Perceived Collective Efficacy and Trust in ...

Environmental Communication

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Perceived Collective Efficacy and Trust in Government Influence Public Engagement with Climate Change-Related Water Conservation Policies Jagadish Thaker, Peter Howe, Anthony Leiserowitz & Edward Maibach To cite this article: Jagadish Thaker, Peter Howe, Anthony Leiserowitz & Edward Maibach (2018): Perceived Collective Efficacy and Trust in Government Influence Public Engagement with Climate Change-Related Water Conservation Policies, Environmental Communication, DOI: 10.1080/17524032.2018.1438302 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2018.1438302

Published online: 06 Apr 2018.

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ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNICATION, 2018 https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2018.1438302

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Perceived Collective Efficacy and Trust in Government Influence Public Engagement with Climate Change-Related Water Conservation Policies Jagadish Thaker

a

, Peter Howeb, Anthony Leiserowitzc and Edward Maibachd

a

School of Communication, Journalism & Marketing (Manawatu), Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand; Department of Environment and Society, Quinney College of Natural Resources, Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA; cSchool of Forestry & Environmental Studies, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA; dDepartment of Communication, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA b

ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

Water insecurity, induced or intensified due to climate change, has emerged as a key policy challenge in poor and developing countries such as India. Drawing on social cognitive theory, this paper examines the role of perceived collective efficacy—people’s shared beliefs about their group’s capabilities to accomplish collective tasks—and trust in government as factors influencing Indians’ engagement with government water conservation policies. Using a national survey of Indians (N = 4031), we found that individuals with high levels of perceived collective efficacy and trust in government are more likely to support government water conservation policies. Moreover, for individuals with low trust in government, higher collective efficacy is associated with greater policy support. Perceived collective efficacy is also associated with activist behaviours, while distrust is not. Increasing collective efficacy beliefs, for example through mass media channels and targeted campaigns, could help increase citizens’ engagement with climate change adaptation policies.

Received 21 March 2017 Accepted 2 February 2018 KEYWORDS

Water conservation; climate change; policy support; collective efficacy; trust; risk perceptions

A primary challenge for climate change scientists, governments, and organizations is how to increase public engagement (Capstick, Whitmarsh, Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Upham, 2015; Moser, 2016; Nisbet, 2009; Ockwell, Whitmarsh, & O’Neill, 2009). Public engagement with climate change refers to two broad categories: mitigation—behaviours and policy support that aim to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases, and adaptation—proactive or reactive measures to alleviate the negative impacts of climate change—the focus of this study. Although much research has focused on encouraging individual-level behaviours such as conserving energy, recycling, or proactive adaptation (Grothmann & Patt, 2005; O’Connor, Bard, & Fisher, 1999; Semenza et al., 2008), there is increasing recognition that responding to climate change requires collective action, across community, national, and international scales (Adger, 2003; Koletsou & Mancy, 2011; Lubell & Vedlitz, 2006; Lubell, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 2007; Ostrom, 2010). Public engagement with climate change spans personal environmental behaviours, environmental political participation, and support for policies designed to mitigate climate change (see, Vraga, 2017). This study tests public support for adaptation policies and behaviours to address drinking water scarcity in the context of climate change in India. It tests the role of perceived collective efficacy, or an individual’s beliefs in their group’s collective abilities, and trust in government in predicting citizen’s support for water conservation policies. Further, it CONTACT Jagadish Thaker

[email protected]

© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

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tests if trust in government regulates the influence of perceived collective efficacy on attitudes towards conventional political behaviours, such as policy support, compared to involvement in activist behaviours such as protest participation. A large body of research on risk perceptions, political communication, and health communication posits that trust is an important predictor of citizens’ attitudes and support for government policies (e.g. Krosnick, Holbrook, Lowe, & Visser, 2006; Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Slovic, 1993). When members of the public encounter complex issues such as climate change, where they may not have the time or capacity to fully understand the issue, they tend to rely on the views of trusted sources to make judgments (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Slovic, 1993). Studies in the US show that trust in scientists and belief in the scientific consensus are associated with public climate change beliefs, attitudes, and policy support (Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2011; Hmielowski, Feldman, Myers, Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2013; van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015). However, while trust increases people’s attention to informational sources, individuals are unlikely to act on recommendations made by trusted sources if they doubt their own abilities to act—individually or collectively (e.g. Witte & Allen, 2000). Efficacy refers to perceptions about one’s ability to perform certain behaviours (e.g. Bandura, 1997). A growing body of research attests to the importance of individuals’ self-efficacy in their participation in, and support for, climate change-related political policies (Hart & Feldman, 2016; Lubell et al., 2007; Lubell & Vedlitz, 2006; Ockwell et al., 2009). Climate change is a collective problem, however, and people who may feel a lack of efficacy as individuals may instead feel effective when they act as part of a group, a community, or political blocs (e.g. Bandura, 1997; Bandura, 2000; Lee, 2006). Drawing on social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997), this paper explores whether collective efficacy promotes public support for government adaptation policies. The study examines public support for government water conservation policies that are part of the Indian government’s climate change national action plan (NAPCC, 2008), even if such policies have a negative short-term economic impact. The impact of climate change on water supplies is a critical issue in many developing countries. Changes in temperature and precipitation patterns, increasing extreme weather events, glacier melting, as well as sea level rise, negatively impact the quantity and quality of water resources. Schewe et al. (2014), for example, estimate that “the level of water scarcity expected owing to population change alone is amplified by up to 40% owing to climate change” (p. 3249), and estimate that about a quarter of the global population will be exposed to absolute water scarcity at 2°C of global warming. In India, per capita water availability has already declined by 70%, from about 5177 cubic metres (m3) in 1951 to 1130 m3 in 2013 (CWC, 2011), which is half of China’s (2072 m3/per capita) and one ninth of that of the US’ (8904 m3/per capita). Moreover, per capita water availability in India is projected to decline further to 753 m3 by 2027 (Ahluwalia, Gupta, & Stern, 2016). India is considered one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to climate change primarily due to the sensitivity of its population to water stress. About half of Indian population is dependent on agriculture or other water-related, climate sensitive sectors. Changes in rainfall patterns due to climate change are likely to affect the livelihood, food and health security of India. India is particularly vulnerable to extreme weather events; for example, at least 580 people were killed by heat waves in 2016, one of the hottest years on record (Imada et al., 2017). The Indian Census (2011) estimates that only 32% of Indian households receive tap water from a treated source, with over 80% of rural households without such access. While nearly half (47%) of Indian households do not have sanitation facilities on their premises, the problem is much more common in rural (69%) than in urban households (19%). Further, water scarcity has a disproportional impact on women; About half of rural women travel between 200 metres and 5 kilometres (3.1 miles) daily to acquire drinking water for their families (“Rural women go,” 2014). These climate change-related impacts on water are a priority for the Indian government. The National Water Mission is one of the eight key missions of the national climate action plan (NAPCC, 2008). The Indian government proposes to improve water use efficiency through increased water pricing, recycling water in urban areas, and new technologies, among other measures.

ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNICATION

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However, public support is a prerequisite for such policies to succeed politically, especially if the policies pose additional financial burdens on citizens. While the Indian public may not consistently shape national policies, which are often the result of closed-door policy-making, public activism can influence public policy as in recent legislation combatting corruption (The Lokpal Act in 2013) and violence against women (The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013) by the Indian parliament. At the same time, public support and participation in implementing these policies locally help create a strong social norm that can help achieve policy goals. Particularly in poor and developing countries such as India, with a large population unaware of the concept of climate change (e.g. Lee, Markowitz, Howe, Ko, & Leiserowitz, 2015), people’s lived experiences with weather patterns and its impacts on their livelihood—including water access—will likely be a primary way by which they learn about and react to climate change and government policies to address it. While previous studies in the US (e.g. Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007; Zahran, Brody, Grover, & Vedlitz, 2006) and elsewhere have measured public support for policies to reduce fossil fuel consumption (mitigation), this study focuses on public support for policies to improve water access in a country with existing water challenges (adaptation). In this paper, we test the relationship between perceived community collective efficacy to ensure access to safe drinking water and support for government water conservation policies.

Literature review Citizens’ support for government policies is one of the most important dimensions of public engagement with climate change. First, many citizens expect governments to lead by proposing and implementing policies to address the issue (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007; Moser, 2016). Second, government policies—by equitably distributing the costs and benefits—can overcome the free-rider problem, that is, individuals choosing not to act, preferring instead to free ride on the effort of others (e.g. Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Lubell et al., 2007). Third, government policies can make climate friendly behaviours easier and eventually habitual, such as reduced car use by promoting public transportation, rather than rely on individuals’ repeated conscious choices to achieve the same targets (e.g. van der Linden, Maibach, & Leiserowitz, 2015). While conventional political participation, such as voting and policy support, underpins successful government policies, confrontation, or “nonallegiant” actions against government—for example, protest participation—can be an equally important method for citizens to demand ambitious and accountable government action (e.g. Lorenzoni et al., 2007). In other words, apart from general public support, active citizens can play an important role in shaping climate change policies, as empirical studies find that policymakers tend to represent public preferences (Soroka & Wlezien, 2010). We test if people’s perceptions about their collective abilities influence their support for government policies as well as their participation in political activities as relates to climate change adaptation in the domain of water conservation. Collective efficacy According to Bandura (1997), human behaviour is influenced by the interplay between personal and social-environmental factors. In this reciprocal relationship, the primary determinant of human behaviour is self-efficacy. In his social cognitive theory (SCT), Bandura (1997) argues that self-efficacy—beliefs in one’s capacity to organize and execute actions to achieve one’s goals—is the foundation of human agency. Self-efficacy beliefs govern how individuals feel, think, motivate themselves, and mobilize the resources needed to succeed in their endeavours (Bandura, 1997). In the political communication literature, efficacy is theorized as the feeling that individual citizens can play a part in bringing about social and political change (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954; Pollock, 1983; Yeich & Levine, 1994). Individual-level political efficacy comprises of three components— internal, external, and response political efficacy. Internal political efficacy refers to perceptions about one’s ability to understand political affairs and exert influence. This dimension refers to

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individual’s beliefs that they are knowledgeable about, and can influence, political action through political engagement, such as contacting public officials (e.g. Morrell, 2003). External political efficacy refers to perceptions about government responsiveness to citizens’ demands (Hart & Feldman, 2016; Pollock, 1983). Internal and external political efficacy influence citizen’s involvement in both conventional and confrontational forms of political participation (e.g. Yeich & Levine, 1994). A third dimension refers to response efficacy—beliefs that a proposed policy will help solve the problem at hand (Hart & Feldman, 2014, 2016). A recent study showed that all three forms of efficacy—internal, external, and response efficacy—have unique, significant positive associations with political activism intentions, including contacting government officials, participation in a rally or protest to support action, and volunteering or donating money to an organization working on climate change (Hart & Feldman, 2016). While these studies provide evidence on the important relationship between individual efficacy and political behaviour, they do not focus on collective political behaviour and the policy process. While individual-level efficacy is important and is positively associated with perceptions of collective efficacy, people’s perceptions about their collective abilities have more predictive value when tasks require coordination and collective action (Lee, 2006; Velasquez & LaRose, 2015). Velasquez and LaRose (2015) show that perceived collective efficacy, and not internal political efficacy, was associated with youths’ political activism. Similarly, Lee (2006) found that perceived collective efficacy, and not internal or external political efficacy, was positively associated with Hong Kong’s citizens’ support for democratization and protest participation. An increasing body of evidence demonstrates that collective efficacy (Bandura, 1997, 2000)—that is, shared beliefs in citizens’ collective capabilities to organize and perform collective tasks—are important to achieve common goals. Studies show that individuals in groups with high levels of collective efficacy are more likely to set ambitious goals, better able to mobilize resources, more efficient in coordinating and performing behaviours, and more persistent despite initial setbacks or growing opposition (e.g. Bandura, 2000). Collective efficacy has been validated both experimentally (Durham, Knight, & Locke, 1997; Earley, 1994) as well as in survey studies of educational systems (Bandura, 1997; Goddard, Hoy, & Hoy, 2004), athletic teams (e.g. Feltz & Lirgg, 1998), workers in business organizations (e.g. Jex & Bliese, 1999), and political systems (Lee, 2006, 2010). Perceived collective efficacy is not a monolithic group attribute; it varies across members in a group, and across activities performed by the group members (Bandura, 1997, p. 479). While collective efficacy is a group’s shared belief, it resides and operates through individual members of the group, because “there is no emergent entity that operates independently of the beliefs and actions of the individuals who make up a social system” (Bandura, 2000, p. 76). That is, all group tasks have to be performed individually by group members, but in coordination with each other, pooling their different resources to overcome common obstacles to achieve their collective goals. Further, Bandura (1997) pointed out that “perceived personal and collective efficacy differ in the unit of agency, but in both forms efficacy beliefs have similar sources, serve similar functions, and operate through similar processes” (p. 478). In other words, just as individuals with high levels of self-efficacy are more likely to perform behaviours that increase their chances of individual goal attainment, individuals with high levels of collective efficacy are more likely to be highly motivated group members who perform a greater number of activities, thereby increasing the odds of group goal attainment. Moreover, individuals with higher levels of collective efficacy, by performing more community behaviours, can boost the collective efficacy of other members of the community in at least three ways: through vicarious learning—one of the primary sources of efficacy perceptions; by socially persuading other members of the group to perform similar tasks; and by creating a positive atmosphere for collective action (Bandura, 1997, 2000; Goddard, 2001; Goddard et al., 2004). Because groups with high levels of collective efficacy often achieve their group goals, being part of a successful group and doing things that successful team members do provides the most important source of collective efficacy—mastery experience (Bandura, 1997; Goddard et al., 2004).


