositions, Kapitan is presently in DeKalb County or The noisiest organism presently in this room is in DeKalb County do not have this implication even though I am the noisiest organism presently in this room. The truth conditions of I am presently in DeKalb County require not merely that a certain organism identical with myself is in DeKalb County, but that this organism qua self-reflective is in DeKalb County. The implicational relevance of indexical modes suggests that they are internal to propositional content. How so? They need not be logical subjects, predicates, copulae, or atomic propositions within the indexical propositions containing them. In particular, if a sentence 'i is F' expresses a proposition in which the indexical 'i' refers to item qua some indexical mode M, it does not follow that M is a separable component about which one thinks in thinking the proposition i is F. The singular referring term 'i' expresses or connotes M, but M is itself neither a subject nor a predicated item in i is F. It is the unconceptualized manner—present in what is thought but not itself referred to—through which one conceptualizes the referent of 'i' and by which 'i' packs the inferential potential it does. Modes are internal to propositional content because they are constitutive of propositional components.16

4. On the Sameness of Thinking Referents What, then, are immediate indexical referents? While Castañeda's answer is given in his theory of individual guises, his account of indexical reference is consistent with alternative views of what we are directly aware of, for example, immediate referents might be mental representations (Kapitan 1990b). One might also consider Whitehead's

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approach to our perception of external events and objects (Whitehead 1929), and theories of tropes may account for the way abstract entities can be referred to indexically. Whether any of these approaches suffices is a question that can only be settled by more data concerning indexicals or a more extensive voyage into metaphysics. At this stage, Castañeda's theory of indexicals leaves the field open to an wide array of proposals. Whatever theoretical approach is followed, it must accommodate the fact that we not only make indexical references but identify indexical referents with each other and with other thinking referents. When I come to believe that Henry is that man I not accepting a trivial identity statement of the form a=a governed by Leibniz's Law, otherwise my identification would amount to my accepting nothing more than Henry is Henry or That man is that man. More is obviously involved in preparing myself for action since I can accept these latter without being prompted to do anything. So, Henry and that man are distinct in my immediate thought, but I am affirming that they are in some sense the "same thing". This notion of sameness, Castañeda argued, requires introducing a further equivalence relation of sameness or congruence among thinking referents. Statements to the effect that a is the same as b--henceforth abbreviated as, a≈b--are informative precisely because they are not statements of identity, but rather, of an equivalence relation that falls short of identity. The derivative sense in which 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' refer to the what is the "same"--corefer if you choose--does not render them universally intersubstitutable since they introduce distinct thinking referents. As with the ontology of thinking referents, a theoretical account of sameness or congruence must be deferred given present purposes.17

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5. Attributing Thinking References Ascriptions in terms of content must be attentive to the type of psychological state attributed. Coarse descriptions suffice for permanent beliefs and long-term plans, say, He wants to become rich, but the closer we come to specifying what a person said in a given utterance or thought in a given act of thinking reference, the more careful we must be in our specifications. There is this constraint; to delineate the ascribee's content requires cognizing that content (Castañeda 1990b, 124), for example, I cannot attribute to you a belief that the Sears Tower is in Chicago unless I myself am able to think that proposition. In general, attribution is governed by a Principle of Shared Accessibility: If X attributes to Y an intentional state by means of a content clause C within an ascription A, then C expresses what is cognitively accessible to X at the time of the ascription. A consequence of this principle is that X's specifications of Y's references can be achieved only through X's own references; I attribute to you reference to the Sears Tower without myself referring to that building (Castañeda 1989a, 89; 1989c, 36). The corollary reiterates the problem in accounting for quasi-indexical attributions given the subjectivity of perspective. How can indexical references be attributed if the ascriber has no access to the ascribee's immediate referents and identifying modes? Some attributions of reference are indefinite in that the attributor specifies only a type of thing to which the attributee is said to refer. Suppose Henry comes upon Donald complaining about management in the company that employs them and catches the words: "What a gullible fool he is." Henry might conclude, (6) Some company VP is such that Donald thinks he is gullible.

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Since Henry associates no particular item with the occurrence of 'he' then the anaphoric chain 'some company VP . . . he' does not specify Donald's referent. Instead, it merely depicts what Donald thought by specifying the sort of thing Donald referred to. In a definite attribution, by contrast, the attributee's referent is identified. For example, if Henry says of his wife, (7) She believes that Bill Clinton is honest. then 'Bill Clinton' is purported to reveal her referent insofar as 'Bill Clinton' is used to specify the very item she is disposed to refer to. The latter might be a doxastic referent if Henry makes no claim about how she thinkingly refers to Bill Clinton. But if Donald nodded toward a group of VPs and said to Henry, "The tallest VP is a gullible fool" then Henry could use this description in, (8) Donald thinks that the tallest VP is gullible. to reveal Donald's thinking referent by referring to that person himself. The mere use of a referring term in the content clause does not imply a definite attribution. Suppose Henry hears Donald describe his office mate, Alexander, as easily fooled. Henry knows, as Donald does not, that Alexander has just been chosen to succeed the company's current CEO. For his own reasons, Henry reports to Carmon--also in the know--what Donald believes with the following ascription: (9) Donald thinks that the future boss is gullible. Henry is using 'the future boss' to impart information to Carmon at the expense of ascriptional accuracy. (9) is false if construed as attributing to Donald a disposition to assent to the sentence 'the future boss is easily fooled' or to affirm the proposition that the future boss is easily fooled, for 'the future boss' does not reveal what Donald thinkingly

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referred to. De dicto readings of ascriptions whose content clauses contain indexicals are usually false for the same reason, for instance, Henry's report to Alexander, (10) Donald thinks that you are gullible. On some occasions, however, an indexical description might reveal the attributee's referent, e.g., had Carmon concluded from (9) that, (11) Henry thinks that the future boss is thought of by Donald as gullible. Similarly, a pure indexical might reveal a referent, for instance, 'I' in the content clause of a self-attribution, (12) I believe that I am happy. which reports my first-person reference (Castañeda 1989a, 7, 105; 1986, 130) Using Castañeda's terminology, a term occurs internally in an ascription insofar as the attributor uses it with an intention of displaying how the attributee referred, e.g., 'the future boss' in Carmon's (11). In (9), on the other hand, 'the future boss' occurs externally since Henry uses it to represent Donald's reference without purporting to render salient Donald's referential modes.18 Following Castañeda, de re ascriptions represent external occurrences with (9) giving way to, (9a) The future boss is such that Donald thinks that he is gullible. and in this way the speaker's mode is segregated from the content clause. Only a term that occurs internally is purported to reveal the attributee's thinking referent. Consequently, (9a) is an indefinite attribution of reference so far Donald's thinking reference goes, and so is (10) given that indexicals usually occur externally. With (11) and (12), however, we see that some indexicals can also be given an internal reading. The internal/external division is too coarse when it comes to quasi-indicators. They are

