organizational development through management

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH MANAGEMENT CONTROL: THE CASE OF ACTION LEARNING

Cover design: Aline van Hoof, Open Universiteit Nederland

© Copyright Shaker Publishing 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers. Printed in The Netherlands. ISBN 978-90-423-0344-7 Shaker Publishing BV St. Maartenslaan 26 6221 AX Maastricht The Netherlands Tel.: +31 (0) 43 350 0424 Fax: +31 (0) 43 325 5090 http://www.shaker.nl

Organizational Development through Management Control: The Case of Action Learning PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Open Universiteit Nederland op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. ir. F. Mulder ten overstaan van een door het College van promoties ingestelde commissie in het openbaar te verdedigen op vrijdag 4 juli 2008 te Heerlen om 15.30 uur precies door Ivo Gerard Martin De Loo geboren op 3 augustus 1972 te Sittard

Promotores: Prof. dr. B.H.J. Verstegen, Open Universiteit Nederland Prof. dr. H.M.J. van den Bosch, Open Universiteit Nederland Overige leden beoordelingscommissie: Prof. dr. M.A. Ezzamel, Cardiff University Prof. dr. A.C.N. van de Ven RA, TiasNimbas Business School, Universiteit van Tilburg Prof. dr. E.G.J. Vosselman, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Prof. dr. T. Homan, Open Universiteit Nederland

- To my parents -

T

able of Contents

Acknowledgement 1. Introduction........................................................................ 1 1.1 Why Study Action Learning? .......................................................................1 1.1.1 Introducing Learning..............................................................................1 1.1.2 Introducing Action Learning .....................................................................3 1.1.3 Evaluating Action Learning ......................................................................6 1.2 Research Goal and Questions......................................................................8 1.3 Expected Research Contributions............................................................... 10 1.4 Action Learning as a Particularization of Management Control ........................... 11 1.5 Chapter Overview ................................................................................. 16

2. Action Learning Foundations ..................................................19 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 19 2.2 Action Learning: Principles ...................................................................... 21 2.2.1 Learning Equation............................................................................... 21 2.2.2 System Approach ................................................................................ 25 2.2.2.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 25 2.2.2.2 System Alpha .................................................................................. 27 2.2.2.3 System Beta ................................................................................... 28 2.2.2.4 System Gamma................................................................................ 31 2.3 Action Learning: Inspirations .................................................................... 34 2.3.1 Background of Reg Revans..................................................................... 34 2.3.2 Educational Theory ............................................................................. 38 2.3.2.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 38 2.3.2.2 Constructivism ................................................................................ 40 2.4 Action Learning, Learning Organizations, Organizational Learning, and Scripts ....... 45 2.5 What’s Ahead....................................................................................... 53

3. Action Learning and Management Control ..................................55 3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 55 3.2 Examining Action Learning....................................................................... 55 3.2.1 Defining Action Learning....................................................................... 55 3.2.2 Defining Personal and Organizational Development ...................................... 62 3.2.3 Defining Learning Systems..................................................................... 63 3.3 Management Control .............................................................................. 66 3.3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 66 3.3.2 Learning Systems as an Embodiment of Management Control .......................... 66 3.3.3 Action Learning, Learning Systems and Trust .............................................. 76 3.4 Reexamining Action Learning.................................................................... 80 3.4.1 Research Framework ........................................................................... 80 3.4.2 Research Considerations ....................................................................... 82 3.5 What’s Ahead....................................................................................... 84

4. Action Learning Cases ..........................................................85 4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 85 4.2 Methodology ........................................................................................ 85 4.2.1 Research Method ................................................................................ 85 4.2.2 Understanding ................................................................................... 87 4.2.3 Triangulation..................................................................................... 91 4.2.4 Research Technique ............................................................................ 92

4.2.5 Data Collection and Analysis .................................................................. 93 4.2.6 Validity and Reliability Issues ................................................................. 99 4.3 Organization ‘C’ ..................................................................................102 4.3.1 Introduction .....................................................................................102 4.3.2 Program Overview .............................................................................105 4.3.3 Program Experiences ..........................................................................107 4.3.4 Reflections ......................................................................................108 4.3.5 Summary.........................................................................................109 4.4 Organization ‘E’ ..................................................................................115 4.4.1 Introduction .....................................................................................115 4.4.2 Program Overview .............................................................................116 4.4.3 Program Experiences ..........................................................................122 4.4.4 Reflections ......................................................................................125 4.4.5 Summary.........................................................................................126 4.5 Organization ‘M’ ..................................................................................132 4.5.1 Introduction .....................................................................................132 4.5.2 Program Overview .............................................................................135 4.5.3 Program Experiences ..........................................................................138 4.5.4 Reflections ......................................................................................139 4.5.5 Summary.........................................................................................140 4.6 Conclusions ........................................................................................147 4.6.1 Across the Cases................................................................................147 4.6.2 About Action Learning.........................................................................148 4.6.3 About Management Control ..................................................................152 4.6.4 About our Reexamination of Action Learning .............................................157

5. Review and Reflections....................................................... 161 5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................161 5.2 Overview ...........................................................................................161 5.2.1 Research Steps .................................................................................161 5.2.2 Research Results ...............................................................................162 5.3 Implications........................................................................................165

References ......................................................................... 167 Appendix I: Interview Questions ............................................... 191 Summary ............................................................................ 199 Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) ................................................ 205 About the Author

A

cknowledgment

The motivation for writing this thesis was, perhaps surprisingly, not to obtain a Ph.D. It was the challenge to write a concise piece that would be about 200 pages long – something I had hitherto not done. When I happened to come across a subject that immediately appealed to me and which I thought required scientific examination, I decided to have a serious go at it. Most ideas come to me while writing. This was also the case now, although this approach was not without problems. I had to learn that thinking about what to write first, writing about what you are going to write next, and then actually writing a piece could be a rewarding strategy as well. The challenging part was to skim down everything I had written into a manageable work that would be scientifically founded. Action learning is an extremely interesting subject in which there is still a lot of unexplored territory. Therefore, the thesis could have contained more than its current 200 or so pages. Many choices had to be made in order to focus my research. I hope I have made my choices explicit, so that some of you who read the thesis may be encouraged to take the issues I have addressed a step further. That would be one of my main goals. Much of the focus and structure of this thesis was a direct consequence of the many productive discussions I had with my two supervisors, Herman van den Bosch and (especially) Bernard Verstegen. I must admit, however, that my first feeling after most of these discussions was one of despair and hopelessness, and the question “Will I ever be able to finish this?” popped up frequently in my mind. In retrospect, this was a good thing – it kept me thinking and implied that I was constantly on my toes (at least I hope I was). Bernard and Herman, I think you can see that I have seriously considered many of your suggestions, which is probably the best indication I can give of what I think of the support you have given me, both formally and informally. I really feel I could not have written this thesis without you. I would like to thank you both very much. Secondly, I would like to thank three persons who were kind enough to read parts of the thesis before it was published. I know it has greatly benefited from their comments and suggestions. I would therefore like to express my gratitude to Henk van den Brink, Martin Loeve, and Arco van de Ven. I thought I had been thorough, but you still found ample room for improvement.

My professional life has greatly benefited from my involvement with specific persons that I consider to be ‘teachers’ in one way or another. Without wishing to disqualify anyone, I would like to single out Piet Zeijen, Franz Palm, Huub Meijers, Luc Soete, Frans Nijsten and Bernard Verstegen. Without you, things might have been very different. Fourthly, I would like to thank several people who helped me with this thesis in their very own way, perhaps unknowingly so. In particular, I would like to single out the coaching I received from Otmar Donnenberg, who, despite living in Germany, never ceased to encourage me. In addition, I would like to express my thanks to Mahmoud Ezzamel, Roger Talpaert, Ad Krijnen, Eelco Boonstra, Kenneth Bertrams, Taco Bisscheroux, Kees Gramkow, Frans Kuipers, Willem van Baarsen, Maaike Rol, and Erica Rijnsburger. You all influenced and shaped my thoughts in one way or another and encouraged me to look beyond the borders of what I (thought I already) knew. This also holds for several close (former) colleagues, friends and family members who regularly informed how things were going. Patricia, Arco, Henk, Han (twice), Peter, Bé, Boudewijn, Leo, Johan, Ger, Max, Arno, Frits, Dianne, Tjandra, Dorien, Stuart, Hugo, Mieke, Christoph, Robert, Erik, Ronald, Tessa, Janno, Silvana, Randy, Henny, Margriet, Léjon, Suzanne, Jan, Martha, Paul and Jetty – thank you. In addition, I would like to thank the interviewees who participated in this research. Without their invaluable assistance, this thesis would have been very different (to say the least). Another word of thanks goes out to Marjo van Wezel, who had the thesis proofread before it was printed. Although all remaining errors are my own, the number of errors that would have remained without her valuable assistance would have been much higher. Finally, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my parents for everything they have taught me. I love you. This work is dedicated to you both. Ivo De Loo

Organizational Development through Management Control

1. I

ntroduction

1.1 Why Study Action Learning? 1.1.1 Introducing Learning How do people learn? There is no clear-cut answer to this question. Everyone learns at different stages of his life, at different intervals, and in different places, both at work and privately. Elements such as education, experience, and having the possibility and willingness to learn all play a role in the process (Juch 1983, Weinstein 1999). How do organizations learn? It has been argued that organizational learning1 is enhanced when the ability of employees to transfer their knowledge, skills and insights to new problem situations increases, especially when far transfers are achieved (Yorks et al. 1998). Transfers take place between real-life situations, learning situations, or both. Royer (1979) describes transfers as: “… the extent to which the learning of an instructional event contributes to or detracts from subsequent problem solving or the learning of subsequent instructional events.” (p. 53) Among the kinds of transfer Royer distinguishes are near and far transfers. A near transfer occurs when an original learning event2 closely resembles another learning event and acts as a stimulus. A far transfer occurs when an original learning event acts as a stimulus for a real-life problem or a real-life learning situation, but is not completely identical to it. Royer thinks that:

1

With the exception of section 2.4, ‘organizational growth’, ‘organizational change’,

‘organizational learning’ and ‘organizational development’ will be used interchangeably, despite the fact that these terms do not necessarily mean the same (Tsang 1997). This also holds for similar expressions involving individuals (‘personal growth’, ‘personal development’, ‘selfdevelopment’, etc.). Note that organizational growth does not have to imply that an organization gets bigger or more profitable (Tsang ibid.). Refer to section 1.4 for details. 2

Note that first exposures to learning events do not only entail classroom activities, but can also

involve real-life problems. This is what we will focus on.

1


“… it remains entirely possible that a learner could have mastered a particular skill or bit of knowledge … and still not be able to correctly apply the knowledge or skill to a task that differed from the original conditions of instruction (a far transfer situation).” (ibid., p. 59) Problem-solving approaches that combine aspects of action, reflection and learning may bring about far transfers (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a3, Kolb 1984). Methods that include these approaches are called 'action science' (Argyris, Putnam and McLain-Smith 1987) or 'action oriented research' (Cunningham 1993). They build on the work of Kurt Lewin and John Dewey in the U.S. and Russell Ackoff and Eric Twist in the U.K. (Moosbruker and Loftin 1998). These methods are: “… an inquiry into how human beings design and implement action in relation to one another. Hence it is a science of practice …” (Argyris, Putnam and McLain-Smith 1987, p. 4) By applying ‘action science’ or ‘action oriented research methods’, a change in individual patterns of thinking and acting may be achieved (that is, a change in personal behavior). Such a change ensures that someone is better equipped to signal problems in the future and can propose alternative and perhaps ‘superior’ solutions (McTaggart 1994). The methods encompass: “... a spectrum of activities that focus on research, planning, theorizing, learning, and development.” (Cunningham 1993, p. 4)

3

Whenever this article is cited, the following acknowledgement note should be read: “It [this

excerpt] is substantially based on the original work from The Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business, Volume 37, Number 1, March 2001 (Editor: Prof. A.D. Amar), published by Division of Business Research, W. Paul Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ 07059, USA. This is done with permission of the copyright holder. Interested readers may order copies of the article by writing directly to the Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business”.

2


1.1.2 Introducing Action Learning A specific problem-solving and learning method that is in line with what has been mentioned in the previous section is action learning4, which has been documented by the British astrophysicist Reginald (Reg) Revans (Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a). Revans asserts that action learning is neither new nor original, and acknowledges that it evolves around rather straightforward, pragmatic concepts (Revans 1976). Dilworth (1998) finds action learning an intervention approach, but this depends on the fact whether action learning is ingrained in an organization’s normal business practices (Donnenberg 2003). Donnenberg (ibid.) also claims that it is not an intervision approach, as the primary concern in an action learning program is a unique and complex (set of) organizational problem(s) that need(s) to be solved and not the discussion and evaluation of the experiences of individual participants, which is what mainly happens in intervision groups. Over the years, many organizations around the world have used action learning. For example, on the basis of the program described by Casey and Pearce (1977) and Foy (1977), General Electric (GE) has extensively used action learning to sustain organizational change, setting up its own corporate ‘university’ in Crotonville, New York along the way. GE’s one-time CEO and Chairman, Jack Welch, has endorsed action learning on several occasions after seeing that change initiatives in his company were not always carried out for bureaucratic reasons (Dilworth and Willis 2003). In the late 1980s, GE initiated about 1,000 action learning programs involving 50 employees to solve critical problems. About 85% of the solutions they proposed were subsequently implemented by top management (Dilworth and Willis ibid.). A list of other multinationals that used action learning in one way or another can be distilled from Boshyk (2000, 2002). This list includes Philips, Shell, IBM, DuPont, Boeing, Heineken, Motorola, Pepsi, Hyundai, Ford and LG. Examples on a national and regional level can be found as well. For example, the MIL institute in Lund (Sweden) has launched many action learning programs in Scandinavian companies since its formation in 1977 (Dilworth and Willis 2003). Action learning activities are generally carried out by an action learning team, which is called a ‘set’ (Revans 1998a). Sets comprise a limited number of people 4

Of course, there are other action-oriented research methods (Cunningham 1993, Donnenberg

and Melief 1995, Senge 1992), but as we will see below action learning deserves special attention.

3


who work together with the possibility and aim to solve one or more problems in a limited period of time (mostly a couple of months) (Revans 1971). Solutions to these problems are to be found through group discussions, by taking action on the basis of these discussions, and by continuously reflecting on the results (Weinstein 1999). It is believed that, consequently, set members will (re)interpret their experiences in such a way that they will understand the processes that helped them to tackle a problem (Juch 1983, Kolb 1984). Stated differently, they will learn and experience personal growth (McTaggart 1994, Revans 1982)5. This can subsequently lead to a far transfer and organizational growth (Royer 1979). We will further discuss this later on in this section. If possible, a set is formed voluntarily6. It has been argued that people from different professions, organizations and hierarchical levels should be included in a set as they can shed a different light on a problem (Revans 1971, 1972, 1982). Set meetings follow certain rules that are decided by its members in their first meeting (Dilworth and Willis 2003, Donnenberg 2003). These rules mostly differ between programs. Often, a ‘set advisor’ or ‘facilitator’ engages in the set meetings as well (Casey and Pearce 1977, Revans 1971). He is to monitor the discussions in the set without teaching or instructing set members7. In addition, sponsors (senior organizational members who are ready to act on behalf of a team when required, without receiving or providing financial incentives) and clients (organizational members who are committed that something is done about a problem and have therefore put it ‘on offer’) are to be involved in an action learning program (Boddy 1979, Revans 1998a, Weinstein 1999). It is difficult to describe how action learning exactly works (Ashton 2006, Revans 1998a, Weinstein 2002, Zuber-Skerritt 2002). Therefore, De Loo (2002) asks: “… even if we cannot pinpoint exactly how action learning works, can we state what it really is? Unfortunately, this is not the case. When defining 5

West and Choueke (2003) argue that action learning allows participants to learn about the

problem at hand, themselves, and the process and transfer of learning (called ‘learning to learn’). Refer to section 2.1 for more information about the latter. 6

Nowadays, organizational members often have to participate in an action learning program

(Weinstein 1999). This may lead to less open and constructive group discussions (De Loo and Verstegen 2002). 7

Facilitators are sometimes not appointed, and their role in and effect on action learning

programs is still being debated (Wallace 1990, Weinstein 1999). Dilworth and Willis (2003) think

4


action learning, authors often resort to stating what it is not, since they find it very difficult to describe a concept that is basically rather simple in short terms. As Revans (1998a, pp. 89-102) tells us8: [It is not] ... job rotation ... project work ... case studies, business games and other simulations ... group dynamics and other task-free exercises ... business consultancy and other expert missions ... operational research, industrial engineering, work study and related objects ... simple common sense. On the other hand, Revans (1976, p. 174) has said that: There can be no simpler definition of action learning … “than” … [an organization that] must be more than ready to learn from its experience of trying to bring about … [a] specific environmental adaptation. This definition obviously is not very explicit9. Revans himself has even admitted that the objectives of action learning are not entirely clear, but he does not seem to regard this as a major problem (Revans, 1976). The only thing that is clearly indicated in the literature is that action learning focuses on real-life problems, instead of on “puzzles”. The outcome of a “puzzle” is known in advance, whereas the outcome of a real-life problem is not, in particular when it concerns a problem that has not been encountered before. Especially in such circumstances action learning is said to have its relevance (Revans, 1998a). When real-life problems are not tackled in due time, a firm may be confronted with substantial and probably negative consequences when they will arise. Viewed in more general terms, Bourner et al. (1996, p. 32) think that action learning:

that facilitators should be used to jump-start a program, but should only subsequently attend set meetings by invitation. 8

Willis (2004) suggests that Revans set up exclusion criteria like the ones below for he found that

too many oversimplifications of action learning existed. However, Revans may have contributed to this situation himself, as we will see in chapter 3. 9

Although it does indicate that an organization is to benefit from an action learning program.

Also refer to section 1.4.

5


“… can be used whenever a group can support the learning of others in a context where it is possible to learn from experience.” (De Loo 2002, p. 247, footnotes added) It is assumed that in addition to the personal development set members experience, other employees, and in fact an organization as a whole, will benefit from an action learning program, so that organizational development is achieved10 (Koo 1999, Revans 1971, 1982, Smith and O’Neil 2003). In fact, the only way in which organizational growth can be realized through action learning is said to be personal growth (Garratt 1983, Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a). However, the issue how people exactly learn through action learning is hardly ever addressed in the action learning literature (Mumford 1994).

1.1.3 Evaluating Action Learning What we see when action learning programs are evaluated is that they often seem to have led to personal development but not (so much) to organizational development. For example, Weinstein (1994), although painting a very positive picture of the action learning programs she has been involved in, believes that the full potential of the approach is hardly ever realized. Wallace (1990) describes some of his experiences as a project officer for the National Development Centre for School Management Training (NDC) in state schools in the U.K. He regrets the lack of a critical debate in the action learning literature, and thinks that the approach has diverged too much from its origins without examining the long-term effects of its application. He says that: “… action learning may be more of an act of faith than a proved technique.” (p. 95) 10

Marsick and O’Neil (1999), who place action learning in four different and pragmatically

chosen schools of practice (namely, the ‘scientific’, ‘experiental’, ‘critical reflection’ and ‘tacit’ school), based on insights gained from action learning practitioners, think that when discussing organizational growth issues, a distinction should be made between action learning programs in which a whole team looks at a single problem and programs in which each team member analyzes a different problem (Marquardt 2001). Team projects usually emphasize organizational development, while individual projects emphasize personal development (Marsick and O’Neil 1999). However, whether any organization will launch an action learning program that is unlikely to lead to organizational development from the outset can be doubted (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a). Therefore, we find the prospect of organizational development crucial if an organization is to consider action learning as a potentially useful problem-solving and learning approach.

6


Harrison (1996), who talks about her involvement in a management development program for managers in the National Health Service (NHS) in the U.K., suggests that action learning is poorly defined and that its learning processes cannot change governing managerial systems. The same is argued by Juch (1983) in his book on personal development based on his experiences with Shell. Finally, Parkes (1998) observes that in North American organizations action learning programs pay relatively little attention to processes of individual and organizational learning, but rather emphasize team-building applications. In his conclusions he summarizes this as follows: “… there is very little effort, or interest, in ascertaining the action learning that has occurred [in action learning programs], individually or organizationally. For the most part, the project or “action” is the reason for action learning, and “learning” the by-product.” (p. 168)11 Other authors express their concern about current action learning practices too, and ask for a reconsideration of the approach (Bourner et al. 1996, Pedler 1997a, Vince and Martin 1993, Weinstein 1994). Some authors claim that action learning should move away from Reg Revans’s principles, be built on best practices, and kept definitionless (Donnenberg and Melief 1995). Therefore we can imagine that there are many contrasting, tension-filled views on action learning in the literature, which makes it an interesting field of study. This explains why we want to engage in the debate. However, a problem is that the theoretical underpinnings of action learning are scarce (Ashton 2006, Revans 1971, 1982)12 and have never been put to the test (De Loo 2003, Willis 2004). In addition, many books and articles contain ‘tricks of the trade’ or practical guidelines to set up a ‘successful’ action learning program (Inglis 1994, McGill and Beaty 1992, Weinstein 1999), while it should be acknowledged that there is no single ‘right’ way to structure an action learning program, because contextual factors always have to be taken into account (Dilworth and Willis 2003). Moreover, apart from a few exceptions (Dilworth and Willis ibid., Revans 1972, Wieland and Leigh 197113), only success stories are reported. The action 11

Dilworth and Willis (2003) claim that this is a common problem in action learning programs in

the U.S. 12

However, contrary to some, we do not claim that action learning is a-theoretical (Revans

1982). This will be substantiated in chapter 2. 13

In a later publication (Wieland 1981), taking a longitudinal approach, the action learning

program discussed in Wieland and Leigh (1971) is said to have caused organizational change after

7


learning literature is full of positivism and optimism14. Critique is generally lacking. Rosenzweig (2007) notes that an analysis of success stories alone cannot generate valuable conditions for the ‘success’ of action learning, as it cannot be said that in ‘unsuccessful’ action learning situations these conditions were absent, because they have not been studied. Hence there is an obvious need to take a more critical perspective on the approach (Rosenzweig ibid., Wallace 1990). Bourner et al. (1996) sustain this when they say that: “Action learning that does not reflect and learn from the experience of its application is a self-contradiction.” (p. 34)15 We also find that developments in any method must be based on evaluations of what has happened up to now. We will therefore try to bring about the abovementioned reflection and learning process in the remainder of this research.

1.2 Research Goal and Questions If action learning is to lead to organizational development, and according to the experts mentioned in the previous section (Bourner et al. ibid., Harrison 1996, Juch 1983, Parkes 1998, Pedler 1997a, Vince and Martin 1993, Wallace 1990, Weinstein 1994) this does not often happen, or at least not sufficiently, it is interesting to find out why. This may ease the more or less automatic link between action learning and organizational development often assumed by practitioners and researchers (Donnenberg and De Loo 2004). This can help to develop a more thorough action learning theory in the future. As action learning is relatively ill defined (Ashton 2006, De Loo 2002, Dilworth and Willis 2003, all. We conjecture that at best, Wieland’s analysis indicates that organizational change coincided with and occurred after an action learning program. Nevertheless, Wieland is one of the few authors who stress the role of management control in invoking and sustaining organizational change, like we will do in section 1.4. 14

The fact that in the early days of action learning only success stories were reported is partly

understandable for the method had to be established and accepted by scientists and practitioners. There may even have been exerted some “(…) pressure to produce results by its techniques (…)” (Revans 1976, p. 127). However, as Wallace (1990) notes: “It is possible that the effort required by Revans and his followers to persuade a conservative establishment to accept action learning as a legitimate method for supporting learning has militated against critical analysis of its philosophy and its effectiveness” (p. 90). 15

Refer to Revans (1984).

8


Harrison 1996, Koo 1999)16 and this is to our knowledge the first scientific action learning investigation, it is not realistic to present such a theory here already. We first have to gain a better understanding of the processes that underlie action learning and personal and organizational development before a more fullfledged theory can come about, as we do not believe that in the social sciences a first scientific investigation warrants a new theory (Blaug 1976, Segers 1983). Further analyses may follow the principles set out by Ahrens and Chapman (2007), de Groot (1981), Llewelyn (2003) and Ménard (2001). It is only possible afterwards to claim a theory. This will be elaborated upon in chapter 4. In this research, we will interpret the relationship between action learning and organizational development in terms of management control. This view is in line with Donnenberg (2006), Revans (1982)17 and Wieland (1981). We will explain this decision in the following section. Given the discussion in the previous section and the abovementioned decision, we can formulate the goal of our research as follows: understanding how organizational development may be achieved (or not) through management control in case of action learning, so as to further our understanding of the relationship between action learning and organizational development. In section 1.1.3, we showed why this is a recommendable goal in the light of the existing literature. In the same section, we addressed the relatively new status of this work, particularly in action learning situations. Therefore, we think that (mainly) exploratory research will be required (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992). We contend that we will gather some first impressions about the aforementioned relationship. In section 3.4 this will be elaborated upon. The main research question we wish to cover naturally follows from this, and reads: is action learning an effective particularization of management control? Below, in figure 1.1, it will be indicated how an answer to this question may be sought. In section 1.4 it will also be shown how this question relates to the existing literature in the field.

16

Also refer to chapter 2 and 3.

17

Although Revans does not interpret action learning in terms of management control, he does

note that management accounting information is necessary to detect problems that action learning can help to tackle.

9


Four additional, lower-level research questions can be formulated that help to answer our main question (which we will partly refine in section 3.4 for reasons outlined there). They are: •

Does action learning lead to organizational development? Although this is argued by Revans (1982), and some authors seem to endorse this based on evidence from the field (Casey and Pearce 1977, McLaughlin and Thorpe 1993, Revans 1985), we have previously claimed that this is arguable at best and warrants further study (De Loo 2003);

•

Nevertheless, if it is the case, does organization development through action learning happen under the conditions listed in the action learning literature? This is mentioned by Revans (1982) and Willis (2004) among others, but only very little, clear evidence for this seems to exist (Casey and Pearce 1977, De Loo 2006). Therefore, further study is warranted here too;

•

When we find that organizational development has not materialized, what does this tell us about action learning? This question has, to our knowledge, not yet been covered in the action learning literature given its focus on success stories, as indicated in the previous section. Therefore, it clearly fills a gap in the existing literature;

•

And what does this tell us about management control? Management control and action learning have been jointly discussed before (De Loo 2006, Revans 1982, Wieland 1981), but not as thorough as we would like to do in this research (which is illustrated in chapter 3). By doing so, the previously mentioned literature will be extended.

We think we have to engage in case study analysis to answer these questions (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992, Yin 1989). Under specific circumstances (Smith 2003, Yin 1989), this allows us to draw conclusions across cases. Thereby, we may be able to understand what happened in specific action learning programs where organizational development did or did not materialize (Ménard 2001). As stated, we will elaborate on this in section 3.4 and chapter 4.

1.3 Expected Research Contributions We will aim to contribute to the action learning literature in various ways. Since action learning is to be analyzed systematically and scientifically, academic

10


publications about action learning can be and have been provided (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a, 2001b, 2002, De Loo 2002, 2006, 2008, Donnenberg and De Loo 2004), as well as similar publications on management control (which is the perspective from which we will look at action learning, as indicated section 1.2 and 1.4) (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a, 2001b, De Loo 2006). In this literature, learning issues are not discussed very often (Henri 2006, Whitley 1999). Our results may be important for various parties, such as practitioners, researchers, managers and politicians. We have set out the relevance for the first two parties both in this section and in section 1.1.3: a different take on action learning, possibly leading to different action learning practices, and various scientific contributions. The relevance for managers stems from the fact that some action learning initiatives seem to fail even when an organization has the best intentions (Dilworth 1998, Dilworth and Willis 2003). Our research may help to assess why this is the case. The relevance for politicians stems from the emphasis that is currently placed, at least in the Netherlands, on life-long learning. The Dutch parliament actively endorses projects that aim to stimulate this18. Action learning can be used to stimulate life-long learning (Bird 2001, Dilworth and Willis 2003, Revans 1982). All this warrants an in-depth investigation into the approach. The focus of this publication will be on contributions to the scientific community.

1.4 Action Learning as a Particularization of Management Control As stated, following Donnenberg (2006), Revans (1982) and Wieland (1981), we will examine the relationship between action learning and organizational development in terms of management control. We stress that management control should not be interpreted as strict rules of conduct that cannot be broken, which seems to be a common interpretation of the term ‘control’ (Bisbe and Otley 2004). As indicated by Davila (2000), such a view is both old-fashioned and shortsighted. We hold a different view, which is outlined below. It should be noted that at the same time, we take a deterministic perspective on strategy formation and execution, although we will only apply some of the underlying assumptions. In its purest form, the aforementioned perspective implies, among 18

For example, refer to the website of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science:

http://www.minocw.nl/levenlangleren/.

11


others, that there is a strict distinction between the formation and implementation of plans on the one hand, and management control on the other (Anthony 1965, Camillus 1986). In practice, however, this distinction usually does not exist (Camillus ibid.). Given limited capacities of individuals and the complexities that occur both inside organizations (like pressure groups) and in their interaction with the environment (like legal changes), strategy formation and execution will, in practice, hardly take place in a clear-cut, sequential fashion as proclaimed in the deterministic view on strategy formation and execution (Cyert and March 1963, Khandwalla 1977, Perrow 1972, Lowe and Puxty 1989, Simon 1982). In addition, management control systems are often implicated in organizational processes, and the strategy formation process that, from a purely deterministic perspective, would precede them therefore cannot be based on well-ordered, sequential considerations alone, because interactions between the two will frequently occur and it will be virtually impossible to determine what preceded or affected what at a certain point in time (Burchell et al. 1980, Mintzberg 1990). We share this critique on the deterministic approach to strategy formation and execution. The only thing we need in this research is the assumption of uniformity between organizational goals, strategic goals and the goals of an action learning program (as we will see in figure 1.1). Therefore, we will assume that strategy formation and execution are consistent with one another. Note that this does not preclude that consistency is achieved in a complex and disordered manner, in which changes in a management control system, for instance, invoke strategic formation, which again lead to changes in a control system, etc. (Camillus 1986). Because of this, the consistency argument is in line with the abovementioned critique on the deterministic approach. Consequently, we can relax the assumption about the well-ordered, sequential manner in which strategy formation and execution are shaped in the deterministic perspective. This (relaxed approach to the deterministic) perspective has been chosen for the way in which problem definitions in action learning are said to come about looks very similar (Revans 1982), as we will further discuss in chapter 319. Note that by doing so we do not claim that other, more complex, process-oriented perspectives on strategy formation and execution as proposed by Birnberg (1998), Mintzberg (1990) or Pettigrew (1992) are less relevant (after all, we acknowledge that this is the way in which the latter will often be shaped and changed in practice), but rather that

19

Since action learning was developed in the 1950s and 1960s, this is not surprising (Revans 1965,

1982).

12


in an action learning context, taking the abovementioned perspective may be more appropriate. Anthony and Govindarajan (1995) define management control as follows: “Management control is the process by which managers influence other members of the organization to implement the organization’s strategies.” (p. 8, italics included in the original publication) Management control therefore focuses on strategy execution. Strategies: “… state in a general way the direction in which senior management wants the organization to be heading.” (ibid., p. 12) Stated differently, management control is about influencing employee behavior in order to realize organizational goals (Merchant 1998). The coordination of employee behavior, and behavioral aspects in general, are therefore often researched in management control studies (Collier 2005, Dermer 1988, Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant 1990). Following De Loo and Verstegen (2001a), we assume that an organization will evaluate an action learning program by its contribution to organizational goals. If organizational growth can only be achieved through personal growth, organizational goals must be realized as a consequence (Anthony and Govindarajan 1995, De Loo 2002). An organization can, either deliberately or not, use action learning to bring about organizational growth. As action learning intends to structure employee activities in such a way that specific goals are realized, it is a particularization of management control (Anthony 1965, Flamholtz, Das and Tsui 1985), for these goals operate at a lower level of abstraction than organizational goals (which we assume them to be consistent with). Note that this means that we do not find action learning a management control measure. We interpret such measures as techniques that may consciously be put to use for management control purposes. Examples include activity-based costing (ABC) and return on investment (ROI) statistics (Anthony and Govindarajan 1995). There is another reason why action learning may be interpreted as a particularization of management control, which is quite different from the first. In chapter 3 we will see that when specific conditions are met and an

13


organization functions as a ‘learning system’ (Revans 1982, 1998a), an organization may experience ample organization growth. In that case, action learning may be regarded as a (temporarily used) problem-solving and learning approach that ‘suits’ a learning system (which is by definition more persistent) in stimulating organizational development. This fits the management control definition of Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem (2007). Using Abernethy and Chua’s (1996) notion of ‘integrated control packages’, they find three elements relevant in studying the management control mix in an organization: the prevailing management culture, the division of power among coalitions in the organization, and the accountability of individuals. We purport that an action learning program involves one or more temporary coalitions of employees (the program’s stakeholders) who are held accountable (through a division of responsibilities) and whose actions and propositions can either be in line with the prevailing management culture or not. An action learning program is therefore a component of the management control mix of an organization. If an organization already functions as a learning system when an action learning program is conducted, it is likely that ample organizational development will be experienced, as action learning ‘suits’ the organization (Revans 1982, 1998a)20. An action learning program therefore operates at a lower level of abstraction than a learning system. This is another reason why it may be interpreted as a particularization of management control (Williamson 2000)21. The above is summarized in figure 1.1. Note that the figure should be interpreted with the previously mentioned assumption of consistency between strategy formation and execution in mind.

20

In doing so, it is assumed that management culture can hardly change by itself (Donnenberg

2007). We claim that, following Williamson (2000), this may be due to the fact that it operates at a higher level of abstraction than what is developed in an action learning program (at least initially). An action learning set is, together with the stakeholders who are involved in a program, a specific coalition that may, in due course, bring about a change in culture through the ‘protoscripts’ that they develop (Donnenberg and De Loo 2004). When these protoscripts are ingrained at the organizational level, they become part of the prevailing management culture. This will be elaborated upon in the following chapters. 21

In section 3.3.1 we will provide yet another reason why action learning may be interpreted as

a particularization of management control, the main difference with the abovementioned reasons being that the reasoning starts from action learning itself, instead of from management control.

14


Figure 1.1

Action learning as a particularization of management control.

The downward arrows depict the way in which an action learning program comes about, whereas the upward arrow depicts the corresponding chain of evidence in the light of our main research question in section 1.2. We assume that an organization has certain goals that it has translated into one or more strategies. As stated, it is conjectured (and not further examined in this research) that the goals of an action learning program are consistent with the aforementioned strategies and goals. For example, the goal of an action learning program may be to devise a suitable organizational response to a hitherto unknown competitor that has recently entered the market (Revans 1971). If a solution to this problem can be found through the program, the corresponding behaviors may become common practice in the organization after they have been exhibited by and shared between the program’s stakeholders (Donnenberg and De Loo 2004). In case this happens, organizational development is realized. We will interpret this as the emergence or adaptation of what is known as ‘protoscripts’ at the organizational level, which help to solve the problem in question. Protoscripts are cognitively held, and possibly enacted, dynamic behavioral patterns that are shared by more people than the one(s) by which they have originally been developed, which help to interpret observable, recurrent activities and interaction processes characteristic of a particular setting (Gioia and Poole 1984). We will elaborate on them in section 2.4 and 3.2.2. The fact that we take a behavioral perspective to determine whether organizational development has occurred and not, for example, a more financial or accounting-oriented approach in terms of sales, profits, etc., is in line with our definition of management control, which after all

15


also has a behavioral focus (Merchant 1998). Although in some action learning publications a financial or accounting oriented perspective on organizational development is taken (McLaughlin and Thorpe 1993, Revans 1985), the general view in this literature is also a behavioral one (Koo 1999, Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a, Smith 1997, Weinstein 1999, Willis 2004), which may have accounting consequences, but is not about accounting as such (Dilworth 1998, Dilworth and Willis 2003, Revans 1982). It is likely that the management of an organization will only be content with organizational development (protoscripts) that is (are) in line with the goals of an action learning program, as we assume these goals to be in line with organizational strategies and goals (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a). However, protoscripts that are not in line with these goals will probably also materialize in an organization, although specific management control measures may be used to reduce the possibility (Anthony and Govindarajan 1995). Therefore, it is not too heroic to assume that protoscripts may arise in an action learning program that do not support organizational goals at all, even though they help to solve the problem at hand. New or adapted protoscripts therefore do not unequivocally have positive effects on the solution of a problem. This should be kept in mind when reading chapter 3, where we will extend the abovementioned view. This will lead to insights that will subsequently be analyzed in chapter 4.

1.5 Chapter Overview The remainder of this research is organized as follows. Chapter 2 tries to clarify some of the concepts used in section 1.1. We will examine questions such as: how did action learning occur? How can we study personal and organizational development? How do ‘learning organizations’ fit into the action learning picture? In chapter 3 we will list and discuss the conditions that, in our view, underlie personal and organizational development. This will generate a specific, theoretically informed relationship that will be analyzed in chapter 4. Chapter 4 includes several case studies with which the aforementioned relationship will be compared. After this, the implications of our analysis for our research questions will be assessed, both at the individual case level and across

16


cases. We will also discuss some of the drawbacks of our research and list possibilities for further research. Finally, in chapter 5 a summary is given.

17


2. A

ction Learning Foundations

2.1 Introduction Since it is not clearly defined (Ashton 2006, De Loo 2002, Dilworth and Willis 2003, Harrison 1996, Koo 1999), many problem-solving and learning approaches today are called ‘action learning’ (Wallace 1990, Weinstein 2002, Zuber-Skerritt 2002). For example, the theories on single, double-loop and deutero-learning of Argyris and Schön (1978, 1996)1 and the way Paulo Freire educated oppressed workers in South-America (Freire 1972) are sometimes considered to be manifestations of action learning, even though the authors in question did not establish this connection. Boshyk (2000, 2002) tries to categorize various action learning approaches and makes a distinction between Revans’s approach, a number of individual approaches (such as those of Krystyna Weinstein2 and Michael Marquardt3), and the ‘business-driven action learning approach’ on which Boshyk focuses. Although it is not denied that all of these approaches combine aspects of action and learning, and occasionally also of reflection, they do not fully correspond to what Reg Revans calls ‘action learning’, except for some of the individual approaches (Dilworth and Willis 2003, Donnenberg and De Loo 2004, Willis 2004). For example, Boshyk’s business-driven action learning approach comprises ‘best practice’ training programs for executive managers. Many of these programs use existing case materials and allow managers who temporarily have no management function to participate in an action learning set. On the one hand, the broad range of action learning approaches in practice 1

Note that Argyris and Schön’s (1978) notion of deutero-learning resembles ‘learning to learn’,

which is sometimes used to describe some of the effects of action learning (West and Choueke 2003). According to Argyris and Schön (1978), deutero-learning is the ability of an organization to thoroughly reflect on its processes, so that an environment in which single and double-loop learning flourish can be created. Note that Gregory Bateson coined ‘deutero-learning’ in 1942. Like Argyris and Schön (1978), he distinguished several intertwined learning processes with different levels of complexity (Bateson 1972, Juch 1983). Juch (ibid.) asserts that action learning is unlikely to bring deutero-learning (or ‘learning to learn’) within range, no matter what is claimed in the literature, because in practice the solution of a problem will be more important for an organization than reflecting on the processes that led to this. Given time and financial constraints, the latter will mostly be skipped. 2

See Weinstein (1999).

3

See Marquardt (2001).

19


is understandable, as Revans never exactly stated what the approach encompassed (Dilworth and Willis 2003, Koo 1999, Mumford 1995, Revans 1982, Zuber-Skerritt 2002), because he thought it would otherwise become a consultancy tool or ‘gadget’ for management professors (Pedler, Brook and Burgoyne 2003, Revans 1998a). It has become this nonetheless. On the other hand, Wallace (1990) and Willis (2004) think that it matters whether an activity or program is called ‘action learning’ or not, as some key elements will always be necessary to reap the benefits of the approach. Any program that calls itself action learning should contain these elements (which, as stated, have not been fully codified. This is an additional problem). Note that Dilworth and Willis (2003), Lewis and Marsh (1987), Mumford (1995), Pedler, Burgoyne and Brook (2005), Smith and O’Neil (2003) and Willis (2004) have tried to distill these. These authors, however, do not clearly indicate, with the exception of Dilworth and Willis (2003) and Willis (2004), how their action learning characteristics have been derived. We will analyze our own set of characteristics in chapter 3. As we find it unethical to call an approach ‘action learning’ if it does not follow some basic principles (Revans 1984, Wallace 1990, Willis 2004), and since Reg Revans is considered the founder of action learning (as he set himself to the task of practicing it for many years and writing down his thoughts and experiences), the remainder of this study will examine action learning from his perspective (Cunningham 1993, Pedler 1997a, Revans 1982)4. The fact that we do not define action learning yet does not hinder the subsequent analysis, if we assume that there is a core set of principles underlying action learning that has never changed (Wallace 1990). As stated, action learning supposedly leads to personal and organizational development. That action learning results in personal development has been illustrated in numerous studies (Casey and Pearce 1977, Revans 1980, Weinstein 1999, Yorks et al. 1998). Some studies argue that action learning results in organizational development as well (Casey and Pearce 1977, McLaughlin and Thorpe 1993, Revans 1985). However, we illustrated in chapter 1 that there is ample evidence that suggests that action learning sometimes fails to achieve organizational development, although personal development may be substantial (Harrison 1996, Parkes 1998, Wallace 1990, Weinstein 1994). This, however, does

4

Other approaches to learning besides the aforementioned that bear resemblance to action

learning include Vaivio’s emergent learning processes (Vaivio 1999) and Likert’s System 4 (Likert 1967, 1973). Note that, according to Marsick and O’Neil (1999), we will focus on the ‘scientific school’ of action learning.

20


not have to imply that it is theoretically impossible5. In fact, how is the relationship between personal and organizational development defined in the action learning literature? How do ‘learning organizations’ fit into the picture? Should, taking a purely theoretical perspective, action learning really result in personal and organizational growth? This chapter tries to answer questions such as these. We will first examine how action learning contributes to solving organizational problems. In doing so, we will confront some of Revans’s ideas with educational theory (Revans 1971). This will lead to a discussion about learning organizations (Gherardi 2006, Tsang 1997). We will see how personal and organizational development can be studied by the ‘script’ concept taken from cognitive science (Abelson 1976). The insights gained in this way will be used in chapter 3 to examine the relationship between personal and organizational growth through action learning in greater detail.

2.2 Action Learning: Principles 2.2.1 Learning Equation In action learning, it is assumed that learning is crucial for the survival of individuals and organizations. The latter can only survive when they learn at least as fast as their environment changes. Revans (1980, 1982) formalizes this in the expression L ≥ C, in which L stands for the ‘rate of learning’ and C for the ‘rate of change’6. He describes the central theme of action learning as follows: “How do those facing the uncertainties of tomorrow help each other to reinterpret their experiences of yesterday?” (Revans 1984, p. 210) 5

Donnenberg and Melief (1995) find it a contradiction to examine the theory behind action

learning, for it is a method based on practice. However, not only does such a point of view leave much freedom as to what action learning really is, means and implies, it also prohibits the method from getting more fully developed (as it has no solid foundation). 6

Note that Weinstein (1999), among others, thinks that the expression reads L > C, which is not

the case. Strictly speaking, if an organization ‘solely’ wants to survive (and not move forward), its rate of learning can be equal to the rate of environmental change, or L = C. Pedler (1997a) uses the same expression as Weinstein (1999) but looks specifically at organizations that flourish. In such a case, L > C represents Revans’s (1980, 1982) notions correctly (but not completely). Other authors have expressed similar ideas about organizational change and survival, albeit not in relation to action learning. Examples include Danneels (2002), Henri (2006), and Nevis, Dibella and Gould (1995).

