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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Dobbs, Crano / OUTGROUP ACCOUNTABILITY

Outgroup Accountability in the Minimal Group Paradigm: Implications for Aversive Discrimination and Social Identity Theory Michael Dobbs University of Arizona William D. Crano Claremont Graduate University nature of the relationship between the social group and the individual’s role in it. Early work emphasized competition over scarce resources as a primary impetus for discriminatory intergroup behavior (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). More recent studies have been guided by SIT, which seeks to explain the cognitive and motivational processes that individuals engage in when acting as group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). The MGP has been an important adjunct to progress in the formation and evaluation of SIT. Developed by Tajfel (1970) and his associates (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), the MGP is used as a convenient paradigm for conducting intergroup research in the laboratory. This article describes an MGP experiment that examines causal factors underlying the common and originally counterintuitive finding that merely categorizing people into distinct groups is a necessary and sufficient condition for eliciting ingroup favoritism. We suggest that the mere categorization effect might be particularly easy to achieve in the MGP, which typically does not include many common characteristics of real intergroup contexts. Specifically, the research is concerned with the possibility that the absence of accountability to outgroup members in the standard MGP might increase the likelihood of discrimination. When group

The minimal group paradigm (MGP) is a popular method of testing intergroup phenomena. Originally created to facilitate discovery of conditions necessary and sufficient to produce ingroup favoritism, early MGP results suggested that simply grouping people was sufficient to cause discrimination. More recent research has uncovered factors that cause MGP-based discrimination to disappear. The present experiment examined outgroup accountability as explicatory of these variations. It was found that requiring justification for allocations attenuated discrimination. Outgroup accountability-based attenuation was especially evident when the allocator was of majority (vs. minority) status, as expected on the basis of aversive racism considerations. Allocators of minority status tended to discriminate more when made accountable to the outgroup. Implications of these results for theories of social identity and aversive racism are discussed.

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ntergroup relations has long been a central research theme in social psychology. The minimal group paradigm (MGP) was developed to facilitate such research. Recently, however, the MGP itself has come under close methodological scrutiny. As a result, questions have been raised regarding the interpretability and generality of results produced in the MGP. The present research was undertaken to provide data relevant to an alternative interpretation of results obtained in the MGP. The research is framed in the context of two competing theoretical perspectives that relate to intergroup phenomena: social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and aversive racism theory (Dovidio, in press; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Intergroup research has progressed through a number of phases, each with a unique perspective on the

Authors’ Note: This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Institute on Drug Abuse (Grant No. R01-DA12578-01). We are grateful to Rachel Smith for her help in conducting the research. Requests for reprints may be addressed to either author at the Department of Psychology, Claremont Graduate University, 123 E. 8th Street, Claremont, CA 91711; e-mail: [email protected]. PSPB, Vol. 27 No. 3, March 2001 355-364 © 2001 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

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members are accountable to the outgroup for their actions, results contrary to the usual findings are expected to ensue. Tajfel’s Minimal Group Paradigm Tajfel’s (1978) initial research, which was designed to discover a baseline intergroup condition of non- discrimination, was envisioned as the first of a series of experiments that would begin by stripping away all characteristics normally associated with groups: face-to-face interaction between members, conflicts of interest, previous hostility between groups, and so on. In subsequent experiments, these characteristics were to be systematically layered on until discrimination was observed, to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions to produce ingroup favoritism (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). The results of the first minimal group experiments were surprising and unexpected: Participants favored members of their own ingroup at the expense of the outgroup despite the lack of any apparent reason for doing so. Group membership was completely anonymous; the groups were artificial, created on the basis of trivial criteria; and the participants had no prior history of intergroup conflict. Discrimination was not expected until later in the research program when some key element (or combination of elements) of realistic groups was added to the variable mix. Based on the results of early minimal group studies, Tajfel and his associates concluded that group formation and intergroup discrimination had occurred as a result of social categorization per se; they were not due to other factors such as interpersonal friendships within the groups. Later studies that implemented the paradigm replicated the phenomenon (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 1975). Social Identity Theory Tajfel and Turner’s (1979, 1986) SIT was developed both to capitalize on and to make sense of the MGP results. The theory posits that individuals strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity, defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). Often, this positive valence can be achieved through an appropriate intergroup social comparison. As presented, SIT is primarily a motivational theory that posits that self-esteem drives individual behavior in intergroup settings. Such an interpretation fits with the results of the early minimal group experiments. Tests of SIT over the past 18 years have proved generally supportive, although some of the theory’s central propositions have received mixed results. In a series of experi-

