Pay Equity in Local Government: A Case Study

Pay Equity in Local Government: A Case Study Carol A. Kates

This article describes the first implementation of the New York State Local Government Pay Equity Project. Jobs held by unionized Tompkins County employees were evaluated in a pilot study, testing a "bias-free" point-factor system. The results show the possibilities and limits of pay equity, and highlight the centrality of bargaining for pay rates, since it Is the pay line which determines whether jobs are downgraded in a new system, whether gender bias is eliminated, and to what extent decisions about job values will change market rates. Unions that fail to prepare their members for an active role in pay equity projects risk political damage.

In April 1992, Tompkins County became the first municipality in New York State to complete a pay equity job evaluation through the Local Government Pay Equity Project. The study tested a "bias-free" point-factor job evaluation system which the Municipal Service Division (MSD) of the NYS Civil Service Department was developing for use by jurisdictions across the state. The pilot project indicates what municipal employees throughout the state may expect within the next several years. Pay equity studies try to determine whether jobs requiring comparable skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under comparable working conditions, are paid equal wages. The goal of pay equity is to eliminate pay Carol A. Kates is in the Philosophy Department at Ithaca College, Ithaca, New York 14850. The author is grateful to the unionized Tompkins County employees. County Board of Personnel Committee members, the County Administrator and Personnel managers, as well as staff persons from the New York State Municipal Service and Classification and Compensation Divisions who generously gave me their time, shared their knowledge, and helped me understand some of the intricacies of classification and compensation in New York State.

PAY EQUITY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

49

differentials attributable to the gender or race of equally productive workers. Evaluation of pay equity projects has generally focused on the actual wage and employment results, the validity of the methodology, and the politics of implementation. Sorensen's analysis predicted that ending the effects of occupational segregation would eliminate between 10 and 30 percent of the wage gap.' The main tool used to assess job worth is job evaluation,^ despite the risk that it may undervalue factors in traditionally female jobs.-^ Particular attention has been given to the need to modify job evaluation systems to make them more equitable.* Treiman emphasized the very large impact that the choice of factors and weights in job evaluation can have on pay results.^ Schwab suggested that job evaluation results should be validated through an institutional criterion: the acceptability of the outcome to the participants.^ Finally, there has been a good deal of recent academic discussion of the political aspect of pay equity implementation.^ Hartmann argues that in spite of gender and class conflicts which can divide workers, 1. Elaine Sorensen, "Measuring the Effect of Occupational Sex and Race Composition on Earnings,' in Pay Equity: Empirical Inquiries, ed. R. Michael, H. Hartmann, B. O'Farrell (Washington. DC: National Academy Press, 1989); Elaine Sorensen, "The Wage Effects of Occupational Sex Composition: A Review and New Findings," in Comparable Worth: Analyses and Evidence, ed. M. Hill and M. Killingsworth (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1989), 2. Donald Treiman and Heidi Hartmann, Women, Work and Wages (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1981). 3. James Rosenbaum, "Jobs, Job Status, and Women's Gains from Affirmative Action: Implications for Comparable Worth," in Comparable Worth: New Directions for Research, tA. H. Hartmann (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1985). 4. Joan Acker, "Sex Bias in Job Evaluation: A Comparable Worth Issue," in Ingredients for Women's Employment Policy, ed. C. Bose and G. Spitze (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987); Ronnie Steinberg and Lois Haignere, "Equitable Compensation: Methodological Criteria for Comparable Worth." in Ingredients for Women's Employment Policy. ed. C. Bose and G. Spitze (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). 5. Donald Treiman, "Effect of Choice of Factors and Factor Weights in Job Evaluation," in Comparable Worth and Wage Discrimination, ed. H. Remick (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984). 6. Donald Schwab, "Job Evaluation Research and Research Needs," New Directions for Research, ed. H. Hartmann (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1985). 1. Joan Acker, "Sex Bias in Job Evaluation: A Comparable Worth Issue," in Ingredients for Women's Employment Policy, ed. C. Bose and G. Spitze (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987); Joan Acker. Doing Comparable Worth: Gender, Ctass and Pay Equity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Carl Cuneo, Pay Equity: The Labour-Feminist Challenge (Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1990); Sara Evans and Barbara Nelson, "The Impact of Pay Equity on Public Employees: State of Minnesota Employees' Attitudes Toward Wage Policy Innovation," in Pay Equity: Empirical Inquiries, ed. R. Michael. H. Hartmann, B. O'Farrell (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989); Lois Haignere. "Pay Equity Implementation," \nJust Wages, t6. J. Fudge and P. McDermott (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Peter Orazem and Peter Mattila, "Comparable Worth and the Structure of Earnings: The Iowa Case." in Fay Equity: Empirical Inquiries, ed. R. Michael, H. Hartmann, B. O'Farrell

