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Transportation Transportation Research Research Procedia Procedia 00 00 (2017) (2017) 000–000 000–000

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Transportation Research Procedia 25 (2017) 5291–5306 www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia

World World Conference Conference on on Transport Transport Research Research -- WCTR WCTR 2016 2016 Shanghai. Shanghai. 10-15 10-15 July July 2016 2016

Parsing Competitive Dialogue in Public-Private Partnerships: Emergence of Capability Search a Fred Fred Amonya Amonyaa* * a aUniversity

Thornhaugh Street, Street, London UK University of of London, London, Thornhaugh London WC1H WC1H 0XG, 0XG, UK

Abstract Abstract The always clear. clear. The The technology, technology, including including engineering engineering and and management, management, may The path path from from policy policy to to service service delivery delivery is is not not always may not not be be known. Consequently, the public sector invites the private sector to participate in devising the specification. That is the essence known. Consequently, the public sector invites the private sector to participate in devising the specification. That is the essence of of competitive public-private partnerships partnerships (PPP). (PPP). The The contracts contracts of of PPP PPP are are long, long, lasting competitive dialogue dialogue (CD), (CD), which which is is associated associated with with public-private lasting decades. they engulf engulf many many variables, variables, resulting resulting in in complexity. complexity. However, However, CD CD is is anchored anchored on on competition competition in in an an decades. Consequently, Consequently, they environment that protects intellectual rights, which means a platform of state strength. The paper takes a vantage point built on environment that protects intellectual rights, which means a platform of state strength. The paper takes a vantage point built on three countries countries –– Sierra Sierra Leone, Leone, Somalia Somalia and and Uganda Uganda –– to to interrogate interrogate CD CD from from aa perspective perspective of of state state structures structures strained strained by by three institutional tension. tension. The The paper paper buttresses buttresses on on case case study, study, as as epistemology epistemology and and methodology, methodology, and and uses uses institutional institutional rational rational choice choice institutional (IRC) as as lens. lens. The The paper paper shows shows that, that, applied applied in in the the three three jurisdictions, jurisdictions, projects projects developed developed from from CD CD would would lack lack structures structures of of (IRC) adaptation when faced with distress. Such situations could be fatal. Consequently, the paper develops capability search (CS) as adaptation when faced with distress. Such situations could be fatal. Consequently, the paper develops capability search (CS) as aa more adapting adapting procurement procurement strategy. strategy. Unlike Unlike CD, CD, CS CS is is aa search search for more for intellectual intellectual tools tools -- not not for for specification. specification. The The joint joint public-private public-private entity entity hinged hinged on on CS CS incrementally incrementally adjusts adjusts the the delivery delivery path path as as the the reality reality unfolds. unfolds. Therefore, Therefore, CS CS appreciates appreciates the the non-ergodicity non-ergodicity of of the the PPP PPP space. space. That That is, is, the the state state space space -- the the trajectory trajectory at at aa project project onset onset -- changes changes along along the the project project life life in in an an unpredictable unpredictable way. way. Yet, Yet, CS CS faces faces aa challenge challenge of of inadmissibility inadmissibility of of agreement-to-agree agreement-to-agree in in common common law, law, and and the the rigidity rigidity of of the the mainstream mainstream financing financing structures structures that that rely rely on on long-term long-term forecasts. forecasts. © 2017 The Authors. Published by B.V. © 2017 2017 The The Authors. Authors. Published Published by by Elsevier Elsevier B.V. © Elsevier B.V. Peer-review under responsibility of WORLD CONFERENCE ON TRANSPORT RESEARCH SOCIETY. Peer-review under responsibility of WORLD Peer-review under responsibility of WORLD CONFERENCE CONFERENCE ON ON TRANSPORT TRANSPORT RESEARCH RESEARCHSOCIETY. SOCIETY. Keywords: public-private partnerships partnerships ;; capability capability search search ;; competitive competitive dialogue; dialogue; institutional institutional rational rational choice; choice; state state fragility; fragility; ergodicity ergodicity Keywords: public-private

* * Corresponding Corresponding author. author. Tel.: Tel.: +44-7956-237-421; +44-7956-237-421; fax: fax: +44-2380-470-939. +44-2380-470-939. E-mail address: [email protected] [email protected] E-mail address: 2214-241X 2214-241X © © 2017 2017 The The Authors. Authors. Published Published by by Elsevier Elsevier B.V. B.V. Peer-review Peer-review under under responsibility responsibility of of WORLD WORLD CONFERENCE CONFERENCE ON ON TRANSPORT TRANSPORT RESEARCH RESEARCH SOCIETY. SOCIETY.

2352-1465 © 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Peer-review under responsibility of WORLD CONFERENCE ON TRANSPORT RESEARCH SOCIETY. 10.1016/j.trpro.2018.02.055

Fred Amonya / Transportation Research Procedia 25 (2017) 5291–5306 Fred Amonya / Transportation Research Procedia 00 (2017) 000–000

