PATHWAYS TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION? - Oxford Journals

International Journal of Public Opinion Research Vol.  No. 

PATHWAYS TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION? RELIGION, COMMUNICATION CONTEXTS, AND MASS MEDIA

Dietram A. Scheufele, Matthew C. Nisbet, and Dominique Brossard ABSTRACT Recently, there has been a focus on religion as an essential catalyst for political participation and renewed civic engagement. Various claims share the common assumption that religion promotes the essential components of political participation including motivation, recruitment, and ability. Using survey data from the  National Election Study, we examine the processes that link the structural and cognitive dimensions of religion with political discussion networks, mass media use, and various indicators of democratic citizenship, including political participation. Our results show that current claims related to religion may be oversold. Specifically, we find that the cognitive dimension of religion leads to several negative effects on aspects of democratic citizenship. Our results also indicate that the structural effects of religion are limited, compared to secular networks, which provide an ideal setting for citizens to gain and exchange information, increase feelings of efficacy, and—most importantly—engage in various forms of participation.

Despite Constitutional boundaries separating church and state activities, religion has always played an important role in American politics. In the nineteenth century, de Tocqueville (/) viewed religious institutions as central intermediaries between citizen and state, and indeed today, churches remain the most popular of American volunteer organizations. While various forms of civic involvement have declined over the past half-century (Putnam, ), participation in religion has remained remarkably unchanged (Wuthenow, ). If all politics is local, religion then parallels the local access points to political power (Leege, ), as churches serve as translocal networks that connect citizens to politics across the nation (de Tocqueville, /). In fact, churches are political institutions, providing sources of political information, opportunities, and incentives to engage in politics (Greenberg, ). Religion’s relevance is not

This article was submitted to IJPOR April , . The final version was received February , . © World Association for Public Opinion Research 

RELIGION, COMMUNICATION CONTEXTS, AND MASS MEDIA

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lost on political elites, who routinely develop campaign themes and use religious imagery as a way to connect religious worldviews with political mobilization (Leege, ). In recent years, several high-profile scholars have suggested that churches, through their contextual influences on their members, can help reverse the decadeslong decline in political participation (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, ), and help restore America’s ‘lost’ social capital (Putnam, ). On the first count, Verba et al. () argue that religious institutions effectively promote among their members the essential components of political participation including motivation, recruitment, and ability. Putnam (), similarly, proposes that religious institutions can serve as ‘networks of civic engagement’, promoting among their members an interest in the collective good, and serving as important challengers to authority, as was the case when black churches and their leaders spearheaded the civil rights movement. If the associational and network influences of churches can serve as a good, Putnam () and others suggest that certain aspects of religion’s individuallevel influences, including extreme doctrinal commitment, or the belief in the absolute veracity of biblical teachings, can have a negative impact on civic engagement. These assertions are linked to the shift in membership over the past three decades away from white mainline Protestant churches towards white evangelical Protestant churches. Many fear that this trend has helped mobilize the ‘Christian right’ as a new political force on social issues, but has worked against civic culture. Researchers allege that the greater levels of doctrinal commitment among evangelicals negatively impacts social capital by fostering in-group trust at the expense of general social trust (Uslaner, ), and within church involvement at the expense of greater community involvement (Wuthenow, ; Putnam, ; Greenberg, ). In this paper we take as a point of departure these claims surrounding the effects of religion on civic culture, and place them in relation to various mediating processes. Does religion provide both the social context and the forms of psychological engagement that promote civic engagement? Of specific interest is how religion interacts with the interpersonal and mass media processes that sponsor political participation. We conceptualize the influence of religion on political participation as three dimensional, involving () structural or associational effects including church-based political discussions and church-based elite cues; () individual-level effects centered on levels of doctrinal commitment; and () differences in effects between denomination, specifically between white mainline Protestant and white evangelical Protestant denominations. We demonstrate that while direct influences for dimensions of religion on political participation do exist, there also exist powerful indirect relationships that are mediated by various interpersonal and mass communication processes.

