Allen W. Barton Robert C. Bishop
University of Georgia Wheaton College∗
Paradigms, Processes, and Values in Family Research
In research on the family, considerable amounts of scholarship have occurred with respect to central domains of theory, methodology, and substantive content. In contrast, attention to philosophy, another domain whose influence is arguably just as central, appears noticeably scant. Considering philosophical issues reveals important yet frequently unrecognized values, beliefs, and modes of inquiry that underlie and inform research endeavors. The present article offers an accessible overview of important philosophical and paradigmatic issues that arise in family research, specifically describing different modes of social inquiry as well as cultural ideals and values embedded in family research. In doing so, implications for current and future family research are highlighted and discussed. Throughout the past century, multiple scholars have underscored the centrality of philosophical matters to researchers in both the natural and social sciences (e.g., Fleck, 1935/1981; Kuhn, 1962; Taylor, 1985). These writings highlight the important yet rarely critically
Center for Family Research, Department of Human Development and Family Science, University of Georgia, 1095 College Station Rd., Athens, GA 30602 (
[email protected]). ∗ Department of Physics, Wheaton College, 501 College Ave., Wheaton, IL 60187 (
[email protected]).
Key Words: family research, ideologies, modes of inquiry, philosophy, values.
examined paradigms that inform researchers and their work. Such paradigms encompass key epistemological (nature of knowledge) and ideological (system of ideas and ideals that guide an individual or group) issues that entail “an entire scientific outlook—a constellation of shared assumptions, beliefs, and values that unite a scientific community and allow normal science to take place” (Okasha, 2002, p. 81). Of particular note, these paradigmatic beliefs and values that shape research are centrally guided by philosophical matters, not research facts. Infrequent attention to these issues is representative of research in many disciplines, with family research no exception. Although family theory sourcebooks highlight the importance of understanding epistemological issues in sourcebooks (e.g., Bengston, Acock, Allen, Dilworth-Anderson, & Klein, 2005), actual commentary is quite limited. Recent scholarship in the family studies literature has, rather constructively, devoted attention to reexamining central issues of theory (e.g., Knapp, 2009) and methodology (e.g., Fincham & Rogge, 2010). Extending the discussion to philosophical topics—which inform both theory and methodology—is a logical next step. Greater awareness of the ideologies and values shaping research not only beneficially exposes their disguised presence but also constructively facilitates the development of novel, forward-thinking theories, methods, and outcomes within family studies.
Journal of Family Theory & Review 6 (September 2014): 241–256 DOI:10.1111/jftr.12043
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242 Despite the recognized importance of these issues, few articles to date have robustly characterized central philosophical issues that arise in family research or help bridge between disciplines. The present article aims to provide an accessible and applicable discussion outlining pertinent philosophical issues that inform family research. We aim to provide readers with a framework, vocabulary, and insight for understanding and addressing how philosophical and paradigmatic issues exist in family research endeavors, the anticipated fruit of which we hope will strengthen individual research programs and foster new research directions in the field. To this end, the remainder of the article is organized as follows. After a brief commentary on values and objectivity, we present five modes of social inquiry that each reflect different paradigmatic approaches shaping social science research endeavors. We then direct attention to articulating prominent underlying values and cultural ideals in family research and their subsequent impact. The present article provides an overview of salient topics but, recognizably, does not describe all the arguments and concepts of the philosophy of social science for family researchers. Readers are encouraged to consult the cited sources for further exploration. Values and Objectivity in Social Science Research The aim of value neutrality and lack of researcher bias in scientific activity reflects a central ambition of post-Enlightenment scientific endeavors. As represented in any course on research methods, a prescribed set of methodologies and practices has been established with the intent of promoting unbiased, value-free research. However, both philosophers (e.g., Nagel, 1961) and family scholars (e.g., K. R. Allen, 2000) have emphasized the difficulty of defending such a position, particularly in the social sciences. Nagel (1961), for instance, highlighted how ideals and values enter into social sciences through avenues such as problem selection, assessment of evidence, and evaluation of conclusions. Moreover, no matter how much effort is expended to refine the operationalization and measurement of a construct, restricting emphasis to method refinement fails to address the underlying question of which constructs are chosen for measurement. No
Journal of Family Theory & Review doubt the question of how a specific construct is measured is important, but perhaps equally or more important is the fundamental question of why the construct is considered important or warranted for measurement. In essence, construct validity does not imply complete construct neutrality. As Fincham and Beach (1999) noted more than a decade ago, there is a fundamental need on the part of relationship scholars to “make explicit and critically analyze the assumptions that informed the choice of what to observe in the first place” (p. 55). Accordingly, the question no longer concerns if assumptions, beliefs, and values are embedded within the research, but which assumptions, beliefs, and values are embedded within it. Drawing attention to the subjectivity and value-ladenness of scientific endeavors does not, however, remove all objectivity from scientific research or everyday life. Recognition of this value-ladenness does, though, introduce more complexity than might be initially perceived to exist regarding the objectivity of these matters. To better grasp the nature of objectivity with respect to social science research, distinguishing between two types of objectivity can be beneficial. As Longino (1998) described, objectivity in one sense arises with questions about “the truth and referential character of scientific theories” (p. 170). Objectivity, here, refers to the created, empirical world—that is, the product. A natural world, with trees and leaves, elements and electrons, exists, as does a social world, with families and children, friends and foes. Objectivity in the sciences equates to discovering and to accurately, consistently describing those existential elements and the nature of their relationships. In a second sense, “objectivity has to do with modes of inquiry . . . the view provided by science is one achieved by reliance upon non-arbitrary and non-subjective criteria for developing, accepting, and rejecting the hypotheses and theories that make up this view” (Longino 1998, pp. 171–172, emphasis added). Here, objectivity concentrates on the process rather than on the product. The key tenet for maintaining objectivity in process commonly involves the practitioner adhering to a particular accepted methodology. However, the activities carried out by practitioners are done so only in the context of a paradigm (or set of paradigms) assented to by the scientific community, with such paradigms being shaped by researchers’
Paradigms, Processes, and Values subjectively held presuppositions, irrespective of whether they are consciously aware of those presuppositions or not (Fleck, 1935/1981; Kuhn, 1962; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999; Taylor, 1985).1 Thus, this second sense of objectivity in process is more tenuous and liable to the influence of subjective values and beliefs, as the following section elucidates.
