Comte's earlier proposal of an idyllic 'new priesthood' of ..... Wernick, A. (2001) Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity. The Post-â. Theistic Program of ...
Paul Feyerabend complains that science has authoritarian tendencies, is he right? Tom Gordon
In 2009, the academic Roger Pielke, Jr. published a caustic exposé of what he believed to be a prime example of science’s authoritarian core. Pielke was particularly rumbled following an editorial piece by the famed NASA scientist James Hansen, in which he demands for a ‘moratorium on new coal-‐fired power plants in Britain’ (2009). Pielke levels criticism on his ‘megalomania’, arguing that ‘Hansen believes that expertise should carry decisive weight in decisions’ and that his view ‘should take precedence over all other views.’ In particular, Pielke points to Hansen’s detachment with the public: ‘he dismisses [their opinions] as being too poorly informed, too distracted or unsophisticated to contribute to decision-‐making on the climate issue’. Pielke’s disgruntlement resonates with the preexisting works of philosopher Paul Feyerabend. In Science in a Free Society (SFS) (1978), Feyerabend claims that science has become disturbingly authoritarian. Steedman (1982) elegantly reviews his stance: ‘Misunderstood as an endlessly self-‐correcting, objective enterprise that reveals ‘truth’, [science] has overpowered other means of gaining knowledge’. Science ‘now resembles the Medieval Church: a body of doctrines and procedures is administered by ‘experts’ and the effect is to stifle all criticism’. Feyerabend calls for a ‘general reassessment of the role of science in human life’ (Steedman, 1982). His alternative doctrine of ‘epistemological anarchism’ was introduced in Against Method (AM) (1975) and elaborated upon in SFS. Feyerabend invites an ‘anything goes’ approach to research, cynically disarming the ‘scientific method’ as an elaborately constructed myth that simultaneously
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propagates the notion of high-‐handed practices whilst ‘enforcing restrictive conditions on new theories’ (Preston, 1997; Chalmers, 2013). In SFS, Feyerabend advocates for an inclusive attitude to all creeds, be they ‘magic, astrology’ or the ‘study of legends’. Feyerabend’s inflammatory writing saw him branded in a 1987 Nature article as ‘the worst enemy of science’ (Preston, Munévar and Lamb, 2000). In his own autobiography (1995), Feyerabend laments the fallout from AM: ‘I was without a defense. I often wished I had never written that fucking book.’ This essay agrees with the Feyerabendian complaint that science has authoritarian tendencies. I investigate how science evolved from ‘a liberating force’ (Feyerabend, 1978) into a quasi-‐religious dogma closely aligned with the authorities of industry and the military. I highlight how the institutionalization of science rendered it selectively elitist. Lastly, I question whether present-‐day science has finally begun the shift towards a more nuanced epistemological anarchy, or if incidents like Hansen’s ‘megalomania’ are telling indicators of an unshakeable and hostile status quo. The more obdurate branches of religion have long been viewed as blueprints for authoritarianism, responsible for ‘pacifying society, mystifying social relations and legitimizing domination by elites’ (Thorpe and Welsh, 2008). The anarchist Mikhail Bakunin was first to highlight the similarities between religion and science in his 1871 essay God and the State (Bakunin, 1998). Comte’s earlier proposal of an idyllic ‘new priesthood’ of scientists was fashioned into a twisted
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mockery by Bakunin, who instead argued for a troubling shift towards a ‘dominant class’ of intellectual elites (Wernick, 2001; King, 2004). The abandonment of religion, particularly in the West, coincided with an increasing dependence on science (Hooykaas, 1972). The longstanding relationship between science and the military was given greater significance throughout two world wars that would come to define the twentieth century (Haraway, 2000). Most famously, ‘science’ was responsible for the development and testing of the first atomic bomb (Roland, 1985). Hiroshima showed that, in the ‘new world order’, power and influence would not be measured in terms of manpower, but in terms of technology. It was this event, above all others, that solidified science as a major contributor to global socio-‐ politics. The scientists responsible for the US led Manhattan Project were now a true reflection of the academic clergy (Scheufele, 2014). Leading experts, J. Robert Oppenheimer memorably among them, resided in the uncomfortable echelon of near-‐sainthood (Strathern, 2012). This reinforced commitment to science would extend to industry as well, requiring ‘cadres of technocratic experts to administer complex systems’ (Thorpe and Welsh, 2008). There was a ‘faith in the institutional ability of science to ensure progress by producing technical and social order’, implying an unquestioning ‘faith’ in the scientists themselves. Scientific ideas became indelible facts, preached to the illiterate proletariat by teachers and doctors who had received their own scripture from established academics.