so

LABOR STUDIES JOURNAL/SUMMER 1994

in the long run, pay equity initiatives encourage collective struggle and unionization.** Feldberg thinks pay equity can promote justice and class unity, but only if workers educate themselves, develop efficient tactics, and challenge management control of the process.^ She notes "the heart" of management resistance is in salary setting, which may (lawfully) override job point values. The Tompkins County project had a mixed, and somewhat paradoxical, result, when judged according to those three criteria. Actual wage increases were significant, and consistent with Sorensen's estimate. Job evalualion used an a priori set of factors which had been consciously selected to include female job factors, and which were balanced in their correlation to male or female jobs. The MSD consultant who did the technical analysis was a pay equity proponent, and the county legislators who chose the factor weights and closely directed most of the project were also strong supporters of pay equity. However, the final pay line undercut the job evaluation and reintroduced gender bias in the system. By Schwab's "institutional" measure, the project may not have been a success. At the end, the political dimension of pay setting had become transparent to many employees who regretted and often resented the passive role taken by their unions. Steinberg's advice to become actively involved in every phase of a pay equity project to maximize gains'" proved apt, as did Feldberg's comment about salary setting." The Tompkins County project is a warning that pay equity presents a challenge which unions will ignore at their peril. Methodology The first phase of the study, position classification and job evaluation, took almost two years to complete. Job evaluation began with a rating by an MSD team, using an a priori set of thirteen factors, several of which cap-

(Washington, DC; National Academy Press, I9H9); Ronnie Steinberg, "Job Evaluation and Managerial Control," in Just Wages, ed. J. Fudge and P. McDennott (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). 8. Heidi Hartmann, "Comparable Worth and Women's Economic Independence," in ingredients for Women's Employment Policy, ed. C. Bose and G. Spitze (Albany; State University of New York Press, 1987). 9. Roslyn Feldberg, "Comparable Worth; The Relationship of Method and Politics," in Ingredients for Women's Employment Policy, ed. C. Bose and G. Spitze (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). 10. Ronnie Steinberg, "Job Evaluation and Managerial Control," in Just Wages, ed. J. Fudge and P. McDermott (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). 11. Feldberg, op. cit.


51

tured aspects of female jobs usually overlooked in traditional systems. The ratings, along with the percent female incumbents in each job, were used as independent variables In a multiple regression analysis to see how well they predicted 1989 entry-level hourly pay. This procedure, called a "policy capluring model," showed that only eight factors were statistically significant for male and female jobs, and that two of those factors (patient/client contract, and risk of injury or illness) had a negative relation to pay. The regression also showed that female jobs (i.e. those with at least 67 percent female incumbency) were underpaid by an average of 44 cents an hour. The gender effect was significant at .05, (t-ratio = -1.965). [Appendix 1] To assist the county, MSD proposed a model of (gender balanced) factor weights and calculated the point values for each job. The County Board Personnel Committee then requested MSD to create two additional models of factor weights.'-^ The three models were checked for gender bias through a regression of job factor ratings and gender composition onto a hypothetical set of pay grades. From those three, the committee chose weights that were the furthest from the old (de facto) pay policy revealed in the regression. [Appendix 1] All jobs were then re-rated by teams composed of representatives from the County Board's Personnel Committee, the County Personnel Office, and the employees' unions. A team of county administrators re-rated the jobs a "final" time to eliminate inconsistencies, and all three ratings were distributed to employees. The county then initiated a 20-month appeals process which is discussed in the section on politics. Pay Rates and Bargaining Strength In April 1991, the County Board established twenty-two pay grades for the new job-point system, and began to negotiate salary ranges for those grades with three county employee bargaining units (white collar, blue collar, and Sheriffs Department employees). The county also participated in negotiations with classified employees at TC3 (Tompkins-Cortland Community College), and with professional employees and support staff at the Tompkins County Public Library. The board adopted new rates for managers and confidential employees.

12. MSD personnel said the Tompkins County Personnel Committee, composed of County Board members, was unusually "activist" and the first lo have requested alternatives. The committee was chaired by Beverly LIvesay, who, along with local members of NOW and Alice Cook, was one of the original supporters of county participation in the MSD project.