243 exhaustive, the subsequent content aims to provide readers with an overview of each mode as well as a functional understanding of the nature and appearance of the mode in research. In addition, we consider how family research is exhibited within each mode with examples from recent research literature. Natural Scientific
Modes of Social Inquiry Applying philosophical concepts to family research advances the discussion beyond theory, methods, and empirical findings and to the broader ideologies undergirding and shaping such theories, methods, and results. Such ideologies are reflected in different modes of inquiry—the “process” aspect of scientific thinking—that subsequently inform how a particular topic is conceptualized and investigated. At this level, issues that begin to be considered include the nature of the distinction between subject and object, the meaning-making processes occurring within communities, and the appearance and role of values in scientific research. The different stances taken on these issues are manifested not only in different methodologies but also in theoretical frameworks, conclusions drawn from analyses, and the overall purpose of research (see Bishop, 2007; Nagel, 1961). The social sciences, in contrast to the natural sciences, offer a much broader range of modes of inquiry (illustrating just one distinction between them). Recognizing such modes is helpful not only for framing research efforts but also for understanding unique obstacles that social science researchers encounter in their efforts to understand human behavior. Thus, understanding these various modes of inquiry and how a topic appears within them can provide insights into some of the complexity surrounding particular topics in family research and how researchers can study them. Following a framework originally described by Richardson and Fowers (1998) and expounded by Bishop (2007), we describe and assess five modes of social science inquiry here. Although it is by no means
1 Note that just because researchers operate with a set of presuppositions does not imply that all of their results are subjective (e.g., Gauch, 2002).
The natural scientific mode of inquiry views the social realm no differently than the natural realm, and thereby it studies social phenomena with methods modeled on those in the physical sciences. Its motivating goal is to produce universal, ahistorical, and context-free laws of psychological and social behavior, derivable from a few assumptions and definitions (Bernstein, 1976; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Nagel, 1961; Taylor, 1985). Propositions, rules, and cause-effect pathways receive much of the attention, typically using correlation or causal methods. Scientific naturalism endorses a clear subject-object ontology, or the nature of being, by proposing a sharp distinction between subjects (i.e., the researcher) and their inward state of awareness and feeling versus a mind-independent realm of external objects (i.e., sample participants, cause-effect connections). From this framework, ideals of naturalism and empiricism are paramount to understanding how things are and how research is performed. Early advocators of this stance in the social sciences included Auguste Comte and Émile Durkheim, both of whom were influential to the foundations of sociology. Writings by Ernest Burgess, an influential early figure in the field of family studies, similarly reflect this stance (e.g., Burgess & Cottrell, 1939). This mode strongly separates facts from values, with scientific knowledge being purely about facts. Values are to be eschewed and withheld from research, being conceptualized and marginalized as subjective feelings, attitudes, or preferences. Main critiques of this approach question its adherence to true value neutrality, its failure to capture the meanings and purposes that undergird and inform behavior and social entities, its presupposition of sociohistorical regularity of human nature, and a general overembracing of scientism (e.g., Bernstein, 1976; Bishop, 2007; Slife & Williams, 1995; Taylor, 1985). For instance, when applied to the human realm, natural scientific methods import particular assumptions about human subjects and the
244 results social scientists seek. Such methods treat human subjects as no different in kind from protons, plants, or planets. This position, however, reflects a value judgment rather than a value-neutral approach to human inquiry. Moreover, natural science methods completely abstract away from the meanings animating human activity and focus strictly on quantifiable properties (see Bishop, 2007). From a purely statistical stance, this approach is well suited for studying the correlational and conditional phenomena that probabilistically exist in family research. Though advantageous for statistical analyses and identifying conditional relationships, the unexamined assumption that the social realm is no different in kind from the natural realm is limited and limiting. For instance, locating correlations between life stress and marital satisfaction says little about how spouses evaluate their own and their partner’s stress levels or how they understand and experience their satisfaction as a couple. Variables such as personal life stress and marital satisfaction must be standardized and quantified, but in doing so, the meanings that stress and satisfaction have for spouses are cut away from investigation (see Fowers & Owenz, 2010). Both the adherence to value neutrality and the separation from meanings and purposes reflect a form of scientism, the view that only natural science methods can deliver genuine, objective knowledge (Hayek, 1942; Stenmark, 1997). Thus, individuals’ values, motivations, and meanings, the very understandings that make human activity what it is, get ignored or squeezed out.2 Scientism, rather than being genuinely value neutral and meaning-free as it purports, is merely another value choice and represents the adoption of an alternative meaning. Hence, those who pursue a natural scientific mode of social inquiry adopt a particular kind of interpretation of the human realm, one privileging correlations and cause-effect relationships among variables in human behavior. The majority of family research (and social science research collectively) employs this 2 Of course, the natural scientific mode of inquiry uses surveys and interviews designed to elicit participants’ values and attitudes. However, these approaches typically objectify subjects’ responses as the relata of correlations or other forms of quantifiable variables so that the interpretive significance and impact these values have for humans are minimized.