21


Note the links with sensemaking (Weick and Quinn 1999) and sustainability (Buchanan et al. 2005) that are contained in this statement. In order to show how the central theme of action learning may be accommodated, Revans puts forward the 'learning equation': L = P+Q (Revans 1982). In this equation, learning (L), which does not stand for ‘rate of learning’ now, is a combination of programmed knowledge (P) and insights gained through critical questioning (Q). Programmed knowledge is knowledge that is contained in someone’s memory in a fixed arrangement. Gained insights are courses of action that are developed or discovered when people perform certain tasks, think about them continuously, and ask questions to proceed (Weinstein 1999). Thereby, the arrangement of what is held in memory will change because personal imagination and creativity are unleashed (Revans 1971, 1984)7. According to Revans (1971, 1998a), lasting behavioral change (L) can only be achieved through questioned insights (Q). This occurs when employees are exposed to real-life problems for which no clear-cut solutions exist. Acquiring new knowledge (P) will help to find a solution for these problems, but it is not essential (Revans 1982, 1983). In due course, action learning participants will absorb views different from their own and question and change their assumptions and behavior. Consequently, personal growth will be achieved, which in turn may lead to organizational growth (Garratt 1983, Revans 1971, 1998a). We argue that depending on the problem at hand, gained insights may be less important than new knowledge to tackle a problem, although the former will always play a role in an action learning program (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a, Dilworth and Willis 2003, Wilson 1999). Taken literally, the learning equation states that there is no interaction between P and Q. Wilson (1999) asserts that this is certainly not always the case. Donnenberg (2003) finds that every action learning program contains a combination of learning and instruction, which is either direct or indirect. The two cannot be disentangled. When a set advisor is talking to a set, he may implicitly be instructing its members without realizing this. A set can learn from this. One may therefore find the learning equation a little naive, simple perhaps (Weinstein 2002). Therefore, Mumford (1995) formulated another learning equation: Q1+P+Q2 = L. He believes that action learning programs start with 7

Note that the links established in this way between knowledge, insights, memory and action

conform to the ‘script’ concept that is introduced in section 2.4.

22


asking questions to solve managerial problems (Q1), which among others requires certain bodies of knowledge (P) that give rise to more detailed or even completely different questions (Q2). Learning will ultimately result from this. However, learning is not a very complex process in Mumford’s learning equation, even though he acknowledges that this is often the case in practice. Marquardt (2001) also proposes a different learning equation. He thinks that L = P+Q+R+I, in which R stands for reflection (recalling, making sense, trying to understand events, etc.) and I for the implementation of chosen solutions. Marquardt, perhaps following Boddy (1979), asserts that the implementation of action learning solutions must be part of a contract between an organization and an action learning set, which is drawn up before a program starts. But again, the learning equation is presented as an addition. The same holds for Sutton (1989), who defines learning as L = P+Q+E, in which E stands for revised experience (every action that is undertaken is an experience that leads to a reconsideration of existing experiences). Presenting the learning equation in additive form suggests that separate measurements of P and Q are possible. This is obviously not the case, especially for Q (Donnenberg 2003). Smith (1997) proposes a non-additive learning equation: L = f (QP,QE,QL). In this equation, the various Q’s stand for insightful set action regarding what is believed, what is eventuating and what is learned respectively. We believe that a more simple learning equation may be sufficient as well and suggest expressing L as a function of P and Q without suggesting how P and Q are to be combined if learning is to take place, for very little is known or can be said about this anyway. Thus, L = f (P,Q). That way, P is included in the equation (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a, Revans 1976) and the fact that the influence of implicit and explicit instruction on personal and organizational learning cannot be analyzed separately, structurally or independently (Donnenberg ibid.) is taken into account more explicitly than Smith (1997) does8. Given the predominance of gained insights in action learning, Revans (1971) thinks that action learning participants should be confronted with problems that occur outside their everyday realm but which may be relevant for their organization. In order to make these problems more challenging, action learning programs should, if possible, include personnel exchange. Employees should 8

Dilworth and Willis (2003) arrive at the equation L = f (P+Q), which mathematically speaking is

a pleonasm. Revans (1982) also lists the equation we end up with, but seems to believe that it is well approximated by L = P+Q.

23


temporarily be placed in another organization than their own, apart from only having to deal with another person’s problem(s). That way, learning processes may be more effective, since people will more easily diverge from their ‘normal’ behavior. When ‘normal’ behavior is not challenged, the result will be routine behavior, and the impact of gained insights on personal and organizational development will weaken (Cunningham 1993, Revans 1971). In case personnel exchange takes place we may find there is: “… collective as well as occasional learning, institutional and social as well as personal and individual development.” (Revans ibid., p. xvi) Marquardt (2001) distinguishes two types of action learning programs: programs in which each set member has a problem of his own to work on (called ‘openset, multiple-task programs’), and programs in which a set as a whole tackles a single problem (called ‘single-project programs’). Of the two, open-set, multiple task programs are the most common in practice (Bourner and Frost 1996, Donnenberg 2003, Rijnsburger 2003, Rol 2003). As far as the structure of such an action learning program is concerned, there are no strict guidelines to follow. We already mentioned this in the first chapter. However, generally speaking, the following phases can be distinguished in an action learning program (Revans 1971, 1982): •

An introductory phase (which may comprise coursework, workshops, lectures, etc.);

•

A diagnostic phase (in which a problem is assessed);

•

A phase in which information or people are exchanged between organizations;

•

An action phase (in which both action and reflection take place, focusing on the [set of] problem[s] at hand).

The diagnostic and action phase take the most time in an action learning program. Programs typically last, depending on the problem(s) that is (are) tackled, between six months and two years (Revans 1971, 1976), with an average of a year (Revans 1982). Donnenberg (2003), Rijnsburger (2003) and Rol (2003) all find nine months a manageable length if regular work processes are not to be disrupted and the problem(s) under consideration are to remain relevant. Donnenberg (2003) and Rol (2003) prefer to start a program with a kick-off meeting in which an organization’s senior management is involved, and end it with a closing conference. If necessary, a conference can be organized

24


halfway through. Incentives are therefore provided to set members to work seriously on a problem. In the next sections, we will describe how Revans may have developed his personal views on action learning (as far as this is possible, given the lack of information on this subject in his publications and the changes in his views over time9). We will discuss, in reverse order, the probably most important action learning program Revans was involved in, his background, and the specific action learning approach that followed from this: the system approach. The system approach is not often discussed in action learning publications, notable exceptions being Dilworth (1998) and Dilworth and Willis (2003). However, it sketches Revans’s views on personal and organizational development (albeit not in great detail). Therefore we find it necessary to devote considerable attention to it below. We will see that this leads to a discussion about the learning aspects of action learning in relation to educational theory and learning organizations. We will distill our own view on personal and organizational development, in particular in section 2.4 and chapter 3, from this discussion, and use it later on in this research. However, as stated, we need to discuss Revans’s system approach first to achieve this (Revans 1971, 1982)10.

2.2.2 System Approach 2.2.2.1 Introduction According to Boddy (1979), Dilworth and Willis (2003) and Weinstein (2002), who quote from several of Reg Revans’s works, action learning can either be used in a manager’s own work setting or not. Both familiar and unfamiliar problems can be treated. This would imply that action learning is useful in all types of situations for all kinds of problems, which is obviously not the case (De Loo 2006). For example, Zuber-Skerritt (2002) prefers to use action learning in unfamiliar surroundings and for unfamiliar problems. Revans sometimes changed his opinion about this aspect as well as about other aspects of action learning, even within a single publication (Revans 1982, 1998a), but without stating why. This complicates empirical research on the subject, as we will see in chapter 3.

9

This will become especially important in chapter 3.

10

Note that this is the only reason why we discuss the system approach. It will not be the focus

of our empirical research, as will become clear in chapter 3.

25


In order to illustrate the system approach, let us assume that a manager participates in an action learning program in which problems of other managers are tackled. These problems resemble the future problems the manager may face in his own work, so that solving them is likely to require some of the competencies acquired in the action learning program. When a manager, in the course of this program, is confronted with problems belonging to other managers, there are two ways in which organizational goals can be served. De Loo and Verstegen (2001a) list these: “Firstly, the action learning program may lead to new insights or avenues for solving the problem that is used in the action learning situation. Secondly, the action learning program could lead to the transfer of knowledge, attitudes or capabilities to the problems the manager meets in his own working situation (Kriwet, 1997). Then the action learning program would contribute to the solution of future problems serving organizational goals.” (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a, p. 58) In either case, a far transfer will be accomplished (Royer 1979)11, although in the latter case its effects will be more far-reaching and, relatively speaking, more personal and organizational development will occur. Revans (1971, 1982) describes how he thinks the ensuing processes work in practice. He uses what is known as the ‘system approach’ of system alpha, beta and gamma to show this12. The approach, which closely resembles the cybernetic view on management control (Anthony 1965, 1988, Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant 1990, Jans and van Nimwegen 1985, Otley and Berry 1980, Whitley 1999), will be outlined below. Note that all of Revans’s systems focus on individual managers who have to tackle a problem. If they experience growth, it is likely that their own (or, in case of personnel exchange, also another) organization will experience this as well (Revans 1971). Revans never described in detail how he established the system approach. The separate systems were introduced in their entirety (Revans 1982). For scientific research purposes they are therefore difficult to use, although one could try to substantiate them. However, this is not the focus of this research, as we may recall from section 1.2.

11

Of course, far transfers can only be achieved at the personal level and not at the

organizational level. 12

Revans calls these systems ‘paradigms’. Whether they would still be called paradigms today

can be challenged (Kuhn 1970).

26


2.2.2.2 System Alpha System alpha depicts the preferences of a manager and the internal and external factors he takes into account when designing his decisions13. It is assumed that some kind of output is required for which certain inputs have to be used. As there usually is more than one way to achieve this output, the personal preferences of a manager will play a role in deciding which inputs he will use, and which set of decisions he will consider in the process. System alpha contains a three-step procedure in which organizational and managerial goals are continuously compared and, if necessary, changed. Revans (1971) tells us the following about these steps: “… every manager or board of management explore three sets of ideas [in system alpha]. In classical decision theory they reflect the elements first, of utility, choice, preference (managerial values); second, of problem, opportunity, state of nature (external system); and third, of resources, actions, means (internal system).” (p. 34) By applying system alpha, managers see what is going on in their environment and determine which actions they can undertake and when they can do this to keep their organization competitive. Revans calls system alpha ‘universal’, because he believes that managers at all levels in an organization either implicitly or explicitly use the system when designing their decisions. For example, factory owners may want to maximize sales (their managerial decision value), but have to do this given customer needs (their external system) and the available men and machinery (their internal system). A board of directors may wish to ensure growth (its managerial decision value), but has to consider its rivals and suppliers (its external system) and the take-over power of coalitions in the organization (its internal system). Etc. System alpha is not new, and Revans (ibid.) acknowledges its similarities to classical decision theory (as mentioned above), operations research models (Cunningham 1993, Waddington 1973), and theorems of speed, allocation and delay14 (Revans 1958). Revans was very much influenced by operations research

13

Revans (1971) calls this “(…) the design of a strategy (…)” (p. 29).

14

Systems of speed, allocation and delay try to determine, among others, how managers spend

their time given their capacity, the tasks they have to accomplish, and the priorities of these

27


in the 1950s and 1960s (Pedler, Burgoyne and Brook 2005, Revans 1965). The models of Abraham Wald (Revans 1971) were of particular importance to him. Revans’s idea to place managers in multidisciplinary teams with sometimes very different origins stems from this (Revans 1965). About the latter he has said that: “Operational research, from its complex nature, is nearly always carried out by teams of workers; it would be seizing an educational opportunity to offer our junior managers a temporary assignment on such a team. For the organic approach of operational research, ranging over the whole field of management activity, with its efforts to identify problems, its insistence in doing so both upon the maximum of observational evidence and upon understanding the motives and values of those involved in them; all this and more carried out by persons of different professional training working as a group, tries to record, after the manner of a slow motion film, the full complexity of the problem.” (ibid., pp. 65-66). Unfortunately, Revans never indicated how all the theories and concepts that underlie system alpha are interrelated. Nevertheless: “… to recognize the three elements of system alpha, and to trace them in any decision whatever, are cardinal tasks for every person carrying responsibility for the work of others.” (Revans 1971, p. 36) How the decision space of a manager in which system alpha operates is shaped is studied in system beta.

2.2.2.3 System Beta In system beta information is collected that helps managers to find a solution for a problem15. The system operates in conjunction with system alpha for Revans (1971) defines the practical value of a solution as how well it stands up against influencing a particular situation. The solution that is finally chosen is the result of negotiations between stakeholders. tasks. A manager can, on the basis of this information, decide which tasks he handles himself and which he leaves to others. 15

Revans (1971) calls this “(…) the negotiation of (…) [a] strategy (…)” (p. 29).

28


System beta consists of a cycle of five steps. These steps are: •

A survey of all the design elements of system alpha;

•

A trial decision stage in which a specific (combination of) design(s) is selected;

•

An action stage in which the chosen design(s) is (are) implemented;

•

An audit stage in which the results of the implementation are examined;

•

A control stage in which it is determined if, how, when and where additional actions need to be taken.

Note the similarities between system beta and the scientific method, which Revans (1965) has called16: “… the greatest, if not the sole, original contribution of western European civilisation to human achievement.” (p. 70) After all, system beta contains elements of observation, hypothesis formation, experimentation, inspection and consolidation, and is supposed to lead to the acceptance, rejection or re-examination of the hypotheses (possible solutions) that are thus found. It has been suggested that Revans’s interest in the scientific method at least partly stems from his work with Ernest Rutherford in Cambridge and his enthusiasm for operations research (Levy and Delahoussaye 2000, Revans 1965). In operations research, problem solving tends to follow distinct and generally accepted consecutive steps derived from the scientific method (Waddington 1973)17. However, system beta is not a copy of the scientific method but an adaptation. Firstly, system beta is meant to be used in management settings, whereas the scientific method may be applied in many other settings, for example in natural sciences. Furthermore, contrary to the scientific method, system beta does not intend to offer scientific knowledge, but insights that can help to solve practical problems in such a way that employees and organizations 16

There is an interesting figure in Revans (1971) (figure 5) that highlights these similarities and

couples them with managerial learning. As we believe the figure would take us too far astray at this point, it is not presented here. 17

Although these steps are also contained in action learning (in system beta), operations

research takes a more analytical approach to problem solving than action learning (Waddington 1973).

29


can learn (Revans 1971). Besides, scientific research protocols such as those listed by Yin (1989) do not have to be taken into account within the various steps of system beta, while this would be required by the scientific method. Revans (1965) acknowledges that this means that two major differences exist between the scientific method and the way he applies it in system beta. Firstly, the scientific method is often used to test a new theory in a controlled, experimental environment, whereas in management settings the environment in which a solution is to be implemented can hardly ever be controlled. Secondly and consequently, managers may be content with variations in results that would be intolerable in experimental settings. To illustrate how system beta works, consider a board of directors that wants to enhance an organization’s reputation and that has to take into account its rivals and suppliers and the take-over powers prevailing in that organization. These elements are all contained in system alpha. The board may for example reconsider its logistics provider (which is part of the external system), because its employees often show up late and deliver bad quality products. In the survey stage of system beta, two alternatives are developed: the board can either switch to a new provider or try to reach an agreement with the current provider to be on time in the future and to deliver better quality goods. Quality standards may be discussed and implemented (for example in terms of ISO-norms). A search may be started for alternative providers meeting the standards set by the board. These are all courses of action that are contained in the trial decision stage of system beta. The board subsequently decides to switch providers, which comprises system beta’s action stage. However, some employees refuse to work with the new provider, because they had a good relationship with the previous provider and feel that it has been dismissed too easily. The internal system of the organization therefore calls for a reconsideration of the actions undertaken, which conforms to system beta’s audit stage. The board then decides that those unwilling to work with the new provider will be laid off, which is the outcome of system beta’s control stage. Ultimately, the tension drops and the organization is provided with better quality products, which help to strengthen its reputation (and perhaps ensure its growth). This ends system beta. What managers learn from the process outlined above, in which system alpha and beta work in conjunction, is assessed in system gamma.

30


2.2.2.4 System Gamma System gamma contains both system alpha and beta, and focuses on the capacity of managers to benefit from the steps taken in the previous systems through gained insights18. It is assumed that under certain conditions, which will be listed below, organization-wide benefits will arise from this. This may be the reason why Dilworth and Willis (2003) call system gamma the ‘growth medium’ of action learning. System gamma allows managers to study the relationship and interactions between single employees and their organization as a whole (Revans 1971)19. It is assumed that managers learn from the solutions they design and the actions they undertake in the situations they try to manage. System gamma can be represented as follows:

Figure 2.1

Schematic representation of system gamma (Revans ibid., p. 56).

18

Revans (1971) calls this “(…) the learning process of the strategists involved” (p. 29).

19

This illustrates that Revans (1982, 1998a) saw an organization as an evolving, living system.

This among others is in line with Senge’s (1992) view. Also refer to Anthony and Govindarajan (1995), who argue that system theorists see the universe as a hierarchy of systems of increasing complexity, ranging from atoms to supranational organizations. They state that systems can be characterized by their “(…) more or less rhythmic, recurring, coordinated series of steps that are intended to accomplish a specified purpose” (p. 7).

31


Figure 2.1 should be read from left to right, starting at the upper left corner (the actual problem that is to be tackled). System alpha is summarized on the right hand side of the picture, while system beta is shown left (in abbreviated form). The solution that is finally chosen to tackle a problem is not shown in the figure but should be placed right (besides the arrow pointing into that direction). Revisions of temporary solutions take place in system beta, but are not highlighted there. What the figure inexplicably does not show is the group (set) interaction as a vehicle for personal and organizational learning. In our view, this should be placed in the lower left corner of figure 2.1 (near, and interacting with, the ‘manager as a unique person’ box). In order to illustrate the figure, let us assume that a problem occurs in an organization that needs to be solved (upper left corner). Managers will never know all the details of this problem, as they only know their own perception of the problem that is based on the facts they collect (via system beta)20, which may be incomplete or colored by those who provide or generate the information (shown in the middle of figure 2.1) (Revans ibid.). The manager who has to solve a problem also brings to bear his own thoughts, norms, routines, habits, experiences, deliberations, biases, etc. in the analysis, and hopefully questions these along the way, so that (changes in) his way of thinking influence the way in which a problem is handled as well (via system alpha). Given the resources the manager has, and the way in which his solution may realize organizational goals (that are also contained in system alpha), a certain solution or design will be chosen, implemented, audited and, if necessary, revised via system beta (this solution and its revisions are, as stated, not shown in figure 2.1). In due course, managers will not only learn more about solving problems, but also about themselves and others, so that increased ‘self-awareness’ and ‘peopleawareness’ is developed (Revans 1971, West and Choueke 2003). Personal growth can subsequently result in organizational growth (Revans 1971)21. An important condition to achieve growth is that: “… at the time of the local manager and the fellow [someone who participates in an action learning program] meeting to discuss some 20

This should be kept in mind when going through section 2.3.2.

21

Cunningham (1993) and Smith (1997) argue that action learning emphasizes personal rather

than organizational growth. However, Revans (1971, 1972, 1982, 1984), most certainly when discussing concrete action learning applications, always pays in-depth attention to organizational growth issues. That is why authors like Casey and Pearce (1977), Donnenberg and De Loo (2004) and Pedler (1997b) claim that organizational growth is the ‘true’ goal of action learning.

32


aspect of the project, they do succeed in directing their individual attentions significantly to the particular business in hand.” (Revans ibid., p. 60) Revans (ibid.), like Dilworth and Willis (2003), asserts that system gamma is the heart of action learning. Whenever a manager or any other employee, when applying system gamma, finds that a previously held view is inadequate and modifies it, his frame of reference changes, learning takes place, and personal development is achieved. It is asserted that organizational development occurs when someone is able to get his proposed solutions (which, since they follow system gamma, are in line with organizational goals) implemented in the organization he (temporarily) works for. In case a far transfer of someone’s newly acquired competencies is achieved, organizational development can occur in another organization as well. However, Revans (1971) states that it is useless to proceed with an action learning program if an organization does not recognize the importance of the problems it is faced with, if it is unwilling to change, or provides an action learning participant with little or no support22. This is another reason why no organizational development may be achieved in an action learning program23. Should the communications or the support a manager has in an organization be insufficient for him to act upon and implement his designed solutions ‘properly’, “(…) the program is misconceived” (Revans 1971, p. 61). At least in Revans’s system approach, these are the only two reasons why action learning programs can fail. In order to see how the aforementioned views on personal and organizational growth through action learning came about, we have to examine Reg Revans’s background and some of the theories that Willis (2004) believes underlie action learning. We will do this in the next sections. Our main argument will be that Revans’s ideas on personal and organizational growth were firmly rooted in constructivist educational theories, which among others took hold because of his 22

Revans (1998a) argues that an organization’s senior management should seek active

cooperation in an action learning program and encourage attentiveness. It should refrain from ‘circumspect alliances’, ‘non-hostile skepticism’, ‘lack of interest’, ‘manipulative guidance’, ‘tactical procrastination’, ‘diagnostic inflexibility’, ‘evasion and vacillation’, ‘directive autocracy’ and ‘defense rationalization’. These are manifestations of what we have mentioned in the main text. 23

Revans (1982) states this as follows: “(…) the main blockages to successful [organizational]

change in their [the participants’] receiving enterprises were among the coalitions of power nominally in command of them” (p. 430, italics included in the original publication).

33


dismay with general educational practices in the 1950 and 1960s and his personal involvement in a specific action learning program of the Belgian Fondation Industrie-Université in the late 1960s.

2.3 Action Learning: Inspirations 2.3.1 Background of Reg Revans Reg Revans was born in Portsmouth, in the U.K., on May 14th 1907. He was trained as an astrophysicist by Ernest Rutherford and Sir J.J. Thomson at Cavendish Laboratory, the University of Cambridge’s Department of Physics, from 1928 onwards (Dilworth 1998, Revans 1982). In Cambridge, Revans got in touch with Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein and Milton Keynes among others, as the Cavendish Laboratory held weekly seminars led by Nobel Prize winner Thomason, with whom Revans was studying for his doctoral dissertation, in which these researchers discussed their progress, questions and doubts (Dilworth and Willis 2003). This prompted Revans to discuss his questions and doubts in a group setting as well (Levy and Delahoussaye 2000)24. Furthermore, Revans was inspired by Sir John Sargent’s writings on education from the early 1930s, in which the need to incorporate field practice in teaching programs was stressed (Revans 1982). Annoyed by the prospects of nuclear research, Revans left Cambridge in 1935 and became Deputy Chief Officer of Education for the Essex County Council, where he was asked to make plans for the education and training of mining personnel (Revans 1984). In October 1945, after having visited some of these mines, he expressed the need for managers to learn with and from each other in difficult times (Revans 1982). Among others, he claimed that university staff did not need to be involved in this (Revans 1984). Revans subsequently devoted his attention almost entirely to what was to be called ‘action learning’. He conducted one of his most renowned action learning programs in February 1954 when he was Director of Education of the British National Coal Board (Marsick and Watkins 1999)25. The program lasted until November 1956 and aimed to reorganize the coalmines in a way that would be acceptable for mining personnel. The success of the program led to Revans’s 24

Revans has said that with the sinking of the Titanic, an event that was analyzed by his father,

who was His Majesty’s Principal Surveyor of Mercantile Shipping, his interest in questioned insights began (Levy and Delahoussaye ibid.). 25

Revans (1982) asserts that the National Association of Colliery Managers conducted the very

first action learning program in 1952.

34


involvement in many other action learning programs, among others in Nigerian copper mills and London hospitals (Revans 1972, 1976). Of particular importance to him were the action learning programs of the Belgian Fondation IndustrieUniversité (Levy and Delahoussaye 2000, Revans 1976, 1998a). Revans was extremely impressed by their success and by the Fondation itself (Talpaert 1981). Revans devoted an entire book to his involvement in the Fondation’s first program (Revans 1971) and regularly referred to it later on (Revans 1976, 1998a). In Revans (1982), he acknowledges the impact the Belgian initiative had on his ideas on action learning. Nevertheless, perhaps deliberately, Revans downplayed some of its difficulties. For example, Talpaert (2005) asserts that: “(…) there were quite some difficulties to convince companies to free a (future) high level manager for a full year – also, in some cases, to accept that someone from another company (even not in direct competition) …[had] access to the internal problems of the organization.” Difficulties such as these may explain why many action learning programs today are conducted within a firm instead of by groups of firms (Bourner and Frost 1996). Revans got involved in the Fondation Industrie-Université in March 1968 (Revans 1971). However, the Fondation itself, which was officially called the ‘Fondation Industrie-Université pour le Dévelopment des Dirigeants d’Entreprises’, had been established in February 1956 in an attempt to overcome the management education gap that presumably existed between Belgium and the U.S. (Bertrams 2001, Vlerick 1965)26. Belgian managers had had virtually no management education in those days, but rather had a background in engineering or law (Talpaert 2000). This seemed to be one of the main reasons for the productivity gap at the time between Belgium and the U.S. (Bertrams 2001, Dilworth 1998). The Fondation was involved in one of the first European initiatives to organize 26

Although examining the Dutch situation, van Baalen (1995) notes that in the mid-1950s

‘management education’ was a general, undefined term. He nevertheless asserts that it firstly involved an attempt to de-specialize universities, which had become highly fragmented at the time. In addition, management education aimed to integrate knowledge domains from the technical, economic and social sciences. Van Baalen states that business schools in the U.S. had gone through similar crises as European universities. In the U.S., business schools became fragmented in the late 1950s. This changed in the early 1960s due to the New Look program, which was completed in 1965. Van Baalen believes that the view that management education in the U.S. had a major advantage over management education in Europe is incorrect.

35


business administration education in universities (Talpaert 2000). With grants from primarily private enterprises, the Belgian government, and the U.S. Ford Foundation27, and at times spurred on by the OECD (Talpaert 1981, 2000), exchange programs with American universities and business schools were established, in which both students and managers participated28. As a consequence, U.S. management techniques began to be taught at Belgian universities, although less extensively than the Fondation may have wished (Bertrams 2001, 2004, Magat 1979). The Fondation was led by Gaston Deurinck, a civil engineer who had graduated from the University of Louvain in 1947 and who apparently was a great networker (Bertrams 2001)29. Among others, he helped to set up regional university-based training centers in which managers could assimilate, mainly through lectures and seminars given by university specialists, U.S. management procedures and techniques. The Fondation did not expect these techniques to be copied, but rather hoped that their introduction would fertilize existing management practices (Bertrams 2004). In 1964 however, the Fondation concluded that its recently established training centers had no more ideas on how to face upcoming business challenges, as their input primarily stemmed from universities for which these challenges were not a crucial issue yet (Bertrams 2001, 2004)30. Therefore, some members of the Fondation, including Deurinck, proposed to institutionalize management education in harmonized and centralized Belgian university programs31. This led to controversies between industries and universities, as well as to discussions within the Fondation (Bertrams ibid.). Possibly in an attempt to ease the tension, the Fondation got involved in action learning in 1968 (Bertrams 2004). Not much is known about the outcome of Revans’s involvement in the 1968 27

For a comprehensive overview of the history and activities of the Ford Foundation, see Magat

(1979). Also refer to footnote 32. 28

From 1953 onwards, there had been other attempts in Belgium to establish exchange programs

with and internships at American universities and business schools. However, these did not lead to different management approaches in corporate businesses (Bertrams 2004). 29

He also received much support from people both in- and outside of the Fondation, such as

Léon Bekaert, Emile Bernheim and André Vlerick (Bertrams 2004). 30

Reg Revans was dismayed by some of the practices of American business schools that had been

introduced in Belgium. Among others, case studies were used to teach students. Revans advanced action learning as an alternative to and an extension of case study analysis (Revans 1982). 31

This was perhaps inspired by the example set by the first European business school, L’Institut

Européen d’Administration des Affaires (INSEAD), which had been established in 1959 (Bertrams 2004). The Belgian experiences formed the basis of several master programs the Irish Management Institute and Trinity College Dublin offered in the 1970s (Revans 1982).

36


program, apart from what has been written in Revans (1971), let alone that the institution often subsequently resorted to action learning. The first program could be conducted because of a one million U.S. dollar research project the Fondation had been granted32 (Talpaert 2000). The Fondation seems to have organized at least three action learning programs (Revans 1982). Revans replicated the format in Egypt and later on in several other Middle Eastern countries (Revans ibid.). Talpaert (2005) asserts that the main reason to stop with action learning was that it was not possible to convince a sufficient number of participants holding a higher management position in an organization to participate in a new program, nor was it possible to convince the organizations themselves. Action learning has nonetheless been used by many Belgian companies without the Fondation’s involvement (Revans 1985, Talpaert 2005). After management education, in accordance with Deurinck’s views, had become institutionalized in 1981, the necessity to have separate regional training centers (some of which had been closed already) decreased (Bertrams 2001). The Fondation’s influence on industry-university relations in Belgium was therefore reduced (Bertrams ibid.), which contributed to its subsequent demise in 1995 (Bertrams 2005). A spin-off of the Fondation called ‘Fondation de l'Entreprise’ was operational until at least in 2001. Although it still exists (Talpaert 2005), Bertrams (2005) states that this Fondation has been inactive since Gaston Deurinck’s death in February 200033. Through the action learning initiatives of the Fondation Industrie-Université Revans received the recognition he was trying to achieve in the academic world in the U.K., although without success. The fact that Revans was fascinated by both these and other Belgian action learning programs is underlined in some of his writings, although he seems to attribute a too large influence to action 32

Following van Baalen (1995), we think this project was an outgrowth of the ‘European

Management Education Program’ that the Ford Foundation set up in 1967. Between 1967 and 1975, about 9 million U.S. dollars were invested in initiatives that aimed to bridge the apparent management gap between Europe and the U.S. (Magat 1979). Special attention was given to the introduction of the MBA-model in Europe (van Baalen 1995). For more details, see case 13 in Magat (1979), in which it is argued that the aforementioned grant had a large impact on management education in Europe. 33

Refer to http://www.ucl.ac.be/CE/com225.html and

http://www.kbr.be/bb/nl/nlsep2001/n01zzzru.html for details. For a detailed overview of the way in which the Fondation Industrie-Université came about and the activities it was involved in until 1970, see Bertrams (2001). Talpaert (1981) contains an evaluation of the Fondation’s activities, written at the time of its 25th anniversary.

37


learning as the main source of Belgium’s economic performance (Revans 1980, 1985). Nevertheless, Revans’s track record in Belgium is impressive (Levy and Delahoussaye 2000). In addition to his involvement in the Fondation Industrie-Université, Revans was Professor of Industrial Administration at Manchester’s College of Science and Technology, Director of Management Training Programs at the Manchester Institute of Technology, research fellow and (second) chairman of the European Association of Management Training Centres34 (Talpaert 2005), and president of A.L.P. International35. He also was an honorable member of the I.F.A.L., the worldwide International Foundation for Action Learning. Reg Revans passed away on January 8th 2003.

2.3.2 Educational Theory 2.3.2.1 Introduction Revans (1976) states that action learning is not new and builds on concepts and ideas that either seem intuitively correct or have proven their usefulness in other problem-solving and learning situations. Which concepts and ideas exactly underlie action learning, and more specifically Revans’s system approach? Unfortunately, Revans hardly ever mentioned these concepts and ideas explicitly or in an all-embracing fashion, and most certainly never discussed their interconnections (Revans 1971, 1982). In the literature, casual references have among others been made to classical decision and learning theories (Revans 1971), cybernetics (Dilworth and Willis 2003), Buddhism (Cederholm 2002, Revans 1982) and the Bible (Revans 1982). Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how they found their way in action learning. Some of them were probably no more than personal inspirations for Revans (like the Bible), or a stimulus after the approach had been established (like Buddhism). Other concepts and ideas were somehow included in the system approach (such as classical decision theory, which is contained in system alpha, and cybernetics, which is contained in both system alpha and beta). Willis (2004) believes that:

34

Gaston Deurinck, the head of the Fondation Industrie-Université, was an important member of

this organization as well. The Ford Foundation was one of its financial supporters (Bertrams 2001). 35

This organization was devoted to spreading and applying action learning in the U.K.

38


“To appreciate fully how wide a net he [Revans] cast to articulate his theory would seem to require a rather sophisticated knowledge of general systems theory, socio-technical systems theory, management and organization theories, theories of education and how people learn, theories of group dynamics and human relations, and certainly considerable understanding of how and why the scientific method works. Revans was versed in all of these.” (pp. 13-14, italics added) Regrettably, Willis does not explicate how the aforementioned theories were combined in action learning. In fact, this is impossible to determine because of the lack of information about this in Revans’s writings (Revans 1982). This begs the question how consciously Revans used the aforementioned theories himself when developing his system approach, and whether action learning is not, by and large, eclectic. This may be why there are authors who argue that action learning is mainly rooted in practice and not based on specific concepts and theories (Donnenberg and Melief 1995), although it certainly is not a-theoretical (Dilworth and Willis 2003, Revans 1982). Despite the fact that Revans never mentioned all concepts, theories, ideas and interconnections that shaped action learning, we would nevertheless, in the light of our discussion on learning organizations in section 2.4, like to examine some of the ideas on how people learn, which Revans (1971, 1982) superficially addressed, that may be contained in action learning. We believe that the emphasis on personal and organizational learning in action learning stems from Revans’s fascination with education from the 1930s onwards36, as well as from his work for the Essex County Council and his interest in the writings of John Dewey and Jean Piaget (Revans 198237). Educational theory is a body of knowledge that primarily examines how individuals learn and can be stimulated to learn. This section gives an overview of some of the literature in order to see how far its ideas may be contained in action learning. Note that it is not our intention to present a full-fledged account of all the prevailing principles, concepts and ideas. For example, Bruner (1990) and Marquardt and Waddill (2004) provide a much broader overview than 36

Refer to section 2.3.1 for details.

37

This is in fact the only case we know of where Revans made a detailed connection between

specific theories and concepts and his own view on action learning. See article 51, which is entitled ‘Action Learning and Epistemology’. A more casual reference to educational theory is given in Revans (1971).

39


we do. However, our analysis is much more in-depth and specifically tailored to Revans (1971, 1982, 1998a).

2.3.2.2 Constructivism A distinction that is made in the educational theory literature, which is also useful in relation to action learning (Marquardt and Waddill 2004), is that between ‘objectivist’ and ‘constructivist’ theories (Duffy and Jonassen 1991)38. Objectivist theories claim that most knowledge is expert knowledge, which can be distilled from an observable reality as long as someone is objective (however that can be accomplished) (Willis 1995). Gathered knowledge can be split up in small ‘chunks’ that can be taught in a classroom setting by experienced teachers using techniques of direct instruction (Fosnot 1996). Constructivist theories argue that since nobody knows the ‘factual’ reality, as we only know our perception of this reality based on our own observations, past, culture and surroundings, and as all knowledge is continuously (re)constructed from our interactions with the environment through which both we and the environment develop, it is entirely subjective. Therefore, objective knowledge and decisions do not exist39, let alone that knowledge can be split up and effectively taught by direct instruction. At the very least, environmental and social aspects have to be considered in the process (Dewey 1999, Vygotsky 1978). Constructivists think that student-oriented learning, in which students can return to, reflect on, and possibly alter previously held assumptions, knowledge and points of view is a more viable starting point for personal learning and growth than the objectivists’ view (Marler 1975). ‘Reflective practitioners’ may be formed through the social creation of knowledge and the discourses that occur in the exploration of that knowledge, leading to shared consensuses among practitioners (Schön 1983).

38

Of course, other classifications can be found as well. For example, Fosnot (1996) discerns

‘behaviorism’ (which is similar to what Duffy and Jonassen 1991 call ‘objectivism’) and ‘constructivism’, and refers to educational theories that contain aspects of both behaviorism and constructivism as ‘maturationism’. Dykstra (1996) distinguishes ‘transmissionist/realist’ theories and ‘constructivist/non-positivist’ theories. For more information about classifications such as these, see Willis (1995). 39

Unless it is given a different meaning than objectivists usually do. Objectivism in constructivist

analyses is about the sharing of subjective perceptions about a phenomenon by a group of persons in a specific context (Marler 1975, Popper 1972, Willis 1995).

40


Objectivist theories were very influential in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (Fosnot 1996). Ever since, constructivist theories have become more popular, although some authors claim that this was the case in writing but not in practice, especially not in education (Mumford 1995). Marler (1975) states that constructivism: “… involves examination with people, decision-making with people, action with people and evaluation with people. In these transactions we create the only possible environment adequate to constructing the richest human nature for both the individual and the species.” (p. 80) Osterman and Kottkamp (1993) concur with this and state that: “Learning … is most effective when the learner is actively involved in the learning process, when it takes place as a collaborative … activity, and when it takes place in a context relevant to the learner.” (p. 20, italics added)

Von Glasersfeld (1996) asserts that the key notion of constructivism, namely that knowledge is not a copy of an independent reality but rather has an adaptive and stabilizing function, was launched by Jean Piaget. Piaget took the notion of adaptation and equilibration from biology when he was studying snail forms (Fosnot 1996). Adaptation involves two processes: assimilation and accommodation. People may firstly interpret experiences in terms of what they already know. In that case, an experience is assimilated. If this leads to problems, people will try to accommodate this by revising what is known already or by introducing something new. This is called ‘accommodation’. The balance between assimilation and accommodation is called ‘adaptation’. In constructivism, learning is regarded as an ongoing adaptation between new knowledge and prior experiences (von Glasersfeld 1996)40. Turn-taking dialogue can stretch and challenge cognitive responses when people give each other new possibilities to consider, given the social environment that they operate in (Fosnot 1996). By doing so, observed reality will actively be constructed by the mind and mediated by personal interpretative frameworks. As human senses are by definition unreliable and only consensus between groups of individuals can be 40

The expression L ≥ C that was introduced in section 2.2.1 illustrates that learning in action

learning is also interpreted as development through adaptation.

41


achieved, the ‘real world’ or ‘truth’ does not exist, although a general consensus that is carried by many may be interpreted as such (Olssen 1996). Constructivism has, among others, led to the construction of ‘generative learning processes’ and ‘generative learning models’ (Osborne and Wittrock 1985, Wittrock 1974), in which the acquisition of knowledge presumes the involvement of an individual who puts his prior knowledge into practice in order to create new understandings, whilst having a “(…) goal directed consciousness” (Olssen 1996, p. 282). Generative learning models mainly examine how children develop their understanding of the world (Osborne and Wittrock 1985). However, the basic idea of generative learning is more extensive and tries to cover all forms of learning, as all individuals continuously develop, combine and reinterpret their experiences (Dewey 1999). Nevertheless, an important distinction between Osborne and Wittrock (1985) and Dewey (1999) is that the former interpret learning as an individual internalization mechanism, whereas Dewey more explicitly stresses the role of social interaction in this. Among others, Vygotsky (1978) and Lave and Wenger (1991) extend this view. As Aebli (1976) tells us (when referring to Dewey’s work): “(…) Jede Kenntnis, jede Operation, … muß einem Bedürfnis genügen, d. h. einer Frage entsprechen, die in einem natürlichen, lebendigen Zusammenhang entstanden ist. Wenn der neue Gedanke oder das neue Verhalten Gestalt angenommen hat, müssen beide der Prüfung in der Wirklichkeit unterworfen werden, sei es durch Anwendung, sei es durch experimentelle Kontrolle. Da das Denken ein Werkzeug ist, … [fordert] Dewey … daß … [mann] seiner zu bedienen lernt.” (p. 41) Note the links with system beta and the script concept introduced in section 2.4 that are contained in this statement. We may recall that system gamma, like generative learning models, not only stipulates goal-directedness (since managers want to solve their problems in line with organizational goals), but also that they work from their own perception of these problems based on the facts they gather. This clearly links action learning to constructivism, which, in more general terms, is acknowledged in the action learning literature (Levy and Delahoussaye 2000, Revans 1982). Nevertheless, some authors mysteriously claim otherwise (De Jong 1995). Occasionally, Revans expressed his admiration for psychologists like Jean Piaget and for pragmatists and pedagogics like John Dewey (Revans 1982). The fact that action learning follows constructivist theories, while objectivism was more or 42


less the ‘standard’ in instructional designs from the 1950s until the 1970s, must have made it difficult for Revans to establish action learning and to get it accepted in the academic world. In fact, he was not able to realize this. This must have frustrated him and may have led to his aversion of the academic world, even though in continental Europe, and especially in Belgium, he ultimately received support from academics41 (Levy and Delahoussaye 2000, Revans 1985). In 1976 Revans stated that: “… [the] evidence of maturity [of action learning] does not seem to make the idea of learning by doing42 any more readily understood and accepted; centres of education are, on the whole, poorly equipped for practical achievement, and often have no clear means for discriminating between taking action, on the one hand, and talking about action, on the other.” (Revans 1976, p. 169, italics included in the original publication, footnote added) Although founded on constructivist theories (Vygotsky 1978), but taking a more anthropological point of view (Barab and Duffy 1998), Lave and Wenger (1991) introduce the concept of ‘situated learning’. According to Lave and Wenger, learning solely occurs in a participative framework in which knowledge and skills are acquired by someone’s engagement in a community that already has these skills. The authors stress the social dimension of learning, which is in fact one of the cornerstones of action learning, as we may conclude from the influence of set members on personal learning (Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a). However, in situated learning, no direct transfer of knowledge occurs43,44. ‘Newcomers’ in a 41

Refer to section 2.3.1.

42

There is a difference between what Revans calls ‘learning by doing’ and what is generally

meant by this. Generally speaking, learning by doing means that learning something eventually involves giving something a shot. In action learning, the latter ‘something’ is known in advance: a unique, complex organizational problem that needs to be solved in a specific setting (through group problem-solving). This is a very specific interpretation of ‘learning by doing’. For details, see http://www.engines4ed.org/hyperbook/nodes/NODE-120-pg.html. 43

Dewey (1999) finds that there is a role for direct transfer in personal learning, while Lave and

Wenger (1991) think there is not. 44

Lave (1991) dismisses the idea of learning transfers, because she thinks that transfers imply

that problem situations are not interconnected and that someone can readily use what he has learned in different contexts. However, if there are several social communities, and someone is allowed to move from one community to another, as may happen after the completion of an action learning program, learning transfers may well occur. Someone may always be able to apply or adapt some of the knowledge and skills acquired in one setting when tackling a problem in another setting. We therefore find Lave’s perspective too rigid.

43


community are transformed into ‘old-timers’ when they get to share understandings about what they should (not) be doing. The process via which someone is acquainted with the socially constructed shared understandings of a community is called ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ (LPP). At some point, learners will be allowed to participate in relevant communities of practitioners45. At first, participation will be marginal. As a learner obtains full mastery over the knowledge and skills required to perform his tasks, he will become more involved in a community’s socio-cultural practices and let ‘fresh’ newcomers engage in his activities with increasing frequency. Step-by-step, oldtimers will be replaced by newcomers46. Providing (higher-level) assistance to a learner in such a situation is called ‘scaffolding’ (Fosnot 1996)47. Common elements of scaffolding include direct or indirect instruction and the provision of materials or equipment (ibid.). Traditionally, scaffolding was provided by a teacher to a learner in real time. Scaffolding can, however, also be provided indirectly, for example through electronic tutorial materials. The fact that learning, according to Lave and Wenger (1991), takes place in a social context implies that work-based learning programs could stimulate employee learning. This is where action learning enters the analysis again. In fact, work-based learning programs based on Lave and Wenger’s work, in which action learning principles are interwoven, can be found in practice (Bird 2001). Summarizing the discussion, we can say that action learning conforms to principles stemming from various constructivist educational theories (Fosnot 1996, Marquardt and Waddill 2004). The idea to let people deal with concrete problems together with others in an environment that is relevant to them is a 45

There is a link with ‘communities of practice’ contained in this statement (Lesser and Storck

2001). 46

Vygotsky’s (1978) theoretical framework, which we deem the starting point of situated

learning, says that social interaction is crucial for the development of cognition. The potential for cognitive development is limited to a specific time span, which is called the ‘zone of proximal development’ (ZPD or zo-ped). Full development during the ZPD depends on ‘full’ social interaction (which, however, can be assessed). The range of skills that can be developed by adult guidance or peer collaboration exceeds what can be learned alone. Vygotsky’s theory is an attempt to explain consciousness as the end product of socialization. Its ties with situated learning through socialization are evident. The interrelationships between social interaction, language, culture on learning were the focus of Vygotsky’s work (Fosnot 1996). 47

Also refer to footnote 46. Scaffolding takes place by a teacher in the ‘zo-ped’ (ZPD) (Vygotsky

1978). The teacher’s support lets a learner achieve something he could not have achieved alone as easily.

44


key characteristic of contemporary views on education and learning, although it must have been a revolutionary idea when Revans endorsed it in the 1960s and 1970s (Revans 1965, 1971, 1982, 1998a). However, we think it would be a bridge too far to claim that action learning is completely in line with constructivism. At best, Revans seems to have borrowed some of its key ideas. This illustrates why this section cannot be interpreted as a full-fledged account of constructivism (Bruner 1990).