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not merely external given their natural habitat within attitudinal scope. In using 'she herself' in, (2) Andrea thinks that she herself is clever. I intend to convey how Andrea referred to herself, namely, in a first person way, implying that 'she herself' occurs internally. But two considerations check a purely internal reading. First, with 'she herself' I report Andrea's first-person reference to herself, not to myself, yourself, or some other self, yet the third-person character of 'her' expresses my modes, not Andrea's. Second, by the subjectivity of indexical reference, 'she herself' cannot express exactly what Andrea expresses with 'I', and this is why Castañeda said that "there cannot be genuine cumulations of reference and attributions of indexical reference to others" (Castañeda 1981: 312).19 If quasi-indicators occur both internally and externally the obvious conclusion is that externality and internality are relativized not only to tokens and speaker's intentions but perhaps also to referential modes: Def. 1 A token t in attributor's X's attitude ascription A is internal relative to referential mode M iff X uses t with the intention of ascribing to the subject of A reference via M; it is external relative to M to M iff X does not use t with the intention of ascribing reference via M.20 Thus, 'she herself' is internal in (2) with respect to the generic self-mode associated with the type 'I', but external with respect to the modes that I, the attributor, express with 'Andrea' or 'she'. Def. 1 is broad enough to allow every singular term token within content clauses to be internal in revealing some referential mode of the agent's, even if a very abstract mode like being an individual. For example, 'he' in (9a) might occur

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internally relative to the mode of being a male (or being a male human). Being internal relative to M in ascription A does not imply that the speaker specifies the exact thinking referent of the attributee. While 'she herself' occurs internally in (2) with respect to the I mode, it is not used by the ascriber to pick out what Andrea refers to with 'I' and, therefore, it does not reveal Andrea's thinking referent. Is the quasiindicator used as a referring expression? If so, to what? If not, then what sort of expression is it? We return to the problem of explaining how quasi-indicators are to be interpreted and, indeed, what quasi-indicators are.

6. Anaphors Within Attitudinal Scope On the present account, a de re ascription like (9a), far from revealing the res with which an agent is en rapport, reflects the speaker's caution in making an attribution and not only does not ascribe belief in a singular proposition, it does not ascribe belief in any specific proposition (Bach 1982, 130; Forbes 1987, 11). (9a) ascribes to Donald belief in some proposition or other but the content clause 'that he is gullible' does not specify a proposition since the token of 'he' is neither referential nor associated with an identifying mode. What, then, does 'he' contribute to an attribution like (9a)? It is helpful to compare (9a) with the generalized ascription, (6) Some company VP is such that Donald thinks he is gullible. where there is no temptation to attribute to Donald reference to a particular person. (6) represents an indefinite attribution with 'he' as an anaphor bound by a quantifier antecedent, not a referential anaphor.21 Its content clause does not express a proposition but, at best, informs us that Donald believes a certain type of proposition, one specified

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by the open sentence 'he is gullible' with 'he' functioning as a variable whose values are propositional components. As such, (6) can be read as, (6a) ( x)(x is a company VP and Donald thinks that x is gullible). However, an alternative rendition preserves the role of 'future company officer' as a characterizing mode rather than a predicated property: (6b) ( xo)(Donald thinks that xo is gullible). where 'xo' ranges over all and only company VPs. Still, both (6a) and (6b) fall short of expressing the attributed content of (6). By expressing personhood as well as gender, 'he' conveys more than "being a logical subject," "being a thing," or even "being a company VP." If the speaker uses 'he' to attribute reference via personhood and gender then (6) may well have the force of, (6c) Some company VP is such that Donald thinks that it, qua male human, is gullible. where 'it qua male human' displays a mode through which Henry assumes Donald refers. The information value of 'he' is not only its binding sortal being a company VP but also the mode of being a male human (or, given that 'he' is inside attitudinal scope, being referred to qua male human). Further inscriptional economy can be achieved by introducing 'xoM' as a complex expression composed of a variable bound by an external quantifier and a modifier expressing the attributed referential mode, with (6c) yielding to, (6d) ( xo)(Donald thinks that xoM is gullible). Stipulating that superscripts occur internally while subscripts occur externally, (6d) shows how 'he' in (6) is internal relative to being a male human but external relative to being a company VP.22

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Is a similar maneuver available for understanding de re ascriptions containing anaphors bound by exported singular terms? If the description in, (9a) The future boss is such that Donald thinks that he is gullible. expresses the speaker's referent only then how is its content clause to be understood? In particular, if 'he' is anaphoric on the singular 'The future boss' then how is (9a) anything other than a stylistic variant of (9)? Some are tempted by a quantified reading of (9a) as, (9b) (∃x)(x = the future boss and Donald thinks that x is gullible). To capture the internal aspect of 'he' we can offer, (9c) (∃x))(x = the future boss and Donald thinks that xM is gullible). There is still a problem: if the very thing that Donald takes to be gullible is identical to what the speaker identifies with 'the future boss', as '=' suggests, we must still explain how the content clause of (9c) differs from that of (9). Castañeda's solution was to interpret the anaphor 'he' as a bound variable ranging over thinking referents, and to use the exported description to assert a congruence between the speaker's referent and the depicted attributee's thinking referent. (9c) gives way to, (9d) (∃x))(x ≈ the future boss and Donald thinks that xM is gullible). An alternative employs the variable 'xf' to range over all and only things that are congruent to what Henry refers to with 'the future boss', with 'xfM' being a complex expression on a par with 'xoM' of (6d). It avoids the conjunction in (9d), not apparent in (9) itself, and allows the embedded variable to more closely mimic the pronoun 'he' of (9) yielding, (9e) (∃xf)(Donald believes that xfM is gullible).