Journal of Family Theory & Review mode, with efforts devoted to identifying correlated or causal relationships between a set of variables, either cross-sectionally or longitudinally (e.g., partner contempt with divorce rates, work–family conflict with parental investment). For example, Kamp Dush (2013) found that cohabitation and marital dissolution increased depressive symptoms for mothers and fathers, with hypothesized time-variant mediators not accounting for the effect. Consistent with the natural scientific approach, such analyses aim to arrive at context-free laws derived from quantified cause-effect patterns; however, illustrative of limitations of this mode, such analyses detach personal meaning. For instance, despite controlling for variance accounted for by other factors, this approach is unable to assess the central question—were participants more depressed because of the dissolution? Despite arguments that research into social science matters can be improved exclusively by strengthening and refining methodologies to be more analogous to natural science research (e.g., Kincaid, 1996), such a position largely fails to stand up to criticism. Increasingly refined arguments have appeared, suggesting the difficulties of social science ever attaining genuine empirical theory are a result of its applying inappropriate epistemological and cultural ideals to its subject matter (Bishop, 2007; Gergen, 1982; Richardson et al., 1999; Taylor, 1985). In essence, research in the social sciences and natural sciences are different in kind, not just in degree, as the following mode of inquiry emphasizes. Descriptivism Descriptivism devotes central attention to understanding the personal and social meanings that structure human life. This mode of inquiry, formed to some extent in response to naturalistic and functionalistic views, seeks to describe purposive human action in a meaningful, intersubjective world. Geertz (1973) illustrates tenets of descriptivism when noting how “the analyses of it [humanity in culture] [is] not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning” (p. 5). Such an approach emphasizes individual subjectivity and the uniqueness of experience within a diverse culture, focusing on personal motives, reasons, and goals within the objects of study (Winch, 1958). Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel,
Paradigms, Processes, and Values 1967) offers an exemplar of this mode of inquiry likely familiar to family researchers (for others, see Bernstein, 1976). The relevance of this approach to the social sciences appears given the doubly interpretive nature of human behavior research, with matters of interpretation inescapably embedded within the subject (i.e., researcher) and object (i.e., sample participant) of study (Giddens, 1976; Taylor, 1985). The first interpretive aspect, present in both natural and social science research, entails the investigator’s (i.e., the subject’s) own framework of assumptions, conventions, and purposes (e.g., the natural scientific mode of inquiry described earlier). The second interpretive aspect, unique to the social sciences and of particular interest to descriptivists, involves how the objects of study are self-interpreting beings: beings who are always striving to make sense of and cope with their world and who do so from their own interpretative framework. Accordingly, inquiry from this mode seeks to uncover the attitudes, words, emotions, and meaning-making processes as described by the object of study, but from an objective viewpoint (i.e., describing the truth of the matter). Descriptivist approaches place heavy emphasis on the lived experiences of the objects of their study and then aim to portray that experience to others. Studies within research on the family involving qualitative methods often exhibit descriptivist approaches. For instance, R. E. Allen and Wiles (2013) recently applied this approach to the study of later-life childlessness. Findings, consistent with aims of descriptivism, outlined the specific words, meaning-making processes, and accompanying actions that individuals assigned to their experience of childlessness as well as its subjective experience across individuals. Central critiques of descriptivism concern its introduction of additional bias into the scientific process (e.g., Bernstein, 1976). Researchers interpret on the basis of their own terms and own categories, never entirely escaping them, and thus never give neutral, objective insightful descriptions of others’ actions. No subject (i.e., no researcher) can avoid subjectively interpreting his or her objects of study. Indeed, to adopt a natural science or descriptivist approach to the study of human behavior is already to adopt a particular kind of interpretation of the object of study. Additionally, descriptivists’ interpretive
245 process (Part 1 of the doubly interpretive nature of human inquiry) is influenced by interactions with their objects and their objects’ values and biases, thus further reducing unbiased analyses (Bishop, 2007; Taylor, 1985). Moreover, every researcher’s description will necessarily be selective and partial, meaning that any descriptions of an object can be accurate only with respect to some purposes of the researcher. Such limitations in study methodology and analysis have been recognized by researchers adopting this mode of inquiry, with various practices introduced by descriptivists to address dimensions of subjectivity and bias in their research (Glesne, 2011). Because of this awareness, descriptivist approaches in qualitative research have noticeably progressed in moving beyond the ahistorical perspectives found in the natural scientific mode of inquiry. Nevertheless, the descriptivist still remains acritical and detached from the social reality under study in a way that mirrors the supposed value-neutral viewpoint of natural science inquiry. Hence, such approaches remain apt to pass through broader cultural ideas and do not provide a rational basis for thoughtfully critiquing the human experiences they attempt to describe and explain (see Bernstein, 1976, p. 84). Critical Social Science Critical social science begins by acknowledging that all research endeavors are inextricably interpretive and evaluative. According to the critical social science stance, values and a moral bent are inescapable. Hence, any attempt to be value neutral or free of any evaluative agenda implicitly advocates another set of values that may be as or more questionable (Held, 1980). Supposedly value-neutral methods do not avoid reinforcing particular values and ideals in practice. As an example, consider natural scientific inquiry on the topic of childhood socialization and parenting practices. In a culture where child autonomy and independence is deemed desirable, a natural scientific mode of inquiry may conduct a study that identifies a positive association between early childhood autonomy and family well-being, along with parenting practices that predict children who demonstrate greater autonomy. Consequently, a natural science mode of inquiry (despite attempts to be value neutral) is prone to reinforce and perpetuate the cultural values and ideals of childhood autonomy.