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1. Background: the reality of the paper Many cities of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) face complex interwoven challenges. Deteriorating transport infrastructure intertwines with a complex mix of traffic, both vehicular and non-vehicular; strains with utility companies; and tension with street traders. This picture will be vivid to many readers. Therefore, a photographic capture is not necessary to make the point. This paper draws from practical efforts at resolving a capsule of the challenge using PPP, and in particular, competitive dialogue (CD). The paper is a case study. It considers the phenomenon of the case in a longitudinal way. It digs into history, seeking salient effects, which works restricted to the contemporary would assume away. Moreover, the paper is addressed to a broad body of transport professionals. These readers will bear a variety of concerns, expectations and tools. Readers from the vantage point of developed economies might struggle to appreciate the institutional complexity of developing economies targeted by this paper, even though many of them will be familiar with the surface challenge of urban traffic. Yet, readers from developing economies will need to step back and look at the challenge to appreciate it. Whichever the vantage point, an interdisciplinary set of tools will be required for access. 2. The epistemology and methodology of case study The hypothetico-deductive (H-D) approach dominates research (Amonya 2015). Given that dominance, which is an attempt at mimicking the deterministic world of physical science, the foundation of case study requires explication. The H-D approach, as applied in social science, premises on stationarity. Generalization, including all forecasts, hinge on reduction in evolutions of state space to a stationary process. That is, a structure with time-invariant moments of the probability distribution. Formally: A process 𝑦𝑦 = {𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 , 𝑡𝑡 ∈ ℤ} defined on a probability space (𝑋𝑋, , ) is [strictly] stationary if  (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡1 , 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡2 , … 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 ) = (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡1+𝑘𝑘 , 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡2+𝑘𝑘 +, … 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛+𝑘𝑘 )

(1)

Where:

 is a set of outcomes (sample space),  are the events (-algebra subsets of ), and  is the probability function (:   )). Note: For an ergodic process, the sample moments converge to the population moments. Therefore, the H-D frame lays a proposition on the evolution of state space, and seeks to test it through experimentation. However, since social science does not enjoy the opportunity of control of physical science, perspectives (partial observations) of reality are used for the test. Within the timeframe of the observations, variations will emerge constituting non-stationarity. Moreover, the sources of these variations will not be identifiable, and they may be inaccessible. However, if these sources can be assumed away with a reasonable level of confidence, then the ensuing model is regarded sound. However, to refresh, this decision would be limited by the boundary of state space, the intensity of illumination, and the frame of time. Of the three, the middle one (illumination) can be improved. That is the essence of case research. A stronger illumination of a capsule of reality leads to a better comprehension of it. In the definition of Polanyi (1958: 6), such illumination is addition to knowledge - ‘a better comprehension of reality’. Therefore, a case study does not need the buttressing of the H-D frame to be epistemological secure. To the contrary, H-D generalization may fatally assume away important variables – unless Hirschman’s ‘hiding hand’ (1967: 10) is imported. Simply put, Hirschman argues that humanity is better off moving into projects on a premise of an erroneous trajectory, and subsequently summoning intrinsic creativity as the challenges of the error come to bear. This paper, like Flyvbjerg and Sunstein (2015), takes a contrary position. However, and this is the point often missed, the two approaches [case study and H-D] do not have to be in tension. Case study has the potential to highlight variables that improve H-D generalization – but any generalization should


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pay respect to non-ergodicity by either working at the margin of time or sticking to intrinsic generalization (see Johansson 2003). Further, the case methodology hinges on an axiomatic position that connects complexity to variety. The complex interwoven strands of reality lead to a cascade of questions. Therefore, a variety of tools is required in the illumination of the reality. That way, the interstices of the case capsule can be opened. Consequently, by definition, the case approach entails the use of multiple tools, and so does this paper. For extended consideration on misunderstandings of case study, Flyvbjerg (2011) would be a good retreat. On the evolution and challenges of the H-D approach, see Amonya (2014 and 2015). 3. The mechanics of competitive dialogue (CD) The case examines CD, asking how the procurement tool can be used in the socio-economic context of SSA. So, what is CD? What is its construction, structure and function (CSF)? See Amonya (2015) for a discussion of CSF, a frame used for explicating complex concepts. Competitive Dialogue is a synthesis of technology. It was developed by the European Commission (EC) and presented first in Directive 2004/18/EC of 2004 (see Burnett 2009 and Hoezen et al. 2012 for this history). The tool (CD) was devised for situations where policy objective cannot be translated into service specification. In these situations, the requisite technology (both management and engineering) is not clear. Therefore, CD seeks to synthesize technology. Fig1 identifies CD amongst other procurement procedures. While the others seek tenders on receiving expressions of interest, CD lays the stage for dialogue. The dialogue is expected to yield project specification. Consequently, CD is built on two premises. First, the private sector can contribute significantly to the synthesis of the technology. Secondly, the state as structure provides an adequate platform for managing the competition amongst private actors in the lead to the service specification. This paper examines the two cords of premise in the context of three countries of SSA, and pursues the remolding necessary. The paper focuses of Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda – three states that have experienced tensions of protracted violence in the past two decades. Note: The paper recognizes the most recent challenge of Somalia including Somaliland. To that end, the pre-1991 geographical demarcation is used without any prejudice.

