Partnership in Urban Regeneration in the UK: The Sheffield Central ...

Urban Studies, Vol . 31, No . 8, 1994 1303-1324

Partnership in Urban Regeneration in the UK : The Sheffield Central Area Study Paul Lawless [Paper first received, February 1993 ; in final form, August 19931

Summary. During the later 1980s, support for public-private sector partnerships came to the fore in British urban policy. This paper explores one particular manifestation of partnership in an English provincial city, the Sheffield Central Area Study, within the context of growth coalition and regime theories . Analysis of agendas adopted by partners and questions of power, suggests that existing theories do not satisfactorily account for experience within partnerships. In particular, in the British context, conceptualisations of partnership need to embrace questions such as the relatively strong position of local government and its professionalised bureaucracy, and the commensurately weaker status of the business community in general and landowners in particular.

Introduction One aspect of urban governance during the 1980s was the degree to which central government accentuated its control over local administration (Goodwin, 1992). This occurred in a number of ways . Local financial autonomy was reduced ; legal impediments designed to restrict local government action were implemented ; an entire tier of metropolitan local government was removed ; and new non-elected agencies such as Training and Enterprise Councils and Urban Development Corporations were created . This centralisation was not perhaps as all encompassing as is often assumed. Observers have pointed out that relations between central and local government in England were characterised by trends other than centralisation-such as ambiguity, negotiation and confusion (Rhodes, 1992) . And in Wales and especially in Scotland, there was evidence

that more mutually acceptable relationships between the centre and local government remained in place for much of the decade . Nevertheless, on the broad canvas it would be difficult to argue that the 1980s witnessed anything other than a deepening of central control . Equally, it is reasonable to argue that the effects of this accentuation in the power of the centre were most obviously apparent in the major, usually Labour-controlled, English conurbations . By the late 1980s and early 1990s this was reflected in, inter alia, substantial budget reductions and the curtailing of policy initiatives in areas such as local economic development (Audit Commission, 1989) . One outcome of this centralisation of power was the deepening privatisation of policy-making and implementation . This

Paul Lawless is at the Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University, Pond Street, Sheffield SI I WB, UK.

1303

1304

PAUL LAWLESS

trend was especially evident in relation to policy towards the cities (Parkinson, 1989) . Throughout the 1980s business organisations and representatives from the private sector came to play a more central role in the functioning of urban policy . This occurred in a number of ways . Chambers of Commerce vetted Urban Programme submissions ; private-sector interests dominated the boards of Urban Development Corporations ; local business played a crucial role in City Challenge submissions ; and so on . This privatisation was acknowledged and promoted by the government. In its 1988 statement on urban policy Action for Cities, for example, local government figured hardly at all within a programme whose prime objective was to encourage private-sector investment in the older conurbations (HMSO, 1988) . However, this 1988 statement probably represents the high tide of anti-collectivism towards the cities . By 1990, in its review of Action for Cities, the Department of the Environment argued that urban regeneration would require a "spirit of co-operation, of partnership between all of those involved in central and local government, (and) local business" (Department of the Environment, 1990, p . 19) . This consensual approach on the part of the government reflected rather more accurately attitudes towards urban regeneration evident within the private sector itself. In 1988, the Confederation of British Industry argued that "business, local authorities, and central government all have crucial and complementary roles to play" [in urban regeneration] (CBI, 1988, p . 10) . This essentially cooperative approach towards urban regeneration epitomised much of the private sector's effort in the field of urban regeneration (Lawless, 1991) . This was true for organisations such as Business in the Community and the British Chambers of Commerce . The latter, for example, specifically argued for a "framework of genuine partnership" within which to organise the renewal of the major conurbations (British Chambers of Commerce, 1988, p . 28), a plea which was to receive considerable support in a number of

British cities (Judd and Parkinson, 1990), including Sheffield . Partnership in Sheffield

The 1980s in Sheffield witnessed dramatic political change (Lawless, 1990 ; Seyd, 1988) . For much of the first half of the decade, the city council adopted what can be perceived as a `radical' approach towards local governance in general and local economic development in particular. An Employment Department was established ; funds were made available for new economic initiatives ; and efforts were made to introduce an interventionist local economic strategy as a counterpoint to government macroeconomic strategy . Whatever the merits or otherwise of this programme, by the mid years of the decade, the local authority in effect abandoned the approach and moved rapidly instead to the adoption of a `partnership' with business, the media, higher education and other key agents and actors . Partnership was formally manifest through the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC) . SERC adopted a number of objectives : to coordinate and encourage investment from its constituent members such as the city council, the Sheffield Development Corporation (SDC) and the local Training and Enterprise Council (TEC) ; to improve the image of the city and hence enhance inward investment; to stimulate non-local organisations such as regional offices of central government to invest in the city ; to help create a political and institutional climate within which pseudo-private-sector quangos such as the SDC could play a more central role in restructuring the city's economy ; and to act as an umbrella organisation coordinating a series of subsidiary partnerships including Sheffield Science Park Limited, and the Sheffield Media and Exhibition Centre . In brief SERC became "the over-arching partnership with a consultative, informational and consensus building role" (Askew, 1991, p. 40) . Many partnerships in British cities have proved unable or unwilling to provide whatmight be perceived a broad, longer-term,

PARTNERSHIP IN URBAN REGENERATION

strategic guidance to their respective conurbations (Boyle, 1990) . SERC probably did more than most in this respect, however (SERC, undated) . For example, through the Sheffield 2000 initiative development opportunities were identified in sectors such as metal manufacturing, selective public services, information and leisure-related industries. However, the collective impact of this innovation remained limited and by the early 1990s little in the way of proactive work was occurring. Nevertheless, on the broader canvas the city continued to proclaim its consensual approach towards urban renewal (Alty et al., 1992). Growth Coalition and Regime Theory The accentuating role of the private sector in urban regeneration in cities such as Sheffield, and indeed more generally throughout the UK, encouraged British academics to explore a number of conceptualisations originating in the US . There, trends such as the longstanding involvement of business in urban governance and the existence of a much larger benevolent corporate sector have stimulated debate around the notion of urban leadership . This has resulted in a number of empirical studies exploring issues of leadership (Judd and Parkinson, 1990). But in addition, business involvement in city governance has been subject to broader debate especially within growth coalition and regime theories . The former, promoted by Molotch (1976) and others (Domhoff, 1986 ; Logan and Molotch, 1987), was to receive increasing attention in the UK from the mid 1980s (Lloyd and Newlands, 1988 ; Harding, 1991) . In brief, the assumption here is that growth becomes the increasing concern of those wielding local economic power . Coalitions of interests dedicated to growth tend to emerge from key local activists, among whom local property owners usually play a crucial mediating role . Local governments and local media on the whole accept and in turn promote a pro-business ethos because of the assumed benefits attendant upon growth, notably jobs, but also rising retail and whole-