246 With its explicit attention to the unavoidable presence of values informing all modes of inquiry, the critical social scientist advocates for a community of researchers who acknowledge, articulate, and adhere to a set of appropriate moral values in their research. Adherents of this mode assume and frequently communicate an explicit set of self-defined values that inform their research. Common foci receiving attention from critical social scientists are power, inequality, and disguised ideologies (i.e., unnoticed cultural values of social scientists and social actors). In doing so, critical social science approaches conduct research with stated intentions of aiding the reduction or elimination of power imbalances, inequity, or oppressive systems. The popularity of discussions surrounding issues of injustice and power highlight the formidable presence that critical social science has acquired in the field of family research, with many dominant “isms” and “ivities” (e.g., feminism, heteronormativity) largely deriving from a critical social science perspective. Many gender studies offer a clear example of research employing this mode. Here, gender roles and relations (both inside and outside the family) are frequently conceptualized as a form of institutionalized power, describing gender as one of the “pervasive structures of social inequalities in society” (Ferree, 2010, p. 421). Such research then investigates how “gender power gets exercised and institutionalized” (Ferree, 2010, p. 425) within the family. Critics of this approach note that critical social scientists must also be subject to the critiques they weigh against other modes of inquiry (e.g., Warnke, 1987). Though admonishing the disguised ideologies and values of others, the ideology of critical social science itself rests on particular beliefs, assumptions, and values that also equally warrant scrutiny. For instance, is the mere presence of a power imbalance—whether in the home, business, or society—inherently oppressive and in need of dismantling? Using the aforementioned gender example, such writing makes the a priori assumptions that institutionalizing gender is detrimental and that eliminating such institutions and power expressions is the appropriate response. Furthermore, a lack of internal consistency exists within this approach. Given its antagonism and criticism toward dominant and oppressive ideologies, if this approach gains such
Journal of Family Theory & Review popularity that it becomes the dominant mode and thereby oppressive toward other approaches and values, does it begin to refute itself? Rather than resolving the problems of subjective and dogmatic viewpoints that exist within other modern Enlightenment-based moral outlooks, such matters are merely reframed and recreated within this mode of inquiry. Postmodern A postmodern mode of inquiry prizes the subjective reality of human existence and rejects any universalizing law, belief, or “grand narrative.” Modes of naturalism, descriptivism, and critical social science are all seen as plagued by desires to “absolutize” a particular stance. For instance, applied to research on parenting, a postmodern approach would rebuff scientific naturalism’s emphasis on universal laws and value neutrality (e.g., universal statements regarding the pathways linking fathers’ and mothers’ parenting styles to child outcomes), descriptivism’s presumed objective and value-free depiction of human meaning and explanation (e.g., impartial characterizations for how parents understand “Dad” and “Mom”), and critical social science’s privileging of a distinct ethical outlook (e.g., absolute critique of gendered-based power displays in parenting). In contrast, postmodernists would, for example, examine the discourse parents use with each other and with their child to “construct” gender within the life of each person. In addition to rejecting universal statements and grand narratives, a postmodern approach places extremely high importance on the role of language in constructing reality. In the postmodern view, we are always inescapably “inside” language and “inside” reality (e.g., Lacan, 1968). Social constructionism (e.g., Rorty, 1982), with its focus on local, community meaning, offers a theory appearing with family research informed by this mode. K. R. Allen (2000) illustrated tenets of postmodernism applied to family studies by advocating for abandoning “the search for the discovery of a single universal truth in favor of allowing for multiple truths” (p. 8) and insisting on “complex, inclusive perspectives that examine race, class, and gender” (p. 13). A second application of this approach is also evident in how researchers conceptualize and discuss marriage teleologically. Does marriage possess a particular fixed, culturally transcendent telos (i.e., goal or end state), or, consistent
Paradigms, Processes, and Values with postmodernism, is marriage culturally defined and created? Although multiple authors have lauded the new tools and insights for studying human behavior that postmodernist approaches have provided (e.g., Flyvbjerg, 2001), many others have also raised strong objections to the approach (e.g., Guignon, 1991; Richardson & Fowers, 1998; Slife & Richardson, 2010). As one critique, a statement about being able to know reality only from the inside is, itself, a universalizing statement and can be made only from the vantage point of someone “outside,” a perspective that postmodernists claim is not possible. Postmodernist thinkers typically argue that the absence of universal or culturally transcendent natures should free people from our tendencies toward dogmatism and domination (e.g., Rorty, 1982). However, with no restraints or orientation beyond possibly those of the local community, what is to keep such “free” or “liberated” spouses from pursuing shallow diversions or freedom from family responsibilities? Additionally, postmodernism can be self-defeating, as the proposition that no universal truth-claims exist is, itself, a universal truth-claim. Although these critiques legitimately question some of postmodernism’s central foundations and arguments, they do not entirely negate the potency of particular concepts and questions raised by postmodern thought (e.g., the historical and cultural embeddedness of research activities). Contemporary Hermeneutics A fifth mode of inquiry, contemporary hermeneutics, considers the self-interpreting nature of human beings and the fact that we live out these interpretations as its fundamental insights (e.g., Gadamer, 1975; Guignon, 1991; Ricoeur, 1992; Taylor, 1985; Warnke, 1987). Overall, contemporary hermeneutics commits to some form of objectivity in terms of clear understanding and acknowledges that accuracy and reproducibility are possibilities for the social world. Recognizing that human action is always interpretive, contemporary hermeneutics values the richness of meaningful human behavior and seeks to uncover disguised ideologies, as both aspects influence the self-understanding of an individual. Further, given the inescapable interpretation occurring via the historically and culturally conditioned nature of human actions, hermeneutic thinkers view natural
247 and social sciences as fundamentally different (electrons are neither culturally conditioned nor self-interpreting, whereas humans are). Hermeneutic thinkers endorse absolutes but recognize that absolutes still stand in need of interpretation and are not univocal in meaning. Writing about the interplay of science, religion, and postmodernism, Carson (2002) illustrated tents of contemporary hermeneutics, noting how “no truth which humans beings may articulate can ever be articulated in a culture-transcending way—but that does not mean that the truth thus articulated does not transcend culture” (p. 119). Meanings within a contemporary hermeneutic approach are recognized as both “out there” and “in us.” Of the five modes of social inquiry, this mode of inquiry remains the most inchoate. Accordingly, little research related to the family (and social science topics more generally) reflects this nature of understanding, although writings by Fowers (e.g., Fowers, 1998; Fowers & Owenz, 2010; Richardson & Fowers, 2010) offer an exception. As an illustration, a hermeneutic perspective devotes emphasis to what spouses themselves evaluate when reporting their marital satisfaction rather than investigators’ predetermined criteria. The search for regularities and predictive patterns of family interaction still occurs within contemporary hermeneutics, but efforts simultaneously consider the broader cultural and historical beliefs and meanings in which such associations appear (for additional discussion, see Fowers, 1998, Fowers & Owenz, 2010; Richardson & Fowers, 2010). Research endeavors within this mode are more nuanced than those based on identifying statistical likelihoods of parameter estimates derived from optimization algorithms or creating thematic summaries of interview data. For instance, in a hermeneutic approach, the observed correlations from measured items are understood in terms of the self-interpretations of the study participants, not in terms of some univocal conception of efficient cause-effect patterns. Accordingly, the meaning of the correlations can differ greatly depending on the meaning-making processes present within an individual and couple. For example, the meaning of the correlation between particular communication patterns and marital satisfaction will differ between individuals who view their spouses and their marriages as means for pursuing individual fulfillment and happiness versus