ments, Diehl (1988, 1989, 1990) examined a number of potential alternative explanations for discrimination in the MGP, including derivations from belief congruence theory (Rokeach, 1960), equity theory (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), and category differentiation theory (Doise, 1978). Results showed that SIT was the most parsimonious explanation in most cases; however, certain elements of real group interaction not modeled in the typical MGP substantially attenuated outgroup discrimination. In particular, Diehl (1989) found that participants tended to reciprocate fairness to outgroup members whom they believed had been fair to them. This suggests the possibility that the lack of interindividual mutuality in the standard MGP might foster discrimination, perhaps because participants need not justify their allocation choices. Another line of research that has questioned the association between social identity and positive distinctiveness as well as the mere categorization effect is found in the work of Mummendey and her associates (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995; Buhl, 1999; Mummendey et al., 1992; Otten, Mummendey, & Blanz, 1996). Among other factors, this research has examined the effect of allocating negative incentives (rather than positive rewards) in the MGP. In Tajfel’s initial delineation of minimal group requirements, penalties (in addition to or in lieu of rewards) are specifically mentioned as acceptable indicators of discrimination (see Tajfel et al., 1971, pp. 153-154). However, the majority of MGP studies since the early 1970s have employed only positive (usually monetary) reward allocations. Research comparing positive with negative allocations across different settings, levels of group categorization, salience of categorization, and relative group size and status shows that participants allocating positive rewards and evaluating others on positive dimensions display the familiar ingroup favoritism found in past MGP studies. However, this effect disappears when negative allocations (such as the time an ingroup or outgroup member must spend in an uncomfortably noisy room) are made under the standard (baseline) conditions. Discrimination on positive outcomes, and its absence when negative allocations and evaluations are made, is termed the positive-negative asymmetry bias in intergroup discrimination. Obviously, positive-negative asymmetry is not meant to imply that discrimination expressed in terms of negatively valenced behavior does not exist but rather that conditions beyond simple categorization may be necessary to provoke it. Mummendey (1995) refers to this possibility as the “aggravation hypothesis” because the conditions that intensify discrimination in the positive case (i.e., salient categorization and inferiority and/or minority status of the ingroup) are needed simply to call it forth in the nega-

Dobbs, Crano / OUTGROUP ACCOUNTABILITY tive case. Thus, it appears that the mere categorization effect does not hold under all circumstances. As suggested by Diehl (1990), some of the characteristics of the classic MGP, such as the consistent use of positive resource allocations (and, we might add, the absence of outgroup accountability), might present a misleading picture of the ease with which discriminatory behavior is elicited. In explaining the mechanisms at work in the positivenegative asymmetry effect, Mummendey (1995) speculated that the different valences of allocations or evaluation dimensions prime different cognitive styles or different styles of information processing. “Negative stimuli may lead to a more analytic, more careful, more accurate way of processing the information in the social situation provided in the experiments” (Mummendey, 1995, p. 667). This more careful cognitive style could lead to the decision to discriminate less, or not at all. C areful co gnitive d eliber ation may lead to superordinate recategorization of the allocation target. As Otten et al. (1996) speculate, this recategorization process might personalize the allocation interaction, thus lessening the likelihood of discrimination. Aversive Racism The study of aversive racism provides an alternative means of conceptualizing allocation asymmetries in the MGP. Throughout the past decade or so, proponents of aversive racism theory have reported research findings on real-world discrimination that may have relevance for understanding the results of the MGP laboratory (e.g., Dovidio, Mann, & Gaertner, 1989; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Drout, 1994). According to the aversive racism perspective, many White people in the United States today readily express a belief in egalitarianism, fairness, and equality. In some situations, however, underlying prejudice against Black people is manifest. Such discrimination occurs as a result of ambivalence on the part of Whites: a conflicting desire to conform outwardly to socially accepted norms of fairness and equality between races and a tendency to view Black people in a prejudicial manner as a result of various cognitive, historical, and sociocultural factors. Aversive racists avoid overt displays of racial favoritism when the normative structure of a situation is clear, but when the situation is normatively ambiguous, racial discrimination may occur (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Although aversive racism studies have focused on race as the basis of intergroup distinction, the logical framework of this perspective lends itself to a broader interpretation, as Crocker, Major, and Steele (1998) have observed. When a situation is normatively ambiguous or anonymous, fairness pressures are absent and familiar