1305

sale sales, more intensive land development and increased levels of financial activity . Other auxiliary interests such as universities, cultural organisations and retailers also operate as elements, although not necessarily key activists, in supporting growth . They are likely to adopt this position since strategies designed to boost local economic growth will tend to reflect their own ideological positions and may also help to achieve direct concrete benefits. The net result of this interaction of activists and supportive elements is the emergence of a policy environment designed to maintain `the kind of `business climate' that attracts industry : for example, favourable taxation, vocational training, law enforcement and `good' labour relations . To promote growth, taxes should be 'reasonable', the police force should be orientated towards protection of property, and "overt social conflict should be minimised" (Molotch, 1976, p . 312) . There are normative elements to Molotch's position . For example, he identifies a core impulse for growth as the enhanced exchange value of land likely to be recouped by property owners as a result of accentuating physical development . At the opposite end of the spectrum, less advantaged groups in the city may be seduced by notions of growth because of anticipated employed benefits . In practice, such benefits will tend to be limited and frequently reflect the redistribution of existing jobs. Indeed, in the longer run, many in the cities may be materially disadvantaged because sustained development can require a higher local tax burden to deal with environmental problems and other disbenefits associated with growth . Notions surrounding growth coalitions have received, often implicit, support from those perceiving a shift in urban governance from what has been called urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism . Harvey (1989a ; 1989b) and other commentators (Amin and Malmberg, 1992 ; Warf, 1991) identify what, in brief, may be the emergence of a new urban political dynamic driven by the twin impulses of enhanced regional, national and international competition for

1306

PAUL LAWLESS

scarce resources in public and private sectors and institutional forces, public officials and combined with a more overt developmental the business community create either through entrepreneurialism . Framed within this re- the electoral process, or more indirectly via constituted politics, urban local authorities opaque governing alliances, what Stone have inevitably, if reluctantly, watered down tends to identify as corporate, Elkin as or abandoned principles of redistribution and entrepreneurial, and, in the context of citythe collective provision of goods and ser- centre redevelopment, Turner as facilitating, vices . regimes . Paralleling the complementary debates foHowever, even if business can be seen to cusing on growth coalitions and urban en- command a privileged position in relation to trepreneurialism, interest has also been urban governance, this is not reflected acexpressed in aspects of regime theory as cording to Stone in what might be seen as a expounded notably by Elkin (1987) and form of social control . Those that are seen to Stone (1989) but by others too (Turner, govern do not seek out, or would be able to 1992 ; Whelan et al., 1991). Growth coalition achieve, control over the public as a whole . interpretations are generally perceived here Rather, Stone adopts a social production as both excessively voluntaristic and as im- model of urban governance. In this perspecposing an overrigid and uniform interpret- tive, society is seen as incohesive and fragation on a markedly more complex reality . In mented-bound together by a "somewhat relation to the former issue, regime theory loose network of institutional arrangements" rejects notions of apparently autonomous and (Stone, 1989, p . 226) . In this policy environindependent players . All actors are con- ment "the issue is how to bring about enough strained by a series of structural forces of an co-operation among disparate community eleconomic, political and institutional nature . ements to get things done-and to do so in In the US in practice these forces may well the absence of an overarching command ensure that business retains a privileged pos- structure or a unifying system of thought" ition in relation to setting and implementing (Stone, 1989, p . 227) . Hence, in this essenurban agendas . For example, because so tially disorganised vision of society, the inmuch in the way of productive assets remains vestor class remains a crucial player because in private hands, public officials tend to of its dependability and cohesion . It will evolve policies over both consumption and be seen as an attractive ally by virtually production which recognise, and prove ac- any political grouping wishing to attain the ceptable to, the business community . At the capacity to govern. same time too because of the lack of powerEven in America, business groupings may ful non-business political groupings, success- not however always dominate . Other interful politicians tend to emerge from, and to est groups and alliances may well be able reflect, private-sector interests not least be- to sustain, albeit temporarily, regimes not cause even at the urban scale electoral suc- driven solely by development motives . For cess requires substantial financial resources . instance, public officials drawn from a range And even where local politicians not necess- of pseudo-professions may well seek to inarily wedded to business do emerge by cre- troduce non-business-orientated objectives, a ating successful electoral coalitions, their process readily identified within the UK with longer-term viability may depend on the im- its more overtly professionalised structure of plementation of highly visible totemic devel- local government (Laffin, 1986) . Where such opments . But the very implementation of groups secure influence at the local level, such developments may well be founded on one consequence may be the creation of the effective manipulation of coalitions what Stone has called the caretaker regime within which business continues to play an where the primary function of government is active role . Hence exactly because of the identified as the routine delivery of basic interlocking impact of political, economic services . In other circumstances, progressive


groups can appear to capture a kind of moral high ground often defined in anti-developmental and redistributional terms . Hence, even if growth, entrepreneurial, or corporate regimes or coalitions of interest might collectively be seen as the norm in the US, their emergence cannot be assumed as a deterministic inevitability . Local political action and discourse can and do affect the formulation and implementation of the economic development agenda (Leitner, 1990) . Explanations rooted in American experience must be treated with considerable caution in the UK . There are significant differences in the prevailing political economy of the two countries in terms of central support, urban politics, the nature of local government and hegemonic political ideologies (Hambleton, 1989) . These contrasts impose constraints on comparative research . Nevertheless, discussions surrounding growth coalitions and urban regimes at the very least provide frameworks through which to examine specific aspects of partnership in the UK . This paper uses one manifestation of partnership in a British city to evaluate these wider conceptualisations of urban governance . Partnership in Sheffield : The Central Area Initiative By the early 1990s, Sheffield, a Labour-controlled city of about 500 000 population, was witnessing a substantial change to its central retail core. There was a marked reduction in turnover in many units . Trade fell by about a sixth for many outlets in real terms between 1990 and 1991 . A substantial proportion of this decline, perhaps as much as a half, was due to competition from the £240m investment at the Meadowhall out-of-town retail centre located about 4 miles from the city centre . That scale of investment in turn undermined the viability of a number of potential retail developments in the central area collectively amounting to over £70m . The net effect of declining expenditure, cancelled development projects and a generally rundown and unappealing environment was doing little to improve the city's image .

1 307

Anecdotal evidence suggested that the loss of one potential public-sector relocation to the city was primarily due to the perceived inadequacies of the central area . The scale of these deficiencies apparently caused one major national retail chain, C & A, to evaluate Sheffield's retail core as amongst the most unattractive in the country . These kinds of consideration encouraged a particularly interventionist president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (COCI), Don Lyon, to call a meeting of interested parties in November 1991 . First-rank representatives attended from, inter alia, Sheffield City Council (SCC), the Sheffield Development Corporation (SDC), the University of Sheffield (US), Sheffield Hallam University (SHU), the Chamber of Trade (COT), the police, local media, major retailers, developers and property agents . Emerging out of this meeting, the decision was taken to undertake a £55 000 study of Sheffield's central area . Five partners provided either direct or indirect resources : SCC, SDC, COCI, SHU, US . The COCI was to act as overall coordinator subject to a Steering Group of 12 representatives from the five funding organisations and other interests such as key retailers, commercial and shopping agencies, the COT and the largest public-transport provider in the city . The Central Area Study The resultant Central Area Study (CAS) (Foley and Lawless, 1992a and 1992b) was intended to provide a broad strategic overview of Sheffield's central area to 2010 . The policy recommendations developed in the strategy would collectively "provide a vision or visions which (would) help the future direction and marketing of Sheffield" (Foley and Lawless, 1992b, p . 8) . For the purposes of the CAS, the central area was identified as not simply the retail core, but most of the city's commercial, legal and tourist activities, together with some housing and manufacturing activities and a great deal of Sheffield's higher education function . Key elements in the central area are presented diagrammatically in Figure 1 .