Fig 1: Mapping competitive dialogue

Invitation to tender

Evaluation of tender

Negotiated procedure (min 3 bidders)

Award (provide for standstill period)

CD

Receipt of tender

Restricted procedure (min 5 bidders)

Invitation to tender (min 3 bidders)

Invitation to participate in dialogue

Invitation to tender Receive expression of interest

Contract notice

Prior information notice (PIN)

Open procedure


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4. The structure of the state: a trilogy of perspectives 4.1. The state and institutionalism The terminology ‘state’ is ubiquitous. With that widespread use, comes casualness. However, when faced with a complex phenomenon – such as the complex space of urban infrastructure in SSA that motivated this paper – the terminology must not be used casually. It must be dissected. Otherwise, without this exacting approach, a critical examination of CD is not possible. The instrument (CD) is built on the two cords of PPP, the state and private actor (investor). Any dissection requires a lens. The instant uses institutional rational choice (IRC). This is a strand of institutionalism. This spectrum of scholarship is broad and the attendant terminologies interwoven. Therefore, for clarity, IRC will be contrasted with the other strands of institutionalism. First, human action can be placed on a spectrum of influence ranging from individual rationality to social context or environment as shown in fig2. That is, at one end, some scholars reduce all decisions to the rational individual. At the other end of the spectrum, the scholars hold the social environment wholly responsible for human decisions. The two ends are asymptotic.

Institutionalism: spectrum of influence

Social context (environment)

Individual rationality

Fig 2: Spectrum of institutionalism

The placement of the scholars on the spectrum traces back to their academic domains. Proponents of new institutional economics challenge individual rationality from a vantage point of that subject (economics). Even within this strand, emphasis differs. North (1981) focuses on the mechanics of transactions, and follows Coase (1937 and 1960) and Williamson (1979). Ostrom (1991) tends to left. The worker emphasizes the social organization. To this school, limits of cognition cf. Cohen et al. 1972) as well as the intrinsic activity of values and norms of society limit individual rationality in the social commons. While the IRC frame is most closely associated with Ostrom (Amonya 2010), the functionality of the frame includes the entire class of scholarship challenging individual rationality from the vantage point of economics. The other strands of institutionalism tend to the left of IRC. Schofer et al. (2012) refer to this portion of the spectrum as sociological institutionalism. These scholars consider social and trans-national spaces. For example, scholarship emerging from political science challenges the premises of social and public choice theories. To this end, Shepsle (1979:27) challenges the ‘atomistic and institutionally sparse’ character of social choice theory. In a later work (Shepsle 1989) the author makes a reflexive consideration of rational choice – which illustrates the fuzzy character of the spectrum of institutionalism. Another strand of sociological institutionalism emerges from international relations. This strand is a critique of the analytical framework of game theory used in trans-national dealings, which framework reduces to individual rationality. Without an underpinning persistent structure, relationships amongst states would continually collapse and reconstitute as opportunities for gain emerge. However, many of these relationships persist. In explanation, scholars such as Keohane (1989 and 2005) argue that institutional structures are not removed from the states. These structures continually change the character of the states. To that extent, they are intrinsic to the states – a departure from the framework of game theory.


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When brought to the empirical surface of transactions, the discussion above will appear too abstract, even threatening irrelevancy. It is relevant. First, CD is an emerging reality in the three countries and the East African region. In Uganda (2015) and Kenya (2014), for example, CD is included in the PPP legislation. The procurement instrument (CD) will be used in a complex and dynamical space, as discussed in subsequent sections. A strata of stability can be assumed, and this is the premise in the construction of CD as discussed in Section 5. Alternatively, the complexity of the public spaces illuminated by the abstractions above can be appreciated. Consequently, an approach tending to CS could be adopted instead of waiting for decades to gather sets of project failures and distresses, and working backwards in a search for explanation. The latter is the essence of the abstraction: theory orders reality. These abstractions do not guarantee success. However, they confront reality – not shying away from it. 4.2. Structure and evolution of the state The state is a platform of competition for CD. In that regard, this is the ensuing question: What is the integrity (functional strength) of the state? That question must be addressed in respect to one of the two definitional elements of the state – protection of property rights (see North 1981), and monopoly over violence. That question is pertinent because CD is a competition of intellectual property. The structure of the state cannot be addressed divorced from its evolution. To attempt doing so would be tantamount to assuming the state is deterministic, that is, sociologically dead. Clearly, it is not. The closest scholarship has approached such determinism in respect to the state is constitutional textualism (Scalia 1997). However, the state does not buttress in the constitution alone, principal though it is. The state interacts with the institution, the norms and values, within the boundaries of the state. Moreover, premising on IRC, rational decisions during constitution-making are bounded within, or controlled by, the institution, which is neither static nor completely rational. Therefore, the state is sociologically alive, and this paper traces the evolution of the three states (Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda) in an effort to illuminate the place of intellectual property. Before looking at the three countries, it is helpful to reflect on the birth of the concept of the state. The concept is a derivative of economic surplus. The state emerged in AD 12 following First Agricultural Revolution. Technology enabled human ecologies to pull away from the gathering of the Paleolithic Period. The resulting food surplus allowed the elite to focus on protection of the communities and management of individual inputs, leading to the twin cardinals of the Northian state (North 1981). This genesis is detailed in Thomas (1991) and Weisdorf (2005). As a more suggestive framing, this early institutional change formalizes as follows: T: ℝn → ℝ2

(2)

Where n is the array of concerns associated with the Paleolithic gathering, which condenses to the twin cardinals of the state. Of particular concern to scholarship on state fragility is the inverse the surjective in 4.1. Does the collapse of state structure lead to chaos, or a more orderly arrangement with sprinkles of aristocracy? When and how? Those questions are an offshoot for another work. The purpose of the trace above was to provide a priming for an exploration of the evolution of the three case states, which follows. 4.3. The three states: Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda Before Western imperial intervention of the nineteenth century, the three countries (Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda) each comprised a collage of neighboring ethnic states. These early states were of different strengths, from strong monarchies to weaker crystallized kinships. For the early social anthropology of Sierra Leone, see Thomas (1970); for Somalia, Lewis (2008); and for a trace of Uganda see Mazrui (1978). Imperialism placed a clamp on the ethnic collages. The new mold created new tensions and exacerbated existing ones. However, the axiomatic logic of the clamps was eventual homogeneity. All the three attained independence in the early sixties (Sierra Leone, 1961; Somalia, 1960; and Uganda, 1962). The new agents of the states were largely products of local universities, modelled, perhaps inevitably, on Western