248 those who view their union in terms of mutual obligation, selfless giving, and the building of community.3 Overall, contemporary hermeneutics functions as a meta-orientation that situates research (and all of life) with an awareness to its interpretive aspects, modifies the interpretations research findings offer, and highlights topics and questions neglected by research from other metatheoretical viewpoints. However, specific application of this mode of inquiry is limited in family research, partially exhibiting the broader question of whether hermeneutic inquiry exists at a level of methodology (e.g., Packer & Addison, 1989) or metatheory (e.g., Bishop, 2007). At the level of metatheory, as previously noted, hermeneutic inquiry positions research, tempers conclusions to be more morally conscious and contextually sensitive, and draws attention to the personal meanings and cultural values that are often neglected in research endeavors. At the methodological level, a lingering question remains concerning the methods offered that make hermeneutic inquiry something more than a meta-level orientation. If no methodology distinguishes contemporary hermeneutics from other modes, why consider it a form of social science inquiry rather than something more akin to social theory or philosophical analysis? Finally, if contemporary hermeneutics is a meta-level approach, is it best used in conjunction with other modes of social inquiry? Such questions, which partially reflect the insistence on clearly defined methodology from natural science and descriptivist modes of inquiry, emphasize the need for further clarification of hermeneutic inquiry. Table 1 provides a summary of the five aforementioned modes of inquiry, providing a description, application, and critique of each approach. Elucidating these different modes is not merely an intellectual exercise; it addresses issues central to the trajectory of marital and family research as a whole. As previously described, different paradigms and different modes of inquiry provide general frameworks
3 Hermeneutic approaches to family research would also highlight the role cultural ideals such as individualism (see next section) play in spouses’ conceptions of family life as well as the way such ideals tend to shape family research itself (e.g., Richardson et al., 1999).
Journal of Family Theory & Review for perceiving the world. For researchers, this equates to shaping their understanding of pertinent problems, appropriate solutions, and preferable methods to address identified problems (see Table 2). As Rosenberg (2008) noted, “The sides scientists take on answers to philosophical questions determine the questions they address as answerable by science and the methods they employ to answer them” (p. 4, emphasis added). Thus, such paradigmatic processes come to dictate both the preferred means and the desired ends of research, shaping both what researchers investigate and how research precedes. In summary, though they are all under the umbrella of social science research, not all family researchers approach problems similarly. Different research endeavors employ different modes of inquiry, modes that inform a broad range of topics including perceptions of the world, meaning-making processes, ontological beliefs, and the bifurcation of subject and object. Given the centrality of such matters, understanding different modes of inquiry is useful for developing a robust understanding of, and reflection on, social science research endeavors. Recognizing underlying philosophical issues helps elucidate why particular research topics are chosen for study versus others and how the phenomena are studied. Focusing on philosophical issues also uncovers how cultural ideals and values shape research activities, whether in construct formation or in the practice of particular modes of inquiry. We now turn to those questions. Cultural Ideals and Values in Family Research Writings on the philosophy of social science highlight how ideals and values can impinge on the research process at many different levels (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Bohman, Hiley, & Schusterman, 1991; Root, 1993). At one level, values embraced by the individual researcher or research team inform the research activities. Here, the previously outlined modes of inquiry are implicated, with each containing a particular set of values and ideals. For example, values and ideals within critical social science research may lead to studies centrally focused on measuring perceived power in the marital relationship or the gender socialization of young children.
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Table 1. Modes of Inquiry in Social Science Research on the Family Mode
Description
Application
Critique
Natural scientific
Social realm is equivalent to the natural; aims to produce universal, context-free laws of relationships among individual, interpersonal, and external factors Focuses on the personal and social meanings structuring human life; illustrates doubly interpretive nature of social science research Acknowledges values in research; advocates adopting the “correct” set of values that will best serve and advance human welfare Rejects any universalizing law, belief, or grand narrative; emphasis on local, contextual meanings and the subjective reality of human existence Some degree of reproducible objectivity with simultaneous recognition of human action as interpretive and influence of existing ideologies
In statistical modeling of cause-effect pathways that encompass family outcomes of interest
Adherence to supposed value neutrality; failure to capture the meanings informing human behavior
To identify meanings, attitudes, and experiences of individuals in marriage, personally and collectively.
Researcher’s own subjective framework inhibits neutral, objective description of others’ actions
To uncover and combat matters of power, oppression, and disguised ideologies within family and society
Determination of “correct” set of values; lack of internal inconsistency
Articulate contextual and pragmatic lived experiences of individuals in local communities
Inability to make any generalizing statements; self-contradiction in tenets
Highlight and understand interpretations and meaning-making processes in family relationships
Lack of distinct and clear methods for inquiry; actual methodology or framework for applying other methods
Descriptivism
Critical social science
Postmodern
Contemporary hermeneutics
In addition to modes of inquiry, values and ideals can also be embedded in research endeavors on the basis of the general milieu of the culture in which research takes place. Within current Western culture, autonomy and individualism are two powerful ethical ideals, with social science research significantly influenced by them (Bishop, 2007; Richardson et al., 1999). Although autonomy and individualism can take various forms within culture and research, for the sake of brevity, only two forms—political liberalism and liberal individualism4 —are discussed here. As described the following, both forms appear influential in research on the family.
4 The term liberal here does not refer to its common political usage in culture (e.g., anticonservative). Rather, it connotes emphasis on freedom of choice and lack of constraints.