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The expression 'xfM' depicts because it informs us about Donald's thinking referent, namely, that it is congruent to the speaker's thinking referent and that Donald thinks it qua male human. It is a referentially composite expression because it reflects or is employed to cause a thinking reference even though it is not itself a singular referring term. It conveys reference in the course of expressing something else much as 'the mayor's daughter' might convey reference to the mayor without referring to the mayor. Composite terms can be predicates as well as singular descriptions, thus, 'future company officer' which conveys reference to a certain company but is not a singular term. If (9e) is an acceptable paraphrase of (9a), then being composite is also a feature of the anaphoric 'he' since it conveys reference to the referent of its antecedent, a fact nicely represented in 'xfM'. Assimilating (9) to (9e) exhibits what Castañeda called a "preliminary alpha analysis" of the attitudinal ascriptions (1980, 791; 1989a, 104). His alternative "property analysis" (1980, 791; 1989a, 216-217, 229-230) utilized higher-order variables and quantification into descriptive terms, rendering (5) as, (9f) (∃K)(the K-er ≈ the future boss and Donald thinks that the K-er is gullible). It is not certain how Castañeda wished to classify an expression like 'the K-er', though at one point he spoke of a similar term as a "variable definite description" (Jacobi and Pape 1990, 469). Restrictions can be introduced here as well. Where 'KfM' ranges over determinates of the determinable property being the same as the future boss and referred to only qua male human, an alternative to (9f) is, (9g) (∃Kf)(Donald thinks that the KfM-er is gullible).

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Are (9f) or (9g) equivalent to (9e)? Is either preferable? Castañeda's framework permits an affirmative answer on the assumption that singular referring terms can always be parsed as definite descriptions (1989a, 63). But the assumption is questionable, especially for pure indexicals. With Castañeda's anti-reductionism about indexical mechanisms it is doubtful that any definite description could pick out a strict indexical referent without containing a pure indexical. The equivalence of (9f) or (9g) with (9e) is doubtful. Whether we parse (9a) as (9e) or (9g), the embedded anaphors depict without purporting to reveal the attributee's strict referent. More precisely, let t be a token of a single term or an anaphoric chain occurring in an ascription A made by person X: Def. 2. By means of t, X purports to reveal Y's thinking referent just in case there is a thinking referent R such that t expresses X's thinking reference to R and is used by X to attribute to Y a thinking reference to R. Def. 3. By means of t, X purports to depict Y's thinking referent just in case there are properties F-ness and G-ness such that X uses t to attribute to Y a thinking reference to some F qua G. In a proper regimentation, the linguistic mechanism for depicting is an anaphoric chain whose antecedent is a quantifier over the values of a substituend of F with a bound variable within the content clause. The material attributed through G can be represented by the anaphor, as 'he' represents male human, by common noun phrases within descriptions or qua locutions, or, by the complex referring terms in the suggested notation. In ordinary language, the vehicles of depiction can be the speaker's referring

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terms as in (9), or anaphoric chains as in (9a), (6), (6d), and (9e).

7. The Analysis of Quasi-Indicators Quasi-indicators are devices for depicting indexical reference. They are not themselves singular referring terms but, instead, anaphors bound to externally occurring antecedents and carrying information about what the attributee referred to and, thus, about the indexical modes of production through which he or she referred (Castañeda 1989c, 38). When I assert, (2) Andrea believes that she herself is clever. to report what Andrea said with 'I am clever' I use the quasi-indicator to depict Andrea's indexical reference by singling out the generic publicly accessible first-person mode that she employed in referring to herself qua self. It is part of what is expressed by the quasiindicator 'she herself', for which reason none of the following is an accurate paraphrase of that ascription: (2a) Andrea thinks that Andrea is clever. (2b) (∃x)(x = Andrea and Andrea thinks that x is clever). (2c) (∃x)(x ≈ Andrea and Andrea thinks that x is clever). Nor do familiar analyses in terms of senses accomplish what (2) manages to convey. For example, letting bracketed expressions represent senses, e.g., '[Self]' the generic selfmode, and '^' express the manner by which senses combine to form complex senses or thoughts (Peacocke 1981; Forbes, 1987), the following won't do: (2d) Andrea thinks [[Self] ^ [is clever]].

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since it could not distinguish between what Andrea is said to think from what is attributed to George by, (13) George thinks that he himself is clever. Proper regimentations must be sensitive to the distinct perspectives expressed by quasiindicators. Suppose '[Self]Andrea' is a description satisfied by the particularized firstperson mode through which Andrea refers to herself qua self (at the time in question). Can (2) be, (2e) Andrea thinks [[Self]Andrea ^ [is clever]]. I think not. By the subjectivity thesis, Andrea's identifying mode cannot be the individuating mode expressed by my use of 'she herself' (contrary to suggestions in Peacocke 1981, 191 and perhaps, Forbes 1987, 21). Alternatively, if '[Self]Andrea' is to be read non-referentially, then the question concerns scope. A small scope Russellian analysis which yields something equivalent to, (2f) Andrea thinks that (∃s)(s and s alone is Andrea's first-person identifying mode and s ^ [is clever]). fails to provide a necessary condition of (2) if Andrea does not think of herself qua the modes which I, the speaker, express through 'Andrea' or have conceptualized her firstperson identifying mode as predicative. This is avoided on the large-scope reading, (2g) (∃s)(s and s alone is a Andrea's first-person identifying mode and Andrea believes [s ^ [is clever]]). which is similar to a proposal in Perry 1983, 25. But this Fregean analysis is foreign to the spirit of Castañeda's non-Fregean account of thinking reference (see Castañeda 1983, 327). With her use of 'I' in (1), Andrea thinkingly refers to herself, a particular, not to

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referential modes, and she predicates something of this particular, namely, wisdom. Unable to reveal her referent the speaker uses a quasi-indicator to depict. With the treatment of 'he' in (a) as a precedent, the quasi-indicator is a referentially complex expression expressing (i) an indexical first-person mode of production indexed to the attributee's perspective, and (ii) the speaker's reference via an antecedent. If it is proper to count such anaphoric complexes as variables (see note 22), then all quasiindicators are to be classified as variables.23 Whether or not we do this, both 'she herself' in (2) and 'he himself' in (13) convey the speaker's reference to Andrea and George respectively. Likewise, in reporting another's now through a use of 'then' as in, (14) At noon yesterday, Cassidy realized that he himself was then in danger. the speaker is also conveying reference to the interval initially specified by 'at noon yesterday', and the quasi-indexical role of 'then' is evidenced in its irreplaceability by 'at noon yesterday'. The subscript-superscript format achieves the right blend of external and internal content expressed by quasi-indicators. First, using indexical types to specify attributed generic indexical modes--then the closest we come to comprehending what Andrea expressed with 'I am clever' is to attribute to her a belief in a proposition of the type 'xaI is clever' where 'xaI' depicts what is the same as Andrea and referred to by Andrea qua Self-or, in other words, to what has the self property within Andrea's perspective. (2) gives way to, (2h) (∃xa)(Andrea thinks that xaI is clever). while the correlated analysis of (13) is,