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH

CHURCH-BASED STRUCTURAL EFFECTS ON PARTICIPATION Verba et al. () have defined political participation as ‘activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies’ (p. ). In this definition they emphasize that political participation is voluntary rather than obligatory; that it includes action, rather than just being attentive to politics; and that the action is directed at a public official or institution. Examples of political participation, according to Verba et al., include voting, volunteering to work on a campaign, contacting a public official or organization, contributing to a campaign or cause, taking part in a protest, engaging in informal community work, serving as a member of a local board, or affiliating with a political organization. Among these activities, voting would be considered the least intensive and individually demanding activity. In predicting political activity, Verba et al. () identify three factors as influential including () the resources to participate; () psychological engagement with politics; and () various ‘recruitment networks’ that bring citizens into politics. These three factors combine into what they define as the ‘civic voluntarism model’. Time, money, and civic skills are essential resources to participate politically. Individuals with these resources are not only more likely to participate, but their efforts are also more likely to be effective. According to Verba et al., religious institutions foster the resources needed to participate by serving as political training grounds. Through the process of planning congregational meetings, speaking in public, ‘schmoozing’ in personal conversations, or writing letters, active members in churches build important civic skills (Verba et al., ). Churches provide an abundance of resources favorable to collective action including formal membership, an organizational headquarters, meeting places, publications, and professional leadership (Wald, ). Churches also provide individuals not only with community networks and opportunities to interact with shared goals, but with organizational skills that can be nurtured through involvement and political action (Harris, ). According to Verba et al. () forms of psychological engagement include an interest in politics, feelings of efficacy, value systems, a sense of group consciousness, or a commitment to specific issues. Based on field observation, Greenberg () suggests that one way that churches enhance the psychological engagement of their members is by serving as important sources of political information and opinion leadership, with religious leaders often striving to make salient the linkages between religious faith and political goals, and by emphasizing political participation as a necessary aspect of religious duty. Previously observed types of church-related political communication include politically-oriented


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sermons; use of churches by political groups as meeting places; the distribution of candidate score cards or literature specific to issues like abortion; candidate speeches; and the political conversations that inevitably ensue, both related and unrelated to these situations (Greenberg, ). These church-based political communications are usually framed in moral terms, playing on the religious motivations of parishioners to mobilize on behalf of the morally correct candidate, cause, or issue (Wald, ).1 In addition to direct linkages to participation, other studies have found that church attendance is positively related with increased political knowledge (Hougland & Christenson, ). Moreover, as Greenberg () observes, political communication within the context of a church provides not only incentives to participate, but also information that enables individuals to feel more internally efficacious about their impact on the political process. Wald () suggests that religious institutions might foster efficacy in other ways, either by providing church members with the ‘spiritual’ confidence that their political efforts were likely to be aided by divine forces, or that their actions are part of a larger group effort. Exhortations to participate by religious leaders and discussions of politics with other congregants also fit with Verba et al.’s () findings on networks of recruitment: people are much more likely to participate when they are asked to do so. Networks of recruitment are requests or demands that come to individuals at the workplace, within membership organizations, among friends or relatives, and at church. As Verba et al. argue, individuals may have already desired to or planned to participate, but the requests that may confront them within their networks of recruitment serve to catalyze their involvement. In a test of their recruitment model, they find that above and beyond demographics, civic skills, and levels of political engagement, individuals who report receiving greater numbers of institutional-based requests for their activism were more likely to participate. These findings are consistent with research on discussion networks in other contexts (e.g., Knoke, ; Huckfeldt & Sprague, ; McLeod, Scheufele, Moy, Horowitz, et al., ). Church-based political discussion networks may be uniquely influential in society, as churches constitute voluntary associations of individuals bound by strong affective ties and regular social interactions. As institutions, churches are chiefly concerned with influencing the worldviews and behavior of their members, and political discussions within church are likely to repeat and reinforce 1 In a recent analysis of the  American National Election Study (ANES),  percent of all respondents reported that political information was available at their place of worship. Among individuals identifying themselves as committed white Protestant evangelicals, Catholics, or committed black evangelicals, more than  percent identified receiving materials. Reports of clergy urging a particular vote were rare, ranging from  to  percent. A regression analysis, however, showed that political communication efforts in churches were influential, increasing participation by a half-point (Kohut, Green, Keeter, & Toth, ).

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the political cues offered by church leaders or by other church-based political communications (Gilbert, ). For regular congregants, churches constitute a salient and powerful climate of opinion with strong isolation effects for members that deviate from perceived majority norms (Jelen, ). Given the evidence for the types of powerful political messages that individuals are likely to encounter, and the strong political contexts and bonds formed by churches, political discussions with fellow church members may have unique effects on participation in comparison to political conversations that might take place outside of church. INDIVIDUAL COGNITIVE INFLUENCES AND PARTICIPATION In addition to providing the more structural background and interpersonal context for mobilization, information, and recruitment through its institutions, religion also plays a role as an individual-level characteristic in promoting or reducing levels of political participation. Much of this impact is likely to be indirect, i.e., mediated through other informational and motivational variables. One of the individual-level variables related to religion that is highly relevant to people’s willingness to participate in politics is what has been labeled doctrinal commitment, typically measured in previous National Election Studies and other surveys with a question that asks a respondent the degree to which they hold to literal interpretations of the bible. The influence of doctrinal commitment parallels theorizing on fatalistic worldviews (e.g., Lerner, ), closed-mindedness (Rokeach, ), dogmatism (Rokeach, ), and research that has characterized religion as an avenue of retreat from the world (Alport, ). Specifically, this parallel line of research suggests that doctrinal commitment emphasizes a relatively closed cognitive organization of worldviews that are based on a central and personal commitment to an absolute and divine authority. Previous research suggests that strong religious interpretations provide a likely framework for cognitive processes that undermine efficacy and self-exposure to heterogeneous sources of political information (such as the mass media) that can sponsor political participation. First, doctrinal commitment—in as much as it parallels fatalistic worldviews—is likely to directly decrease feelings of political efficacy, i.e., a person’s perception that he or she can make a difference in the political system or that the system is responsive to his or her particular needs (Abramson, ). (This negative influence of the individual dimension of religion contrasts with the previously discussed church-based structural effects that are claimed to increase efficacy directly, or increase politically-relevant knowledge, thereby indirectly enhancing efficacy.) Second, and perhaps more importantly, McLeod, Sotirovic, and Holbert () found fatalistic worldviews—again conceptually very similar to literal religious beliefs—to be negatively related to public affairs media use and political


