'Painful Exit' Electoral Abstention & Neoliberal Reform In Latin America

‘Painful Exit’ Electoral Abstention & Neoliberal Reform In Latin America Jeffrey J. Ryan Center for the Study of Representation Department of Political Science University of Arkansas

Prepared for delivery at the 2001 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, DC, September 6-8, 2001

1 Over the course of the last 20 years, the people of Latin America have experienced sweeping transformations of their economic and political systems. In the economic realm, the crisis of the 1980s shattered confidence in traditional statist developmental models and gave rise in the 1990s to near universal adoption of the neoliberal paradigm. In the political realm, electoral democracy expanded from a handful of states to encompass virtually the entire hemisphere. Yet there are troubling undercurrents in both these trends. While structural reforms have in many cases produced marked gains in macroeconomic growth and stability, they have also resulted in rising levels of inequality and insecurity. And though the elected civilian regimes that prevail in the region are vastly preferable to their authoritarian forebears, the promise of robust democratic participation and governmental responsiveness appears to remain unrealized in many societies. Survey after survey over the last ten years demonstrates a deep and bothersome disquietude among Latin American citizens in virtually every country. Falling confidence in traditional political institutions, lack of faith in economic justice and fear of social and economic marginalization--all of these concerns surface time and again. Perhaps the most visible manifestation of this Latin American ‘democratic malaise’ is a substantial region-wide decline in electoral participation. Given the historical conjunction between rising voter abstention and the widespread adoption of neoliberal reforms, it seems plausible to suggest a link between the two trends. The objective of this paper is to explore the relationship between neoliberalism and voter turnout declines in the region. While there is a sizeable and growing literature that seeks to explain the conditions under which governments are able to manufacture support for difficult economic reforms, virtually all of these analyses ignore the question of electoral abstention patterns.1 Though candidates are indeed winning elections despite promising to administer the ‘bitter pill’ of painful structural reform (or even

1

See, among others, Buendia 1996 (Mexico), Przeworski 1996 (Poland), Stokes 1996 (Peru), and Weyland 1998 (Venezuela).

2 winning re-election after actually introducing such reforms), the proportion of citizens actually voting has been dropping, in some cases precipitously. Why might this be the case? I would argue that the turnout decline is a consequence in part of the political changes associated with the adoption and implementation of neoliberal reforms. These changes are of two broad types. First, an effective monopolization of the developmental policy debate by the neoliberal paradigm has altered the institutional and conceptual parameters of Latin American political systems. Institutionally, this is reflected in a contraction of the sphere of decision making authority, and conceptually, in a contraction of the ‘effective’ ideological spectrum. Second, the socioeconomic consequences of the reforms have had distinct political parallels. The growing concentration of wealth, well documented in data on inequality in the region, has been mirrored by a growing concentration of political influence and access. As representative institutions (i.e., parties, legislatures) become weaker, access becomes more restricted to those with the economic resources to necessary to wield influence in the new institutional setting. Contraction in Spheres of Debate & Decision-Making: Fewer Options, Fewer People Though it is undeniable that other development paradigms have held great sway in Latin America at various historical periods (e.g., import-substitution industrialization), it could be argued that neoliberalism has permeated the hemisphere to a depth rarely, if ever, seen before. Out of conviction or necessity, political leaders who in many cases had earlier been staunch champions of statist development strategies now march to the neoliberal drummer. From one of the intellectual godfathers of the ‘dependencia’ school (Enrique Cardoso) to a Sandinista guerrillero (Daniel Ortega), there has been a seemingly endless parade of born-again market enthusiasts seeking atonement for the errors of their previous incarnations. Yet these conversions are less reflective of pure opportunism and more a function of the extent to which the new thinking has crowded out the debate. To be more than a little facetious, neoliberalism has become to development policy what Microsoft is to software.

3 In systems where high degrees of ideological diversity, even polarization, has been a defining characteristic of national politics, we see the continuum of choices offered to voters contracting to a narrow band. In Argentina, where elections pitting Peronists and their opponents once took on the hue of life-or-death political battles, the electoral arena today is positively placid by comparison. Levitsky’s insightful research on the adaptation of Peronism to the neoliberal ‘realities’ of the 1990s describes the new system as somewhat paradoxical. He argues that though the symbolism and even the class basis of political competition in Argentina has endured, “by the mid-1990s, all the great parties had accepted the essential characteristics of the neoliberal model.” (Levitsky 6) While some observers claim that the end of ‘polarized politics’ is a healthy boost to democratic governance2, Canitrot and Sigal suggest that “depolarization of the political system deprived the parties of much of their role as builders of collective identities and cultural loyalties… [and] … undermines the public’s confidence in the ability of political parties to represent the various interests.” (Canitrot & Sigal 138-9) Thus, the ultimate consequence of consensus, it appears, is not harmony, but ennui. The emergence of the same pattern in countries where less than a decade ago, life-or-death political battles were fought in the streets instead of the ballot box is even more remarkable. In Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, hundreds of thousands of lives were lost over efforts to broaden the ideological spectrum. When the armed forces of left and right finally came to terms and settled on democratic forms and processes, most observers expected the emergent party systems to be broadly representative of all ideological interests. Yet within a few short years, the scope of policy debate has sharply narrowed. One observer, for example, asserts that “the forces of the left in Central America appear adrift . . . and incapable of presenting alternatives to the neoliberal politics that reign.