2.4 Action Learning, Learning Organizations, Organizational Learning, and Scripts Revans’s system approach illustrates how managers take decisions and what they learn from this. As a consequence, organizations can gain something as well. Unfortunately, it is unclear what it means when an organization ‘gains something’ from an action learning program, apart from the fact that it will ‘learn’. What does this look like? How do learning organizations fit into the picture? We will examine these issues below. In chapter 3 this will lead to our own view on personal and organizational growth that will be used in the remainder of this research. We assert that ‘learning organizations’ are organizations that are involved in organizational learning (Tsang 1997), but are not necessarily knowledgeable about action learning. Harrison (1996) claims that action learning can be used to stimulate learning organizations nevertheless. She argues that: “… on the surface AL [action learning] does model the practitioner concept of the learning organization. In both, the emphasis is on openness, support, a climate of trust and challenge and learning from reflection and experience. In both, there is a focus on individuals learning how to resolve intractable problems that are of major importance to the organization as a whole. In both it is the resolution of those problems and the enhanced organizational learning capability that has thereby been developed that promise to transform the organization over the longer term.” (p. 31)

45


Garvin (1994) identifies three separate stages through which an organization must move before it can be called a ‘learning organization’48. The first stage is a cognitive stage, in which employees are encouraged to share ideas and question their ways of thinking. The second stage entails behavioral change. This occurs when employees internalize the insights and knowledge they have acquired in the previous stage and act accordingly. The third stage is organizational development itself, which, according to Garvin, is about improved organizational performance. Easterby-Smith, Snell and Gherardi (1998), Ray (1992), Sun and Scott (2003) and Tsang (1997) assert that there are two streams of research on learning organizations and organizational learning: a prescriptive and a descriptive one49. Both seem to have had limited practical appeal (Tsang 1997). This may have been caused by the fact that learning organizations essentially are metaphors for organizational behavior that are difficult to research (Donnenberg 2006, Gherardi 2006). Discussions on learning organizations and organizational learning emphasize that learning is driven by the possibility of solving organizational problems (Gherardi ibid.). This is in accordance with Revans’s conception of action learning (Revans 1971). However, learning can also be a mystery-driven process, or driven by the aim to decipher the ‘outside world’ as well as the learners involved (Gherardi 2006). We will not follow these lines of reasoning here, although Revans (1971) does address them50. What we would like to find out is when we can say that an organization learns (Harrison 1996). Is organizational learning achieved when better balance sheet figures are obtained (Garvin 1994, McLaughlin and Thorpe 48

Donnenberg (2006), Kim (1993) and Nevis and DiBella (1998) argue that all organizations are

learning organizations, since they all must learn in order to survive. In their view, it is the extent to which an organization learns that matters. 49

Tsang (ibid.) states that these streams examine learning organizations and organizational

learning respectively. We do not explicitly make this distinction below, although it was common to do this until the mid-1990s (Sun and Scott 2003). Gherardi (2006) describes how a realist conception (learning organizations), ‘invented’ by practitioners, started to coexist with and eventually replaced a heuristic device (organizational learning), proposed and accepted by scientists, to create a seemingly measurable notion of ‘learning’. This led to new identities and sources of legitimacy for many organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1991). Gherardi (2006) argues that this is why many people believe that learning organizations exist and should be studied. Among others, this has led to an extensive literature on learning organizations, which is difficult to classify (Weick and Quinn 1999). 50

Refer to section 2.2.2.4.

46


1993)? Do learning effects have to be visible straight away after an action learning program has ended? Is organizational learning the sum of everything someone has learned in an action learning program? Etc. Some researchers look for a quantifiable outcome of learning when defining organizational learning (like economists), while others examine the processes that lead to learning (like those involved in innovation studies). This further complicates organizational learning studies (Cohen and Sproull 1996, EasterbySmith, Snell and Gherardi 1998, Gherardi 2006, Lahteenmaki, Toivonen and Mattila 2001, Ray 1992). In order to formulate our own standpoint in the discussion, let us assess what learning can imply at the individual and organizational level. Lundvall (1998) says that: “… [Learning] refers to the formation of new skills at the level of the individual and to the formation of new competencies at the level of organisations and networks. In the latter case, the competencies are embodied in procedures, routines, and conducts of behaviour shared by the individuals belonging to the organization. Such a concept of 'learning' is much closer to normal usage than the content given to it in mainstream economics where it is either treated as a 'black box' phenomenon or simply as the acquisition of information.” (p. 419) We want to stress the role of behavioral change in discussing how organizational learning occurs, as this is also common practice in parts of the action learning literature (Dilworth and Willis 2003, Garratt 1983, Kim 1993, Ray 1992, Revans 1971)51. We will assume that organizational learning can fuel organizational change, but can also make further change impossible when change processes cannot be set in motion, because certain actions have previously been carried out (Burns and Scapens 2000, Huber 1991, Kim 1993). This is called the ‘path 51

Easterby-Smith, Snell and Gherardi (1998) argue that this is a far from common assumption.

For example, Cook and Yanow (1993) assert that organizational learning should not be studied by examining individual behavior, but by examining group processes. This would be in line with Lave and Wenger’s (1991) perspective discussed in section 2.3.3. Therefore a distinction can be made between embedded knowledge that is contained in a system between the individuals of which it consists (as is the case in guilds and apprentice systems) and embodied knowledge that is contained in individuals that can be codified and understood independently (Roberts 2007). The latter is in line with the ‘script’ concept introduced below.

47


dependence’ of learning (Dosi 1988). In addition, we think that organizations with different structures can exhibit different abilities to learn (Argote and Ingram 2000). Learning something in an action learning program could imply that the problem solving potential of an individual is increased (that is, personal growth is achieved), but that organizational growth is absent as no far transfer is possible, because what is learned is not applicable in the organizational context and networks in which a person is usually involved (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a52). Apart from individual characteristics such as the ability and willingness to learn, learning is influenced by environmental pressures an organization faces, organizational and national culture, past decisions, organizational rules, routines and norms, the competitiveness of the market in which it operates, etc. In short, it is influenced by institutions (Dodgson 1993, Ray 1992, Revans 1984). Institutions are socially constructed templates for action (Burns and Scapens 2000). Burns, Ezzamel and Scapens (2003) define institutions as the: “(…) taken-for-granted assumptions that inform and shape the actions of the groups of individuals who make up the company. They define the expected patterns of behaviour, and members of the group simply take for granted that ‘this is the way things are’.” (pp. 18-19, footnote dropped). Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem (2007) state that institutions comprise a structure “(…) that has become taken for granted by members of a social group as efficacious and necessary” and thereby generates action (p. 175). Institutions exist both outside (like laws and national culture) and inside (like organizational culture and past decisions) organizations (Barley and Tolbert 1997)53. According to Barley and Tolbert, operations involving institutions can be studied in terms of scripts. Scripts apply to observable, recurrent activities and interaction processes characteristic of a particular setting (Gioia and Poole 1984). They are hypothesized, dynamic and adaptable cognitive frameworks (or schemas54) for 52

The authors call this phenomenon ‘differences in perspectives’.

53

Additional information on institutions can, among others, be found in Burns and Scapens (2000)

and Zucker (1987). Burns and Scapens (2000) provide a rather ambitious account of how rules and routines are intertwined with scripts and institutions, highlighting the role of the internal organization and its institutions (Siti-Nahiba and Scapens 2005). 54

Despite the fact that some authors disagree with this (Lave and Wenger 1991), reasoning in

terms of schemas (or more generally, in terms of mental models) is not uncommon in

48


understanding and enacting behavior (Abelson 1976, Gioia and Manz 1985). When someone is involved in infrequent but recurrent situations, script development is cued55. Burns and Scapens (2000) suggest that scripts only describe routine behavior. However, Schank and Abelson (1977) think this is not the case as routine behavior involves what they call ‘situational scripts’. Routine behavior becomes apparent when someone is frequently confronted with a certain situation, at least at some point in time. However, scripts can also capture behavior in recurrent but infrequent situations that describe behavior that is not routine yet. This behavior is contained in someone’s ‘personal scripts’ (Schank and Abelson ibid.). Personal scripts “(…) need not behave in the stylized fashion of situational scripts” (ibid., p. 62). An element of repetition is present in personal scripts, but they do not have to describe routine behavior (Gioia and Manz 1985). Schank and Abelson (1977) also discern ‘instrumental scripts’. They describe sequences of activities so common to individuals that they need not be fully explained to be understood by others (like cooking an egg). We will not examine instrumental scripts in this study, as they are by definition not developed in an action learning program. After all, an action learning program focuses on one or more organization-specific problems that call for new scripts that do not yet exist. This is not in line with Schank and Abelson’s definition of instrumental scripts.

constructivism (Piaget and Inhelder 1978), let alone in organizational learning discussions (Dilworth and Willis 2003, Kim 1993, Ray 1992). Since Revans (1982) was influenced by the work of Jean Piaget when he developed his action learning concept, we find it appropriate to use a schema-based concept such as scripts. Note that scripts also conform to Revans’s notion (1984) of ‘mental filing cabinets’ (Kim 1993) and his notion of “(…) mental schemata or library of perceptual subroutines (…) [a manager] carries around in his head ready to call forward into action” (Revans 1971, p. 4). 55

Boshuizen (2003) interprets scripts in terms of protocols, procedures and diagnostic steps (in

medicine) involving stereotypical actions, following Feltovich and Barrows (1984). With a limited set of indicators, ‘experts’ generally gain time over ‘novices’ in diagnosing medical patients, because they possess scripts that novices lack. Therefore, they can skip one or more steps in a protocol or procedure. This is a conception of scripts that only partly corresponds to the one proposed by Abelson (1976) and Schank and Abelson (1977), which is much more dynamic. We also use a more flexible interpretation of scripts, looking specifically at individual behavioral patterns and therefore at personal scripts, which may well bear little resemblance to protocols or procedures (as we will see below).

49


We will therefore focus on personal scripts in the remaining part of this research. Gioia and Poole (1984) subdivide these scripts into ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioral scripts’. When action learning participants decide, for one reason or another, to act in a certain way, a behavioral script is performed. The scripts from which participants choose a particular behavioral script are called ‘cognitive scripts’. Behavioral scripts are therefore observed cognitive scripts. Gioia and Manz (1985) state that variations in scripts between employees either stem from the nature of the organizational context (that is, from situational factors) or from individual differences (that is, from personal factors). In addition, they assert that script development and the long-term retention of scripts are facilitated by their functional importance, the frequency of their repetition, and the exhibited degree of self- or external reinforcement to show them. Recognition, reappearance and fortification of scripts developed through action learning enhance their retention. This does not seem to be an automatic process. In the action learning literature, however, a single experience is often deemed to be sufficient to induce lasting behavioral change (De Loo 2006, Donnenberg and De Loo 2004, Revans 1971, Weinstein 1999). Following Gioia and Manz (1985), we hypothesize that scripts can be institutionalized at the organizational level after having first been scripted and shared at the personal level56. The process of script institutionalization contains several steps, namely (Barley and Tolbert 1997, Donnenberg and De Loo 2004)57: •

Encoding: this happens when an individual develops cognitive scripts. This conforms to Garvin’s (1994) first stage of learning organizations that we previously discussed, as well as to a part of his second stage (as far as the process of internalization is concerned);

56

Also see Garratt (1983) and Revans (1971, 1998a).

57

Note that these steps are in line with Pautzke’s (1989) ideas on organizational learning, in

which individual learning, argumentation, collective learning and institutionalization are linked. Kim (1993) presents a more elaborate model of individual and organizational learning, emphasizing individual mental models, which possess “(…) the vast majority of an organization’s knowledge (both know-when and know-why)” (p. 44). Somehow, and at some point, these models are transformed into shared mental models at the organizational level and result in organizational routines that are affected by the latter’s Weltanschauung. Weltanschauungen indicate if and how an organization adapts to environmental change. Although Kim’s model looks appealing, he admits that it is just a set of assumptions. It does not describe how processes (like the transfer from individual to organizational learning) materialize.

50


•

Enacting: this happens when a person performs a specific behavioral script that has been encoded in the previous step. This is the remainder of Garvin’s second stage of learning organizations;

•

Revision/replication: actual behavior can lead to the modification of the scripts that have been enacted in the previous phase, for example when resistance is encountered. Both cognitive and behavioral scripts change. This stage is not covered by Garvin, but is significant nevertheless, as it emphasizes the cyclical nature of organizational development and the emergence of institutions;

•

Objectification/externalization: in the final step of institutionalization scripts are no longer linked to specific persons. They acquire a ‘factual’, normative quality. Gioia and Poole (1984) call these scripts ‘protoscripts’ when they are transferred to other situations and persons than the ones in which and by which they were originally used. This is stage three of Garvin’s (1994) conception of learning organizations, although we believe it is not necessarily about increased organizational performance (Tsang 1997).

In figure 2.2, the various steps that Barley and Tolbert (1997) think will lead to the institutionalization of scripts are shown. Note that we will solely use this figure for illustrative purposes58:

58

The figure has been adapted by Burns and Scapens (2000). There is a link with Lewin’s (1951)

three-stage model for planned change through institutionalization contained in it. Lewin’s model consists of an ‘unfreezing’, ‘change’ and ‘refreezing’ phase. Our own interpretation of institutionalization is one of repeated interaction between the realm of action and the institutional realm with continuous ‘unfreezing’, ‘change’ and ‘refreezing’ processes (Burns and Vaivio 2001, Nixon and Burns 2005). This serves to illustrate that there are mostly no clean sheets in organizations, in which everything is unlearned when new insights become available (Donnenberg 2007).

51


Figure 2.2

Stylized portrayal of the institutionalization of scripts (Barley and Tolbert ibid., p. 101).

We allege that set members initially only use their current cognitive scripts in an action learning program (Yelon et al. 2004). Not all of these scripts will be taken into account however, as employees are only ‘partially included’ in an organization (Tannenbaum 1968). Besides, institutions in and around organizations will probably make that some scripts are considered more easily than others (Burns and Scapens 2000, Pautzke 1989). As action learning gets into the realm of action, it is hoped that set members open up and question, develop and alter their scripts, and encode and enact new problem-solving procedures and solutions along the way. When these new or altered scripts are transferred to and shared with other stakeholders involved in the program, they become protoscripts. If organizational development is to be stimulated, a connection must be established between these protoscripts and the scripts used by the rest of the organization (Enderby and Phelan 1994, Miller 2003). Therefore, the aforementioned protoscripts have to be institutionalized at the organizational level. When this happens, organizational development is realized (Donnenberg and De Loo 2004). We will elaborate on this view in section 3.2.2. It has to be acknowledged that in the absence of contextual change scripted behavior is likely to be replicated. This proclivity makes institutions, and the

52


scripts connected herewith, very persistent (Burns and Scapens 2000, Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem 2007)59. Huber (1991) thinks that most organizational learning occurs unsystematically and is multi-faceted, and he therefore regrets that experimental work on the issue has nearly ceased. The case study evidence of Marsick and Watkins (1999) also suggests that, while there are underlying principles, the move towards a learning organization is an explorative one for most, if not all organizations. The individual steps leading to such an organization cannot be codified (De Loo 2002, Marsick and Watkins 199960). This is in line with the ‘capability perspective’ of DiBella and Nevis’ (1998), which states that learning is inherent to all organizations and there is no ‘best’ way to learn61.

2.5 What’s Ahead Summarizing, in the action learning literature it is often argued that organizational development will be realized when the system approach is followed (Revans 1971, 1982). Determining what personal and organizational development really mean and imply is, however, difficult. The related literature remains vague about this (Revans 1971, 1982, Tsang 1997). In this chapter we illustrated, taking specific theoretically informed standpoints, that studying organizational conduct in terms of (proto)scripts may be a useful way to describe organizational development. We showed that this approach is in line with the existing action learning literature (Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a) and various educational theories (Duffy and Jonassen 1991, Fosnot 1996, Willis 1995) among others. Furthermore we claim that it is far from certain that organizational development will actually be realized in or through an action learning program. After all, the related literature paints a very positive picture of how these programs typically 59

We conjecture that institutions can create scripts that stand in the way of (further)

organizational development (Argyris 1990, Revans 1971). 60

Marsick and Watkins describe this as follows: “(…) the learning organization is more of a

guiding vision and a value framework than a concrete prescription” (ibid., p. 22). Also refer to Donnenberg (2006), Gherardi (2006), Kim (1993) and Tsang (1997). 61

The authors also distinguish a ‘normative perspective’, which claims that a ‘best’ way to

sustain a learning organization does exist, and a ‘developmental perspective’, which states that a learning organization is but a stage in an organization’s development.

53


develop and how its participants behave (Mumford 1995, Revans 1971). In an attempt to corroborate the views mentioned in this chapter, we will explicitly treat action learning as a particularization of management control from chapter 3 onwards, following the guidelines set out in section 1.2 and 1.4.

54


3. A

ction Learning and Management Control

3.1 Introduction Despite the positive picture painted in much of the action learning literature, mixed feelings about action learning as a whole, and specific programs in particular sometimes find their way into publications, most certainly when personal and organizational growth have not materialized in or through a program (Caine 1987, Conger and Toegel 2003, Harrison 1996, Mercer 1990, Parkes 1998, Wallace 1990, Weinstein 1994). In this chapter, as well as in the next, we will explore why these feelings may arise by treating action learning as a particularization of management control. As stated in section 1.2, our main research question will be: is action learning an effective particularization of management control? We will end this chapter with a theoretically informed relationship that helps to answer this question. We will start, however, by pinpointing what we will mean by action learning, personal development, and organizational development.

3.2 Examining Action Learning 3.2.1 Defining Action Learning As action learning is relatively ill defined (Ashton 2006, Dilworth and Willis 2003, De Loo 2002, Koo 1999, Mumford 1995), it is difficult to say what it is and what it is not, even though Revans (1998a) provides a definition of the latter (ZuberSkerritt 2002)1. It is a ‘moving target’ for which many definitions have been 1

Revans (1982) also provides two definitions of the former (in article 45, ‘The Nature of Action

Learning’), of which the first definition is taken from a publication of another author. Revans does not indicate whether he supports it or not. Therefore, we will not use it here. The second definition, of which elements are also used in Revans (1984), states that action learning is the “(…) development of the self by mutual support of equals (…) action learning does not pretend to supply the subject with much fresh cognitive knowledge; it is sufficient to help him use more effectively what he already has, and to reinterpret the experiences of yesterday in the light of tomorrow” (ibid., p. 633). However, from Revans (1971, 1982) it is clear that action learning is much more than self-development alone, if only for the organizational context in which the approach is used (for which a greater understanding is to come about through someone’s involvement in the action learning program). Note that we have equated self-development and

55


proposed (Boshyk 2000, Dilworth and Willis 2003, Koo 1999, Weinstein 2002, Willis 2004, Zuber-Skerritt 2002). Even Reg Revans’s approach, which is relatively speaking well documented, has never been fully codified and has seen some changes over time (Pedler, Burgoyne and Brook 2005, Mumford 1995, Revans 1971, 1976, 1982, 1998b). We feel that one of the reasons why action learning research is still at its infancy is that many researchers could or would not choose a clear definition of action learning to start their research from. Mostly, casual references are given to the related literature without conceptually explicating what is meant by action learning (Willis 2004)2. However, this is necessary in order to engage in scientific research (Dilworth and Willis 2003, Segers 1983). Since action learning approaches differ from practitioner to practitioner, it is difficult to make a cross-comparison of approaches and thereby, of action learning programs. The lack of a uniform action learning definition makes it virtually impossible to determine which approaches are ‘truly’ action learning (Wallace 1990). How about survival weekends for organizations? Can we call them action learning? And what about a program of which the solutions are not implemented? Or a program in which the senior management of an organization does not find the solution of a problem very important, but rather the acquirement of certain skills? And what can we say about a program that an employee is forced to participate in, because this is necessary for his career? Or what about a program in which the solution is predefined and someone is allotted a fixed period of time to realize it? And what about a program that does not lead to organizational development? Can we call all of them action learning? Since we chose to examine Reg Revans’s action learning approach in chapter 2, it is natural to look for what we will mean by action learning and personal and organizational development in his publications. Perhaps the most all-inclusive personal development in chapter 1. Also note that in article 51 of Revans (1982) (‘Action Learning and Epistemology’), general characteristics are used to define action learning. We will use this list when we prepare our list of action learning requirements and conditions later on in this section. 2

Zuber-Skerritt (2002) believes that such an explication can be given, most certainly when

researchers have conducted ‘successful’ action learning programs themselves. However, he acknowledges that what he provides is but his own conceptualization (even though some of Revans’s works are addressed), while his participation in action learning programs puts him in the role of participant observer, which is difficult for scientific research purposes (McCall and Simmons 1969).

56


book on action learning is Revans (1982), in which many previously unpublished writings from 1938-1981 are collected. Although the background of action learning and Revans’s system approach are also covered in Revans (1971), several articles in Revans (1982) examine this more thoroughly. This happens most notably in articles 30 (‘The Managerial Alphabet’), 31 (‘The Choice of Action Learning Projects, Clients and Fellows’), and 45 (‘The Nature of Action Learning’), with articles 11 (‘Management and the Scientific Method’) and 51 (‘Action Learning and Epistemology’) providing an overview of Revans’s system approach and action learning in general respectively. We will use these articles in the remaining part of this section. Interestingly, the importance of system beta and the scientific method is continuously stressed in these articles, with system gamma (containing both system beta and alpha) receiving only limited attention in articles 11 and 30, even though the system sketches the learning process of action learning participants and, consequently, of organizations, and may therefore be the heart of the approach (Dilworth and Willis 2003, Revans 1971). Perhaps system gamma had not been fully developed yet when Revans wrote these articles. We want to connect action learning with both personal and organizational development. In order to accomplish this, we firstly acknowledge that Revans, at some point, no longer found it necessary to exchange personnel between organizations. For instance, article 45 in Revans (1982) does not stress the need for personnel exchange in action learning anymore, as employees can also tackle problems in their own organization. In article 30, however, personnel exchange is still at the heart of a ‘typical’ action learning program3. Programs that take place within organizations, excluding personnel exchange, also seem to be very popular in practice these days (Bourner and Frost 1996), perhaps because they allow set members to take responsibility more easily for the problems they have to handle: they are close to their heart (Dilworth 1998). When personnel exchange takes place, and a set is comprised of employees of various organizations while it has to tackle a problem that is only really important to one of them, it may be questioned how much participants will feel responsible for what happens. We therefore decide to exclude personnel exchange from our action learning definition. Secondly, we contend that the actual outcome of a program can never be contained in a definition of the approach, because a program that does not lead 3

Also refer to chapter 2 of Revans (1998a).

57


to this outcome would simply not be called ‘action learning’. Programs would then, by definition, offer their intended result. Furthermore, we do not think that the implementation of the solutions stemming from an action learning program can be part of a definition of the approach, although it may be one of the key conditions to ensure that organizational growth is realized (Revans 1982). Donnenberg (2003), Mumford (1995), Revans (1998a), Rijnsburger (2003) and Rol (2003) claim that implementation must be part of an action learning program, but it should be kept in mind that the management of an organization will mostly maintain control over the solutions proposed by a set, certainly when the problems under consideration are strategically founded (Boddy 1979). When senior managers decide to intervene or interfere in an action learning program in order to stop or change implementation (even if they have been active participants), can the events preceding the intervention be called ‘action learning’? Following Revans (1982), we think this is most certainly the case. Although we do not wish to disqualify action learning definitions used implicitly or explicitly by other authors, we first put forward a set of requirements for a problem-solving and learning approach to be called ‘action learning’. When one or more of these requirements are not met, we will not call the corresponding approach ‘action learning’. As stated, these requirements are derived from Revans (ibid.). They are considered to be plain facts that are taken as given. We also list a number of empirical statements that will be called ‘action learning conditions’, which are taken from the same publication. These contain the elements that need to be in place for personal and organizational development to start materializing. These statements can and will be researched (in chapter 4). Other authors (Dilworth and Willis 2003, Enderby and Phelan 1994, Lewis and Marsh 1987, Marquardt 2001, McMorland and Piggot-Irvine 2000, Mumford 1995, O’Hara et al. 1997, Pedler, Brook and Burgoyne 2003, Pedler, Burgoyne and Brook 2005, Smith and O’Neil 2003, Wallace 1990, Weinstein 2002, Willis 2004, Zuber-Skerritt 2002) have also endorsed some of them, but we have only based their relevance on the aforementioned articles in Revans (1982)4. Note that after 4

Boddy (1979) thinks, among others, that requirements and conditions such as ours, although

theoretically desirable, may be too strict for they deal with ideal-like situations. He believes that more flexibility is required to determine what action learning is and what it implies. This illustrates that views of practitioners on the relevance of our action learning requirements and

58


each requirement and condition page references are given to the selected articles in Revans (ibid.)5. In order to alleviate our empirical research, we tried to formulate the requirements and conditions independently of one another and independently of each other as a group, which means that some of Revans’s original propositions had to be condensed into single statements6. The action learning requirements and conditions established in this way are: Necessary and sufficient action learning requirements: •

One or more real-life, complex problems that urgently call for a solution and that have a clear strategic dimension. Note that the problems themselves do not have to be strategic in nature7. However, they must be in line with organizational goals, because their solution may not be crucially important otherwise (p. 350, p. 353, p. 627);

conditions are not unanimous (Pedler, Burgoyne and Brook 2005). Following chapter 2, we have decided to let Revans’s notions prevail. 5

The action learning conditions necessary to stimulate personal development are also discussed

in chapters 3 and 5 of Revans (1998a), whereas those required to fuel organizational development are covered in chapters 4 and 5. Revans (ibid.) also mentions (in chapters 5 and 8) that organizations must operate as ‘learning systems’ for organizational development to materialize, and suggests that he has made action learning deliberately unclear to prevent it from becoming a consultancy tool and university ‘gadget’ (see the end of chapter 2 of Revans ibid. and section 2.2.1 of this research for details). Therefore we believe that the conditions for action learning we distilled can only be interpreted as necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for personal and organizational development. We find the action learning requirements both necessary and sufficient. This is not too heroic, as the requirements are also mentioned by Revans (ibid.) in chapter 2, although in a different form. Note that we will discuss learning systems later on in this chapter. 6

We run the risk of invoking the Duhem-Quine theorem here, which states that auxiliary

hypotheses such as ours stand in the way of really examining the underlying theories and principles (Heijdra and Lowenberg 1986, Søberg 2002, 2005). However, all empirical research such as ours contains auxiliary hypotheses (Segers 1983). Perhaps more importantly, the hypotheses we impose are no ‘ad hoc’ hypotheses, installed for reasons of convenience (Blaug 1976), but they are of vital importance to say anything in a scientifically founded manner about Revans’s notions about action learning. The fact that Revans did not make his action learning ‘theory’ very specific means that this is inevitable, although we are well aware of the possible side effects. 7

For example, analyzing the way in which an order tracking system operates is in principle not a

strategic problem, but the analysis may nevertheless be motivated by strategic goals as the system may be crucial to achieve or maintain a competitive advantage (Dilworth 1998).

59


•

The sharing of these problems in a group of four to five people with different backgrounds (p. 359, p. 643, p. 774)8;

•

Learning together with other stakeholders (p. 350, p. 353, p. 627, p. 630, pp. 644-645, p. 774);

•

Active, controlled experimentation over an extended period of time (p. 334, p. 343, p. 639, pp. 644-645, p. 775);

•

Continued evaluation of, and reflection on, the progress made and the results achieved, both individually and by a set as a whole. This is done by critical questioning and by providing personal feedback (p. 353, p. 627, p. 639).

Necessary conditions to stimulate personal development: •

Set members and an organization’s senior management have a willingness to learn. They accept new ways of thinking even if these are contrary to their current beliefs and habits (p. 353, p. 627, p. 629, p. 630, p. 632, p. 638, p. 775)9;

•

Constructive set behavior that manifests itself in open discussions and genuine attempts to solve organizational problems (p. 630, pp. 644-645).

Necessary conditions to stimulate organizational development (in addition to the above conditions): •

Active cooperation of and stimulus by an organization’s senior management in an action learning program (to highlight that the problems under consideration are relevant and their solution is important) (p. 352, p. 355, p. 776);

•

The presence of identifiable clients and sponsors (to embed the program in an organization and ensure that problems are taken seriously by those concerned) (p. 349, pp. 351-352);

•

An intention to implement the resulting solutions (p. 353, p. 633), which is to be followed by the actual implementation of these solutions (p. 330, p. 775)10;

8

Nowadays, action learning sets generally comprise more than five people (Donnenberg 2003,

Weinstein 2002). We will therefore be flexible with respect to the set size. Also refer to Pedler, Burgoyne and Brook (2005) and Revans (1998a) for more details on the issue. 9

This is to be accomplished by removing personal obstructions that stand in the way of getting

things done (Argyris 1990, Revans 1971, 1982). 10

Revans (1982) seems to believe that the implementation of action learning solutions will

overcome all obstructions that stand in the way of organizational development, as their implementation would otherwise not occur. Given the effects of internal and external

60


•

A manageable and controllable period of time within which an action learning program is conducted, so that regular work processes are not disrupted (p. 352, p. 354, p. 356)11.

Note that the above list is larger than similar lists Revans (1971, 1972) has proposed. This may either be due to new insights Revans gained between 1972 and 1981 or by his deliberate downplaying of the relevance of some of these conditions (Mumford 1995), which we, since Revans (1982) contains multiple articles on the same subject, circumvented (Denzin 1970). Nevertheless, the fact that Revans never provided a complete list of action learning conditions, highlighting their status in terms of their necessity and/or sufficiency and clearly linking their separate presence to the materialization of personal and organizational development, is troublesome for research purposes 12. Only when, in addition to the aforementioned conditions, an organization functions as a ‘learning system’ (which we will address in section 3.2.3), it is said to fully experience the effects of action learning and achieve ample organizational development (Revans 1982, 1998a). The aforementioned absence of clarity greatly hinders our empirical research. Because of the inclusion of unknown conditions in Revans’s conception of action learning, which by definition cannot be operationalized, it is always true because a closed system is established (Segers 1983). When an organization has not experienced ample organizational development, the unknown conditions can always be ‘blamed’ for this. This makes Revans’s conception of action learning neither testable nor a very strong ‘theory’ (Popper 1972, Segers 1983). Consequently, it may even be claimed that action learning is but a collection of developing and possibly interrelated ideas (De Loo 2003). Coincidentally, this is confirmed in the foreword of Revans (1998a). In section 3.4 we will see how this problem can be circumvented in this research. At this stage, we feel that we have to become more explicit about the other concepts and expressions used in this section. We will do this in the following section. institutions on organizational conduct, this may be a little optimistic (Barley and Tolbert 1997, Williamson 2000). 11

See section 2.2.1 for details.

12

It may be hypothesized that the conditions Revans never codified include differences in

perspectives, polarization, and groupthink effects between employees (De Loo and Verstegen 2002).

61


3.2.2 Defining Personal and Organizational Development What is organizational development? In section 1.4 and 2.4 we already hinted at this. We will first define it as the solution to the problem(s) tackled in an action learning program, and secondly, as the emergence or adaptation of protoscripts that help to realize this from here on onwards. We will elaborate on this definition below. Let us start with the first part of our definition, which states that the problem or problems tackled in an action learning program are solved. This we presume to be the main or one of the main goals of the program, following figure 1.1 (Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a). These goals we assume to be consistent with organizational goals, as argued in section 1.4. When no new or adapted scripts come about in an action learning program, the problem(s) at hand will probably not be solved (Dilworth 1998). Therefore we also contend that, as a consequence of applying action learning, protoscripts that help to solve the aforementioned problem(s) have to be developed or altered. When they are institutionalized at the organizational level after first having been scripted and shared by set members or other stakeholders engaged in an action learning program, organizational development will be realized. Taken together, this comprises our definition of organizational development13. Some may find it a limited definition, as it focuses on embodied knowledge that can be captured in terms of scripts, while embedded knowledge may also be contained in organizations, most notably in the relationships between the individuals who comprise the organization (Burns, Ezzamel and Scapens 2003, Cook and Yanow 1993, Lave and Wenger 1991, Roberts 2007)14. We certainly believe that not everything that happens in organizations can be scripted (Gioia and Poole 1984). However, although there may much more to say about organizational behavior than scripts alone, the approach sketched in section 1.4

13

As argued in chapter 1, organizations will not automatically become more profitable when new

or adapted protoscripts are institutionalized. Learning is not the same as increased organizational performance (Lundvall 1998, Tsang 1997, Zuber-Skerritt 2002). Furthermore, organizations tend to be bound by past learnings and a lack of reflection on and anticipation towards future business opportunities, thereby hampering their possibilities to improve their performance (Revans 1982, Scharmer 2001). 14

Also refer to section 2.4.

62


justifies merely examining the latter15, as we did not set out to study all organizational behavior anyway. Note that, following the above, our definition of personal development or learning becomes apparent as well16. We claim that personal development is achieved when new or different behaviors are at least encoded and possibly enacted and revised by individual action learning stakeholders (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Given the aforementioned definitions, how is organizational development to be facilitated? It is here that Revans’s (1982, 1998a) ‘learning system’ comes in. In order to see what learning systems imply, we first have to discuss the general view on organizations that prevails in the action learning literature.

3.2.3 Defining Learning Systems Action learning case studies focus almost exclusively on willing organizations and set members (De Loo 2003). In the early days of action learning the emphasis on ‘successful’ case studies may have been understandable, as the method was to be established and accepted by businesses and the academic world (Revans 1976). Many action learning publications have been written by consultants, who will generally not be critical about their own programs, discuss programs that failed (Mumford 1994, 1995), or set up programs that aim to achieve organizational development if they find this difficult or something they are not used to (O’Neil 1996). As a consequence, most action learning case studies start from a too optimistic, oversimplified view of organizations (De Loo 2003, ZuberSkerritt 2002). Brown (1960) proposes a set of organizational views that have partly been derived from cybernetics. He makes a distinction between the manifest, assumed, extant and requisite organization17. The manifest organization is the 15

Note that this also implies that we will not examine the implementation process of scripts

developed through action learning in great detail. 16

This is in line with the claim that in action learning organizational development can only be

achieved through personal development (Garratt 1983, Revans 1971, 1998a). 17

Of course there are more categorizations (Argyris 1964, Cohen and Sproull 1996, Etzioni 1961)

and it is not claimed that Brown's (1960) is the 'correct' one. It is however an insightful one and we will therefore use it below.

63


organization that is formally displayed on organizational charts. The assumed organization is the organization that individuals perceive. There may or may not be consistency between the assumed and manifest organization. The extant organization is the organization that is revealed by careful exploration. The requisite organization is the prototypical organization that functions exactly like it should when taking into account all the environmental forces it faces18. Brown describes the ideal situation in which the manifest, assumed, extant and requisite organization are in line with one another, but notes that at the same time the tendency of these four is to move out of line. In requisite organizations, employees do their best to carry out their tasks and fulfill their responsibilities. They therefore help their organization to foster and strive to take decisions that requisitely belong to their responsibilities. They hereby realize organizational goals. Brown asserts that many organizations fail to reach the requisite perspective. However, he also thinks that employees can be taught how their organization works. This would enable the requisite perspective to flourish. Revans (1982, 1998a) sees an organization as a developing, living system in which specific inputs are used to set certain processes in motion that generate specific outputs. This is a view on organizational conduct that is largely based on cybernetics (Jans and van Nimwegen 1985, Katz and Kahn 1978, Macintosh 1985, Otley and Berry 1980), just like Brown’s (1960). There are other links between Brown’s requisite perspective and Revans’s (1982, 1998a) notion of ‘learning systems’ as well, because in the latter notion employees do their best to learn from the challenges their organization faces and think about how organizational conduct can be enhanced as well. In order to achieve this, Revans (ibid.) asserts that employees must be encouraged to develop in their daily work and be able to solve complex problems autonomously without higher-level interference, except when this has been predetermined, is required, or deemed necessary. In this way an 'elevation of the spirits' will occur, and both employees and their managers will develop and learn. Consequently, an organization will learn as well, and an autonomous learning system will be realized. When an action learning program is carried out in these circumstances, it is assumed that an organization will fully experience the effects of action learning and achieve ample organizational growth.

18

Brown believes that the extant organization cannot be known completely, for systematic

investigation will never reveal everything that happens in and around organizations.

64


At least five characteristics are said to underlie a learning system (Revans ibid.): •

Chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning (p. 284);

•

This they stimulate through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottomup inputs (pp. 284-285);

•

Rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable (p. 285);

•

Unsolvable or intractable problems (at the level that they occur) are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems, so that similar problems can be solved in the future (p. 285);

•

Employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work (p. 285).

Note that these characteristics are independent of Revans’s action learning conditions to stimulate personal and organizational development in section 3.2.1. Even the last characteristic, which some may find to resemble action learning, does not have to be per se about action learning. This independence, together with the previously mentioned independence between the (groups of) action learning requirements and conditions, facilitates our empirical research19. Revans thinks that when organizations operate as learning systems, differences between organizations are caused by the likeliness that individuals can develop in the course of their daily work20. Provided that an organization functions as a learning system, the action learning conditions in section 3.2.1 and the ones Revans deliberately never codified would, at least in our view, be sufficient for an organization to achieve ample organizational development. How can this be realized, given that action learning is a particularization of management control? This will be discussed in the next section.

19

Of course, in practice, there will always be some kind of relation (correlation) between

variables, if only by chance. Also refer to footnote 6. 20

Also refer to Nevis, Dibella and Gould (1995).

65


3.3 Management Control 3.3.1 Introduction In section 1.4 we argued that action learning can be interpreted as a particularization of management control. If this is correct, we should be able to link all of our action learning requirements to management control. This would further substantiate the conclusion we have drawn in the abovementioned section. The link with management control is evident for the first requirement: problems have to have a clear strategic dimension that is consistent with organizational goals. This fits the very essence of management control (Anthony 1965, Anthony and Govindarajan 1995), although, as stated in section 1.4, we will not concern ourselves with how consistency is achieved in this research. The second requirement, on group problem sharing, contains elements of management control as well, since it involves the coordination of individuals (Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant 1990). The third requirement, group learning, will not happen without the motivation of group members and a positive attitude towards what happens in an action learning program by other stakeholders, such as sponsors, clients, and an organization’s senior management (Revans 1971). This is also in accordance with the goals of management control (Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant 1990). Controlled experimentation, the fourth requirement, is evidently linked to management control, as is clear from the term itself. It implies that experimentation must stay within time and/or financial limits and remain technically feasible (Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant ibid.). Finally, the last requirement, evaluation, is an integral part of the review and feedback aspects that underlie management control (Anthony and Herzlinger 1975, Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant 1990). Therefore, we can reconfirm that action learning can indeed be treated as a particularization of management control.

3.3.2 Learning Systems as an Embodiment of Management Control Organizations that operate as learning systems exert control to achieve conformity in activities between employees (Revans 1982, Tannenbaum 1968, Wieland 1981). By integrating activities organizational strategies and goals may be realized (Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant 1990, Tannenbaum 1968). Managers 66


at all levels of an organization exert control. It is therefore often referred to as ‘management control’. However, it is not necessarily unilateral (Tannenbaum ibid.)21. As organizations may be interpreted as living, developing systems (Revans 1982, 1998a), management control will differ between organizations and across time (Whitley 1999). The management of an organization will often install specific accounting information systems and measures to invoke control (Revans 1982, Whitley 1999, Wieland 1981). Examples include enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, budgets, reward systems, transfer prices, balanced scorecards (BSC), etc. Together, they comprise a management control system (Otley 1999). However, when can it be said that an organization is ‘in control’? Early views on management control were largely based on cybernetics (Birnberg 1998, Burchell et al. 1980, Earl and Hopwood 1980, Macintosh 1985, Otley and Berry 1980, Whitley 1999). In economics, these views were generally inspired by Anthony’s (1965) work, which was later refined in Anthony (1988). Management control was to ensure that the transformation processes from inputs to outputs remained on track and that deviations could be swiftly traced and corrected (Whitley 1999). It was thought that this allowed organizations to implement 'optimal' policies given their presumably fixed production environment, leading to constrained optimal results (for example in terms of profits) (Hiromoto 1991). The optimization process was to offer numerical information that could be used for effective and efficient decision-making (Whitley 1999). Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant (1990), who follow this view, list four conditions that have to be fulfilled before organizational processes are ‘in control’22. They are: •

The existence of objectives (in order to give meaning to control);

•

Output measurement in terms of these objectives;

•

The presence of a predictive model for the processes under consideration (so that if objectives are not realized, causes can be traced);

•

The capability to undertake action (so that deviations from objectives can be reduced or stopped).

21

Think for example of participative management techniques.

22

This framework has been extended and refined by Otley (1999) and Ferreira and Otley (2005),

although the basics still apply.

67


The interrelationships between these conditions are shown in figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1

Schematic overview of management control (Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant ibid., p. 9)23.

Johnson and Kaplan (1987) claim that most measures that can be used to induce control, following figure 3.1, had already been developed by the early 1920s. By 1987, they had at best been improved and embellished by academics, although with little practical appeal. They were and are not fit for modern-day management settings, as they are mainly backward looking and function best under fixed environmental conditions, establishing an ‘after the fact’ type of control (Hiromoto 1991, Simons 1990)24. Processes of globalization and expanded competition have made organizational environments increasingly unstable and cause-and-effect relationships between inputs and outputs unclear (Hiromoto 1991). Therefore, organizations that want to be competitive have to strive for continuous innovation instead of the periodic optimization of results (Hiromoto ibid., Scharmer 2001). This harks back to Revans's (1971) notion in section 2.2.1

23

Some may point out the similarities between this figure and single loop learning, as proposed

by Argyris and Schön (1978, 1996). 24

Among others, Ezzamel, Hoskin and Macve (1990) relax the rather negative picture painted by

Johnson and Kaplan (1987), stating that the latter missed out on the opportunity to examine the constitutive power of accounting in situations of organizational change for they provide a technical picture of accounting.

68


that an organization's rate of learning must be larger than or equal to the rate of environmental change if it wants to stay in business. In an action learning situation, the aforementioned shortcomings of management control in the cybernetic view become apparent. After all, when an action learning program is carried out, there generally is little uncertainty about the objectives of the related processes (one or more complex problems need to be solved, which may contribute to organizational development), while there is a great uncertainty about the cause-and-effect relationships of the actions undertaken (as the problems have strategic ties and have hitherto not occurred). A predictive model that is required for management control in the cybernetic view is therefore difficult to provide. This has consequences for the way in which we can determine whether organizational development is present. In section 3.2.2 we saw that our definition of organizational development consists of two parts: the solution of the problem(s) tackled in the action learning program, and the emergence or adaptation of protoscripts that help to realize this. The absence of a predictive model implies that whether or not a problem is solved in an action learning situation can be assessed, as the criteria for this can be set out in advance. However, the protoscripts required to achieve this by definition cannot be set out in advance, as the problem has hitherto not occurred. This hinders interpreting action learning as a particularization of management control in the cybernetic view. Thompson and Tuden (1959) provide a 2x2 matrix in which managerial beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships and the level of consensus on the objectives of a decision-making process are compared on two dimensions: high and low. The corresponding types of decisions are called ‘decision by computation’, ‘decision by compromise’, ‘decision by judgment’ and ‘decision by inspiration’ respectively. Burchell et al. (1980) and Earl and Hopwood (1980), using this matrix, categorize accounting information systems as ‘answer machines’, ‘dialogue machines’, ‘learning machines’ and ‘idea machines’. As Revans (1982) finds management accounting information crucial to detect situations where action learning may be useful, a natural link between the two is established. Our definition of organizational development includes aspects of both ‘learning machines’ and ‘idea machines’. That is, it requires accounting information systems that operate as both ‘machines’. Whether or not a problem is solved in

69


an action learning situation is a clear objective. This part of our definition of organizational development requires accounting information systems that operate as ‘learning systems’. Macintosh (1985) argues that: “In these situations information systems can, at best, only suggest a set of feasible solutions, provide data along the way, and help managers assess alternatives thoroughly.” (p. 200) The second part of our definition of organizational development is about the institutionalization of protoscripts at the organizational level. Whether or not this happens, what the institutionalization process looks like and what the related protoscripts look like is completely unknown in an action learning situation, as the problem(s) under consideration are new, complex, and have no clear-cut solutions. Macintosh (ibid.) finds that in this case accounting information systems should operate as ‘idea machines’ and that: “Decisions call for inspiration; thus accounting and information systems should help to trigger creativity.” (p. 201) Birnberg (1998), Hedberg and Jönsson (1978), Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck (1977) and Simons (1990, 1995, 2000) also argue that management control systems should stimulate employees to learn and adapt in a group setting in complex, unclear situations, so that they are free to experiment with alternative behaviors in a controlled environment. This implies a less rigidly structured and more organic form of control, in which much more emphasis is placed on employee cooperation than what is common in the cybernetic view (Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant 1990). Note that the above substantiates our view that action learning can be interpreted as a particularization of management control (De Loo 2006). Hiromoto (1991) finds that if continuous innovation is to be promoted in an organization through management control, four elements must jointly determine the characteristics of the management control system that is in place. These elements are25: 25

It is interesting to note that Anthony (1988) addresses some of the issues mentioned below as

well when he tries to move away from the standard control framework discussed in his earlier work (Anthony 1965). When an organization is faced with an unstable environment, he believes that no strict financial targets should be imposed and that performance evaluation should emphasize the effectiveness rather than the efficiency of actions undertaken, using a lot of 'soft

70


•

A behavior-influencing focus. Senior management has to encourage interdepartmental brainstorming and communication, rather than using the information it has as a power base to take decisions;

•

A market-driven customer focus. The management of an organization has to encourage employees to break down the technical limitations that restrain business activity. Management control systems must be pull systems instead of push systems, driven by customer demands instead of by current technology;

•

A dynamic evaluation approach. Innovation is a learning process. Therefore, organizational performance has to be judged by its progress over time rather than by results in a single period;

•

A team-oriented approach. Management accountants have to collect the knowledge and experience that is present in an organization and become team players, talking to various employees at regular intervals. No overspecialized units should exist in order to discourage ‘baton passing’ when complex problems arise. Management accountants will then find it easier to think about how they can contribute to solving problems instead of focusing on (the documentation of) financial results.

