OVERCOMING CONTRADICTION Overcoming ...

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Retrieved May 31, 2009, from http://www.apa.org/divisions/div10/about_us.html#history. Strauss, A. (Ed.). (1964). George Herbert Mead on social psychology.
Overcoming Contradiction, p. 1 Running head: OVERCOMING CONTRADICTION

Overcoming Contradiction in the Four-Dimensional Dialectic of Action: Response to Slife and Reber

Hendrika Vande Kemp Private Practice, Annandale VA

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 2 Abstract Author argues that the implicit bias against theism is part of a larger pattern of ignoring the realm of illusion (Pruyser, 1983) and related products of culture. In response, each psychologist must develop an integrated theory that incorporates four dimensions of human experience: intrapersonal, interpersonal, impersonal, and transpersonal.

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 3 Overcoming Contradiction in the Dialectic of Action: Response to Slife and Reber In 1958, a group of Lutheran scholars published their reflections on the Christian doctrine of persons in the light of recent contributions from psychology and psychiatry (Meehl, Klann, Schmieding, Breimeier, & Schroeder-Slomann, 1958, p. vi). They commented on the common compartmentalization of faith and science: The proposed accommodation does not work. The God whom the Christian worships will not allow Himself to be shut up in a remote heaven while scientific enterprise undertakes to govern the world below. The Creator is also the Preserver and Redeemer. He has reached into the world and will continue to do so. For the Christian the contradictions between empirical evidence and the contents of his faith are constantly being overcome in the dialectic of action. (p. 35) Slife and Reber (2009) and I share this perspective, though we now speak of “Godself” and her faith as well as his. It is no wonder that, in reading this paper, I experienced a sense of déjà vu, as I’ve spent my entire career—including my student years—wrestling with the challenge of integrating psychology, theology, and philosophy in my role as a historian of the psychology of religion, historian and teacher of “integration”, practicing clinical psychologist and family therapist, and suffering human being (see Vande Kemp, 1984, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2003, 2005). Each new generation of Christians in psychology feels compelled to prove that psychology excludes or oppresses religion, the most recent effort coming from Cummings, O’Donahue, and Cummings (2009). Beit-Hallahmi (1977) advised that ?one way of measuring the impact and

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 4 importance of the psychology of religion today is by looking at the treatment given this topic in introductory psychology texts" (p. 381). Research data consistently indicate that the situation remains virtually unchanged six decades after Allport’s (1948) first textbook study, and MacLeod’s (1952) response, which focused on the responsibility of experimental psychologists ?to accept the phenomena of religion as a worthy object of scientific curiosity" (p. 5; see also Vande Kemp, 1995, 2002a). This situation exists because the core of psychological knowledge reviewed in undergraduate textbooks typically excludes the “illusionistic world,” which stands between the “autistic world” and the “realistic world” (Pruyser, 1983, p. 65). According to Pruyser, “the autistic world is a private one whose essence is difficult to convey” (p. 64). It includes dreaming, hallucination, private religious experiences, and various mental states routinely covered in later courses on personality and psychopathology. The “realistic world is a public one whose features are open to inspection and verification by all. It is the world of sensory data, of facts, of denotable entities, of events that can be registered and recorded” (p. 64) by research psychologists. The “illusionistic” world is the world of “transcendent entities that are the products of civilized man as being endowed with imagination” (p. 69). They are “neither flimsy thoughts nor tangible things” (p. 69). Psychological theories and world views are illusions, but we seldom discuss the processes of theory formation and illusion processing in psychology textbooks, despite the fact that education serves “in large part to acquire skill in illusion processing” (p. 70). Pruyser discusses illusion processing in the visual arts, literature, the sciences, religion, and music—all areas typically excluded from introductory texts, at considerable cost to society. The American Psychological Association’s (APA) division 10, a charter division