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(13a) (∃xg)(George thinks that xgI is clever). Suppose Andrea referred to George as that man, thinking him to be wise, we have, (15) (∃xg)(Andrea thinks that xgTHAT MAN is clever). where 'xgTHAT MAN' depicts what is same as George and referred to through the that man indexical mode. Were Andrea to address George in the second-person we would report, (16) (∃xg)(Andrea thinks that xgYOU is wise). Finally, letting 'tn' range over intervals which are the same as noon yesterday, and 'xc' range over things which are the same as Cassidy, (14) can be expressed as, (14a) (∃xc)(∃tn)(at noon yesterday Cassidy realized that xcI is tcNOW in danger). And so it is with all attributions of indexical reference. Each quasi-indicator is a referentially composite term which conveys reference to what its antecedent refers while expressing the referential modes used by the subject in making a reference. These modes, whether being a this, a you, a there, a beyond, etc., are, at best, determinable indexical properties whose determinates are accessible only to the occupants of particular non-repeatable perspectives. Vicarious depictions of indexical reference are accomplished by recourse to generic modes functioning as the G-ness properties of Def. 3. The preliminary alpha analysis of (2) includes the perspectivity that Castañeda incorporated in his property analysis of quasi-indexicals. Variants of the latter are also available on the present format. Letting 'Fa' range over determinates of the determinable property of being the same as Andrea, we get, (2i) (∃Fa)(Andrea thinks that the FaI-er is clever).

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In this case 'FaI' depicts Andrea's first-person mode, a determinate perspectival property that only she has access to, while 'the FaI-er' is the analogue of the quasi-indicator showing the type of thing she refers to. The correlated determinable is the public quasiindexical property connoted by 'she herself' and constituting the intension of 'xaI' in (2h). Though (2i) implies (2h), misgivings about their equivalence have been expressed above. As (14) shows, tokens of standard indexical types can be used quasi-indexically (Castañeda 1981, 301-7; 1983, 322-3), for example, (17) I now feel that I am in danger. Here there is risk of ambiguity. If I use the second 'I' indexically with no intention of revealing how I think of myself then it is not a quasi-indicator. But if I wish to emphasize my possession of a mechanism for making first-person references then I intend (17) to be read as, (18) I now feel that I myself am in danger. with 'I myself' as a quasi-indicator used to attribute to myself first-person awareness (Forbes 1987, 18). If so, it is not an indexical—recalling property Q6—though it conveys indexical reference in just the way that 'she herself' in (2) conveys a third-person reference. Can (18) be accommodated on our proposals? Compare it with a past-tensed, (19) Yesterday, I felt that I myself was in danger. The first 'I' is indexical, but 'I myself' is used to report what I thought yesterday, namely, that I am the same as something which I then felt qua Self to be in danger. That past self is not my present thinking referent. Instead, I am now attributing to myself possession yesterday of a first-person referential mechanism;

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(19a) (∃xi,y)(Yesterday I felt that xi,yI was in danger). where the variable ranges over that which is the same as me yesterday. Moroever, taking 'was' as quasi-indexical we get, (19b) (∃ty)(∃ xi,y)(Yesterday I felt that xi,yI is at tyNOW in danger). where 'ty' ranges over intervals the same as yesterday. But (19a) and (19b) are not the only readings of (19). If 'I myself' and 'was' are genuine indicators, (19) can be taken at face value. The same might be true of (18), though giving it the suggested quasiindexical reading yields, (18a) (∃xi,n)(I now feel that xi,nI is (am) in danger). where the subscripted 'n' abbreviates the indexical 'now'. This is as appropriate for (18) as (19a) or (19b) is for (19). Inserting temporal parameters increases ascription accuracy and goes some way towards capturing the "ephemeral" nature of indexically expressed content. Suppose the speaker of, (13) George thinks that he himself is clever. intends to attribute an indexical belief to George at time t. Letting 'xg,t' range over just those items which are the same as George at t, then (13a) gives way to, (13b) (∃xg,t)(at t George believes that xg,tI is wise). as a representation of (13). Given the subscript convention, 't', like 'George', occurs externally relative to the modes by which the speaker identifies it. One might think that (13b) moves us closer to revealing George's actual referent, thereby, challenging the claim that one person's indexical content is subjective and cannot be thought or referred to by another. Yet even if the interval expressed by 't' is so short

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that 'xg,tI' has only one value, George's thinking referent, (13b) does not represent our direct access to that value.24 Its external elements keep it at the level of 'the future boss . . . he' of (9a) that depicts without revealing. The point can be made better, perhaps, by the perspectival property analysis. Take (13) to be, (13c) (∃Kg,t)(at t George believes that the Kg,tI-er is wise). where 'Kg,t' ranges over determinates of the determinable property of being the same as George at t. Though only one property falls within its range, 'the Kg,tI-er' does not reveal George's strict referent since the property Kg,tI-ness is not his identifying mode but rather, a non-identifying mode--a quasi-indexical property--employed by the speaker. Whether we go with the property analysis or stick to the preferred alpha analysis, one difficulty common to all accounts of ascriptions can now be approached, namely, the analysis of iterated attitudes. The indexicals in, (20) Isabella knows that Maria believes that I am happy. are best understood as expressing speaker's reference only and given an external construal. The reading Castañeda suggests of a similar example (1989a, 105) can be phrased as follows: (20a) (∃x)(I ≈ x and Isabella knows that (∃y)(x ≈ y and Maria believes that y is happy)). The most controversial aspect of this analysis is the appearance of theoretical notions within attitudinal scope, a problem common to most attempts to deal with iterated belief (Forbes 1993). The key point to remember is that ascriptions are the attributor's interpretations of what the attributee thinks. The content is said to be the attributee's but insight into its form, composition, and entailments is a matter of theoretical investigation