2

See Mainwaring & Scully. Norden argues that while highly polarized, ‘combative’ party systems can produce democratic instability, so too can ‘collusive’ party systems. She suggests that such systems undermine democracy by, ‘limiting (at times explicitly) the kinds of policies the government may pursue.’ (Norden 433) While her analysis is focused on the more formalized collusion which takes place in ‘pacted’ democracies, the same logic applies to systems in which the effective collapse of the ideological spectrum as a result of neoliberal ‘consensus’ has occurred.

4 Lacking an anchor, they have been dragged down by the traditional political system and become simply one more of the pile.” (Ramirez) The changes in orientation are most dramatic among both traditional and emergent parties whose leftist outlook is furthest from the neoliberal pole. For these parties, according to Coppedge, “implementing stabilization and structural adjustment meant reversing many of the policies they had championed for years.” Political and economic realities “presented them with a Faustian bargain: surrender your soul and you can live forever; otherwise, you will die.” (7) The perception across the ideological spectrum that resisting the neoliberal monolith is akin to economic, if not political, hara-kiri has created an intellectual and ideological vacuum at the heart of political life in Latin America. Colburn quotes a Venezuelan member of Congress as saying, “There is no debate because there are no alternatives.” (Colburn 36) The increasingly wholesale adoption of neoliberal economic policy proscriptions was accompanied by an implicit political proscription as well. In order to carry out the admittedly difficult and painful economic reforms called for by the model, policy decision making would have to be ‘insulated’ from popular demands. In concrete terms, this meant concentrating decision making authority in the hands of those with the will (i.e., executives) and ability (i.e., technocrats) to administer the bitter medicine of structural reform. The result, of course, was the well-documented rise of what O’Donnell calls ‘delegative democracy’ or what others have labeled ‘decretismo.’ According to O’Donnell, these systems, “rest on the premise that whoever wins the [presidency] is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office….Typically, winning presidential candidates in delegative democracies present themselves as above both political parties and organized interests. How could it be otherwise for somebody who claims to embody the whole of the nation? In this view, other institutions—courts and legislatures, for instance—are nuisances that come attached [to the office].” (O’Donnell 59-60)

5 Powerful executives are not the only source of the continued diminution of legislative power. Cerdas notes that the “increasing importance of economic czars, central banks and finance and international commerce ministries . . . have left parliaments with little or nothing to say.” (23) As legislatures, voluntarily or involuntarily, cede more and more of their authority over key policy decisions to other actors, it sets in motion,

…a vicious circle with pernicious consequences for democracy. Presidents demand more power to govern on the pretext that parties and legislatures are weak institutions, but this accumulation of power, rather than resolving the problem, further aggravates it, weakening the key instruments society has for enforcing accountability, further distancing citizens from the public interest, and deteriorating democratic life. (Lasagna & Cardenal 132) As Lasagna and Cardenal indicate, it has been political parties and their principal institutional venue, legislatures, that have borne the brunt of the damage arising from this ‘vicious circle.’ Throughout the hemisphere, analysts have identified a systemic ‘crisis of representation’ in which parties have increasingly proved incapable of fulfilling their traditional role as mediating institutions. As Garretón notes, “the very idea of the political party is in crisis everywhere as the concept of representation…is being redefined.’ (73) Instead of serving as mechanisms for aggregating societal interests and generating alternative programs for national development, parties now are often perceived at best to be irrelevant in devising solutions to national problems, and at worst nothing more than vehicles of self-aggrandizement. Alarmingly, this trend appears to be endemic to the region, crippling both venerable ‘partidocracias’ (in places like Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Colombia) and freshly minted party systems (in places like El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua) alike. The survival of parties with long histories and deep roots in their respective societies is in serious question, as is that of newer parties whose births were hailed as signal events in the democratization of their nations. Table 1 provides an illustrative snapshot of some of these ‘fallen parties.’

6 The losses in some cases are staggering. In the span of only a decade, AD and COPEI went from winning a collective 93% of the presidential vote to only slightly more than 11%. In twenty years, the AP and APRA went from a combined total of roughly three quarters of the presidential and two thirds of the legislative vote to under 2% and 8% respectively. The two Christian Democratic parties who were at the forefront of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan transitions to democracy are perilously close to extinction.