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discussions with non-likeminded others. This possible negative link between strength of religious belief and public affairs media use is also supported by a series of experimental studies based on the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, ). In these studies, individuals with strong religious beliefs were likely to avoid secular news or entertainment media that might present ideas or information with which they disagree (Brock & Balloun, ).

DIFFERENCES ACROSS DENOMINATION In sum, the direct and indirect effects of religion’s structural and individual dimensions on political participation are still largely unexplored. In terms of structural effects, the literature suggests that churches can serve as networks of political recruitment; as important social contexts where church-goers encounter political information and opinion leaders; and as a potentially coercive climate of opinion. With regards to individual-level effects, personal adherence to literal religious interpretations can provide a powerful anchoring for a retreat from the external world. This process parallels theorizing on closed-mindedness and fatalistic orientations, both of which have been shown to be linked to diminished internal efficacy, and avoidance of political or ‘secular’ sources of information with which a highly religious respondent is likely to disagree. Related to religion’s structural and cognitive effects on political participation, denominational membership is also likely to have an influence on civic engagement. As mentioned at the outset of this paper, specific to the contemporary American political landscape, the key denominational affiliations of interest are white evangelical Protestants and white mainline Protestants. There have been multiple reasons provided for this expected negative impact. Based on field observation, Greenberg () characterizes evangelicals as preferring within-church activities and efforts at proselyzation to greater community involvement and engagement. Uslaner (), in his criticism of religion for its ability to foster in-group trust, alleges that the higher levels of doctrinal commitment and church involvement that are unique to evangelicals (see Leege & Kellstedt, , for an overview), likely serve to further promote in-group orientations at the expense of diverse political interactions. To the degree that previous research has shown evangelical Protestants to hold to greater levels of literal religious of doctrinal commitment than mainline Protestants (Leege & Kellstedt, ), or are likely to be receiving more frequent cues from church leaders and fellow congregants regarding political issues, candidates, the mainline media, and society at large (Jelen, ), evangelical Protestants may be less likely to use public affairs media, and less likely to engage in political conversations with a diversity of others. Even accounting for these negative cognitive effects associated with evangelicalism, members of evangelical

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churches may still be more likely to participate in politics than other societal groups because of strong church-based structural and associational effects. Evidence on these matters remains incomplete, if not somewhat contradictory. It is fairly clear, however, that differences between white evangelical Protestants and white mainline Protestants specific to the processes that shape political participation merit closer examination. POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Thus far in our discussion we have made several references to the possible indirect effects of religion on political participation that are mediated through different types of interpersonal and mass communication processes. In this section, we briefly outline the relevant literature related to these communication effects. Previous research has consistently shown positive links between various types of public affairs media use and political participation. These links have usually been strongest for newspaper reading (Bybee, McLeod, Leuscher, & Garramone, ; McLeod & McDonald, ; Scheufele & Nisbet, ; Viswanath, Finnegan, Rooney, & Potter, ). Given the differences in information presentation and in the impact on people’s information processing, television news viewing has been found as a weaker predictor of political participation than newspaper reading (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, ; Scheufele & Nisbet, ; Smith, ; Wattenberg, ). Overall, however, public affairs content both in newspapers and on television were found to increase political participation (Chaffee & Kanihan, ; McLeod et al., ). Beyond the use of various mass media, interpersonal communication about politics also matters. Specific to the political conservations that might ensue within and outside of church contexts, interpersonal discussion or talk about political issues has also been shown in previous research to facilitate various forms of political participation (McLeod et al., ; Scheufele, ; Verba et al., ; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, ). Although the direct links from various types of media use and interpersonal communication to political participation are well-established, it is important to also examine the potential interrelationships among different types of media and their relevance for participatory behavior. Examining the relative impact of communication variables on political participation, McLeod et al. () found local newspaper reading to be the strongest predictor of traditional participation. Television news viewing had no direct influence, unless mediated by newspaper reading or interpersonal communication. Scheufele and Shah () also found a modest direct effect of newspaper reading on civic engagement, while the impact of television news viewing was detected only through the causal link from television news viewing to newspaper reading. Since some of these links could