Political Liberalism According to the ideal of political liberalism and its attendant values, the state (including academic scholarship) “should not support one conception of the good life—to seek happiness, to live with honour and integrity, to become rich and famous—over any other, nor favour any particular religion, sexual mores and so forth” (Root, 1993, p. 15). The focus for research, as typified by the natural science mode of inquiry, as well as descriptivism, concentrates on questions of appropriate means while refraining from addressing questions of appropriate ends. For instance, although much research aims to identify “optimal” or “effective” conditions for families (e.g., parenting style, marital communication patterns), such research does not endorse some forms of parenting or conflict resolution as more desirable or preferable on any other basis than effectiveness for achieving desired ends. This is exactly political liberalism as a disguised ideology in research.
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Table 2. Dictates of Modes of Inquiry on Research Endeavors Pertinent Problems
Solutions
Appropriate Methods
Example
Natural scientific
Limited knowledge of universal laws that govern relationships
Computational optimization modeling of quantified variables
Structural functionalism
Descriptivism
Inattention to personal, subjective experiences Oppressive ideologies, power imbalances, differences between groups Absolutized and universalized truth and meaning
Refined measurement and analysis of relationships among variables Allow participant’s own voice to be heard
Observation of personal meanings and social structures To identify experiences of marginalized groups and remove inequality
Ethnomethodology
To identify personal narratives and subjectivity with focus on language To identify values and meaning-making processes; correlations and causal pathways, suitably interpreted
Social constructionism
Critical social science
Postmodern
Contemporary hermeneutics
Inattention to values, meanings, and interpretations in human relationships that inform objects of study
Equity, power equivalency, research informed by right values Disregard of grand narratives, focus on contextual lived reality Focus on self-interpreting nature of human beings while maintaining generalizability and absolutes
Root (1993) additionally characterized the ideal of political liberalism as the “underlying or unifying theme among the social sciences” (p. 15). Its influence contributes to the belief in the social sciences that no researcher can prescribe how an individual should behave or how a relationship should be structured. In essence, one should not define what is objectively good and right ideology or morality. For example, the values of political liberalism appear in the notion that research cannot (or at least should not) tout one form of family as superior and preferred to others (e.g., arranged versus free-choice marriages). As another example, research on parenting typically focuses on “effective” or “ineffective” parenting techniques (based on positive associations with particular preselected outcomes) rather than on the “right” ways to parent (irrespective of outcome). Despite its pervasive presence, the unquestioning (and usually surreptitious) adoption of political liberalism by the social science and broader academic community has tenuous logical underpinning. The stance of political liberalism does not hold up under its own scrutiny, as it touts an ideological position (namely, political liberalism and its version of neutrality)
Feminism
Eudaimonic theory (as described by Fowers & Owenz, 2010)
as superior to all others. In other words, the statement that one person or group should not promulgate or proselytize its beliefs on any others is itself a belief being promulgated and proselytized. Political liberalism, whether in the political arena or in academia, represents a version of the good life, the right way to live as mature enlightened human beings free from the judgments of others. It therefore engages in the very activity it condemns and warns others from doing, holding itself up as the preferred way of life in contrast to its insistence that no points of view be favored over others. For the family researcher, one consequent implication involves recognizing the degree to which this ideal covertly informs one’s approach to and evaluation of research endeavors and dissemination of findings. The pervasive cultural presence of political liberalism suggests that, in the absence of such reflection, research likely will default to reinforcing this ideal as the norm in research and to encouraging its adoption by families. As previously noted, even research that identifies and endorses “healthy,” “successful,” or “effective” features of family interaction and functioning still reflects political liberalism ideology. To challenge or do
Paradigms, Processes, and Values the opposite of political liberalism would be to explicitly endorse some forms of life as superior to others regarding ends (e.g., what is just, worthwhile, or of ultimate concern). Focusing solely on issues such as functionality and effectiveness does not explicitly imply any form of life as being better than any other regarding ends, but it does, surreptitiously, endorse functionality and effectiveness as preeminent values. Conversely, if this form of liberalism is rejected and some other viewpoint is embraced, how does research endorse or prescribe what people should believe, and again, on what basis or foundation? Could researchers prescribe just and right (and not merely “effective”) parenting practices or household division of labor? These are questions critical social inquiry faces. Further, for all modes of social inquiry, how often are researchers already endorsing such prescriptions in the name of optimality or happiness without even realizing it? Liberal Individualism A second broad cultural ideal noticeably informing family research is liberal individualism, which originated in the 18th century from a combination of factors such as Enlightenment philosophy, the rationalization of society, the rejection of stultifying theological and political systems, and the rise of capitalism, industrialization, and modern science. This ideal places the individual at the focus and center of life, stressing and prizing matters of individuality, rights, dignity, autonomy, and freedom (Gunton, 1993; Taylor, 2007; Turner, 1985). Liberal individualism manifests in different forms, including utilitarian, expressive, existential, and ontological (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipson, 1986; Richardson et al., 1999). The first two forms—utilitarian individualism and expressive individualism—are subsequently expanded upon, on the basis of our perceptions of their dominance in much of the academic and, to a greater extent, societal conceptions of marriage and the family. Utilitarian individualism. Utilitarian individualism sees human life as an effort by individuals to maximize self-interest relative to personal appetites and fears. Personal well-being and satisfaction are the acme, with both human thought and action merely instruments aimed toward bringing about such ends. Classical