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patterns of intergroup bias such as those observed in the typical MGP may become evident. Although we do not speculate on its source, we may indeed possess a tendency to discriminate against outgroups. However, expression of ingroup favoritism may be masked when circumstances require public allocations of resources or merely careful thought about normative expectations. When these conditions are absent, ingroup/outgroup discrimination is more probable. This pattern of bias or nonbias in allocation behavior follows logically from aversive racism theory; for present purposes, we refer to this composite allocation/evaluation pattern as aversive discrimination. Accountability Consistent with both aversive discrimination and Mummendey’s perspective, research on the effects of accountability on individual judgment may shed light on the processes that operate in the MGP. Tetlock (1983, 1992) found that “accountability to an individual of unknown views motivates people to consider arguments and evidence on both sides of [an] issue in order to prepare themselves for a wide variety of possible critical reactions to their views” (p. 75). Earlier, Cvetkovitch (1978) claimed that accountability led to “less intuitive” and “more analytic” modes of thought (p. 155). In the MGP, participants are physically isolated from one another, anonymous, and have no anticipation of interacting with and/or justifying their choices to members of the ingroup or outgroup. In real-life situations, this normally is not the case. Individuals do typically interact with one another and information about group membership often is readily available, if not blatantly apparent (as with gender or race). In such situations, accountability is usually inferred to some degree and, as a result, whereas one’s ingroup may be privately favored, the behavioral manifestations of that favoritism may be subtle or less likely to emerge (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996). Whereas accountability to an outgroup member may cause people to think about the expression of their attitudes and actions more carefully, and not necessarily suppress them, the more thoughtful consideration of group bias may restrain obvious favoritism or discrimination. In this way, accountability can also be viewed as similar to the concept of identifiability (to the ingroup or the outgroup), as considered in the Social Identity Deindividuation (SIDE) Model (Spears & Lea, 1994). Within SIDE, identifiability is related to an individual’s freedom to express the contents of a salient identity. However, the issue of to whom the individual is accountable is an important moderator in this context. Whereas accountability to ingroup members may result in heightened conformity to ingroup norms and a more devout

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adherence to ingroup identity maintenance strategies (Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995), being accountable to outgroup members may suppress the expression of ingroup-favoring actions. In this study, we consider the latter. Reicher and Levine (1994) showed that individuals are more likely to endorse attitudes and behaviors of an outgroup when in the presence of, and identifiable by, a member of this group, especially when under the threat of punishment for holding a counterattitudinal position. Thus, highly identifiable individuals “may be more inhibited to engage in behavior that is proscribed by or detrimental to the outgroup for fear of disapproval or sanction” (Spears & Lea, 1994, p. 447). It follows, then, that introducing outgroup accountability in the MGP may attenuate or conceal ingroup favoritism, just a s in tro duc ing negative allocations d id in Mummendey’s research. However, giving people a justifiable reason to favor or defend their own ingroup may cause discrimination to become manifest, consistent with Mummendey’s hypothesis. Central Variables and Hypotheses This experiment compares the effects of a typical minimal group treatment with one that adds a layer of accountability, whereby participants anticipate that they will be required to justify their allocation choices to outgroup members. In addition to accountability, the research makes use of two other treatment variables, minority/majority group status and task competence, that have relevance to a comparison of SIT, the positivenegative asymmetry hypothesis, and aversive discrimination theory. The manipulated variables promote different predictions and facilitate comparison of the competing models. Predictions regarding the effects of accountability on discrimination are not readily derived from either SIT or aversive discrimination theory. However, as will be argued, aversive discrimination does suggest a possible interaction of outgroup accountability with group status. A main effect of accountability can be derived from Mummendey’s positive-negative asymmetry hypothesis if we assume that outgroup accountability motivates more careful thought and that this added consideration is a driving force behind the allocation asymmetries that she and her colleagues have discovered (Buhl, 1999). As noted, SIT holds that group factors that affect self-evaluations will have an important bearing on discrimination. Thus, an individual whose ingroup is threatened in some way is expected to reassert a positive social identity by devaluating or disadvantaging a competing outgroup. One way a group may be threatened is by showing that its members are incompetent vis-à-vis a comparison group. Another way may be to characterize