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and hypothesis. Iterated ascriptions simply illustrate this more vividly. Multiple operators with quasi-indicators introduce special ambiguities. Contrast (20) with, (21) Isabella knows that Maria believes that she herself is happy. If the speaker intends to represent Isabella's self-reference without claiming that she attributes any particular mode of reference to Maria, then (20) is, (21a) (∃xi)(Isabella knows that (∃y)(y ≈ xi and Maria believes that y is happy)). where 'xi' ranges over thinking referents congruent to what the speaker refers to with 'Isabella'. On the other hand, (21) can also be taken as reporting Isabella's attribution of self-reference to Maria: (21b) Isabella knows that (∃xm)(Maria believes that xmI is happy). Other ambiguities lurking in (21) are due to the differences in the interpretation of 'Maria'. (21b) works as an analysis of (21) if the occurrence of 'Maria' is intended to reveal Isabella's reference, but if it is the speaker's mechanism only, the following paraphrase might be more appropriate: (21c) (∃x)(x ≈ Maria and Isabella knows that ( yx)(x believes that yxI is happy). Even more complicated analyses are in order if we wish to capture the temporal parameters implicit in (21). A different sort of ambiguity emerges in another case: (22) Arthur told Neil that he thought that he ought to go. Although both occurrences of 'he' can be read quasi-indexically, there is a difference over which of Arthur's thoughts (22) reports. It could record,

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(23) I think that you ought to go. as well as, (24) I think that I ought to go. If the former, then (22) is to be read as, (22a) (∃xa)(∃ yn)(Arthur told Neil that xaI thinks that ynYOU ought to go). But if the intent is to report (24) then (22) should be read as, (22b) (∃xa)(Arthur told Neil that xaI thinks that xaI ought to go). Other readings are also possible, e.g., one reporting Arthur's 'You think that I ought to go," but the pattern of analysis is clear by this time. Quasi-indicators that are more obviously variable-like are to be handled in the following manner. Consider, (25) Every boy tells some girl that he will love her always. While the quantifiers range over boys and girls respectively, the embedded anaphors 'he' and 'her' can be used as quasi-indicators depicting indexical references by means of 'I' and 'you'. One analysis is this: (25a) (∃xB)(∃yG)(∃z)(∃w)(z ≈ xB & w ≈ yG & (xB tells yG that zI will love wYOU always)) where 'xB' and 'yG' range over boys and girls respectively. However, the values of these variables are thinking referents in (25a). To quantify over "massive" organisms one needs an account of how such external objects are related to the thinking referents that "present" them so to speak (see, for example, Castañeda's discussion of "Leibnizian individuals" in 1989a, 249-250). Letting '⇒' represent the relation between a thinking referent and a "massive" external doxastic referent it presents then (25) could also be,

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(25b) (∃xB)(∃yG)(∃z)(∃w)(z⇒xB & w⇒yG & (xB tells yG that zI will love wYOU always)) Once again, the initial conjuncts in either (25a) or (25b) can be dispensed with by restricting the range of the quantifiers as in the treatment of (6). The difference between these quasi-indicators and those with singular antecedents is that the latter reflect a speaker's singular reference while the former do not. Still, both types of quasi-indicators are complex expressions whose component variables are bound by antecedent quantifiers or—recalling note 22—variables themselves.

8. Concluding Remarks Let us return to the properties Q1-Q12 that Castañeda felt governed quasi-indicators. We can retain Q1-Q6 and Q11 as is, with the problematic Q5 accommodated by noting that quasi-indicators are "mechanisms" of singular reference only because they are referentially composite. It is clear by now that Q7-Q10 must be dropped, though variants of Q7-Q8 can be retained. As to Q7, if the antecedent of a quasi-indicator is referential then the quasi-indicator is a referentially composite expression that is not itself a singular referring term though a proper part of it is. As to Q8, while quasi-indicators display the attributee's content they do so only by depicting the type of indexical referent and, correspondingly, the type of indexical thought attributed to the agent. The example of (9a) suggests that "depicting" extends beyond the efforts to capture indexical usage. An ascriber depicts whenever he or she is unsure of the ascribee's referential modes, regardless whether the latter's inference is indexical or not. One might think that Q12 is anchored on the fact that we cannot have access to another person's

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particularized indexical modes, whereas the modes conveyed by descriptions and names are, ipso facto, public. But depending on the strength of the modality, there is no reason to hold this. We attribute reference to dogs via sounds that we have no direct access to by employing descriptions that succeed in picking them out, viz., in terms of frequencies. Depiction is all we can hope for. A similar situation might occur even within our species. Consider Peter, who hears his friend Johann say, (26) Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem is true. Peter might report what Johann has said with the following: (27) Johann believes that Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem is true. Suppose that Peter lacks the ability to comprehend Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, quite literally, is unable to think what proposition constitutes that theorem. Then, with (27, Peter does not attributes a belief in a singular proposition to Johann. At best, he ascribes belief in a certain type of proposition, which type depending on what Peter takes Johann to be saying. If Peter knows nothing more of Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem beyond the fact that it was the second incompleteness theorem proved by Godel, his attribution might amount to nothing more than, (27a) The second incompleteness theorem proved by Godel is such that Johann believes that it is true. where the description is to be read attributively rather than referentially. If Peter intends that Johann thought of this theorem qua second incompleteness theorem proved by Godel, then a more accurate paraphrase is,

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(27b) Whatever was the second incompleteness theorem proved by Godel is such that Johann believes that it, qua second incompleteness theorem proved by Godel, is true. However we do it, 'it' is Peter's device for depicting what he cannot apprehend directly. Consequently, it functions as a quasi-description or a quasi-name insofar as Peter takes Johann to have referred via a definite description or name. Hence, there are grounds for rejecting Q12 as a property of quasi-indicators.

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References Almog, J. et al, eds. Themes From Kaplan (Oxford). Bach, K., 1982. "De Re Belief and Methodological Solipsism," in A. Woodfield, ed., Thought and Object (Oxford). Bach, K., 1987. Thought and Reference (Oxford). Baker, L. R., 1981. "On Making and Attributing Demonstrative Reference," Synthese 49, 245-273. Bezuidenhout, A., 1996. "Pragmatics and Singular Reference," Mind & Language 11, 133-159. Boer, S., and Lycan, W., 1980. "Who Me?" The Philosophical Review 89, 427-466. Brown, M., 1992. "Doing it With Mirrors," manuscript. Burge, T., 1977. "Belief De Re," The Journal of Philosophy 74, 338-362. Castañeda, H-N., 1967. "Indicators and Quasi-Indicators," American Philosophical Quarterly 4, 85-100. Reprinted in Castañeda 1989a, 206-231. Castañeda, H-N., 1977a. "On the Philosophical Foundations of Communication: Reference," Midwest Studies in Philosophy II: Studies in the Philosophy of Language (Minnesota), 165-186. Castañeda, H-N., 1977b. "Perception, Belief, and the Structure of Physical Objects and Consciousness," Synthese 35, 285-351. Castañeda, H-N., 1980. "Reference, Reality, and Perceptual Fields," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 53, 763-822. Castañeda, H-N., 1981. "The Semiotic Profile of Indexical (Experiential) Reference," Synthese 49, 275-316. Reprinted as "Indicators: The Semiotics of Experience," in