1308

PAUL LAWLESS


The Study, which was launched in October 1992, was structured around three major themes . First, the CAS provided a brief comparison of Sheffield in relation to other major urban competitors . Secondly, an overview of trends in key sectors such as transport, retailing, commerce and higher education was presented . And thirdly, a set of policy proposals concerned with the reorganisation of the central area was developed. The 98 recommendations fell into four major areas as is indicated in Table 1 . A physical theme outlined how the central area might be re-ordered over a 20-year period ; economic or entrepreneurial questions were explored within which the future role of higher education was given particular emphasis ; a wide range of social questions was examined including residential, artistic, leisure and tourist-related activities ; and finally implementation issues, including the possible creation of a City Centre Manager were examined . These recommendations, taken together with debates surrounding the origin and evolution of the CAS, provide an opportunity to assess partnership within broader conceptual parameters. This evaluation needs to be treated with care . The Study was not undertaken through the direct aegis of the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC) and not all of SERC's membership contributed to the Study . But all of the partners in the Study play a key role in SERC . It was given a high priority by funding organisations . Representatives on the Steering Group were drawn from senior management tiers, which by the early 1990s was no longer true for SERC itself. And at both the initiation of the project and at its formal launching it was widely perceived as a working example of partnership . In January 1992 when the initiative was announced the major local newspaper assessed it as an "excellent example of the partnerships the city must have" (The Star, 16 January 1993) . And at its formal press launch in October 1992, representatives available for questioning included the President and Immediate Past President of the COCI, the Leader of the Council, the Assist-

1309

ant Principal of SHU and the Chief Executive of the SDC . The CAS can reasonably be perceived as a focused manifestation of a partnership which the British Chamber of Commerce (1989, p . 8) has agreed led to "the rebirth of a city" . The Sheffield Central Area Study : Partners and Power During the Study, evidence in relation to, and reflection on, Sheffield's partnership emerged through three main sources . First, qualitative interviews were held with more than 300 individuals . Secondly, detailed written comments were received on draft versions of the Study, and its relationship to partnership as a whole from all of the major players apart from the SDC . And thirdly, five separate sets of meetings were held : media conferences to announce and launch the project; two `brainstorming' sessions with representatives from the Universities and the local authority ; six meetings of the Steering Group between January and November 1992 ; two larger meetings of all key agencies to establish the Study and to discuss its broader implications ; and seven presentations of key findings to organisations such as the COCI, SHU, US and to committees and forums within the local authority . Findings emerging from these dense, interlocking, and frequently confidential sources can be assimilated into two themes for initial debate : partners and agendas ; and power. 1 . Partners and Agendas

All of the major organisations, and many key individuals, central to the governance and economy of the city were involved in some capacity in helping to devise, implement, or comment upon, the Study . Agendas adopted by, and behavioural responses characteristic of, partners fell into three major categories . These are presented in a simplified schema in Table 2 . At one level, most informed organisations and individuals within the city proved essentially reactive, although usually supportive, of a central area study . At its launch, The

1310

PAUL LAWLESS

U

C O ~a

q `~ a)° U w pA

EO

U

~

C

t

U

S

b

° 3.

EL o0

U,

a

o ~

o

O 0 > o.

on °

00

0 0

a

im CU W N O y C a .~ U

a)0

yc

`~~

,c

b y

E 4) L" NU 0 a.TU 4; CO

y o ,~

~ ~

U 7 U

.b N C

o N

U

U .~

N

0 U G) O

`,1

0~

)

C`

M

It

N

-

M

z

U,

C w .o

=E z Q U N H

C O

C Uq b

V

rO. 1) C N 2 U 0 Q 0

N

1 31 1


c

U cC U

O w m y ~

a• ~ 0a I

a+

N CO

mA ~ N

.d

2

a>

0U

h O .

bq

V

w

w .~

0= m

0

0

- U cV

2 .b p

N

46 N

Z . 0

0 y U

O O

CID CV

t, Q. w O U

U a) G

y p cV

eV > C C) eV . C

(y S7 U C E N C) d O - C) C)

U > w C) O vU

G

>+ O ."

c)v

b a ao

p O U

) C

'b

N C O' 4a U

c,3t~ O

0 rn O

C N O

N .^ 0

y

bbo

cq

0 0

O

V >

04 w

•b ~q U

>

Y

>

C

a p

K a) U N > .O

a'O .+

w 0

U

-

as Q U

a 0

~

C

Q

•U

C p

.>

a

a~ n

N .~

O

'V

O Q.

O CO

41

N

W

N bq

.

C

E

C¢

C

:d N q

y

°

°

aDU

01)

.c

.O

0.

,

F

c

>

0

a

C) N

U

U

W

>

>

>

O

w U

y C)

y O

O

C)

. C

C

U aN

y

~ .

Op

0C)

O

0 ,CO 0 C

to

O 0 C

.C

0

U G

.U C

°

1312

PAUL LAWLESS

Sheffield Star saw it as "a `last chance' bid to

come up with ideas to reverse the city centre's plunge into ruinous decline" (16 January 1992) . And on publication, the Star's sister paper, The Sheffield Telegraph, argued that the CAS "represents one of the most wide-ranging attempts ever undertaken in the UK to consider the future development of a city centre" (16 October 1992) . The mere existence of a new initiative seemed to mollify many critics: none of the 98 recommendations in the Report ever received substantial public criticism . For most observers and commentators, the Study appeared to be perceived as a valuable, if uncertain, exercise . And however, useful proposals might be, one comment characterised a great deal of informal debate : how was it all to be paid for? A second group of organisations, akin to Molotch's supportive elements, acted in a more proactive manner . They were usually involved in order to maintain their status or material interests . The Chamber of Trade, for example, through its Chief Executive Officer laid considerable emphasis on the implementation of relatively modest improvements to the major retail core : "the need for accessibility to and linkages between various parts of the City Centre and to the bus interchange are critical to retail survival . . ." . On the other hand, the COT proved generally reluctant to address more fundamental issues . For instance, one of the most crucial questions examined by the CAS is the scale of land formally allocated to retailing . Evidence from both public- and private-sector appraisals suggested that there is too much retailing in the central area . The Study proposed that perhaps 25 per cent of the retail core should move to other uses over a 20year period . The substance of, as opposed to the justification for, this proposal was not adversely commented upon by either the Chamber or indeed by any other agency . This may well have been because of the divisive nature of the recommendation . Some retailers would be disadvantaged, but others would benefit. Reduced supply should en-

hance sales, rents and land values in a curtailed, but more intensively used, retail core . In other instances, auxiliary elements adopted positions which reflected professional interests . The Director of Tourism, for instance, saw his main role as attempting to maintain the higher profile given towards tourism and related activities in recent years . And in one or two cases, more obvious manifestations of material self-interest occurred . For example, one member of the Chamber of Commerce's Property and Regeneration Committee sought out an early, and at that stage confidential, Draft in order to help negotiations regarding a potential City Grant application . The third group of actors, the five funding organisations, proved central to the implementation of the Study . These can be identified as the key activists in the partnership. They provided the substantial bulk of written comments ; they were all represented at senior level at every Steering Group meeting ; they were all actively supportive at the two media conferences which announced the Study and launched the Final Report . Yet their agendas differed . The two Universities had an ambivalent relationship to the Study : they both funded and implemented it . In practice, this led to the creation of 'chinese walls' between higher management in each institution and those actually producing the Study . The former provided both verbal and written comments . In the case of SHU, observations proved both critical and reflective . For example, one Assistant Principal commented on the need to ensure a "sharpness which promotes debate and decision-making" amongst partners . This same respondent also provided one of the few genuinely visionary observations on where the city centre should go : "we should become the city of higher education" . The University of Sheffield, reflecting a stronger collegiate and decentralised tradition, proved rather more disparate in its response . For example, the Vice Chancellor asked three professors within the institution to comment on the Draft Report . Few of these comments, received in early September