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The most often used method to measure collective efficacy, as Bandura (2000) suggested, is using “we” referent statements (e.g. “We—my neighbors and I—can work together to do … ”). While aggregate measures of collective efficacy refer to a group’s collective efficacy (e.g. Goddard, 2001), in this study, we use perceived collective efficacy at the individual level. Alternative ways to measure collective efficacy include aggregating the self-efficacy assessments of all members of the group (e.g. “How confident are you that you can do [X]?”) as well as group consensus approach, where members of the group discuss and agree on their group capabilities. While the aggregation of self-efficacy assessment approach ignores the group’s coordinative and interactive dynamics (Bandura, 2000), the group consensus approach is susceptible to social desirability bias, as well as ignoring withingroup differences in collective efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1997). Perceived collective efficacy and engagement with government adaptation policies Studies show that perceived collective efficacy is a significant predictor of political attitudes and participation (Lee, 2006, 2010) as well as of more confrontational political modes such as protest participation and protest movements’ success (Lee, 2006, 2010; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). For example, Seligson (1980) found that efficacy beliefs, including perceived group efficacy, best predicted institutionalized modes of political engagement such as participation in local council meetings, and local community organizations, as well as confrontational modes such as squatting or illegal occupation of public and private property. Similarly, Lee (2006, 2010) found that perceived collective efficacy had a significant effect on Hong Kong citizens’ support for more democratic reforms and intention to participate in pro-democracy protests. Specifically, Lee (2010) found that people’s perceptions of the civic competence of fellow citizens, perceptions of the representativeness of the political system, and perceptions of the news media affect collective efficacy, which in turn, affects political participation. Further, Lee (2006, 2010) found that Hong Kong residents had greater perceptions of collective efficacy to bring about political change than in their own individual abilities. Previous research attests that perceived collective efficacy, ranging across groups such as sports teams (e.g. Feltz & Lirgg, 1998), workers in business organizations (e.g. Jex & Bliese, 1999), schools (Goddard, 2001), rural communities (e.g. Seligson, 1980), and nations (Lee, 2006, 2010), is associated with individual participation in group tasks that ultimately achieve group outcomes. Individuals with a robust belief in their group capabilities to solve a common problem can form powerful collectives to influence the kinds of policies their government can formulate and implement. While a local group of community members with high collective efficacy may have a marginal influence on a national policy, they can be a powerful influence on the successful implementation of that policy locally. Individuals with the strong sense of their group’s capabilities may demand and support government policies that they perceive can enhance their own community’s ability to adapt to climate change impacts. Perceived collective efficacy can establish a strong community norm of civic participation and help achieve the goals of national policies. For example, reviewing the work on collective efficacy and health outcomes, Bandura (1998, p. 646) noted, “A comprehensive approach to health must provide people with the knowledge, skills and sense of collective efficacy to mount social and policy initiatives that affect human health.” Based on the above literature, the following hypotheses are proposed: Hypothesis 1a: Individuals’ perceived collective efficacy regarding their community’s capacity to ensure the adequacy of its drinking water supply will be positively associated with their support for government’s water conservation policies. Hypothesis 1b: Individuals’ perceived collective efficacy regarding their community’s capacity to ensure the adequacy of its drinking water supply will be positively associated with protest participation to enhance adaptation.

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Trust and engagement with government adaptation policies There is evidence from diverse fields—political communication, risk perception and health communication—that trust is an important predictor of public attention, concern, and support for government policies (e.g. Krosnick et al., 2006; Malka et al., 2009; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Slovic, 1993). For example, based on studies in the US, Priest (2001) argued that trust is a bigger factor than knowledge in predicting public support for funding novel science and technology research. People tend to pay more attention to and consider information from trusted sources to be reliable. Krosnick et al. (2006) found that trust in sources of information about climate change, such as scientists, regulates the association between media exposure and belief in the existence of global warming, which in turn increases concerns about seriousness and the need to address the problem. Similarly, Malka et al. (2009) found trust in scientists as a source of information moderates the relationship between knowledge and concern about global warming such that knowledge was positively associated with concern only for people who trusted scientists. Many of the prior studies were conducted in the US, and featured trust in scientists. This study extends these findings to India and tests if trust in government affects policy support. In this study, we treat trust in government as a source of information about climate change as a proxy for more general trust in government. Indians who trust government may perceive that their elected representatives provide credible information to the public, and would enact policies that may help vulnerable populations to better adapt to climate change impacts. In addition, we test if trust regulates the form of citizen engagement with government adaptation policies, as examined below. While citizens more trusting of government may participate in conventional forms of policy engagement, such as voting, less trusting citizens may either remain apathetic or organize for social change (Bandura, 2000; Gamson, 1968). Less trusting citizens may organize as activist publics to confront the government— through protests and marches—to challenge and change national and local policies. Based on the above studies, we propose the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 2a: Individuals’ trust in government will be positively associated with support for government’s water conservation policies. Hypothesis 2b: Individuals’ trust in government will be negatively associated with protest participation to enhance adaptation.