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Just as Christianity demolished paganism at the twilight of the Roman Empire (Curran, 2010), it has been argued that many disciplines of science have marginalized competing ideologies (Feyerabend, 1978; Stenmark, 1999). Nowhere is this more obvious than in the field of Western medicine. As Feyerabend (1978) himself puts it: ‘The power of the medical profession over every stage of our lives already exceeds the power once wielded by the Church.’ In a circular fashion, the scientific method endorses its own practices whilst stigmatizing ‘alternative medicine’ as illegitimate witchcraft. Here I am drawn to the opening remarks of a paper by doctors Fontanarosa and Lundberg (1998): ‘There is no alternative medicine. There is only scientifically proven, evidence-‐based medicine supported by solid data’. The pair’s rhetoric is stiflingly authoritarian. For them, any rival to the scientific method does not deserve acknowledgement. Science has ‘intoxicated us to the point where we regard it as the only valid form of understanding’ (Steedman, 1982). Their judgement is a by-‐product of the institutionalisation of science. The ivory tower of The University, populated in the aftermath of the Scientific Revolution, has ordered itself into a highly structured hierarchy (Hall and Dunstan, 1954). From the teaching fellow to the professor, there is a clearly defined ladder of expertise. In order to climb, subordinates must abide by a covenant of rules. Specifically, they must publish their ‘expertise’ in journals endorsed by science.
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The construct of the ‘scientific journal’ has encouraged scientists to become authorities to each other. The specialisation of science has narrowed the capabilities of its subjects. A practicing biologist would likely no better understand the jargonistic vernacular of a paper on particle physics than an individual with absolutely no connection to science (Sand-‐Jensen, 2007). More importantly, the ‘knowledge’ contained in these journals is only available to those willing to pay for its content, namely, universities and other pseudo-‐ corporate institutions. Restricting the layman from attempting to understand (and thus rationally criticise) scientists’ fallible efforts is both elitist and authoritarian. Science has now elevated itself into a decision-‐making realm where it should have had no automatic jurisdiction. The UK makes for an extreme case study. Science advisors are central to the policy-‐making at every level of the British Government. They put forward suggestions on a myriad of global issues such as food security, energy production and climate change (Van der Meulen, 1998). Competing ideologies are not permitted in this, the most critical of all theatres. In a recent address, the Government Chief Science Advisor Sir Mark Walport reminded the public that he had ‘not been democratically elected’. This would be far more palatable to the epistemological anarchist if those who had been elected could listen to the advice of other doctrines, now marginalized into near-‐silence. The practitioners of science are now authorities rather than guides (Thorpe and Welsh, 2008).
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Here I feel it is important to clarify that I do not take umbrage with science itself, nor argue that its practice should be stopped. I do however maintain that its authoritarian persuasion has rendered science, in the most part, undemocratic. The present-‐day reality is wholly incompatible with Feyerabend’s (1978) expectation that the layman ‘can and must supervise science’. That being said, whilst the social construct of science remains dogmatic (Pielke, 2013), some of its recent fringe work has shown indications of becoming more inclusive. Citizen science has been defined as ‘a form of research collaboration involving members of the public in scientific research projects to address real-‐ world problems’ (Wiggins, 2009). The number of schemes available to the public has exploded in recent years. There are now ‘thousands of research projects…engaging millions of individuals’ (Bonney et al., 2014), especially in the fields of ecology and conservation. ‘Participating in citizens’ initiatives’ was considered by Feyerabend (1978) to be a critical exercise for scientists. Public engagement, Feyerabend hoped, would be the first step towards a representative democracy rather than an authoritarian one. There have also been calls for a transparent review of the methodologies of science as well at free access to scientific data and research. This endeavor has been dubbed ‘Open Science’ (Peters, 2014). Here the flow of information is not stemmed or dictated to by the status quo of peer-‐review, nor its impact sullied by the quality of journal. In the open model, credit is established by the paper’s popularity in an entirely democratic way. In their manifesto for epistemological