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 5 founded in the late 1940s, gave early legitimacy to the study of the illusory realm by professing interest in creativity in areas “ranging from art to music to literature to science” (The Society for the Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 2009, p. 1). Ironically it failed to include religion as a common cultural creation. Pruyser (1983) regards civilization as “a precarious achievement that needs constant nurture and a great deal of vigilance against intrusions from either the autistic or realistic side” (p. 71). Even theists confront the ongoing challenge of living out faith in the realm of illusion rather than that of pure subjective experience or the stultified objective world of rigid institutional religion and dogma, as Brunner (1943) argued so persuasively in The Divine-Human Encounter. Pruyser (1983), inspired by Huizinga’s Homo Ludens (1938/1949), first commented on this illusory element in A Dynamic Psychology of Religion (Pruyser, 1968) by noting the connection between religion and play. Both involve the participant’s “double awareness”: The player knows ”that there is a world ‘outside’ the play circle with whose mores he must be in tune in order to survive, and he knows that there is another word inside the circle to which he must be fair as long as the play lasts” (p. 190). The Christian psychologist is involved in multiple levels of play. She plays in her religious practices which move back and forth between solitary religious experience and institutionalized ritual. She plays in her chosen world of literature, drama, music, and art. She plays interpersonal and social games with families, friends, fellow parishioners, and colleagues. She plays at construcing a framework of interconnected psychological theories. She walks repeatedly into territories mapped by other disciplines and by the various sub-disciplines of psychology. She acknowledges that each psychological

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 6 theory constitutes one of many possible “terministic screens“(Burke, 1966), sets of symbols that become a kind of screen or grid of intelligibility through which the world makes sense. Burke argued that language does not simply reflect reality, but also selects and deflects reality—a point commonly acknowledged by philosophers of language, who have long argued that language shapes both thought and culture (see, for example, Chase, 1953). Ultimately she is challenged to make her own world intelligible. If her world includes God, she develops a theoretical framework complex and comprehensive enough to reflect her reality without unnecessarily deflecting or invalidating other realities. She is allowed a tremendous range of creativity in her theory-building and professional practices, as is evident in the remarkable diversity represented by APA’s many divisions. Her theories will be embraced in some psychological circles, tolerated in others, ignored in most. Intermittently she encounters, in subtle form, the bias described by Slife and Reber (2009). For example, when I submitted an article under the title “Making the History of Psychology Clinically and Theologically Relevant” (Vande Kemp, 2002b) the editors requested me to change “theologically” to “philosophically,” despite the fact that my course was taught in the context of the integration of psychology and theology at Fuller Theological Seminary. My first major effort to develop an adequate explanatory framework was in the publication of my doctoral dissertation on pre-Freudian dream theories (Vande Kemp, 1981). Dreams, which may be regarded from a naturalistic perspective as merely intrapersonal, neurobiological events possibly stimulated by impersonal external stimuli, have been found intelligible in various ways over the centuries: During the Classical period, dreams were regarded as messages from the gods

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 7 to men (in the Christian tradition, from God to men), thus assuming a transpersonal or supernatural significance. During the nineteenth century there was a strong tendency to regard them as messages from one person to another, or as mere epiphenomena of physiological processes. Thus, they took on an interpersonal or extrapersonal significance. In the twentieth century they have become messages from the person to the self, thus taking on an intrapersonal1 meaning. (Vande Kemp, 1981, p. 102) I found it useful in my classes to discuss the possibility that “truth” might mean something quite different in each of the four dimensions: the impersonal or nonpersonal, the interpersonal or extrapersonal, the intrapersonal, and the transpersonal or superpersonal.2 I discussed their clinical relevance in an account of my experience with mild traumatic brain injury (Vande Kemp, 2001). Later I discovered a similar scheme developed by the pastoral theologian Paul Johnson (1957) in Personality and Religion, the exposition of his “dynamic interpersonalism." Johnson’s theory is based on the personalistic tradition, interpersonal psychology, and dynamic psychology, and is also firmly rooted in pastoral theology. At the center is the conscious I who is "the subject of experience" (p. 233) and who "is actively participating in ... biological, physical, social, and ideal relationships at the same time" (p. 233). These “psychological dimensions arise from the basic relationships of personal life ... in which and through which [we find] the meanings and values of [our] existence” (p.235). .