52

,

LABOR STUDIES JOURNAIVSUMMER1994

The county negotiated first with the white collar unit of the Civil Service Employee's Association (CSEA), affiliated with AFSCME, signing an agreement in May 1991. The county's offer essentially equated pay grades in the new system with the old grades (e.g., 1991 Step E hourly rate for grade 3 in both the old and new contract was $7.97), but some adjustments were made to change the pay intervals between grades. These changes have a larger significance which is discussed in the section on the pay curve. The agreement upgraded about 80 percent of the white collar jobs, and pay increases for about 380 employees were fully implemented without loss of step position in the new grades. Seventeen jobs were downgraded to lower pay rates, but the twenty-eight employees (6 percent) in those jobs were "held harmless" against pay losses during the contract. Once the bargain had been struck with the largest unit, the county used that as a model for the CSEA blue collar proposal. The county offered a pay line which, again, equated the old and new labor grades. Under that assumption, most blue collar jobs were to be downgraded. In the end, 71 pwrcent of blue collar employees would hold downgraded titles. However, the pay offer also equalized hourly wages between the white and blue collar units, a change which would offset most of the pay consequences of the downgrades. In fact, about 90 percent of the blue collar employees would have increased their pay under the county's 1991 proposal. In the original contract, white and blue collar jobs in the same pay grade received the same annual salary. However, since all white collar titles except two worked thirty five hours per week, whereas all blue collar titles except one were forty-hour jobs, blue collar workers received a significantly lower hourly wage than their white collar counterparts in the same labor grade. CSEA negotiators for the blue collar unit had never questioned the pay differential, even though at least some board members reportedly viewed it as an inequity. The 1991 offer set blue collar hourly rates equal to the white collar (35/hour) rates in the same pay grade, multiplied by the actual number of hours worked each year. Since the County made that offer to be consistent with the MSD's estimate of the relative value of county job titles, one can reasonably say that most blue collar rates increased because of the pay equity study. Had hourly rates not been equalized, blue collar jobs in their new grades would have been significantly underpaid in relation to white collar jobs. Despite the increases in pay that most blue collar employees would have received in May 1991, the unit refused to sign the contract amendment until final decisions had been made on appeals of job ratings. There was


S3

some bitterness over the perception that their employers had changed their minds about the (relative) value of the work they performed, and 21 out of 27 male job ratings in the unit had been appealed. At that point, eight (male) titles, with fourteen employees (13 percent), had been downgraded below the original hourly rates for those titles. On average, the reductions were $1.17/hour. Of course, incumbents were to be held harmless against pay loss during the contract. The options for the unit were to accept the offer, argue for a different link between the old and new grades, e.g. one that would have been prevented any grade reductions that lowered pay, or defer the decision while appealing the job ratings. The CSEA negotiator did not propose alternative salary ranges for the new pay grades. When the appeals were finally decided in May 1992, 11 of the 21 ratings went up an average of 1.64 grades while ten were unchanged, and five titles, with eleven employees, were still downgraded below their original rates at an average of $0.92. The unit accepted the county's offer in July 1992, with pay retroactive only to May 1992. Again, 90 percent of the employees increased their pay under the agreement, and many of those employees were angry that they had lost money by waiting one year to sign the contract. Although individual members of the blue collar unit had resisted the downgrades by insisting on extensive appeals of job ratings, there was no evidence of any bargaining strategy to prevent downgrades or to take some action when appeals were complete. The "point" of waiting was thus unclear. The seventy three employees in the Sheriff's Department had formed an independent union with the bargaining strength to push wages as much as 24 percent above the CSEA white collar rates. The final ratings of sheriffs jobs would have upgraded titles held by 100 percent of the male employees (who hold all of the highest-paid jobs), and about 76% of the female employees. If all employees were at the maximum step in 1991 (as they would be by March 1994), the added cost of the upgrades would have been more than $300,000 (or $270,000 at a uniform minimum), all of it paid locally. Not surprisingly, the county asked the sheriff's employees' union to accept the new pay grades without any pay increases. The union negotiators declined the offer and simply broke off negotiations. The pay equity project in Tompkins County included civil service jobs at the county library and the Tompkins-Cortland Community College (TC3). The library employees were represented by two independent unions, and TC3 employees were represented by CSEA. The TC3 pay line was about 11 percent below the CSEA county pay line in May 1991. Library pay rates for