the group as a minority, in competition with the larger collective. Otten et al. (1996) suggested that low competence and minority status constitute threats to social identity. Accordingly, participants under such threats may be prone to discrimination against an outgroup. The aversive discrimination approach makes no strong prediction for competence or group status (main) effects. However, it fosters a prediction of an interaction of group status with outgroup accountability; discrimination should be exacerbated among unaccountable majority members. The approach does not predict this same discriminatory behavior for anonymous members of the minority. The final possibility to be considered involves the interaction of competence and group size. The aversive discrimination model does not make a clear prediction in this instance. SIT, however, holds that the minority tendency to discriminate against the majority will be exacerbated when their competence is threatened. The double threat to identity in the minority-incompetent condition of the study should pose the most extreme menace to social identity. Thus, nonaccountable participants classified as members of incompetent minority groups should exhibit the greatest discriminatory reaction. METHOD

Participants Ninety-seven undergraduate communication students at the University of Arizona served as participants and were given extra credit and a small monetary reward for their service. The study was conducted in groups that ranged in size from 10 to 21 participants. Design Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (accountability vs. no accountability) × 2 (high competence vs. low competence) × 2 (majority vs. minority) factorial design. Effects of the independent variables on monetary allocations, the dependent measure, were assessed via Tajfel matrices (see Allen & Wilder, 1975; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon, 1994; Diehl, 1988; Otten et al., 1996; Tajfel et al., 1971). These matrices are widely used; their application in the present research allows comparison of results with previous minimal group studies. Procedure After arriving, participants were seated individually at desks that were separated by shoulder-high dividers. They could not see the other participants. To create a basis for dividing participants into groups, they com-

Dobbs, Crano / OUTGROUP ACCOUNTABILITY pleted a trivial line estimation task. Although group assignment was random, participants were led to believe the division was based on overestimation or underestimation of the line lengths. All were given feedback concerning their individual results on the line estimation task as well as their membership in either the overestimator or underestimator group. In addition, the cover passage supplied participants with their group member identification letter (all participants were listed as member “N”). Participants were led to believe that their ingroup was of either high or low competence in line estimation. This ability was defined as characteristic of overestimators or underestimators. They were told that their group tended to be more (or less) accurate judges in perceptual tasks, such as line estimation. In addition, they were told that their group represented a numerical majority (“80% of the general population is also an over/underestimator”) or minority (“20% of the general population . . . ”). When participants finished reading the cover page, they were instructed to answer 10 items taken from Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES) and then to read, as the experimenter carefully recited aloud, the instructions for completing the allocation matrices that followed. As a manipulation check, each participant was asked to write his or her group name and group membership identification letter on the next page before continuing on to the matrices. In the accountability condition, participants also wrote their group name and participant identification letter, as well as their real name, on a name tag sticker that was clipped to the booklet. These outgroup-accountable participants were told they would later meet with members of the opposite group. When completing the allocation matrices, participants apportioned points (supposedly worth 25 cents each) between an anonymous member of their own ingroup and an anonymous member of the outgroup. Each matrix pits particular arrangements of allocation strategies against each other, as follows: • maximum ingroup profit (MIP), in which the most possible points are awarded to the ingroup member, regardless of outgroup points; • maximum joint profit (MJP), in which the most total points is awarded to both ingroup and outgroup member, regardless of which receives more; • maximum difference in favor of ingroup (MD), in which the difference between amount awarded to ingroup member and amount awarded to outgroup member is the greatest, with the ingroup member receiving more; • favoritism (FAV), which is a combination of the MIP and MD strategies; and • parity (P), in which each person receives an equal amount of money.

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One matrix type pits the FAV strategy (a combination of the MD and MIP strategies) against the MJP strategy. The two remaining matrix types pit FAV against P and MD against MIP + MJP. Participants always awarded points to two other anonymous players, never directly to themselves. They were told they would receive the amount two other (anonymous) participants awarded them. Placement of in- and outgroup awardees was counterbalanced in the matrices, and the columns were reversed for each of the various matrices, resulting in 3 (matrix types) × 2 (ingroup or outgroup in top row position) × 2 (column reversal) matrices. In all, participants completed 12 matrices. In the accountability condition, participants were told to wear their name tag sticker and that after they filled out their booklets, they would discuss their allocation decisions with two members of the outgroup. This manipulation formed the central accountability factor. In the standard (control) condition, no mention was made of other group members or revealing group membership during the experiment itself. When all participants finished the matrices, the booklets were collected and participants were carefully debriefed. In the interest of fairness, each participant received $1. RESULTS