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Jacobi and Pape 1990, 57-93. Castañeda, H-N., 1983. "Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference," in J. Tomberlin, ed., Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World (Hackett), 313-328. Castañeda, H-N., 1984. "Philosophical Refutations," in J. Fetzer, ed., Principles of Philosophical Reasoning, 227-258. Castañeda, H-N., 1986. "Self-Profile: De Dicto," in J. Tomberlin, ed., Hector-Neri Castaneda (Reidel), 77-137. Castañeda, H-N., 1987. "Self-Consciousness, Demonstative Reference, and the Self Ascription View of Believing," in J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 1 (Ridgeview Publishing Company), 405-454. Castañeda, H-N., 1989a. Thinking, Language & Experience (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Castañeda, H-N., 1989b. "Direct Reference, the Semantics of Thinking, and Guise Theory" in Almog et al, eds., 105-144. Castañeda, H-N., 1989c. "The Reflexivity of Self Consciousness: Sameness/Identity, Data for Artificial Intelligence." Philosophical Topics XVII, 27-58. Castañeda, H-N., 1989d. "Persons, Egos, and I's," Psychopathology and Philosophy, in M. Spitzer et al, eds. (Berlin: Springer-Verlag), 210-234. Castañeda, H-N., 1990a. "Indexicality: The Transparent Subjective Mechanism for Encountering a World," Nous 24, 735-750. Castañeda, H-N., 1990b. "Self-Consciousness, I-Structures, and Physiology," in Philosophy and Psychopathology, M. Spitzer and B. Maher, eds. (Berlin: Springer-

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Verlag), 118-145. Castañeda, H-N., 1998. The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness, James Hart and Tomis Kapitan, eds. (Bloomington, Indiana University Press). Chastain, C., 1975. "Reference and Context," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science VII, 194-269. Clark, R., 1980. "Not Every Act of Thought Has a Matching Proposition," Midwest Studies in Philosophy V (Minnesota), 509-523. Crimmins, M., 1992. Talk About Beliefs, (MIT). Crimmins, M. and J. Perry, 1989. "The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs," The Journal of Philosophy 86, 685-711. Evans, G., 1977. "Pronouns, quantifiers and relative clauses (I)," in M. Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality (Routledge & Kegan Paul). Evans, G., 1982. The Varieties of Reference (Oxford). Evans, G., 1985. Collected Papers, (Oxford). Fodor, J., 1990. A Theory of Content and Other Essays, (MIT). Forbes, G., 1987. "Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective," The Philosophical Review 96, 3-31. Forbes, G., 1989. "Indexicals" in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, ed., D. Gabbay, vol IV (D. Reidel), 463-490. Forbes, G., 1993. "Solving the Iteration Problem," Linguistics and Philosophy 16, 311-330. Frege, G., 1967. "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," in P. Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic (Oxford), 17-38.

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Jacobi, K. and H. Pape, eds. 1990. Thinking and the Structure of the World (Berlin: De Gruyter). James, W., 1904/1976. Essays in Radical Empiricism, (Harvard University Press, 1976). Kapitan, T., 1990a. "A Critical Study of Hector-Neri Castañeda," Nous 24, 473-486. Kapitan, T., 1990b. "Preserving a Robust Sense of Reality," in K. Jacobi and H. Pape, eds. 1990. Thinking and the Structure of the World (Berlin: De Gruyter), 449-458. Kapitan, T., 1992. "Review Essay: Thinking, Language & Experience," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 203-214. Kapitan, T., 1993a. "An Intensional Interpretation of Variables" in H. Pape, G. Wolfart, and J. Kreuzer, eds., Zeichen und Sprach (Fink-Verlag). Kapitan, T., 1993b. "Keeping a Happy Face on Exportation," Philosophical Studies 70, 337-345 Kapitan, T., 1994. "Exports and Imports: Anaphora in Attitude Ascriptions," in J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 8: Philosophy of Logic and Language (Ridgeview Press), 273-292. Kaplan, D., 1989a. "Demonstratives, An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals," in Almog et al, eds., 481-564. King, J., 1987. "Pronouns, Descriptions, and the Semantics of Discourse," Philosophical Studies 51, 341-363. McKay, T., 1988. "De Re and De Se Belief," in D. F. Austin, ed., Philosophical Analysis (Kluwer, 1988), 207-217. McKay, T., 1991. "Representing De Re Beliefs," Linguistics and Philosophy 14, 711-

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739. McGinn, C., 1981. "The Mechanism of Reference," Synthese 49, 157-186. McGinn, C., 1983. The Subjective View (Oxford). Millikan, R., 1990. "The Myth of the Essential Indexical," Nous 24, 723-734. Millikan, R. G., 1991. "Perceptual Content and Fregean Myth," Mind 100, 439-59. Nagel, T., 1986. The View From Nowhere (Oxford). Neale, S., 1989. "Logic of Anaphora," The Encyclopedia of Linguistics, 358-363. Neale, S., 1990a. "Descriptive Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora," The Journal of Philosophy 87, 113-150. Neale, S., 1990b. Descriptions (MIT). Peacocke, C., 1981. "Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation," Synthese 49, 187-218. Perry, J., 1977. "Frege on Demonstratives," The Philosophical Review 86, 474-497. Perry, J., 1979. "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," Nous 13, 3-22. Perry, J., 1983. "Castaneda on He and I," in Tomberlin 1983, 15-42. Perry, J., 1988. "Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference," Nous 22, 1-18. Perry, J., 1990. "Individuals in Informational and Intentional Content," in E. Villanueva, ed., Information, Semantics and Epistemology (Blackwell), 172-189. Rapaport, W., 1986. "Logical Foundations for Belief Representation," Cognitive Science 10, 371-422. Recanati, F., 1990. "Direct Reference, Meaning, and Thought," Nous 24, 697-722. Recanati, F., 1993. Direct Reference (Blackwell). Richard, M., 1989. "How I Say What You Think," in P. French et al, 317-37.