54


support staff (about 47 employees) were also lower than CSEA county rates, while professional rates were somewhat higher. In part because those pay lines were unchanged, the impact of upgrades, for about one-half of library employees and about three-fourths of TC3 employees, was relatively small. For all female-dominated jobs at 1991 maximum rates, the average increase was $0.10 at the library and $0.52 at TC3, compared to $1.07 in the white collar unit. Management and confidential salaries were also changed in 1991. Confidential rates were adjusted to the renegotiated white collar rates. Management pay had been keyed to a distinct set of management pay grades. When management titles were allocated to the new labor grades, hourly midpoint pay for those jobs was set at the new 1991 white collar Step E (maximum) hourly rate. The result was a loss of hourly pay at the midpoint for 55 percent of the titles. To offset some of the effects of the new pay line, about one-third of the jobs shifted from a thirty-five to a forty-hour schedule in June. Individuals were also exempt from pay cuts. The pay lines negotiated by the county had a major impact on the results of the pay equity project because they uncoupled pay grade and pay rate by setting unequal rates for the same labor grades. In the original MSD regression, jobs from all units were examined in an equation which attributed hourly pay differences that could not be explained by "legitimate" job factors to gender discrimination. Bargaining unit (or "bargaining strength") was not a variable in this model. While the MSD report to the county'^ assumed the new pay structure would establish a linear relationship between pay grade and hourly pay, the county appealed to unit bargaining strength (or status as a "county employee") to justify a differential in the impact of points on pay. On the other hand, the county was limited in its pay options both by negotiated pay rates and by budget constraints. To equalize pay rates for all units would have required either reducing all units to the TC3 level, something precluded by contract at least until 1994, or raising all rates to the highest pay line in the Sheriffs Department, a multi-million dollar proposal. By 1991, county budget problems seemed to be growing, because of state and federal funding cutbacks, escalating costs for services, and reduced sales tax revenues. Yet the county's pay equity adjustments were fairly expensive. The county estimated that the 1991 local share of increased payroll costs resulting from pay equity just for "county employees," assuming the blue 13. "Tompkins County Pay Equity Report," Municipal Service Division, New York State Department of Civil Service, April 1990.


55

collar and sheriff's proposals were accepted, would be $882,458, or 9 percent of the county payroll.''* County legislators assumed that for every budget increase of about $180,000 (or about $120,000 in local costs), property taxes rose about 1 percent. Concerns about the costs of pay equity probably explain the emphasis on "bargaining strength" as the factor controlling pay. Results The pay equity project resulted in higher pay for most job titles in the County. Out of about 245 jobs that existed before and after the job evaluation study (ignoring title changes), and leaving out promotion or other separate reclassifications, about two-thirds went up in pay or pay grade in the new system, while about 25 percent of the jobs lost pay and the rest were unchanged. Of the jobs that gained in pay or grade, about 52 percent were female-dominated titles (most 100 percent female), and about 44 percent were male titles (again, usually 100 percent male). As noted above, the blue collar jobs generally increased their hourly pay even though most were downgraded. Again, the sheriffs unit did not receive higher pay, but most of those jobs were upgraded. For comparison. New York State's pay equity real locations, starting in 1987, upgraded about 63 percent of the evaluated titles and downgraded about 1.5 percent.'^ To estimate the dollar value of the pay equity changes before and after May 1991, it was necessary to make some simplifying assumptions."" The results for employees in male or female jobs among all units were substan-

14. The actual local cost in 1991, excluding the blue collar estimate, was $726,458, or 7.7 percent of the payroll. The local cost is about 60 percent of the total cost. The 1991 total payroll cost increase for pay equity at TC3 was $126,000, or about 10 percent of payroll, and $24,000, or 2.9 percent of payroll for the library. 15. Between April 1987 and July 1993, the state completed title reallocations through the quantitative job evaluation system for 617 out of about 5,500 titles, covering about 82 percent of all classified state employees, and including the jobs most likely to show a gender effect. In Tompkins County, about 17 percent of jobs in the white and blue collar units lost pay. 16. The sample includes only jobs that existed before and after the study, and excludes promotions and .separate reclassifications. In estimating 1991 pay changes, the final ratings of pay grades were used; these were not actually approved by the Board until May 1992, and I modelled what the county was willing to implement in 1991. Thu.s, it was a.ssumed that the 1991 blue collar offer was accepted, even though there was no agreement until 1992. In the sheriffs unit, pay grades but not salarie.s were changed. Although no current employee lost pay as a result of the pay equity changes, the calculations assume pay was cut for downgraded title Incumbents. This was done to see how pay equity would affect unprotected occupants of reallocated titles. Estimates are based on 1991 hourly Step E or Job Rates and Midpoint