Table 1: Fallen Parties

67,207 87,074

% of Vote 5.5 7.2

Absolute Loss 482,520 418,264

Pr 1999 Leg 1999

0 86,839

0 4.1

648,681 331,011

38.6 30.4

27.4 27.6 45.2 40.9

Pr 2000 Leg 2000 Pr 2000 Leg 2000

150547 537431 45,192 237,962

1.3 5.5 0.4 2.4

936,641 606,772 1,747,998 1,456,990

26.1 22.1 44.8 38.5

52.8 40.3 45.7 32.9

Pr 2000 Pr 2000 Leg 1998 Leg 1998

591,415 140,837 1,185,683 591,639

9.0 2.1 20.5 10.2

3,277,428 2,814,224 1,938,107 1,655,597

43.8 38.2 25.2 22.7

Election

Total Vote

43.4 52.3

Pr 1999 Leg 2000

648,681 417,850

38.6 34.5

Pr 1980 Leg 1980 Pr 1980 Leg 1980

1,087,188 1,144,203 1,793,190 1,694,952

Pr 1988 Pr 1988 Leg 1988 Leg 1988

3,868,843 2,955,061 3,123,790 2,247,236

Country

Party

Election

Total Vote % of Vote

El Salvador

PDC PDC

Pr 1984 Leg 1985

549,727 505,338

Guatemala

DCG DCG

Pr 1985 Leg 1985

Peru

APRA APRA AP AP

Venezuela

AD COPEI AD COPEI

Loss in % 37.9 45.1

Election: Pr=Presidential, Leg=Legislative Parties: PDC-Partido Demócrata Cristiano, DCG-Democrácia Cristiana Guatemalteca, APRA-Partido Aprista Peruano, AP-Acción Popular, AD-Acción Democrática, COPEI-Partido Social-Cristiano

Though the roots of this crisis are complex and varied, there is no question that, at least in a temporal sense, it has coincided with the advent of the neoliberal era in the hemisphere. A number of scholars have argued that Latin American parties are in such dire straits in large measure because the very concept of democracy is undergoing a wholesale redefinition, one which may render political parties essentially irrelevant in the traditional sense. As citizens grapple with the enormous changes, stresses, and challenges that have resulted from structural reform, parties are reduced to fighting over marginal variations on the neoliberal theme.

7 The result is a widespread perception among the public that both parties and their principal venue, legislatures, are becoming less and less powerful relative to other public and even private actors. (See Table 2)

Table 2: Perceptions of Power 1996

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Avg

Government Legislature 59 8 74 30 48 40 59 16 54 26 53 17 56 25 53 13 47 14 58 12 80 10 36 17 63 8 36 10 69 20 57 14 55 32 56.3 18.4

Govt. Minus Legis. 51 44 8 43 28 36 31 40 33 46 70 19 55 26 49 43 23 37.9

Big Business 60 53 45 56 39 56 56 50 58 57 29 46 63 57 35 51 54 50.9

Political Parties 18 37 23 36 30 19 28 20 15 29 34 26 18 14 9 27 42 25.0

Big Bus. Minus Party 42 16 22 20 9 37 28 30 43 28 -5 20 45 43 26 24 12 25.9

Question: “Who do you think has more power?” Multiple responses permitted. ‘Government’ (‘gobierno’) refers to executive/bureaucracy, Big Business (‘grandes empresas’) to large domestic enterprises. Source: Latinobarómetro 1996.

It is not surprising that as people have come to view parties and legislatures as weak and ineffective, their level of confidence in these institutions has sagged accordingly. For well over a decade, the public image of Latin American parties has deteriorated. Polls taken in 1993 and 1997 (see Table 3) indicate that in no country where data are available have political party confidence levels risen above 28%. Moreover, in every country except Bolivia and Peru, confidence fell from already low levels in 1993 to even lower levels in 1997. Earlier data confirm the downward trend. In 1988, for example, Colombian parties were ranked last among eight national institutions in terms of ‘quality,’ with only 15% of the public rating them as ‘good.’ By contrast, the media, Roman

8 Catholic church, and Armed Forces were rated ‘good’ by 45% or better of the sample. (Archer 195) Equally dim views of parties were reported in the 1980s and early 1990s in Mexico (Craig & Cornelius 262), Brazil (Mainwaring 386), Peru (Cotler 337-9), Costa Rica and Honduras. (Rovira 23) In Argentina, party approval levels dropped from 84% in 1984 to 68% in 1988 to 17% in 1996. (McGuire 223, Latinobarómetro)

Table 3: Confidence in Parties & Legislatures 1993-97 Political Parties Difference National Legislature Difference 1993-97 1993-97 1993 1997 1993 1997 Bolivia 15 17 2 28 20 -8 Brazil 22 10 -12 37 12 -25 Chile 12 11 -1 54 35 -19 Colombia 12 10 -2 26 23 -3 Ecuador 12 6 -6 21 15 -6 El Salvador 23 8 -15 32 28 -4 Guatemala 7 11 4 16 22 6 Mexico 24 9 -15 29 19 -10 Peru 16 18 2 40 32 -8 Uruguay 28 25 -3 53 30 -23 Venezuela 7 5 -2 23 9 -14 Avg. 16.2 11.8 -4.4 32.6 22.3 -10.4 Country

SOURCES: Segundo Barómetro de Opinión Iberoamericana, 1993; Latinobarómetro, 1996; CIMA Y CAMBIO, 1997, cited in Lasagna & Cardenal, 1998.

This lack of trust, furthermore, is not generalized across other social institutions. In 1997, the average confidence levels for the church (59.7%), media (51.1%), business (52.6%), banks (54.8%), NGOs (41.3%) and even unions (21.3%) far surpassed those of political parties (11.8%). (Lasagna & Cardenal) While legislative confidence levels were higher than those of parties, they too dropped between 1993 and 1997 everywhere except in Guatemala. Perhaps the most telling indication of lagging trust in political parties came in responses to a 1995 poll question as to whether or not democracy can exist or function without political parties. (See Table 4)

9 Table 4: Democracy Without Parties ARGENTINA BRASIL CHILE MEXICO PARAGUAY PERU URUGUAY VENEZUELA

Cannot Function 79.9% 52.9% 63.2% 56.7% 68.2% 59.1% 83.7% 59.8%

Can Function 20.1% 47.1% 36.8% 43.3% 31.8% 40.9% 16.3% 40.2%

Question: “Can democracy function without political parties?” Source: Latinobarómetro 1995.