The I-Me relation involves the mind (or psyche) and body.3 "The subject of all

relationships is the self we call I. As I perceive myself there is more than the subject perceiving; there is Me. The Me is what others observe, as well as what I think and

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 8 expect of myself. What others observe is my body ... and their comments help to shape the image I have of me" (p. 236). Ultimately, "the individual is not partly body and partly mind but a personality with the capacity for experience" (p. 239). The intrinsic validity of experience has been recognized by a host of psychologists in the traditions of Geisteswissenschaft, Verstehende Psychologie, and phenomenology (see, for example, Vande Kemp, 2002a ). Yet scientific psychologists ignore the “I” virtually as much as they ignore religion, and it is essentially absent from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Psychodynamic psychologists have remedied this situation with a Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (PDM Task Force, 2006). The I-It relation concerns the person in what Kurt Lewin (1936) called the “life space,” within which the person "seeks goals, meets barriers, and explores detours to overcome them" (Johnson, 1957, p. 241). We adapt to the world’s pressures and resistances, but we also restructure and remake the environment to fit our needs and serve our purposes. In a dynamic relationship the person "determines the character of [the] world and its meaning" (p. 243). Whatever the ”facts” of our physical world, we "give meaning to events" and guide our behavior towards our own goals in an exercise of intentionality. The contextual family therapists (see Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986; Vande Kemp, 1987) are sensitive to the “world” in the four-dimensional assessment that includes “objectifiable facts” referring to both “pre-existing factors” and “unavoidable existential conflicts” (pp. 47-48). In my family therapy classes at Fuller Theological Seminary students wrote contextual assessments of the biblical family in Genesis, whose context-creating “world” included a desert climate, nomadic

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 9 shepherding, tribal warfare, laws of primogeniture, intrafamilial marriages, infertility problems, and the emergence of monotheistic religion. The I-We relation concerns our life as members of groups, beginning in the family. Fritz Künkel (1931/1938) pointed out that children begin life as part of the "Primal-We" in which mother and child "form a common subject" (Johnson, 1957, p. 245) and share a unified goal. Soon, the child must "participate in other groups and exercise a variety of roles in different contexts" in order to grow beyond the original We (p. 246). For Künkel, group life is lived, not in the dialectic of "I and You, but as I and We, the individual and the group" (p. 246). The individual is aware of the self as part of something larger than itself: "the I does not stand alone in self-sufficient independence, but emerges out of the living relatedness of the We, and will need again and again to return to the group for creative awakening as well as for emotional and moral sustenance" (p. 248). This ontological primacy of relatedness is central in writers such as Buber (1958) and Brunner (1943). Minuchin & Fishman (1981) argue that the concept of the “single, unattached adult” is nonsensical: "nowhere among living organisms can one find 'unattachment,' yet it exists in our human typologies" (p. 14). The recognition that we are “persons in relation” (Macmurray, 1961/1979) remains virtually absent from the DSM-IV. In response, interpersonal psychologists who participated in the DSM-IV task force compiled the hefty Handbook of Relational Diagnosis and Dysfunctional Family Patterns (Kaslow, 1996), which provides many possible ways to think about parallels between interpersonal relationships and the relationship with God. Interpersonal reality is confirmed by what Sullivan (1953) called “consensual validation,” the process of being able “to appeal to principles which are

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 10 accepted as true by the hearer” (p. 29, n. 9), who acquires that conviction through group and interpersonal activities. The I-Thou relation with God involves the person in the search for something greater than the self. "Thou is the ultimate authority to whom I am responsible" (Johnson, 1957, p. 251). Thou is also "the Supreme Person to whom [I am] committed in worship and whole-hearted dedication" (p. 252). In meeting Thou, I confront a being beyond the self. "I meet Thou through interpersonal relationship. The response is mutual and there is a feeling of confrontation by person to person" (p. 255; see also Buber, 1958). Johnson (1957) also delineated the domains of scholars who focus on each of the four dimensions. The physical sciences and field psychology study the It. The biological sciences and psychoanalysis study the Me. The social sciences and interpersonal psychology study the We. The ideal sciences and personalistic psychology study the Thou. I’ve found Johnson’s model consensually validated by numerous other psychologists and theologians who use it implicitly if not explicitly. Guinness (1973) employed it to describe the relational nature of alienation, which is “theological, between God and man; sociological, between man and other men; psychological, between man and himself; and ecological, between man and nature” (pp. 35-36). Tillich (1952) articulated it when he described “the courage to be as a part” (p. 86, interpersonal), “the courage to be as oneself” (p. 113, intrapersonal), “the courage to accept acceptance” (p. 155, transpersonal), alongside the traditional courage of daring (impersonal). It is implicit in Pepper’s (1942/1957) world hypotheses: formism,