56


tial. Assuming that the approximately 244 employees in male jobs and the 490.2 "full-time equivalent" employees in female jobs were all paid at the Step E, job., or midpoint 1991 hourly rate before and after the new pay rates, average pay for employees in female jobs would increase about 11 percent, or Sl.23/hour. That would mean a gain of over $2,200 for a 35-hour per week employee. Average pay for empioyees in male jobs would increase about 2 percent, or $0.30/hour, an annual increase of about $548 for a 35hour employee, or $626 for a 40-hour employee. The largest gains were made by white collar employees: a 14 percent increase for employees in female jobs worth almost $2,900 on an annual basis, and a nine percent increase for employees in male jobs worth about $2,000 annually. As Table 1 indicates, the mean pay for female jobs was about 82 percent of the mean for male jobs. If the male pay line got a $0.44 premium from occupational segregation (about 16 percent of the gap), that "unbiased" ratio should be about 85 percent. In the new system, the ratio did increase to about 84 percent. Finally, to estimate how well the new job rates reduced the wage gap, changes in mean pay for male and female jobs were calculated, using 1991 hourly Step E and midpoint rates. The analysis was based on 184 jobs which had been included in the original sample used by MSD to estimate gender bias.'^ There were also some larger effects if one looked only at multiple occupancy titles. Thus, while there was no change in the .87 ratio of mean (Step E) pay for female and male jobs in the white collar unit, the ratio for only multiple occupancy titles in that unit changed from .87 to .94. Again, the ratio between white collar female jobs and blue collar male jobs only changed about 3 percent for all jobs, but for multiple occupancy titles the ratio changed eight percent. TABLE 1*

Female Jobs (109) Maie Jobs (75)

Orig. MSD Rating

$/Hr.

Final Ratng

$/Hr.

gr. 10.42 gr. 12.41

$12.70 $15.42

gr. 11.77 gr. 13.68

$13.46 $15.94

*Alt figures are averages Management rates. Minimum rates are 10-15 percent lower, with the same intervals between grades. All white collar, blue collar, and sheriff's employees will be at the maximum rate by the end of their contracts. 17. MSD used 210 Jobs In the original regression. Since that original study, which did nol include all county titles, the county has abolished and created some jobs. As of April t992, there were about 263 titles in the system.


57

To summarize, the pay equity project did substantially increase pay for employees in female jobs, and improved the ratio of pay between female and male titles. However, the gender neutrality of the new system was never confirmed by a regression using pay rates rather than (hypothetical) pay grades as a dependent variable, presumably because of the view that it was sufficient to check the new rating system for bias, leaving pay rates to be set through collective bargaining. However, those pay rates raise new questions about the system. The Pay Curve The uncoupling of pay grade and pay rate through differences in unit "bargaining strength" is predictable. What is more surprising and perhaps more damaging to pay equity were the unequal ratios between grades and rates which the county pay line created. Unfortunately, none of the bargaining units questioned or even, apparently, noticed these unequal ratios. The new pay line had 5 percent intervals between grades 2-13, a seven percent (1991) or eight percent (1992) interval at grade 14, and 10 percent intervals between grades 15-22. The resulting curve [Appendix 2] had the effect of changing the factor weights selected by the county, since it gave the factors which were most significant in higher level jobs extra weight in determining pay. The curve also reintroduced the gender bias which the MSD study was intended to correct. About one-third of the classified jobs were rated at grade 15 or higher, and were concentrated in the white collar and management units. Jobs at grade 18 or above, about 15 percent of the total, were almost exclusively in management. In the white collar and management units, 56 percent of the jobs at grade 15 or above were male-dominated, and 76 percent of the jobs at grade 18 or above were male. A simple regression model using the 206 job titles in the white collar, blue collar, and management units reveals that the (female) gender composition of those titles had a significant, negative effect on pay. The regression equation which explains 88.7 percent of the variance in the 1991 hourly Step E/Midpoint county pay curve is: Hourly Pay = 1.78 + 1.04 x Pay Grade - .675 x % Female. These variables are significant at .01 (t-ratio for Pay Grade = 38.53, t-ratio for % Female = -2.81). This result, showing gender bias in the county pay curve, is more significant than the original finding of a $0.44 loss in female titles, with an alpha = .05 (t-ratio = -1.965). Taken at face value, the regression