This disillusionment, lack of confidence and pessimism, furthermore, is not distributed equally within societies. Perhaps unsurprisingly, on many if not all measures of ‘democratic disenchantment’, those on the left of the political spectrum are consistently less sanguine about neoliberal democracy than their counterparts on the right. (See Tables 5 & 6) Table 5: Ideology & Disillusionment Ideological Self-Placement WOULD YOU SAY THE COUNTRY IS: Progressing At a standstill Declining WHAT IS THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY? Very Good Good About average Bad Very Bad IF GOVERNMENT HAD TO CHOOSE, WHICH IS BEST? Reduce Inflation Reduce Unemployment DOES DEMOCRACY SOLVE COUNTRY’S PROBLEMS? Solves Problems Does Not Solve Problems ALL PARTIES/GROUPS HAVE EQUAL CHANCE TO GET ON TV All have equal opportunity All do not have equal opportunity THE WAY ONE VOTES CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE Can make a difference Cannot make a difference LEGISLATORS ARE CONCERNED WITH HOW PEOPLE THINK Concerned Don’t Care

Left

Center

Right

32.1% 46.3% 21.6%

44.8% 39.9% 15.3%

45.7% 39.0% 15.4%

1.7% 13.3% 38.6% 31.4% 15.0%

2.3% 19.1% 43.4% 24.7% 10.5%

1.9% 21.6% 41.1% 24.8% 10.7%

43.0% 57.0%

43.8% 56.2%

50.7% 49.3%

54.7% 45.3%

59.8% 40.2%

60.7% 39.3%

33.6% 66.4%

44.0% 56.0%

46.9% 53.1%

63.9% 36.1%

65.1% 34.9%

67.2% 32.8%

23.7% 76.3%

23.9% 76.1%

27.0% 73.0%

Table 6: Ideology & Confidence in Institutions Left

Center

Right

CONFIDENCE IN CONGRESS A lot Some A little No confidence

6.8% 29.0% 37.4% 26.8%

6.6% 31.3% 37.4% 24.7%

12.5% 28.8% 34.6% 24.0%

CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL PARTIES A lot

5.3%

3.6%

7.5%

10 Some A little No confidence

23.1% 36.4% 35.2%

22.5% 37.3% 36.6%

23.2% 34.0% 35.3%

CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT A lot Some A little No confidence Source: Latinobarómetro 1995

9.4% 27.3% 30.9% 32.4%

12.1% 34.5% 31.4% 22.0%

20.6% 29.7% 29.2% 20.5%

Voting under these conditions, particularly for those who are disillusioned with the neoliberal model, can in many ways be seen as a largely futile endeavor. People are essentially being asked to choose from among a slate of individuals who will have little say in policy decisions and among platforms which, even if they are carried out, will primarily respond to pressures from the ‘market’ and international lenders, not popular will. Even with compulsory voting laws, this is hardly a recipe for motivating the citizenry to cast ballots on election day. The negative impact on turnout associated with a narrowing of the debate and a contraction of policy making authority have only been aggravated by the social consequences of the reforms. Neoliberalism & the Social Structure One of the direct, even expected, consequences of the structural reform policies is the ‘shortterm pain’ of social dislocation. Privatization, the paring of the state, deregulation and the opening up protected domestic markets may be essential to long-term development, but the short-term effects on societies and individuals are undeniably grim. The result has been a sharp widening of the gap between rich and poor in Latin America, which even before the crisis had the most inequitable distribution of wealth of any region in the world. Kliksberg reports that in 1980, the wealthiest 1% of the population in Latin America earned 237 times more than the poorest 1%. In 1995 this gap had jumped to 417 times. (Kliksberg 3) Other data confirm the widening gap between the rich and poor. Figure 1 presents the

11 inequality trend line from 1980-1995 utilizing the Theil Index, with higher figures indicating higher levels of inequality. 3 Figure 1: Average Annual Theil Scores for Latin American Countries, 1980-1995 0.12

0.1

0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02

0 1980

1985

1990

1995

Source: Author’s calculations based on ‘World Theils 2000 Update’ data set from the University of Texas Inequality Project website. (http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/)

In absolute terms as well, neoliberal reforms have resulted in a striking rise in the number of Latin Americans living below the poverty line. Between 1980 and 1995, the total number of people living on less than one dollar per day rose from 36 million to 74.5 million. In percentage terms, there was a 55% increase in extreme poverty and a 20% increase in total poverty during that period. (See Table 7) Table 7: Average Poverty in Latin America, 1980-95 (% of population)

1980 1995 Change

Total Poverty ($2/day/person in 1985 dollars) 27.5 33.1 20.4%

Extreme Poverty ($1/day/person in 1985 dollars) 10.5 16.2 54.3%

Source: Londoño & Székely.