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also be conceptualized differently, we will not specify any directional links between the different variables in this study. In addition to the direct effects of various types of communication on participation, a potential mediation of these communication effects through other factors is of special interest to this study. Indirect impacts of communication on participation in the literature have been found working through two pathways: cognitive and motivational routes. In other words, political learning and motivation for participation are enhanced through various types of communication, which in turn increases the level of political participation. The relationships between communication and political learning have been documented across various types of media, in which newspaper reading played a consistently positive role (Patterson & McClure, ; Robinson & Levy, , ). And increased political knowledge in turn was related to more active participation in various political activities (Inglehart, ; Klingemann, ; Bennett, ; Neuman, ). The effective role of newspaper reading in political learning is also highly relevant to its effect on political efficacy. As Iyengar () argued, newspaper’s ‘thematic’ presentation of news is more likely to encourage people to reason with issues or about the role of government, and as a result, to increase political efficacy. The media–participation relationship, however, is often mediated through people’s feelings of political efficacy. Efficacy itself is positively related to political participation, (Gans, ; Pomper & Sernekos, ). More importantly, however, it mediates the impact of various types of media use on political participation. McLeod et al. (), for example, found an indirect link from higher levels of newspaper hard news use through knowledge and then through political efficacy to be the strongest predictor of institutionalized participation.

HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS Due to the relatively inconsistent theorizing and findings about the structural and cognitive effects attributed to religion in promoting political participation, we decided to base our research on a combination of hypotheses and relatively narrowly defined research questions. Specifically, we put forth the following: H: Religion’s structural dimension, in the form of church attendance, church-based elite cues, and religious discussion networks, will be positively related to political participation. RQa: What are the processes that link church-based structural influences to political participation through various mediators such as mass media use, political knowledge, and political efficacy? RQb: In addition, when compared to religion’s structural effects, what is the role of political discussions outside of church in this process?

 H: RQ:

RQ:


The individual-level dimension of religion, as measured by doctrinal commitment, will be negatively related to political participation. What are the processes linking the individual level influences of religion to political participation through various mediators such as mass media use, political knowledge, and political efficacy? What are the effects of denominational affiliation, specifically white evangelical Protestant and white mainline Protestant affiliation, on political participation? METHOD

Data for our study came from the  National Election Study, based on a national survey of , respondents between September and December . The overall response rate was . percent. Like every presidential election year, the survey was based on pre-election interviews with respondents who were then re-interviewed after Election Day. The response rate for the first wave was . percent. The response rate for the re-interviews was  percent. In our analysis, we exclude the  percent of respondents who dropped out in the post-election portion of the survey, leaving a total sample size of ,. The variables used for the study can be categorized into three groups: exogenous variables (those not influenced by other variables in the model), ‘antecedent’ endogenous variables (those influenced by some variables in the model but that also influence other variables), and our ‘consequence’ endogenous variable. E XOGENOUS V ARIABLES Nine variables served as antecedent exogenous variables in our model: sex, age, formal education, income, region (south),2 ideology, strength of partisan affiliation, and the denominational affiliation of white evangelical Protestant, and white mainline Protestant. The measures of age (M = ., SD = .) and gender (. percent females) are relatively straightforward. Formal education was measured using seven categories that ranged from eighth grade or less (coded ) to an advanced degree (coded ) (M = ., SD = .). Income, similarly, was a nominal variable with a mode between US$, and US$,. Ideology was a summary measure on the liberal to conservative continuum with  representing ‘strong liberal’ and  representing ‘strong conservative’ (M = ., SD = .). Another control was strength of party affiliation, which was a folded-over measure of a summary variable that measured respondent’s self-identification of their partisan affiliation. This folded-over measure (M = ., 2 Region was controlled for given the disproportionate number of white evangelical Protestants who live in the American South (Steensland et al., ).


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SD = .) ranged from  (independent–independent) to  (strong republication or strong democrat). Third party affiliation was coded as missing. White evangelical Protestant and white mainline Protestant affiliation were dichotomous measures of all respondents who indicated membership in specific church organizations that had been previously classified by Steensland et al. (). Respondents were first asked a question about their general religious affiliation. For those respondents who indicated that they were Protestant (. percent), a series of detailed follow-up questions probed their specific Protestant denominational membership. White evangelical respondents were coded  (. percent of respondents), and white mainline Protestants were coded  (. percent) in their respective variables, with all others coded . (This other category includes Protestants who were not clearly identifiable as either evangelical or mainline, and Protestants from traditionally black church affiliations.) Although these proportions under-represent reported levels of denominational affiliation from other national studies, these constructed measures maximize precision of measurement within the constraints of the available NES codebook. (See appendix for details on precise coding procedures.) ‘A NTECEDENT ’ ENDOGENOUS V ARIABLES Ten variables served as antecedent endogenous variables, and we further categorize the indicators among these eleven that are related to religion into structural and cognitive effects. In terms of structural effects, church attendance ranged from ‘’ (never attends church) to ‘’, attends more than once a week (M = ., SD = .). Church-based elite cues were measured by a combined index of two items that included: () an indicator asking respondents if information about candidates, parties, or political issues were made available in their place of worship before the election, with ‘yes’ coded ‘’ (. percent of respondents) and all other responses coded ‘’; and () an indicator that asked respondents if their clergy encouraged the respondent to vote for a particular candidate or party with ‘yes’ coded ‘’ (. percent of respondents) and all other responses coded ‘’. The final constructed measure of church-based elite cues therefore ranged from ‘’ to ‘’ (M = ., SD = .). In terms of additional structural effects of religion, churchbased political discussion networks (ranging from  to , M = ., SD = .) measured the number of people (excluding spouses and relatives) with whom the respondent discussed government, elections, or politics at a place of worship or church. For the individual-level effects of religion, doctrinal commitment or level of literal interpretation of the bible (M = ., SD = .) was measured by agreement with the following statements:  = ‘the bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God’;  = ‘the bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word’;  = ‘the bible is the actual word of god, and should be taken literally, word for word’.