Manipulation Checks The manipulation check data reveal that all participants, save one, correctly identified their group membership. The errant individual’s data were excluded from further analysis. A second analysis was conducted to determine the effect of the manipulations on participants’ self-esteem. Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) SSES purports to assess momentary instantiations of an individual’s overall well-being. The 10 items taken from the SSES were combined (α = .76) and analyzed in a 2 (outgroup accountability: present/ absent) × 2 (relative ingroup size: minority/majority) × 2 (ingroup competence: high/low) ANOVA. The analysis revealed a main effect for group size, F(1, 89) = 3.66, p < .06; majority participants displayed higher self-esteem scores than those assigned to the minority condition (X = 40.56 and 38.48, respectively). The analysis also revealed a statistically significant Accountability × Competence interaction, F(1, 89) = 5.80, p < .02; participants in the high-competent group who were accountable for their actions to outgroup members displayed higher self-esteem than incompetent, but accountable, participants (X = 41.43 vs. 38.19, respectively), F(1, 89) = 4.49, p < .05. These results suggest that participants in the minority condition, or who were both accountable and a member of an incompetent group, experienced identity threat. The

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experimental treatments generally functioned as planned.

TABLE 1:

Strategy Orientation

M (SD)

Allocation Analyses

FAV on MJP MD on MIP + MJP FAV on P MJP on FAV MIP + MJP on MD P on FAV

1.98 (4.20) 1.80 (3.85) 1.53 (4.06) 0.21 (3.81) 1.27 (5.14) 5.77 (5.09)

Allocation decisions on the Tajfel matrices were analyzed using pull scores, which measure participants’ preferences of one allocation strategy over another (see Bourhis et al., 1994). Six pull scores were calculated for each participant: the pull of FAV on MJP, MD on MIP + MJP, FAV on P, MJP on FAV, MIP + MJP on MD, and P on FAV. The first three of these strategies favor the ingroup over the outgroup. The remaining strategies (MJP on FAV, MIP + MJP on MD, and P on FAV) represent decisions that are more fair and economically rational. In testing pull score data, Bourhis et al. (1994) suggest both within- and between-subjects analytic designs be used to provide a complete data depiction. In the within-subjects analysis, each pull score is examined via a t test, which pits the mean pull against a hypothetical mean of zero. This analysis indicates intensity of a given strategy in the reward allocation process. Next, effects of the manipulated between-groups variables are investigated for those strategies whose pull scores exceed zero. In the present study, this analysis will require two 2 (accountable/not accountable) × 2 (relative ingroup size: majority vs. minority) × 2 (group competence: high vs. low) MANOVAs on the combined discriminatory and the combined nondiscriminatory strategies. Within-Subject Analyses Each of the six allocation strategies was analyzed via one-sample t tests. This test was used to determine the difference between the observed mean pull score on each strategy and a hypothetical value of zero, which suggests the absence of any appreciable pull. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 1. As shown, significant pull scores were found for five of the six allocation strategies. Only the maximum joint profit on favoritism (MJP on FAV) pull score, an egalitarian strategy, was not significantly different from zero. These results suggest that with one exception, participants employed both discriminatory and egalitarian strategies in the allocation of resources. A second within-subjects analysis also was calculated. In this (nonparametric) analysis, the two rank components of the pull scores were compared via Wilcoxon ranked pairs tests. The results of these nonparametric comparisons are presented in the final column of Table 1. As shown, both the Wilcoxon and the one-sample independent t-test analyses yielded essentially identical results. Following previous analyses (e.g., Mullin & Hogg, 1998; Otten et al., 1996), Table 2 summarizes the mean pull score differences (from zero) within each of the extended experimental treatment cells. The table

Mean Pull Scores for Each Strategy Across All Participants t Value 4.65*** 4.61*** 3.70*** 0.55 2.43* 11.18***

z Value 4.46*** 3.98*** 3.54* 0.43 2.34*** 7.39***

NOTE: t tests represent difference from a hypothetical mean of zero; Z scores obtained via Wilcoxon ranked pairs test compare the two rank components of each pull score. Significant values suggest that the strategy was used at greater than chance levels. FAV = ingroup favoritism, MJP = maximum joint profit, MD = maximum difference in favor of ingroup, MIP = maximum ingroup profit, and P = parity. *p < .05. ***p < .001.