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Richard, M., 1990. Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them (Cambridge). Saarinen, E., 1986. "Castaneda's Philosophy of Language," in Tomberlin 1986, 187-214. Salmon, N., 1986a. Freges's Puzzle (MIT). Schiffer, S., 1981. "Indexicals and Reference," Synthese 49, 43-100. Schiffer, S., 1990. "The Mode-of-Presentation Problem," in C. A. Anderson and J. Owens, eds., Propositional Attitudes (CLSI, Stanford). Searle, J., 1983. Intentionality (Cambridge). Smith, D. W., 1981. "Indexicals and the Theory of Reference," Synthese 49, 101-128. Tomberlin, J. ed., 1983. Agent, Language and the Structure of the World (Hackett). Tomberlin, J. ed., 1986. Hector-Neri Castaneda (Reidel). Wettstein, H., 1986. "Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?" The Journal of Philosophy 83, 185-209. Wettstein, H., 1989. "Cognitive Significance Without Cognitive Content," in Almog et al 1989, 421-454. Whitehead, A. N., 1929. Process and Reality (Macmillan). Zalta, E., 1988. Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality (MIT). Zemach, E., 1985. "De Se and Descartes: A New Semantics for Indexicals," Nous 19, 181-204.

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Notes 1. The perspectivity of indexical reference was emphasized in I&Q where perspectives are treated in terms of perspectival properties though, subsequently, Castañeda spoke in terms of demonstrative or indexical properties (1977, 320; 1989a, 71). Such properties are relational properties that items have in ordered to be indexically referred to. That indexical properties reflect or "fix" positions in spatio-temporal fields is emphasized in 1977, 320. William James wrote that even the first-person 'I' is a "noun of position" and seemed willing to generalize this to all indexicals (James 1904/1976, 86). See also Whitehead 1929, 43, where demonstrative elements are taken to enter into the expression of every proposition. 2. The irreducibility of indexical reference was urged by Castaneda since his earliest papers on the topic in the 1960s (see, for example, Castañeda 1967), while more recent statements can be found in 1989a, 70-76. For example, the attempt to reduce 'I' to the description 'this person now speaking' fails because it imputes too much conceptual apparatus to their users, particularly, small children (1989a, 72-5). Again, there are modal difficulties inasmuch as "I am this person now speaking" expresses a contingent truth while "I am I" is necessary. The differences in grammatical person are not reducible to each other, in particular, the first-person indexicals are not the most basic (1990a, 736). 3. The subjectivity thesis and its reliance upon particularized indexical modes of presentation was articulated in Castaneda 1981, 1989a, and 1990a. It is also implied by John Searle's treatment of indexicals in 1983, 220-230. Analogous reasoning appears in Frege 1967, 25-6 with respect to first-person reference; "everyone is presented to himself

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in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else." See also McGinn 1983, 17 and Nagel 1986, chps. 2-4. Boer and Lycan 1980 provides a contrasting view of indexical reference, as do Perry 1979 and 1983, Kaplan 1989, and Millikan 1990, but see Castañeda's responses to these positions in 1984, 249-256; 1983, 313-328; 1989b; and 1990b. 4. This problem and that of accounting for indexical communication is a principal concern throughout Castañeda's writings on indexicals, e.g., 1980, 794 and 1989a, 69. The problem is also discussed in Frege 1967, p. 26, Forbes 1987, pp. 18-21, and Forbes 1989, p. 467. In responding to Frege's concern, Forbes writes that "all that is required for communication, or for "grasping," is that the hearer come to know, in an appropriate way, what is being said." But while claiming that such appropriateness reflects "how the semantic properties of the utterance enter into the route to the hearer's conclusion about what has been said," he acknowledges that he is unsure how to make this more precise (Forbes 1987, p. 20). 5. See Castañeda 1975, chapters 2 and 4, for a defense of the view that intentions are first-person practical thought contents. 6. Presumably the higher animals can discriminate spatial relations which we would normally express with her, there, near, beyond, etc. Morover, they seem to react appropriately to our demonstrative pointings, and their own interactions may be replete with indexical communication, e.g., the bee's dance (see Millikan 1990). 7. Only when used to report first-person thinking is 'she herself' to be classified as a quasi-indicator. There are also non-quasi-indexical usages of this same token, e.g., 'The essays that Mary wrote were things that she herself attached little importance to.'

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Saarinen 1986, 200-203 overlooks such cases in his attempt to argue for the unique quasiindexical status of the type 'she herself' (see Kapitan 1990, 477-8). 8. One consequence of this development is that we abandon the so-called principle of semantic innocence according to which "the utterances of the embedded sentences in belief reports express just the propositions they would if not embedded, and these propositions are the contents of the ascribed beliefs" (Crimmins and Perry 1989, 686). Castañeda explicitly rejected this principle in Castañeda 1980, 768, where he calls it the "Semantic Embedment Assumption". For more on what is expressed by quasi-indexical that-clauses see the exchange with R.M. Adams reproduced in both 1983, 293-309 and 1989a, 144-157. 9. This question is discussed at some length in Brandom 1994. His Sellarsian approach construes quasi-indicators as devices for reflecting the ascribee's "committments" to use tokens of given types. For Castañeda, by contrast, language reflects underlying thinking processes and, accordingly, his account is conerned with explaining the thoughts and dispositions to think that underlie the committments to use indexicals. 10. Alfred North Whitehead speaks more generally of all conscious states as embodying a sense of contrast or what he calls "the feeling of negation" (see Whitehead 1929, Part II, chp. VII, section II, and Part III, chp. II, section IV). 11. Castañeda spoke of indexical references to abstract entities in 1989a, 78. See also, Evans 1982, 198. 12. Suppose I hear a door slam and ask: "Did you hear that?" What do I pick out with 'that'? Not the event of my hearing a certain sound, nor my private sense-datum, nor the abstract qualities of the sound I hear but, presumably, some public event to which we

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have like auditory access. Admittedly, this depends on how events are individuated. If the distant event is itself propagated by sound waves, as Whitehead thought, then it is an item of direct awareness by virtue of being "objectified" within perceptual states. Further, if a Whiteheadian analysis of external physical "objects" in terms of events is accurate, then these objects too can be immediate referents, not in their entirety of course, but as objectified in percipient organisms. 13. Use of the terms 'mode' 'referential mode' and 'mode of presentation' is my own. Castañeda tended to use 'properties' (1967), 'mechanisms' (1980), and 'cognitive content' (1989a, 55) instead. 14. See Millikan 1990, 727-728: "to interpret an indexical one must have prior knowledge, one must already know independently and ahead of time, what item bears the indexical's adapting relation to the indexical token. One must already konw both that this referent exists and how it is related ot the token, hence, to the interpreter." 15. Eddy Zemach has questioned whether talk of referring to oneself qua oneself might seem uninformative (1985, 194); how does the second 'oneself' indicate anything different from the first? Castañeda argued that while the first is a pure reflexive, merely repeating its antecedent, the second conveys one's experiential confrontation with oneself as "a thinker presently involved in the very experience of making the referring [sic] in question" (1989a, 170). While he elaborated on this in 1990b, 127-139, he also spoke of "a primitive apprehension of the subject one calls "I," not mediated by any identification procedure" (129), and of the I-properties expressed by first-person pronouns as "indefinable" (1989a, 76). See also my introduction to Castañeda 1998. .