Note that Hiromoto’s behavior-influencing focus is a somewhat misleading expression. After all, influencing employee behavior is the very essence of management control (Anthony and Govindarajan 1995, Collier 2005, Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant 1990, Ferreira and Otley 2005, Otley 1999). What Hiromoto information' received from line managers. Process measures instead of result measures should be used to assess performance. This is in line with Hiromoto's (1991) call for a dynamic evaluation approach combined with a team-oriented approach (although Anthony 1988 does not look at management accountants per se). When cause-and-effect relationships are uncertain, a subjective form of performance evaluation will have to be installed and managerial judgment will play a larger role in organizational decision-making than quantitative methods (Anthony ibid., Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant 1990, Simons 1990, 1995, 2000). External benchmarking may be employed to assess organizational performance (Anthony 1988). This again corresponds to Hiromoto's (1991) dynamic evaluation approach. Finally, Anthony (1988) asserts that in unstable situations with no clear-cut cause-and-effect relationships between actions and outcomes, much emphasis should be placed on subordinate decision-making. Control should focus on the limitations on employee activity, not be concerned with details, and aim for overall achievements (Simons 1995, 2000). This is in line with Hiromoto's (1991) behavior-influencing approach. Note however that Anthony (1988) does not discuss Hiromoto’s (1991) market-driven customer focus, perhaps because it is not in line with the cybernetic view on management control that Anthony (1988) still uses, which mainly has an internal organizational focus (Whitley 1999).

71


(1991) means is that when organizational strategies change due to customer information, management control systems must change as well, while continuing to emphasize employee creativity. This may lead to different ways of affecting employee behavior. We purport that the elements Hiromoto (ibid.) lists for continuous innovation are in line with what Revans (1982) calls ‘learning systems’. The correspondence between the two is set out in Table 3.1. Of course, the correspondence is not exact, as the authors examine different issues from different perspectives. For example, Revans (1982) does not focus on management accountants, while Hiromoto (1991) does. Besides, learning systems focus more on the internal organization, whereas management control, at least in Hiromoto’s (ibid.) view, also has strong external ties. Nevertheless, it is evident from the table that the authors’ views are interconnected.

72


Table 3.1

Connection between modern views on management control (Hiromoto 1991) and learning systems (Revans 1982).

Hiromoto’s (1991) view on management control

Revans’s (1982) view on learning systems

Behavior-influencing focus. Senior management has to encourage interdepartmental brainstorming and communication, rather than using the information it has as a power base to take decisions

Chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning. This they stimulate through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottom-up inputs

Market-driven customer focus. The management of an organization has to encourage employees to break down the technical limitations that restrain business activity. Management control systems must be pull systems instead of push systems, driven by customer demands instead of by current technology

Rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable (note that this characteristic can be linked with the next item)

Dynamic evaluation approach. Innovation is a learning process. Therefore, organizational performance has to be judged by its progress over time rather than by results in a single period

Unsolvable or intractable problems (at the level that they occur) are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems so that similar problems can be solved in the future

Team-oriented approach. Management accountants have to collect the knowledge and experience that is present in an organization and become team players, talking to various employees at regular intervals. No overspecialized units should exist in order to discourage ‘baton passing’ when complex problems arise. Management accountants will then more easily think about how they can contribute to solving problems instead of focusing on (the documentation of) financial results

Employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work

What do the connections thus established between Hiromoto’s (1991) view on management control systems and Revans’s (1982) learning system mean? We believe that they signify that learning systems are an embodiment of management control as they can be seen as a worked-out version of Hiromoto’s (1991) take on management control. They depict a continuous way of working (embodied in employees) in organizations independently of the question whether an action learning program is conducted or not. Besides being an embodiment,

73


learning systems also operate a higher level of abstraction (institutionalization) than action learning programs as they are not temporary affairs like the latter. Note that this distinction is not made by Revans (1982, 1998a). In addition, the protoscripts that emerge through an action learning program operate at a lower level of institutionalization than those contained in a learning system (Williamson 2000). After all, at first, action learning protoscripts are developed and shared by set members or (other) stakeholders in the program. It is only when these scripts are shared by other employees that they have a chance to become institutionalized at the organizational level (Enderby and Phelan 1994). Only then can they become entrenched in the organization’s normal way of working, independently of the program. In case this happens, they become taken-for-granted throughout the organization (Burns, Ezzamel and Scapens 2003). Stated differently: they have reached the institutional level at which learning systems operate. Following section 1.4, this fits the management control definition of Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem (2007). They find three elements relevant in studying the management control mix in an organization: the prevailing management culture, the division of power among coalitions in the organization, and the accountability of individuals. Following the previous discussion, we conjecture that these elements operate at different levels of institutionalization, based on their persistence to change. Most difficult to change is management culture (Donnenberg 2007), which is the level that we think contains learning systems. According to Schein (1983), management culture26 can be defined as: “(…) the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration.” (p. 14) Note the link with taken-for-granted behavior that is contained in this statement (Burns, Ezzamel and Scapens 2003), which substantiates the connection between management culture and institutionalization that we have previously discussed. Changes in management culture, despite its persistence, can occur when there are coalitions in an organization who have concluded that change is necessary (Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem 2007). This is the second level of institutionalization at which we think that action learning programs operate. The 26

Schein actually provides a definition of organizational culture. As management is part of an

organization, his definition must hold for management culture as well.

74


third level is the individual level, which is typically associated with personal growth (Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a). Here, individual accountability can help to achieve control, as stated in section 1.4 (Abernethy and Chua 1996, Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem 2007), although as we have seen in this section, a less rigidly structured form of control is required if personal and organizational learning are to be stimulated. In line with our distinction between the first two levels of institutionalization, Langfield-Smith (1995) distinguishes first- and second-order organizational change. First-order change is witnessed when an organization tries to find a solution for its problems, but is constrained by the limits of its shared belief system (Simons 1995, 2000). According to Simons (1995), belief systems lead to the creation of control through a shared vision and value system among employees, which may be more pronounced when culture has been established over a ‘considerable’ period of time. It is, however, not until an organization finds it can no longer effectively manage its problems that second-order change takes place and organizational development can actually take place (through the institutionalization of new or adapted scripts). Although Langfield-Smith (ibid.) does not pinpoint who or which departments make that an organization finds that it does not handle its problems well enough and how an organization may find solutions to its problems (or if and when action learning can be used to do this), she does note that a distinctive element in the division between first- and second-order change is the extent in which cooperation existed between employees before a problem arose. This is the element of coalition that we have previously mentioned. If such cooperation exists, second-order change is easier to accomplish. This is identical to what has been argued above. Therefore we claim that when an organization functions as a learning system (as defined in section 3.2.3), action learning can be an effective particularization of management control: it ‘suits’ an organization27 and can consequently lead to ample organizational development (Revans 1982, 1998a) following our definition in section 3.2.2. This is an important insight that we will use to interpret the results of our empirical research in chapter 4.

27

As it operates at a different level of institutionalization.

75


3.3.3 Action Learning, Learning Systems and Trust The emphasis on employee empowerment and experimentation in both learning systems and action learning implies that there is a role for trust in both (Birnberg 1998, Dilworth 1998, Revans 1982, 1998a). An organization’s senior management, as well as action learning participants, have to believe that (in case of senior management) by assigning decision authority to lower-level employees and (in case of the participants) by working together according to action learning principles, problems will be solved, learning will take place, and an organization will ultimately move forward (or at least, not decline in terms of our definition of organizational development)28. Employees have to trust each other, find action learning a viable concept, and see the need to apply it to promote organizational development, particularly when an organization functions as a learning system (Busco, Riccaboni and Scapens 2006, Revans 1982, 1998a). Trust is an organizing principle than may achieve this, as it can both structure and mobilize employee activity (McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer 2003). It can shape and coordinate interaction patterns and encourage collective endeavors towards organizational goals. It can help to disclose and share (newly developed) employee scripts, which may subsequently lead to organizational development (McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer ibid.). For this to happen: “… organizations must grant agents the freedom to use their own discretion as a means of conveying their willingness to fulfill obligations and meet the positive expectations of those with whom they deal.” (ibid., p. 99). This is exactly what action learning tries to accomplish (Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a). When a transfer of trust can be realized, previously uninvolved employees (in an action learning program) get to share what has been developed by others. In case this happens, scripts may be transferred (relatively fast) to other employees. However, this also signals the downside of trust as an organizing principle: it can lead to strategic blindness, overconfidence and an inability to improve, since the validity of the institutionalized scripts may at some point no longer be checked (McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer 2003). What are some of the characteristics of trust? Trust comes into the fore when someone (an individual or a group) assumes, for whatever reason, that an 28

Employees who are not involved in an action learning program obviously have to believe this as

well.

76


uncertain event or outcome will appear even if other events and outcomes may appear as well. These events or outcomes and the circumstances surrounding them are (partly) under the control of others. As compared to the current situation, a ‘better’ situation may result for those exhibiting trust, but they may be worse off as well. Trust is determined by personal factors (for example, someone’s beliefs about mankind) and situational factors (for instance, time constraints, or specific behaviors that are expected in a decision situation) (Nooteboom 200229). An ignorant person cannot invoke trust (Luhmann 1979). It can only appear in situations where the ambiguity of outcomes and events is reckoned (Yates 1992). In an action learning situation these ambiguities are clear, as we have seen in section 3.3.2 (De Loo 2002, Revans 1971, 1982). Trust may then be a mechanism to reduce social complexity. Without trust, people would be overcome by fears and anything would be possible (Luhmann 1979)30. If however trust for (organizational) change can be established through action learning, it can be a catalyst for the emergence of adaptation of (new) protoscripts when complex problems arise (Busco, Riccaboni and Scapens 2006), because it focuses attention on specific problems for a limited period of time. Besides, it can lead to action learning itself becoming institutionalized in an organization. When this happens, we can say that ‘system trust’ (in action learning as a particularization of management control) has materialized as a consequence of the interactions between employees who have established trust among themselves. The latter is called ‘personal trust’ or ‘process-based trust’ (Bachmann 2001). System trust can reinforce personal trust and vice versa31. However, the starting point for a relationship between individuals based on trust is personal trust (Bachmann ibid.).

29

Nooteboom asserts that trust rests on four pillars. (a) Someone trusts (b) something or

someone, in (c) some respect, depending on (d) specific conditions such as the context of action. 30

Nevertheless, many researchers do not clearly indicate what they mean by trust. This, we

hypothesize, may at least partially be due the fact that trust is a latent variable (Svensson 2006). Trust is not easily measured or observed, and its presence is often assessed through indirect measures such as risk or by expert judgment. Trust may also simply ‘be there’, based on tacit factors or induced by pressure. It may be the only option (or explanation) left in a certain situation. It is therefore not always inferred by reasoning (Nooteboom 2002). 31

Of course, there are also other definitions and manifestations of trust (Dietz and Den Hartog

2006), but we have chosen to follow Bachmann’s (2001), because it fits the discussion. Note that there may be interconnections between personal and system trust on the one hand and levels of institutionalization of learning systems and action learning protoscripts, as mentioned in the previous section, on the other.

77


Nevertheless, it is very likely that not everything that happens in and around an action learning program can be based on trust, whether an organization operates as a learning system or not. If everything could be based on trust, the goals of action learning participants and their organization would automatically be in line. De Loo and Verstegen (2001a, 2001b, 2002) and Donnenberg and De Loo (2004) argue that this is far from common practice. Even when some form of personal or system trust is present, it may prove to be very difficult to bring the goals of an organization and action learning participants in line with one another. Therefore, one should be careful to recommend action learning as an approach that will automatically lead to personal and organizational development (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a, 2001b). How could specific management control measures that follow the above, and that aim to sustain personal trust and thereby system trust, look like in an action learning situation? An example would be an explicit contract between action learning participants, the content of which includes, but is not limited to, participants’ inputs and the division of expected outputs, taking an explicit process approach emphasizing learning aspects (Boddy 1979). The content could be determined organically through negotiations between action learning participants and their management (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a, 2001b, Myerson 1991). It may be revised while the program runs and new insights become available. Issues to be considered include ‘What does a participant expect to gain from the program?’ and ‘What does he expect from his client?’ (Boddy 1979). The corresponding answers could be collected and compared using Machin’s (1977, 1980) ‘expectations approach’. In this approach it is described what an employee expects from himself and from all other employees he is in touch with. All other employees do the same. Both formal and informal expectations can be collected. Ultimately, the (priorities and levels of achievement of the) perceived and actual expectations of employees can be compared. Machin claims that his approach strengthens management control in an organization. Unfortunately, it seems to have had limited practical appeal since the early 1980s, perhaps because it involves much analysis. Exceptions include the empirical articles of Machin, Stewart and Hales (1981) and Willcocks (1994, 2002). Since action learning can be interpreted as a communication method (Dilworth 1998), we assert that even without a contract the expectations approach may be useful in action learning situations to see what managers and action learning participants want to achieve in a program (De Loo 2006). Within a set, analyzing and discussing the expectations of the persons

78


engaged therein can lead to the establishment or an increase of personal trust (Bachmann 2001). When a set’s expectations do not match in any way with those of an organization and further discussion does not redeem this, an action learning program should not be undertaken, as the ensuing solutions and scripts are unlikely to become institutionalized at the organizational level (Machin 1977, 1980, Revans 1971). In such cases, personal growth may still materialize, however organizational growth is questionable (Burns and Scapens 2000, Smith 1988). Although refuted by Zuber-Skerritt (2002), Boddy (1979) clearly values management control measures such as the above, as he believes that action learning programs improve when stakeholders explicate what they wish to gain from a program, negotiate with other stakeholders, and design contracts that have to be followed. This may also reduce the possibility that unwarranted protoscripts materialize as a consequence of applying action learning (Anthony and Govindarajan 1995). According to Boddy (1979), stakeholders must be fully aware of the requirements posed by and the difficulties involved in an action learning program to ensure their commitment. He also notes that: “A truer test of learning … lies in the future. For example, whether those for whom the participants work in their own organisations are able to observe any specific differences in the way they go about their work. This would still leave open the questions of whether such differences were due to the action learning programme and whether they justify the time and cost of the programme or whether greater benefits could have come from some other development activities.” (ibid., p. 18) We hypothesize that by installing management control measures such as Machin’s (1977, 1980) expectations approach, the activities, decisions, solutions and scripts developed in an action learning program may contribute to organizational growth. Whether this will actually happen is something that remains to be seen (Anthony and Govindarajan 1995, Marsick and Watkins 1999). Nevertheless, we believe that Revans’s (1982) known conditions for learning systems and the materialization of personal and organizational development may consequently be realized.

79


3.4 Reexamining Action Learning 3.4.1 Research Framework In the preceding sections we listed and analyzed a number of conditions and requirements for personal and organizational development, learning systems, and action learning. Furthermore, we showed why action learning can be treated as a particularization of management control and learning systems as an embodiment of it, and what role trust may play in action learning situations. Unfortunately, there is no real action learning ‘theory’ to examine, as Revans (1982) included unknown conditions in his framework. Therefore, in order to engage in scientifically founded empirical research, we have to distill our own framework and base this as best we can on Revans’s work, despite the difficulties this involves32. We have gradually moved towards this framework in the previous sections. We conjecture that when the known conditions of a learning system are in place, a learning system is present33. Then, action learning ‘suits’ an organization, following section 3.3.2. In that case, following section 1.4 and 3.2.2, it may be an effective (but not necessarily efficient) particularization of management control (Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem 2007). In addition, when all Revans’s (1982, 1998a) unknown conditions and the necessary (known) conditions for personal and organizational development through action learning of section 3.2.1 are in place, we assume that an organization will solve the problem(s) tackled in the action learning program and, as a consequence, achieve ample organizational development. Moreover, specific management control measures may be applied within an action learning program to reduce the possibility that unwarranted protoscripts materialize (Anthony and Govindarajan 1995). We wish to check this as well. As unknown conditions cannot be researched, we have to remove them from our framework. We assume that the remaining relationship will hold. In case it does not hold, we want to know why, as this could illustrate where the materialization of organizational development ‘went wrong’. This may tell us

32

See footnote 6.

33

There allegedly are no unknown conditions for learning systems (Revans 1982, 1998a).

80


something about why action learning is not an effective particularization of management control in a particular situation or range of situations. How can our framework be summarized? Let us denote Revans’s (1982, 1998a) known conditions for learning systems by KCLS and the conditions for organizational development through personal development by KCAL. The solution of the problem(s) tackled in an action learning program will, in conjunction with the emergence or adaptation of protoscripts that help to sustain this, be denoted by A. This we will interpret as ample organizational development, following Revans (1982). We can therefore summarize our interpretation of Revans’s ideas as follows34: KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A. Using logical operators as we do above may give the impression that Revans’s ideas on action learning are well defined, and that a strict assessment of the various conditions and the establishment of causal relationships between conditions and events is possible (even though we are not conducting experiments). Obviously, this is not the case (Smith 2003). We will elaborate on this in section 3.4.2. We feel however that in order to ease the discussion the use of logical operators may be useful, despite the interpretation problems this may cause. It should be noted that the abovementioned relationship goes both ways. Therefore: KCLS ∧ KCAL A; and KCLS ∧ KCAL A. We already stated that when KCLS are in place, we assume that action learning ‘suits’ an organization. In addition, when KCAL are in place (and an action learning program is carried out), the program, at least according to Revans (1982), will help to achieve ample organizational development. Independently of 34

Note that KCLS can be written as follows: (KC1 ∧ KC2 ∧ KC3 … ∧ KCn), in which ‘KCi’ stands for

the single learning system conditions in section 3.2.3, and i runs from 1 to n (the total number of conditions involved). A similar line of reasoning holds for KCAL, where KCi runs from n+1 to N. N is determined by adding the total number of conditions for personal and organizational development in section 3.2.1 and those for learning systems.

81


this, it must be checked if situation ‘A’ has materialized. If it has, it is claimed in the literature that the action learning and learning system conditions are present (Revans ibid.). When situation ‘A’ has not materialized, at least some of them must be absent. All this serves to illustrate why the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A goes both ways. However, if situation ‘A’ is absent, there may also be other reasons why it failed to materialize, which are not covered by Revans (ibid.) as he does not propose a very strong ‘theory’. In case this happens, we also want to know what the missing conditions may be. All in all, this comprises our research framework35. We regard this framework as a strong theory in order to be able to start our analysis (Segers 1983).

3.4.2 Research Considerations Every concept, and thereby, every framework that is to be researched, is based on an isolation of certain properties (Mäki 1992, 2004). An example would be our interpretation of personal and organizational development that was set out in section 3.2.2. Scientists focus on the question whether the most important essential elements, if not all essential elements, of a concept have been isolated (Mäki 1992). Since we have closely followed Revans’s conception of action learning, we think we have indeed isolated these elements. Our approach conforms to what Mäki (2004) calls ‘theoretical isolation’, even though Revans (1971, 1982, 1998a) does not formulate a ‘real’ theory (but we assume our interpretation of it does). Isolation may be vertical or horizontal. In a vertical isolation, elements are stripped from their particularities in order to construct a ‘universal’ theory36. Horizontal isolation occurs at a given level of abstraction. Only a limited set of items is included in the analysis. Both types of isolation are applied here. Our take on Revans’s ideas on action learning is a vertical isolation, because we have distilled specific context-free conditions from his writings. However, we could only present a limited subset of these conditions, since they have never been fully codified. This is a form of horizontal isolation. Therefore, a ‘universal’ theory cannot be claimed and we have to be modest in our claims what our empirical research can achieve (Sugden 2000). We will further explore this in the next chapter.

35

Note that appendix I all aforementioned issues are addressed.

36

Llewelyn (2003) calls this level 5 theorizing. Also refer to section 4.2.2.

82


In chapter 4 we will try to provide concrete evidence leading to the ‘deisolation’ of the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A (Mäki 2004). ‘De-isolation’ involves adding a condition that has previously been excluded from an isolation, without replacing the conditions already present. This may be necessary when we find that the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A cannot be corroborated. As the creation of different isolations can go on and on, because one can never be certain when it is time to stop adding or replacing conditions (Wilber and Harrison 1978), we will not engage in the act of ‘de-isolation’ ourselves. However, what we can say is that when a ‘de-isolation’ is necessary, what is known as the ‘isolated essence’ of organizational development through action learning is not ‘accurately’ represented (Mäki 1992), since the necessity of the underlying conditions can be questioned with regard to ample organizational development occurring (Mäki 2004). In that case, we acknowledge that our view on Revans’s action learning ‘theory’ is in need of revision. However, we do not claim this will immediately present a new theory, as this is to our knowledge the first empirical investigation into the issue (Sugden 2000). We will elaborate on this in chapter 4 as well37. The above requires in-depth analyses that allow us to assess the details of specific action learning programs in specific situations. We believe we have to examine case histories to accomplish this (Yin 1989)38. The technicalities of the analysis will be set out in chapter 4. At this point, we only wish to stress that despite such in-depth analyses, it will be very difficult to establish casual relationships between variables, since we are not operating in laboratory settings. We can only see whether variables appeared together or not (Segers 1983)39. Therefore we think that in order to be on the safe side, one of our additional research questions in section 1.2 has to be refined to read: does the use of action learning appear together with organizational development? The other research questions in that section remain unchanged, because causality only plays a role when a relationship between variables is found and it has been or has to be assessed whether other variables interfere in the relationship or not.

37


38

We will elaborate on our reasons to use case histories in chapter 4.

39

Verifying the absence of causality (the fact that phenomena do not cause one another as they

do not jointly appear) is possible in case study analysis. Verifying causal relationships that always apply is not possible (Smith 2003).

83


If we are to conclude that we cannot corroborate our interpretation of Revans’s take on action learning (that is, that action learning is an ineffective particularization of management control), we have to find at least one of the following: KCLS ∧ KCAL ∧  A; or  (KCLS ∨ KCAL) ∧ A; or  KCLS ∧  KCAL ∧ A. We will try to seek manifestations of the above in our empirical research (Eisenhardt 1989). The number of cases to be examined will be determined organically until at least one of the aforementioned manifestations is found. We will look into this more closely in the following chapter as well.

3.5 What’s Ahead As stated, the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A cannot and does not pretend to be an all-inclusive summary of what may happen due to an action learning program in an organization. However, it can offer important insights into our main research question. How we think we should proceed to gain these insights is set out in detail in chapter 4. Nevertheless, the foregoing discussion does indicate that Revans’s views on action learning leave much to be desired and do not comprise a strong ‘theory’. The relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A needs to be examined in practice if we want to strengthen or relax our impressions about this ‘theory’. As stated previously, interpreting action learning as a particularization of management control can help us achieve this.

84


4. A

ction Learning Cases

4.1 Introduction In this chapter, our interpretation of Revans’s views on action learning will be explored in various settings. We will first examine our research method more closely and discuss how we will apply it. After this, the action learning programs under consideration will be described and examined, after which the analysis results will be presented, discussed, and set against the issues addressed in section 3.4.

4.2 Methodology 4.2.1 Research Method Let us elaborate a little on our decision to study cases, the motivation for which has already partly been given in section 1.2 and chapter 3. For starters, it gives us the possibility to develop rich and complex insights into our main and additional research questions, highlighting process aspects (Dyer and Wilkins 1991, Eisenhardt 1989, Smith 2003, Yin 1989). Although some may claim that the research framework depicted in section 3.4.1 does not have to be studied at all by using cases, as mainly a list of conditions has to be checked, the fact that we seek alternative interpretations of our findings by assessing if relevant conditions for the materialization of situation ‘A’ can be found that were not uncovered by Revans (1982), shows that there clearly is added value in analyzing cases. From this, new action learning theories may eventually be developed and the processes underlying organizational development through action learning may be understood (Llewelyn 2003). In addition, the study of specific phenomena in management accounting and control research in their natural environment through cases has become widespread over the last 15 years (Smith 2003). Finally, our choice to use cases is sustained by Yin (1989). Yin asserts that three factors have to be examined to see what kind of research method (experiments, surveys, histories, cases, etc.) suits a certain research set-up. These factors are:

85


•

The type of research question (“how”, “why”, “who”, “what”, “where”, “how much” or “how many”);

•

The amount of control of an investigator over behavioral events;

•

The question whether contemporary or historical phenomena are studied.

The various methods of analysis Yin distinguishes are shown in Table 4.1. Table 4.1

Overview of research methods and the circumstances in which they can be used (Yin 1989, p. 17).

When we examine our research questions and recall from section 3.4.2 that we seek to find that our interpretation of Revans’s views on action learning cannot be corroborated (that is, that action learning is an ineffective particularization of management control), we primarily want to answer “if”, “how” and “why”like questions1. After all, our research questions focus on organizational development through action learning and why and how this has (not) happened. Following Table 4.1, in such cases the use of case studies, experiments, or histories is recommended. Experiments are useful when a researcher has direct control over variables. This is not the case in an action learning situation (Revans 1971). Histories study past events. As we want to analyze already completed action learning programs, because it takes time for protoscripts to materialize (Barley and Tolbert 1997, Burns and Scapens 2000, Gioia and Poole 1984, Miller 2003), this may be in line with what we want to do. Besides, we prefer to analyze recent programs in order to tap relatively ‘fresh’ memories of

1

Also refer to appendix I.

86


participants. Therefore we wish to engage in case research as well2. Taken together, this means that we will examine case histories. How long ago a program must have ended before we decide to analyze it is difficult to tell, as protoscripts have different degrees of complexity and propensities to change, as we saw in section 3.3.2 (Burns and Scapens 2000, Hagmann et al. 1998, Williamson 2000). Therefore, we will be flexible and select cases that have been completed between six and three years ago, acknowledging that these limits are arbitrary. Case research is an appropriate research method when a theory is not well developed (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992). As stated, it allows us to get rich and complex descriptions of specific situations over an extended period of time (Dyer and Wilkins 1991, Eisenhardt 1989, Smith 2003, Yin 1989). It has the capability to uncover specific connections between phenomena and identify influences and interaction effects through its richness of detail, which might not be discovered, for example, through statistical analyses. We deem the latter to be inappropriate for our analysis, since action learning ‘theory’ is still in its infancy. Working with pre-coded questions and limited elaborations would, we believe, result in few new insights. We feel, instead, that more exploratory research is required (also see section 4.2.2). By using a structured approach (the data collection protocol described in section 4.2.5) we can compare cases with one another at a detailed level and find out more about the processes underlying organizational development (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992, Yin 1989). As stated, this is in line with our research questions.

4.2.2 Understanding Although they specifically examine accounting, Ryan, Scapens and Theobald (1992) think that case research, which is comprised of case study analysis, can have several forms. These forms are: •

Descriptive case studies (in which current techniques and practices are described);

2

Yin (1989) seems to suggest that case research can only be conducted in situations that are still

unfinished, as it cannot focus on contemporary events otherwise. Following Tripp (1985), we take a broader perspective.

87


•

Illustrative case studies (in which new and possibly innovative practices that specific organizations have developed are illustrated);

•

Experimental case studies (in which the difficulties involved in implementing new measures or procedures are assessed and potential benefits are evaluated);

•

Exploratory case studies (in which preliminary investigations are carried out to prepare hypotheses that can be tested in large-scale studies);

•

Explanatory case studies (in which a theory is used to explain and understand current practices without trying to produce generalizations).

Although the authors admit that the distinction between these forms of case studies are not unambiguous, it is a combination of exploratory and explanatory case research (without hypothesis formulation or testing3) that will be emphasized in the remainder of this chapter. We do not aim at any prediction and do not expect to discover new theories. This we find an intermediate step between exploration and explanation, and call it ‘understanding’. Ménard (2001) regards scientific progress as an activity entailing three steps: theory formation, model formation and statistical testing. Understanding is an additional step that we believe both precedes theory formation and takes place between statistical testing and theory formation4. Action learning ‘theory’ is still in its infancy, as a theory can only be claimed when there is a conceptual system of logical, nonconflicting statements, views and terminology about specific phenomena from which testable hypotheses can be distilled that can be shown to hold (de Groot 1981, Llewelyn 2003). We do not know (yet) if our interpretation of Revans’s views comprises such a system. Further than providing rich insights how organizational development through action learning may happen in practice (or not) we think we cannot go. Therefore we can only focus on the first manifestation of understanding mentioned above. We believe it can offer some 3

It may seem that the issues addressed in section 3.4.1 resemble and should be transferable into

hypotheses. However, if they were to be interpreted as hypotheses, it should be possible to transform them in measurable terms. We may hereby lose some of the finesses we can express in words, but not in symbols or numbers (Ménard 2001). Since action learning is relatively ill defined, we question whether such a transformation would ensure the level of detail we deem necessary to perform a thorough exploratory analysis (Ahrens and Chapman 2006). 4

This is an extension, but not a contradiction of Ménard’s views, as he assumes that a theory

already exists. Note that Ménard describes an empirical cycle (de Groot 1981). Understanding lies on a continuum of research functions that moves from describing, arranging, classifying, understanding and explaining phenomena to predicting and influencing them (de Groot ibid.). Theories fulfill all of these functions. Understanding is one particular aspect of them.

88


of the logical and non-conflicting statements that may be contained in a theory, but it can by no means comprise a full-fledged conceptual system, if only for Revans’s views on action learning have never been completely codified (Mumford 1995). Our research therefore operates at a lower level than what is generally called ‘theory formation’ (de Groot 1981, Llewelyn 2003). Llewelyn (ibid.) claims that there are five levels of theorizing. These levels view theorizing as: •

Metaphor: meaning is created using images to express and structure people’s experiences. For example, the statement ‘he shot down my argument’ contains a metaphor (shown in italics). Hereby the foundations of a conceptual system are explained;

•

Differentiation: experiences are subdivided into categories (pairings, contrasts, dualities) so that they can be ordered. Examples include ‘presence/absence’ or ‘public/private’. Thereby, meaning is given to people’s ways of acting and thinking. The concepts that are included in a conceptual system are in line with the categorizations that are thus established;

•

Conceptualization: people use concepts to observe, represent, act and work (in) practice. New concepts involve different ways of acting and thinking. At this level, meaning is created by interconnecting the metaphors and categorizations found at the previous levels. New concepts are introduced or existing ones refined;

•

Context-bound theorizing of settings: at this level, concepts are linked together in a network that seeks to understand and explain their appearance in concrete settings at a more general level than the individual. A conceptual system emerges. The primary concern is distinguishing and interrelating the social conditions under which the concepts are likely to appear. Hereby meaning and significance can be given to specific phenomena;

•

Context-free ‘grand’ theorizing: meaning is created outside of the realm of practice by identifying and interrelating the structural conditions underlying a network at an abstract, large-scale level. It is hoped that by doing so, predictive qualities will be attributed to a conceptual system, so that society can be ordered.

Llewelyn finds that most theories can or aim to be categorized as either level 4 or 5. This is what we have previously called ‘theory formation’ (de Groot 1981).

89


Most of our research takes place at level 3 and 4, as level 1 and 2 have already been covered in the action learning literature (De Loo 2003, Mumford 1995). The focus will mainly be on level 4, particularly when we try to find out why organizational development has not materialized in specific cases, and what this tells us about action learning. However, as indicated above, this will not provide the kind of the network Llewelyn (2003) talks about. Level 4 is therefore only partially studied. Level 5 is, we believe, a bridge too far for our research, in view of the lack of large-scale studies in action learning (De Loo 2003, Willis 2004). Given that our theorizing takes place at level 3 and 4, and it is not common practice to call this ‘theory formation’ (de Groot 1981, Llewelyn 2003), the fact that we will not develop a new or revised action learning ‘theory’ is substantiated. In sum, our interpretation of Revans’s views on action learning has to be researched scientifically if his views are to be included in a theory in the future. This kind of research has not been carried out before. That is why understanding the phenomena underlying organizational growth through action learning is an appropriate (and even necessary) goal for our research if a ‘real’ action learning theory is to appear in the future (de Groot 1981). As argued below Table 4.1, this approach fits our research questions. It may seem strange that we apply exploratory case research among others to tackle a set of research questions that is more about understanding than exploration. However, despite a seeming contradiction, ‘understanding’ is an important aspect of exploratory case research as well, because it is often among the outcomes of this type of research (de Groot ibid.)5. This is not too surprising, since, given that action learning theory is so ill developed, we first have to explore how organizational development can manifest itself (or not) before we can arrive at a more thorough understanding of the relationship between action learning and organizational development. In order to achieve this, patterns will have to be sought within a case to understand the events that have taken place in the materialization (or not) of organizational growth (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992, Yin 1989). It may be interesting to see whether the patterns discovered in one case can be transferred to another, so that we can compare cases and further increase our understanding of the phenomena under consideration (Ryan, Scapens and 5

See footnote 4.

90


Theobald 1992, Yin 19896). Then we move to explanatory case research. When defining these patterns, the effects of specific circumstances within each case have to be taken into account (Tripp 1985). For example, the way managers behave in a certain situation may have to do with the incentive system that is used. When transferring patterns from one case to the next, we have to acknowledge that the circumstances of the second case may be different from the first (since, say, another incentive system is used). By comparing patterns and acknowledging the effects of specific circumstances on them as much as possible, we may ultimately be able to draw conclusions about our research questions.

4.2.3 Triangulation7 Atkinson and Shaffir (1998) note that a researcher’s perception of a situation in a case may differ from the subject’s perception he is studying. It is therefore possible that a researcher inadvertently draws ‘incorrect’ conclusions or fails to describe events ‘accurately’8. This may be why Denzin (1970) claims that most research methods express only one view of empirical reality. ‘Rival interpretations’ of a seemingly clear phenomenon always exist (Denzin ibid., Yin 1989). Therefore Denzin (1970) asserts that: “… because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple methods of observation must be employed. This is termed triangulation …” (Denzin ibid., p. 26) Although Denzin examines how research methods can be combined to facilitate theory formation in the sociological sciences, triangulation can also be useful in our analysis, even though theory formation is not at the heart of it (Birnberg, Shields and Young 1990). After all, action learning programs can be studied from the viewpoint of various stakeholders. This circumvents Atkinson and Shaffir’s (1998) problem. We will examine this in greater detail in section 4.2.6. 6

Note that Yin has a restricted view on the discovery of patterns, stating that they must have

been established prior to the case analysis and can only be refined or rejected. Given the lack of in-depth action learning studies (De Loo 2003, Willis 2004), we will be more flexible and also examine patterns that arise from a case instead of defining them all in advance. 7

Also refer to section 4.2.5, as triangulation enhances the validity and reliability of research

findings. 8

This also depends on a person’s view on reality (Ahrens and Chapman 2006, Olssen 1996).

91


A distinction can be made between data triangulation, investor triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological triangulation. Data triangulation is achieved when different data sources are combined to generate insights into a phenomenon. When multiple instead of single researchers are used, investor triangulation can be claimed. According to Denzin (1970), theory triangulation is seldom achieved, but can be realized when empirical material is studied from various and possibly conflicting theoretical perspectives. Finally, methodological triangulation can have two forms: the ‘within’ and ‘between’ (or ‘across’) method. In case of within-method methodological triangulation, a single research method is applied using different measures of the same phenomenon, thereby enhancing construct validity (Yin 1989). In case of between-method triangulation, two or more different research methods are combined to study the same phenomenon. How far and in what way we will engage in triangulation is described in the following section.

4.2.4 Research Technique In our research we will apply data as well as methodological9 triangulation. Several action learning cases will be examined, combining record analyses10 (reports, notes, etc.) and semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders (set members, sponsors, clients, etc.). Interviewing is one of the research techniques besides observation that both Denzin (1970) and Segers (1983) recommend to obtain rich descriptions of specific phenomena. However, as interactions between researcher(s) and subject(s) are not easily established, observation may not offer insights into the deeper motivations of the subject(s)’ behavior. Consequently, the reasons why certain actions have been undertaken may remain unclear, while it is important to reveal them, in view of our lower-level research questions. This substantiates our choice to use interviews. There is also a practical reason: we wish to study recently completed action learning programs that by definition can no longer be 9

As stated in the previous section, this means a triangulation of research methods, not of

research methodologies (Denzin 1970). As argued below, we will use both interview techniques and record analyses in our research. 10

This is a form of historical analysis (Yin 1989).

92


observed. Segers (ibid.) claims that interview reports are reliable when both researcher(s) and subject(s) open up during the interview and do not mislead one another. This we will try to accomplish by using a highly structured interview approach (shown in appendix I), by asking very general questions at the start of an interview to make people feel comfortable (Oppenheim 1992), by concealing our own opinion, and by not asking suggestive questions (Segers 1983). Nevertheless, as Smith (2003) argues, some interview bias will always slip through in the results. Therefore we will ask all interviewees to sustain our interview findings11. Furthermore, company documents will be studied to see whether we have not been misled by or inadvertently misled interviewees (Denzin 1970, Yin 1989). The interviews and record analyses comprise the methodological triangulation we apply. The fact that we interview different stakeholders, who may view an action learning program from different perspectives (Atkinson and Shaffir 1998), implies that we also apply data triangulation. Note, however, that the primary observational unit is an organization that has used action learning in an attempt to solve one or more complex, strategic problems (Yin 1989).

4.2.5 Data Collection and Analysis The organizations whose action learning programs, we think, can offer valuable insights into the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A involve a specific police corps (organization ‘C’), the Department of Social Affairs of a middle-large Dutch town (organization ‘E’), and an elevator company (organization ‘M’). These organizations were suggested by befriended action learning consultants who were familiar with our research and knew what we were looking for. We had met them at workshops of the Dutch Action Learning Association (ALA) that were visited at the start of this research. No random sampling was used, which is common to case research (Eisenhardt 1989). Following what Glaser and Strauss (1967) call ‘theoretical sampling’, the abovementioned organizations were selected on the basis of their potential to develop insights into the social life under investigation using the research framework of section 3.412. We analyzed 11


12

This framework thus formed the theoretical basis for our sampling. An action learning

program, according to the definitions given in chapter 3, had to be carried out that either resulted in situation ‘A’ or not. Note, however, that we do not follow Glaser and Strauss’

93


them one by one and stopped selecting new ones, when we found we could not corroborate the relationship mentioned in section 3.4.1. That is to say, we brought our analysis to a close when at least one of the manifestations we had identified in section 3.4.2 had been discovered (Eisenhardt 1989). We found that four cases in the three organizations mentioned above were needed to realize this. How did we go about analyzing the cases? What was the data collection protocol (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992, Yin 1989)? Smith (2003) notes that such a protocol is required to enhance both reader and researcher confidence in the sustainability of the research findings13, as it: •

Provides a chain of evidence from the data collection process to the outcome of the ensuing analyses;

•

Ensures that all cases are used in the analysis, preventing interviewer elimination;

•

Describes an analytical framework that helps to assess the value of the research findings.

In shaping the data collection protocol, we used specific measures to enhance the validity and reliability of our research (that are discussed in the next section). We will describe the data collection protocol more specifically below. The consultants we had met at the ALA workshops suggested several action learning programs they had been involved in, perhaps surprisingly including programs which, in their opinion, had failed (Bourner et al. 1996, De Loo 2006, Donnenberg and De Loo 2004). In discussions with the consultants it was checked whether these programs, on the surface, met the action learning requirements of section 3.2.1. If this was the case, the consultant was asked to introduce us in an organization, if possible at the (senior) management level. Subsequently, we conducted an open-ended interview of a purely orienting nature with the company (or business-unit) director. This interview had two aims: to sustain our preliminary findings on the action learning requirements and obtain more information about the action learning programs conducted by the organization. All interviews were audio-taped to avoid selective listening (Segers 1983) and to make further analyses easier (Oppenheim 1992). They lasted between 1-2 hours. (original) grounded theory approach (Smith 2003). We try to understand specific action learning situations using the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A, but do not intend to end up with a new theory. 13

Also refer to section 4.2.6.

94


Sometimes company documents were shown during or after the interviews to endorse what had been told. We were never allowed to make copies of them. These documents (and more specifically, the notes we were allowed to make) contributed to the triangulation of our findings (Denzin 1970). Extensive interview reports were prepared using the interview tapes. In the reports, we combined the insights gained from the interviews and from the company documents. The interviews were not fully transcribed14, because we had them on tape in their entirety and some interviewees (in two organizations) had asked us not to do this if we wanted to have access to their organization. All interviews were listened to twice before reports were made. Each report, containing a summary of an interview and the company documents we had been shown was verified and possibly extended or corrected by the interviewee in question through e-mail and subsequently used in our analyses, provided that we still found that the action learning requirements of section 3.2.1 were met. If this was not the case, an organization was rejected for further analysis. We subsequently told this to the consultant and the company (or business-unit) director. We selected specific programs from the remaining organizations that we thought could provide valuable insights into our research questions. When we found a certain program interesting, we asked the company (or business-unit) director, by sending e-mail instructions, to select and approach the following persons who had been involved in the program in addition to himself, again with the aim of triangulation in mind (Denzin 1970):

14

Strauss and Corbin (1990) claim that interviews should always be fully transcribed. However,

they use (a variation of) grounded theory, which we do not use (Smith 2003). In addition, it should be kept in mind that quotes may inadvertently be used out of context, and that they originate from interviewees who have their own frame of reference. The alleged ‘objectivity’ of quotes can therefore be questioned. Multiple researchers would be required to reduce possible biases due to transcription and quotation (Smith ibid.) and even then the bias of the interviewee might not be noticed. This is another reason why we chose not to use transcripts. Besides, letting interviewees verify complete transcripts is not viable, as this will often cost more time than they are willing to spend, thereby reducing the value of the verifications received. A final reason not to use literal transcripts is that this form of analysis is rare in accounting research (Smith ibid.). Kirk and Miller (1986) argue that the kind of conventionalized field notes we make, and the way in which we check them, is sufficient to obtain reliable research results. Also refer to section 4.2.6.

95


•

The sponsor(s) of the action learning program;

•

The client(s) of the action learning program;

•

Two set members (per set).