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structures. Sierra Leone relied on Fourah Bay College (FBC); Somalia had the National University (SNU); and Uganda depended on Makerere. Of the three, FBC and Makerere were regional centres, of global recognition (see Nicol 1963). The history of SNU (Abdi 1998) was rather difficult. The university was caught in the Italian - British imperial tension. In contrast to the other two, SNU had weak regional significance. The immediate challenge of the new leaders was keeping the integrity of the state. That meant defusing [ethnic] institutional tensions. This nationalist drive benefitted from the anti-colonial struggle, and hence it often took a socialist stance; see McGowan (2003) and Mazrui (1995). In Somalia, this stance was named Scientific Socialism (see Menkhaus 2000); and in Uganda, the Common Man’s Charter (see Aasland 1974). However, Sierra Leone is different. The binding force of nationalism does not show an explicit socialist tendency, and in fact, workers like Bah (2014) have pronounced that Sierra Leone has never experienced socialism. Why does this left-right political balance matter? The socialist lens sees intellectual property as a public good resident in an individual. The society invests in the most gifted, sending them for higher education. Later, should these individuals have the intellectual capacity and positioning to solve complex problems of the society, the common strand of public service should bind them. On the other hand, the capitalist lens relies on the ‘invisible hand’ to translate selfish interests to the commons of public service. Therefore, the socialist lens would see CD as a less adversarial exercise, which requires a lower wall of protection of intellectual property than would the capitalist frame. Moreover, while these left-right strands of thought may be removed from the textual descriptors of the state, starting with the constitution, they will continue to reside in the institution - that is, the values and norms of the society. That is a cord of institutional rational choice, and a premise of this paper. These institutional nuances would be expected to surface in the practical exercise of CD. What is the decay path of such strands of the institution? While that question cannot be answered in a deterministic way, by definition, institutions outlive the actors. The actors of the sixties and seventies continue to guide the three countries, though. Therefore, the institutional strands from that period cannot be dismissed in analyses of the three states. How did the nationalist forces of the sixties evolve? Two influences have been identified – ethnic institutional tensions and the Cold War (Amonya 2014). However, ultimately, the state is fed by economics. To that end, fig3 traces military coups in SSA (a proxy for state strength), and its economy, alongside the world economy. Consequently, the chart paints the context of the three countries from a perspective of the influences identified above. Moreover, given the primacy of imperialism on the institutional landscape of Africa, it is imperative to search for reflections of imperial heritage on the economic plate of the continent, and hence table 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: states and the economics

No of military coups

Fig 3: Sub-Saharan Africa – state and economy Sources: WDI (World Bank) and African Development Bank

2013

2011

2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

Year

GDP world (trillion current USD)

1993

1991

1989

1987

1985

1983

0

1981

200 1979

400

10 1977

600

20

1975

800

30

1973

40

1971

1000

1969

1200

50

1967

1400

60

1965

70

1963

1600

0

GDP SSA_developing (billion current USD)

SSA GDP

1800

80

1961

SSA coups and world GDP

90


5297

7

Table 1: Tracing imperial heritage in economic growth of SSA

Dependent variable: y2014 Method: least squares Date: 09/13/15 time: 13:41 Sample: 1 48 Included observations: 47 Y2014 = C(1) + C(2)*Li Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Statistic

Prob.

C(1)

5.73

0.96

5.99

0.00

C(2)

-1.34

1.64

-0.82

0.42

R-squared

0.01

Mean dependent var

5.28

Adjusted R-squared

-0.01

S.D. dependent var

5.31

S.E. of regression

5.33

Akaike info criterion

6.23

Sum squared resid

1278.92

Schwarz criterion

6.31

Log likelihood

-144.33

Hannan-Quinn criter.

6.26

F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)

0.67 0.42

Durbin-Watson stat

2.39

Year

C(1)

C(2)

SE (C1)

SE (C2)

T (C1)

T (C2)

P (C1)

P (C2)

1966

3.65

0.26

1.24

2.15

2.94

0.12

0.01

0.90

1970

6.94

0.08

1.48

2.52

4.70

0.03

0.00

0.97

1975

2.18

4.67

1.82

3.20

1.20

1.46

0.24

0.15

1980

1.55

0.18

1.54

2.75

1.00

0.06

0.32

0.95

1985

2.72

2.25

1.18

1.98

2.30

1.14

0.03

0.26

1990

1.63

-1.23

1.74

3.02

0.94

-0.41

0.35

0.69

1995

5.21

-0.25

1.27

2.14

4.09

-0.12

0.00

0.91

2000

4.06

-1.38

1.04

1.74

3.91

-0.79

0.00

0.43

2005

5.17

0.71

0.83

1.41

6.23

0.50

0.00

0.62

2010

5.68

-0.08

0.58

1.00

9.75

-0.08

0.00

0.93

2014 5.73 -1.34 0.96 1.64 5.99 -0.82 0.00 0.42 Note: This is an output of Eviews drawing on 48 countries of SSA. Anglophone countries were used as dummy defined by {𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 |𝑖𝑖=1 }. This institutional divide is insignificant along the economic trajectory of the region. Source: African Development Indicators