1992, had any bearing on the content of the Draft. One set examined what might be termed the structure of the Report . The others essentially discussed in broad academic terms the relationship between the department concerned and what might be termed urban development . However, even if formal observation provided little substance to the production of a Final Report, in common with SHU, the US proved generally supportive of the project . And certainly the Universities clearly regarded themselves as key players in the renewal of the central area . This was true too for the Sheffield Development Corporation . The SDC has indirect interests in the central area. The canal basin, part of its Urban Development Area, immediately abuts the Study area's eastern perimeter . Indeed, parts of the UDA surrounding the canal basin were included in the local authority's 1988 Central Area Plan (Sheffield City Council, 1988) . In addition, the SDA has an interest in the fate of the city centre because of its strong emphasis on inward investment . The SDC can provide sites for potential developments in the Lower Don valley . But attempts to attract mobile projects will depend on other factors nominally beyond its control, such as the attractiveness of the central area . Hence its own promotional literature refers to specialist facilities in the city centre such as the Orchard Square shopping development and the two theatres (SDC, undated) . In practice, the SDC's formal contribution to the exercise as a whole was relatively limited . Its main objective in terms of detailed policy formulation was to ensure the integration of the canal basin into the central area . In the previous two years, the Corporation had seen the collapse of two development schemes for the basin promoted by Shearwater and Norwest Holst . The CAS offered some possibility of enhancing the marketability of the canal basin . For example, the SDC argued that the Study should address the need to improve pedestrian access over the inner ring road to create environmentally attractive links between the basin and the rest of the city's retail core . In

131 3

addition, the Corporation supported the view that the basin should be linked into a public transport system which the Study argued should be introduced to integrate the disparate elements of a diffuse central retail core . In other respects, however, the Corporation said little about the other recommendations within the Draft Report . Unlike other funders, it provided no written comments . The COCI played the key coordinating role in the initiation and implementation of the Study . Its motives were essentially commercial . Key members of the Chamber, including the 1991 President, had business interests in a declining central retail core . From this perspective, it was vital that the Final Report should place an emphasis on the "trends that are now evident in the decline in shopper traffic" and the effect this decline might have "on future investment" . The then President's concerned, but somewhat loosely defined, view of the Study and its relationship to the central area, reflected the position of many within the business community as a whole : "I think we have got one opportunity to get it right . This study has got to be taken extremely seriously whatever conclusions it comes to . The city centre has got to get its act together" (Sheffield Telegraph, 17 January 1992) . Three elements of this general position reflected a great deal of thinking within the business community as a whole . The CAS was perceived as the `last chance' for the central area . There was a widespread assumption that the fortunes of the city centre were exclusively bound up with retailing . And the central area had to create a `purpose and identity' which would allow it to compete with the city's regional shopping complex at Meadowhall . The final key actor was the City Council . Sheffield City Council's response to the Study proved to be both more ambivalent and more heterogeneous than was the case with other funding partners . Of itself, the city would not have commissioned the Study . It was operating within a formal policy context set by the 1988 statutory Local Plan : a central area for everyone (Sheffield City Council, 1988) . In addition, both a Central Area

1314

PAUL LAWLESS

Integrated Transport Study (1993a) and Unitary Development Plan (1993b) were

the produce what might be seen externally as an due òbjective' study . to be launched in early 1993 . Moreover, the Ultimately, perhaps two features can be council, through its Environmental Planning seen to dominate relationships between those Officer, was coordinating the city's 1992 supporting and producing the Report on the City Challenge bid throughout the Spring one hand and the council on the other . First, and early summer (Sheffield City Council, whilst the council proved reluctant in the first 1992). This bid was concerned with regener- instance to become involved in the initiative, ating a relatively derelict area immediately to the clear determination on the part of other the north of, and impinging upon, the city's key actors in the city to proceed with the retail core. In this complex and competitive project and the authority's reluctance to unpolicy environment, an early comment from dermine wider partnership placed it in a posthe Chair of Planning and Economic Devel- ition where unwillingness to cooperate would opment that the Study was `fatally flawed' in have proved problematic . And secondly, its conception was not especially surprising . once committed to the project, the council But that was not the position held by most operated as a disinterested but supportive officers and councillors . At an early stage, resource, willing to provide advice and inforone middle-ranking planning officer wel- mation and positively enthusiastic about the comed the project because "you can say need to ensure an intellectually valid docuthings which we can't" And as the Study ment . To give two examples . The authors evolved, a wider range of officers, and some were recommended to sharpen up their ascouncillors, became involved in the process sessments with regard to policies designed to of formulating a CAS . This occurred in sev- reduce the size of the retail core : "the case eral ways . SCC organised two open, 'brain- (for reducing retailing on one part of the storming' sessions for middle-ranking central area) is not veryy fully argued" . And officers . Existing policy documents and re- more generally in some areas, "specific ports were made available and some of these, recommendations do not always fit comfortsuch as a 1989 urban design evaluation of the ably with the analysis"-a potentially worrycentral area (Sheffield City Council, 1989), ing discrepancy for an authority conceivably provided an important policy context for the subject to a range of commitments if the CAS . The authors of the Study were also CAS were to receive substantial and conseninvited to a meeting of the City Centre Ac- sual support from different parties . tion Group, an advisory body on city-centre issues, at which the parameters of the CAS 2 . Partners and Power were widely discussed . In addition, interviews were held with 21 SCC employees Issues of power are central to debates surmainly in Land and Planning but also in rounding partnership . Within the CAS, these Employment and Economic Development, considerations are best assimilated into two Housing, Libraries, the Transport Policy Unit tiers of analysis : interactions between agenand the Women's Unit . Not surprisingly, in- cies and actors within the context of the terviewees tended to discuss issues of rel- CAS ; and interrelationships between partners evance to their department or unit, but some and the wider political economy . broader themes did emerge. Many conInterrelationships between partners emersidered that there was a need to create a CAS ged in a range of situations . Virtually all with a strong sense of implementation which formal meetings were characterised by an would adequately reflect the scale and pres- apparently cooperative and consensual atence of the council within the central area . mosphere . It would be difficult to argue that The importance of integrating the Study into relations were overly friendly ; but in public the existing statutory planning system was at least, neither were they strained . However, also emphasised, as was the requirement to underlying tensions emerged through per-