Interaction between perceived collective efficacy and trust Bandura (2000) and others (e.g. Gamson, 1968) argued that trust and efficacy, together, play an important role affecting the form and level of political engagement. While efficacy motivates action, trust structures the type of conventional (e.g. voting, attending local meetings) or confrontational (e.g. protest) political engagement. For example, Gamson (1968) and Bandura (2000) suggested that high levels of trust and efficacy will result in more conventional forms of political participation like voting and lobbying; Seligson (1980) called people who have these attributes “allegiant activists.” However, low trust and high efficacy will result in mobilized forms of political participation such as rallies, strikes, and boycotts, as these citizens, or “alienated activists” (Seligson, 1980), tend to believe in their collective abilities to organize and demand a more responsive government action. According to Gamson (1968), the combination of a high sense of efficacy and low political trust is “the optimum combination for mobilization—a belief that influence is both possible and necessary” (p. 48). Citizens with low trust and low efficacy tend to be apathetic, as they perceive that they cannot act together on the issue and do not trust the government’s actions either. Citizens with high trust and low efficacy tend to be subordinate to government rule and support government policies. Further, they may perceive efforts to change or challenge government rule as ineffective. Individuals with high trust and high collective efficacy are likely to actively participate in government policymaking process and its implementation and strongly support new policies.


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Public engagement with climate change is likely to span cognitive, affective, and behavioural elements (Lorenzoni et al., 2017; Vraga, 2017). In this study, we use the attitudinal measure of public support for government water conservation policies as a representative measure of conventional political behaviours such as voting. Specific attitudes are likely to correlate strongly with and show high degree of predictive accuracy with specific behaviours (e.g. attitudes towards recycling should be strongly associated with support for recycling policies and recycling behaviours compared to general environmental attitudes) (e.g. Ajzen, Joyce, Sheikh, & Cote, 2011). Individuals are likely to vote for policies that they believe represent their interests and will achieve their goals. Citizens’ favourable attitudes towards policies are likely to be proximal antecedents of their voting behaviour and other political engagement behaviours. For example, Krosnick (1988) showed that important citizens attitudes towards policies are potent predictors of political candidates evaluations and voting behaviour, in part because of ease of retrieval of such attitudes from memory. In contrast, individuals holding ambivalent attitudes (holding both positive and negative attitudes) are associated with weak policy support as well as low political engagement (e.g. Hmielowski & Nisbet, 2016). Hmielowski and Nisbet (2016) show that ambivalence is negatively associated with the strength of policy position, or the degree of public support or opposition to mitigation policies. Holding strong policy positions was predictive of behavioural intentions to take action regarding climate change mitigation policies. Following Gamson, we expect that citizens high in trust and efficacy will be more likely to have positive attitudes towards conventional political processes, such as shaping policy change through expressing support for government policies. In turn, we expect these attitudes to be positively associated with conventional political behaviours such as voting. Citizens low in trust, but high in efficacy are more likely to hold favourable attitudes towards confrontational methods, such as support for a public protest or rally to achieve their goals, which will potentially be positively associated with their participation in such efforts. For example, Lee (2006) showed that collective efficacy was positively associated with willingness to protest for democratization and participation in a public demonstration in support of democratization in Hong Kong. These two broad categories of citizens can also be classified as “incremental change believers” compared to the “radically inclined,” who believe that systemic change is necessary. Citizens with high trust and efficacy, if they fail to achieve their goals through conventional means, may become distrustful of the political process and institutions. Those who become distrustful, but retain beliefs in collective efficacy may consider applying alternative, confrontation approaches for policy or system change. Indeed, Gameel, Lu, Jung, and Johnson (2017) show a positive causal relation between participation in conventional and confrontational political behaviours, arguing, “ … in authoritarian regimes such as Egypt … conventional political participation might serve to prepare people with political resources as well as political opportunities to participate in protest” (p. 1831). We therefore focus on policy support as an attitudinal antecedent to participation in conventional political behaviours such as voting and participation in local government councils and political institutions. As previously mentioned, much of the political communication literature has focused on different dimensions of self-efficacy: internal, external, and response political efficacy (Campbell et al., 1954; Pollock, 1983; Yeich & Levine, 1994). Previous studies have found mixed results for interaction between self-efficacy and trust on political participation (e.g. Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Watts, 1973). However, these studies have only focused on self-efficacy, not people’s perceptions of collective efficacy. As Lee (2006) argued, “Citizens may recognize that only the citizenry acting collectively, rather than individuals acting separately, can help to accomplish the task” (p. 300). To the best of our knowledge, the interaction between collective efficacy and trust is untested in published research on climate change communication. We propose the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 3a: Perceived collective efficacy and trust in government will have an interaction effect on policy support. Hypothesis 3b: Perceived collective efficacy and trust in government will have an interaction effect on protest participation.

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The aim of this study is to measure unique effects of collective efficacy and trust in government, and interaction between the two factors, in predicting public’s support for climate change-related water conservation policies and protest participation. Other variables that have been found to influence policy support, such as gender, age, socio-economic indicators such as caste, income, and educational levels will be controlled in the analysis. In addition, because studies show that public risk perceptions is one of the strongest predictors of public policy support (Leiserowitz, 2006; O’Connor et al., 1999; Slovic, 1993), they too will be statistically controlled for in this study.