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Other antecedent endogenous variables were related to interpersonal and mass media communication processes, as well as informational and motivation-related variables. Political discussions outside of church or secular political discussion networks (ranging from  to , M = ., SD = .) measured the number of people (excluding spouses and relatives) with whom the subject discussed government, elections, and politics in settings outside of a religious context. Newspaper use (M = ., SD = .) was measured by a question that asked respondents how many days in the past week they had read a daily newspaper. TV national news use was measured by a question that asked respondents how many days in the past week they had watched the national network news on TV (M = ., SD = .). In terms of political efficacy, we chose to include in our model only the internal dimension, which is defined by Abramson () as feelings of personal political effectiveness, as opposed to beliefs about government’s responsiveness. This internal dimension of efficacy is likely to be more closely related to the type of psychological engagement fostered by religious networks, religious beliefs, or media use. Internal political efficacy was an additive index of two -points item ( = ‘agree strongly’;  = ‘disagree strongly’): ‘People like me don’t have any say about what the government does’ and ‘Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on’ (M = ., SD = .). The two items were correlated at r = .. Political knowledge was an additive index (α = .) of four dichotomous items asking the respondent to correctly identify the political office that William Rehnquist, Trent Lott, Tony Blair, and Janet Reno held at the time of the survey (M = ., SD = .). ‘C ONSEQUENCE ’ ENDOGENOUS V ARIABLE Political participation was the final outcome variable in our theoretical model. Consistent with most previous research (for an overview, see Verba et al., ), it was operationalized as an additive index (α = .) of five dichotomous items (M = .), measuring if respondents had participated in political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or related activities in support of a particular candidate; if they had done any (other) work for one of the parties or candidates; if they had given money to an individual candidate running for public office; if they had worn a campaign button, displayed bumper stickers or yard signs; and finally, if they had talked to any people and tried to convince them whom to vote for. T ESTING THE M ODEL The covariance matrices that our analyses are based on were prepared using PRELIS. In other words, they take the unique level of measurement of each variable into account. To test the relationships among independent and dependent


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variables we employed structural modeling techniques, and used LISREL. In contrast to other multivariate techniques, structural equation modeling allows for the simultaneous estimation of all parameters in a model. Any given coefficient therefore represents the relationship between two variables controlling for all other relationships and variables in the model. A structural model shows relationships among variables that are not only controlled for all other variables in the model but also for all relationships among independent and dependent variables. This approach to the analysis of the relationship between religion and political participation allows not only for examination of the direct impact of church-based structural influences and individual-level cognitive influences on participation, but also the indirect effects of these structural and cognitive aspects of religion on participation through intermediary variables including interpersonal and mass communication, internal efficacy, and political knowledge. Large parts of our original model were based on previous theorizing and research. In fact, out analyses of media use, factual political knowledge, political efficacy, and political participation directly replicate much previous work in this area (for an overview see McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, ). A small number of paths were adjusted after an initial test. RESULTS The final model fit the data exceptionally well with a Chi-square of . (df = , N = ,) which translates into a BIC statistic of − .. The Goodness-of-FitIndex (GFI) was . and the Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit-Index (AGFI)— controlling for multivariate nonnormality—was .. Our model accounted for  percent of the variance in church attendance,  percent of the variance in literal interpretation of the bible,  percent of church-based elite cues,  percent for church-based political discussion networks,  percent for secular political discussion networks,  percent of newspaper reading,  percent of national television news viewing,  percent of political knowledge,  percent of efficacy, and  percent of political participation. As previously outlined, the main focus of this paper is on the relationships among the endogenous variables in our model. Figure  displays the direct effects among ten endogenous variables. Not shown, but controlled for, are the nine endogenous controls. Our model specified the strength but not the direction of the links between biblical interpretation and church attendance (α = .), and between newspaper reading and national television viewing (α = .). In order to account for possible spurious and third variable influences on the relationships among endogenous variables, our model incorporates the relevant controls of education, income, region (south), ideology, strength of partisanship, sex, and age. The effects of these controls are displayed in Table .