Fig3 shows there was a spike in military coups in 1966-67. However, the region maintained an upward GDP trend, and table 1 shows that institutional differences arising from differences in imperial heritage do not seem to reflect on the economic trajectory post-independence. Therefore, the GDP trajectory post-independence points to a number of possibilities. First, it might suggest the troubled countries were the lesser economies. Secondly, the strength of the global economy had an overriding drag


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across the region. Third, the troubles of 1966-7 spread across the region leading to the economic downturn of the early eighties; however, the global economy stagnated in the same period, reducing the strength of this argument. In respect to the first possibility, McGowan (2003) shows that the coups spread across the continent. Therefore, the second point seems to bear the most strength. That is, global growth of the sixties and seventies dragged along SSA. Moreover, a plot of the three economies (fig4) shows they followed the regional trend described above. GDP: Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda

30

GDP (Current Billion USD)

25 20 15 10

2013

2011

2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

1993

1991

1989

1987

1985

1983

1981

1979

1977

1975

1973

1971

1969

1967

1965

1963

0

1961

5

Year GDP Sierra Leone ( Curren Billion USD)

GDP Somalia (Current Billion USD)

GDP Uganda (Current Billion USD)

Fig 4: GDP of Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda Source: WDI (World Bank)

In addition, all the three countries experienced coups, and failed coups, in the sixties and seventies. In Sierra Leone, the coups started in 1967 when the APC government was ousted (Keen 2005 and Fisher 1969). In Somalia, Said Barre forced his way to power in 1969 (detailed in Laitin 1976). Uganda had Amin. See Mazrui (1975) for an institutional mechanics of Amin’s rise to the 1972 coup. So, while the three states were strained by institutional forces in the sixties and seventies, the economies were buoyed by the global trend. However, how did the strains, and eventually the coups, affect the nationalist bind? Military means to power diminish the strength of democratic appeal. While the extent can be debated, on that note alone, these coups diminished the appeal of individual capability as a means to attaining personal desires, and on a stable platform of the state. The three states failed in their cardinal function of monopoly over violence (North 1981). Consequently, the trust the people would have had in the state, as a protector of property rights, diminished – simply because the states themselves were weak. These are axiomatic derivatives. Come the eighties, SAP emerged. Sierra Leone and Somalia were still under a militaristic clamp, continually threatened by other power seekers. In Uganda, Amin had just been overthrown (1979), and the new actors had to reconstruct the state. Therefore, SAP hit cracked or weak (nascent) state structures. Sierra Leone and Uganda provided access to SAP – not Somalia, the state was strongest, in a strict Northian sense. There was a more limited access for SAP in Somalia (cf. Adedeji 1999, and Stein and Nafziger 1991). The pursuit of SAP was clear – lay a free-market platform. However, the state on which this platform was to be laid was facing influences of institutional disillusion. Trust in the state had diminished. Moreover, in the case of Somalia and Uganda, the old state structures were socialist. Actors of the state were expected to have transformed from a mind-set of socialism to a mind-set of chaos, and now, a mind-set of capitalism within a decade. That is an institutional vortex. It is a tri-track vortex of socialism, chaos and capitalism.


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Two decades after SAP, Sierra Leone and Uganda face PPP - Somalia is still mired in conflict. Before digging into the new phase, PPP is one of the terminologies that suffer from the tragedy of ubiquity, joining ‘policy’ and ‘institution’. The varied use undermines hermeneutical rigor. The logical way out is to tap the etymology of the word – and hopefully – identify the point of dispersion and confusion. At that point of dispersion, a meaning can be placed. That exercise is outside the scope of this work but Amonya and Okello (2014) consider the matter. Therefore, in definition, PPP is a philosophy of government that seeks joint risk management of public service by the state and private sector. A prominent tool of PPP is CD (Sec 3). The tool premises on the existence of a competition-enabling state platform, and a private sector with a capability to provide pathways (solutions) to the policy objective. In the two countries (Sierra Leone and Uganda), CD faces the institutional vortex above. The third (Somalia) should find decent vantage points in the former two when calm is restored in the country. The dominance H-D has led to the notion that a tool like CD can only be understood by examining the observed effects of its application. That is, pure empiricism must rule. That is misleading. We can sketch effects by examining two colliding bodies (Fischer 2003 and Fry 2006). That is the analytic approach of this paper. The next section focuses on the infrastructure space, and particularly the roads sector, as a point on the institutional vortex described above. 5. The vortex of the infrastructure space 5.1. Emergence of structural adjustment program (SAP) and public-private partnerships(PPP) In this context, SAP refers to a wave of public sector reforms of the eighties and nineties. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) asked borrower countries to implement the reforms as a condition for loans. These countries were in distress following the global economic crisis that started in the late seventies. The SSA region was severely affected. For the origin and depth of SAP, see Easterly (2005). The wave of SAP struck the road sector of SSA in the early nineties. In most countries, the sector had management arrangements and institutional structures inherited from the imperial regime (Amonya 2006). Predominantly, the state played the client and supplier role, commonly called ‘force account’. However, for the upgrading of trunk roads, the supplier role was contracted out, and these projects were mainly donor funded (particularly by the World Bank). In the three case countries, this commercialization had started in the sixties, and mirrored the post-War changes in road management across the West, and particularly in Britain (Robinson et al. 1998 and Talvitie 1996). The wave of SAP sought the corporatization of road management. The first step was to create client units within the ministries, along with road funds to improve accountability. These client units would later be removed from the ministries leading to arm’s length agencies and the attendant funds. That change would allow the parent ministries to focus on policy. In Sierra Leone, the client unit was formed in 1993. However, it would take a decade before the corporatization would be complete. Under the divestiture program of the ministry of finance [a SAP pursuit], the new agency was formed in 2003. The PPP unit was formed in 2014. Note that between 1991 and 2002, the country was mired in a civil war (Keen 2005 and Zack-Williams 1999) for a dissection of this period. It would take another seven years for the autonomous road fund to emerge. The road sector of Sierra Leone needs to be examined through the tri-track institutional vortex of socialism, chaos and capitalism. The socialist component was minimal in the country. Therefore, the present tension is between the tracks of chaos and capitalism. Both tracks appreciate the individual. However, capitalism expects state structure to ensure property rights. The institution of chaos is resigned to ineffective state. It is a struggle of institutional legitimation and delegitimation. The vector of success will depend the strengthening of the state, which reflexively, depends on an enabling road network. This complexity, captured in fig5, shows that CD would not find the implied platform for competition in Sierra Leone. The platform is under reflexive institutional tension of chaos and capitalism. These are not exclusive but dominant forces.