Methods Sampling and data collection The population for this survey was all adults in India (18 and above), drawn from urban, semi-urban communities and rural communities. The stratified random sampling plan is as follows: parliamentary constituencies that refer to the federal government level electoral units served as primary sampling units (PSU). From each randomly sampled PSU, an assembly constituency—state level electoral unites—was randomly selected. All respondents within an assembly constituency served as a “community” block in our study, as they are a basic political unit, with one member representing each constituency in the state legislative assembly. Then polling locations (or polling stations) within an assembly constituency were randomly selected. From each of the randomly selected polling stations, using the electoral rolls provided by the Election Commission (the official body entrusted to conduct elections), the first respondent was randomly selected, after which every tenth subsequent respondent on the list was selected. From each polling station, the target was to achieve at least 10 completed surveys. To increase the size of the non-urban sample, a separate random sample of 1000 rural respondents was surveyed, composed of people residing in rural areas in all major states of India, similar to the stratified sampling mentioned above. In total, 10,153 respondents were contacted out of which 4031 respondents completed the survey, resulting in a response rate of 39.7%, with a 1.54% margin of error at the 95% confidence level. The survey was administered face-to-face at the home of the selected respondents, and took approximately 45 min to complete. The interviews were conducted in November and December 2011 by C-Voter and Markelytics. Interviews were conducted in Hindi, Marathi, Punjabi, Bengali, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu, Kannada, English, Malayalam, Oriya, Assamese, and Gujarati. The final data were weighted to match the age, gender, religious, and regional distribution of the target population— adults 18 and above, using Census 2001 parameters. The demographic characteristics of the sample are listed in Table 1 below. Further, to account for missing values (10–18% of responses) for key variables in the study, we used hot-deck imputation (Myers, 2011) to impute missing data for the variables considered in this study by borrowing from a respondent with similar sex, age, religion, and geographical location (tier 1-3 cities, and rural) nearest to it. Such missing values are cases where respondents decided to skip a particular question. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the unweighted, weighted, and Census statistics.

Measures Dependent variable: support for government adaptation policies The Indian government has proposed several policy measures to improve the efficiency of water use by 20% in order to adapt to climate change; these include increasing the price of water, recycling wastewater in urban areas, and empowerment of communities to promote local water conservation efforts (CWC, 2011). We measure public support for government policies to address drinking water scarcity.


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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (data weighted to match target sample characteristics for age, gender, religion, and region). Variable

Unweighted (%) 4031

Gender Male 2397 (59.5) Female 1634 (40.5) Age groups 18–24 years 378 (9.4) 25–34 1074 (26.6) 35–44 962 (23.9) 45–54 780 (19.4) 55–64 489 (12.1) 65+ 344 (8.5) Caste groups Scheduled Tribe 293 (7.3) Scheduled Caste 728 (18.1) Other Backward Classes 1153 (28.6) Upper Caste 1535 (38.1) Education levels Primary education 1060 (26.3) Secondary education 1141 (28.3) Higher Secondary 908 (22.5) Graduate and above 922 (22.9) Monthly household income Up to 1000 rupees 158 (3.9) 1001–2000 241 (6) 2001–3000 236 (5.9) 3001–4000 269 (6.7) 4001–5000 482 (12) 5001–10,000 1093 (27.1) 10,001–20,000 845 (21) Above 20,000 707 (17.5) Payment for drinking water Don’t pay any money 942 (26.8) Less than 50 rupees 396 (11.3) 50–100 rupees 535 (15.2) 100–200 rupees 642 (18.2) 200–300 rupees 471 (13.4) 300–400 rupees 305 (8.7) More than 400 rupees 229 (6.5) Geographic location Urban Tier 1 2094 (51.9) Tier 2 459 (11.4) Tier 3 517 (12.8) Rural 961 (23.8) Notes: Percentages do not always add up to 100% because of missing values. –

Weighted (%) 4000 2090 (52) 1910 (48) 791 (20) 1015 (25) 880 (22) 569 (14) 410 (10) 331 (8)

Census 2001 1,028,737,436 52 48

–

301 (8) 729 (19) 1204 (32) 1515 (40)

8 16 – –

987 (24.7) 1042 (26) 952 (23.8) 1020 (25.5)

–

146 (3.6) 265 (6.6) 223 (5.6) 300 (7.5) 479 (12) 1049 (26.2) 872 (21.8) 667 (16.7)

–

908 (26.7) 489 (14.4) 522 (15.3) 623 (18.3) 433 (12.7) 242 (7.1) 187 (5.5)

–

1810 (45) 1076 (27) 338 (8) 776 (18) indicates data not available.

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Specifically, respondents were asked, “Please tell me how much would you favour or oppose India taking each of the following steps to help deal with environmental problems.” Three items were used to assess policy support using a 4-point Likert-type scale (1, “strongly oppose” to 4, “strongly favour”): (1) Encouraging households and industry to waste less water by increasing the price of water; (2) Requiring new buildings to waste less water and energy, even if this increases their cost; (3) Encouraging local communities to build check dams to increase local water supplies. The three items were moderately correlated with each other, and the principal component analysis identified only one factor, which accounted for 56% of the variance (eigenvalue = 1.78). The three items were added to create an index of policy support (M = 8.72, SD = 2.26, α = .74). Higher scores on the scale represent more support for proposed government policies. Over 60% of the sample somewhat or strongly favoured the above government policies, with the highest support, 76%, for the third policy measure—encouraging local communities to build check dams to increase local water supplies. More responsible and efficient use of water will likely help India manage drinking water distress in times of climate change.