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Figure  Relationships among endogenous variables



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TABLE  Relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables Sex (f) Age Educ. Income Region Party Ideology WEP WMP (South) strength Church attendance Biblical interpretation Church elite cues Church discussion networks Secular discussion networks Newspaper

TV National News Political knowledge Political efficacy Political participation

. – . . – . . . . . . . − . − . − . − . − . − . – – – − . − . − . − . − . − . − . − . − .

. . – – . . – − . – – – − . − . – . . – . . – . . . . − . . − . – − . . . . − . – . . . – – . . . . . . . . . − . . . . − . . – – . . . .

– – – – – – – – – . – . – − . − . – – – – – – – . . – – – – . .

. – . . – . – . . − . . − . − . – − . − . − . − . . − . – – − . − . – − . − . . − . .

. – . . . . . . . – . . . – . – – – . . . . – . – . . . . .

. – . . – . – . . . . . – − . − . – − . − . – – – – − . − . – − . − . − . . − .

. – . . – . – . . – . . – – – . − . . – – – − . − . − . – − . − . – – –

. – . . – . −. . − . −. . – . – . . – . – – – . – . . . . . . .

Notes: () All coefficients shown are significant at p < . () Coefficients in the first row indicate direct effects, coefficients in the second row indicate indirect effects, and coefficients in the third row indicate total effects. (3) Rounding and non-significant indirect effects may produce some total effects that are not equal to the sum of direct and indirect effects. In other cases, a difference in the direction of direct and indirect effects may result in non-significant total effects.

THE S TRUCTURAL D IMENSION OF RELIGION Our first hypothesis predicted that religion’s structural dimension would be positively linked to political participation. We also posed research questions specific to (a) the processes that link church-based structural influences to political

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TABLE  Relationships among endogenous variables

Church attendance () Doctrinal committment () Church elite cues () Church discussion networks () Secular discussion networks () Newspaper ()

National television news () Political knowledge () Political efficacy () Political participation

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

– – – – – – . – . . – . – − . − . – – – – – – – − – – – – – . .

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – − . – − . – – – − . − . − . − . − . − . – − . − .

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – . – .

– – – – – – – – – – – – − . – − . – – – . − . . . – . – – – . – .

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – . – . . – . . . . . . . . . .

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – . – . – – – . . .

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – . – . – . . – . .

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – . – . . . .

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – . – .

Notes: () All coefficients shown are significant at p < . () Coefficients in the first row indicate direct effects, coefficients in the second row indicate indirect effects, and coefficients in the third row indicate total effects. (3) Rounding and non-significant indirect effects may produce some total effects that are not equal to the sum of direct and indirect effects. In other cases, a difference in the direction of direct and indirect effects may result in non-significant total effects.

participation through various mediators such as mass media use, political knowledge, and political efficacy; and (b) specific to the comparative influence of political discussions outside of church. Our findings indicate mixed support for our first hypothesis, and several relationships of interest to our research questions. In Table , as might be expected, frequent church attendees were more likely to be exposed to church-based elite cues, and were more likely to engage in


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church-based political discussions. Exposure to church-based elite cues had a direct positive effect on political participation, a finding in line with previous research and theorizing relevant to networks of recruitment. Political discussions within church displayed both positive and negative effects for aspects of democratic citizenship. On the negative side, those respondents who engaged in churchbased political discussions were less likely to engage in political discussions within secular settings. On the positive side, however, church-based political discussions were directly and positively linked to national television news viewing, political knowledge, and to political participation. This last finding is a second confirmation of expectations relevant to networks of recruitment. Specific to research question (a), the importance of communication variables and other indicators of democratic citizenship as mediators between the structural dimension of religion and political participation are apparent from our results. Both newspaper reading and national television news viewing were positively related to political knowledge. Similarly, respondents with higher levels of factual knowledge also felt more efficacious about politics. Finally, newspaper reading, political knowledge, and political efficacy were all directly related to political participation. In regards to research question (b), the comparative relationship between church-based political discussions and secular political discussions was of special interest. Interpersonal political interactions outside of church had stronger direct effects on political participation than church-based interactions. Political discussions outside of church also had stronger direct effects on political knowledge, and national television news viewing. These non-church based political discussions were also positively linked to newspaper reading. INDIVIDUAL -LEVEL DIMENSION OF RELIGION Our second hypothesis was specific to the expected negative influence of the individual-level dimension of religion on political participation. In this regard, our findings do not support this direct link, as there are no significant direct or total effects between these two variables. However, specific to research question (), our results reveal several negative relationships between religious belief and indicators of democratic citizenship, that result in an indirect negative relationship between doctrinal committment and participation. As Table  indicates, respondents with higher levels of doctrinal commitment were less likely to read the newspaper, had significantly lower levels of political knowledge, and felt less efficacious about their role in the political system. These findings are consistent with previous work and theorizing that indicates that doctrinal commitment provides a likely framework for cognitive processes that undermine efficacy and self-exposure to heterogeneous sources of political information. These indirect relationships resulted in a total negative relationship between doctrinal commitment and participation.