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Road authority: corporatisation of road management Road fund: de-politicisation of funding PPP unit: focusing policy and delivery environment

PPP

Vortex of infrastructure and sociological challenges

Competitive dialogue

Other MDAs and supra-national organisations

Fifty years of policy trunks: - Socialist stances of the sixties and seventies - Structural adjustment program (SAP) of the eighties and nineties - Emerging PPP

Trilogy of structural challenges  Structure of the state [property rights]  Institution of the private sector  Institution of the society

Fig 5: The vortex of infrastructure management

Somalia has been in conflict since 1991. It has not experienced evolution in road management similar to Sierra Leone. However, Uganda has, and that will be the new turn. However, before moving to Uganda, it is worth refreshing that the tri-track institutional vortex is a lens applicable to Somalia. The tracks of socialism and chaos have been strong in the country (cf. Menkhaus 2000). Moreover, in the Diaspora, capitalism has found a path to the country. Consequently, the country is in reflexive tension of socialism and chaotic capitalism. This frame will be useful in analyzing the country’s infrastructure sector as strife subsides. On a pedagogical note, the richness of case study is manifested in this stoppage. Not all tracks in an archaeological dig of a case will progress to the end. However, the halted ones end with a knot providing a platform and triggers for future research. On the hypothetico-deductive platform, the terminated tracks would be clamped, and effectively dismissed, as statistical residual. Road reform in Uganda presents a particularly rich fodder for the analysis of the reverberations of SAP. That reform follows. 5.2. Stoppage: reflection on road reform in Uganda The road ‘authority’ of Uganda (UNRA) was enacted in 2006. However, it only became functional in 2008. The fund was enacted the same year. Unlike the case of Sierra Leone, the fund was designed as a dedicated entity for user charges from the outset. In other words, it was designed as a ‘second generation’ fund, see Heggie and Vickers (1998). The PPP unit is being crafted. Road reform in Uganda, seen through the IRC lens, raises many questions. First, the dynamics of the reform needs to be explored deeper. A reasonable starting point is the road management initiative (RMI) launched by the World Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in the late eighties (Amonya and Okello


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2012, and Heggie and Vickers 1998). This early quest for efficiency focused on reforms within the existing organizational structures of the sector. However, in the late nineties, the World Bank noted that the internal reforms were ineffective and a more fundamental change that imported private sector values and practices was required. That pursuit is crystalized in the seminal work of Heggie and Vickers. This new effort advocated for executive agencies for road management. In Uganda, the Road Agency Formation Unit (RAFU) was formed in 1998. The development component of road projects moved to RAFU. However, institutionally, this was not a difficult move. Development projects were largely managed by donors. The underpinning institutions of these projects, the norms and values, were different from the broader institution of the ministry. In some cases, the foreign development agency was the client and the local ministry of works simply a recipient. To this end, projects funded by Danish aid (DANIDA) are an example. Therefore, the heavy task of institutional reform of Uganda’s roads sector would be the transfer of the maintenance function to the new agency. That shift lasted a decade. Today, UNRA is moving away from the commercialization principles that led to the entity (Wesonga 2016). This is a delegitimation of the legitimation effort of two decades for road reform. Why? The lesson of abstractions in this paper is that policy space is complex and dynamical. The different institutions of the roads sector have links to other entities of the state and the international funding community. The present network of actors and issues trace back in history. The calculus of dynamical systems is clear – these nonlinear systems do not have stable solutions. Therefore, any diagnosis and prescription should be short-term and incremental, drawing on Taylor approximation. In explaining the delay in establishing UNRA, the World Bank (2011:75) noted, ‘Road Agency Formation Unit (RAFU) reduced the sense of urgency in moving forward’. In other words, the reform should have been swift. However, that argument assumes when human agency is moved to a new institutional set, the delegitimation of the old institution that influenced their action proceeds faster. Further, the argument of the World Bank assumes the institutional of RAFU was set to the design parameters. It assumes RAFU was ready to receive the maintenance team from the ministry of works along with the straddling institution. Moreover, the argument of the Bank assumes that other institutional links, within and outside government, are mild. It is a complex situation. The assumptions above cannot be defended as a collective. Therefore, while it is easy to sympathize with the argument of the Bank since delays are frustrating, resilience and complexity of institutions guides otherwise. They point to an incremental and recursive approach in dealing with complex dynamical systems. This resilience and complexity becomes more evident looking at Uganda of the sixties and seventies, while noting that many of the key policy actors of the country were molded in that period. That examination is done in Section 5.3. Finally, it could be argued that, on a long time line, the present legitimation–delegitimation mutations pan out as an incremental-recursive structure. It could be so, but only as an outcome of serendipity. This paper argues for conscious design. 5.3. Socialist stances of the sixties and seventies Wearing the vortex lens, the seventies delivered the institution of chaos, disillusionment with the state. That is a delegitimation of the socialist track of the sixties. The wave of SAP struck in the late eighties finding the country in an institutional interregnum. The force of chaos had been eliminated but not the institution. However, the institution of chaos was being moderated by the institution of socialism. Therefore, the eighties is characterized as a period of socialist chaos. For a deeper appreciation of this taxonomy, see Mamdani 1990, Mazrui 1978, and Kanyeihamba 1973. Therefore, the present attempt at creating a PPP unit is a legitimation of the institution of capitalism. However, is the delegitimation of the institution of socialist chaos largely complete? It is difficult to answer in the affirmative when, at present, the country is caught in a judicial probe of corruption in the road agency (Sanya 2015, and Kafeero 2014 and 2015). Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that, in Uganda, CD would strike a road sector in a tension of capitalism and socialist chaos. The platform of competition and intellectual rights on which CD is built is lacking. Therefore, the exploration of the three countries shows they do not have the requisite platform for CD. However, they all face complex interwoven challenges perhaps most clearly manifested in the urban centers. In these centers,