58

'


says that if two county jobs had the same pay grade, a female title would be paid about $0.68 less than a male title, which is clearly false. However, the result indicates that the best linear representation of the relation between pay grade and hourly pay, given the fact that male titles dominate the top of a curve, is, in effect, two pay lines. Along the male line (which estimates the mean effect of pay grade on male titles), jobs pay an average $0.68 premium over jobs at the same pay grade which lie on the female job line. The way to remedy this problem is either to change the gender composition of top jobs, or, to maximize equity and restore the intended factor weights distorted by the pay curve, to create a straight pay line. How could the county have created a straight pay Hne as envisaged by the MSD repjort? One method would have been to add equal dollar amounts to each interval, thus creating unequal per cent increases. For example, adding $1.00 to each step would have created a 1991 Step E line for hourly pay ranging from $7.57 at grade 2 to $27.57 at grade 22, with intervals running from 13 percent between grades 2 and 3 to 4 percent between grades 21 and 22. In that line, all grades except the top three would increase their pay, in most grades rather significantly. Another method would be to create a more even, "flatter" curve by paying rates with a 7 percent, or even a 5 percent, interval between grades. [Appendix 3] If one assumed that all white collar, blue collar, and management jobs were paid at Step E/Midpoint rates in 1991, and compared the mean hourly pay for (103) female jobs and (86) male jobs before and after the pay equity adjustments and then as they would be with a hypothetical 7 percent and 5 percent pay line, the results (Table 2), suggest that a flatter pay line does reduce the gender-correlated pay gap.

Female Jobs (103) Male Jobs (86)

Rating gr.I2.23 gr.13.79

TABLE 2* Orig. Pay Final Pay 7% Line S% Line $13.06 $13.80 $15.64 $12.69 $16.35 $16.10 $17.63 $13.80

*AII figures are averages

Whereas the county pay line reduced the gap in this sample from 20 percent to 14 percent, a 7 percent line would have reduced it to 11 percent, and a 5 percent line to 8 percent. The final pay means of $13.80 and $16.10 are consistent with the results predicted by the regression equation for those mean pay grades. Adding $0.68 to $13.80 would produce about the same ratio of female to male pay as the 7 percent and 5 percent pay lines, supporting the idea that these lines would remedy pay bias. Is it likely the county would ever adopt a flatter pay line? A 7 percent


59

pay line would increase pay for atl grades except the top two, and would be fairly expensive, though perhaps only about half the cost of the "$ I/grade" line. For example, if all white collar, blue collar, and management jobs were paid at Step E/Midpoint rates in 1991, the additional cost for those jobs on a 7 percent line would be almost $2 million dollars. If 60 percent of that cost were paid locally, the 1991 payroll would increase by about 12 percent. A 5 percent pay line, under the same assumptions, would actually save the county money, perhaps as much as 6 percent of the 1991 payroll budget, but that line would of course reduce pay rates above grade 13, and would probably put those jobs below market rates. Clearly, it is unlikely the county would pay for a line that would greatly increase the cost of an already expensive pay equity package, unions would certainly resist a line that cut job rates, and management would resist below-market rates at the top. The pay curve seems to be a compromise favoring jobs at the top. County Board Representative Beverly Livesay, who chaired the Personnel Committee overseeing the pay equity project, said the county pay curve was "not a finished product," but rather a necessary compromise with market forces and budget constraints which sharply limit what can be done at any one time. Whether that view prevails in future pay negotiations depends entirely on the politics of future board members. Politics The Tompkins County pay equity project had a paradoxical result. Most employees, especially those in female titles, increased their pay, in some cases significantly. No employee lost current pay in the new system. And the County Board authorized an appeals process for job ratings which was perhaps uniquely open and painstaking. There is no doubt that members of the County Board who supported the pay equity project, especially those who served on the Personnel Committee, made a good faith effort to eliminate gender bias and produce an equitable pay structure. However, although no survey was done to assess employee reaction to the project, there is reason to believe a large number, and possibly a majority, of employees were unhappy about the results and highly critical of the process. Union representatives in all the bargaining units, and about two dozen management and non-management employees in various departments,'** reported widespread and often bitter complaints about "pay equity." In fact, only the white 18. As both an academic researcher and a union advocate within a labor coalition representing the unions in four counties, I had unusually full access to all parties in the project.