After making separate appointments with the interviewees, we followed exactly the same protocol as when we first interviewed the company (or business-unit) director. The only change was the semi-structured (Hedges 1985) or focused (Yin 1989) nature of this interview, using the questions shown in appendix I. Note that the company director (or business-unit manager) was interviewed twice. Even though he was interviewed for a second time, in view of the importance of senior management support and involvement in an action learning program (Dilworth 1998, Dilworth and Willis 2003, Marquardt 2001, Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a, Weinstein 1999, Zuber-Skerritt 2002), the questions were mostly new to him. After all, the second interview focused on specific action learning programs instead of on a more general discussion about action learning. Note that set advisors, who some say have to be involved in a ‘typical’ action learning program (Dilworth 1998, Revans 1998a), were not interviewed unless their role coincided with one of the above. This was done for two reasons. Firstly, the role and necessity of set advisors in action learning is still being debated (as indicated in chapter 1), whereas the role of sponsors, clients, and set members is not (Dilworth 1998, Revans 1971, 1972, 1982, Wallace 1990, Weinstein 1999). These are all deemed important, even by those discussing the role of the set advisor (Wallace 1990, Weinstein 1999). Secondly, a set advisor is usually involved in an action learning program for a more limited period of time than the other participants and leaves an organization when a program has ended (Casey and Pearce 1977, Revans 1998a, Zuber-Skerritt 2002). This implies that he has at best a limited view of organizational conduct, certainly if he is an external consultant. For information and triangulation purposes, we prefer to use interviewees who probably have a broader perspective, for example set members. Hereby, we assume that our results will become more valid. It is possible that the company director was the sponsor of an action learning program, or that a client was also a set member. In that case we had less than five persons to interview. Everyone was interviewed separately for reasons of confidentiality, although this may have prohibited some issues from emerging that would have come up if we had allowed for group interaction (Hedges 1985). We acknowledge this is a possible drawback of our analysis. We asked the

96


interviewees to not discuss the interviews with each other, as no one was interviewed on the same day. We reckoned that if all interviewees were equally informed and had undergone similar experiences, they would give highly comparable answers (Atkinson and Shaffir 1998). As stated, the questions we used in the interviews are shown in appendix I. Again the interviews lasted between 1-2 hours. Additional questions could come up in the interviews, but they were solely the result of interviewee input. The interviewees verified their interview reports before we proceeded with our analysis. A combination of the interview reports and the insights gained from record analyses in each case comprised the case descriptions we prepared. They were sent to the company director (or business-unit director) for a final check. This description did not include our personal interpretation in the light of our research questions, since this was our own analysis15. Although it may be argued that we thus dismissed a possibility for verification, it should not be forgotten that we had already conducted two rounds of verification: one of the separate interviews and one of the case description. We considered this to be sufficient, in view of our research purposes in section 4.2.2. Besides, if we had presented our personal interpretations to the interviewees, formulated in terms of section 3.4.1, it is questionable if much in terms of verification would have been obtained because the interviewees were largely unfamiliar with the exact research set-up. We only interpreted the cases in the abovementioned way after the final approval of the company (or business-unit) director. After this, we also sought patterns that transcended single cases. This was possible, because they had all been analyzed and interpreted in the same way. Subsequently, conclusions were drawn across cases. Additional insights drawn from the analysis increased our understanding of organizational development through action learning, illuminating the richness and complexity of the data gathered through case study analysis (Dyer and Wilkins 1991, Eisenhardt 1989, Smith 2003, Yin 1989). We will illustrate the above with an example. In several interviews in a specific case it was mentioned that management support for an action learning program was lacking, even though it had previously mentioned that organizational change was necessary. This offered important insights into one of the known action learning conditions for organizational development, namely if the management of an organization really wanted to change its behavior. These insights were included in the case description. In principle, the analysis could have stopped 15

Thus all sections were sustained but the ‘Summary’ section of each case (see below).

97


here. However, in order to increase our insights, since we had deliberately engaged in case research to understand processes of organizational development through action learning, we asked why management support was lacking according to the interviewees. As it turned out, some managers had endorsed the program for political reasons. Privately, they had resisted the program all along. This insight was then included in our analysis across cases. We only deviated from the aforementioned procedure in one case (in organization ‘C’), as despite several requests two of the interviewees failed to sustain their interview report, because they did not want to spend time on this. For the same reason, the entire case description was also not corroborated by the company director in question. We acknowledge this is a weak point of the case in question, but find that the overall results are valid and reliable nevertheless, because we could still apply some data and methodological triangulation (Denzin 1970)16. Therefore, this particular case was not rejected. Furthermore, as we will see later on, it was not critical in drawing conclusions about our research questions. This substantiated this decision. Two of the selected cases concern single action learning programs, and may be referred to as ‘holistic case studies’ (Yin 1989). The other examines a whole string of action learning programs, as action learning was part of the normal working routine of the organization in question. This manifestation of ‘embedded action learning’ (Donnenberg 2003) resembles ‘embedded case studies’ (Yin 1989). All case descriptions and analyses in section 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 have the same setup. This set-up has been derived from the sections in appendix I and the questions addressed therein, although it is of course not the only set-up that could have been chosen17. The following sections are distinguished: •

Introduction. In this section, background information about the organization and action learning program(s) in question is given, with a focus on the latter. The information is drawn from company documents and the interviews we conducted;

16


17

For example, presenting our inferences solely in terms of the requirements and conditions

listed in section 3.2.1 could have been possible as well, but we feel that much of the information about processes that we gathered in the interviews would have been lost as a consequence.

98


•

Program overview. This section provides a detailed account of how the action learning program(s) under consideration was (were) organized. This information also stems from both company documents and interviews;

•

Program experiences. In this section the experiences of interviewees with the action learning program(s) are described, as well as their inferences about a variety of program-related matters (other employees, managerial behavior, etc.). There is a great emphasis on the information drawn from the interviews in this section;

•

Reflections. This section contains the conclusions interviewees provided when they were asked to look back at the program(s) in question in the interviews. These have been combined with information taken from (evaluation) reports, notes, letters, memos, etc. about the program(s).

Note that the aforementioned sections jointly comprise the case description that was handed to the company (or business-unit) director for verification. The final section in each case is the: •

Summary. This section is based completely on the information contained in the previous sections. It shows some of our own inferences about a case. We interpreted the (except in organization ‘C’) verified case descriptions against the background of the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A. Additional insights across cases that arose from the interviews are presented separately after the description and interpretation of the individual cases (in section 4.6.2).

4.2.6 Validity and Reliability Issues In empirical research, issues of validity and reliability have to be considered in order to safeguard the sustainability of research findings (Ahrens and Chapman 2006, Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992, Yin 1989). Validity applies when what is to be measured is actually measured. Reliability applies when these measurements are carried out correctly, so that they repeatedly offer the same results (Babbie 1992, Bromley 1986). In order to be valid, measures must be reliable, however high reliability may involve invalid measures (Babbie 1992).

99


Yin (1989) makes a distinction between construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability18. These concepts can be described as follows: •

Construct validity entails finding suitable operational measures for the concepts under study. This is the case when various sources of information are used in their construction, highlighting different aspects of the same concept (de Groot 1981);

•

In case of internal validity, all observed changes in a case can be attributed to identifiable causes. This is especially important for explanatory case research, but not for exploratory case research (Smith 2003, Yin 1989). However, we would find it a too harsh claim that, consequently, internal validity does not have to be taken into account in this research. Even though we will not establish cause-and-effect relationships, the fact that we want to determine if certain conditions appear together or not implies that, as far as their co-appearance is concerned, internal validity has to be considered anyway, although less extensively than in case of establishing clear-cut cause-and-effect relationships (Smith 2003);

•

External validity defines the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized. This is, among others, important when cases are to lead to theory formation (de Groot 1981, Llewelyn 2003, Smith 2003);

•

As stated, reliability assures that a study can be replicated with the same results (Babbie 1992, Bromley 1986, Yin 1989). This is important for all types of case research (Ryan, Scapens and Theobald 1992), although Ahrens and Chapman (2006) claim that reliability can never be fully guaranteed in qualitative field research, as researchers tend to analyze a case from their personal and therefore different points of view, thereby affecting the research results. Babbie (1992) corroborates this and thinks that case studies tend to provide more valid but less reliable results than surveys or experiments. Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1990) refute this view however.

How will we realize the validity and reliability of our research? This is described below: 18

Other distinctions are possible as well. For example, Kirk and Miller (1986) distinguish

apparent validity, instrumental validity, theoretical validity and quixotic reliability, diachronic reliability and synchronic reliability. Wilber and Harrison (1978) state that case studies are always contextually valid. Etc. Since Yin’s (1989) classification is commonly used in accounting studies (Smith 2003), we will use it as well.

100


•

Studying the action learning and management control literature and looking for common denominators has contributed to construct validity. From this we established the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A in chapter 3. In addition, following appendix I, sometimes more than one question is used to cover a condition. This form of within-method methodological triangulation (Denzin 1970) enhances construct validity (de Groot 1981) as well as the reliability of the interviews as a whole (Segers 1983). Finally, within each case, we will enhance construct validity by examining information from various sources (interviews with different stakeholders, studying company documents). This is an example of between-method methodological triangulation as well as of data triangulation (Denzin 1970);

•

In order to be on the safe side, external validity only concerns the three examined organizations. Given that we do not wish to develop a new theory, no larger generalization claims are made, even though such claims might have been made, since isolations such as ours can lead to insightful representations of the outside world, even if they do not cover this world exactly or correctly (Mäki 1994, Sugden 2000). The identification of patterns transcending single cases (using the results from our structured interview approach) fosters external validity as well. The fact that all interviews are audio-taped, which allows us to prepare extensive interview reports, helps to identify these patterns (Segers 1983);

•

Internal validity is not extensively covered in our research, because we cannot establish causal relationships with certainty and do not operate in laboratory conditions (Smith 2003, Yin 1989), as argued in section 3.4. However, according to Smith (2003), measurement and selection problems (of interviewees) need to be foregone nevertheless. We will try to avoid the former by interviewing different stakeholders on the same subjects, using the same questions, while explicitly trying to assess whether in their view, certain conditions and events co-appeared or not. Besides, pattern matching will be applied as an analysis across cases is performed. This will also reduce the probability of measurement errors. Following section 4.2.5, selection problems will be foregone by selecting interviewees solely on the basis of the role they had in an action learning program;

•

Finally, reliability is enhanced by examining information from various sources, by letting interviewees verify and rectify all reports we prepare, and by asking one of them to sustain the final case description. In addition, we follow clear, theoretically founded, and exactly identical

101


protocols in every case that can easily be replicated (Yin 1989). This has already been mentioned in section 4.2.5. Jointly, the above measures lead to the ‘case study database’ presented in section 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 (Yin ibid.). In these sections we will zoom in on a couple of action learning cases. They have to follow the action learning requirements of section 3.2.1, as these determine what we call ‘action learning’. In our analysis, we will use Mäki’s (2004) notions on ‘de-isolation’, following section 3.4.2. When de-isolation is deemed necessary, we acknowledge that switching to a different isolation may help to grasp all the necessary conditions of organizational development through action learning (Mäki 1994). As argued in section 3.4.2, we will not engage in the act of ‘de-isolation’ ourselves. After all, new, hitherto unexplored situations may require new conditions to be added or replaced. Our analysis may therefore never be finished (Popper 1972). Some preliminary insights why organizational growth may be absent in specific cases will nevertheless be given, as they may be useful, at a later stage and in a different study, for the actual ‘de-isolation’ of our interpretation of Revans’s view on action learning.

4.3 Organization ‘C’ 4.3.1 Introduction Some of the most renowned action learning programs in the Netherlands have been conducted by a consortium called ‘BOSNO’ (‘Bedrijfsgeïntegreerde Opleiding op basis van Samenwerking Nederlandse Ondernemingen’), which was established in 1975. It was founded by five large organizations: Shell, Heidemij, Heineken, Hoogovens, and Philips19. In BOSNO, 'high potentials'20 get the opportunity to work together in an artificial setting on problems that are similar to the ones they are likely to meet in the future (Lackie 2000). They can do this outside the hierarchical environment of their organization. Human resource managers of each of the participating organizations form groups of high potentials and assess whether in

19

Currently, none of these organizations is still involved in BOSNO. In 30 years, about 30

organizations have participated in the consortium (Lackie 2000). 20

These are mainly 35-45 years old managers with 10-15 years of work experience who are

approaching their first senior management function.

102


their view, its members can work together21. Sometimes group members choose the problem(s) they will tackle in BOSNO themselves. Mostly however, the management of their organization selects these. Preferably, problems are real-life issues that need to be solved. Every year, BOSNO’s management board22 selects a general theme on which all problems have to be focused. Examples include customer satisfaction, innovation, or safety. After having taken various introductory courses, groups can start to tackle their problem. They are aided by a set advisor from their organization, who is called ‘team coach’. In the following months, groups regularly meet to present and discuss, often with other groups, the issues, problems and questions they are faced with. After approximately eight months, all groups write a report how the problems they have examined should be tackled. These reports are presented to the management boards of their organizations in the final BOSNO-meeting. The implementation of group proposals is not part of BOSNO, even though this happens sometimes later23. Although personal learning goals of participants are matched with organizational goals in BOSNO, the emphasis is mostly on realizing personal goals. Therefore, BOSNO’s action learning programs mainly aim at personal development. However, there are exceptions. We will focus on an action learning program carried out by the Dutch police force in BOSNO 2000-2001 (in its 36th run). The Dutch police force is subdivided in 26 police corps. Each corps has several districts. The force has a long track record in BOSNO, but does not participate in BOSNO every year. Participation is involuntary for the corps. The police currently has its own national training centre (the ‘Politieacademie’) and has gradually decreased its BOSNO-efforts. The outcome of this particular program, however, was implemented in at least two of the participating corps and has contributed to behavioral change in the corps and in related institutions, although three of the interviewees stated that the BOSNO-program was at best a catalyst and not an initiator of change. 21

Pilots have also been conducted with ‘mixed teams’, containing employees from different

organizations. Further pilots currently conducted are to establish whether this should become common practice in BOSNO. One interviewee stated that mixed teams were used as well in the action learning program under consideration, but this was not the case according to the others. 22

The board at least consists of representatives of the participating institutions (mostly human

resource managers). 23

For more details about BOSNO, see Lackie (2000). The program for which the above description

holds, which is supervised by a program manager, is called ‘Perspectief in Ontwikkeling’ (PIO). Refer to http://www.bosno.nl/index.php?language=UK for details. We are grateful to the former and current program manager of PIO for giving us the above information.

103


Another interviewee argued that this particular BOSNO-program helped to intensify organizational change in some corps but did not bring it about, as these corps were already using action learning-like concepts. They had experienced cultural change during the 1980s and early 1990s, moving from a vertical, hierarchical structure and a culture based on power, fear, learning by instruction, and the repression of mistakes to a much more horizontal, cooperative and participative structure with less management levels, in which policemen were encouraged to have their own, personal learning experiences. In one corps in particular action learning was seen, at least in the late 1980s, as the ‘cultural property’ of the police24. One interviewee stated, when discussing how action learning programs such as BOSNO can lead to organizational change, that as soon as senior managers have a participative leadership style, which stimulates, appeals to and makes use of individual learning experiences, organizational change will generally materialize as policemen are, by and large, pragmatic learners. New recruits, especially in management functions, have to have this leadership style as well. Otherwise, it was argued, action learning cannot lead to organizational change, since the element of discovery is removed from everyday practice. According to one interviewee, directive leadership styles have since the 1990s replaced employee empowerment. The ‘high potentials’ of the force still participate in BOSNO when a team of more than one corps can be formed. However, it can be questioned whether nowadays the personal growth of participants can still result in organizational growth. In the program under consideration, organizational growth materialized nevertheless. The program we will discuss involves a different way to handle juvenile delinquents, based on the prevention in addition to the repression of delinquency acts. In BOSNO, this particular program is highly regarded25. We interviewed four persons who fulfilled specific roles in the action learning program, following section 4.2.5: two set members, the sponsor, and the client of the program. The latter also functioned as project supervisor/‘project assignor’ (see below). The set members were all police commissioners at the time, while the sponsor and client/project supervisor were both members of the Board of Chief Commissioners ('Raad van Hoofdcommissarissen') of the police. At the request of 24

As indicated by one interviewee, there were also corps in which the aforementioned change

became a complete disaster. Action learning-like principles were therefore not used by all police corps. 25

As evidenced by the former program manager of PIO.

104


two interviewees, their interviews were conducted by phone; the others were conducted face-to-face. We used the questions shown in appendix I. All interviews lasted between 1-2 hours and were audio-taped. Apart from the interviews, we could also use the BOSNO-report prepared by the group and had access to general information about BOSNO (newsletters, websites, etc.).

4.3.2 Program Overview In September 2000, six (at that time) police commissioners from six different police corps in the Netherlands were assembled to participate in a new BOSNOprogram. Some of them had asked their human resource manager to participate, while others had been approached. One of the commissioners had never heard of BOSNO. Another commissioner knew that some of his colleagues were very enthusiastic about it. The commissioners had never met before, but had, according to one interviewee, come in touch with juvenile delinquency problems in the course of their work. Another interviewee, who stated that juvenile delinquency was an uncharted field of work for them all, refuted this. As the annual theme of BOSNO was ‘chain dependency’, it was not surprising that the Board of Chief Commissioners assigned a problem to the group that had to do with the assessment and treatment of criminal behavior26. The original problem statement was: 'What can the police do to prevent juvenile delinquency, and which factors have to be taken into account to achieve this?'. One interviewee argued that the problem was selected for his district was, at the time, responsible for juvenile care in the Netherlands and had a large say in the Board of Chief Commissioners. A particular member of the Board of Chief Commissioners functioned as its spokesman and principal, and therefore became the liaison with the group. In BOSNO-terms, he was the ‘project assignor’. He was also the one who selected the group’s problem, together with another police officer from the same district. One group member knew the assignor very well from previous contacts, and knew he had a personal interest in the problem.

26

One interviewee noted that, although he, being a member of BOSNO’s management board,

often participated in the selection of the annual themes, he mostly left the specification of these themes to the ‘project assignor’ (who is introduced below).

105


Initially, the group was not very thrilled by its assignment27. One interviewee stated that the police had spread several internal reports on juvenile crime just before his participation in BOSNO. Therefore, the group found it useless to prepare yet another report. Stimulated by the team coach, the group decided to change its assignment. This had not often happened in BOSNO, but was endorsed by both the project assignor and program manager. The group set itself to the task to prepare a report that, when executed, could decrease juvenile delinquency by 50% in 10 years and would put it firmly on the political agenda. These were clear output targets, and the group reckoned they were idealistic. In order to set change in motion they felt they had to do this nevertheless. Group members asked themselves: ‘Why have the results from previous research not been implemented yet in the Netherlands?’. They wanted to conduct site visits in other countries to see why and how the results from previous research had been implemented, so that they could examine how the situation in the Netherlands could be improved. One of the interviewees found the change in direction very interesting, because he was involved in a pilot of his own at the time (in his regular work) that also focused on preventing juvenile delinquency. Until 2000 repressive behavior had commonly been used to fight juvenile crime. The police and related institutions only started to work with young delinquents when a crime had been committed. The group wanted to see if it was possible to signal and follow potential criminals from the time they were 4-5 years old28, using about 40 indicators (like the presence of other criminals in a family, family size, and the level of parent education) in the process. It tried to chart the personal situation of delinquents with the help of related institutions such as childcare services, municipality psychologists, and lawyers. This was to lead to tailor-made programs to handle individual criminals and their offspring, not only in case they were caught, but also beforehand, in order to prevent crimes from occurring. This approach was called the ‘chain approach’.

27

The problem statement turned out to have been a deliberate choice of the project assignor to stir

up group discussion and set behavioral change (in the group) in motion. One interviewee addressed this, but another did not recall it, stating only that group members were eager to discuss their assignment. 28

There were (mainly U.S.) studies indicating this was the earliest age that criminal behavior

could be detected.

106


4.3.3 Program Experiences According to one interviewee, all group members contributed equally to the proceedings. Three interviewees argued that group discussions were always open and constructive. One interviewee highlighted the role of the team coach in them. Stimulated by the latter, the group first conducted a literature search on the Internet to see which approaches to handle juvenile delinquency had already been put into practice. In addition, interviews were held with Dutch crime specialists. Partly as a result of these activities, and also partly out of boredom (according to two interviewees), the group decided to go to the U.S. for its site visit, although Australia and New Zealand were mentioned as possible destinations as well. However, it was difficult to find the 'right' contacts in these countries. After a month’s work, one of the interviewees managed to get in touch with someone from the Los Angeles police force who turned out to be a great help. He arranged two site visits: one in Los Angeles, and one in San Diego. In San Diego, the group had some ‘hands on’ experience with juvenile delinquents, as it was allowed to join forces with local police officers. In Los Angeles, discussions were held with policy makers. All group members went along on the trip, which lasted five to six days according to one interviewee and nine to ten days according to another interviewee. Personal funds were used to pay for expenses. After visiting each site, group discussions were held in the hotel in action learning style. At the end of the trip it was concluded that although there were cultural differences between the U.S. and the Netherlands (for example, U.S. policemen were considered more aggressive than their Dutch colleagues), the chain approach followed in the U.S., which was called the 'comprehensive strategy', could be applied in the Netherlands as well29. One of the things by which the group was struck was that whereas in the U.S. volunteers were available on a 24hour basis to collect and disperse information among stakeholders, this did not happen in the Netherlands. The Dutch police, for example, received a wealth of information, but could not always act upon it, because it had a statutory obligation to involve other institutions as well. The latter were often not available on a 24-hour basis. Important information was therefore sometimes not distributed on time, or not at all, and crimes were not adequately acted upon, let alone prevented. In addition, some institutions had little face-to-face contacts with their most difficult clients (criminals). This method of working had to be changed if the ‘comprehensive strategy’ was to be effective in the 29

Note the link between the annual theme of BOSNO 2000-2001 and the ‘comprehensive

strategy’. Both focus on chain dependencies.

107


Netherlands. Several, if not all group members tried to achieve this in their own corps and district after the BOSNO-program had ended. They did this by participating in round-table conferences with representatives of related institutions and by talking to politicians among others. The project assignor, as well as some group members, gave presentations about the BOSNO-program in other police corps and distributed the group’s report, but it is unclear how far these corps subsequently picked up the issue. However, it definitely happened in the two corps where the set members came from whom we interviewed. Preventing juvenile delinquency also became an important political issue and now ranks high on the agenda of many political parties. The chain approach contained in the ‘comprehensive strategy’ was an eye-opener for at least one of the interviewees, although another interviewee had already heard of it and wondered why it had not been implemented in the Netherlands yet. Since then, various pilots have been conducted using the approach to prevent juvenile delinquency, while platforms have been set up in which organizations such as the police, parole officers, and child care representatives work together to prevent juvenile crime. Three interviewees claim that juvenile delinquency is now treated much more professionally than before, based on an integral (chain) approach where institutions no longer compete with one another to receive the largest subsidy, but really work together. The following example on the chain approach was provided by one of the interviewees and serves to illustrate this. When the police receives incriminating information about a criminal, immediate house calls, on a 24-hour basis, are made by the local health care service, which often has these criminals on file (most certainly when they have children). If they cannot gain access to a house, the police is called in. Track is kept of the criminal’s whereabouts through an extensive computer system. Individual treatment follows in case he is caught. This may include sending a criminal to school or locking him up for a limited period of time. The chain approach is currently not only used for juvenile delinquents, but also for heavy criminals and terrorists. The aim is not to wait until a crime occurs, but to intervene as soon as possible in the hope that people stay away from crime.

4.3.4 Reflections Two interviewees experienced much personal growth in BOSNO, among others with respect to the treatment of complex problems. There also seems to have been organizational development in some corps after the ‘comprehensive 108


strategy’ had been introduced, but, as argued in section 4.3.1, BOSNO does not seem to have been the initiator of this, but it may have speeded up the proceedings. The strategy is now common practice in many a corps. As a consequence, it was possible for lower-level managers in one of the participating corps to conduct several pilots in action learning style as well. At least in this particular corps organizational learning seems to have been emphasized since (according to one interviewee). The same interviewee found the following personal success factors necessary to achieve organizational change: (technical) know-how, vision, leadership, fighting bureaucracy, learning together with other stakeholders, making work pleasant, and ensuring that backup is available at a strategic level when problems occur. Three interviewees stated that if action learning is to be effective, stakeholder support must be present. One interviewee gave concrete examples of this. Although two of the interviewees found the group discussions in BOSNO valuable, one interviewee found the discussions with groups from other organizations not very interesting, because they could not really relate to the problems and questions of his group. Another found group interaction one of BOSNO’s unique selling points (Bourner et al. 1996). All interviewees currently hold high-ranking positions in the Dutch police force, although one of them retired after 2001. The participating corps used no additional management control measures to spur on organizational development through BOSNO. Over time, the impact of BOSNO on the Dutch police decreased, the reasons for which have been set out in section 4.3.1. In earlier years, literally hundreds of action learning-like initiatives, mainly outside of the BOSNO-environment and in different areas than juvenile delinquency, had been put into practice that led to an increased feeling of safety among the general public. These initiatives focused on the organization of community programs, new ways to fight corruption and fraud, and the improvement of traffic safety. They have been described, for example, by the Foundation for Society, Safety and the Police (‘Stichting Maatschappij, Veiligheid en Politie’ 2004).

4.3.5 Summary It is clear from the above description that police corps in the Netherlands have used BOSNO for different purposes and in different ways. Some of them regularly 109


participated in its programs, while others never did. Sometimes it resulted in more than merely personal development, while on other occasions not much happened at all. Therefore, no overall analysis comprising the entire Dutch police force is possible. We will confine our analysis to the corps of one of the set members, since he was most outspoken in his account about personal and organizational development through action learning. At least in his corps and in this particular program, BOSNO resulted in more than merely personal development, as new procedures and ways of thinking to treat juvenile delinquency were installed in his organization, partly as a consequence of the program. These procedures are now common practice in the corps and the corresponding activities, and behavior, may therefore be interpreted as protoscripts (Gioia and Poole 1984, Lord and Kernan 1987). However, the interviewee did not think that the BOSNO-program was an initiator of change. At the time, general organizational culture was such that individuals were allowed to develop and gain valuable experience in the course of their work anyway. This resembles a learning system (see below). Although, as stated, culture has since changed, it apparently contributed to the proceedings in 2000-2001. No additional management control measures were used to stimulate organizational development in the corps. Has situation ‘A’ been realized in this particular program? Did the corps achieve ample organizational development? The interviewee in question thinks this was most certainly the case. New ways to handle juvenile crime were institutionalized at the organizational level after having been proposed by BOSNO-participants. They describe the general way in which juvenile delinquency is currently handled by the corps. However, a pilot was already being conducted to change the treatment of juvenile delinquents when the BOSNO-program came about. Besides, the BOSNO-program had played a role in personal and organizational development in the corps for many years. It had thus become more or less legitimized (Meyer and Rowan 1991). Therefore, it is likely that system trust was present (Bachmann 2001). Both the pilot and the BOSNOprogram were supported by the management of the corps, which reinforced the latter (as well as personal trust between employees). As a result the BOSNOprogram helped to foster organizational change. This also serves to highlight the connection between protoscript development or adaptation at the level of action learning stakeholders vis-à-vis the organizational level: the BOSNOprogram clearly suited the prevailing management culture in this particular case

110


(Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem 2007). Perhaps as a result of this the program is still highly regarded by BOSNO officials. We therefore think that situation ‘A’ can indeed be claimed. Below we will discuss the action learning conditions for personal and organizational development and those for learning systems, and check whether they were met in this particular case. We will focus on the corps for which the aforementioned set member worked at the time and start by analyzing the learning system conditions (see the texts below: each condition is accompanied by a motivation. They have all been taken from the case description, except for one which is based on literature): •

Chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning The management of the corps clearly wanted to enhance organizational learning, since it had been striving to develop new ways to reduce juvenile crime;

•

This they stimulate through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottomup inputs Several pilots were conducted, in which different ways of working and thinking could be experimented with. Hereby the force’s senior management gave lower-level policemen the opportunity to discover different approaches to handle youth crime. The BOSNOprogram was an example of this;

•

Rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable The foregoing means that rules and procedures were variable. Otherwise, no change in the method of working of the corps could take place;

•

Unsolvable or intractable problems (at the level that they occur) are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems, so that similar problems can be solved in the future The BOSNO-program was a vehicle to see why new approaches to handle delinquency that were actually known30 had not been implemented yet in the Netherlands, whereas they had led to visible results elsewhere (most notably in the U.S.). Some of these

30

Among others, their existence had been acknowledged in several internal documents.

111


approaches, when deemed appropriate, were subsequently adopted by the corps; •

Employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work At least in this particular situation, BOSNO was a stimulus for employees to get together to develop new ways of thinking, although the set member in question was the only member of his corps who participated in BOSNO in its 2000-2001 run (but, at the same time, his manager was a member of the Board of Chief Commissioners). Moreover, by stimulating pilots like the one the set member was involved in when he joined BOSNO, employees were regularly encouraged to get together with direct colleagues to propose better ways to organize their work.

Therefore all the learning system characteristics seem to have been met. The same holds for the necessary conditions for personal and organizational development that we listed in section 3.2.1. When analyzing these conditions, the following conclusions may be drawn: Necessary conditions to stimulate personal development: •

Set members and an organization’s senior management have a willingness to learn. They accept new ways of thinking, even if these are contrary to their current beliefs and habits As stated, there was a change in the behavior of set members and the senior management as a result of the BOSNO-program, which later also applied to (at least) the police corps in question;

•

Constructive set behavior that manifests itself in open discussions and genuine attempts to solve organizational problems Despite an initial lack of enthusiasm, set behavior was constructive. Otherwise, there would not have been a change in direction in the group’s assignment and the interviewees would not have stated that group discussions were productive.

Necessary conditions to stimulate organizational development (in addition to the above conditions):

112


•

Active cooperation of and stimulus by an organization’s senior management in an action learning program (to highlight that the problems under consideration are relevant and their solution is important) The Board of Chief Commissioners actively sustained the group’s change of direction in BOSNO, and wanted to go ahead with the outcome of the program;

•

The presence of identifiable clients and sponsors (to embed the program in an organization and ensure that problems are taken seriously by those concerned) In BOSNO, identifiable sponsors and clients are always present (Lackie 2000);

•

An intention to implement the resulting solutions, which is to be followed by the actual implementation of these solutions The group set itself to the task to change the way in which juvenile crime was viewed. Although the BOSNO-program was but a catalyst of subsequent changes, we think that the corresponding condition has been met. After all, the ‘comprehensive strategy’ is now common practice in the corps in question;

•

A manageable and controllable period of time within which an action learning program is conducted, so that regular work processes are not disrupted The BOSNO-program lasted eight months. This means that this condition has been met as well (see also section 2.2.1).

Summarizing our analysis, we can say we have uncovered the following (as shown in Table 4.2)31: KCLS ∧ KCAL ∧ A.

31

Refer to section 3.4.1 for details. Note that the analysis has been confined to a single corps,

which admittedly is delicate (Denzin 1970).

113


Table 4.2

Case summary in organization ‘C’.

Condition

Condition present? (Yes/No)

LEARNING SYSTEM Chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning They stimulate this through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottomup inputs Rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable Unsolvable or intractable problems (at the level that they occur) are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems, so that similar problems can be solved in the future Employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work

YES Yes

ACTION LEARNING Personal development Set members and an organization’s senior management have a willingness to learn. They accept new ways of thinking, even if these are contrary to their current beliefs and habits Constructive set behavior that manifests itself in open discussions and genuine attempts to solve organizational problems

YES Yes Yes

Organizational development Active cooperation of and stimulus by an organization’s senior management in an action learning program (to highlight that the problems under consideration are relevant and their solution is important) The presence of identifiable clients and sponsors (to embed the program in an organization and ensure that problems are taken seriously by those concerned) An intention to implement the resulting solutions, which is to be followed by the actual implementation of these solutions A manageable and controllable period of time within which an action learning program is conducted, so that regular work processes are not disrupted

Yes Yes

SITUATION A Situation ‘A’ has been achieved

YES Yes

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes Yes Yes

Given what has been mentioned above, we think that this particular case highlights the role of senior management support, in a positive sense, in inducing

114


organizational change, and emphasizes the contribution of a legitimized development program (BOSNO) for protoscript institutionalization to occur.

4.4 Organization ‘E’32 4.4.1 Introduction Between October 2002 and January 2004, municipality officials of a mediumsized town in the west of the Netherlands with 12,0000 inhabitants, which is located in a highly industrialized area, were involved in a pilot that aimed to integrate elderly foreigners who had sought asylum in the Netherlands, who were over 35 years old, who had been living in the country for more than three years, who hardly spoke the Dutch language and had been unemployed for more than a year, in several pre-selected firms. The municipality had recently carried out a reorganization. Although there were many power struggles at the time of the pilot, since the municipality still had its share of unsolved problems due to the reorganization, the pilot was started nevertheless, even though two of the interviewees listed below found it was doomed to fail as a consequence. In addition, policy-makers did not seem to be bothered by all kinds of implementation problems that occurred, which also greatly affected the pilot. As a result it was not possible to realize organizational change. The pilot consisted of two phases. The first phase, which lasted from October 2002 to July 2003, was a planning phase. It was based on action learning principles, although most participants were not informed about this, because it was thought that the pilot would otherwise be regarded as ‘just another project’ – which is the way it was finally regarded after all. The second phase covered the actual conduct of the pilot, and was not founded on action learning principles. We will focus on the first phase of the pilot. We will not evaluate the pilot as a whole, but rather the action learning part of the pilot. Originally, the pilot was to be completed in December 2003, but several problems (some of which are listed below) made this impossible. The pilot ended in January 2004. The municipality recently evaluated the pilot. Some of the evaluation results are included in the analysis.

32

A partial analysis of this case can be found in De Loo (2008).

115


Following section 4.2.5, we interviewed the following persons who were involved in the pilot: •

The formal head/contractor;

•

The sponsor;

•

The client;

•

Two set members.

The formal head of the pilot also was its sponsor. Although the client (the person who handed in the original pilot plan) was also a set member, we interviewed him merely in his role as client. The two set members are an external consultant33 who was asked to lead the pilot instead of the formal head and a senior manager known as ‘case manager’ (who is introduced below). Therefore four persons were interviewed. The interview questions are shown in appendix I. All interviews lasted between 1-2 hours and were audio-taped. We followed the research protocol of section 4.2.5 and obtained the following results.

4.4.2 Program Overview Why was the pilot started? The interviewees gave several reasons, namely: •

Problems with foreigners were an important and sensitive political issue at the time. In the municipality in question, these problems were augmented by the fact that half of its population of unemployed persons had no prospects of a regular job, because their knowledge of the Dutch language was below par (this level was called 'NT-2', or 'Dutch as a second language'). This was sustained by all interviewees;

•

Many firms in the area had previously relocated for the lack of suitable personnel at the NT-2 level. This was mentioned by one interviewee;

•

In 2001, the Dutch government had subsidized large and medium-sized towns in the Netherlands to work on their problems with foreigners. The Ministry of Social Affairs had granted approximately 0.45 million Euros to the town council in question, which could be invested in any program the council wished. The money had to be spent before December 2003. By then, results should be visible to avoid future financial cuts. This was mentioned by all interviewees, although the amount of money involved was only mentioned by one;

33

Recall what we said about external consultants in section 4.2.5. Given the role the consultant

played in this particular case, he was interviewed nevertheless.

116


•

Meanwhile, a senior staff member of the Department of Social Affairs had become dismayed with the way problems with foreigners were handled. Until then, most municipalities had offered language and skills courses to foreigners, which were organized by external language institutes. Unfortunately, the persons who followed these courses, mostly unemployed persons who lived among people with similar backgrounds, often did not have to put into practice what they had learned. In addition, there was no 'greater picture' as far as the courses were concerned. Foreigners could follow these courses, but the effects of this, besides acquiring knowledge and skills that might help them to find a job, were unclear. The staff member thought that organizational change was necessary. His idea was to adopt a 'work first' approach34, since he assumed that foreigners could best learn Dutch on the work floor. Originally, the step from courses to work had been the 'end of the line' for foreigners. Now, he wanted it to be the first step. In the future language skills should mainly be acquired during the job, not before a job was found. The staff member presented his views to his head clerk. The importance of his views was addressed by three of the four interviewees;

•

The aforementioned head clerk had been involved in discussions with regional employers and their legal representatives for almost a year on how to match the wishes of employers with the population of unemployed persons in the municipality. Although some employers had had serious problems with foreign employees in the past, with layoff rates as high as 50%, they seemed to be interested in trying something new. It was suggested that the municipality should conduct a pilot. This was stated by three of the four interviewees;

•

There had been rumors about new legislation in the Netherlands facilitating a 'work first' approach. The municipality decided to be a frontrunner. One interviewee mentioned this, but another refuted it. Interestingly, when the municipality became involved in the pilot, other Dutch cities were also involved in similar initiatives. Besides, new legislation was introduced some time after the pilot had ended, as evidenced by two interviewees.

34

The term ‘work first’ is now common knowledge in the municipality, although it is used

differently than we do here. In order to facilitate the discussion, however, we found we needed a simple term signifying the essence of the pilot. We believe this expression accomplishes this, when it is used in the way we do. Thanks are due to the interviewee who mentioned the interpretation problems this may cause.

117


The aforementioned aspects all seemed to come together in the second half of 2002, when the city’s Alderman of Social Affairs embraced the staff member’s ideas. The staff member was asked to prepare a full-fledged plan. He found that learning Dutch on the work floor was not a new initiative. Among others, the Dutch Postal Office (TPG Post) had conducted projects similar to the one the staff member had in mind. These projects had been successful, which stimulated his enthusiasm. Both the Ministry of Social Affairs and the town council accepted his final plan. The pilot could therefore proceed. Its target was to select and grant 150 elderly foreigners a job. 'Case managers' or 'consultants', municipality officials working for the Department of Social Affairs, all had a number of foreigners in their portfolio that they regularly contacted and tried to find a job for. In total, the municipality had about 50 case managers. They were to select and prepare the aforementioned 150 foreigners for the pilot. The firms that were to be involved in this had to be among the abovementioned firms with which the municipality discussed (un)employment matters. They had to create or allot 150 jobs before the second phase of the pilot started. Apart from meeting the output target of 150 foreigners, which arguably was necessary to 'defend' the grant from the Ministry of Social Affairs, the staff member’s idea of organizational change based on a ‘work first’ approach was also endorsed by the town council. The 'work first' approach had to become a standard approach in the municipality. With hindsight, only one interviewee still finds this goal realistic and manageable, in view of the circumstances in which it had to be realized. All other interviewees find it too ambitious. The 'work first' approach was to be applied in three stages. In the first stage, which lasted three months, foreigners had to follow language and skills courses in order to master the aforementioned NT-2 level, and they were assisted and coached by their case managers. The job they would subsequently receive should be known before they entered the first phase, so that tailor-made preparation programs could be created. In addition, job simulations were to take place in 'orientation firms' during the first three months. These firms, which were not known yet, were to differ from the firms in which the participants were to work later. In the second stage, foreigners would receive the job for which they had prepared themselves, and they would work and learn Dutch on the work floor for a period of nine months, using a mentoring system with a work floor coach. After twelve months, the participants would receive a fixed contract if all parties

118


were satisfied. This comprised the third stage of the pilot. If a firm still had these foreigners under contract six months later, it would receive a bonus. In principle, foreigners could turn down the offer if they were approached for the pilot. If they did this, however, they would lose their unemployment benefit if they had no medical reasons to refuse the job. If they lost interest in the pilot or failed to show up at work or in class without reason, they would lose their benefit for a month. If they continued to show a lack of interest, they would lose their benefit completely. Two options were considered when setting up the pilot. One option was to regard the pilot as a ‘one-off’, as an initiative separated from the normal work of municipality officials. Officials would then have to have the opportunity to participate in the pilot every once in a while. The other option was to integrate the pilot in the daily work of the officials. Two interviewees discussed these options. In the end it was decided to make case managers fully responsible for the 'work first' approach, who would determine whether a foreigner was to be included in the pilot in the course of their daily work. They were completely free to make this choice. This freedom was at odds with the output target that had to be realized. One interviewee still endorsed this decision. Another did not. He argued that it may have caused case managers to underestimate the relevance of the pilot. The 'work first' approach differed in several ways from what was common practice in the municipality. Perhaps most importantly, it constituted a ‘pull’ approach instead of a ‘push’ approach. Foreigners could work towards a clear goal, assisted by case managers and work floor coaches. If they worked well, a job would be guaranteed. Previously, foreigners were sent to courses in the hope they would find a job. In addition, the 'work first' approach included clear sanctions if foreigners did not do their best. This was something that was completely new at that time and which some case managers found unreasonable, according to one interviewee. Case managers would, as a consequence of the pilot, also lose some of the tasks that had remained after the previous reorganization. One interviewee noted that this led to motivational problems. A steering committee ('Stuurgroep') was to be installed to oversee the pilot. It was to consist of the city's Alderman of Social Affairs and representatives of the

119


organizations that were to be involved in the pilot. The 'Stuurgroep' was to meet four times a year, and had to assist the project management (‘Projectleiding’). The latter was to be formed by the project manager. Among others, the project management had to ensure that the ideas of the project team ('Projectgroep'), which was to reside under the steering committee, would be discussed by the latter (and vice versa). The project team was to comprise eight members, so that a cross-section of the parties involved in the pilot could be formed: four case manager representatives, the head clerk of the staff member who had handed in the pilot, the staff member himself (who would later be appointed secretary of the project manager), the jurist of the Department of Social Affairs, and the project manager. Therefore, the project management was to participate in the project team. This team was to meet weekly. Schematically, the proposed management of the pilot looked as follows:

Figure 4.1

Proposed management of the pilot.

Although the previously mentioned head clerk was to become project manager, he decided to call in an external consultant to do this, as he already headed two departments at the time and felt he would, therefore, not be accepted by all parties. With hindsight, he thinks he should have headed the pilot after all, for he might have been able to get things done more easily in the municipality than the external consultant. An ad was placed to hire a new project manager. The person who was selected was an action learning consultant who decided, upon approval of the head clerk, to apply action learning principles in the first phase of the pilot. He was given

120


the project plan written by the staff member and had to work in the management setting shown in figure 4.1 (which he would not have chosen himself). His task was to structure the pilot and make all internal and external parties ready for the actual conduct within six months. The operationalization phase of the pilot was to be headed by a municipality official. The consultant was told that the town council supported the pilot and found that something had to be done about its problems with foreigners. Looking back, he questioned how far this support was fueled by the fact that the municipality was dealing with a politically sensitive issue and had received money that had to be spent. In his view, ‘hands on’ support was often lacking. Two of the four interviewees acknowledged this. There appeared to be a large gap between policy-making and implementation, with policy-makers often downplaying and not wishing to handle implementation problems. Three interviewees in particular thought that the behavior of the then time Alderman of Social Affairs was problematic. The consultant left the municipality in July 2003. Meanwhile, he had managed to make some changes to the pilot’s management. It was he who appointed the staff member who had handed in the original pilot plan as his secretary. He also installed three project teams instead of one. Moreover, in order to facilitate discussions and contract negotiations with legal representatives of organizations and organizations themselves, he installed a reference board (‘Klankbordgroep’) in which the organizations and institutes that were to be involved in the pilot were assembled. The board operated directly under the project management and met every two months. Therefore, the management of the pilot looked like this during the first phase:

121


Figure 4.2

Actual management of the pilot.