shows that participants in the accountable majority conditions did not make use of any of the discriminatory strategies. In the nonaccountable conditions, each subgroup employed at least one of the discriminatory strategies. A more precise parametric appraisal of the effects of the manipulated variables on variations in distribution behaviors is provided in the between-subjects analyses that follow. Between-Subject Analyses: Discriminatory Distribution Strategies Pull scores on the three discriminatory distribution strategies (FAV on MJP, MD on MIP + MJP, and FAV on P) were analyzed in a 2 (outgroup accountability) × 2 (relative ingroup size) × 2 (ingroup competence) MANOVA. The MANOVA revealed a significant main effect of accountability, F(3, 87) = 2.71, p < .05. This result suggests the general tendency of outgroup-accountable participants to discriminate less across the three strategies than those not held accountable to the outgroup. Univariate ANOVAs on each of the three discriminatory strategies disclosed a significant main effect of outgroup accountability for the FAV on MJP strategy, F(1, 89) = 4.49, p < .05. Participants who were made accountable to the outgroup for their allocations were significantly less discriminatory than were nonaccountable participants (M pull = 1.13 vs. 2.94 for accountable and nonaccountable participants, respectively; higher scores indicate greater discriminatory pull). Neither the competence nor the group status manipulation produced significant univariate main effects. The MANOVA on the discriminatory strategies also disclosed two substantial first-order interactions. The first was the Multivariate Outgroup Accountability × Relative Ingroup Size interaction, F(3, 87) = 2.18, p < .10. Univariate ANOVAs revealed significant Accountability × Group Status interactions for both FAV on P and MD on MIP + MJP, F(1, 89) = 4.12 and 5.30, respectively, both ps < .05. These interactions, presented in Figure 1, show that

Dobbs, Crano / OUTGROUP ACCOUNTABILITY TABLE 2:

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Mean Pull Scores by Accountability, Relative Ingroup Size, and Relative Group Status Minority

Allocation Strategy Not accountable FAV on MJP MD on MIP + MJP FAV on P MJP on FAV MIP + MJP on MD P on FAV Accountable FAV on MJP MD on MIP + MJP FAV on P MJP on FAV MIP + MJP on MD P on FAV

Low Status

Majority High Status

Low Status

High Status

1.50 (3.52)* –0.38 (2.51) .92 (2.54) –0.73 (5.45) 2.23 (6.98) 8.31 (3.95)***

3.15 (6.25) 3.19 (5.02)* 1.15 (5.84) 0.54 (2.87) 1.88 (5.68) 2.85 (5.56)

3.41 (5.06)* 4.00 (4.42)* 2.05 (5.02) 1.77 (6.47) 1.45 (6.30) 3.86 (7.07)

3.68 (4.33)* 2.05 (2.23)* 2.45 (4.90) 0.04 (2.64) 1.95 (6.01) 6.64 (4.84)**

0.32 (2.93) 2.14 (4.10) 3.64 (3.54)** –0.77 (4.20) 0.86 (4.39) 5.91 (3.77)***

2.32 (3.70) 2.86 (3.26)* 1.68 (4.00) 0.50 (1.25) 1.68 (5.33) 6.68 (4.82)**

0.46 (3.90) 0.82 (3.88) 0.11 (3.52) 0.61 (2.63) 0.39 (3.31) 5.54 (4.21)***

1.42 (2.41) 0.42 (3.41) 0.88 (2.13) –0.19 (3.05) –0.12 (3.25) 6.42 (5.24)**

NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Pull scores for each allocation strategy can range from –12 to +12. FAV = ingroup favoritism, MJP = maximum joint profit, MD = maximum difference in favor of ingroup, MIP = maximum ingroup profit, and P = parity. Cell ns range from 11 to 14. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001, two-tailed t tests.

majority participants were significantly less discriminatory when held accountable to the outgroup (minority) for both the FAV on P, t(95) = 1.50, p < .07, and the MD on MIP + MJP strategies, t(95) = 2.24, p < .025. This pattern was not found among minority allocators. The Relative Group Size × Competence interaction was the final substantial multivariate effect found in the MANOVA on discriminatory strategies, F(3, 87) = 4.51, p < .005. Univariate ANOVAs on the three strategies revealed that this interaction was significant for the MD on MIP + MJP strategy, F(1, 89) = 4.81, p < .05. Inspection of this interaction, graphically depicted in Figure 2, reveals a set of results that, although unanticipated, may prove useful for theory development. The interaction suggests that minority participants discriminated more than majority when both were members of highcompetence groups, t(95) = 1.66, p < .05. However, in the low-competence condition, minority participants tended to discriminate less than the majority, t(95) = 1.44, p < .08. The MANOVA on the egalitarian/economic strategies (MJP on FAV, MIP + MJP on MD, and P on FAV) revealed no significant multivariate main effects or interactions. DISCUSSION