In addition to rising numbers of the ‘traditional poor’, several observers have documented a pattern of impoverishment stretching into some segments of the middle class, creating a sector that has 3

Though distinct from the more well-known Gini Coefficient Inequality measure, the Theil Index allows for broad comparisons of changes in inequality over time While the Theil Index technically only measures income inequality across industrial wage classifications, it has been persuasively demonstrated to serve as a surrogate for general household income inequality in terms of time-series data. See, Conceição and Galbraith

12 been labeled the ‘new poor.’ Large segments of a once secure middle class, including small businessmen, mid-level public employees, and retirees have become part of an expanding “new poor” sector. Minujin has estimated that in Argentina, the size of this group more than quadrupled in only a decade, from 4.2% in 1980 to 18.4% in 1990. (Minujin 163) For every income bracket except the top 20%, the gains in income share made during the 1970s were all but wiped out in the economic crisis of the 1980s. As neoliberalism took hold in the 1990s, only the wealthiest quintile saw their share increase over 1980 levels. Between 1980 and 1995, the three biggest losers in terms of income share were the lower (-17%), lower middle (–8%) and upper middle (-5%) classes. (See Table 11)

Table 11: Changes in Income Distribution 1970-1995

Quintile (lowest) I II III IV (highest) V

1970 2.7 6.0 10.4 18.6 62.2

Share of Income 1980 1990 3.0 2.7 6.6 6.1 11.1 10.6 20.1 18.3 59.2 62.2

1995 2.5 6.1 11.0 19.1 61.3

% Change in Share 1970-80 1980-95 11% -17% 10% -8% 7% -1% 8% -5% -5% 4%

Source: Author’s calculations based on Londoño & Székely.

The economic marginalization of increasingly large proportions of the population has profound implications for the democratic process in Latin America. It is occurring in conjunction with the other tendencies outlined above, particularly the accretion of power by the executive at the expense of other institutions such as parties and legislatures, as Vilas has noted:

… ‘delegative’ regimes afford the institutional setting to advance policies and decisionmaking which in the past were insulated from middle- and low-income groups through overt authoritarianism or dictatorship….Yet, delegative ‘insulation’ is uneven and works in a different fashion and to a different extent with regard to different actors. Shrinking parliamentary and political party involvement in policy-making affects the average citizen much more than it does those who are high above the average, namely, the most strategic actors of neoliberal economics. Lobbying, ‘media politics’, or bribery,

13 strategies not available to every actor in the political system, substitute for open party competition. (Vilas, 1997, pp. 28-9) It seems clear that any improvement in macroeconomic performance resulting from neoliberal reforms “has been bought,” according to an Inter-American Development Bank economist, “at a very high social price.” (Everingham 1) As Rial and Zovatto conclude, the dislocations of neoliberalism have resulted in the “deterioration of social capital, community confidence, . . . exclusion and social marginality” throughout Latin America. (xviii) The literature on popular support for neoliberal measures seems to suggest that the most citizens, while recognizing rising levels of inequality, accept the trend as simply a natural by-product of reform. Those making this case point to the strong tendency for Latin American voters to support candidates who advocate the ‘bitter pill’ of structural adjustment, suggesting that these voters accept the widening inequality as both necessary and legitimate. The 1995 Latinobarómetro results paint a much different picture. Far from seeing inequality as a tolerable price to be paid in return for the benefits of structural reform, Latin Americans overwhelmingly see the maldistribution that prevails in their societies as patently unjust. (See Table 8)

Table 8: Legitimacy of Inequality Just Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Average

9 7 7 7 6 13 8 13 8

Neither Just/Unjust 19 11 30 13 11 29 18 13 18

Unjust 66 78 61 78 76 48 66 66 67

Question : “What do you think of the distribution of wealth in your country ? Is it just, neither just nor unjust, or unjust?” Source: Latinobarómetro 1995

Other region-wide polls have revealed the profound lack of confidence in the ability of the neoliberal agenda, and by extension, the state, to foster equitable national development. Surveys in 1996 found that Latin Americans overwhelmingly believe the current economic system is tilted heavily

14 in favor of the wealthy, and that it is incumbent on the state to reduce the inequality gap in their societies. (See Table 9) Table 9: Inequality & Government Responsibility The Current Economic System In Our Country Offers More Opportunities To Whom? Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Average

The Rich 81 76 88 79 80 85 71 76 81 83 74 73 85 84 66 78 75 78.5

Should Government Reduce Differences Between Rich & Poor?

Everyone 11 19 7 16 15 8 15 15 11 8 20 15 9 12 20 15 14 13.5

Yes 84 88 88 89 89 87 92 82 84 93 84 89 92 81 88 86 85 87.1

No 14 10 12 10 10 10 7 9 9 4 16 6 5 16 9 10 12 9.9

Source: Latinobarómetro 1996

If it is true that ‘the lack of citizen participation [in political activities] is linked to conditions of social and economic marginalization,’ (Cruz 28), it is probable that deepening marginalization among working sectors and the extension of marginalized status to the middle class will lead to even less participation in activities such as voting. We turn now to a discussion of how this discontent has translated into a rising tide of ‘abstencionismo’ in the region. Rising Abstention The first task, of course, is to demonstrate that turnout has in fact been declining in Latin America. It goes without saying that anyone using electoral data from developing nations must be careful in their conclusions. Nonetheless, data from a wide array of sources, including the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos

15 (IIDH), the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and officially published results from individual countries indicate quite clearly that electoral turnout in Latin America has dropped in the last 10 years. (Table 10) Table 10: Average Turnout in Latin American Elections (1970-99) a Presidential Elections (%)

Legislative Elections (%)

1970-79 (10 elections) = 75.0 1970-79 (8 elections) = 75.16 1980-89 (26 elections) = 76.5 1980-89 (31 elections) = 76.8 1990-00 (41 elections) = 71.0 1990-00 (54 elections) = 66.0 a Countries include all Spanish-speaking nations of Central and South America, plus Brazil and the Dominican Republic. (Does not include Mexico) Source: See Appendix.