sonal interview and during informal debate. In these situations, some interrelationships appeared to be characterised rather more by conflict and manoeuvre than by consensus . The principal root for conflict surrounded the interactions between what might broadly be seen as the `business community' including the SDC on the one hand, and the local authority on the other . Some of this debate was pitched at a simplistic level . A number of independent observers argued that `the council has ruined this city' . But most observers were rather more sophisticated in their responses . More informed members of the business community were fully aware of the financial constraints operating on the city council . At the same time, however, the council was perceived as making a number of strategic and tactical errors . These include antagonising central government, failing to deal adequately with basic functions such as street cleaning, appointing inappropriate people to key tasks, and creating an unnecessarily bureaucratic administrative structure. These sentiments were probably expressed most strongly by the SDC . The Corporation argued for a `hard-hitting report' which would disentangle factors and agencies responsible for decline . In the event, ascribing `blame' for the state of the city centre was not addressed by the CAS . But during informal discussions it was made quite clear that, from the perspective of the Corporation, much of the blame for decline within the central area should be apportioned to the council . Shortly after the launch of the Study, Hugh Sykes, the Chairman of the Corporation, argued publicly that one of the reasons why inward investment was not occurring "was because of the reputation and credibility of the council" (Sheffield Telegraph, 20 November 1992) . And whilst the SDC was probably the most insistent critic of the local authority, it emerged during confidential discussions that these views were relatively widespread amongst the business community . The council was not unaware of the potential conflict between itself and the private sector . The Chair of Planning and Economic

131 5

Development knew of the determination on the part of some within the business community to incorporate questions of `blame' within the CAS . However, once it became clear that the CAS would not address this issue, the council adopted a generally neutral, even cooperative, approach towards other partners during the formulation of the Study . For example, at the final session of the partners held in December 1992, and immediately after, the Director of Land and Planning defused much of the potential conflict in relation to the fate of the CAS . This was achieved in two ways . First, he indicated that the authority would not wish unilaterally to dismiss any of the Study's 98 recommendations. And secondly, in a later written comment on the CAS, he argued for the need to move "the existing partnership between the public and private sectors from the àgree to differ' model to one of agreeing to support a consensus for progress" (Jones, 1992, p . 1) . In any event, it was always unlikely that the CAS would erupt into outright conflict between the SCC and other partners . At one level, business needed the city council . The implementation of all but two of the 98 recommendations involved the local authority in some capacity. SCC was clearly perceived as the central agency for effecting change within the central area . And as the Director of Land and Planning pointed out at the final meeting of interested parties in December 1992, although the authority was subject to substantial financial constraints, it "still has lots of money to spend" . In addition, public manifestations of conflict were probably somewhat muted because, whilst the CAS was the key reflection of partnership in 1992, other developments were about to occur. In particular, discussions were taking place within the city as a whole to reaffirm partnership through the creation of an overarching committee of Chief Executives, or their equivalents, from key institutions, the so-called À team' . This reconstitution of partnership was occurring for a number of reasons . SERC was per-

1316

PAUL LAWLESS

appointment of a number of new people to key positions within the city including the Vice Chancellor to Sheffield University and the Chief Executive to the TEC offered opportunities to start afresh. Within this delicate political environment, public conflict between partners was unlikely to emerge within the more focused context of the CAS . But this is not to deny the existence of real underlying tensions and strains between partners . This conflict was accompanied by political manoeuvring on the part of several key players. Mention has already been made of the way in which the COCI, through hosting a locally high-profile initial meeting of interested partners in November 1991, applied pressure on a reluctant local authority to support the concept of a Study . But the authority itself was not slow to create an effective defensive position . It provided critical comments on the initial brief: "at present (the Study) appears to place too much emphasis on generating vision rather than briefly reassessing that which we already have". Moreover, whether intentionally or not, throughout the period during which the Study was being produced it announced a steady trickle of new initiatives, such as the creation of specialist `quarters' in the central area, which were to appear in the CAS . Also, effectively clouded the key issue of city centre management . The CAS argued for an independent central area manager . Whatever the merits of the proposal, the council sidelined the question by arguing, inter alia, that it had already undertaken a review of management (Sheffield City Council, 1991b), that suitable organs for change such as the City Centre Action Group were already in place, and that the debate should be about management and not a manager . Although many of the conflicts and tensions between partners focused on projects and policies developed within the CAS, there was too a wider agenda relating to the economic and political context beyond the city . Here partners across the board perceived a clear distinction between relatively marginal policies which might be effected locally, and

those which would require support from either the market and/or central government . This reality was manifest at both the micro and macro scales . In the case of the former, one of the key environmental problems to be faced within the central area is a 1960s subway : `the hole-in-the-ground' . As part of a general programme of environmental improvements, in late 1992 the authority proposed that it should be filled in and landscaped. However, according to the local press, the scheme was being blocked by C & A, a major national retail chain, which was demanding £500 000 compensation for the loss of basement space (The Sheffield Star, 2 February 1993) . Specific environmental improvements may be seen by local actors and agencies as a crucial ingredient in effecting positive change ; the justification for this investment may be less apparent to those operating at regional and national levels . At the macro-level, debates concerning the dependency of the city centre on wider political and economic issues surfaced in the 1992 City Challenge bid . If the bid had proved successful, City Challenge would have provided a boost to the northern segment of the central area . Partners identified the funding associated with City Challenge, potentially £35m over 5 years, as a crucial stimulant to the fortunes of the central area and responded accordingly . A complex network of boards and committees was created encompassing all key actors and agencies in the city (Alty et al., 1992). City Challenge resources would have contributed substantially to the physical restructuring of the most rundown section of the central area, and would also have helped lever in private investment . Key partners in both City Challenge and the CAS were fully aware that the implementation of flagship projects within the city could only be achieved through the successful incorporation of regional/national institutional and financial networks . Partnership might provide a framework within which a reordered central area might emerge. The implementation of many aspects of that strategy was beyond the capabilities of the partners themselves .


Theory Revisited The partnership surrounding the production of Sheffield's CAS provides an opportunity to reassess theoretical constructs outlined at the beginning of this paper. There are aspects to both growth coalitions and regime theory which can help us to understand and locate partnership . One obvious example here is that both perspectives address equity considerations . Molotch comments that "in many areas . . . growth benefits only a small proportion of local residents" (1976, p. 318) . Although the CAS must be perceived as but one reflection of partnership in the city, its central message was one of enhancing market investment through programmes surrounding image and the physical reconstitution of the central area . Although the authors of the Study pressed for a more concerted equity element within the CAS, no actor or agency ever explicitly supported this . Indeed, references to `the poor' within the Study were identified as "meaningless and patronising" in the only written comments, in this case from a middle-ranking local authority official, ever directed at equity issues . The authority's 1988 Local Plan had been predicated on the idea that "commercial development did not over-rule community needs" (Darke, 1990, p . 175); and the local authority at least had always sought to retain questions of redistribution within partnership itself (SCC, undated) . Nevertheless, these sentiments were simply not part of this agenda . A second area where growth coalition literature can help us frame the CAS is the distinction it makes between central activists on the one hand and a wider array of auxiliary elements on the other . Many actors and agencies expressed general support for the CAS . It was, however, driven by a much smaller group of key activists without whom it would not have occurred. And thirdly, on the wider canvas, growth coalition and regime theories provide useful contextual devices within which to explore urban policy in the UK generally and in Labour-controlled cities in particular . Com-

131 7

mentaries on urban policy made little if any reference to the private sector in the early 1980s (Lawless, 1981) . At that time, in cities such as Sheffield, admittedly an extreme example, there was virtually no structured programme of discourse between the city council and the business community . Yet by the mid to late 1980s these conditions had been reversed. Growth coalition and regime theories provide, at the very least, an initial framework within which to examine this transformation . However, although these interpretations offer useful insights, evidence from this partnership and from other similar initiatives (Cooke, 1988 ; Harding, 1991 ; Lloyd and Newlands, 1988) suggests that problems emerge when they are applied too rigidly to the British situation. These issues are schematically outlined in Table 3, where generalised interpretations of the partnership surrounding the CAS, growth coalition and regime theory are tabulated. Five themes appear especially pertinent here : the status of local government ; the role of the business community ; landowners ; conflict within the business community ; and the impact of a professionalised bureaucracy.