The initial within-subjects analyses demonstrated that the participants made substantial use of both discriminatory and egalitarian strategies. However, outgroup accountability impeded discrimination, especially among members of the majority, a finding anticipated by the aversive discrimination model. Multivariate analysis of the three discrimination strategies confirmed the

Outgroup Accountability × Relative Group Size interaction: Pull of FAV on P (top view) and MD on MIP + MJP (bottom view). NOTE: Higher scores indicate greater discrimination. FAV = ingroup favoritism, P = parity, MD = maximum difference in favor of ingroup, MIP = maximum ingroup profit, and MJP = maximum joint profit.

Figure 1

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Ingroup Competence × Relative Group Size interaction: Pull of MD on MIP + MJP. NOTE: Higher scores indicate greater discrimination. MD = maximum difference in favor of ingroup, MIP = maximum ingroup profit, and MJP = maximum joint profit. Figure 2

expectation that participants held accountable to the outgroup for their decisions show less ingroup favoritism than those not held accountable. Univariate analysis revealed that this result held only for one of the three discriminatory strategies (FAV on MJP), but among these strategies, FAV on MJP is arguably the most self-serving. At one end of the FAV on MJP matrix, one can obtain the highest ingroup profit for one’s group along with the maximum positive between-groups differential (the FAV strategy). This outcome contrasts with an outgroupfavoring allocation at the other end of the choice matrix. The realistic choice for even mildly discriminatory participants appears obvious in this case. The proper choice is not so evident in the other discriminatory matrices. For example, to generate a positive differential in the MD on MIP + MJP matrix, the discriminating allocator is forced to take less, whereas FAV on P demands a choice of clear favoritism over equality rather than outgroup favoritism. Thus, whereas a significant pull score for any of the discriminatory strategies indicates bias, the FAV on MJP strategy may represent the most obvious form of favoritism available. This is consistent with Buhl’s (1999) approach, which used only the FAV on MJP strategy when agglomerating results of earlier selected MGP studies in his meta-analytic summary. Three possibilities suggest themselves as responsible for the outgroup accountability effect. Consistent with Mummendey’s (1995) reasoning, those who are aware that they will be held accountable for, and possibly asked to defend, their allocation behavior to outgroup members may adopt a more careful thought-processing style. The accountability results are consistent, too, with expectations based on aversive racism theory. This

approach holds that White aversive racists are mindful of the appropriateness of their behavior in situations that feature clear normative guidelines, but this mindful consideration is attenuated in situations that are less well defined. Finally, it is possible that outgroup-accountable participants become repersonalized, moving from group-level identification to the individual level. In a mindful, normatively unambiguous, personalized context, the complementary tendencies to identify with an ingroup and discriminate against an outgroup would diminish. Although these possibilities were not tested directly, the results suggest provocative possibilities that, at a minimum, encourage future research on the mechanisms responsible for accountability effects. Whereas both positive-negative asymmetry and aversive racism produce predictions regarding the main effect of accountability, SIT does not. However, SIT does form the basis for predictions of the main effects of both relative group size and group competence on allocations. The theory fosters the prediction that an individual characterized as belonging to an incompetent group, or thrust unexpectedly into minority status, may suffer a threat to social identity. Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Roefs, and Simons (1997) point out that the degree of perceived stability and legitimacy in an intergroup situation featuring groups of unequal status may moderate the perception of threat. As such, membership in a low-status group (i.e., minority and/or low competence) does not automatically constitute a social identity threat. However, our self-esteem data show that participants in this study did perceive such a threat when in a minority or an accountable, low-competence group. This should prompt the individual to discriminate more than a person of majority status and/or high competence. Contrary to these expectations, the analysis revealed no significant multivariate or univariate main effects for either group competence or group status. The absence of group competence and relative group size main effects does not mean that the variables had no impact on allocation behavior. They did, but their impact was moderated, as shown in the significant interaction effects obtained. The aversive discrimination perspective fosters the expectation that majority-status allocators will discriminate less when held accountable to the outgroup for their actions. SIT makes a different prediction: Experiencing a threatened social identity, members of a minority group should discriminate more in general, regardless of accountability. The positive-negative asymmetry hypothesis would seem to support a similar (main effect) prediction. The results provide strong support for the aversive discrimination prediction: Accountability interacted with group status. Majority allocators discriminated more when not held accountable to the outgroup for their actions, whereas minority members