4.4.3 Program Experiences How did the external consultant organize the action learning part of the pilot? He first tried to isolate the expected problems in the operationalization phase. In order to find these, he talked with several managers and head clerks of the Department of Social Affairs, case managers, and two foreigners who might be included in the pilot. The consultant then clustered the problems he had found in three groups: input (into the pilot, primarily of foreigners), throughput, and output. For each cluster of problems he organized a project team that was to handle the problems one by one in action learning style. Group members had to keep track of the progress made in the project teams and had to consult the employees they represented in their group in between meetings. This was to happen over a period of four months. Groups had to meet every two weeks in 23 hour sessions. It was hoped that decisions could be taken every meeting, starting from the second meeting, to tackle the problems that had previously been discussed. Following the original plan for the pilot, after four months, the consultant had to prepare a plan for the operationalization phase of the pilot, which he would present to the town council. According to three interviewees, the project team meetings went very well the first four times. There was a complete exchange of opinions and decisions could always be taken. However, one interviewee noted that only one other member 122


in his team kept track of the progress and the effects of the pilot on his department. Two interviewees stated that the consultant noticed, after four meetings, that some team members did not discuss problems at all with the people they represented, but rather gave their personal opinion (although they stressed otherwise in their team). Employees who were not involved in the project teams therefore did not necessarily support the decisions previously taken. This turned out to be a structural problem. There was no control over what happened after and in between team meetings, because the consultant was convinced that action learning would work in the municipality. There was too little time to try a different approach, also because the regular workload of municipality officials was already very high. In addition, there were problems between the steering committee and project teams. The steering committee wanted to get things done as fast as possible and did not seem to be bothered by the implementation problems signaled by the project teams. Two interviewees addressed this. According to one of the interviewees, the aforementioned problems were exacerbated by the fact that a member of the steering committee headed an agency that would have liked to be more actively involved in the pilot. He never failed to express this. This caused the consultant to reduce his contacts with the steering committee, which he subsequently met every two months instead of every month. In order to get the pilot operationalized, despite the aforementioned problems, and given the strict deadlines that had to be met because of the ending date in December 2003, the consultant organized a ‘breakthrough’ meeting in which not only all project team members, but also high-ranking municipality officials participated, together with representatives of the steering committee. The consultant expressed his problems and views and asked attendants about their problems. It turned out that there was very little confidence and support for the pilot and much resistance, particularly among case managers. The 'work first' approach was another great change from the type of work they had become used to, and they had more work than they could handle anyway. They therefore wanted to pay little attention to the pilot, and felt stressed. Moreover, municipality officials were not used to discuss problems with one another. This is because, as in many government organizations, they could usually wait for proposals or new procedures to be introduced by others (mostly the central government). Generally, they were not involved in preparing proposals. Therefore, one interviewee argued that the local authorities were not 'ready' for

123


action learning. High-ranking officials, on their part, openly expressed their lack of confidence in the pilot as a whole, despite the fact that they had previously stated otherwise. The project teams were reassembled after the breakthrough meeting. From then on, only small-scale problems were tackled. According to one interviewee, the solutions developed to tackle these problems were hardly ever implemented, because of the overall resistance exhibited by municipality officials. Some case managers nevertheless began to see the relevance of the pilot and wanted to contribute. However, they were stopped by their peers. One of the older case managers was not bothered by this and took the problems signaled by the consultant seriously and tried to realize the output target of 150 foreigners, coaxing his colleagues, with a lot of humor and persistence, into selecting them. Nevertheless, one interviewee thinks that tougher sanctions would have speeded up the proceedings. Another interviewee alleged that the old relationship between foreigners and case managers was beneficial to both and that the resistance of the case managers could therefore be explained. One interviewee painted a different picture of case managers, indicating that some were threatened by foreigners whom they wanted to select for the pilot, and that the pilot, at times, revealed family problems that could not be dealt with. All these problems had not been foreseen and slowed down the pilot. Two interviewees stated that some case managers ultimately had to be forced to select participants. Given that more than a month had been lost due to the problems with the project teams, one of the requirements to select the 150 foreigners, namely that they had to be at least 35 years old, was reduced to 23, so that the established output target could be met. When the aforementioned problems were tackled, the consultant devoted more of his time to the safeguarding of 150 jobs. Despite their previous commitment, firms had difficulties allocating them. Part of the problem was that municipality officials had mostly been in touch with legal representatives of firms instead of their managers. They had promised jobs for activities some firms did not even undertake. Firms also wanted to have a say in whom they hired, and did not want to leave the selection process to municipality officials. This further mitigated the tasks of case managers and increased their resistance. Besides, the abovementioned representatives had underestimated the gap between what firms wanted in terms of applicants on the one hand, and what they could realistically expect

124


from foreigners on the other. Finally, drawing up contracts with firms was a relatively new activity for municipality officials. Two interviewees expressed the view that a specialist should have been hired for this. Now it turned out to be a costly affair. In addition, new studies showed that productivity levels of foreigners learning the Dutch language were at best 50% of equally qualified Dutch workers, and their layoff rate was, as previously argued, high. This meant that firms had to be subsidized if they were to employ foreigners. The financial consequences of this were underestimated as well. A further blow was that many firms did not want to adopt foreigners after all, despite these measures. An agreement could only be reached with three ‘orientation firms’. It turned out that these firms were also the only ones interested in taking on the foreigners later, possibly because they had already had some ‘hands on’ experience with them by that time. Therefore, in practice there was no difference between the 'orientation firms' and the firms where participants would be placed at a later stage, although this was part of the original plan of the pilot, as we have seen above. A final problem had to do with the language institutes. They did not want to develop new courses at the NT-2 level for a pilot just because they were asked to do so, within a limited amount of time and for a limited amount of money. It took municipality officials a lot of effort and extra money to realize these courses. One interviewee stated that many institutes nevertheless are offering language courses today that are consistent with the ‘work first’ approach.

4.4.4 Reflections The expected output target of 150 foreigners was ultimately realized. Thus, the local authorities fulfilled its obligation stated in the project plan. Unfortunately, only 77 of the 150 foreigners entered the second phase of the pilot. After this at most 10-15 foreigners were given a fixed contract. One interviewee was of the opinion that a pilot like this should never be undertaken again (although another one was carried out later, which he also considered to be a complete failure). Another interviewee argued that the pilot was a success, as over 70% of the foreigners in the pilot found a job after they had participated in the pilot (even if they had dropped out). Besides, there were indications that learning Dutch on the work floor improved the language skills of the foreigners faster than regular courses. 125


Although the prospected output target was realized, the pilot certainly did not realize the intended organizational change. All interviewees but one stated that the pilot did not result in new procedures or ways of thinking in the municipality. The remaining interviewee thinks this must have happened, because the pilot would have been stopped otherwise. Three interviewees found the reluctance exhibited by case managers the greatest obstacle in the pilot. Case managers had a pivotal role in the pilot, but their views and resistance were not sufficiently noticed until the planning phase was well underway. The fourth interviewee regarded the differences between policy-making and implementation as a major cause of the pilot’s failure. As a consequence of the pilot, the number of case managers in the municipality was reduced from 50 to 20, leaving only those who were satisfied with limited tasks. The organizational change the pilot aimed to achieve was realized later on (the 'work first' approach is now common practice in many Dutch municipalities), but this was hardly a conscious effort of those involved, because it required both another reorganization and a change in legislation. According to three interviewees, it might have been best to restrict the pilot to a pilot as such, leaving aside the organizational change aspect. They all nonetheless consider it a major learning experience, although in different ways. One interviewee asserted that some participants were damaged professionally by the pilot and had to switch jobs. One interviewee noted that the municipality did not use separate management control measures to stimulate organizational growth. The project manager never considered this (but afterwards found that he should have), and some higherlevel officials never considered organizational change as an important aspect of the pilot, although they had previously stated otherwise.

4.4.5 Summary The pilot seems to have been executed too rapidly, at a time when (further) organizational change seemed unlikely, as the expected organizational change from a previous reorganization had not settled in yet (Busco, Riccaboni and Scapens 2006). Many problems were not foreseen and were of such a structural nature that they caused 'hick-ups' in the execution, which could only be tackled 126


through 'quick and dirty' solutions. The output target of 150 foreigners seemed to dominate the proceedings, possibly since the stakes were high in the face of future financial cuts by the Ministry of Social Affairs. There was also too little ‘hands on’ support for the pilot in the municipality. When problems arose, given the pilot’s management structure, the steering committee should have helped the project management. However, they did not seem to be interested in tackling implementation problems, even though they kept underlining the relevance of the pilot for quite some time. Following Revans (1971), this indicates that the pilot was doomed from the outset. As stated, two interviewees had the same opinion. In the municipality, norms and procedures were not critically discussed on a regular basis, perhaps because it had strong political ties and had to fulfill many obligations in a more or less predetermined manner (Lapsley and Pallot 2000). As the organization clearly was not ‘ready’ for action learning, organizational growth was negligible. At best, personal growth was achieved in the pilot. As evidenced by all interviewees but one, situation ‘A’ was certainly not realized. No new or altered protoscripts emerged at the organizational level as a consequence of the action learning part of the pilot. Personal trust between employees was extremely limited, because there seemed to be much aggravation between case managers and other municipality officials on the one hand, and within the latter group of officials on the other (Bachmann 2001). System trust in action learning was therefore unlikely to be realized, despite the consultant’s personal beliefs (Bachmann ibid.). A learning system does not seem to have been present either. One of the reasons was that employees in the municipality were not used to developing new ways of thinking and working together (Lapsley and Pallot 2000). There was a clear top-down way of doing things in the municipality. This was the prevailing management culture. Management support was lacking, because the coalitions formed in the action learning part of the pilot were unstable, and the pilot was deliberately frustrated by a number of action learning stakeholders, so that the prevailing culture was unlikely to change. Therefore action learning did not really ‘suit’ the municipality. However, since an output target had to be realized in the face of future financial cuts, some personal frustration and resistance was temporarily put aside, partly as a consequence of the 'breakthrough' session organized by the project manager. When the output target had been realized,

127


the pilot was effectively 'over', although later on some employees were laid off. All this is discussed in greater detail below. Let us continue by analyzing how far the action learning conditions for personal and organizational development, as well as those for learning systems, were met in this particular case. We will start with the latter (see the texts below the conditions for a motivation): •

Chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning There is little indication that the municipality wanted to increase organizational learning. Although some officials claimed that behavioral change was necessary to change the municipality’s treatment of unemployed foreigners, all interviewees found that actual support was limited. Reaching output targets (in the face of future financial cuts) seemed to be more important than ingraining new ways of working and thinking in the municipality. When new legislation was introduced and another reorganization was carried out several years later, behavioral change was invoked. Most interviewees stated that this was not a consequence of the pilot;

•

This they stimulate through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottomup inputs Although there was a delegation of tasks in the municipality (for example, a senior staff member was asked to write the pilot plan), this did not seem to happen with the aim to sustain organizational learning;

•

Rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable Although the pilot was started to examine, among others, if different procedures to handle unemployed foreigners would work, we previously indicated that most rules and procedures for municipalities in the Netherlands are imposed by the central government (Lapsley and Pallot ibid.). Conducting pilots to see if organizational change was possible was not the norm in the municipality. Therefore, this condition is arguable at best;

•

Unsolvable or intractable problems (at the level that they occur) are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are

128


explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems so that similar problems can be solved in the future The staff member who handed in the original plan found that the municipality's problems with unemployed foreigners were getting out of hand. He had some ideas on how the situation could be improved and got in touch with his head clerk. His support ultimately led to the pilot. Therefore, an at first unsolvable problem was ultimately tackled through bottom-up inputs, that is to say, from the perspective of the staff member (but not of the organization as a whole). However, there subsequently was no change in organizational systems, although some case managers were laid off as a consequence of the pilot; •

Employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work In the municipality it was uncommon for employees to get together to discuss new ways of working, perhaps partly for the reasons outlined above.

Analyzing the necessary conditions for personal and organizational development in section 3.2.1, we find the following: Necessary conditions to stimulate personal development: •

Set members and an organization’s senior management have a willingness to learn. They accept new ways of thinking, even if these are contrary to their current beliefs and habits The participants in the first phase of the pilot had many difficulties to change their behavior. Some flatly refused this, while others were held back by their peers. ‘Hands on’ support from higherlevel managers was lacking;

•

Constructive set behavior that manifests itself in open discussions and genuine attempts to solve organizational problems Even if the discussions in the sets were productive, the fact that set members did not subsequently do what they were supposed to do (namely, discussing problems with the employees they represented) is distressing.

129



Active cooperation of and stimulus by an organization’s senior management in an action learning program (to highlight that the problems under consideration are relevant and their solution is important) As we have previously argued, there was no support for the pilot at higher management levels. Many managers did not want to be bothered by implementation problems and only seemed to be interested in reaching the output target in order to 'defend' the grant the municipality had received;

•

The presence of identifiable clients and sponsors (to embed the program in an organization and ensure that problems are taken seriously by those concerned) The pilot had identifiable clients and sponsors, as stated in the case description;

•

An intention to implement the resulting solutions, which is to be followed by the actual implementation of these solutions The problems uncovered by the project manager were discussed in the various sets and decisions could, at least until he found out that set members did not work according to plan, usually be taken. However, these decisions were hardly ever implemented because of the resistance in the municipality. Municipality officials may have been used to follow new procedures imposed by the central government, but not those proposed by their colleagues;

•

A manageable and controllable period of time within which an action learning program is conducted, so that regular work processes are not disrupted In total, the pilot lasted over a year. However, only the first phase was based on action learning principles. This phase lasted ten months, which is not uncommon in action learning (Donnenberg 1999, Weinstein 1999, 2002). Some interviewees argued that work processes were disrupted nevertheless because of the already heavy workload.

A summary of our analysis is shown in Table 4.3. From this Table we can conclude that organization ‘E’ had the following characteristics at the time of the action learning program described above35:  KCLS ∧  KCAL ∧  A. 35


130


Table 4.3

Case summary in organization ‘E’.

Condition

Condition present? (Yes/No)

LEARNING SYSTEM Chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning This they stimulate through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottom-up inputs Rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable Unsolvable or intractable problems (at the level that they occur) are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems, so that similar problems can be solved in the future Employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work

NO No


NO No No

No No No

No

No


No No


NO No

131

Yes No No


Given what has previously been discussed, we believe that this case, among others, highlights the negative role of employee resistance and the absence of management support in bringing about organizational change.

4.5 Organization ‘M’36 4.5.1 Introduction Organization ‘M’ is an elevator company located in the middle of the Netherlands. We interviewed the sponsor of its action learning programs, who was also company director (‘F’), the head of operations (‘K’), the financial director, who was the project manager of most of M’s action learning programs (‘G’), and the sales manager (‘T’). In action learning terms, they were related, at least on one occasion, to each other as follows: •

Project manager: G

•

Action learning sponsor: F

•

Action learning client: F

•

Two set members: K and T.

Whereas single action learning programs were studied in the previous organizations, we will now examine more action learning programs, because they were ingrained in the company’s daily practices (as we will see below). The interview questions we used are listed in appendix I. All interviews lasted between 1-2 hours and were audio-taped. We employed the research protocol shown in section 4.2.5. M operated as a separate entity between May 1996 and June 200437. At first it was a service provider for companies owning elevators from various brands38. Between May and September 1996, its legal body was an ‘eenmanszaak’ (‘sole proprietorship’) and comprised one person: F (who remained CEO up until the company’s sale). He was subsequently joined by one of his brothers, an elevator technician, while the company’s legal body changed to a ‘VOF’ (‘vennootschap onder firma’ or ‘partnership’). Subsequently, F began to hire more personnel. These were mainly technicians. M’s work force gradually increased to 60 persons 36

An abbreviated version of this case is discussed in De Loo (2006).

37

The company was sold in March 2004, but briefly remained a separate entity after this.

38

According to one interviewee, in this specific part of the elevator market entry barriers were

the lowest.

132


at the end of 2003. By 2003, the management team had been enlarged and consisted of M’s human resource manager, K, G and F. M’s service portfolio ultimately contained 1,000 elevators. In comparison, the Finnish market leader, operating worldwide, serviced 52,0000 elevators in 40 countries in 2004. The total number of elevators serviced in the Netherlands, including those serviced by the market leader, was 80,000 at the time of M’s sale. The company that finally bought M, which was the second-largest elevator company in the Netherlands, serviced about 21,000 elevators. One interviewee claimed that by 2003, M had become the largest small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) on the elevator market in terms of personnel. Some of M’s competitors focused on building elevators instead of servicing those of others. In 2004, the Dutch elevator market consisted of 30-35 companies, of which 6-7 were multinationals. The rest were SME’s like M. F had worked in the elevator business as a sales engineer and had strong beliefs about the way in which personal development could lead to organizational development and increased financial performance. He therefore decided to start M. Since he knew that returns to scale would be difficult to obtain for a small company, he opted for a focus strategy. Learning with and from customers became one of M’s goals, together with the creation of innovative services, flexibility, and a desire to be financially healthy. F wanted to sustain organizational learning in his company. At the end of 1996 it was announced that new European legislation would be introduced in 1999, which among others implied that elevator companies had to have their own elevator(s)39. Since F did not want to stop M after a few months, he decided to grow faster than he had first intended, in order to accommodate the new legislation. M’s growth set in during the early months of 1999. Another office was temporarily opened in the west of the Netherlands, while other offices were opened later on. At one point, M had four sales offices, two of which operated from M’s main office. They had to attract more customers than the main office could. In addition, many new technicians were hired. Large 39

This was caused by the fact that under the new legislation, servicing elevators from different

brands would become more difficult, because the original producers could protect their construction manuals. Although SME’s could work out how specific elevators worked and were therefore, in theory, able to construct manuals of their own, this required substantial investments and was therefore not often considered. Under the new legislation, service activities would become more costly unless a company had its own elevator(s). Therefore, M had to grow. With hindsight, all interviewees endorse this decision.

133


investments were made to construct an elevator especially for M. F worked together with suppliers of elevator parts and co-producers to develop it. In line with the new legislation, M became a ‘full concept provider’, integrating production, installment, maintenance, modernization and advisory activities. M’s clients started to include housing corporations (which ultimately comprised 40% of M’s portfolio in terms of number of elevators), representatives from residential rental buildings (‘verenigingen van eigenaren’), hospitals, and firms in the petrochemical industry. When the new legislation was introduced in the summer of 1999, M was well underway to meet the necessary requirements (complete compliance occurred in 2001). As the company was growing it had to be restructured. Until then business had been conducted professionally but also rather informally. This was not possible anymore in view of the company’s new size. It is here that action learning started to play a role in M, as we will see later on. In the years 2001-2002 M’s management decided to grow further, although the company’s financial performance was less than expected according to three interviewees. All interviewees but one found that the company’s increasingly sour financial status would sound its death knell. They wanted to consolidate what had been built up and not move forward. Although revenues increased throughout M’s existence, other financial measures showed less desirable results from late 2002 onwards. Nevertheless, while M’s price for elevators generally was 20% over the price of the market leader, the company became renowned for its service and customer satisfaction. The lack of sufficiently skilled and motivated personnel on the job market started to make itself felt as time went by. Most of M’s employees were about 30 years old and had little in-depth expertise or experience. Only M’s elevator technicians were older and had more business experience. Unfortunately, there was too little time to acquire all the knowledge and skills employees needed to carry out their tasks. They hardly had time to grow. One interviewee indicated that the company could not keep up with this, even though two interviewees stated that the elevator market was predictable, because the company was working with durable goods. In early 2003 various other changes affected M’s prospects: housing corporations started to merge, so that the total number in the Netherlands fell from

134


approximately 1,500 to 600. Furthermore, elevator companies started to merge, bringing down the price/quality ratio through economies of scale, scope and skills. M could at one point no longer compete with them. Moreover, an increasing number of clients required service within the hour, which a company with 60 people operating from a (then again) single location in the Netherlands could not guarantee. In addition, material prices started to rise, making both production and maintenance more costly. Since M had reinvested most of its resources in order to grow, these costs were increasingly difficult to cover through bank loans. In addition to this, two interviewees stated that M still had little internal structure while it continued to grow. This caused serious problems. Moreover, communication about M’s new structure was not optimal. This led to motivational problems among employees. Finally, new European legislation was announced, which would be introduced in September 2003. The legislation implied that more extensive quality and safety standards had to be met, and that every company had to structure its service activities according to new rules, which, according to one interviewee, were so strict that they could hardly be obeyed by SME’s, because this again required large investments. Since F deemed the risk too great to comply with the new legislation, he decided to sell M to the second largest company on the elevator market. The sale ensured that M’s management team became financially independent. It was effectuated in March 2004. G, K and T subsequently helped to transfer M to its new environment, with K and T staying on for six months, and G for eleven. F left M in July 2004.

4.5.2 Program Overview When M’s rapid growth set in, so that the first change in European legislation could be tackled, F felt that the company’s organizational structure and management control system had to be changed. In many company documents the need to do so was stressed. M’s new structure was operational at the beginning of 200240. Up until then the company had mainly been organized through processes of trial and error, with little emphasis on formalized procedures. However, continuous improvement through kaizen principles was stressed. Many employees had grown used to this loosely structured way of working. In 1999 however, F started to follow an MBA program in which he got in touch with action learning. He subsequently tried to make communication and 40

Three interviewees claimed that M’s new structure was never fully operationalized.

135


trust two of his guiding principles and began to emphasize employee empowerment in his company. Nevertheless, this implied, among others, that M never had a worked out, formal organizational structure, although a general distinction between upper, middle, and lower-level management was made. As stated, almost all interviewees (with one exception) said this was one of the reasons why internal problems occurred after 1999. In order to facilitate employee empowerment, F introduced what became known as the ‘initiative’ concept. Throughout the year, employees could apply for an initiative if they had the impression that business processes had to be changed in order to attain the financial targets M’s management had stated in its yearly budget rounds (for which a rolling budget system was used) (Wildavsky 1986). Every initiative started with a formally specified research question, which had to be sent to the management team at a special e-mail address. In an initiative, employees signaled a problem and asked to work on it. If possible, they also had to list the goal(s) of an initiative, the estimated financial requirements, the required number of employees, and the expected outcome41. In addition, initiatives had to contain a communication and implementation plan42. In their regular (mostly biweekly) meetings, M’s management team determined whether an initiative indeed required immediate attention. Provided that a problem could not be easily solved, more than one of M’s core business processes were involved, and immediate attention was found necessary, an initiative could be undertaken, although at most three of them43 were conducted at the same time in order not to disrupt regular work. All initiatives were treated as projects, and although this was never made specific, they were in fact action learning programs. One interviewee noted that most of the changes in M were based on initiatives, as there was no other way to start large improvement processes from December 2001 onwards44. Since that time, complex problems did not lead to 41

Although outcomes had to be as specific as possible, this was often difficult because those

handing in an initiative did not always oversee all business processes that were involved in a problem. That is why the leadership of an initiative was mostly left to a management team member (as we will see below). 42

This was the responsibility of the ‘project manager’, who is introduced below.

43

Two interviewees said that five initiatives were the maximum. Another interviewee confirmed

that in practice no more than three initiatives were carried out simultaneously. 44

Before December 2001 it was possible to start large improvement processes as well, but this

did not happen in a structured fashion, let alone by using action learning principles. These processes were carried out under the direct supervision of M’s senior management instead.

136


immediate action but to one or more initiatives. However, according to two interviewees, decision-making again became more impromptu by the time the company’s sales decreased in late 2002. Immediate action resurfaced to tackle most problems. All interviewees stated that as far as they could tell, project team discussions (in initiatives) were always open and constructive. One interviewee indicated that most employees wanted to be involved in improving business processes, most certainly if this was to result from an initiative they had handed in (although this also occasionally led to difficulties when an initiative was declined). A special computer program tracked the status of an initiative. From March 2002 onwards, K was in charge of this program, like F and G had been before. In 2001 and 2002, M’s personnel submitted a total of 109 initiatives. By far not all of these were tackled during M’s existence (we will get back to this later on). Examples of initiatives that were carried out include new inventory planning and exit procedures for employees, better communications with external parties, the creation of a special service level agreement (SLA) for hospitals, and the delivery of colored elevator parts. M’s management team regularly clustered and cleaned up the list of initiatives. Every initiative had the same set-up, as shown in figure 4.3:

Figure 4.3

Set-up of an initiative. 137


Each initiative had a project manager, who was appointed by the management team. Sometimes the project manager was the person who had handed in an initiative, but mostly a management team member was appointed, because of the strategic ties of the initiatives. The project manager coordinated the initiative, which was carried out by a project team. The project manager selected this team, which could comprise all of M’s employees, although people outside the company could participate as well (customers, suppliers, etc.). M’s management team had to approve of the selected team. A team usually consisted of 5-8 members. The project manager operated as a client (in action learning terms), and was not part of the team. F was the sponsor of every initiative. G was the project manager of most initiatives. According to F, both a ‘resonance group’ and a principally external facilitator accompanied each team45. A resonance group contained representatives of external parties, like coproducers. When asked by the project manager, they would give feedback on the proposed solutions. It was their task to ensure that these solutions met the quality standards prevailing on the market and could be implemented. Final decisions about implementation issues were left to M’s management team. The facilitator was to safeguard the group’s learning and problem-solving processes. An initiative typically lasted between two to nine months. Employees could be involved in different roles in different initiatives at the same time, but also had their regular tasks to accomplish.

4.5.3 Program Experiences All project teams had to use specific heuristics to find a solution to the problems they had to tackle. Teams did not strictly have to follow these heuristics though, and could go back to or start again at previous steps, if necessary. Meanwhile, the project manager had to discuss the intermediate results of an initiative with M’s management team. It took a fairly long time before employees adapted themselves to M’s new way of working. Quite a few tended to take shortcuts instead of thoroughly analyzing a problem. They literally had to be taught that their behavior could lead to 45

Two interviewees claimed that resonance groups were often absent. Note that Boddy (1979)

discusses the role and relevance of resonance groups in action learning, stating that they are difficult to construct.

138


ineffective solutions. M used several external consultants to do this. In addition, F was the facilitator in most initiatives. He also explained, on various occasions, how he thought his company should function. Unfortunately, under the pressure of deadlines and decreasing sales, employees tended to fall back into routine behavior (Cunningham 1993). Besides, some of them had started to work for M since it had little formalized procedures. They did not want to work differently. Furthermore, according to two interviewees, since F did not always work according to the framework he had introduced after 2002 himself, some employees felt they could do the same. The number of initiatives finally carried out was, perhaps therefore, much lower than 109. The estimates of three interviewees was between two and ten, but the other interviewee noted that this number must have been much higher, as installing the new organizational structure required many initiatives as well. Even if F did not always follow his framework after 2002, initiatives were carried out in 2003. For some reason these were small-scale projects.

4.5.4 Reflections Some employees had to be laid off, because they could or would not adapt to M’s new practices or did not fit the strategic decisions taken by M’s management team. Although most employees ultimately accepted and learned to work with initiatives, one interviewee acknowledged that it was very difficult to draw a line between ‘regular’ problems that could be tackled though kaizen principles, without the necessity of an initiative, and problems that required an initiative. That is, the elements that made problems ‘really’ complex instead of more undemanding were open for debate. Sometimes, decisions to conduct an initiative were taken purely on instinct. One of the greatest advantages of initiatives was that they were easy to manage and took a limited period of time, so that results could be achieved relatively fast. However, since M was also confronted with many internal problems because of its fast growth, there was little time and money (left) to run initiatives, although all interviewees acknowledged that this was the way business should have been conducted until M’s sale, because it focused attention on specific problems for a limited period of time. All interviewees mentioned that they had to work hard in M, but that they did this with pleasure. They considered themselves pioneers, working together with energetic and enthusiastic colleagues, tackling problems head-on (although in 139


sometimes chaotic circumstances). Despite the company’s demise, they felt they had been involved in something special. Organizational change seems to have materialized in M, because the outcome of initiatives was almost always implemented and thereby led to changes in organizational practice and behavior. These changes were codified in the 'Handboek Algemeen’ (‘General Handbook’), in which all of M’s internal and external procedures were gathered after 2001. Several versions of the Handboek exist. The final version was prepared in December 2002.

4.5.5 Summary Note that this case differs from the previous cases in several important ways. It is the only case in which an organization actually recognized and treated action learning as a particularization of management control. After all, initiatives were part of M's management control system and intended to promote organizational learning through employee empowerment, which was among M's goals. In addition, the results from initiatives were codified in the ‘Handboek Algemeen’, which can be regarded as a collection of protoscripts. M also explicitly used management control measures in every initiative to stimulate organizational change. The heuristics that team members used, senior management approval of the selected teams, the assignment of a project manager from M's management team, the consent this team had to give to implement solutions, and the presence of the ‘Handboek Algemeen’ are just a few examples of additional management control measures M employed to stimulate change. Donnenberg (2003) calls action learning programs such as M’s ‘embedded action learning’. As a consequence, it is possible to analyze more action learning programs at once. We wish to analyze M’s action learning programs in two separate years: 2002 and 2003. M’s senior management, and F in particular, had previously cleared the floor for action learning in several company-wide sessions, as well as in various personal conversations and company documents. Those unwilling to work according to the new guidelines were laid off, after having been granted several chances to change their behavior. In 2002, after the initiative concept had been introduced, the company fared fairly well (possibly) as a consequence, but its fortunes changed at the end of 2002 and further declined in 2003. As we previously argued, the company frequently resorted to impromptu decisionmaking in 2003, whereas it had resorted to initiatives before when complex 140


problem arose. The fact that the final version of the ‘Handboek Algemeen’ stems from December 2002, while it was constantly changed after initiatives had been carried out, also suggests that there was something different about initiatives in 2003. We conjecture that because of the resurgence of impromptu decision-making and F’s involvement in this, the importance that was once attributed to and felt about initiatives among employees declined. This hindered the subsequent materialization of new or adapted protoscripts at the organizational level, as employees could not tell anymore how serious action learning activities were being taken. As a consequence, the number of initiatives carried out was smaller in 2003 than in 2002. This hints at the relevance of personal and system trust in realizing organizational change (Bachmann 2001). Personal trust was exhibited by F in 2002, which together with his clear endorsement and approval of initiatives led to system trust (in initiatives to bring about organizational change) among employees. When this changed in 2003, both types of trust declined and the coalitions of employees formed in initiatives were no longer motivated or encouraged to strive for organizational change themselves46. Therefore, we assert that situation ‘A’ was realized in 2002 but not in 2003. Let us now discuss the learning system conditions and the conditions for personal and organizational development through action learning that we distilled in chapter 3. As stated, two periods will be distinguished: 2002 and 2003. In 2002 M structurally used initiatives and managed to reap its fruits. In 2003, their effects decreased. We will start by looking at 2002. As far as the learning system conditions are concerned, we find the following results (see the texts below the conditions for a motivation): •

Chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning M's organizational goals included stimulating organizational learning through employee empowerment. The initiative concept was a way to achieve this;

•

This they stimulate through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottomup inputs Although M never had a formal organizational structure, a clear delegation of tasks occurred within initiatives. Some interviewees argued that the absence of a formal structure led to internal

46

This may explain why small-scale projects were emphasized in 2003, but not in 2002.

141


problems when M's economic conditions worsened. However, this condition, by itself, was met in 2002; •

Rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable The fact that M wanted to be an innovative and flexible organization meant that rules and procedures had to be considered as being variable. This was also a feature of the initiative concept. New versions of the ‘Handboek Algemeen’ were prepared when rules and procedures changed;

•

Unsolvable or intractable problems (at the level that they occur) are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems, so that similar problems can be solved in the future Initiatives were an integral approach, in the sense that all of M's business processes were considered simultaneously in an initiative, so that changes in organizational systems could occur if necessary;

•

Employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work Initiatives ensured that employees regularly got together to improve work processes (although not necessarily their own). Before 2002, M had used more informal procedures to achieve this.

Therefore, a learning system was present in 2002. When we analyze the necessary conditions for personal and organizational development of section 3.2.1, we find the following: Necessary conditions to stimulate personal development: •

Set members and an organization’s senior management have a willingness to learn. They accept new ways of thinking, even if these are contrary to their current beliefs and habits Although there were difficulties with employees who did not want to work with initiatives, the initiatives themselves, when carried out, went very well. The subsequent changes in the ‘Handboek Algemeen’ helped to ingrain new ways of thinking and working in M;

142


•

Constructive set behavior that manifests itself in open discussions and genuine attempts to solve organizational problems Team discussions always seemed to be open and constructive.


Active cooperation of and stimulus by an organization’s senior management in an action learning program (to highlight that the problems under consideration are relevant and their solution is important) F, as well as the other management team members, endorsed the initiative concept and were always involved therein (in various roles);

•

The presence of identifiable clients and sponsors (to embed the program in an organization and ensure that problems are taken seriously by those concerned) All initiatives had identifiable clients and sponsors;

•

An intention to implement the resulting solutions, which is to be followed by the actual implementation of these solutions Upon approval of M's management team the implementation of solutions always occurred after initiatives had been carried out, and at least in 2002, new versions of the ‘Handboek Algemeen’ were subsequently prepared;

•

A manageable and controllable period of time within which an action learning program is conducted, so that regular work processes are not disrupted The fact that initiatives should not disrupt regular business processes was always kept in mind when they were designed.

Given the above motivations, we can draw the following conclusions for the year 2002 in organization ‘M’: KCLS ∧ KCAL ∧ A. Let us now turn to the year 2003 and analyze the same conditions. We will mainly focus on the conditions that differ from 2002 (motivations can again be found below the conditions): •

Chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning

143


Although the role of F is uncertain (as he did not always seem to endorse the initiative concept anymore), organizational learning through employee empowerment was still among M's goals; •

This they stimulate through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottomup inputs Instead of resorting to initiatives and delegating authority to other employees, M's management team now regularly decided on matters for which it had previously applied initiatives. Therefore the delegation of tasks was less extensive in 2003 than in 2002;

•

Rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable This condition did not change in 2003;

•

Unsolvable or intractable problems (at the level that they occur) are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems, so that similar problems can be solved in the future This condition remained the same as well, but only when initiatives were carried out;

•

Employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work Since M faced many internal problems in 2003, there were fewer deliberations among employees. Mostly, decision-making occurred ad-lib, by M’s management team. However, the aforementioned deliberations did occur in the initiatives that were conducted in 2003.

Contrary to 2002, we now see that the presence of a learning system is arguable at best. We can say the following about the necessary conditions for personal and organizational development in section 3.2.1: Necessary conditions to stimulate personal development: •

Set members and an organization’s senior management have a willingness to learn. They accept new ways of thinking, even if these are contrary to their current beliefs and habits Despite the fact that no new ‘Handboek Algemeen’ was prepared in 2003, one interviewee claimed that changes in employee thinking

144


and behavior did occur as a consequence of the initiatives that were carried out nevertheless; •

Constructive set behavior that manifests itself in open discussions and genuine attempts to solve organizational problems This condition did not change in 2003.


Active cooperation of and stimulus by an organization’s senior management in an action learning program (to highlight that the problems under consideration are relevant and their solution is important) Even if M's management team did not always act accordingly, it continued to support the initiative concept;

•

The presence of identifiable clients and sponsors (to embed the program in an organization and ensure that problems are taken seriously by those concerned) This condition did not change in 2003;

•

An intention to implement the resulting solutions, which is to be followed by the actual implementation of these solutions This condition remained the same as well;

•

A manageable and controllable period of time within which an action learning program is conducted, so that regular work processes are not disrupted This was the company’s aim from the outset, and it remained so throughout 2003 even though it faced many internal problems.

Therefore, in 2003, we can conclude the following with respect to the conditions listed in section 3.4.1:  KCLS ∧ KCAL ∧  A. The results for 2002 and 2003 are summarized in Table 4.4.

145


Table 4.4

Case summary in organization ‘M’.

Condition

Condition present in 2002? (Yes/No)

Condition present in 2003? (Yes/No)

LEARNING SYSTEM Chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning This they stimulate through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottom-up inputs Rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable Unsolvable or intractable problems (at the level that they occur) are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems, so that similar problems can be solved in the future Employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work

YES Yes

NO Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No


YES Yes Yes

YES Yes Yes

Yes

Yes


Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes


YES Yes

NO No

146


Taken together, we believe that this case illustrates the negative effects of (extreme) external pressure on further organizational change (as new or adapted protoscripts take time to manifest themselves at the organizational level, which is hard to accomplish when pressure is continuously increasing and changes quickly succeed each another) (Burns and Scapens 2000, Hagmann et al. 1998, Williamson 2000). Besides, we assert that the importance of senior management support in legitimizing action learning and fostering organizational change is stressed as well (Meyer and Rowan 1991). In organization ‘M’, support was achieved by setting up various company-wide and individual training sessions, by M's senior management putting into practice what it had previously preached, and by the signaling effects caused by the abovementioned layoffs.

4.6 Conclusions 4.6.1 Across the Cases What can we conclude when we combine the insights gained from the cases? In order to answer this question, we will start by listing the inferences we have previously drawn about the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A: Organization ‘C’: KCLS ∧ KCAL ∧ A; Organization ‘E’:  KCLS ∧  KCAL ∧  A; Organization ‘M’ (in 2002): KCLS ∧ KCAL ∧ A; Organization ‘M’ (in 2003):  KCLS ∧ KCAL ∧  A. When analyzed separately, we can corroborate our interpretation of Revans's ideas on action learning in organization ‘C’ and ‘E’, and in organization ‘M’ in 2002. In one case it was refuted (in organization 'M' in 2003). It may be recalled that we had some difficulties in organization 'C' with validity and reliability issues, as we could only partially sustain our interview reports and case description. Besides, our discussion on organizational development focused on one police corps only. In this respect it is interesting to see that in organization 'M', where we had no such problems, we found exactly the same result (at least in 2002). Perhaps the most illuminating result is found when we compare organization 'E' and 'M' in the year 2003. From this we can conclude that KCAL are not necessary to find situation ‘A’. When we set this result against the other two cases, we can conclude that only KCLS are relevant if situation ‘A’ occurs.

147


Therefore, the action learning conditions, and thereby action learning itself, are not necessary if ample organizational change is to take place. Whether or not an organization functions as a learning system is the only thing that matters. In other words: KCLS ≡ A. Note that this conclusion is sustained by our findings in organization ‘C’, ‘E’ and ‘M’ in 2002. If we had merely researched the above relationship there, it would have been corroborated. This further enhances the above conclusion. Given this conclusion, we claim that action learning is an ineffective particularization of management control. This answers our main research question. Stated differently, our conception of Revans's view on action learning is not corroborated. In terms of our additional research questions, this first of all implies that action learning is not required for organizational development. Secondly, organizational development does not always occur under the conditions listed in the action learning literature. The learning system conditions, and thereby learning systems themselves, are self-sustaining. Based on the cases we analyzed, having a learning system is sufficient to make organizational change happen. We will discuss the remaining additional research questions in the following sections.

4.6.2 About Action Learning If action learning is an ineffective particularization of management control, what does this say about action learning (our third additional research question)? Perhaps most importantly, it illustrates that action learning is no ‘Holy Grail’ that, when it is applied, will more or less automatically lead to organizational development. The success stories that fill much of the action learning literature (as indicated in chapter 1) may nevertheless lead us to think so47. Conger and Toegel (2003) present a critical analysis of action learning. They state among others that a fatal design flaw in many action learning programs is that they focus on singular learning experiences. This, by itself, is a problem because:

47

Although some have asked whether action learning has had its day or should be applied at all

when complex problems arise (De Loo 2003, Pedler, Brook and Burgoyne 2004).

148


“… often when action-learning projects end, they quite literally end. There is an assumption that sufficient learning has taken place during the programme itself and that it will be self-sustaining. Nothing could be further from the truth. … action-learning programmes need mechanisms to ensure the transfer of learning back to the workplace.” (ibid., p. 338) A learning system, we claim, implies that protoscripts are already present at the organizational level containing “mechanisms to ensure the transfer of learning back into the workplace”. Throughout the organization, this is a taken-forgranted way of working (Burns, Ezzamel and Scapens 2003, Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem 2007). In such a case, the protoscripts developed or adapted by the temporary coalition(s) involved in an action learning program are shared with employees who were not stakeholders in the program, making organizational development happen. In case this happens, action learning ‘suits’ the organization. Attention is focused on specific problems for a specific period of time, while the presence of a learning system ensures that the protoscripts developed or adapted in this way are subsequently ingrained at the organizational level. Thereby, organizational change is realized, while management culture is changed (Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem ibid.). In addition, given our case analyses, it seems that the presence of the KCAL, when a learning system is present as well, can speed up organizational change. This we saw in both organization ‘M’ and ‘C’, where action learning was a catalyst of future organizational development. In both organizations, attention was focused on important problems that had not been tackled yet and probably would have remained so. Let us elaborate a little on the last issue. In section 3.3.2, we concluded that KCLS function at a higher institutional level than KCAL. This begs the question whether there is only one level of situation ‘A’ to analyze. The latter is suggested in the action learning literature, and is among others portrayed in Revans’s (1971) system approach. In line with the notion that KCLS operate at a higher institutional level than KCAL, our own analysis in section 3.3.2 at least suggests that there may be different levels of situation ‘A’ to analyze, perhaps most prominently the level of action learning stakeholders and the level of the organization in its entirety. We conjecture that Revans (1971, 1982) focuses on the latter, despite the fact that he makes a distinction between personal and organizational development. Personal development is, after all, individually bound in Revans (ibid.), while organizational development is about the

149


organization as a whole. It is here that, in Revans’s view, situation ‘A’ comes into play. If KCAL are especially tailored to a lower-level manifestation of ‘A’, it is not too surprising that they are dropped from our analysis, as Revans then focuses on a level of ‘A’ for which KCAL are not effective by definition. Organizations sometimes use fashionable techniques and tools to gain legitimacy from their environment, for example from their business partners, the government or the general public. Moreover, for instance, the use of consultants can create legitimacy for the activities of an organization (Meyer and Rowan 1991). Both external and internal legitimacy can be distinguished. External legitimacy is contained in the examples just mentioned. Internal legitimacy is linked to employee impressions of the effectiveness of an organization’s practices, tools and systems. They must believe that these are appropriate to meet organizational demands and have to act accordingly (Meyer and Rowan ibid.). It is here that protoscripts enter the analysis. Different external and internal institutional conditions can lead to conflicting institutional pressures on organizations, which can reduce internal legitimacy. This may hamper organizational development (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens 2005). The analysis of section 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 uncovered several positive and negative internal and external factors affecting the emergence or adaptation of protoscripts through action learning, which are in line with this. Taken together, these highlight the relevance of the social context in which action learning (and management control in general) takes place for specific results to arise. The factors may, we assert, (jointly) influence the effectiveness of action learning as a particularization of management control. The positive factors include senior management support and the internal legitimacy of action learning, while the negative factors include internal resistance and external organizational pressure. External pressure can always arise when an organization cannot affect market conditions. This pressure is difficult to counterbalance, especially for small organizations such as, in our case, 'M'. Internal resistance, according to our cases, may be tackled through layoffs, introductory sessions and personal conversations48. This may enhance the internal legitimacy of action learning. When senior management support is absent, an action learning program should probably not be undertaken (Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a). In organization 'E' the negative consequences of this were overwhelming, although they were augmented by other problems the 48

Although most of these insights stem from organization ‘M’ only.

150


organization faced. When personal and system trust is present for a longer period of time, overall resistance to action learning may decline. We saw this in organization 'M', although the company-wide introductory sessions that were held may have played a role in this as well. At least in 2002, organization ‘M’ was also a good example of how personal trust could be translated into system trust (Bachmann 2001). In 2003 however, system trust declined when personal trust between employees fell. Moreover, following Busco, Riccaboni and Scapens (2006), trust in organizational change through action learning existed for quite a time in organization ‘M’. When it was present, action learning served as a catalyst for organizational change: it speeded up protoscript development and adaptation, because attention was focused on specific problems for a specific period of time that had not been tackled until then, although they had been signaled and deemed important. Note that the same can be said of organization ‘C’ during and after the BOSNO-program we discussed. This was stated literally by some of the interviewees. Action learning apparently ‘suited’ these organizations at the time. We have summarized the above in Table 4.5. Table 4.5

Factors affecting organizational development through action learning.

Factors with a positive impact on organizational development

Factors with a negative impact on organizational development

Management support

Internal resistance

Internal legitimacy of action learning

External pressure

We conjecture the following with respect to the factors shown in Table 4.5. There may be a connection between internal resistance, the legitimization of action learning and management support. Management support can ease internal resistance, or increase it when it is absent. Both can be coupled with internal legitimacy issues. The latter can by definition only occur when internal resistance in an organization is negligible (Meyer and Rowan 1991, Siti-Nahiba 151


and Scapens 2005). Active management support in an action learning program may help to achieve this49. We also surmise that the balance between internal resistance, management support and legitimization issues, which is rather delicate in our cases, influences whether a learning system will be in place or not (Revans 1982, 1998a). In view of the fact that trust, in a learning system, is both implicitly and explicitly placed on employees at lower management levels to tackle organization-wide problems and learn from this, the importance of trust in action learning situations is stressed. External pressure can influence the dynamics of the aforementioned structure, which, as stated, may be hard to counterbalance when an organization cannot affect market conditions.

4.6.3 About Management Control We previously mentioned several times that action learning is a particularization of management control. As it is a particularization, what we conclude with respect to action learning also holds for management control. Therefore, our conclusions are context-freer that it may first appear. This helps to answer our fourth additional research question. As action learning is deemed an ineffective particularization of management control, it may seem difficult to draw conclusions about the latter. However, since we found that KCLS ≡ A, it is interesting to discuss the management control of learning systems. In section 3.3.2 we clearly connected Revans’s (1982) view on learning systems to Hiromoto’s (1991) view on modern-day management control systems. We concluded that organic forms of management control fit the dynamic nature of learning systems. Given this link and the former’s embodiment in learning systems, Hiromoto’s (ibid.) view on management control is worth considering in greater detail. He lists a number of elements that jointly determine the management control system that is in use in innovative organizations. Hiromoto states, among others, that control systems should be pull systems, measure organizational progress over time, and leave a lot of decision authority to lower-level employees instead of to an organization’s senior management. Members of the latter should become ‘team players’ instead. Note that this is in line with Simons’s (1990, 1995, 2000) ‘interactive control systems’, which we will examine later on. 49

Management support may not be the only way to decrease internal resistance. As stated, it

may also be lessened through for example layoffs.