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16. Not being logical subjects in the propositions into which they enter as modes, they are not, as such, referred to, nor are they in need of identifying modes of presentation. This allows us to circumvent the regress argument offered in Schiffer 1990, 255, by allowing that properties as characterizers, not as predicates, are grasped "directly," being neither referred to nor items those propositions are in any sense about. For a different account of the way in which modes of presentation or senses are employed in accounting for indexicals, see Perry 1977, 1983, the concerns raised by Wettstein 1986, and a reply in Perry 1988. For additional discussion of indexical modes of presentation see Boer and Lycan 1980; Evans 1982, chp. 6 and 1985, chp 10; Searle 1983, 220-230; Peacocke 1983, chps. 5-6; Forbes 1987, 14-25; Smith 1989, 71-79; Recanati 1990, 706-715 and 1993, chps. 4-5; and Bezuidenhout 1996. One benefit of taking indexical modes as internal to propositional content is given in my 1993 where I attempt to resolve the problems raised by Richard's context-hopping "Phone-Booth" argument. 17. Castañeda also operated at this generic level when discussing attribution apart from Guise Theory. "As always, the elucidation of sameness is a serious matter. Consequently, we must not prejedge the nature of the sameness involved in referring acts. We remain open to there being several different types os sameness required for the elucdiation of storable mental representations, and for their occurrences yielding thinking presentations to a thinker." (1981, 126) 18. The terminology of 'external occurrence' and 'internal occurrence' is employed by Castañeda in 1980, 780-783 and 1989a, chp. 5, and also by Clark 1980, and Forbes 1987. Castañeda sometimes used the more familiar terminology of 'de dicto and 'de re', though he eventually expressed a dislike for this terminology (1989a, 189; 1989c, 33). In his

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view, the contrast between external (de re) and internal (de dicto) properly belongs to occurrences of individual terms and noun phrases (1989a, 93-97), an interpretation upheld in Zalta 1988, 171, Richard 1990, 128, Brown 1992, and Kapitan 1993, 1994. So understood, the de re/de dicto distinction represents a difference in ascriptive strategies, not between different kinds of belief, and it does not support an implication that the de re mode involves the subject being related to an object in a way that the de dicto modes does not (see also Searle 1984, 217 and Rapaport 1986, 391). Compare Fodor 1990, 1712, which argues that the de re/de dicto distinction sits on a continuum concerning the degree to which an embedded expression is explicit about the "vehicle" of the attributed belief, and also Crimmins 1992, 170-179 which, however, is less warm towards the distinction. 19. See Castañeda 1981, 312. He used the terms 'cumulative', 'cumulation', and 'cumulative convergence' to indicate the speaker's attribution of a mechanism or manner of referring. 20. In terminology Castañeda also used, terms that are used by the speaker to reveal propositional content, e.g., a subject's thinking referent, are propositionally transparent (1989a, chp. 5). This notion, and that of its mate propositional opacity, are characterized somewhat differently in different places. In Castañeda 1977, for example, an oratio obliqua construction was said to be propositionally transparent (p-transparent for short) if it reveals the proposition in the mind of the subject. But in Castañeda 1989a the notion was defined in terms of what an interpreter understands by a speaker's utterances: token tE occurs in text C(T) with degree 1 of p-transparency if the interpreter can ascertain what the speaker thought of with tE (1989a, 93). tE occurs with degree 2 if is embedded

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within the scope of one oratio obliqua prefix and the interpreter can ascertain what the subject thought in thinking the attributed content. Higher degrees of p-transparency concern embeddment within more than one psychological verb. Finally, tE occurs popaquely in C(T) if it occurs in C(T) with no degree of p-transparency. However, the occurrence of 'what' in this definition of p-transparency is problematic. If full ptransparency is achieved only when an interpreter X ascertains the exact proposition a subject Y thinks (1989a, 90), X must have access to Y's identifying modes. But then quasi-indicators cannot be fully p-transparent, contrary to what is said in 1989a, 106. Moreover, a token is presumably p-opaque when the speaker does not use it to indicate what the subject thought, i.e., the token expresses none of the subject's referential modes. Is this possible? Even when we fall short of full p-transparency are we not indicating what a subject thought insofar as we make any attribution of reference at all? The 'what' might not be the strict referent nor the identifying mode, but, at least, some general mediating attribute. We must say that the subject referred to something qua individual (logical subject), or, more specifically, qua horse, qua flower, etc., otherwise we attribute nothing. If so, none of the expressions used in attributing content can be purely popaque. 21. By 'referential anaphor' is meant a singular referring term which is anaphorically dependent upon a referring antecedent. They are contrasted with bound-variable anaphors and E-type pronouns that are not bound but are anaphorically dependent upon antecedent quantifiers (Evans 1977). See Neale 1989 for a discussion of these differences and his category of D-type pronouns in 1990b. No particular account of binding is assumed herein, and it should be noted that this use of 'anaphor' is to be

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contrasted with Castañeda's non-standard use in 1980, 804, which effectively takes an anaphor to be a pronoun of laziness. 22. There is also the option of treating the complex expression 'xoM' itself as a variable bound by the external quantifier and whose substituends are all and only company VPs that are referred to qua male human. To do so would conform to the data showing that bound anaphors can pick up descriptive content that goes beyond what their antecedent supplies, but it would require expanding the conventions on binding as follows: a superscripted variable ?? is bound in any occurrence in a sentence S that falls within the scope of a variable-binding operator V? in S. Some such adjustment is required by Castañeda's property analysis of quasi indicators (1989a, 216-217). 23. I might add to the textual evidence a private conversation with Castañeda in June of 1991 where he concurred with the interpretation of quasi-indicators as variables. See also his description of 'I' as a variable as it occurs in 'Stan believes of me that I am grouchy' (Tomberlin 1983, 320-321). 24. It is precisely the abstractive power of the variable that allows us to understand the intension (property, concept) that determines the variable's range without our referring to any member of that range. To understand the cognitive significance of variables and their correlated natural language anaphors we must resort to intensions (see Kapitan 1993a).

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