Dobbs, Crano / OUTGROUP ACCOUNTABILITY did not discriminate differentially on the basis of outgroup accountability. In short, consistent with aversive racism, in the absence of normative guidelines, majorities discriminated; when made accountable to the outgroup for their actions, majority bias was attenuated. Similar accountability variations on discrimination were not found in members of minority status. This pattern of findings fits well with expectations based on aversive racism; it is less successfully anticipated by the other theoretical orientations considered to this point. The lack of main effects of relative group size and competence was contrary to expectations based on SIT. The particular form of the interaction of these two variables also was unanticipated. It was expected that participants in the minority/incompetent group treatment condition would experience the greatest identity threat and, thus, the greatest need to discriminate against the outgroup (in this case, the majority). Such discrimination was not evident. In fact, the opposite was found. When the minority was competent, it tended to discriminate more than the majority. When informed that they were part of an incompetent group, minority members tended to discriminate less than their majority counterparts in their allocation behavior. These findings lend little support for the standard SIT approach. Of course, it could be argued that the theory does not necessarily require that minority or members of incompetent groups discriminate against the outgroup. Other mechanisms of self-enhancement may be employed. The reversal of the predicted results, however, is less comforting than a mere null finding and should motivate serious consideration. Accountability Effects and the MGP In examining the results of this experiment, it is apparent that accountability played a powerful role in participants’ allocation decisions. Consistent with our expectations, the findings indicated that discrimination was attenuated when participants felt they would have to justify their allocation decisions to outgroup members. Such results support the hypothesis initially proposed by Mummendey and her associates that discrimination in terms of a mere categorization effect may obtain only under certain conditions that incidentally happened to be present in the classic minimal group studies. When certain factors or layers (such as negative allocations or, in the present case, accountability) are added to the minimal intergroup situation, discrimination disappears. Thus, this experiment may have uncovered a new kind of inconsistency effect that, in keeping with Mummendey’s (1995) nomenclature, can be thought of as an “accountability asymmetry effect.” The accountability findings are consistent with Mummendey’s speculation that more careful thought is at least partly responsible for the

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attenuation of discrimination. Although this hypothesis was not directly tested here, research suggests that the accountability construct represents a more direct linkage to careful thought than allocation valence (Cvetkovich, 1978; Tetlock, 1992). Conclusions The results of this experiment suggest that the traditional conceptualization of a minimal group is at least partially misleading. Instead of establishing a ground-level intergroup situation, the MGP appears to present respondents with a scenario in which discrimination is fostered, so that adding certain layers of real group characteristics (in this case, outgroup accountability) to the paradigm can result in less, rather than more, discrimination. Thus, when Tajfel and his associates attempted to remove these intergroup characteristics, they were, in fact, unwittingly adding certain elements, such as positive reward allocations and n o n acco u n tab ility, wh ich s er v e to p r om ot e discrimination. Our findings suggest that it might be fruitful to take a closer look at the MGP. Arguably, a central goal of research in intergroup relations is to understand the processes at work in negative social interactions, to understand how and why we discriminate, so that harmful real-world discrimination might be reduced. By analyzing behavior through the MGP, a technique fundamentally characterized by trivial criteria and unrealistic conditions, we may be limiting ourselves in the pursuit of this important understanding. The baseline conditions established in the early minimal group experiments may have led to a baseline understanding that may be unrealistic. By systematically moving toward more realistic groups and examining various group characteristics across studies, the knowledge we already have can be combined with new discoveries about the effects of the various components of group membership and the psychological, behavioral, and communicative effects they have both in isolation and in interaction with each other. In this way, existing theories might be refined and expanded to better predict and explain intergroup relations. The direction of research being advocated is neither meant to diminish SIT nor to discount the role of SIT and the MGP in furthering understanding and promoting research. Rather, it is suggested that the considerable energies that have been devoted to these issues be harnessed and perhaps redirected so that the ultimate aim of the field may be achieved. If studied logically and systematically, the utility and possible integration of other empirically supported perspectives such as aversive discrimination and the positive-negative asymmetry effect can lead to a better understanding of intergroup rela-

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