152


The only organizations that fully correspond to the abovementioned view on management control are organization ‘C’ and ‘M’ (in 2002). Employee involvement in organizational decision-making was stimulated in both organizations at the time. BOSNO-programs on the one hand and the initiative concept on the other were explicitly applied as problem-solving and learning devices. Being (primarily) service providers (both in terms of safety), C’s and M’s control systems were also pull systems50. This was a deliberate choice in organization M after 1999. Flexibility in organizational practices was encouraged through M’s rolling budget system and C’s endorsement of pilots in general (at least in the police corps in question). Besides, management culture in both organization ‘C’ and ‘M’ stimulated employee empowerment, although this changed as time went by, especially in organization ‘C’, where much less emphasis was placed on employee empowerment. In organization ‘M’ impromptu decision-making resurfaced in 2003, which confused employees who had come to believe that employee empowerment was the taken-for-granted way of doing things in the organization (Burns, Ezzamel and Scapens 2003). In organization ‘E’, a municipality, it seems that as it operated in a government setting where top-down decision-making was and still is more or less the general rule (Lapsley and Pallot 2000), temporary employee empowerment had disastrous effects as it did not fit the prevailing management culture. However, it may also be that as the effects of a previous organization had not settled in yet, there was no room for trust in management control approaches such as action learning for other changes to come about (Busco, Riccaboni and Scapens 2006). Besides, it may be argued that as the new approach to management control in organization ‘E’ was mainly based on political reasons and not on a problem that the municipality as a whole, in all its management levels, considered a major issue, it was doomed to be ineffective from the outset (Dilworth 1998), because internal legitimacy could not be realized (Meyer and Rowan 1991)51. We therefore conclude that our connection between Revans’s (1982) view on learning systems and Hiromoto’s (1991) ideas about suitable management control systems in turbulent, changing environments is substantiated, since the

50

Organization ‘E’ was, in a way, a service provider as well, but was, we claim, much more

influenced by demands from the central government than by customer demands (the general public) than the other organizations. 51

Also see section 4.6.2.

153


case organizations that operated as learning systems also fulfilled Hiromoto’s (ibid.) criteria for management control systems (and vice versa)52. The interrelationships between Hiromoto (1991) and Revans (1982) could perhaps be worked out further. This may be linked to the argument in the previous section that there may be more than one level of situation ‘A’ to analyze. This could lead to additional conditions to be added to our take on Revans’s action learning ‘theory’. This begs the question what such a condition could look like. For this, let us turn to a discussion about Simons’s (1995, 2000) ‘levers of control’, and focus in particular on interactive control systems. In Simons (ibid.), interactive control systems are placed in a structure of four types of management control (called ‘levers’) that can all affect or be affected by strategic change: diagnostic control systems (that are primarily backward looking based on the cybernetic view on management control, and incorporate critical performance variables), belief systems (that specify organizational norms and core values), boundary systems (that signify what is not allowed in an organization, thereby establishing the risks to be avoided), and interactive control systems (formal information structures that focus on the strategic uncertainties of an organization so as to open up a variety of internal dialogues that stimulate organizational learning). Examples of (elements of) boundary and belief systems can be found in all of our cases. To start with latter, in organization ‘C’, at least in 2000-2001, the view was held that BOSNO would be a good way to stimulate personal and (at times) organizational development. In organization ‘M’, there were strong views that it should move forward at all costs, partly because it wanted to be an innovative service provider, and partly because external pressures required organizational change according to M’s management team. Organization ‘E’ did not really seem to endorse new changes at the time of study at all, as it had recently undergone many changes and was still suffering from its effects. It wanted things to settle down. This seemed to be a generally held view. Examples of (elements of) boundary systems include M’s use of heuristics in initiatives, the rules of the BOSNO-program that the participating organizations 52

As these ideas are also partly in line with Anthony (1988), his claims about modern

management control systems are substantiated as well (that is, insofar as they diverge from the cybernetic view on management control, the basics of which Anthony still holds on to in the abovementioned publication).

154


agreed upon to solve organizational problems (although these mainly played a role in the BOSNO-context and not in organization ‘C’ itself) and the rules that the external consultant installed to make the project teams in organization ‘E’ manageable. In addition, the initiative concept itself can be interpreted as a boundary control system in organization ‘M’, as it specified specific ‘rules of the game’ when employees saw that M’s strategic targets could not be met. The abovementioned heuristics can therefore be interpreted as rules within the ‘rules of the game’ (at a lower level of institutionalization). Strictly speaking, purely diagnostic control systems were not present in organization ‘M’ (after all, its rolling budget system was also partly forwardlooking and could therefore be deemed an interactive control system), but they were in organization ‘C’ and ‘E’. As argued, for example, by the ‘Stichting Maatschappij, Veiligheid en Politie’ (2004), many projects the police has undertaken aimed to satisfy specific output targets. In organization ‘E’, being a municipality, working with output targets was a well-known, taken-for granted way of working as well53. The goal that had to be met in the latter’s pilot (in terms of a specific number of foreigners that had to receive a temporary job) is a clear example of such a purely diagnostic output target. Below we want to pay more attention to interactive control systems, because as stated, these formal systems presumably stimulate organizational learning more than the other levers of control (Simons 1995, 2000)54. In Simons (1990), the following is said about them: “… the personal involvement of top managers, the defining characteristic of interactive control, influences strongly the incentives to produce and share information. Moreover, this focusing of organizational attention and the interactive exchange of information stimulates learning throughout the organization about the strategic uncertainties that are perceived by top management. By focusing attention throughout the organization, top managers use interactive management control to influence and guide the learning process – understanding that individual ideas and initiatives will emerge over time in unsystematic ways. By emphasizing select 53

Following Lapsley and Pallot (2000), this may have been a consequence of the New Public

Management (NPM) movement, at least partially. 54

However, among others, belief systems can inspire employees to search for new ways to

create ‘value’ for an organization as well (Simons 1995).

155


management controls and making them interactive (and programming and delegating others) top managers ensure that the organization is responsive to the opportunities and threats that the firm’s strategic uncertainties present.” (p. 137) Simons (1995) argues that there are four important differences between diagnostic and interactive control systems. What sets the latter apart is firstly the fact that they incorporate constantly changing strategic information. Secondly, they demand frequent attention from lower-level managers. Thirdly, data stemming from an interactive control system need to be discussed in faceto-face meetings with stakeholders, since they can have far-reaching effects for an organization. Finally, interactive control systems may serve as a catalyst for future organizational activities. The above characteristics are very much in line with what happened in organization ‘M’ in 2002, about which the former employees were still very enthusiastic in their interviews. The initiative concept that we discussed in section 4.5 focused on strategic problems, tried to get employees throughout the organization involved in them, led to several meetings with M’s management team and, as a consequence, sometimes resulted in discussions about the future strategic direction of the company. In addition, M’s rolling budget system can be interpreted as an interactive control system, although ideas for strategic change did not primarily stem from the system. In organization ‘E’ nothing like this happened at all, but the BOSNO-program studied in organization ‘C’ partly corresponds to an interactive control system, as it was a catalyst for future organizational change in the organization’s treatment of juvenile delinquents (besides a number of other factors). However, whether it can be interpreted as a formal information system may be questioned. What do our conclusions about the various levers of control tell us? Simons (1995) believes that organizations that manage to balance the four levers can “(…) reconcile the conflict between creativity and control (…)” (p. 80) and thereby unleash the “(…) innate potential of people to innovate and add value” (p. 88) to an organization. In organization ‘M’ we found manifestations of all levers of control, except for a full-fledged example of a diagnostic control system (although part of its rolling budget system may count as such). In organization ‘C’ and (particularly) ‘E’, the latter were heavily emphasized. At different levels of institutionalization, we also found examples of (elements of)

156


boundary and belief systems in the organizations under study. However, interactive control systems were only fully present in organization ‘M’ and (at best) partly in organization ‘C’. As these systems allegedly stimulate organizational learning the most, this may substantiate why situation ‘A’ only materialized in these organizations. Therefore, the presence of an interactive control system may be an additional condition to check when situation ‘A’ appears (or not). This serves to highlight the example we set out to provide above.

4.6.4 About our Reexamination of Action Learning What can we say about the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A that we used to operationalize our research? First of all, we had to make some assumptions in order to construct this relationship. This is common to all empirical research (Segers 1983). As far as the actual operationalization of our research is concerned, we tried to base ourselves as best we could on Revans (1982). But also this we could not do without imposing some assumptions, as shown in chapter 3. This is common to empirical research as well (Segers 1983). In addition, various measures were taken to realize the validity and reliability of the research, as argued in section 4.2.6. We concluded that we could not corroborate our interpretation of Revans’s views on action learning. However, the question remains how solid are our results really are. Can we sustain them without a doubt? Despite the fact that we have done our best to safeguard the validity and reliability of our research, there is always room for error. No research in the social sciences is definite (Denzin 1970). Although we studied various cases using triangulation techniques, and generated outcomes that, taken together, led to clear conclusions about the relationship between action learning and organizational development that do not contradict (Glaser and Strauss 1967), we think that these conclusions are only conditionally true pending further analysis (Popper 1972). After all, no positivistic perspective has been taken in our research, claiming that there is only one reality to uncover for which universally applicable laws have to be generated (Ahrens and Chapman 2006, Smith 2003). Instead, we argued that reality is actively constructed within a specific context (Bruner 1990, Popper 1972). That is why we did not focus on the corroboration

157


of the relationship KCLS ∧ KCAL ≡ A, as this can never be ascertained. The reverse, however, can be ascertained. We already mentioned this in section 3.4. We focused on specific measures in the research literature to enhance the validity and reliability of our findings. Our goal was not theory development but rather, following section 1.2, the understanding of the relationship between action learning and organizational development, which, following Ahrens and Chapman (2007), de Groot (1981), Llewelyn (2003) and Ménard (2001) precedes theory development. Furthermore, we want to highlight an important assumption we made in this research in section 1.4, namely that there is consistency between strategy formation and execution. We did not explicitly check this assumption in our research. However, the assumption is necessary in the light of the operationalization of figure 1.1. It should be noted that there is a potentially relevant problem related to this assumption. Let us suppose that an action learning program is executed in which the problem(s) under consideration are solved, and new protoscripts arise. However, let us also suppose that there is no consistency between the goals of the action learning program and strategic goals. In such a case, we cannot say anything about whether or not organizational development has occurred (at least, in the way we define it). The protoscripts that are developed may or may not be consistent with organizational goals, but we have no way of checking this within the research framework we have hitherto used. Therefore, we cannot tell which way it would go with the organization in question (as far as the co-appearance of action learning and organizational development is concerned). When the assumption mentioned in section 1.4 is imposed, such a situation would be impossible to find. This does not preclude, however, that it cannot occur in practice. This further decreases the generalizability claims that can be made on the basis of this research. Therefore, our conclusions only pertain to the cases at hand under the abovementioned assumption. Studying action learning in terms of management control is relatively new (De Loo 2002, 2006, 2008, Wallace 1990). Although the use of management accounting information in action learning programs had been discussed before (Revans 1982), the interpretation of action learning as a particularization of management control had not (De Loo 2002, 2006, 2008). In the preceding sections we showed that this has led to important insights that broaden the currently prevailing views in the action learning literature.

158


Finally, given the relevance of the outcomes of, among others, organization ‘E’ and ‘M’ for our research, we wish to stress the importance of openly discussing action learning ‘failures’ in the literature if the approach is to be advanced. This has already been proposed by Bourner et al. (1996) and Mumford (1995), but apart from Dilworth (1998) and Dilworth and Willis (2003) no one seems to have picked up the issue. Most books and articles that are published still focus on success stories, in which practitioners tell us about the more notable programs they have been involved in as a set advisor, highlighting their personal tips, tricks and suggestions, based on ‘best practices’, to construct a ‘successful’ action learning program. Unfortunately, these normative publications are often regarded as recommended action learning material, while failures, we feel, are more productive learning events (Donnenberg and De Loo 2004). There is also a methodological reason why we propose to study failures. Studying successes, which may have prompted Revans (1982) to distill the list of necessary conditions we used to assess the presence of personal and organizational growth through action learning, tells us nothing in itself about whether these conditions are actually necessary for organizational development to come about. After all, if the same conditions are present in action learning ‘failures’, they are irrelevant to induce organizational change. This can never be assessed when only success stories are studied (Rosenzweig 2007). Studying ‘failures’ is inevitable in this respect. This problem is known as ‘connecting the winning dots’ (ibid.). Discussing action learning ‘failures’ is therefore essential for the future development of the approach in both a theoretical and practical sense. Given that action learning has by now been firmly established as a useful problemsolving and learning approach (Revans 1998a), this should not be deemed a problem by those who wish to advance it (Bourner and Frost 1996, Wallace 1990).

159


5. R

eview and Reflections

5.1 Introduction In order to enhance our understanding of the relationship between action learning and organizational development, this study set out to examine if action learning is an effective particularization of management control. Four additional, lower-level research questions were formulated: •

Does action learning co-appear with organizational development?;

•

If so, does this happen under the conditions listed in the action learning literature?;

•

When we find that organizational development has not materialized, what does this tell us about action learning?

•

And what does this tell us about management control?

The answers to all of these questions, which we presented in section 4.6, will be briefly referred to in section 5.2.2 in the abovementioned order, after first having discussed the various phases of this research.

5.2 Overview 5.2.1 Research Steps Before we started our analysis, we motivated why action learning could be regarded as a particularization of management control and how it might be used to analyze and solve complex organizational problems. In addition, we assumed that organizational strategies are consistent with (the solution of) these problems, which is in line with the action learning literature (Revans 1982). We then tried to define action learning, organizational development, and the conditions listed in the action learning literature to realize organizational development. This turned out to be a difficult task, as action learning is relatively ill defined, even when we resort to the writings of its 'founder', the British astrophysicist Reg Revans (Revans ibid.). His views changed over time and he never fully disclosed what he meant by ‘action learning’. The conditions 161


under which action learning is supposed to result in organizational development have never been fully codified either, while the importance of the conditions that have been mentioned changed over time (Mumford 1995). Finally, organizational development turned out to be an unclear concept for which many operationalizations could be derived as well (Garvin 1994, Gherardi 2006, Lahteenmaki, Toivonen and Mattila 2001). Following Revans's 'system approach' and that the claim that organizational development can only be achieved through personal development in action learning (Garratt 1983, Revans 1971, 1998a), we decided to operationalize the former in terms of new or changed organization-wide behaviors that we tried to capture in terms of 'protoscripts' (Gioia and Poole 1984). These are behavioral patterns that are shared and frequently invoked by a group of employees in particular settings. Protoscripts can, among others, appear at the level of the stakeholders involved in an action learning program and at the level of the organizational as a whole. From the insights gained from a comparison (triangulation) of several of Revans's writings (Denzin 1970), we could distil a number of requirements for a problemsolving and learning approach to be called 'action learning' and a number of requirements for the latter to result in personal and organizational development. As this was to our knowledge the first systematic and scientifically founded empirical research into action learning, we decided to analyze case histories to tackle the research questions mentioned in section 5.1 (Yin 1989). We tried to gainsay our take on Revans's views. As Revans never fully disclosed these views, we concluded that they did not constitute a strong theory and that we had to create our own interpretation. We regarded this interpretation as a strong theory in order to start our analysis (Segers 1983). However, the outcome of this analysis did not constitute a new theory. Our results might contribute to such a theory in the future, as further insights from other studies become available (Ahrens and Chapman 2007, de Groot 1981, Llewelyn 2003, Ménard 2001).

5.2.2 Research Results We analyzed four cases in three organizations to answer the research questions in section 5.1. We concluded that action learning is an ineffective particularization of management control. If organizational development is to be achieved, action learning does not have to be applied at all. Whether or not an 162


organization functions as a 'learning system' or not determines whether organizational development will be realized. This contradicts the action learning literature (Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a). In a learning system, among others, the management of an organization actively stimulates employee empowerment and ensures that employees get together at regular intervals to, for example, discuss better ways to organize their work. This alone, at least in the cases under consideration, turned out to be sufficient to induce ample organizational development (according to our definition). This answers the main and first two additional research questions we formulated in section 5.1. When organizational development was absent, 'hands on' managerial support for action learning was often lacking, and external pressure or internal resistance in an organization were high. If, however, personal trust between the stakeholders in an action learning program could be established, we concluded that the approach might well receive support throughout an organization, what is known as ‘system trust’ might be realized (Bachmann 2001), and the protoscripts that arose from an action learning program could become institutionalized in an organization (Siti-Nahiba and Scapens 2005). The exact interrelationships between the aforementioned concepts could not be determined in this study (as causal relationships were not at the heart of it), but their importance as such was quite evident. We think that the latter aspect is one of the advantages of the case study analysis we conducted, apart from the fact that it allowed us to get rich insights into our research questions (Smith 2003, Yin 1989). What does all this tell us about action learning, which helps us to answer our third additional research question? We conjecture, following Dambrin, Lambert and Sponem (2007), that there may be two levels of protoscript development or adaptation to study in an action learning situation. The first level concerns the program’s stakeholders. The second concerns the organization in its entirety. By explicitly examining protoscript development, we tried to bridge the gap between the two. This is something that warrants further study. If we assume that organizational growth can only take place through personal development, while employees can be grouped in an organization in various ways, questions may be raised such as: is what a group can achieve equal to the sum of what its members can achieve? Do organizations indeed behave like individuals, certainly since individuals may have different learning styles (Belbin 1993, Honey and Mumford 1992)? Can there be organizational growth that is organization-specific, without having clear-cut links to individual employees? Etc. We assert that,

163


similar to this study, examining protoscripts (in greater detail) can help to get to terms with these questions. This is, we believe, one of the valuable additions we have made to Revans’s take on action learning. What can we, given the above results, conclude with respect to management control, so that the final additional research question can be answered? In section 3.3.2 we linked Revans’s (1982) view on learning systems to Hiromoto’s (1991) view on modern-day management control systems enhancing organizational innovation. We saw that organic forms of management control fit the dynamic nature of learning systems. We further substantiated this link in our research. Therefore, organizations that operate as learning systems also fulfill Hiromoto’s (ibid.) criteria for innovative management control systems (and vice versa). In addition, we concluded that the presence of an interactive control system (Simons 1990, 1995, 2000) may be a condition that Revans (1982) did not include in his action learning ‘theory’ to check if ample organizational development may be expected in an action learning situation1. This is a possibly valuable addition to our research framework that has been directly derived from the management control literature, the actual contribution of which has to be assessed in future studies as well. However, the perhaps most influential assumption we made in this research, namely that organizational strategies and goals are consistent with the goals of an action learning program, is in need of further examination too. After all, when the assumption is relaxed, we have no way of knowing if the protoscripts developed in an action learning program actually contribute to organizational strategies and goals or not. This would even be an issue when the problem(s) studied in the action learning program have no apparent strategic ties. After all, the action learning program could change strategic and organizational goals, and the protoscripts that are developed may (even before the abovementioned changes come to pass) happen to contribute organizational goals, perhaps inadvertently so. The only way to determine this would be to investigate what these protoscripts actually look like. This would require a more in-depth analysis into organizational strategies and goals as such, as well as into the actual content of the developed protoscripts, than we have conducted here. As far as the latter aspect is concerned, the studies performed by Lord and Kernan (1987) and Poole, Gray and Gioia (1990) may be useful. By relaxing the abovementioned assumption and extending the research framework like we have just described, 1

Of course, in 1982, interactive control systems were not yet known by that name.

164


we may be able to further our understanding about the relationship between action learning and organizational development even more when insights from new cases become available.

5.3 Implications In chapter 1 we argued that there are four parties for which this research could provide useful insights: researchers, practitioners, managers and politicians. We will analyze the contribution of this research for these parties below. Researchers operate in a scientific community. What we have contributed to this community is a variety of scientific publications on action learning (De Loo and Verstegen 2001a, 2001b, 2002, De Loo 2002, 2006, 2008, Donnenberg and De Loo 2004). Although it is still too early to claim a new action learning theory linking action learning to organizational development, the general view among action learning advocates that it will more or less automatically result in organizational development when certain conditions are in place has to be reconsidered on the basis of our study (Revans 1971, 1982, 1998a). What practitioners may gain from this research has not been specified yet, as this was not the focus of our research. They may find the absence of an automatic connection between action learning and organizational development useful as a possible explanation why personal rather than organizational development seems to be emphasized in action learning programs these days. This may help them when setting up specific programs of their own (De Loo 2006, Pedler, Burgoyne and Brook 2005). After all, in our case studies, only learning systems co-appeared with organizational development, not action learning programs. However successful action learning may be in inducing personal development, its effects on organizational development are arguable at best. Managers may conclude from this research that action learning is no 'Holy Grail' that will always brighten the future of their organization, as is sometimes stated in the action learning literature. However, when an organization functions as a learning system (Revans 1982), organizational development (in terms of protoscript emergence or adaptation) may well be realized. Managers may work on this in their organization, since this could brighten their future, as is shown in some of our case studies. 165


Finally, we argued that politicians may be interested in this research, given the emphasis that is often placed on life-long learning (Bird 2001, Dilworth and Willis 2003, Revans 1982). There are a few studies indicating that action learning can achieve personal development beyond an action learning program (Mercer 1990). This study suggests that it may be best not to make greater claims for action learning, because it is an ineffective particularization of management control for organizational development purposes. Whether it suits life-long learning initiatives is therefore something that needs to be studied further, since it depends on the social context in which action learning (as a particularization of management control) takes shape (Busco, Riccaboni and Scapens 2006).

166


R

eferences

Abelson, R.P., ‘Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision Making’. In: Carroll, J.S. and Payne, J.W. (Eds.), Cognition and Social Behavior, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 1976, pp. 33-45. Abernethy, M.A. and Chua, W.F., ‘A Field Study of Control System “Redesign”: The Impact of Institutional Processes on Strategic Choice’, Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (1996), pp. 569-606. Aebli, H., Psychologische Didaktik: Didaktische Auswertung der Psychologie von Jean Piaget, 6th edition, Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart, 1976. Ahrens, T. and Chapman, C.S., ‘Doing Qualitative Field Research in Management Accounting: Positioning Data to Contribute to Theory’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 31 (2006), pp. 819-841. ___, ‘Management Accounting as Practice’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 32 (2007), pp. 1-27. Anthony, R.N., The Management Control Function, The Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1988. ___, Planning and Control Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Harvard University, Boston, 1965. ___ and Herzlinger, R.E., Management Control in Nonprofit Organizations, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, 1975. ___ and Govindarajan, V., Management Control Systems, 8th edition, Irwin, Chicago, 1995. Argote, L. and Ingram, P., ‘Knowledge Transfer: A Basis for Competitive Advantage in Firms’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 82 (2000), pp. 150-169.

167


Argyris, C., Integrating the Individual and the Organization, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1964. ___, Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating Organizational Learning, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1990. ___, Putnam, R. and McLain-Smith, D., Action Science, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1987. ___ and Schön, D.A., Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1978. ___, Organizational Learning II: Theory, Method and Practice, Addison-Wesley, New York, 1996. Ashton, S., ‘Where’s the Action? The Concept of Action in Action Learning’, Action Learning: Research and Practice 3 (2006), pp. 5-29. Atkinson, A.A. and Shaffir, W., ‘Standards for Field Research in Management Accounting’, Journal of Management Accounting Research 10 (1998), pp. 41-68. van Baalen, P.J., Management en Hoger Onderwijs: De Geschiedenis van het Academisch Managementonderwijs in Nederland (doctoral dissertation of the Erasmus University Rotterdam, April 1995). Babbie, E.R., The Practice of Social Research, 6th edition, Wadsworth, Belmont, 1992. Bachmann, R., ‘Trust, Power and Control in Trans-Organizational Relations’, Organization Studies 22 (2001), pp. 337-365. Barab, S.A. and Duffy, T.M., ‘From Practice Fields to Communities of Practice’ (CRLT Technical Report no. 1-98, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1998). Barley, S.R. and Tolbert, P.S., ‘Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying the Links between Action and Institution’, Organization Studies 18 (1997), pp. 93-118.

168


Belbin, R.M., Team Roles at Work, Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 1993. Bertrams, K., Les Universités Belges et le Monde de l’Entreprise (1880-1970) (doctoral dissertation of the Faculty of Philosphie et Lettres, Section Histoire, of the Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2004). ___, ‘The Diffusion of U.S. Management Models and the Role of University: The Case of Belgium (1945-1970)’ (paper presented at the fifth European Business History Association [EBHA] conference, Oslo, July 2001). ___, 2005 (personal correspondence with Ivo De Loo). Bird, L., ‘The Use of a Virtual Learning Environment to Support Learners on Work-Based Learning Programmes’ (Coventry Business School working paper, 2001). Birnberg, J.G., ‘Some Reflections on the Evolution of Organizational Control’, Behavioral Research in Accounting 10 (1998), pp. 27-46 (supplement). ___, Shields, M.D. and Young, S.M., ‘The Case for Multiple Methods in Empirical Management Accounting Research (With an Illustration from Budget Setting)’, Journal of Management Accounting Research 2 (1990), pp. 33-66. ___, Turopolec, L. and Young, S.M., ‘The Organizational Context of Accounting’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 8 (1983), pp. 111-129. Bisbe, J. and Otley, D., ‘The Effects of the Interactive Use of Management Control Systems on Product Innovation’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 29 (2004), pp. 709-737. Blaug, M., ‘Kuhn versus Lakatos or Paradigms versus Research Programmes in the History of Economics’. In: Latsis, S.J. (Ed.), Method and Appraisal in Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 149-180. Boddy, D., 'Some Lessons from an Action Learning Program', Journal of European Industrial Training 3 (1979), pp. 17-21.

169


Boshuizen, H.P.A., ‘Expert Development: The Transition between School and Work’, Open Universiteit Nederland, Heerlen, 2003 (inaugural address). Boshyk, Y. (Ed.), Business Driven Action Learning: Global Best Practices, McMillan Press, Basingstoke, 2000. ___, Action Learning Worldwide: Experiences of Leadership and Organizational Development, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2002. Bourner, T., Beaty, L., Lawson, J. and O’Hara, S., ‘Action Learning Comes of Age: Questioning Action Learning’, Education and Training 38 (1996), pp. 32-35. Bourner, T. and Frost, P., ‘Experiencing Action Learning’, Employee Counseling Today 8 (1996), pp. 13-20 (no. 6). Bromley, D.B., The Case-Study Method in Psychology and Related Disciplines, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Chichester, 1986. Brown, W., Exploration in management, Heinemann, London, 1960. Bruner, J., Acts of Meaning, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990. Buchanan, D., Fitzgerald, L., Ketley, D., Gollop, R., Jones, J.L., Saint Lamont, S., Neath, A. and Whitby, E., ‘No Going Back: A Review of the Literature on Sustaining Organizational Change’, International Journal of Management Reviews 7 (2005), pp. 189-205. Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., Hughes, J. and Nahapiet, J., ‘The Roles of Accounting in Organizations and Society’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 5 (1980), pp. 5-27. Burns, J., Ezzamel, M. and Scapens, R.W., The Challenge of Management Accounting Change: Behavioural and Cultural Aspects of Change Management, Elsevier, Oxford, 2003. Burns, J. and Scapens, R.W., ‘Conceptualizing Management Accounting Change: An Institutional Framework’, Management Accounting Research 11 (2000), pp. 325.

170


Burns, J. and Vaivio, J., ‘Management Accounting Change’, Management Accounting Research 12 (2001), pp. 389-402. Busco, C., Riccaboni, R. and Scapens, R.W., ‘Trust for Accounting and Accounting for Trust’, Management Accounting Research 17 (2006), pp. 11-41. Caine, B., 'Learning in Style – Reflections on an Action Learning MBA Programme', Journal of Management Development 6 (1987), pp. 19-29. Camillus, J.C., Strategic Planning and Management Control: Systems for Survival and Success, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1986. Casey, D. and Pearce, D. (Eds.), More Than Management Development: Action Learning at GEC, Gower Press, Farnborough, 1977. Cederholm, L., ‘Tibetan Buddhism and Action Reflection LearningTM Philosophy’. In: Boshyk, Y. (Ed.), Action Learning Worldwide: Experiences of Leadership and Organizational Development, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2002, pp. 268-281. Cohen, M.D. and Sproull, L.S. (Eds.), Organizational Learning, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1996. Conger, J. and Toegel, G., ‘Action Learning and Multi-Rater Feedback as Leadership Development Interventions: Popular but Poorly Deployed’, Journal of Change Management 3 (2003), pp. 332-348. Cook, S.D.N. and Yanow, D., 'Culture and Organizational Learning', Journal of Management Inquiry 2 (1993), pp. 373-390. Collier, P.M., ‘Entrepreneurial Control and the Construction of a Relevant Accounting’, Management Accounting Research 16 (2005), pp. 321-339. Cunningham, J.B., Action Research and Organizational Development, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 1993. Cyert, R.M. and March, J.G., A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1963.

171


Dambrin, C., Lambert, C. and Sponem, S., ‘Control and Change – Analysing the Process of Institutionalisation’, Management Accounting Research 18 (2007), pp. 172-208. Danneels, E., 'The Dynamics of Product Innovation and Firm Competences', Strategic Management Journal 23 (1995), pp. 1095-1122. Davila, T., ‘An Empirical Study on the Drivers of Management Control Systems’ Design in New Product Development’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 25 (2000), pp. 383-409. De Jong, J.A., ‘Activerende Didactiek: Een Theoretische Oriëntatie’. In: Kessels, J.W.M. and Smit, C.A. (Eds.), Activerende Werkvormen voor Groepen, Kluwer Bedrijfswetenschappen, Deventer, 1995, pp. 1-11. De Loo, I., ‘Action and Organizational Learning in an Elevator Company’, The Learning Organization 13 (2006), pp. 204-214. ___, ‘An Action Learning Failure in a Dutch Municipality’, Public Administration Quarterly 31 (2008), forthcoming. ___, ‘Organisatiegroei door Action Learning: Minder Vanzelfsprekend dan het Lijkt’, Management & Organisatie 57 (2003), pp. 55-71 (no. 4). ___, ‘The Troublesome Relationship between Action Learning and Organizational Growth’, Journal of Workplace Learning 14 (2002), pp. 245-255. ___ and Verstegen, B., 'Does Action Learning Lead to Organizational Growth?', Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business 37 (2001), pp. 55-65 (a). ___, ‘Modelling Group Effects in Action Learning’, International Journal of Action Learning 3 (2002) (This paper is only available electronically. Refer to http://www.i-m-c.org/imcass/VUs/IMC/frames.htm). ___, ‘New Thoughts on Action Learning’, Journal of European Industrial Training 25 (2001), pp. 195-204 (b).

172


Denzin, N.K., The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1970. Dermer, J., ‘Control and Organizational Order’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 13 (1988), pp. 25-36. Dewey, J., Ervaring en Opvoeding, Bohn Stafleu Van Loghum, Houten, 1999. DiBella, A.J. and Nevis, E.C., How Organizations Learn: An Integrated Strategy for Building Learning Capability, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1998. Dietz, G. and Den Hartog, D.N., ‘Measuring Trust inside Organisations’, Personnel Review 35 (2006), pp. 557-588. Dilworth, R.L., ‘Action Learning in a Nutshell’, Performance Improvement Quarterly 11 (1998), pp. 28-43. ___ and Willis, V.J., Action Learning: Images and Pathways, Krieger Publishing Company, Malabar, 2003. Dodgson, M., ‘Organizational Learning: A Review of Some Literatures’, Organizational Studies 14 (1993), pp. 375-394. Donnenberg, O., 2003 (personal correspondence with Ivo De Loo). ___, 2006 (personal correspondence with Ivo De Loo). ___, 2007 (personal correspondence with Ivo De Loo). ___ and De Loo, I., ‘Facilitating Organizational Development through Action Learning – Some Practical and Theoretical Considerations’, Action Learning: Research and Practice 1 (2004), pp. 167-184. Donnenberg, O.H.J. and Melief, M.E.M., ‘Action Learning – Lerend Werken’. In: Kessels, J.W.M. and Smit, C.A. (Eds.), Activerende Werkvormen voor Groepen, Kluwer Bedrijfswetenschappen, Deventer, 1995, pp. 21-32.

173


Dosi, G., ‘Sources, Procedures, and Micro-Economic Effects of Innovation’, Journal of Economic Literature 26 (1988), pp. 1120-1171. Duffy, T.M. and Jonassen, D.H., ‘Constructivism: New Implications for Instructional Technology’, Educational Technology 31 (1991), pp. 7-12. Dyer, W.G., Jr. and Wilkins, A.L., ‘Better Stories, not Better Constructs, to generate Better Theory: A Rejoinder to Eisenhardt’, Academy of Management Review 16 (1991), pp. 613-619. Dykstra, D.I., Jr., 'Teaching Introductory Physics to College Students'. In: Fosnot, C.T. (Ed.), Constructivism: Theory, Perspective, and Practice, Teachers College Press, New York, 1996, pp. 182-204. Earl, M.J. and Hopwood, A.G., ‘From Management Information to Information Management’. In: Lucas, H.C., Jr., Land, F.F. and Lincoln, T.J. (Eds.), The Information Systems Environment, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1980, pp. 3-13. Easterby-Smith, M., Snell, R. and Gherardi, S., ‘Organizational Learning: Diverging Communities of Practice?’, Management Learning 29 (1998), pp. 259272. Eisenhardt, K.M., ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research’, Academy of Management Review 14 (1989), pp. 532-550. Emmanuel, C., Otley, D. and Merchant, K., Accounting for Management Control, 2nd edition, Chapmann and Hall, London, 1990. Enderby, J.E. and Phelan, D.R., ‘Action Learning Groups as the Foundation for Cultural Change’, Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 32 (1994), pp. 74-82. Etzioni, A., A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement, and their Correlates, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1961. Ezzamel, M., Hoskin, K. and Macve, R., ‘Managing It All by Numbers: A Review of Johnson & Kaplan’s “Relevance Lost”’, Accounting and Business Research 20 (1990), pp. 153-166.

174


Feltovich, P.J. and Barrows, H.S., ‘Issues of Generality in Medical Problem Solving’. In: Schmidt, H.G. and De Volder, M.L. (Eds.), Tutorials in ProblemBased Learning, Van Gorcum, Assen, 1984, pp. 128-142. Ferreira, A. and Otley, D., ‘The Design and Use of Management Control Systems: An Extended Framework for Analysis’, 2005 (SSRN working paper. Refer to http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=682984). Flamholtz, E.G., Das, T.K. and Tsui, A.S., ‘Toward an Integrative Framework of Organizational Control’, Accounting, Organizations & Society 10 (1985), pp. 3550. Fosnot, C.T., ‘Constructivism: A Psychological Theory of Learning’. In: Fosnot, C.T. (Ed.), Constructivism: Theory, Perspective, and Practice, Teachers College Press, New York, 1996, pp. 8-33. Foy, N., 'Action Learning Comes to Industry', Harvard Business Review 55 (1977), pp. 158-168. Freire, P., Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Sheed and Ward, London, 1972. Garratt, B., 'The Power of Action Learning'. In: Pedler, M. (Ed.), Action Learning in Practice, Gower Publishing Company, Aldershot, 1983, pp. 23-38. Garvin, D.A., ‘Building a Learning Organization’, Business Credit 96 (1994), pp. 19-28 (no. 1). Gherardi, S., Organizational Knowledge: The Texture of Workplace Learning, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2006. Gioia, D.A. and Manz, C.C., ‘Linking Cognition and Behavior: A Script Processing Interpretation of Vicarious Learning’, Academy of Management Review 10 (1985), pp. 527-539. Gioia, D.A. and Poole, P.P., ‘Scripts in Organizational Behavior’, Academy of Management Review 9 (1984), pp. 449-459.

175


Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L., The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, 1967. von Glasersfeld, E., ‘Introduction: Aspects of Constructivism’. In: Fosnot, C.T. (Ed.), Constructivism: Theory, Perspective, and Practice, Teachers College Press, New York, 1996, pp. 3-7. de Groot, A.D., Methodologie: Grondslagen van Onderzoek en Denken in de Gedragswetenschappen, 11th edition, Uitgeverij Mouton, ‘s-Gravenhage, 1981. Hagmann, J., Chuma, E., Connolly, M. and Murwira, K., ‘Client-driven Change and Institutional Reform in Agricultural Extension: An Action Learning Experience from Zimbabwe’ (Agricultural Research & Extension Network [AgREN] Paper no. 78, January 1998). Harrison, R., ‘Action Learning: Route or Barrier to the Learning Organization?’, Journal of Workplace Learning 8 (1996), pp. 29-41. Hedberg, B. and Jönsson, S., ‘Designing Semi-Confusing Information Systems for Organizations in Changing Environments’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 3 (1978), pp. 47-64. Hedberg, B.L.T., Nystrom, P.C. and Starbuck, W.H., ‘Designing Organizations to Match Tomorrow’. In: Nystrom, P.C. and Starbuck, W.H. (Eds.), Prescriptive Models of Organizations, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1977, pp. 171-181 (TIMS Studies in the Management Sciences, volume 5). Hedges, A., ‘Group Interviewing’. In: Walker, R. (Ed.), Applied Qualitative Research, Gower Publishing Company, Aldershot, 1985, pp. 71-91. Heijdra, B.J. and Lowenberg, A.D., ‘Duhem-Quine, Lakatos and Research Programmes in Economics’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 1 (1986), pp. 175-187. Henri, J.-F., 'Management Control Systems and Strategy: A Resource-Based Perspective', Accounting, Organizations and Society 31 (2006), pp 529-558.

176


Hiromoto, T., ‘Restoring the Relevance of Management Accounting’, Journal of Management Accounting Research 3 (1991), pp. 1-15. Honey, P. and Mumford, A., The Manual of Learning Styles, 3rd edition, Peter Honey, Maidenhead, 1992. Huber, G.P., ‘Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures’, Organizational Science 2 (1991), pp. 88-115. Inglis, S., Making the Most of Action Learning, Gower Publishing, Aldershot, 1994. Jans, E.O.J. and van Nimwegen, J., Grondslagen van de Administratieve Organisatie, 13th edition, Samson Uitgeverij, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1985. Johnson, H.T. and Kaplan, R.S., Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1987. Juch, A., Personal Development: Theory and Practice in Management Training, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1983. Kaplan, R.S. and Atkinson, A.A., Advanced Management Accounting, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 1998. Katz, D. and Kahn, R.L., The Social Psychology of Organizations, 2nd edition, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1978. Khandwalla, P.N., The Design of Organizations, Brace Jovanovich, Inc., Harcourt, 1977, Kim, D.H., ‘The Link between Individual and Organizational Learning’, Sloan Management Review 35 (1993), pp. 37-50. Kirk, J. and Miller, M.L., Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research, 2nd printing, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1986. Kolb, D.A., Experimental Learning, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1984.

177


Koo, L.C., ‘Learning Action Learning’, Journal of Workplace Learning 11 (1999), pp. 89-94 (no. 3). Kuhn, T.S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970. Lackie, G.L., ‘Heineken, Shell et al.: Twenty Years of Consortium Action Learning – The BOSNO Programme’. In: Boshyk, Y. (Ed.), Business Driven Action Learning: Global Best Practices, McMillan Press, Basingstoke, 2000, pp. 55-64 (chapter 5). Lahteenmaki, S., Toivonen, J. and Mattila, M., ‘Critical Aspects of Organizational Learning Research and Proposals for its Measurement’, British Journal of Management 12 (2001), pp. 113-129. Langfield-Smith, K., ‘Organisational Culture and Control’. In: Berry, A.J., Broadbent, J. and Otley, D. (Eds.), Management Control: Theories, Issues and Practices, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1995, pp. 179-200. Lapsley, I. and Pallot, J., ‘Accounting, Management and Organizational Change: A Comparative Study of Local Government’, Management Accounting Research 11 (2000), pp. 213-229. Lave, J., ‘Situated Learning in Communities of Practice’. In: Resnick, L.B., Levine, J.M. and Teasley, S.D. (Eds.), Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition, American Psychological Association, Washington, 1991, pp. 63-82. ___ and Wenger, E., Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. Lesser, E.L. and Storck, J., ‘Communities of Practice and Organizational Performance’, IBM Systems Journal 40 (2001), pp. 831-841. Levy, M. and Delahoussaye, M., ‘Reg Revans: A Man of Action’, Training Journal 2 (2000), pp. 8-13. Lewin, K.F., Theory in Social Science, Harper and Row, New York, 1951.

178


Lewis, A. and Marsh, W., ‘Action Learning: The Development of Field Managers in the Prudential Assurance Company’, Journal of Management Development 6 (1987), pp. 45-56 (no. 1). Likert, R., The Human Organization: Its Management and Value, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967. ___, 'Human Resource Accounting: Building and Assessing Productive Organizations', Personnel 50 (1973), pp. 8-24. Llewelyn, S., ‘What Counts as "Theory" in Qualitative Management and Accounting Research? Introducing Five Levels of Theorizing’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 16 (2003), pp. 662-708. Lowe, T. and Puxty, T., ‘The Problems of a Paradigm: A Critique of the Prevailing Orthodoxy in Management Control’, in: Chua, W.F., Lowe, T. and Puxty, T. (Eds.), Critical Perspectives in Management Control, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 1989, pp. 9-26. Luhmann, N., Trust and Power: Two Works by Niklas Luhmann, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1979. Lundvall, B-Å., 'Why Study National Systems and National Styles of Innovation?', Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 10 (1998), pp. 407-421. Machin, J.L.J., The Expectations Approach: Improving Managerial Communication and Performance, McGraw-Hill Book Company, London, 1980. ___, ‘Using the Expectations Approach to Improve Managerial Communication and Organisational Effectiveness’, Management Decision 15 (1977), pp. 259-277. Machin, J., Stewart, R. and Hales, C. (Eds.), Toward Managerial Effectiveness: Applied Research Perspectives on the Managerial Task, Gower, Westmead, 1981. Macintosh, N.B., The Social Software of Accounting and Information Systems, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1985.

179


Magat, R., The Ford Foundation at Work: Philanthropic Choices, Methods, and Styles, Plenum Press, New York, 1979. Mäki, U., ‘Isolation, Idealization and Truth in Economics’. In: Hamminga, B. and De Marchi, N.B. (Eds.), Idealization VI: Idealization in Economics, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 147-168. ___, ‘On the Method of Isolation in Economics’. In: Dilworth, C. (Ed.), Idealization IV: Intelligibility in Science, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1992, pp. 317-351. ___, ‘Theoretical Isolation and Explanatory Progress: Transaction Cost Economics and the Dynamics of Dispute’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 28 (2004), pp. 319-346. Marler, C.D., Philosophy and Schooling, Allyn and Bacon, Inc., Boston, 1975. Marquardt, M., Action Learning, ASTD Info-Line, Alexandria, 2001 (no. 9704). ___ and Waddill, D., ‘The Power of Learning in Action Learning: A Conceptual Analysis of how Five Schools of Adult Learning Theories are Incorporated within the Practice of Action Learning’, Action Learning: Research and Practice 1 (2004), pp. 185-202. Marsick, V.J. and O’Neil, J., ‘The Many Faces of Action Learning’, Management Learning 30 (1999), pp. 159-176. Marsick, V.J. and Watkins, K.E., Facilitating Learning Organisations: Making Learning Count, Gower Press, Aldershot, 1999. McCall, G.J. and Simmons, J.L. (Eds.), Issues in Participant Observation: A Text and Reader, Random House, New York, 1969. McGill, I. and Beaty, L., Action Learning: A Practitioner’s Guide, Kogan Page, London, 1992. McLaughlin, H. and Thorpe, R., 'Action Learning – A Paradigm in Emergence: The Problems Facing a Challenge to Traditional Management Education and Development', British Journal of Management 4 (1993), pp. 19-27.

180


McMorland, J. and Piggot-Irvine, E., ‘Facilitation as Midwifery: Facilitation and Praxis in Group Learning’, Systematic Practice and Action Research 13 (2000), pp. 121-138. McTaggart, R., 'Participatory Action Research: Issues in Theory and Practice', Educational Action Research 2 (1994), pp. 313-337. Mead, M., 'From Colleagues in Adversity to the Synergy of the Set', Industrial and Commercial Training 22 (1990), pp. 3-8. Ménard, C., ‘Methodological Issues in New Institutional Economics’, Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (2001), pp. 85-92. Mercer, J.R., ‘Action Learning: A Student’s Perspective’, Industrial and Commercial Training 22 (1990), pp. 3-8. Merchant, K.A., Modern Management Control Systems: Text and Cases, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 1998. Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B., ‘Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony’. In: Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, pp. 41-62. Miller, P., ‘Workplace Learning by Action Learning: A Practical Example’, Journal of Workplace Learning 15 (2003), pp. 14-23. Mintzberg, H., ‘The Design School: Reconsidering the Basic Premises of Strategic Management’, Strategic Management Journal 11 (1990), pp. 171-195. Moosbruker, J.B. and Loftin, R.D., ‘Business Process Redesign and Organization Development: Enhancing Success by Removing the Barriers’, The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 34 (1998), pp. 286-304. Mumford, A., ‘Learning in Action’, Industrial and Commercial Training 27 (1995), pp. 36-40 (no. 8).