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Protest participation Respondents were asked if in the past year they had (1) “Participated in social demonstrations such as gheroas (encirclement of officers, picketing), rasta rokos (road blocking), or bands (strike action, boycott) to demand more safe drinking water for your community,” [28.4%, Yes], and “Demanded that your community leaders or government officials improve the amount of safe drinking water for your community” [42.4%, Yes]. Respondents who had explicitly stated that they had participated in a protest or demanded improved drinking water access were recoded as 1 (51.6%), compared to the rest of the sample who said they did not perform either behaviour or were unwilling or unable to say whether they did or did not. “Safe” was used in the survey to refer to treated water, as safe for human consumption. A separate analysis was also conducted using respondents who explicitly stated they did both behaviours (19.2%), and the results were largely similar (not reported). Independent variables: perceived collective efficacy to ensure drinking water adequacy Two items were used to assess individuals’ perceptions about their community’s abilities in the domain of drinking water adaption using a 4-point scale (“not at all confident” to “very confident”): How confident are you that your community can work together to increase access to safe drinking water? (2) How confident are you that your community can work together to make sure that everyone has enough safe drinking water even during difficult times like floods or droughts? The two collective efficacy items were highly correlated at r = .54, p < .001. The items were added to compute an eight-point collective efficacy to ensure drinking water adequacy scale, henceforth referred as the collective efficacy scale (M = 5.21, SD = 1.76). Trust in government as a source of climate change information Respondents were asked to rate their level of trust on a 4-point scale (“strongly distrust,” to “strongly trust”) in the national government, state government and local government as a source of information about climate change. The three items correlated at 0.5 and above. Further, principal component analysis identified only one factor, which accounted for 71% of the variance. The Kaiser– Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .71, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ 2(3) = 3660.601, p < .0001; α = .79). The three items were added to construct a single scale, such that a higher score indicates more trust in government as a source of climate change information (M = 8.08, SD = 2.62). Control variables Two items were used to measure risk perceptions related to drinking water scarcity: “If a 1 year-long severe drought happened in your local area, how big of an impact would it have on your household’s drinking water supply?” and “Would you say a 1 year-long severe flood would have a large impact, a medium impact, a small impact, or no impact at all on your household’s drinking water supply.” Both items were assessed with a 4-point scale: no impact at all (1), a small impact (2), a medium impact (3), and a large impact (4). The items were highly correlated (r = .59, p < .001), and were summed to create a risk perception scale (M = 6.04, SD = 1.89). Apart from risk perceptions, eight variables were used as control variables in this study: respondents’ sex, age, income levels, educational attainment, caste groups (as identified by the Government of India), payment for drinking water, political party affiliation, and location of the respondent’s household. For sex, dummy codes were used such that female (48%) was the reference category, coded as 0, compared to male (52%), coded as 1. The caste variable was dummy-coded, comparing upper castes (1, 40.3%) to other lower castes. Upper castes generally refer to individuals having higher social-economic status in India. Income was measured using 8 categories (“up to 1000 rupees a month” to “more than 20,000 rupees a month”) and education was measured using 10 categories and recoded into 4 primary categories (“primary education” to “postgraduate and above”). Respondents who pay for drinking water access were coded as 1, and


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those who do not pay any monthly fee at all were coded as the reference category. Respondents who said they feel closest to the Indian National Congress—the political party running the central government when this survey was conducted—were coded as 1 compared to other respondents with other political party affiliations. Respondents in urban areas were the reference category compared to respondents living in rural areas. For ease of interpretation, income, education, and age groups were treated as continuous variables. The descriptive analysis of the variables is presented in Table 1. To test the hypotheses, multilevel models were tested using the lmer function in R, available as part of lme4 package (e.g. Gelman & Hill, 2006). To test the hypothesis regarding policy support, linear models were built and tested, while logistic multilevel modelling was used to test the hypothesis on protest participation. Because people’s perceptions about their collective efficacy are contingent on the communities they live in, it is important to control for difference in communities. The models were fit by restricted maximum likelihood (REML), and model fit was compared using ANOVA and was based on values of Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and the log likelihood (logLik); models with lower AIC values are estimated to reduce prediction error. In addition, this paper specifically tests for the interaction between collective efficacy and trust. The following models were fit for both unimputed and imputed data sets. The results were largely similar; however, the interaction between trust and collective efficacy did not reach the 95% significance threshold in the unimputed dataset, although the sign of the interaction remained the same and the coefficient was similar in unimputed and imputed dataset. To take advantage of the increased sample size, results based on the imputed dataset are listed below. However, findings that differ in significance between the two datasets— namely the interaction between trust in government and collective efficacy—should be regarded with lower confidence than the main effects.

Results Correlations between support for government climate change-related water conservation policies and perceived collective efficacy indicate a moderate positive relationship, r = .17, p < .001. Similarly, trust in government was positively correlated with policy support r = .07, p < .001. Thus, as perceived collective efficacy and trust increases, so does support for government water conservation policies. The first hypothesis (H1a) was supported. Results of the multilevel model show that perceived collective efficacy (B = 0.30, SE = .06, p < .001) was a significant predictor of policy support. The second hypothesis (H1b) was also supported: Perceived collective efficacy was positively associated with protest participation. For one unit increase in perceived collective efficacy, the results show about an 11% increase in the odds of participating in a protest to secure safe drinking water facilities for their community. See Tables 2 and 3. H2a was supported. Trust in government as a source of information (B = 0.20, SE = .04, p < .001) was positively associated with policy support. However, trust and protest participation were unrelated, providing no support for H2b. Supporting H3a, the interaction between perceived collective efficacy and trust in government (B = −0.022, SE = .006, p < .001) was significant in predicting policy support. This interaction suggests that for individuals with low trust in government, greater perceived collective efficacy perceptions increased policy support. Conversely, for individuals with high levels of trust, perceived collective efficacy does not show a similar incremental effect in the level of support for government climate adaptation-related policies (see Figure 1). A comparison between models without (AIC = 16,888) and with the interaction (AIC = 16,880) show that the model with the perceived collective efficacy—trust in government interaction is better at predicting policy support (Δχ 2 (1) = 10.21, p < .01). See Table 2. The interaction between perceived collective efficacy and trust predicting protest participation was not statistically significant, thus H3b was not supported. See Table 3.

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Table 2. Multilevel models predicting citizens’ support for adaptation policies.