There is, of course, a great deal of country-by-country variation in turnout trends masked by these aggregate figures. Nonetheless, most countries have seen turnout declines in presidential and/or legislative elections. In some locations, these declines have followed a clear pattern, while in others, no obvious trend upward or downward can be established. As Table 11 indicates, turnout has declined (between the first and most recent polls) in both presidential and legislative elections in 14 of 17 nations. In only two countries (Paraguay & Uruguay) did turnout rise in presidential elections over time, and legislative turnout rose in only three nations (Honduras, Paraguay & Uruguay). The declines, moreover, are in some cases startling in both scope and speed: in legislative contests, there was a 31% drop in 12 years in El Salvador; a 27% drop in 10 years in Venezuela; and a 20% drop in only 2 years in Ecuador. Table 11: Turnout Differences between First & Last Presidential and Legislative Elections 1970-2000 (Percentages)

Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dom. Republic Ecuador

Legislative Presidential First Election Last Election Difference First Election Last Election Difference (year) (year) (year) (year) 83.3 (83) 77.3 (99) -6.0 83.3 (83) 77.3 (99) -5.7 82.0 (85) 71.4 (97) -9.6 82.0 (85) 71.4 (97) -10.6 88.1 (89) 78.5 (98) -9.6 84.6 (90) 78.5 (98) -6.1 94.7 (89) 87.2 (99) -7.5 94.7 (89) 82.5 (97) -12.2 58.1 (74) 50.9 (98) -7.2 57.1 (74) 45.0 (98) -12.1 83.3 (70) 70.0 (98) -13.3 83.3 (70) 70.0 (98) -13.3 75.7 (74) 75.1 (00) -0.6 69.5 (86) 50.6 (98) -18.9 80.4 (79) 71.0 (98) -9.4 80.3 (79) 47.3 (98) -33.0

16 El Salvador 79.0 (84) Guatemala 65.0 (85) Honduras 78.0 (81) Nicaragua 86.2 (90) Panama 73.7 (94) Paraguay 69.0 (93) Peru 81.8 (80) Uruguay 85.8 (84) Venezuela 96.5 (73) Source: See Appendix.

37.3 (99) 49.1 (99) 69.6 (97) 76.4 (96) 72.9 (99) 80.5 (98) 78.1 (00) 92.6 (99) 56.5 (00)

-41.7 -15.9 -8.4 -9.8 -0.8 11.5 -3.7 6.8 -40.0

67.7 (88) 69.3 (85) 67.5 (81) 81.0 (90) 73.7 (94) 66.2 (93) 80.4 (80) 87.9 (84) 96.5 (73)

36.2 (00) 49.1 (99) 73.7 (97) 77.1 (96) 71.6 (99) 80.5 (98) 67.9 (00) 92.6 (99) 54.8 (98)

-31.5 -20.2 6.2 -3.9 -2.1 14.3 -12.5 4.7 -41.7

Obviously there are idiosyncratic factors at play which might account for low turnout in any given election. Yet statistically speaking, there is a significant regionwide difference between turnout in a country’s first democratic election and its most recent one. (See Table 12) Table 12: Difference of Means Test for Turnout Change Mean

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Pair 1 First Leg Election Turnout - 12.8250 Last Leg Election Turnout

3.028

15

.008

Pair 2 First Pres Election Turnout Last Pres Election Turnout

2.341

15

.033

8.8375

Sources: See Appendix

One possible explanation for the downward trend is a ‘natural decline’ in turnout following the ‘founding’ elections in a given country. The problem with testing such an explanation as a rival hypothesis to the impact of neoliberalism, however, is that in the majority of Latin American cases the two phenomena (democratic founding and neoliberal reform) occurred nearly contemporaneously. In fact, if we compare turnout change across successive elections in the two longest uninterrupted democratic systems, Costa Rica and Venezuela, with those of the more recently established democracies (either inaugurated or restored), it suggests that the ‘natural decline’ explanation is weak at best. In those two countries, there was a very slight drop in turnout between the first and second elections (-1% in Venezuela, -2.5% in Costa Rica), and substantial gains between the second and third elections (+4.5% in Venezuela, +16.5% in Costa Rica). This contrasts with the average drop of more than 8.5% among the recently democratized countries which saw turnout fall between the founding and

17 second election. (In approximately one fourth of the cases, turnout rose.) Furthermore, while turnout more or less stabilized in the two older democracies, varying little for many years, many of the newer democracies have continued to experience drop-offs. (See Table 13) Table 13: Differences in Turnout Across Successive Elections Presidential Elections (Differences)