181


___, ‘A Review of Action Learning Literature’, Management Bibliographies & Reviews 20 (1994), pp. 2-16 (no. 6/7). Myerson, R.B., Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991. Nevis, E.C., DiBella, A.J. and Gould, J.M., 'Understanding Organizations as Learning Systems', Sloan Management Review 36 (1995), pp. 73-86. Nixon, W.A.J. and Burns, J., ‘Management Control in the 21st Century: Introduction’, Management Accounting Research 16 (2005), pp. 260-268 Olssen, M., ‘Radical Constructivism and its Failings: Anti-Realism and Individualism’, British Journal of Educational Studies 44 (1996), pp. 275-295. O’Neil, J., ‘A Study of the Role of Learning Advisers in Action Learning’, Employee Counseling Today 8 (1996), pp. 42-47 (no. 6). Oppenheim, A.N., Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement, new edition, Pinter Publishers, London, 1992. Osborne, R.J. and Wittrock, M.C., ‘The Generative Learning Model and Its Implications for Science Education’, Studies in Science Education 12 (1985), pp. 59-87. Osterman, K. and Kottkamp, R., Reflective Practice for Educators, Corwin Press, Newbury Park, 1993. Otley, D., Accounting Control and Organizational Behavior, Heinemann, London, 1987. ___, ‘Performance Measurement: A Framework for Management Control Systems Research’, Management Accounting Research 10 (1999), pp. 363-382. ___ and Berry, A.J., ‘Control, Organization and Accounting’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 5 (1980), pp. 231-244.

182


Pace, R.W. and McMurray, A.J., ‘Action-Learning-Research Spheroid’, International Journal of Action Learning 3 (2002) (This paper is only available electronically. Refer to http://www.i-m-c.org/imcass/VUs/IMC/frames.htm). Parkes, D., ‘Action Learning: Business Applications in North America’, Journal of Workplace Learning 10 (1998), pp. 165-168. Pautzke, G., Die Evolution der Organisatorischen Wissensbasis: Bausteine zu einer Theorie des Organisatorischen Lernens, Verlag Barbara Kirsch, Herrsching, 1989. Pedler, M., 'Interpreting Action Learning'. In: Burgoyne, J. and Reynolds, M. (Eds.), Management Learning: Integrating Perspectives from Theory and Practice, Sage Publications, London, 1997, pp. 248-264 (a). ___, ‘What Do We Mean by Action Learning?’. In: Pedler, M. (Ed.), Action Learning In Practice, 3rd edition, Gower, Aldershot, 1997, pp. 61-76 (b). ___, Brook, C. and Burgoyne, J., ‘Action learning – Are Reg Revans’ Teachings Being Practiced?’, People Management 9 (2003), pp. 40-45 (no. 8). ___, Brook, C. and Burgoyne, J. ‘Time for Action’, People Management 10 (2004), p. 46 (no. 10). ___, Burgoyne, J. and Brook, C., ‘What Has Action Learning Learned to Become?’, Action Learning: Research and Practice 2 (2005), pp. 49-68. Perrow, C., Complex Organizations: A Critical Analysis, Scott, Foresman and Co., Glenview, 1972. Pettigrew, A.M., ‘The Character and Significance of Strategy Process Research’, Strategic Management Journal 13 (1992), pp. 5-16. Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B., De Psychologie van het Kind, 1st additional edition, Von Loghum Slaterus, Deventer, 1978.

183


Pisano, G.P., ‘Knowledge, Integration, and the Locus of Learning: An Empirical Analysis of Process Development’, Strategic Management Journal 15 (1984), pp. 85-100. Poole, P.P., Gray, B. and Gioia, D.A., ‘Organizational Script Development through Interactive Accommodation’, Group & Organization Studies 15 (1990), pp. 212-232. Popper, K.R., Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972. Ray, U.W., Organisationales Lernen und Führungskräfteentwicklung (Diplomarbeit of the Faculty of Verwaltungswissenschaft of the University of Konstanz, December 1992). Revans, R.W., ABC of Action Learning, 3rd edition, Lemos & Crane, London, 1998 (a). ___, Action Learning in Hospitals: Diagnosis and Therapy, McGraw Hill Book Company, Maidenhead, 1976. ___, 'Action Learning: Its Origins and Nature'. In: Pedler, M. (Ed.), Action Learning in Practice, Gower Publishing Company, Aldershot, 1983, pp. 9-21. ___, Action Learning: New Techniques for Management, Blond & Briggs, London, 1980. ___, ‘Any More Unmeeting Twains? Or Action Learning and its “Practitioners” in the 1980s’, Industrial and Commercial Training 17 (1985), pp. 8-11. ___, Developing Effective Managers, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971. ___ (Ed.), Hospitals: Communication, Choice and Change, Tavistock Publications, London, 1972. ___, ‘”Meadium”: On the Learning Equation in 1984’, Management Education and Development 15 (1984), pp. 209-220.

184


___, The Origins and Growth of Action Learning, Chartwell-Bratt, Bromley, 1982. ___, ‘Sketches of Action Learning’, Performance Improvement Quarterly 11 (1998), pp. 23-27 (b). ___, The Theory of Practice in Management, MacDonald & Co. Publishers, London, 1965. Rijnsburger, E., 2003 (personal correspondence with Ivo De Loo). Roberts, H., ‘Knowledge Resources and Management Accounting’. In: Hopper, T., Northcott, D. and Scapens, R. (Eds.), Issues in Management Accounting, 3rd edition, Pearson Education Ltd., Harlow, 2007, pp. 317-332. Rol, M., 2003 (personal correspondence with Ivo De Loo). Rosenzweig, R., The Halo Effect ... and the Eight Other Business Delusions that Deceive Managers, The Free Press, New York, 2007. Royer, J.M., ‘Theories of the Transfer of Learning’, Educational Psychologist 14 (1979), pp. 53-69. Ryan, B., Scapens, R.W. and Theobald, M., Research Method and Methodology in Finance and Accounting, Academic Press Ltd., London, 1992. Schank, R.C. and Abelson, R.P., Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1977. Scharmer, C.O., ‘Self-Transcending Knowledge: Sensing and Organizing around Emerging Opportunities’, Journal of Knowledge Management 5 (2001), pp. 137150. Schein, E.H., ‘The Role of the Founder in Creating Organizational Culture’, Organizational Dynamics 12 (1983), pp. 13-28 (Summer). Schön, D.A., The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action, Temple-Smith, London, 1983.

185


Segers, J.G.H., Sociale Onderzoeksmethoden: Inleiding tot de Structuur van het Onderzoeksproces en tot de Methoden van Dataverzameling, Van Gorcum, Assen, 1983 (deel I). Senge, P.M., De Vijfde Discipline: De Kunst en Praktijk van de Lerende Organisatie, Scriptum Management, Schiedam, 1992. Simon, H.A., Models of Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1982. Simons, R., ‘Control in an Age of Empowerment’, Harvard Business Review 73 (1995), pp. 80-88. ___, Management & Control Systems for Implementing Performance Strategy: Text & Cases, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 2000. ___, ‘The Role of Management Control Systems in Creating Competitive Advantage: New Perspectives’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 15 (1990), pp. 127-143. Siti-Nahiba, A.K. and Scapens, R.W., ‘Stability and Change: An Institutionalist Study of Management Accounting Change’, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 18 (2005), pp. 44-73. Smith, M., Research Methods in Accounting, Sage Publications, London, 2003. Smith, P.A.C., ‘Q’ing Action Learning: More on Minding our Ps and Qs’, Management Decision 35 (1997), pp. 365-372. ___, ‘Second Thoughts on Action Learning’, Journal of European Industrial Training 12 (1988), pp. 28-31. ___ and O’Neil, J., ‘A Review of Action Learning Literature 1994-2000: Part 1 – Bibliography and Comments’, Journal of Workplace Learning 15 (2003), pp. 63-69 (no. 2). Søberg, M., ‘The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Experimental Economics: A Reinterpretation’, 2002 (Discussion Papers no. 329, Statistics Norway, Research Department, August).

186


___, ‘The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Experimental Economics: A Reinterpretation’, Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (2005), pp. 581-597. Stichting Maatschappij, Veiligheid en Politie, Stichting Maatschappij, Veiligheid en Politie 18 jaar (1986-2004): Een Verantwoording, Stichting Maatschappij, Veiligheid en Politie, Dordrecht, 2004. Strauss, A.L.S. and Corbin, J.M., Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, 1990. Sun, P.Y.T. and Scott, J.L., ‘Exploring the Divide – Organizational Learning and Learning Organization’, The Learning Organization 10 (2003), pp. 202-215. Sutton, D., ‘Further Thoughts on Action Learning’, Journal of European Industrial Training 13 (1989), pp. 32-35 (no. 3). Svensson, G., ‘Multiple Informants and Asymmetric Interactions of Mutual Trust in Dyadic Business Relationships’, European Business Review 18 (2006), pp. 132152. Talpaert, R., ‘25 Ans Fondation Industrie-Université: Le Bilan’ (evaluation report of the Fondation Industrie-Université, Brussels, May 1981). ___, ‘The Belgian “Fondation Industrie-Université”: A Pioneering Approach in a European Context’ (paper presented at the 3rd European Social Science History Conference [ESSHC], Amsterdam, April 2000). ___, 2005 (personal correspondence with Ivo De Loo). Tannenbaum, A.S., ‘Control in Organization’. In: Tannenbaum, A.S. (Ed.), Control in Organizations, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1968, pp. 3-30 (chapter 1). Tripp, D.H., ‘Case Study Generalization: An Agenda for Action’, British Educational Research Journal 11 (1985), pp. 33-43.

187


Tsang, E.W.K., ‘Organizational Learning and the Learning Organization: A Dichotomy between Descriptive and Prescriptive Research’, Human Relations 50 (1997), pp. 73-89. Vaivio, J., 'Examining "the Quantified Customer"', Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999), pp. 689-715. Vince, R. and Martin, L., 'Inside Action Learning: An Exploration of the Psychology and Politics of the Action Learning Model', Management Education and Development 24 (1993), pp. 205-215. Vlerick, A.J., ‘Vorming en Volmaking van Ondernemingsleiders’. In: Bouma, J.L. en Willems, H. (Eds.), Bedrijfseconomische Verkenningen, N.V. Uitgeversmaatschappij v/h G. Delwel, Den Haag, 1965, pp. 76-92. Vygotsky, L.S., Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978. Waddington, C.H., O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the UBoat, Elek Science, London, 1973. Wallace, M., 'Can Action Learning Live up to its Reputation?', Management Education and Development 21 (1990), pp. 89-103. Weick, K.E. and Quinn, R.E., ‘Organizational Change and Development’, Annual Review of Psychology 50 (1999), pp. 361-386. Weinstein, K., 'Experiences of Action Learning: A Dialogue with Participants', Management Bibliographies & Reviews 20 (1994), pp. 17-40. ___, Action Learning: A Practical Guide, 2nd edition, Gower Publishing Limited, Aldershot, 1999. ___, ‘Action Learning: The Classic Approach’. In: Boshyk, Y. (Ed.), Action Learning Worldwide: Experiences of Leadership and Organizational Development, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2002, pp. 3-18.

188


West, P. and Choueke, W., ‘The Alchemy of Action Learning’, Education & Training 45 (2003), pp. 215-225. Whitley, R., ‘Firms, Institutions and Management Control: the Comparative Analysis of Coordination and Control Systems’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 24 (1999), pp. 507-524. Wilber, C.K. and Harrison, R.S., ‘The Methodological Basis of Institutional Economics: Pattern Model, Storytelling, and Holism’, Journal of Economic Issues 12 (1978), pp. 61-89. Wieland, G.F. (Ed.), Improving Health Care Management: Organization Development and Organization Change, Health Administration Press, Ann Arbor, 1981. ___ and Leigh, H. (Eds.), Changing Hospitals: A Report on the Hospital Communications Project, Tavistock Publications, London, 1971. Wildavsky, A., Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes, 2nd revised edition, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1986. Willcocks, S.G., ‘Adopting a Multi-Perspective Approach to the Study of Public Sector Managerial Effectiveness’, The International Journal of Public Sector Management 15 (2002), pp. 262-280. ___, ‘The Clinical Director in the NHS: Utilizing a Role-Theory Perspective’, Journal of Management in Medicine 8 (1994), pp. 68-76 (no. 5). Williamson, O.E., ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’, Journal of Economic Literature 38 (2000), pp. 595-613. Willis, J., ‘A Recursive, Reflective Instructional Design Based on ConstructivistInterpretivist Theory’, Educational Technology 35 (1995), pp. 5-23. Willis, V.J., ‘Inspecting Cases against Revans’ “Gold Standard” of Action Learning’, Action Learning: Research and Practice 1 (2004), pp. 11-27.

189


Wilson, V., 'Action Learning: A "Highbrow Smash and Grab" Activity?', Career Development International 4 (1999), pp. 5-10. Wittrock, M.C., ‘Learning as a Generative Process’, Educational Psychologist 11 (1974), pp. 87-95. Yates, J.F. (Ed.), Risk-Taking Behavior, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1992. Yelon, S., Sheppard, L., Sleight, D. and Ford, J.K., ‘Intention to Transfer: How Do Autonomous Professionals Become Motivated to Use New Ideas?’, Performance Improvement Quarterly 17 (2004), pp. 82-103. Yin, R.K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd edition, Sage Publications, Inc., Newbury Park, 1989. Yorks, L., O’Neil, J., Marsick, V.J., Lamm, S., Kolodny, R. and Nilson, G., 'Transfer of Learning from an Action Reflection Learning Program', Performance Improvement Quarterly 11 (1998), pp. 59-73. Zuber-Skerritt, O., ‘The Concept of Action Learning’, The Learning Organization 9 (2002), pp. 114-124. Zucker, L.G., ‘Institutional Theories of Organization’, Annual Review of Sociology 13 (1987), pp. 443-464.

190


A

ppendix I: Interview Questions

The following questions were covered in all interviews after the introductory interviews that we conducted to see if organizations fitted and wanted to engage in this research. They serve to highlight their semi-structured nature (Hedges 1985) as well as the validity and reliability of the research findings (Smith 2003, Yin 1989). The questions are subdivided into four subsets: a set of general questions we asked to make people feel comfortable (Oppenheim 1992), a set of questions on action learning itself and how people got in touch with it (to check the action learning requirements of section 3.2.1), two sets of questions on the set-up of and participants’ experiences with these programs (to analyze the learning system conditions of section 3.2.3 and some of the conditions for personal and organizational development of section 3.2.1), and a set of reflective questions (to check the remaining conditions for personal and organizational development and, following section 3.3, the presence of situation ‘A’, the reasons why it may have been absent, and the presence of specific management control measures to reduce [the impact of] unwarranted [proto]scripts). By analyzing these questions, we can contribute to the following issues in section 3.4.1, which together comprise our research framework: •

The question whether it is indeed an action learning program that is analyzed (part II of the questionnaire);

•

The presence of the known conditions for learning systems (part III);

•

The presence of the known conditions for personal and organizational development (part III and IV, section A);

•

The presence of situation ‘A’ (part IV, section B);

•

The presence of specific management control measures to attain or preserve organizational development in an action learning situation (part IV, section C);

•

The emergence of new or altered protoscripts in an organization (part IV, section B);

•

In case these new or altered protoscripts did not emerge, indications why this may have been the case (part IV, section B and D).

As stated, part II of the questionnaire is a double check on the action learning requirements of section 3.2.1, which we implicitly used to select the cases.

191


I. Introduction: General Questions about the Interviewees and their Perception of Action Learning -

Could you tell me something about yourself?

-

What is your educational background?

-

What is your professional background?

-

Could you tell me something about organization X?

-

When did you start working for organization X?

-

What were your main activities?

-

How long did you stay?

-

How do you look back at your time with X (until now)?

All of these questions are based on Oppenheim (ibid.). -

How did you get in touch with action learning?

-

How would you define it?

-

Did the concept immediately appeal to you?

-

As far as you can tell, did the concept immediately appeal to other employees?

These questions check an interviewee’s general view on action learning and give a rough idea of the presence of the action learning requirements of section 3.2.1. We also checked for the presence of the requirements when we selected the cases for inclusion in our study. The aforementioned questions are a way to substantiate the validity of these findings. No contradictions were found – that is, no case had to be replaced by another. We will therefore only briefly refer to this part of the questionnaire in our analyses. II. Program Overview: Questions about the Set-Up of (an) Action Learning Program(s) -

What were the goals of organization X?

-

How did you get involved in organization X’s action learning programs?

-

What were its goals?

-

In which role(s) did this happen?

-

What were your main activities?

-

How long were you involved?

-

How often have you been involved?

-

Who else was involved?

-

In which role(s)?

-

Did you work with sets?

192


These questions cover the action learning requirements “the sharing of [these] problems in a group of four to five people with different backgrounds” and “learning together with other stakeholders”. -

What kind of problems did you focus on?

-

Was their solution imperative to realize organizational goals?

These questions cover the requirement “one or more real-life, complex problems that urgently call for a solution and that have a clear strategic dimension [need to be tackled in an action learning program]. Note that the problems themselves do not have to be strategic in nature. However, they must be in line with organizational goals, because their solution may not be crucially important otherwise”. -

Could employees ‘live out’ their creativity in the program(s)? Did they have the possibility to experiment with certain ideas or solutions to assess their value, before opting for a ‘final’ solution?

This question examines the action learning requirement “active, controlled experimentation over an extended period of time”. -

To what extent did reflection and critical feedback play a role in the sets? Was there room for critical questioning and personal feedback?

This question examines the requirement “continued evaluation of, and reflection on, the progress made and the results achieved, both individually and by a set as a whole. This is done by critical questioning and by providing personal feedback”. III. Program Experiences: Questions about the Conduct of (an) Action Learning Program(s) and Interviewee Experiences -

Was organizational learning emphasized in organization X? If so, how was this done?

-

Did chief executives stimulate this in any way?

This question provides insights into the learning system condition “chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning”. -

Did organization X have specific views on innovation and organizational improvement? If so, what were they?

193


-

Did the organization want to develop new rules or procedures in the organization through action learning when it got involved therein?

This question covers the learning system condition: “rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable”. -

Why do you think organization X used action learning to solve (some of) its problems?

-

How were action learning programs organized?

-

Was there a clear delegation of tasks in organization X, so that you were empowered to tackle the problem(s) you focused on in the program(s)?

-

How was or were the problem(s) selected on which you focused?

-

How did you report on your progress? What were your main communication channels?

-

To whom did you report?

-

How often did you report?

-

What happened with these reports?

-

What happened in case a problem could not be solved?

These questions jointly highlight the following learning system conditions: “this [operating an organization as a learning system] they [chief executives] stimulate through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottom-up inputs”, “unsolvable or intractable problems (at the level that they occur) are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems, so that similar problems can be solved in the future”, and “employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work”. -

Did senior managers participate in the organization’s action learning programs?

-

Who else was involved?

-

In which role(s)?

These questions specifically examine the following necessary condition for organizational development: “active cooperation of and stimulus by an organization’s senior management in an action learning program (to highlight that the problems under consideration are relevant and their solution is important)”.

194


-

How were sets selected?

-

How frequently did they meet?

-

Were there open discussions in the sets, in which everyone was free to put forward his or her views, or did some group members tend to emphasize their own views at the expense of those of others?

These questions cover the following necessary condition for personal development through action learning: “constructive set behavior that manifests itself in open discussions and genuine attempts to solve organizational problems”. -

Were sponsors and clients assigned to each program?

-

If so, how did this happen?

These questions cover the following necessary condition for organizational development through action learning: “the presence of identifiable clients and sponsors (to embed the program in an organization and ensure that problems are taken seriously by those concerned)”. -

How long did a program typically last?

This question examines the following condition for organizational development: “a manageable and controllable period of time within which an action learning program is conducted, so that regular work processes are not disrupted”. IV. Reflections: Reflective Questions about (an) Action Learning Program(s). The questions are subdivided into four segments: one about the action learning conditions (A), one about the materialization of organizational development (B), one about the management control of the program(s) (C), and one containing the overall thoughts of interviewees (D). In the various case descriptions, sections A-D have been combined to paint a coherent, integral picture of each case A. Action Learning Conditions -

Did you change your behavior in some way during or after a program? Please indicate if and how this happened.

-

Did this new behavior contrast in any way with previously held views?

-

If so, (why) did you find it necessary to change your views or behavior?

-

Did other employees, in your opinion, undergo these changes too? Please explicate.

-

Were there also employees who did not change their behavior?

195


These questions tackle the following condition for personal development through action learning: “set members and an organization’s senior management have a willingness to learn. They accept new ways of thinking, even if these are contrary to their current beliefs and habits”. -

Was it clear to you in advance that the proposed solution(s) might be implemented?

-

If so, how had this been communicated?

-

Were the aforementioned solutions actually implemented?

-

If so, did this result in the expected results?

These questions check the following condition for organizational development: “an intention to implement the resulting solutions (…), which is to be followed by the actual implementation of these solutions”. B. Organizational Development -

Did general organizational behavior or policies change during or after the action learning program(s)? Please indicate if, how, when and why this happened.

-

Would you deem organization X’s action learning program(s) a success or not? Why?

-

Did the organization, in your view, realize the targets it set for itself in the program?

-

If so, why do you think this happened?

-

If not, why were the targets not realized?

The foregoing questions aim to detect whether new protoscripts were developed or existing ones changed as a consequence of the action learning program(s) under consideration, and whether this was the best the organization could have achieved in the eyes of the interviewees. C. Management Control of the Program(s) -

How did organization X monitor its action learning program(s)? How was progress ‘measured’?

-

Was progress stimulated in any way? If so, how?

-

Were any constraints imposed on the program? If so, which one(s)?

-

Did they change during a program or in between programs? If so, why and how did this happen?

These questions examine the management control of the action learning program(s) in question, following section 3.3.3.

196


D. General Reflections -

What are, in retrospect, your main impressions about the use of action learning in organization X?

-

Do you believe action learning will work in all organizations?

-

When do you think it will work?

-

When do you think it will not work?

-

If it did not work in organization X in this particular case, why do you think this happened?

These questions tell us when interviewees find that action learning will (not) coincide with organizational development in a specific situation. They serve as additional checks on the necessity of the requirements and conditions that have previously been mentioned. This therefore is another validity check (Smith 2003, Yin 1989). Besides, these questions can help to extend our research framework as they shed some light on (other) conditions under which organizational development may or may not materialize.

197


S

ummary

‘Organizational Development through Management Control: The Case of Action Learning’

Research Goal and Questions Can organizational development be achieved through management control in the special case of action learning (which is, as we will see, a particularization of management control)? Or, stated differently, is action learning an effective particularization of management control? This is the main issue addressed in this publication. Depending on the answer we can ask ourselves what this tells us about action learning and management control. The goal of this research is to get a better understanding of the relationship between organizational development and management control. In many action learning articles and books that have been published to date the abovementioned issue is confirmed: action learning seemingly results in organizational development. However, since these publications focus on success stories almost without exception, in which consultants tell us about the more notable programs they have been involved in, while often not following the rigors of scientific research, we should not be too surprised about this. Nevertheless, an increasing number of authors are critically discussing action learning, with some even claiming that it has had its day or has turned into an act of faith. Besides, in the management control literature, there is growing interest in the interconnections between organizational learning and management control. It therefore seems worthwhile to examine action learning more closely. Key Terms Action learning is a problem-solving and learning approach for organizations, which was promoted and (among others) practiced by the English astrophysicist Reg Revans since the early 1950s until his death in 2003. When organizations are faced with complex, strategic problems for which no standard solutions exist, it is said that action learning cannot only help to solve these (or indicate why this cannot be done), but can also help to achieve personal and organizational 199


development. Unfortunately, what these terms exactly mean remains, just like what action learning really is, unclear in the related literature. This research shows that despite this critique, it is possible to distil a number of what we have called ‘action learning requirements’ from Revans’s book ‘The Origins and Growth of Action Learning’, which was published in 1982. These requirements are: •

The presence of one or more real-life, complex problems that urgently call for a solution and that have a clear strategic dimension;

•

The sharing of these problems in a team of four to five people across the organizational hierarchy, who have different backgrounds;

•

Learning together with other stakeholders in a problem (or problems), including those who are not team members;

•

The possibility to experiment with different solutions in a controlled environment over an extended period of time;

•

Continuous evaluation of, and reflection on, the progress made and the results achieved, both individually and by a team as a whole. This is done by critical questioning and by providing personal feedback.

When the above requirements are met, we call the way in which an organization tackles the aforementioned problems ‘action learning’ in this research. What is management control? Many definitions have been proposed in the literature. In this study we take a behavioral perspective: management control is defined as influencing employee behavior in such a way that organizational goals are realized. The problems tackled in an action learning program must have a strategic dimension (see the ‘action learning requirements’) and are therefore, we presume, consistent with organizational strategies and, thereby, with organizational goals. This is an important assumption in this study. Consequently, we can assert that action learning is a particularization of management control. Personal development has been defined as the behavioral change of employees after an action learning program has ended, provided that they say that this change was a consequence of the program. Following the action learning literature, we assumed that organizational development can only be realized through personal development. When employees, either deliberately or not, change their behavior in a particular situation, it is argued that their ‘scripts’

200


change. Scripts are adaptable cognitive frameworks for understanding and enacting behavior. When they spread in an organization and are shared by more employees than the one(s) by which they have originally been developed, new or altered ‘protoscripts’ develop. When protoscripts get to be used throughout an organization as a taken-for-granted way of thinking and working and the problem (or problems) tackled in an action learning program has (have) been solved, we say that organizational development has materialized. Protoscripts are therefore deemed to be part of organizational culture. How can, given the above definitions, organizational development be realized in an action learning situation? Revans, although explicitly mentioning that his account is incomplete, states in his book from 1982 that at least the following conditions have to be met to achieve this: •

Team members and an organization’s senior management have a willingness to learn. They accept new ways of thinking, even if these are contrary to their current beliefs and habits;

•

The presence of constructive team behavior that manifests itself in open discussions and genuine attempts to solve organizational problems;

•

Active cooperation of and stimulus by an organization’s senior management in an action learning program;

•

The presence of identifiable clients (employees who are committed that something is done about a problem and have put it ‘on offer’) and sponsors (mostly senior managers who are ready to act on behalf of a team when its members ask for this);

•

An intention to implement the solutions stemming from an action learning program, which is to be followed by the actual implementation of these solutions;

•

A manageable and controllable period of time within which an action learning program is conducted, so that regular work processes are not disrupted.

We have called the above conditions ‘action learning conditions’ in this research. In addition to these conditions, Revans claims that even more conditions have to be met if organizational development is to appear in an action learning situation. He also lists these conditions in his book published in 1982. They do not concern a specific action learning program, but rather the way in which an 201


organization is generally run. Therefore, they operate at a higher level of abstraction than the ‘action learning conditions’. Revans states that an organization must also function as a ‘learning system’ if organizational development is to be realized. The corresponding conditions have been called ‘learning system conditions’ and are also included in this research: •

Chief executives regard it as their main responsibility to enhance organizational learning;

•

They stimulate this through an explicit delegation of tasks, so that staff members have the authority to solve complex problems through bottomup inputs;

•

Rules and procedures in an organization may be improved and are therefore variable;

•

Unsolvable or intractable problems are presented as such, and the reasons why they cannot be solved are explained. This must result in a change in organizational systems, so that similar problems may be solved in the future;

•

Employees at all levels in an organization are encouraged to get together with direct colleagues at regular intervals to propose better ways to organize their work.

A major problem is that Revans deliberately kept the abovementioned lists incomplete, with the exception of the ‘learning system conditions’. This implies that they do not constitute a strong ‘theory’. After all, when all conditions have been met and organizational development is still not realized, the conditions Revans never mentioned can always be blamed for this. In order to operationalize this research we therefore had to assume that the lists were actually complete. By so doing we could, in a scientifically viable way, proceed with our empirical analysis (given our research questions). Operationalization By examining several case histories we have tried to determine whether the ‘action learning conditions’ and ‘learning system conditions’ were met (or not) when organizational development materialized (or not) after the conduct of several specifically selected action learning programs. We analyzed four cases in three organizations to assess this. The cases were selected on the basis of the ‘action learning requirements’ mentioned above. As case research generates much detailed information, our understanding of the interrelationship between organizational development and management control could be enhanced. The

202


validity and reliability of our findings was safeguarded by applying triangulation techniques (that is, by asking several interviewees about the same program in the same way and by applying both interviews and archival analyses) and by using structured research protocols that could easily be replicated (we used the same list of questions, which was clearly linked to the literature, in every interview and asked each interviewee to sustain his interview report before we proceeded with our analysis). Results Based on our case analysis, we can conclude that action learning is an ineffective particularization of management control. The ‘action learning conditions’ do not have to be met in order to realize organizational development – at least, in the cases under consideration. Meeting the ‘learning system conditions’ suffices. Stated differently, when a ‘learning system’ is present action learning does not have to be applied at all if organizational development is to appear. This contradicts the many success stories found in the action learning literature. In two cases we saw that action learning speeded up organizational change when a ‘learning system’ was present. We conjecture that this happened, since action learning warrants that considerable attention is paid to a specific problem (or problems) for a specific period of time. It was also found that several internal and external factors in an organization can affect the abovementioned speed and the interrelationship between action learning and ‘learning systems’. These factors concern the personal trust employees place in one another, the trust they have in action learning as a valuable problem-solving and learning approach, senior management support of an action learning program, the internal resistance to it, and the internal legitimacy of action learning as a whole. We believe that these factors, which are obviously interconnected, would not have been uncovered if we had not conducted case research. Conclusions We claim that this research gives cause to reconsider both the action learning and management control literature. More specifically, we argue that:

203


•

Reg Revans never described a compelling action learning theory;

•

Action learning is no ‘Holy Grail’ that will automatically realize organizational development;

•

‘Learning systems’ are much more important to realize organizational development than action learning programs (which we found not to be important at all);

•

Management control and learning in organizations may be strongly linked to the way in which organizations are structured, as well as to the internal and external circumstances they have to deal with;

•

In order to enhance our understanding of action learning as a particularization of management control and its relation to organizational development, it is recommendable to study action learning ‘failures’ in the literature to counterbalance the success stories that have swamped it to date;

•

Scripts may be valuable to bridge the gap between personal and organizational development.

Future research into action learning, and more generally, into management control, may be shaped by using the abovementioned insights.

204


S

amenvatting (Dutch Summary)

‘Organisatieontwikkeling door management control: een onderzoek naar action learning’

Onderzoeksdoel en onderzoeksvragen Kan organisatieontwikkeling worden gerealiseerd door middel van management control, wanneer wij dit toespitsen op action learning? Of, anders gezegd, is action learning een effectieve verbijzondering van management control? Dat is de hoofdvraag die in deze publicatie centraal staat. Hangende het antwoord op deze vraag kunnen we ons, als verdiepingsslag, afvragen wat dit ons vertelt over action learning en management control. Het doel van dit onderzoek is een beter inzicht in de relatie tussen organisatieontwikkeling en management control tot stand te brengen. In veel action learning publicaties wordt bevestigend geantwoord op onze hoofdvraag: action learning gaat (schijnbaar) gepaard met organisatieontwikkeling. Dit is echter niet zo heel verrassend. De action learning literatuur staat namelijk bol van de succesverhalen, waarin voornamelijk consultants ons deelgenoot maken van hun eigen ervaringen in de meest gedenkwaardige programma's waarbij zij betrokken zijn geweest, meestal zonder daarbij de 'spelregels' van wetenschappelijk onderzoek in acht te nemen. Hun conclusies zijn daarom, wetenschappelijk gezien, van weinig waarde. Aan de andere kant zijn er steeds meer auteurs te vinden die action learning in een kritisch daglicht plaatsen. Sommigen claimen zelfs dat het anno 2008 achterhaald is of meer geloof dan wijsheid bevat. Een dergelijke controverse maakt nader onderzoek interessant, te meer daar de (eventuele) dwarsverbanden tussen organisatieleren en management control in de laatstgenoemde literatuur ook nog niet veel aandacht krijgen. Begrippenkader Action learning is een aanpak om problemen op te lossen en te leren in organisaties, die vanaf de jaren vijftig van de vorige eeuw is gepropagandeerd en (onder meer) gepraktiseerd door de Engelse astrofysicus Reg Revans. Wanneer organisaties geconfronteerd worden met complexe, strategische 205


problemen waarvoor geen standaardoplossingen beschikbaar zijn, zou via de toepassing van action learning niet alleen het probleem of de problemen in kwestie moeten worden opgelost (of duidelijk gemaakt moeten worden waarom dit niet kan), maar zou tevens zowel persoonlijke als organisatiegroei moeten optreden. Wat deze vormen van groei precies behelzen is echter, net als wat action learning is, niet helemaal duidelijk. In dit onderzoek wordt aangetoond dat er ondanks deze kritiek wel, uitgaande van één van de standaardwerken van Revans (namelijk zijn boek ‘The Origins and Growth of Action Learning’ uit 1982), een aantal heldere uitgangspunten van action learning kunnen worden geformuleerd. Deze uitgangspunten zijn: •

De aanwezigheid van één of meer complexe, actuele problemen in een organisatie met een strategische dimensie, waarvoor een oplossing gevonden móet worden;

•

Het aanpakken van dit probleem (of deze problemen) in een multidisciplinaire groep van circa 4-5 leden uit verschillende lagen in de organisatie;

•

Leren samen met andere betrokkenen bij het probleem (of de problemen). Ergo: leren samen met stakeholders die geen groepslid zijn;

•

De mogelijkheid om binnen bepaalde randvoorwaarden te experimenteren met verschillende oplossingen voordat een ‘finale’ oplossing voor een probleem (of de problemen) wordt gekozen;

•

Continue reflectie door individuele groepsleden en de groep als geheel op ondernomen acties en resultaten, en wel door middel van het geven van feedback en het kritisch bevragen van elkaar.

We hebben de bovenstaande uitgangspunten ‘action learning requirements’ genoemd. Als hieraan niet is voldaan, noemen we de wijze waarop in een organisatie problemen worden aangepakt niet action learning. Wat is management control? Hiervan zijn vele definities in omloop. In deze studie wordt een gedragsmatige definitie van management control gehanteerd. Management control wordt namelijk gezien als gedragsbeïnvloeding van werknemers opdat zij de doelstellingen van hun organisatie behartigen. De problemen die in een action learning programma worden bestudeerd hebben een strategische component (zie de ‘action learning requirements’) en zijn daarmee, als het goed is, consistent met organisatiedoelen. Van een verbijzondering is sprake omdat de doelen van een action learning programma in de bovenstaande

206


gedachtegang een afgeleide zijn van organisatiedoelen. Dit is tevens een belangrijke aanname die we in het onderzoek hebben gedaan. Aan persoonlijke en organisatieontwikkeling hebben we vorm gegeven door te kijken naar veranderende gedragingen van werknemers (enige tijd) na afloop van een action learning programma, die hier naar hun eigen zeggen een uitvloeisel van zijn. We hebben daarbij de zeker vanuit theoretisch perspectief niet onacceptabele aanname gedaan dat persoonlijke groei aan de basis van organisatiegroei ligt. Als werknemers al dan niet bewust hun gedrag veranderen in een bepaalde situatie, kunnen we zeggen dat er een verandering in hun zogeheten ‘scripts’ is opgetreden. Dit noemen we persoonlijke groei. Scripts beschrijven de adaptieve gewoonten en opvattingen van een individu die karakteristiek zijn voor een bepaalde situatie, en die op enig moment in concreet gedrag kunnen worden omgezet. Wanneer deze scripts worden verspreid en gedeeld door meer werknemers dan door degene door wie ze zijn oorspronkelijk zijn ontwikkeld, is sprake van zogenaamde ‘protoscripts’. Wanneer deze protoscripts door de hele organisatie heen als een voor waar aangenomen wijze van denken en werken worden gebruikt en het probleem (of de problemen) die werden aangepakt in een action learning programma is (of zijn) opgelost, stellen wij dat organisatieontwikkeling is opgetreden. Protoscripts zien we als een onderdeel van de cultuur van een organisatie. Hoe kan, gegeven de bovenstaande definities, organisatieontwikkeling in action learning situaties worden gerealiseerd? Hoewel hij nadrukkelijk aangeeft dat de onderstaande opsomming incompleet is, stelt Revans in zijn boek uit 1982 dat zowel persoonlijke en organisatieontwikkeling optreden als in ieder geval aan de onderstaande voorwaarden bij een action learning programma is voldaan: •

Groepsleden, evenals het management van een organisatie, hebben duidelijk de wil om te leren. Nieuwe manieren van denken in de organisatie worden geaccepteerd zelfs wanneer deze haaks staan op de in zwang zijnde gewoonten en opvattingen;

•

Er is sprake van constructief groepsgedrag dat zich manifesteert in open discussies en het ondernemen van welgemeende pogingen om het onderhavige probleem (of de onderhavige problemen) aan te pakken;

•

Het management van een organisatie neemt actief deel aan een action learning programma en stimuleert dit ook;

•

Er zijn aanwijsbare cliënten (werknemers die willen dat iets met een probleem gebeurt en dit hebben aangedragen) en sponsoren (meestal

207


doorgewinterde managers die de groep bijstaan indien groepsleden dat vragen) betrokken bij het programma; •

In de organisatie bestaat de intentie de uiteindelijk gekozen oplossingrichting(en) in te slaan. Dit gaat, uiteindelijk, gepaard met het implementeren van de bijbehorende oplossing(en);

•

De looptijd van het programma is overzichtelijk zodat de lopende processen in de organisatie niet te zeer ontwricht raken.

Deze set van voorwaarden hebben we in het onderzoek ‘action learning conditions’ genoemd. Echter, Revans stelt dat naast de bovengenoemde voorwaarden nog andere voorwaarden opgeld moeten doen wil organisatieontwikkeling als uitvloeisel van action learning optreden. Deze voorwaarden hebben niet zozeer te maken met een specifiek programma, maar met het algemene reilen en zeilen in een organisatie. Zij hebben dus betrekking op een ander niveau van abstractie dan de ‘action learning conditions’. Volgens Revans moet een organisatie als een zogenaamd ‘learning system’ functioneren wil organisatieontwikkeling zich manifesteren. De hierbij behorende voorwaarden, die we eveneens in ons onderzoek hebben meegenomen en ‘learning system conditions’ hebben genoemd, zijn volgens zijn boek uit 1982: •

Managers zien het vergroten van het leervermogen van hun organisatie als hun expliciete verantwoordelijkheid;

•

Dit stimuleren zij door bepaalde taken te delegeren naar lagere echelons in de organisatie, zodat de betrokken werknemers, ‘bottom-up’, problemen kunnen oplossen;

•

Regels en procedures in een organisatie worden continu verbeterd en zijn dus variabel;

•

Niet op te lossen of te traceren problemen worden als zodanig gepresenteerd en geanalyseerd. Dit leidt tot aanpassingen in systemen zodat soortgelijke problemen in de toekomst wel kunnen worden opgelost;

•

Werknemers worden gestimuleerd om op gezette tijden bij elkaar te komen om betere manieren om hun werk te organiseren uit te werken.

Een probleem wordt gevormd door het feit dat, zoals we eerder al hebben aangestipt, Revans de bovenstaande lijsten (afgezien van de lijst met ‘learning system conditions’) bewust incompleet heeft gehouden. Dit maakt dat zij, 208


tezamen, geen sterke theorie vormen. Immers, als aan alle voorwaarden wordt voldaan en er toch geen organisatieontwikkeling optreedt, kunnen de door Revans niet uitgewerkte voorwaarden hiervoor altijd als oorzaak worden aangewezen. Om het onderzoek te kunnen operationaliseren hebben we daarom moeten aannemen dat de bovengenoemde lijsten wel compleet zijn. Zo konden we toch op een wetenschappelijke zinvolle wijze invulling geven aan ons empirisch onderzoek (tegen de achtergrond van onze onderzoeksvragen). Concrete uitwerking Door het verrichten van specifiek casusonderzoek bij reeds enige jaren geleden beëindigde action learning programma’s hebben we geprobeerd te achterhalen of in die gevallen waarin daarbij organisatieontwikkeling optrad (of niet) ook voldaan werd aan de bovenstaande ‘action learning conditions’ en ‘learning system conditions’. We hebben hiertoe vier cases in drie organisaties geanalyseerd. De programma’s hebben we geselecteerd op basis van de ‘action learning requirements’. Doordat casusonderzoek een grote hoeveelheid gedetailleerde gegevens oplevert heeft dit ons begrip over de (mogelijke) verbanden tussen organisatieontwikkeling en management control vergroot. De validiteit en betrouwbaarheid van de resultaten hebben we gewaarborgd door triangulatie (het bevragen van verschillende werknemers bij ieder programma over dezelfde aspecten, alsmede door het afnemen van interviews, gecombineerd met het doen van archiefonderzoek) en gestructureerde onderzoeksprotocollen (het gebruik van identieke vragenlijsten in elk interview en het laten accorderen van elk interviewrapport door de geïnterviewde in kwestie voordat we verdergingen met onze analyses) toe te passen. Resultaten Er kan worden geconcludeerd dat action learning een ineffectieve verbijzondering van management control is. Aan de ‘action learning conditions’ hoeft helemaal niet te worden voldaan om organisatieontwikkeling te realiseren – tenminste, in de cases die wij hebben onderzocht. Het voldoen aan de ‘learning system conditions’ is afdoende. Anders geformuleerd, als er sprake is van een ‘learning system’ hoeft action learning niet te worden toegepast om organisatieontwikkeling tot stand te brengen. Dit is in tegenspraak met de vele succesverhalen die we aantreffen in de action learning literatuur. In twee cases hebben we echter gezien dat action learning het tempo waarin organisatieontwikkeling zich manifesteert positief kan beïnvloeden als er tevens

209


sprake is van een ‘learning system’, waarschijnlijk doordat er dan een focus plaatsvindt op een bepaald probleem (of op bepaalde problemen) binnen een bepaalde periode. Uit het onderzoek is tevens naar voren gekomen dat sommige in- en externe factoren in een organisatie van invloed kunnen zijn op het bovengenoemde tempo en de wisselwerking tussen action learning en ‘learning systems’. Deze factoren betreffen het vertrouwen dat er op persoonlijk niveau tussen werknemers in de organisatie en in action learning als aanpak om problemen op te lossen en te leren bestaat, de ondersteuning van action learning door het senior management, de interne weerstand tegen action learning, en de interne legitimiteit van action learning. Deze factoren, die uiteraard onderling samenhang vertonen, zouden we niet op het spoor zijn gekomen als we geen casusonderzoek hadden verricht. Conclusies Onzes inziens geeft dit onderzoek aanleiding tot een heroverweging van de huidige stand van weten en denken in de action learning en management control literatuur. Meer specifiek kan daarbij worden gedacht aan de volgende punten: •

Reg Revans heeft geen eenduidige action learning theorie beschreven;

•

Action learning is geen ‘heilige graal’ die vanzelf organisatieontwikkeling dichterbij brengt;

•

‘Learning systems’ zijn veel belangrijker om organisatieontwikkeling te realiseren dan action learning programma’s (die dit geheel niet zijn);

•

Management control en leren in organisaties kunnen sterk gekoppeld zijn aan de wijze waarop organisaties zijn ingericht, maar ook aan de in- en externe omstandigheden waarmee zij te maken hebben;

•

Het verdient aanbeveling mislukte action learning programma’s te bestuderen om tegenwicht te bieden aan de stortvloed aan succesverhalen die in de action learning literatuur zijn beschreven. Op die manier kan ons inzicht in de relatie tussen action learning, management control and organisatieontwikkeling zeer waarschijnlijk worden vergroot;

•

Scripts zijn vermoedelijk goed bruikbaar om een brug te slaan tussen persoonlijke ontwikkeling en organisatieontwikkeling.

Toekomstig onderzoek naar action learning en meer algemeen, naar management control, kan onder meer langs de bovenstaande lijnen worden vormgegeven. 210

A

bout the Author Ivo De Loo (1972) studied Business Economics, specialization Quantitative Economics, at Maastricht University between 1990 and 1995. During this period he taught mathematics to undergraduate students. After receiving his cum laude master of science degree, he worked for MERIT (currently UNU-MERIT) between 1995 and 1998 and Statistics Netherlands (CBS) from 1998 to 1999. Since 1999 he has been an assistant professor in management accounting at the Open University of the

Netherlands (OUNL). He has among others developed and taught various management accounting and control courses at the master of science level, suiting the distance-teaching goals of the university. Besides, he has written and co-written many academic and professional articles that have been published in well-known (inter)nationals journals, among others in Accounting History, the Journal of Workplace Learning, ESB, MAB, the Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business, Qualitative Research in Accounting and Management, the Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, Public Administration Quarterly, The Learning Organization, and Action Learning: Research and Practice. In 2007, he co-edited a special issue in the latter journal on lean thinking and action learning. Together with several co-authors, he was awarded a best paper award by Elsevier Science and Emerald’s Literati Network in 1999 and 2007 respectively. He still works at the OUNL, his research activities being embedded in the recently established Research Centre of Accounting and Control Change (RACC), a joint research institute of the OUNL and the Radboud University Nijmegen.