60

LABOR STUDIES JOURNAWSUMMER 1994

collar union representative thought a majority in the unit were satisfied with the results! Moreover, the pay line which the county implemented in 1991 arguably subverted the factor weights selected by the board, reproduced a kind of "class bias" in market rates by paying a premium to jobs at the top, and evidently reintroduced gender bias into the new system. These outcomes in a county as "progressive" as Tompkins do not bode well for other jurisdictions which will undergo a similar process. They also show something about the limits of pay equity. The major problems connected with the pay equity project can perhaps be reduced to four areas: the appeals process, unrealistic expectations, gender and class divisions, and civil service testing. The MSD Report stated that appeals would be "limited to the accuracy of the [job] specification as it describes the work performed by the employee." In fact, the County Board authorized what turned into a two-year process during which employees appealed their ratings and, indirectly, the factor definitions, as well as their own job descriptions. Employees were given a copy of the three initial job ratings, along with copies of factor definitions and point values. The appeals that followed resulted in an administrative decision, a Personnel Committee decision, an administrative recommendation, and, finally, a recommendation of the Budget and Administration Committee of the County Board. There were 168 appeals out of 268 titles rated in April 1992: ninetythree appeals of female titles and sixty-seven of male titles. About 59 percent of the female titles and 69 percent of the male titles went up after the appeal. The most successful appeals, defined as the percent of titles upgraded after appeals, were all by male titles in the sheriffs unit (80 percent upgraded an average 3.75 grades), management (84 percent upgraded an average of 1.88 grades), and in the white collar unit (80 percent upgraded an average of 2 grades). These figures suggest that the unusually open, lengthy appeals process had a large impact on the final dollar value of the pay equity upgrades. One might think the appeals process would have increased employee satisfaction with the system. However, this author thinks the opposite may be true. Employees saw their ratings jump up and down on various factors seven limes, causing many to see the process as "political" and, especially at the end, strongly driven by cost-cutting motives. When employees appealed to the County Board Personnel Committee, the second step after appealing the third "final" rating to administrators, employees were told on the spot, at the end of their appeal, what the "tentative" decision would be. Though they received a letter from the committee informing them that what


tfl

they had been told was not yet final, many felt at that point that, as they put it, "they had won." Most Personnel Committee ratings were higher than the previous administrative decisions, many significantly higher. However, the committee turned their ratings over to administrators again to check their consistency. In most cases the administrative recommendation reduced the prior Personnel Committee rating, frequently back to the original administrative rating. Thus, when employees received their new "final" rating many were extremely angry. There was finally so much protest over the new final ratings that the board appointed a special subcommittee to "review" employee complaints and make a new set of final recommendations. These recommendations, which upgraded some of the administrative ratings but did not restore the original Personnel Committee decisions, were adopted by the board in April 1992. The upshot of the appeals process, then, was that many employees in jobs that had been upgraded from, e.g., grade 4 in the old system to grade 5 in the new system, were actually angry at the result, because they had been told months earlier that there were a grade 6. In effect, many employees experienced their upgrades as cost-cutting downgrades! Another source of unhappiness with the results may have been unrealistic expectations that pay equity would resolve all issues of equity. In effect, pay equity may have become a "garbage can" which collected longstanding resentments about low pay scales, job descriptions, departmental structures, merit issues, and particular managers. When these were not resolved, many employees tended to blame "pay equity." The fact that the final ratings were decided during a budget crisis which caused layoffs and increased some work loads added to the perception of many that they were not necessarily better off after "pay equity." The unhappiness of blue collar, predominantly male empioyees with "pay equity" has already been mentioned. There was a wide-spread belief among blue collar employees that women gained at their expense, even though most male titles increased their pay. One employee even filed a human rights complaint on that point. There was also a growing sense among some employee and union activists that the new pay structure favored jobs at the top at the expense of others. Whether the union or other employee groups will take any action to challenge the new pay line in a future contract remains to be seen. There has also been some discussion of finding a different union which would represent workers more effectively. A final major problem which arose during the project is the issue of civil service testing. As part of the classification study, the county created three new clerical titles and eliminated several older titles. At first, em-

62

.