(Intercept) Gender (Male) Age Education Income Upper caste Paid for drinking water access Rural Political party support (INC) Perceived risk Trust in government Collective efficacy Collective efficacy*Trust Model characteristics Individual-level variance Community level variance AIC BIC Log likelihood Deviance

Null model B (SE)

Model 1 B (SE)

Model 3 B (SE)

Model 4 B (SE)

8.81*** (0.13)

8.06*** (0.31) −0.01 (0.06) −0.08** (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) −0.02 (0.01) 0.21** (0.07) 0.21* (0.08) 0.16 (0.26) 0.09 (0.07) 0.11*** (0.02)

6.75*** (0.33) −0.01 (0.06) −0.07** (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) −0.02 (0.01) 0.18* (0.07) 0.21* (0.08) 0.14 (0.25) 0.11 (0.07) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.09*** (0.01) 0.13*** (0.02)

5.88*** (0.43) −0.01 (0.06) −0.07** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) −0.02 (0.01) 0.19** (0.07) 0.21* (0.08) 0.13 (0.26) 0.11 (0.07) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.31*** (0.06) 0.20*** (0.04) −0.03** (0.01)

3.70 1.92 17,023 17,042 −8508.3 17,017

3.66 1.80 16,978 17,054 −8477.2 16,954

3.58 1.68 16,888 16,977 −8430.2 16,860

3.57 1.68 16,880 16,975 −8425.1 16,850

Note: N = 4031 in 138 communities. ***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05.

Discussion Climate change will have serious impacts on the availability of water around the world. Meanwhile, public support for government policies is often essential for successful policy change and its implementation. Studies that focus on individuals’ knowledge, risk, and efficacy perceptions to predict public policy support tend to overlook the fact that climate change is a collective problem and Table 3. Multilevel logistic regression models predicting protest participation to improve access to safe drinking water. Null model B (SE) (Intercept) Gender (Male) Age Education Income Upper caste Paid for drinking water access Rural Political party support (INC) Perceived risk Trust in government Collective efficacy Collective efficacy*Trust Model characteristics Community level variance AIC BIC Log likelihood Deviance Note: N = 4031 in 138 communities. ***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05.

.13 (.12)

1.82 5021.5 5034.2 −2508.8 5017.5

Model 1 B (SE) .71 (.32)* .11 (.07) .03 (.02) .07 (.03)* −.09 (.02)*** −.14 (.08) .39 (.09)*** .16 (.26) .02 (0.08) −.12 (0.02)***

1.66 4967.7 5037.0 −2472.8 4945.7

Model 3 B (SE) .03 (.35) .11 (.08) .03 (.02) .06 (.03)* −.09 (.02)*** −.16 (.08)* .39 (.09)*** .13 (.26) .02 (.08) −.12 (.02)*** .02 (.01) .11 (.02)***

1.59 4944.1 5026.0 −2459.1 4918.1

Model 4 B (SE) −.11 (.47) .11 (.07) .03 (.02) .06 (.03) −.09 (.02)*** −.16 (.08) .39 (.09)*** .13 (0.26) .02 (0.08) −.12 (.02)*** .04 (.04) .14 (.06)* −.01 (.01) 1.59 4945.9 5034.1 −2458.9 4917.9


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Figure 1. The figure shows the interaction between collective efficacy at the high and low levels of trust in government on policy support. Among people with low trust in government, the higher the degree of their collective efficacy perceptions, the more they support policy. Whereas among those people with high trust in government, higher perceived collective efficacy does not affect policy support. Policy support was measured on a 10-point scale (3–12) as sum of three items (M = 8.72, SD = 2.26). Collective efficacy was measured on a 7-point scale (2–8) as a sum of two items (M = 5.21, SD = 1.76). Trust in government was measured on a 10-point scale (3–12) as sum of three items (M = 8.08, SD = 2.62).

collective action is imperative. Drawing on social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997), we hypothesized that people’s perceptions about their community’s collective ability to adapt to drinking water scarcity would be associated with their support for government climate change-related water conservation policies and protest participation. We also hypothesized that people who trust government are more likely to support government policies. Further, we expected that high levels of trust and perceived collective efficacy would be most strongly associated with policy support, while distrust and high levels of perceived collective efficacy would be most associated with activist political behaviours such as protest participation. The key finding of this study is that, controlling for other factors, higher levels of collective efficacy were associated with greater support for water conservation policies, even if such policies have a financial cost for individuals. Previous studies have found that citizen’s willingness to take voluntary actions decreases with more difficult actions (e.g. O’Connor et al., 1999). But action on climate change often requires tougher and more difficult choices for individuals, and governments are called upon to facilitate such changes through policies (e.g. Moser, 2016). The results from this study suggest that increasing collective efficacy beliefs can help build public support for ambitious climate change-related water conservation policies.

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Perceived collective efficacy was also positively associated with protest participation. Citizens participate in the political process through various means such as voting, forming political pressure groups, and participating in political protests to achieve political and social aspirations that they perceive are more feasible via collective than individual actions. In fact, as Lee (2006, p. 307) stated, Hong Kong people’s support for democratization is driven by a sense of the ability of the public as a collective actor more than by a sense of the individual himself or herself as a competent actor in the public arena.

However, there is a critical difference in the operationalization of the collective efficacy construct used in this study compared to that used by Lee (2006) and much of the political communication literature. The measures of collective efficacy in this study referred to a community’s abilities whereas in the political science literature the collective refers to all the people in a nation. It is possible that if the relevant policies are local, such as the third measure in the policy support scale in this study (“Encouraging local communities to build check dams to increase local water supplies”), perceived community collective efficacy will be a better predictor of policy support, and when relevant policies are at the national level, such as the first two outcome measures of this study, perceived national-level collective efficacy will be a better predictor of public support for national-level policies. Indeed, correlations between collective efficacy and the third measure of policy support—encouraging local communities—was stronger (r = .20, p < .001), than the other two policy measures. Future research could examine collective efficacy beliefs with reference to the country as a whole, in addition to efficacy beliefs about their respective communities as in this study. Trust in information sources has been found to be an important factor in increasing public knowledge, concern, and policy support for climate change (Dietz et al., 2007; Hmielowski et al., 2013; Krosnick et al., 2006; Malka et al., 2009). This study extends these prior findings about policy support. Although most prior studies were conducted in developed countries, particularly in the US, this study also finds this pattern in India. While many studies explore trust and collective efficacy as separate factors to predict public policy support, we hypothesized that trust and collective efficacy may have a conjoint influence. Consistent with social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1995), we hypothesized and found evidence that the combination of collective efficacy and trust leads to greater policy support. Respondents with high levels of trust and perceived collective efficacy were the most supportive of government policies. In addition, respondents who most trusted the government already displayed high affinity towards government policies and collective efficacy did not moderate the association between trust and policy support. For citizens with low trust in government, however, higher perceptions of collective efficacy were associated with greater policy support. Perceptions of acting and succeeding collectively may overcome citizens’ distrust in government if they perceive themselves to be part of a powerful collective that can shape and implement government policies in order to meet their common objectives. Further, while collective efficacy was associated with protest participation, trust was not, and the interaction between collective efficacy and trust was not significantly associated with protest participation. It was predicted that collective efficacy with low levels of trust would lead to more confrontational political action, such as protests. It is not clear why the interaction was not significant in predicting protest participation. However, some prior studies, primarily conducted in the US, have also reported mixed findings between self-efficacy and trust on the form of citizens’ political engagement (e.g. Seligson, 1980; Watts, 1973). Seligson (1980), for example, reported an insignificant interaction between trust and efficacy dimensions and found that protest or strike participation was entirely driven by mistrust and not efficacy. Gameel et al. (2017) reported the influence of high internal efficacy on both conventional and confrontation political behaviour, with even trusting citizens (with high efficacy) likely to participate in protests, contrary to Gamson’s hypothesis. Analyzing data from 25 European countries, Hooghe and Marien (2013) found that while trust and internal efficacy interacted to predict institutionalized political participation, internal efficacy did not heighten the association between distrusting citizens’ participation in non-institutionalized politics. These studies, as described earlier, ignored the level of collective agency in predicting collective