251 social exchange (Blau, 1964) and rational choice (Coleman & Fararo, 1992) theories illustrate the influence of utilitarian individualism in the social sciences and provide prime exemplars of how underlying values and ideals can shape the nature of theory construction. For instance, on the social exchange account, individuals’ presumed aim is to maximize outcomes (e.g., personal well-being), entering into and maintaining relationships on the basis of an evaluation of rewards or benefits minus costs. Within research on romantic relationships, utilitarian individualism conceives the dyadic union mainly in terms of economic exchange and personal satisfaction. The relationship is understood as being founded and continued on the basis of each partner’s self-interest. Given the assumed ultimate objective of personal satisfaction and happiness, a person’s satisfaction with his or her relationship immediately suggests itself as a natural construct to study. Studies that principally focus on personal relationship satisfaction as the main ends for a romantic union illustrate how this value can shape relationship research efforts—even those seemingly neutral in design. Moreover, natural science or descriptivist approaches “objectively” reporting personal satisfaction or happiness as the result of particular qualities or characteristics of the relationship surreptitiously reinforce utilitarian individualism despite their attempt to be value neutral. Expressive individualism. In contrast to the pragmatic nature of utilitarian individualism, expressive individualism is foundationally much more aesthetic. Self-autonomy and self-actualization emerge as prized constructs, believing that each person’s “true self” should be respected and nurtured. Under this ideal, marriage, family, and other relationships more broadly function as an arena for providing individual belonging, purpose, and growth where the “true self” can be realized and developed. Expressive individualism originated in the late 18th century and began to alter marriage practices and expectations as early as the 19th century (see May, 1980; Mintz & Kellogg, 1988). Following the social revolutions in the 1960s and 1970s, this ideal has come to appear highly influential in Western culture and romantic relationships therein (Bellah et al., 1986; Cherlin, 2009). Self-expansion theory (Aron & Aron, 1986) provides an apt illustration of
252 how ideals about self-expression have shaped intimate relationship research. From this theoretical perspective, romantic relationships are perceived as one means by which individuals seek to expand the self (whether cognitively, social, physically, or experientially), and relationships are initiated and maintained to the degree that each individual’s self is expanded by being with the other person. To the extent that a mode of social inquiry aiming at value neutrality reports positive correlations between intimate relationships and individuals’ self-actualization and self-expression, expressive individualism is being reinforced by that very mode of inquiry. Presence and implications of individualism. Although not articulating these two ideals explicitly, writings by prominent family scholars demonstrate the presence of these liberal individualistic ideals in both academic and societal understandings of the family. For instance, in characterizing shifts that began in the 1960s concerning individuals’ conceptualization of marriage and that have continued since then, family demographer Cherlin (2009) commented: When wives and husbands evaluated how satisfied they were with their marriages, they began to think more in terms of self-development, as opposed to the satisfaction they gained through pleasing their spouse and raising their children. They asked themselves questions such as: Am I getting the personal satisfaction I want from my marriage? [i.e., utilitarian individualism] And Am I growing as a person? [i.e., expressive individualism]. The result was a transition from the companionate marriage to what we might call the individualized marriage. (p. 88)5
Similarly, Amato, Booth, Johnson, and Rogers (2007) documented this ideal within academics, observing how “the current focus among family scholars on marital happiness as the central defining characteristic of high-quality marriages reflects the culture of expressive individualism
5 Note how Cherlin’s (2009) description illustrates that both utilitarian and expressive individualism are fundamentally instrumental in character. That is to say, both forms of liberal individualism focus on how marriage—among other relationships—is a means toward the end of personal satisfaction and growth. Compare with Bellah et al. (1986).
Journal of Family Theory & Review and self-growth that has become pervasive in American society since the 1960s” (p. 251). Multiple authors have recognized and critiqued the hegemonic focus on marital satisfaction (see, e.g., Carroll, Knapp, & Holman, 2005; Hawkins, Blanchard, Baldwin, & Fawcett, 2008). However, less attention has been devoted to understanding why there is such interest in satisfaction. Considering the role of cultural ideals embedded in the research process helps elucidate the fascination with marital satisfaction—personal marital satisfaction originates from a highly individualistic conceptualization of marriage. From the stance of utilitarian individualism, as the main focus in human affairs is individual personal satisfaction, then satisfaction with marriage is one of the most salient factors to measure. For expressive individualism, marital satisfaction is emphasized because it promotes personal fulfillment through bonding and intimacy. Although differing in underlying reasons, utilitarian and expressive individualism uniformly lead both marital researchers and individual spouses to place a premium on marital satisfaction. Most discussion regarding clarifying marital assessments (e.g., Fincham & Rogge, 2010), though beneficial and warranted in many respects, has remained at empirical (identifying measures with robust psychometric properties) and theoretical (conceptually clarifying the construct being measured) levels. However, at a more fundamental level, all these questions turn on matters of why and how variables are selected. Indeed, an essential question for consideration by marital researchers is what makes the construct of marital satisfaction so important as to warrant assessment? The emergence and continued presence of these ideals in cultural and academic conceptions of marriage and family is not merely an ivory-tower issue; it is one with significant ramifications. Writing shortly after the beginnings of this cultural shift toward self-fulfillment and expressive individualism, Yankelovitch (1981) rather prognostically described the potential detrimental impact on marriage of widespread adoption of this ideal: Successful marriages are woven out of many strands of inhibited desire—accessions to the wishes of the other; acceptance of infringements on one’s own wishes; disappointments swallowed; confrontations avoided; opportunities for anger
Paradigms, Processes, and Values bypassed; chances for self-expression muted. To introduce the strong form of self-fulfillment urge into this process is to take a broomstick to a delicate web. Often all that is left is the sticky stuff that adheres to the broom; the structure of the web is destroyed. (p. 76)
Viewing marriage along such utilitarian and expressive individualist lines (i.e., that a good marriage enhances personal happiness, self-growth, and self-actualization) leads to a peculiar paradox in the American marriage (Fowers, 1998). When such conceptions are present, individuals have “maximized their expectations for emotional fulfillment and self-satisfaction in marriage . . . [yet simultaneously] minimized their sense of obligation and commitment to spouses and children as well as to marriage as an institution” (Bishop, 2007, p. 182). Consequently, and quite importantly, researchers and practitioners who aim to strengthen marriages, yet operate under a utilitarian or expressive individualistic conception of the purpose of marriage (and whose measures reflect this), find themselves in a perplexing situation. By focusing on the emotional fulfillment and satisfaction of individual spouses and encouraging participants to evaluate their marriage similarly, researchers may encourage a mind-set within individuals that directs the focus away from accessions and accommodations to the other and toward expectations for personal self-fulfillment. Such ideals of self-fulfillment and self-satisfaction in marriage tend to undermine, rather than bolster, fundamental constructs and practices needed for healthy, stable marriages (Fowers, 1998). Thus, by focusing measurement on emotional fulfillment and satisfaction, researchers may be perpetuating the frailties in marriage they are attempting to prevent, passing the disease on through the cure, so to speak. Reconsidering Outcomes The cultural ideals of political liberalism and liberal individualism have exerted noticeable influence both on how families are studied and on which variables are considered relevant for study. This section considers criterion variables that shift from these dominant cultural ideals. Presently, this exploration revolves around examples with marital research, although many points immediately relate to other content areas