LABOR STUDIES JOURNAUSUMMER1994

ployees in those (upgraded) jobs were quite pleased with what they took to be a "pay equity" adjustment. However, three months after they were placed in the new titles, many of those employees were told they would have to pass a civil service test to hold the new position. At TC3, where fifteen people were notified of the test requirement, there was a major protest about the perceived unfairness of testing. The TC3 employees argued that they had continued to do the same job after the title change. Thus they concluded that their old job description had been inaccurate, and they had been underpaid for their work—essentially the argument of pay equity. Many TC3 employees knew of State CSEA workers who had been "grandfathered" without testing into newly created positions in 1989, and they wanted the same protection for their own jobs. The employees and their CSEA bargaining unit officers lobbied CSEA to intervene, with the result that the union filed a lawsuit against the county alleging the testing requirement was "unfair." However, the suit did not refer to a civil service rule for grandfathering employees. In fact, CSEA never explained to the TC3 employees what had occurred at the State level in j9g9 19 jf^g gyj( ^35 eventually withdrawn after the employees were tested. Many TC3 employees had discussed the idea of decertifying their union for failure to inform them fully about the pay equity project, civil service testing, and transfer options. Those members viewed the CSEA lawsuit as a "public relations" effort to appease them. Conclusion The rather significant pay increases resulting from upgrades of some female jobs, especially in traditionally undervalued social service and health care occupations, provide good reason to support pay equity initiatives. However, in Tompkins County these upgrades came about because management chose to address certain equity issues. The openness of the appeals process and the high cost of the pay package in the county reflected the liberal politics of legislators. In other, more conservative jurisdictions market rates will probably not be changed very much "from above." And, in Tompkins County, further resolution of equity issues will depend on bargaining strength.

19. Civil service law (70.1) allows state and some municipal workers to be transferred to a new title without testing under some conditions. Changing the Tompkins County rule would require political action, which CSEA might not support, since transfers give greater flexibility to management.


63

Bargaining strength requires a high level of informed, active participation by union members. In Tompkins County, each unit could have negotiated a different relationship between the old and new labor grades, rather than accepting the county's premise that a job rated at grade 4 in the old system and rated at grade 3 in the new system had thereby been downgraded to a lower pay scale. The county's original point-factor system was totally different from the new system. Assigning salary ranges which would actually create a link between the old and new set of pay grades was subject to bargaining. However, the unions all played an essentially passive role during the project. None of the unions proposed an alternative set of salary ranges for the new labor grades and attempted to use their "bargaining strength" to win a better pay line. The county was able to link the old and new systems in a way which imposed lower pay levels on about 17 percent of the titles held by unionized employees. A single regional union agent coming around for final "negotiations" at the end of the process is, obviously, no substitute for a strong union. Change from below will require unions on a regional and state level to give more support to local bargaining units and to make that support more efficient. In particular, local units should begin to prepare for a pay equity study at the earliest possible point, so they can inform themselves and participate in what are ultimately political decisions about critical choices such as selection of factors and weights, the scope of a study (i.e., which bargaining units are included), composition of rating teams, the appeals process, and testing requirements. To be well-prepared, a Local should get information directly from a union research department. If unions expanded their research capacity and provided such information, local representatives could anticipate issues and develop their own well-informed bargaining positions. A bureaucratic union may prefer not to inform and involve local units to avoid political conflicts, but that strategy runs the risk of decertification by alienated members. In many ways, the Tompkins County project is a warning that pay equity job evaluation is a double-edged sword. Many employees in the County became angry with their union, with management, and with members of other bargaining units they believe fared better than they. The all too frequently somnolent rank and file members have become more aware of the politics of pay and the weakness of their unions. This change could have a positive result, if it motivates new leaders to come forward and push for a redress of some of the grievances that have come to light.

64


APPENDIX 1 MSD 13-factor model Knowledge Patient/Client Contact Autonomy/Independent Judgment Physical Effort Supervision Risk

Interpersonal Skills Job Demands

Work Environment Internal Contacts External Contacts Machines, Tools, Equipment Visual Effort Percent Female

(1) "policycapturing" +23% -2% +21%

+2% +21%

-2% +25%

+2% n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. -2%

(2) model chosen 20% 3% 18% 2% 17%

5%* 17% 5%

2% 3% 3% 2% 3% * Later changed to 6%


«5

Q.

a r, ^ =

" -s

t^ o '3

66

LABOR STUDIES JOURNAIVSUMMER 1994

2 2 S _o

V3 —

si 9

T

1

1

1

1

1

\

r

"T

1~

O

[Q

IO

Cu