Avg Gain/Loss (%) First to Second -4.67 Second to Third -2.87 Third to Fourth -2.44 Legislative Elections (Differences) First to Second Second to Third Third to Fourth

-4.26 -3.09 -2.41

Count 15 12 10

Loss Count 11 9 7

Median -4.2 -3.85 -4.3

15 12 10

11 7 5

-3.7 -2.7 -0.05

% of Countries Avg Among Losing Losers 73% -8.97 75% -5.76 70%

73% 58% 50%

-8.69 -7.27

Sources: See Appendix

Are these declines, then, associated with neoliberal reforms? Using a set of indices constructed to measure the scope of structural reform over time in individual Latin American countries, we can at least begin to explore this hypothetical linkage. Morley, Machado and Pettinato have constructed a measure which assigns a score between zero and one along five separate structural reform dimensions, with higher scores indicating greater reform. Using these indices, they built a time series dataset measuring reform in 17 Latin American countries from 1970-1995. I ran a series of regression models in which these indices were used as independent variables to predict various measures of turnout in the region. What follows is a discussion of these models. 4

4

The five measures are: Trade Reform (average level and dispersion of tariffs), Domestic Financial Reform (control of borrowing and lending rates at banks and reserves to deposits ratio), International Financial Liberalization (sectoral control of foreign investment, limits on profit and interest repatriation, controls on external credits by national borrowers and capital outflows), Tax Reform (maximum marginal tax rate on corporate incomes and personal incomes, the value added tax rate and the efficiency of the value-added tax), and Privatization (one minus the ratio of value-added in state owned enterprises to non-agricultural GDP). (Morley, Machado & Pettinato, pp. 8-10) There is some disconnect between the electoral dataset I have compiled and their data. Their data includes two countries that I do not (Jamaica and Mexico), and does not cover one that I have used up to this point for largely illustrative purposes, Nicaragua. I have not included Jamaica because it falls outside the ‘traditional’ definition of Latin America, and have excluded Mexico because of serious questions regarding the validity of electoral statistics.

18 I first ran a series of models using all five of the indices in two forms, the most recent actual score (1995), and the change in each from its value at the time of the country’s first election and the 1995 value, as independent variables. The four dependent variables were: actual turnout in the most recent presidential and legislation elections and the difference in turnout between the country’s first and most recent presidential and legislative elections. The majority of these models proved to have little explanatory power, but this is not surprising given that there is little theoretical reason to expect several of the reform measures to be related to turnout. By contrast, models using the two measures which can be theoretically linked to turnout decline (tax reform and privatization) produce the most robust results. The weaker relationships are those between changes in the tax and privatization scores and changes in presidential and legislative turnout. Considerably stronger models emerge when the dependent variables are the most recent turnout in both types of elections. Change in the level of tax and privatization reforms accounts for roughly 70% of the variance across countries in legislative turnout and 62% in presidential turnout. (See Table 14) Curiously, though the tax variable moves in an intuitive direction (i.e., the higher the shift toward regressive tax systems, the lower the turnout), the privatization variable moves in what appears to be a counterintuitive direction.5 Table 14: Models of Reform and Turnout Dependent Variable: Difference First v. Last Legislative Turnout (Model 1)

(Constant) DIFTAX DIFPRIV Adj R2

5

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

-.865 -60.515 13.085

-.614 .097

.322

t

Sig.

-.142 -2.686 .423

.889 .020 .680

Dependent Variable: Difference First v. Last Presidential Turnout (Model 2) Unstandardized Standardized Coefficients Coefficients .593 -50.709 15.219

-.520 .114

t

Sig.

.091 -2.097 .458

.929 .058 .655

.202

Though the privatization variable is significant at the .05 level for the models using the most recent turnout rates (Models 3 & 4), the amount of variation it accounts for is relatively minor. Running the same models with only the DIFTAX variable produces an adjusted R2 of .575 (Model 3) and .495 (Model 4) respectively.

19 Dependent Variable: Last Legislative Turnout (Model 3)

(Constant) DIFTAX DIFPRIV Adj R2

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

77.755 -77.641 63.219

-.670 .397

.701

t

Sig.

16.651 -4.479 2.655

.000 .001 .021

Dependent Variable: Last Presidential Turnout (Model 4) Unstandardized Standardized Coefficients Coefficients 79.945 -60.882 53.845

-.620 .399

t

Sig.

17.754 -3.643 2.345

.000 .003 .037

.625

Part of this is likely due to the nature of the privatization variable itself, which probably masks a great deal more variation across cases than does the tax variable. For example, the privatization scores for two types of countries in particular are likely to be somewhat misleading: those in which the state has never played a significant role in the economy and the oil-producing countries. For the former, the change score will be low because there was little or nothing to privatize in the first place. For the latter, low change scores may result from the fact that the index, to some extent, penalizes states that retain ownership of profitable industries. Thus, a country which privatizes a sizable number of its unprofitable assets will not see much change in its score, since the value-added by such assets (relative to both GDP and the non-agricultural sector) was likely minimal to begin with. Profitable (even if inefficient and poorly run) industries like oil will, by contrast, deflate a country’s score, particularly when prices are high. This is relevant for our analysis when we consider that of the six countries registering both the biggest declines and lowest absolute values for legislative turnout, five fall into either the former (El Salvador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic) or latter (Venezuela, Ecuador) categories. It does seem apparent, though, that the more substantial the shift toward a tax system which is regressive, the lower the turnout in recent elections. Also, in line with the arguments put forth earlier, the impact is greater in elections for the more broadly representative institution, the legislature, than it is in executive contests. Again, it appears that what is most important in depressing turnout is not necessarily the absolute regressiveness of the tax system, but the speed and depth of movement from a