1 . The Status of Local Government

Growth coalition and regime theories reflect a political economy within which local government generally plays a more limited, yet more diverse, role in urban governance than is the case in the UK . Molotch sees efforts to influence growth distribution as the essence of local government (1976, p . 313) . For Elkin, too, city governments "are interested in the economic performance of the industries within their borders and in attracting new investment" (1987, p . 6) . But efforts to achieve these limited ends will tend to be severely constrained by limited formal authority which "may be dwarfed by processes and activities outside government control" (Stone, 1989, p. 219) . Within the UK, too, it would currently be unrealistic to accord local government undue

1318

PAUL LAWLESS

Table 3 . The Central Area Study: perspectives on partnership The CAS partnership

Growth coalition

Regime theory tendency towards èntrepreneurial' regimes influential ; generally, not always, homogeneous

Role of local government

central role in independent policy formulation

subservient to growth interests

The business community

small ; limited indigenous control

homogeneous ; influential

Landowners

largely absent

central to coalition

Conflict within the business community

marked

very limited

Professional bureaucracy

key agency in policy formulation

subservient to growth dynamic

power and influence. But if the CAS is any guide, local authorities remain the crucial agency for implementing and coordinating change . In the context of the CAS, this manifested itself in a number of ways . The COCI would not have been prepared to proceed without the direct involvement of the city council . When the initiative was originally discussed, at which time the city council expressed strong reservations, the then President of the COCI indicated that he would, as it proved successfully, "work on them" . And once incorporated within the networks supporting the initiative, the authority provided advice, information and comment commensurate with its legal and financial status . It remains the statutory planning authority ; it can pump prime investments, notably through its current annual allocation of approximately £5-6m of Urban Programme funds ; and, to a large extent, it retains expertise on city centre development. At the same time, it is clear that local

usually important element within business community limited but evident in some cities normally pro-business ; more independent in some regimes

government, even when working with business interests as was the case with the CAS, operates within a tightly constrained environment . Growth coalition literature places little emphasis on wider structural constraints . Here regime theory is more relevant to the British situation . In his analysis of Atlanta, Stone argues that urban regimes are shaped less by ideology than "by the ability to allocate small opportunities" (1989, p . 232) . These might encompass "selective material benefits that are important in solving the free-rider problem in collective action and in providing a means to apply discipline" (p . 232) . This notion of small opportunities is useful here . Efforts were made through the Study to create groupings of retailers to help fund minor environmental improvements in discrete parts of the central area . Nevertheless, the larger vision of change emerging from some business-driven regimes in America (Elkin, 1987 ; Stone, 1989) appears less relevant to British-based partnerships . Certainly within the CAS, broader strategic


agendas were articulated by local government, not by the business community, and they are generally dependent for their implementation on direct financial support from central government and/or national institutional investors . 2 . The Role of the Business Community

American literature tends to stress the proactive role of business in setting developmental agendas for downtown redevelopment . To Stone "the business elite has engaged actively in formulating a policy agenda and in structuring a set of arrangements through which that agenda could be advanced" (1989, pp. 232-233) . Indeed, because of capital's effective control of the production of most goods and services, and a parallel weakness in local government, "capital does not necessarily require the state in order to reshape the urban environment" (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986, p . 247) . Growth coalition and regime theories hence are predicated on the existence of a substantial and active business community . Indeed, to Elkin "it is . . . likely that business attempts to influence government are now at a high point" (Elkin, 1987, p . 132) . However, in a second-league English conurbation such as Sheffield, although the ability and willingness of the business community to enter debates surrounding urban governance has certainly increased, the scale and impact of this involvement can easily be overestimated. Less than 20 male, white, middle-aged people, at Chief Executive or equivalent level, dominate what might be seen as business representation within formal manifestations of partnership . The same people will tend to be on the decision-making boards of the SDC, the TEC and institutions of higher and further education . It is this same small grouping which represents the business community within specific manifestations of partnership such as the CAS . There may be several reasons why the business community is relatively small when compared with equivalent experience in the US, but probably the main reason is a

1 31 9

marked decline in the number of indigenously controlled enterprises . The city has seen what one observer has identified as a "dramatic fall in the number of head offices within its boundaries" (Watts, 1989, p . 167) . Those most likely to seek to influence the local developmental agenda are those most likely to be affected by it-and there are now fewer medium to large-sized businesses with a direct and exclusive interest in the city than was the case even 10 years ago . 3. Landowners

It is not however simply the case that independent representation from the business community has declined . It also lacks one ingredient crucial to some interpretations of partnership: landowners . Molotch identifies competition in terms of land use as one of the major driving impulses in the creation of growth coalitions. Similarly, Elkin has argued that "land interests and city politicians regularly try to build up institutional arrangements designed to reduce the probability that major land use changes become a matter of public dispute" (1985, p . 13). But in the context of the CAS, and this comment could be extended more widely to partnership within the city as a whole, local landowners played an insignificant role . Indeed, the Director of Land and Planning in his comments on the Study argued that its implementation would depend on the inclusion of "those currently little in evidence, the major property owners and investors, who have, within the private sector, the longest-term interest in a thriving centre" (Jones, 1992, p . 1) . The lack of involvement of landowners within the CAS can be ascribed to a number of factors, but the crucial issue is that the scale of local land ownership and the of the local development industry remain limited . Of the 15 major developments occurring in the central area in 1993, only 4 were being implemented on private-sector land, and only two projects were being undertaken by local developers (Sheffield City Council, 1993c) . Virtually all projects are being implemented on land owned by major public-sector organisations

1320

PAUL LAWLESS

such as SCC, SDC or the Universities and almost all projects are being developed by construction companies operating at the national level .

ther damage city centre business" (3 January 1992). Certainly, in this partnership, despite a formal cohesiveness amongst business interests, deep-seated antagonisms remained .