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anarchism, Thorpe and Welsh (2008) argue ‘for a people’s science forum which would challenge elite dominance of techno-‐scientific agendas and re-‐orientate scientific and technological inquiry towards far reaching democratic and liberatory social change.’ Open source projects such as Science 2.0 embody this ideal (Waldrop, 2008). The philosopher Bruno Latour claims to have observed a recent desanctification of the scientific method (Godmer, 2012). Echoing Feyerabend, he argues that the ‘true, hard scientists’ now believe that ‘anything goes as long as it leads to what you want to find’ whilst exhibiting a ‘total indifference to questions of method’ (Godmer, 2014). Whether this reformation extends to the ‘soft’ scientists in positions of higher authority is open to debate. However, it appears clear that science remains, at its center, authoritarian. Once a worthy foil for religion, science has since outcompeted it to become the dominant ideology of modern Western civilization. The Old World exceptionalism of science, personified by Renaissance figures such as Da Vinci, Copernicus and Galileo, has given way to what Weber (1968) termed ‘the routinization of charisma’. To conclude, the worship of science as a powerful stimulant of human progress was cemented following its determination of the Second World War. Both the widespread institutionalization of science and the public’s acceptance of the scientific method as a barometer of ‘truth’ encouraged its latent authoritarian tendencies. The formal inclusion of unelected scientists into political
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administrations as ‘advisory bodies’ marked a final hagiographic ascent. Critics of scientific authority, including Paul Feyerabend, have argued for a return/transition to epistemological anarchy. Despite grass-‐root indicators of a shift, recent examples such as Fontanarosa and Lundberg’s (1998) rejection of alternative medicine and Hansen’s (2009) megalomaniacal demands on energy policy highlight the resilience of science as a profoundly authoritarian construct. References Bakunin, M. A. (1998) God and the State. , Mother Earth Publishing Company. Bonney, R., Shirk, J. L., Phillips, T. B., Wiggins, A., Ballard, H. L., Miller-‐Rushing, A. J. & Parrish, J. K. (2014) Citizen science. Next steps for citizen science. Science (New York, N.Y.). 343 (6178), 1436-‐1437. Chalmers, A. F. (2013) What is this thing called science? , Hackett Publishing. Curran, J. R. (2010) Pagan city and Christian capital: Rome in the fourth century. , . Feyerabend, P. (1995) Killing time: the autobiography of Paul Feyerabend. , University of Chicago Press. Feyerabend, P. (1978) Science in a Free Society. , . Feyerabend, P. (1975) Against method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge. Atlantic Highlands. , . Fontanarosa, P. B. & Lundberg, G. D. (1998) Alternative medicine meets science. Jama. 280 (18), 1618-‐1619. Godmer, L. (2014) Bruno Latour and Epistemiological Anarchism. [Online] Available from: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2014/02/22/bruno-‐latour-‐ and-‐epistemological-‐anarchism/ . Godmer, L. (2012) 'L'œuvre de Bruno Latour: une pensée politique exégétique'. Raisons Politiques. (47), 115-‐146. Hall, A. R. & Dunstan, G. (1954) The scientific revolution, 1500-‐1800: the formation of the modern scientific attitude. , Longmans, Green London.
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Hansen, J. (2009) Coal-‐fired power stations are death factories. Close them. [Online] Available from:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/feb/15/james-‐ hansen-‐power-‐plants-‐coal . Haraway, D. (2000) Science, technology, and socialist-‐feminism in the late twentieth century. The Cybercultures Reader. , 291. Hooykaas, R. (1972) Religion and the rise of modern science. , Scottish Academic Press Edinburgh. King, L. P. (2004) Theories of the new class: Intellectuals and power. , U of Minnesota Press. Peters, M. A. (2014) Open Science, Philosophy and Peer Review. Educational Philosophy and Theory. 46 (3), 215-‐219. Pielke, R. (2013) The Authoritarian Science Myth. [Online] Available from: http://rogerpielkejr.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/the-‐authoritarian-‐science-‐ myth.html . Pielke, R. (2009) The rise of scientific authoritarianism. [Online] Available from: http://www.spiked-‐online.com/newsite/article/6271#.VFtX41OsVzN . Preston, J. (1997) Paul Feyerabend. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), . Preston, J., Munévar, G. & Lamb, D. (2000) 'The Worst Enemy of Science'?: Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend. , . Roland, A. (1985) Science and war. Osiris. , 247-‐272. Sand-‐Jensen, K. (2007) How to write consistently boring scientific literature. Oikos. 116 (5), 723-‐727. Scheufele, D. A. (2014) Science communication as political communication. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.111 Suppl 4, 13585-‐13592. Steedman, P. (1982) Theory and Society. 11 (5), 724-‐728. Stenmark, M. (1999) Science and Ideology. , . Strathern, P. (2012) Oppenheimer and the Bomb. , Random House. Thorpe, C. & Welsh, I. (2008) Beyond primitivism: Towards a twenty-‐first century anarchist theory and praxis for science and technology. Anarchist Studies. 16 (1), 48-‐75.
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Van der Meulen, B. (1998) Science policies as principal–agent games: Institutionalization and path dependency in the relation between government and science.Research Policy. 27 (4), 397-‐414. Waldrop, M. M. (2008) Science 2.0. Scientific American. 298 (5), 68-‐73. Weber, M. (1968) On charisma and institution building. , University of Chicago Press. Wernick, A. (2001) Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity. The Post-‐ Theistic Program of French Social Theory. , . Wiggins, A. (2009) From Conservation to Crowdsourcing A Typology of Citizen Science. [Online] Available from: http://crowston.syr.edu/system/files/hicss-‐ 44.pdf .
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