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the challenge of infrastructure deterioration is vivid. However, intertwined is a complex mix of traffic, both vehicular and non-vehicular. Moreover, these two are also intertwined and in tension with utility companies and street traders. The traditional approach is for each sector to try solving their strand of the problem. In appreciation of the interconnectedness of the strands, the sectors meet under an organizational public sector umbrella – for instance, the prime minister’s office. The consideration of CD under PPP is an improvement. It shows the sectors appreciate that the interwoven challenge cannot be solved in isolation. However, CD assumes a stable solution (specification) will emerge at the end of the dialogue. That assumption would hold had the challenge been a purely engineering one. Engineering technology is deterministic – subsuming common white noise and the attendant stochastic character. Once the initial state is established, the trajectory will be stable. Therefore, CD reduces to the task of establishing the initial state. However, the challenge above entails the interaction of engineering and sociology. The strands of engineering interact not just with each other but also with the social space – including polity. That is not a deterministic challenge, and not a stochastic one. It is a challenge of non-ergodicity. Therefore, any trajectory of state space at the onset of the project will come under distress. A new approach is required – one that is adaptive to the unfolding phases of nonergodicity. This paper suggests capability search (CS). 6. From competitive dialogue (CD) to capability search (CS) Competitive dialogue invites intellectual apparatus to wade through complexity seeking an optimal solution. A contract will only emerge at the end of that exercise, while intellectual rights must be protected along the competition. The institutional vortex of the three cases dissected above would distress the CD exercise. That is a micro-level outlook of the dialogue. At the macro, the moulding state structures would struggle to offer protection. Capability search hinges on solution-at-the-margin. Instead of seeking solutions in the hazardous vortex, CS seeks a set of intellectual tools suitable for the visible state space. To that end, it starts with a situational analysis of the policy environment. Thereafter, it considers the policy objective. On the basis of that environment-objective analysis, CS explores and invites suitable private sector expertise. Note the difference, CD digs for a solution across the continuum of time so it can yield a specification. On the other hand, CS seeks to seat an adaptive team in the vortex. The team should then be trusted to incrementally develop solutions, and hence ‘solution-at-the-margin’. This incremental approach to managing the infrastructure space traces back to post-War scholarship, and notably Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963). More recently, Talvitie (2006) has advocated for ‘experiential incrementalism’. This paper builds on that trunk of scholarship while focusing on CD, as a compositional structure in the wave of PPP hitting an infrastructure space conceptualized as a non-ergodic dynamical system. The result is CS. The search for capability is an installation of the foundation for a technological transformation. Formally: T: ℝg → ℝ3

(3)

Where g is the number of government entities (ministries, departments and agencies, MDAs) that are interlocked by the complex challenge in focus.

The three resulting dimensions of (3) are private equity, public equity and debt. This taxonomy of PPP interests draws from a conceptualization of PPP as a dynamical system whose manifold covers the three dimensions. This system, discussed in Amonya 2015, formalizes as follows: 𝑺𝑺̇(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)𝑺𝑺(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡)𝑷𝑷(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)𝑼𝑼(𝑡𝑡) Where:

𝑺𝑺(𝑡𝑡) ∈ ℝ3 is the state space of the market comprising three interests (private equity, public equity and debt) – the ‘real’ risk 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) ∈ ℝ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3 is a matrix of project risks distributed to the three market interests

(4)


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𝑷𝑷(𝑡𝑡) ∈ ℝ3 is the impetus of PPP (funds seeking investment) - impacting the country exogenously 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡) ∈ ℝ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3 captures PPP risk factors aligned to the three markets

𝑼𝑼(𝑡𝑡) ∈ ℝ3 is the force of technological change [exogenous] attributed to the three interests 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) ∈ ℝ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3 captures the environment of technological change.