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D ENOMINATIONAL AFFILIATION The third research question was specific to the influence of white evangelical Protestant and white mainline Protestant denominational affiliation on political participation. Table  indicates that evangelicals are more likely to hold to higher levels of doctrinal commitment than mainline Protestants, and attend church more frequently. Our results also indicate that church contexts for mainline Protestants are less politically charged. Mainline Protestants are less likely to be exposed to churchbased elite cues, and less likely to take part in church-based political discussions. Mainline Protestants are also more likely to seek out diverse political viewpoints, with a positive link to political discussions outside of church and to newspaper reading. In direct links, mainline Protestants are also more knowledgeable of politics, and feel more efficacious about politics. Specific to political participation, in a direct relationship, mainline Protestants are also more likely to participate in politics. In contrast, the links between evangelicals, political participation, and several indicators of citizenship are negative. The strong positive link between evangelicals and doctrinal commitment results in a likely self-selection process into a church environment that indirectly exposes the respondent to a greater number of political messages. In total effects, evangelicals are slightly more likely to be exposed to church-based elite cues, and to take part in church-based political discussions. Evangelicals are also more likely to read the newspaper. Yet despite these tendencies to engage in church-based political communication, and to read the newspaper, evangelicals are less knowledgeable about politics, and less efficacious about politics. O THER R ELATIONSHIPS The findings specific to the influence of education warrant elaboration as they shed light on a current debate in political science and communication research. As Tables  and  show, education had an overall positive impact on political participation. However, this relationship is not direct. In other words, education’s influence was fully mediated through a person’s religious and secular networks, communication behavior, political knowledge, and feelings of political efficacy. Verba and Nie () have argued that education and other socioeconomic variables are the predominant predictors of participatory activities. Our research confirms, however, the assumption by Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry () that—rather than having direct influences—socioeconomic status is only indirectly related to political participation.

CONCLUSIONS The findings from our study raise important questions for how we define the role of religion in everyday civic life. However, before we delve into these questions


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and their implications for the contemporary political landscape, it is necessary to look more closely at some of the more technical aspects of our study. S OME DATA -R ELATED ISSUES Our study utilized a national survey data set collected during the  presidential elections. This raises a number of issues that we need to address at least briefly. First, it has been argued that levels of media use, efficacy and political activity are overall higher during election years (e.g., Moy & Scheufele, ). This is likely to be due to the fact that election campaigns provide easy access to political information and increase awareness among citizens of different ways of getting directly involved in the political process. Second, the media measures included in the National Election Study did not tap the attention and exposure to various types of content to the degree that would have been ideal for our purposes. Norris () and Moy, Scheufele, and Holbert (), for example, demonstrated that the role of media use in promoting civic life is to a large degree dependent on the specific content that individuals attend to. This raises two issues. As far as content is concerned, our measure of newspaper use did not explicitly tap use of political news. Unfortunately, the contentspecific measures all referred to the presidential race in particular which would have limited the comparability between this measure and other variables in our model. For the second problematic issue—the lack of attention measures—we encountered similar problems, i.e., content-specific attention measures that referred too narrowly to the presidential race. Overall, the use of less-thanperfect single-item public affairs media use measures in our study probably increased the chance of random measurement error and probably led us to underestimate effects. In other words, more reliable and valid media measures would likely strengthen the pathways to and from television and newspaper public affairs media use. Moreover, the current study does not explore the effects of the religious media. As early as the s, communication researchers highlighted the tendency among white evangelical Protestants to create a sort of ‘rival public sphere’ by establishing private broadcasting networks and other forms of media with contexts that attract an audience of like-minded religious viewers (Gerbner et al., ). Today, the evangelical public sphere—comprised of religious news media, books, videos, Web sites, radio, and recorded music—is estimated to be a US$ billion industry (Peyser, ). Future research should explore the effects of this new Christian media on political participation and other indicators of civic culture. A final caveat is specific to possible socialization effects not accounted for in our analysis. Adults who have strong ties to religion, both at the structural and