4 . Conflict within the Business Community

Growth coalition literature tends to paint a generally homogeneous and consensual picture of local business interests . Regime theory, however, and this is a more realistic interpretation of events surrounding the CAS, assumes a more divided community (Elkin, 1987 ; Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986 ; Leitner, 1990) . Certainly here conflict emerged over a number of issues. Some of these related to the physical reordering of the central area . The extent to which commercial activity might realistically expand was one manifestation of this . Local commercial agents were in favour of the Study identifying substantial zones within the central area as suitable for new office development. Others with retail interests were less convinced. However, at a more profound level, the major impulse in fracturing the formal veneer of business consensus was the role of the SDC . Some proposals within the Study, such as enhanced commercial activity which would benefit the central area, could be undermined if the Corporation were so inclined. It could offer incentives such as cheap, serviced land which were not available in the city centre. Its agenda, focusing on the image of the central area and inward investment into its administration, was, and was seen to be, of a different order from that adopted by other business partners, many of whom appeared to have a longer-term commitment to the central area . In this respect, the CAS merely accentuated long-standing differences between the Corporation and the city centre business community. In discussing the launch of the CAS in January 1992, The Sheffield Telegraph commented on the "background of resentment over the role of the SDC . They (sic) have been strongly criticised by the council and traders for granting permission for a complex of retail warehouses near Meadowhall which . . . will fur-

5. The Impact of a Professionalised Bureaucracy

Because of the inchoate nature of the business community in the city, it depends for much of its expertise on the local authority. Representatives and individuals within the business community will hold often strongly expressed views on aspects of the urban agenda . However, they are generally unaware of how to formalise these views within appropriate institutional channels. They depend to a large extent on functional bureaucracies within the town hall . The ability of the latter to "seek to expand and maintain their autonomy" and hence become "important actors in shaping a city's policies" (Elkin, 1987, p . 34) has been identified by regime theorists in America . In the case of the CAS, policies were driven very much by what might be seen as orthodox and professionalised bodies of knowledge residing partly in the Universities but mainly within the local authority . The tenor of these policies was not apocalyptic and tightly prescriptive, as some within the business community would have preferred . For example, the COCI in its July 1992 comments on the draft report argued for policies which "should not be `woolly' but specific action points" . Instead, the Study provided argued and indicative proposals . In essence, it reflected the òbjectivity' and 'respectability' of established professional communities (Laffin, 1986) . In such an ostensibly disinterested policy environment, there is little opportunity "for public officials and local business men, particularly those with fixed assets, to regard each other with fond interest" (Elkin, 1987, p . 34) . The explicit professionalism of most local government officials leads them to tease out policies for an initiative such as the CAS from a relatively narrow range of options bounded by their own awareness of financial, legal and


political constraints . Operating within this kind of intellectual framework, local professionals can perceive the consequences, and hence often shortcomings, of more radical proposals . The Chamber of Trade may argue for example that "access to parking for visitors is VITAL" but this ignores longer-term environmental and political imperatives which seem certain to impose constraints on urban vehicular access within the time horizon of the Study . In a similar vein, business partners were eager to identify land-use changes for particular sites . However, as the Central Policy Unit at the city council pointed out, devising specific land-use proposals was especially difficult in a non-statutory document because of a real danger that areas identified for change "will be further blighted on publication of the report" . To the business community, the narrowness of this agenda remained irritating and incomprehensible-but, unaware of institutional barriers and opportunities, business partners proved unable to substitute any enduring alternative .

Conclusion Ultimately, it seems reasonable to conclude that whilst conceptualisations based on growth coalition theory and synthesised versions of regime theory provide a valuable checklist of parameters through which to examine partnership, they have only a limited applicability to the British context . They underestimate the professionalised nature of the local bureaucracy ; they underplay political conflict within and between partners ; they overemphasise the influence of the indigenous business community ; they assume too readily that growth dominates urban governance ; and, crucially, they fail to give due prominence to local government . Indeed, evidence from the narrative surrounding CAS would lead strongly to suggest that efforts to disentangle partnership in the UK need to focus on local government in both its internal dynamic and in its relationship to external actors and agencies . In terms of its internal dynamic, once

1 321

committed to this project the authority proved quite the most influential partner . It provided much of the background information and commented widely on proprosals . It accepted its role as a prime mover in coordinating and/or implementing recommendations. And, as the virtually unanimous endorsement of the Study clearly revealed, the council was perceived within the business community as the appropriate champion to promote effective change in the central area . In the light of diminishing responsibilities, powers and finance imposed on local government in the recent past, it may appear perverse to see the city council retaining a primary role in urban development . But certainly, in this partnership, it was SCC which most commentators identified as the key actor in effecting change . Local government has clearly witnessed a diminution in powers, responsibilities and funding in the last decade, but in the absence of a substantial, independent, publicly minded business community, local government remains the fulcrum around which urban development revolves . And yet the debate is clearly not simply about local government . To appreciate partnership in the UK it is crucial still to embrace that intermeshing set of relationships between public and private sectors . For example, at an immediate level, the CAS reflects the degree to which the authority, in common with local government generally, has become much more acclimatised to market attitudes and aspirations . Policies contained within the Study address issues which would not previously have appeared in a central area plan for the city . The proposed development of the inner ring road is one example here. So too is the entrepreneurial nature of the document with its more clearly delineated emphasis on marketing and management than would characterise most local government planning documents . These kinds of development in other cities have encouraged some observers to speculate as to the existence of a `new urban corporatism' wherein business-style developmental agendas emerge out of mechanisms devised to

1322

PAUL LAWLESS

enhance institutional cooperation in the field

will probably only get worse .

of local economic development (Shaw, 1993) . In this instance, however, ùrban corporatism' appears a less appropriate vehicle to frame the CAS when relationships between SCC and its business partners are examined within a more profound causative dimension . Interpretations based on growth coalitions, regime theory and indeed ùrban corporatism', tend to visualise partnerships in an essentially positive light : the willing coalescence of mutually supportive interest groups seeking to boost business opportunities . But the CAS was driven by different motives . Here the dominating impulse was the essentially pessimistic perception of the city, and in particular its central area, held by both public and private sectors . This is a city in decline. Its corporate head offices almost halved from 22 to 13 in the 12 years preceding 1988 (Watts, 1989) ; it has a higher unemployment rate, lower proportions of its workforce working in service-sector employment, and much lower industrial and commercial rentals than neighbouring regional competitors such as Manchester, Nottingham and Leeds (Antwi et al., 1993) ; rankings of urban socio-economic indicators consistently evaluate it as less successful than most other conurbations in the north of England (Cheshire, 1990) ; it has seen the abandonment of several key planned retail developments in the city core ; it has witnessed anticipated relocations from London and the South East, such as the dispersal of part of the Royal Armouries from the Tower of London, ultimately located in Leeds; and in early 1993 it had a local authority struggling to make a £40m reduction in planned expenditure for 1993/94 . This partnership is not based on a politics of consensus emerging out of the successful achievement of longstanding and mutually supported objectives . This is a partnership reflecting the reluctant embrace of partners who, at most, retain a luke-warm attitude towards each other . Their coalition is not rooted in an optimistic vision emerging out of marketing success . It is founded on a deep-seated anxiety that things