The vector space of interests S (t) in Equation 4 reflexively interacts with the environment U (t). However, under common law jurisdiction, CD would assume this environment to be static. Otherwise, the specification crafted following CD would require an agreement-to-agree structure, which common law does not admit. Common law regards such contracts incomplete (cf. Posner 1999 and Burton 1980). Given the institutional vortex, and the attendant molding states, examined above, this rigidity of CD (static specification) bears the potential of fatal distress. Moreover, to account for the rigidity of CD, private equity and debt will assume the boundary of the vector space S (t) in their risk analyses. That is inefficient and expensive to the ultimate principal, the people (users of the facility). It shows up in high expectation of returns. The search for capability under CS is an acceptance of the dynamical character of Equation (3). However, mainstream private actors would struggle with this regime. They have to interact with rigid structures in the background – not just the law identified above, but also the financing structures. Moreover, at every scale and instance of PPP, there is reflexive interplay between the institution [norms and values] as structure and the agents (cf. structuration, Giddens 1984). Formally: For a set of agents a and institutional strands i belonging to a community C, a relationship R exists between the agents and institution. That is: (5)

∀ (a, i) ∈ C: T: aRi

The agency-institution reflexivity is depicted in Fig 6. The fundamental goal of CS, as a tool of PPP, is to lay a new institution of partnering, and hence provide a requisite platform for infrastructure science (physical and social) as formalized in (5). The change is a delegitimation of the existing institution. State

Institution

Agency

Capability Search (tool of PPP)

Fig 6: Structural action of PPP

The main concern of the proponents of PPP will be the rate of convergence to the new institution. That concern, as a continuum, formalizes as follows: ∇. (𝐟𝐟𝑖𝑖 ∘ 𝐟𝐟𝑎𝑎 ) Where:

(6)


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𝐟𝐟𝑖𝑖 is a vector function capturing the influence of the existing institution on the agency

𝐟𝐟𝑎𝑎 is the institutional influence of PPP on the agency.

The Derivative can be simplified in short-term analysis. In that situation, the institution can be considered a scalar function, which reduces to a proxy weighting w in risk analyses. Here is the new formulation: ∇. (w𝐟𝐟𝑎𝑎 ) = 𝐟𝐟𝑎𝑎 . (∇w) + w(∇. 𝐟𝐟𝑎𝑎 )

(7)

If institutional strength is considered constant across the agency then fa . (∇w) vanishes. The challenge of organisational change then reduces to the building of a new agency underpinned by a new PPP institution. This is the common practice reflected in the plethora of PPP capacity building work across the world. They cannot hold in the long-run because of Derivative 6. The strength of CS resides in its potential to segment institutional change, and hence make an appropriate use Equation 7. In contrast, CD assumes away institutional evolution. Along the life of the project, these evolutions will bring the service specification, and the contract, under distress. However, CS must be wrapped in a team that can understand institutional evolution, as it applies the science of infrastructure. This newly synthesized tool (CS) finds an epistemic position on a wider manifold of scholarship concerned with the uncertainty of social space. Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) crystallize their struggle with the uncertain social space by arguing for a ‘strategy of disjointed incrementalism’. Writing in the same year, Arrow (1963) shows that a stable and surjective structure of policy is impossible in a democracy – devoid of the rigidity of autocracy. Therefore, if we hold to Fukuyama’s flow of the liberal frontier (1989), the vortex of the infrastructure space captured in this paper cannot be ignored neither can CS. 7. Conclusion Enquiry seeks to predict, explain, or simply to illuminate reality. The last is the domain of case study. In appreciation of complexity, case study dissects reality in a longitudinal way using a variety of tools (numerical, textual, or hermeneutics). The primary object of study is the illuminated reality as an addition to the broader comprehension (body of knowledge). This case study attends to competitive dialogue (CD), a tool of PPP, which is most prominent from a procurement perspective yet its impact permeates public policy and management. The tool was crafted by the European Commission for complex projects. On these projects, public actors cannot map out the delivery paths or specifications for the motivating policy objective. Consequently, the public actors seek private sector participation. The premise of CD is competition in an environment that secures intellectual rights. Therefore, CD rests on the functionality of the state. The paper triangulates on SSA countries whose histories show state distress - Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda. The political, social and economic tapestry of these countries forms a vantage point for viewing CD. The resulting view, using IRC as lens, is an institutional vortex. Three streams of institution swirl around the object of CD. The first is the socialist stream following independence. Secondly, the institution of chaos of the sixties and seventies emerges. Finally, the capitalist stream underpinning SAP is attempting to gain prominence. That vortex does not suit CD. The competing institutional streams would strain the cords of CD. The paper molds a new tool. It is capability search (CS). It is more adapting than CD, seeking a combination of intellectual tools not a defined path, as does CD, as the basis of contract. The joint public and private project vehicle, hinged on CS, then incrementally changes the path to service delivery as the reality unfolds. That way, CS respects the non-ergodic reality of the PPP space, and hence avoids potentially fatal distresses. However, CS faces legal and financial challenges. Common law does not admit agreement-to-agree, characteristic of CS. In addition, the main financing structures of infrastructure are built on the rigidity of forecasting – yet CS argues that these rigid models, including the stochastic but ergodic ones, will crack and collapse under non-ergodicity. Finally, being an analytic construct, CS is a nudge on the front that argues against empirical testing as the definitive gate of scientific knowledge. Particulars of reality allow us to construct a combination of them, and the product is no


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