253 as well. Just as the outcome of satisfaction can have positive and negative consequences, the following constructs are not inherently beneficial. They do, however, illustrate constructs that differ from the underlying cultural ideals that have dominated outcomes of interest in many previous research studies. An alternative focus could involve increased weight on marital commitment (Stanley, 2007). Again, quoting Amato et al. (2007): A good argument can be made, however, that commitment is central to what we mean by marital quality as is happiness. . . . [A] focus on commitment as a central feature of marital quality represents a necessary corrective to the individualistic and hedonistic slant of much contemporary research on marriage. (p. 251)
Instruments currently exist for measuring indicators of commitment (e.g., Stanley & Markman, 1992; Weigel, 2008), although these are infrequently conceptualized as the targeted end for married individuals. Taken further, the outcome of marital commitment could focus on permanent stability of the marital union (regardless of spousal levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction).6 Other potential outcomes for marital research could concentrate on the character, conduct, and societal contributions of each spouse (Hawkins, Fowers, Carroll, & Yang, 2007). Outcomes of interest here include the demonstration and development of individual virtues such as forgiveness, generosity, patience, and devotion (Fowers, 1998, 2000; Hawkins et al., 2008), all of which are highly important to handling the ebb and flow of married life as well as life in a community. At the communal level, marriage could be centrally conceptualized in relation to fostering social responsibility, such as workplace productivity, involvement in local organizations, and avoidance of deviant or illegal activity. Previous research has alluded to marriage producing changes in such areas, particularly for men (e.g., Beaver, Wright, DeLisi, & Vaughn, 2008; Nock, 1998). Furthermore, underexplored or new constructs could receive attention. For instance, 6 In no way should such a stance be construed as endorsing that partners continue staying in an abusive marriage. An abusive marriage is one where commitment has already dissipated and some other kind of unhealthy power relationship is in play.
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marital research could focus on communal orientation, a construct that reflects mutual concern for spousal (rather than self) well-being and giving assistance as needed rather than on the basis of equitable exchange or quid pro quo reciprocation (see also Clark & Mills, 1979). A second construct could be family happiness, reflecting an individual’s or couple’s contentment in sacrificial service that leads to being and building a family together (see Stanley, 2009). This latter construct represents a constitutive goal in which the actions taken to achieve the goal help constitute the goal itself. The ends, in essence, are inseparable from the means (for more discussion, see Fowers & Owenz, 2010). Importantly, individuals with such a constitutive goal can have a sense of marital and family satisfaction and success even in the midst of personally unpleasant times, for it is only through self-denial, forbearing irritations, and enduring relationship difficulties that this goal can be fully realized (for other potential constructs, see Fowers, 2000; Fowers & Owenz, 2010). Conclusion Multiple family researchers have emphasized the importance of understanding context and “taking context seriously” (e.g., Karney & Bradbury, 2005; Karney, 2007). In such instances, context typically has been in reference to environmental stressors such as economic hardship, job strain, and poor neighborhood conditions. However, as social ecology models illustrate, macroenvironmental factors extend beyond situational and environmental aspects and to cultural norms and belief systems (e.g., Huston, 2000). Without lessening these calls for greater incorporation of context in research, we further recommend broadening the context lens to consider the cultural, ideological, and epistemological factors that influence participants in research studies as well as the researchers conducting them. Although the presence of beliefs, values, and ideals is inescapable, awareness of them need not be. An overview of philosophical themes within family research raises a variety of questions. Here are four we think are pressing:7 (1)
Have the constructs of personal happiness and self-esteem been overutilized in family research? (2) What outcomes are relevant, moving beyond those advocated by the values represented in cultural ideals of political liberalism and liberal individualism? (3) How are strengths of particular modes of inquiry leveraged and their limitations taken into account in research on families? (4) How can family researchers simultaneously embrace an objective reality of family interaction while still maintaining the meaning-making processes and interpretations of the individuals within the family itself? As these questions demonstrate, attention to philosophical issues does not lessen the value of human inquiry; instead, it offers a means to better reflect on and refine it. Articulating values and different modes of inquiry, rather than being a deterrent to research, uncovers fundamental philosophical assumptions by which the foundations of the field can be probed and clarified, thus strengthening its overall state (also see Knapp, 2009). In summary, integrating insights from the philosophical domain into established areas of expertise provides family scholars with the opportunity to develop novel, forward-thinking theories, methods, and programs of research that expand, challenge, and refine existing findings as well as existing ideologies. References Allen, K. R. (2000). A conscious and inclusive family studies. Journal of Marriage and Family, 62(1), 4–17. Allen, R. E., & Wiles, J. L. (2013). How older people position their late-life childlessness: A qualitative study. Journal of Marriage and Family, 75(1), 206–220. Amato, P. R., Booth, A., Johnson, D. R., & Rogers, S. J. (2007). Alone together: How marriage in America is changing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Aron, A., & Aron, E. N. (1986). Love and the expansion of self: Understanding attraction and satisfaction. New York, NY: Hemisphere. Beaver, K. M., Wright, J. P., DeLisi, M., & Vaughn, M. G. (2008). Desistance from delinquency: The marriage effect revisited and extended. Social Science Research, 37(3), 736–752. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2007.11.003
7 As
previously mentioned, this content only reflects our position on a portion of philosophical issues. Different authors adopting different philosophical positions could
emphasize alternative topics (e.g., social atomism, methodological holism) and alternative questions for consideration.
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