References ALTY, C ., BOOTH, C ., DALGLEISH, K. and LAWLESS, P . (1992) City Challenge : Sheffield 1992 ; The Communication Process: An Evaluation . Sheffield : Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University . AMIN, A . and MALMBERG, B . (1992) Competing structural and institutional influences on the geography of production, Environment and Planning A, 24, pp . 401-406 . ANTWI, A ., ASKHAM, P., GARDINER, C ., HENNEBERRY, J ., MACKMIN, D ., MCGAULEY, A ., PARsoNS, D . and RAMDSEN, P . (1993) The 1980s Property Boom in Sheffield. Sheffield : Joint Initiative in Social and Economic Research, Sheffield City Council. ASKEW, J . (1991) Public- and private-sector partnerships for urban regeneration in Sheffield and Wakefield, Local Government Policy Making, 17(4), pp. 37-43 . AUDIT COMMISSION (1989) Urban Regeneration and Economic Development: The Local Government Dimension . London : HMSO. BOYLE, R . (1990) Regeneration in Glasgow : stability, collaboration and inequity, in : D . JUDD and M . PARKINSON (Eds) Leadership and Urban Regeneration : Cities in North America and Europe. Newbury Park: Sage . BRITISH CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE (1988) A Tale of Four Cities . London : British Chambers of Commerce . CHESHIRE, P. (1990) Explaining the recent performance of the European Community's major urban regions, Urban Studies, 27, pp . 311-344 . CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY (1988) Initiatives Beyond Charity . London : CBI . COOKE, P. (1988) Municipal enterprise, growth coalitions and social justice, Local Economy, 3(3), pp . 191-199 . DARKE, R . (1990) A city centre for people : popular planning in Sheffield, in : J. MONTGOMERY and A . THORNLEY (Eds) Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directions for Urban Planning in the 1990s . Aldershot : Gower, in association with Planning Practice and Research . DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (1990) People . in Cities . London : HMSO . DOMHOFF, G .W . (1986) The growth machine and the power elite, in : R . WASTE (Ed .) Community Power: Directions for Future Research . Beverly Hills, CA : Sage . ELKIN, S . (1985) Twentieth-century urban regimes, Journal of Urban Affairs, 7, pp . 1128 . ELKIN, S .L . (1987) City and Regime in the American Republic . Chicago : University of Chicago Press .


N .I. and FAINSTEIN, S .S . (1986) Regime strategies, communal resistance and economic forces, in : S . S . FAINSTEIN, N. I . FAINSTEIN, R . C . HILL, D . JUDD and M . P . SMITH (Eds) Restructuring the City, 2nd edn, pp . 245282 . London : Longman . FOLEY, P . and LAWLESS, P . (1992a) The Sheffield FAINSTEIN,

Central Area Study; 2010 A Vision of Quality .

Sheffield : Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University . FOLEY, P. and LAWLESS, P . (1992b) Sheffield Central Area : Options and Opportunities into the Next Century; A Research Proposal from Sheffield City Polytechnic and The University of Sheffield . Sheffield : Centre for Regional

Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University . GOODWIN, M . (1992) The changing local state, in: (Ed .) Policy and Change in Thatcher's Britain . Oxford : Pergamon . P . CLOKE

R. (1989) Urban government under Thatcher and Reagan, Urban Affairs Quarterly, 24, pp. 359-388. HARDING, A . (1991) The rise of urban growth coalitions, UK style?, Environment and Planning C, 9, pp . 295-317 . HARVEY, D . (1989a) The Urban Experience . Oxford : Blackwell . HARVEY, D . (1989b) From managerialism to entrepreneurialism : the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism, Geografiska Annaler, 71(B), pp . 3-17 . HMSO (1988) Action for Cities . London : HMSO . JONES, R .D . (1992) The City Centre-Ways Forward . Sheffield : Department of Land and Planning, Sheffield City Council . JUDD, D . and PARKINSON, M . (Eds) (1990) LeaderHAMBLETON,

ship and Urban Regeneration : Cities in North America and Europe . Newbury Park : Sage. LAFFIN, M . (1986) Professionalism and Policy: The Role of the Professions in the Central-Local Government Relationship . Aldershot : Gower . LAWLESS, P. (1981) Britain's Inner Cities, 1st edn .

London : Harper and Row . P . (1990) Regeneration in Sheffield : from radical intervention to partnership, in : D . JUDD and M . PARKINSON (Eds) Leadership and

LAWLESS,

Urban Regeneration : Cities in North America and Europe . Newbury Park: Sage . LAWLESS, P . (1991) Public-Private Sector Partnerships in the United Kingdom . Sheffield :

Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University . LEITNER, H . (1990) Cities in pursuit of economic growth : the local state as entrepreneur, Political Geography Quarterly, 9, pp . 146-170 . LLOYD, G . and NEWLANDS, D . (1988) The `growth coalition' and urban economic development, Local Economy, 3, pp . 31-39 .

1 323

J. and MOLOTCH, H . (1987) Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place . Lon-

LOGAN,

don : The University of California Press . H . (1976) The city as growth machine, American Journal of Sociology, 82, pp. 309332. PARKINSON, M . (1989) The Cities under Mrs Thatcher. Liverpool : Centre for Urban Studies, Liverpool University . RHODES, R .A .W . (1992) Changing intergovernmental relations, in : P . CLOKE (Ed .) Policy and Change in Thatcher's Britain . Oxford : Pergamon . SEYD, P . (1988) Socialist City Politics . Sheffield: Sheffield Department of Politics, University of Sheffield . SHAW, M . (1993) The development of a new urban corporation : the politics of urban regeneration in the North East of England, Regional Studies, 27, pp. 251-258. SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL (1988) A City Centre for MOLOTCH,

People : Sheffield Central Area Local Plan .

Sheffield : Sheffield City Council . (1989) Looking at the

SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL

City: An Urban Design Guide of Sheffield City Centre . Sheffield: Sheffield City Council. SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL (1991a) The Draft Unitary Development Plan . Sheffield : Sheffield

City Council . (1991b) City centre management: A discussion, issues and proposals paper. Sheffield : Sheffield City Council . SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL (1992) Sheffield Riverside: 1992 City Challenge Submission . SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL

Sheffield : Sheffield City Council . (1993a) Central Area Integrated Transport Study. Sheffield : Sheffield City Council . SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL (1993b) Unitary Development Plan . Sheffield : Sheffield City Council . SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL (1993c) Major Development Schemes in Sheffield. Department of Land and Planning, Sheffield City Council . SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL (undated) Poverty in Sheffield . Sheffield: Sheffield City Council . SHEFFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (undated) A New CityA new Valley . Sheffield : Sheffield Development Corporation . SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL

SHEFFIELD ECONOMIC REGENERATION COMMITTEE

(undated) Sheffield 2000 . Sheffield : Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee . STONE, C .N . (1989) Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta . Kansas : University Press of Kansas . TURNER, R .S . (1992) Growth politics and downtown development : the economic imperative in sunbelt cities, Urban Affairs Quarterly, 28, pp. 3-21 . WARF, B . (1991) Power, politics and locality, Urban Geography, 12, pp . 563-569 .

1 324

PAUL LAWLESS

WATTS, H.D . (1989) Non-financial head-offices: a view from the North, in : J . LEwis and A . TOWNSEND (Eds) The North South Divide . London : Paul Chapman Publishing . WHELAN, R ., YOUNG, A . and LAURIA, M . (1991)

Urban regimes and racial politics : New Orleans during the Barthelemy years . Working Paper No. 7, Division of Urban Research and Policy Studies, College of Urban and Public Affairs, University of New Orleans .