20 less to more regressive scheme. In the countries ranking among the highest in legislative abstention rates, the tax score has more than doubled (Dominican Republic), tripled (El Salvador) or even quadrupled (Venezuela) in only four years between 1991-1995. Discussion and Conclusion These results, though interesting, can hardly be considered conclusive. Obviously the data presented here should be seen as a first pass at exploring an undoubtedly complex and multilayered set of relationships. Yet if there is indeed a connection between the adoption of neoliberal reforms and rising electoral abstention, two additional questions arise. First, echoing Hirschman, why exit instead of voice? One explanation, of course, is that people are not voting because they are satisfied with the status quo and see little reason for changing it. Those making this argument might point to a number of careful and innovative studies recently which demonstrate that Latin Americans do seem to support neoliberal reform packages. Yet most of this research, when it looks at voting at all, focuses on the relative support garnered by candidates who are proposing or have already implemented such packages, they do not look at an alternative expression of popular will: abstention. Furthermore, it seems hard to reconcile such an argument with the grim outlook so thoroughly documented in survey after survey throughout the region. Simply put, it should be evident to anyone looking at the data that most citizens in the region are anything but, ‘contented cows.’ Yet if people are, in fact, disheartened, distrustful and disillusioned about their political leaders and institutions, why aren’t they pressing for change instead of simply abstaining? I have argued here that it is because, in effect, they see such leaders and institutions as unwilling or incapable of effecting change. Even the emergence of viable (politically, if not necessarily economically) options to the neoliberal agenda in the form of leftist populists, such as Chavez in Venezuela, or parties, such as the FMLN in El Salvador, has not stemmed the rising tide of abstention in those countries. Much public opinion research would be needed to conclusively

21 demonstrate this, but it seems plausible in light of anecdotal evidence to suggest that people may not necessarily be so much supportive of the neoliberal paradigm as they are resigned to it. A second question relates to the possibility that as structural reform moves in the so-called ‘second generation’ the drop-offs in turnout rates will stabilize or even reverse. Like the previous question, this must remain for the time being unanswered. Unfortunately, there doesn’t seem much cause for optimism based on regional electoral experience to date. It appears that once the bleeding starts, so to speak, it is virtually impossible to stop. I can not find a single instance in the 77 presidential and 77 legislative elections in Latin America in the past 30 years in which a country which has seen turnout drop by 5% or more has ever recovered to previous levels. This suggests that even if the second generation reforms have a ‘kinder, gentler’ face than their first generation forebears, repairing the damage done to the democratic fabric of Latin America will prove considerably more difficult than tearing it was in the first place.

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25 APPENDIX Comprehensive and reliable statistics on Latin American electoral turnout are fairly difficult to obtain. I have consulted a number of sources in an effort to cross-check reported data, but this is not always possible. The primary sources I have utilized are of two types: compilations of electoral statistics and official source statistics. In cases of conflict, I have relied on official source statistics where available. The compilation sources include: Institute for Democracy & Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1998: A Global Report on Political Participation. http://www.idea.int/voter_turnout/index.html Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH) (1995) Partidos y Clase Política en America Latina en los 90. San José, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH) (1998) Elecciones y Democracia en America Latina, 1992-1996: Urnas y Desencanto Político. San José, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) Election Guide. http://www.ifes.org/eguide/elecguide.htm Official sources include the results published by the respective electoral tribunals of each country. The following is a list of known web sites for these tribunals: Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Venezuela

Cámara Nacional Electoral Corte Nacional Electoral Tribunal Superior Eleitoral Ministerio del Interior Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones Junta Central Electoral Tribunal Supremo Electoral Tribunal Supremo Electoral Tribunal Supremo Electoral Instituto Federal Electoral Consejo Supremo Electoral Tribunal Electoral de Panamá Tribunal Superior de Justicia Electoral Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales Consejo Nacional Electoral

http://www.pjn.gov.ar/cne/ http://www.bolivian.com/cne/ http://www.tse.gov.br/ http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/ http://www.registraduria.gov.co/ http://www.tse.go.cr/ http://www.jce.do/jce/ http://tse.satnet.net/tse http://www.tse.gob.sv/ http://www.tse.org.gt/ http://www.ife.org.mx/ http://www.cse.gob.ni/ http://www.tribunal-electoral.gob.pa/ http://www.tsje.org.py/ http://www.onpe.gob.pe/ http://www.cne.gov.ve/

Turnout percentages were calculated, where possible, by using valid votes cast as percentage of registered voters. The categorization of the ‘first’ election for each country was based on a judgment as to when the current iteration of democratic governance began. There are, of course, differences of opinion in terms of dating the founding elections of a country. I sought again to consult multiple sources to make our determinations for each case. Latinobarómetro polling data were obtained from the Corporación website (http://latinobarometro.cl/), the Latinobarómetro 1995 dataset, and from results reported in other published sources.