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individual level, are likely to have been raised in a dense church-based social structure. Religious indoctrination early in life may inhibit childhood exposure to diverse social interactions, and to secular public affairs media. In the current study, we are unable to account for these prior socialization effects, but recognize that they are a likely influence. O UTLOOK As outlined earlier, we found four groups of variables to be key mediators: () religious belief and church contexts, () discussion networks (both religious and secular), () mass media variables, and () political knowledge and efficacy. One group of these mediators – religious and secular discussion networks – warrants special attention. An increasing number of studies recently point to political discussion more generally (e.g., Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, ; Scheufele, ), and discussion networks more specifically (e.g., Huckfeldt & Sprague, ; McLeod et al., ), as key predictors of political participation. Others (e.g., Verba et al., ) identified religious networks as playing an especially important role as networks of recruitment for various participatory activities. Our results provided mixed support for this latter assumption. Religious belief overall has detrimental effects on indicators of democratic citizenship. This includes negative effects on newspaper reading, political knowledge, and political efficacy. At the same time, however, people with more extreme religious views are more likely to attend church, and as a result are exposed to a greater number of church-based elite cues and political discussions which serve as networks of recruitment into politics. Yet, the effects of these church-based networks are mostly unmediated and direct, bypassing other criteria of democratic citizenship including engaging in political discussion with a diversity of others, learning about politics, and feeling efficacious about politics. Based on these results, it appears that the primary role that previous research has attributed to religion as a catalyst for America’s civic re-engagement is oversold, and only warranted to a degree. Even more disturbing, however, was the fact that membership in church networks was negatively linked to membership in secular networks. The latter in itself is not surprising given that discussion networks were measured for a finite number of discussion partners and the two measures are at least to some degree structurally negatively related. The negative relationship between church-based and secular networks, however, is further validated by the fact that people with more extreme biblical views were more likely to have well-developed church-based networks but were not more likely to have well-developed secular networks. This is somewhat worrisome given the dominant role we found secular discussion networks to play in contributing to individual participation in politics. People


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with well-developed secular networks were more likely to expose themselves to news media, they knew more about politics, they felt more efficacious, and they were more likely to participate in politics. More importantly, however, secular discussion networks produced strong indirect effects on participation through the democratic ideals of political knowledge and political efficacy. Our findings relevant to the effects of denominational affiliation on political participation are also of importance. Evangelicals are more likely to hold to extreme doctrinal views, are less knowledgeable of politics, and feel less politically efficacious. This study, therefore, provides some confirmation for prevailing concerns that the evangelical church movement may be having a negative impact on American civic culture. In short, de Tocqueville’s observations regarding the central role of religion in American democracy do not apply to the contemporary political setting. The structural dimension of religion is limited both in respect of the number of people who are recruited through religious networks as well as with regards to the effects that these networks can have. Religious belief sponsors stronger church-based ties, but is negatively related to political knowledge and efficacy. More importantly, religious belief and religious association undermine secular political interaction, a context that serves as a catalyst for developing a dense texture of ‘non-faith-based’ networks among citizens. These more secular networks, not religion, seem to be an essential element of what is necessary to reinvigorate American civic life and ultimately increase communication, information, and feelings of efficacy among the electorate. APPENDIX ITEMS USED FROM  NES DATA SET Gender: v Age: v Formal education: v Income: v Region (South): v Strength of political party affiliation: v Ideology: v White evangelical Protestants: All respondents who indicated the following responses were coded as white evangelical Protestants: v =  (Evangelical United Brethern); v =  (Assembly of God); v =  (Holiness); v =  (Southern Baptist Convention); v =  (American Baptist

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Churches in the USA); v =  (American Baptist Association); v =  (Independent Baptist); v =  (Evangelical Luther Church); v =  (Evangelical Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod); v =  (Christian Reformed Church); v =  (Church of the Brethern); v =  (The Plymouth Brethern); v =  (Church of Christ); v =  (Church of God of Anderson, Indiana); v =  (Church of God of Cleveland, Tennessee); v =  (Church of God in Christ); v =  (Church of God, other). White mainline Protestants: All respondents who indicated the following responses were coded as white mainline Protestants: v =  (Episcopalian, Anglican, Church of England); v =  (Just protestant); v =  (United Church of Christ); v =  (Non-denominational, protestant); v =  (United Methodist Church); v =  (The Reformed Church in America); v =  (Christian Church Disciples of Christ); v =  (United Church of Christ). Church attendance: v, v Church-based elite cues: v, v Literal interpretation of the bible: v Networks. Non-church based discussion networks are ‘Total Discussion Networks—Church-Based Discussion Networks.’ Church-based Networks: v, v, v Total Discussion Networks: v, v, v, v Television news viewing (national): v Newspaper reading: v Internal political efficacy: v, v Political knowledge: v, v, v, v Political participation: v, v, v, v, v

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Dietram A. Scheufele (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison) is assistant professor in the Department of Communication at Cornell University. His current research interests include the formation and expression of public opinion, and the impact of mass and interpersonal communication on various forms of political behavior. Matthew C. Nisbet (Ph.D., Cornell University) is an assistant professor in the School of Journalism and Communication at The Ohio State University, specializing in political mass communication, public opinion, and media sociology. Dominique Brossard (Ph.D., Cornell University) is a post-doctoral associate in the Department of Communication at Cornell University. Her current research focuses on media effects, public opinion, and political behavior in a wide variety of contexts. Address correspondence to Dietram A. Scheufele, Department of Communication, Cornell University,  Kennedy Hall, Ithaca, NY –, USA. E-mail: [email protected]