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 11 mechanism, contextualism, and organicism focus, respectively, on Thou, It, We, and Me. It is present in the contextual family therapist’s (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986) dimensions of existential facts (It), psychology and biology (Me), transactions and systems (We), and Relational Ethics (Thou). Even those who leave out Thou often recognize the essence of We, It, and Me as we see in Binswanger’s (1944-1945/1958) Umwelt, Eigenwelt, and Mitwelt. His model is completed by those existentialist writers who implicitly or explicity include the fourth dimension of Uberwelt (see Van DeurzenSmith, 1984). I offer as a clinical example a recent case of a middle-aged Iranian woman whose presenting complaint was the escalating verbal conflict with her 22-year-old daughter and a recent incident in which the police were called after the daughter assaulted her. The husband/father works two jobs as the family copes with the consequences of real estate investments devalued by the recent economic crisis Mother/wife suffers from asthma and other medical conditions, but works full-time as a daycare provider. Daughter was becoming increasingly inconsistent in her work and her expensive post-college training as a pastry chef. All of these are important impersonal contextualizing “facts. Daughter had been tentatively diagnosed with lupus, an autoimmune disease. For several months, I encouraged mother to press her daughter to assume adult responsibility by working and going to school, or by pursuing a definitive diagnosis which might qualify her for disability. A series of diagnostic tests led to the additional diagnosis of polymyositis, an inflammatory muscle disease which had already advanced to a stage of irreversible muscle loss and a prognosis of permanent disability. As this young woman copes with her disability, I must engage with mother and daughter

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 12 in all four dimensions of their experience. On the impersonal front, mother must recognize the family home as a disabling environment for a daughter who can barely lift her legs, and the parents will have to decide whether to modify their current house or to move to a single-story home or one equipped with an elevator or stair lift. Mother must recognize that daughter is surrounded by physical challenges. In the interpersonal realm, the daughter also confronts multiple challenges: her older sister persistently accuses her of faking it, even after medical specialists confirmed the diagnosis; the busy father wants mother to cope on her own as he struggles to accept the diagnosis; extended family is unavailable emotionally and practically. The family must interact with the social security/disability system and must persuade the school to refund tuition as a disability accommodation (see Banks, 2003). They must interface an extensive network of medical specialists. Both must cope with the disastrous results of the delay. On the intrapersonal level mother is coping with the guilt of having disqualified her daughter and disconfirmed her reality (interpersonal acts), a realization that puts the daughter’s verbal and physical aggression into a new perspective. Daughter is recovering from eight months of not being heard, during which she increasingly felt she was “going crazy.” At the transpersonal level, both are facing the problem of suffering (see Bowker, 1970), and the need for hope (Lynch, 1965). As we move comfortably from one sphere of existence to another in a healing encounter, the client and I engage in a dialectic of action undergirded by a rich psychological tradition that addresses all four essential dimensions of human existence. And in doing so, we relegate the nontheistic psychologists to the periphery of our world.

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Overcoming Contradiction, p. 18 Author Note Hendrika Vande Kemp was on the faculty of the Graduate School of Psychology at Fuller Theological Seminary for 25 years. She is now in private practice as a clinical psychologist in Annandale, VA. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Hendrika Vande Kemp, 7815 Rebel Drive, Annandale, Virginia, 220031429. E-mail: [email protected]

Overcoming Contradiction, p. 19 Notes 1.

There is an error in the published text, which substituted interpersonal for

intrapersonal. 2.

A previous draft of my discussion on the four dimensions was presented in

lectures at George Fox University (Vande Kemp, 2000). 3.

This distinction is rooted primarily in the work of George Herbert Mead (see

Strauss, 1964).