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action. Seligson (1980) found that among Costa Rican peasants, group efficacy was a primary driver of institutionalized participation while distrust was a primary predictor of protest participation. It is possible that the outcome measure of protest participation used in this study, measured dichotomously, was not sensitive enough to capture the variance in protest participation. It is also possible that a generalized trust in government variable, instead of trust in the government as a source of information about climate change, could produce the expected interaction effect. Future research should further explore these interactions. Finally, while previous research (Gamson, 1968; Lee, 2006; Seligson, 1980), conceptualized political participation in the dimensions of conventional (measured as voting, support for democracy) and confrontational political action (land invasions, mobilization, protest participation), recent scholarship also identifies policy support as an attitudinal measure and as a potential predictor of political behaviour, including protest participation (e.g. Drews & Bergh, 2016). Some studies have measured policy support as a behaviour, arguing that policies exert a large change in behaviours of many people and organizations (e.g. Zahran et al., 2006). We caution however, the need for researchers to clarify their measures about political engagement about climate change to aid comparative and longitudinal research (Vraga, 2017). While Upper Castes, who represent high socio-economic status in India, were more likely to support water conservation policies, they were less likely to participate in protests. This could be because of their ability to access and influence existing institutions to manage drinking water stress, precluding the need for confrontation. Limitations While two central measures used in this study—perceived collective efficacy and policy support— refer specifically to water conservation, trust is measured in relation to government as a source of information about climate change. Ideally, all the measures would refer to a similar domain, preferably focusing on local issues such as water scarcity that act as an interpretive lens for people to understand and respond to climate change. Thus using trust in government as a source of information about climate change as a proxy for trust in government to act on the issue of drinking water is a study limitation. While only a few prior studies have accounted for different levels of self and perceived collective efficacy (Lee, 2006; Velasquez & LaRose, 2015), the survey our study was based on did not contain multiple measures of efficacy, and as a result our research cannot isolate the effect of perceived collective efficacy relative to other dimensions of efficacy as a unique predictor of engagement. While not a limitation per se, an alternative way to measure collective efficacy is to aggregate individuals’ perceptions of collective efficacy within a group and test group-level outcomes. Another study, for example, used the mean of teachers’ collective efficacy perceptions to measure differences between schools on student achievement (Goddard, 2001). Indeed, a recent study illustrates that the effect of individual-level collective efficacy is contingent on group-level collective efficacy, with members with high perceived collective efficacy performing better in groups with higher group collective efficacy compared to similar respondents in groups with low group collective efficacy (Thaker, Maibach, Leiserowitz, Zhao, & Howe, 2015). In addition, this was a cross-sectional study that cannot establish causality. Longitudinal investigations and experiments would be needed to assess causal effects. Field experiments designed to increase people’s collective efficacy beliefs, with measures of impact on policy support and protest participation, would be particularly compelling. Communicating to enhance collective efficacy What are the implications of this study for increasing public engagement in water conservation policies in the context of climate change? Mass media, which is the primary source of information on climate change for many people, reports climate change often in the context of natural disasters or is

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generally saturated with “catastrophe” connotations for climate change impacts (e.g. Antilla, 2010) and scepticism about climate science (e.g. Painter, 2013). In the US, and the UK, mass media coverage on climate change is often skewed towards threat without providing information on how to act and often containing scepticism about the collective will to address the issue (Gavin & Marshall, 2011; Hart & Feldman, 2014). While climate change is primarily framed as an environmental problem, news stories often include negative efficacy messages and actions framed as political conflict (Hart & Feldman, 2014). Such portrayals of climate change are less likely to motivate positive personal engagement with the issue (Moser, 2016; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). A large and substantial body of literature on fear appeals attests that for a fear appeal to be successful, it has to be conjoined with perceptions of efficacy (e.g. Witte & Allen, 2000). Similarly, the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) posits that without accompanying efficacy information, threat messages are likely to result in several negative responses including ignoring or dismissing the threats. Merely communicating the risks without also communicating efficacy perceptions to manage those risks may be counterproductive. Increasing people’s perceptions about their collective abilities to act will likely result in greater support and motivation to deal with collective problems such as water scarcity. Previous studies show that communication campaigns aimed at increasing people’s collective efficacy beliefs resulted in individual and community mobilization for environmental protection (e.g. Papa et al., 2000). Based on an experimental study of US citizens, Hart and Feldman (2016; Feldman & Hart, 2016) suggested that news stories that include efficacy information can increase people’s hope and their self-efficacy perceptions, which in turn, increases their intentions for political engagement with climate change. This finding has important implications and future research can test if increasing people’s perception of collective efficacy through mass media can similarly increase citizen’s political engagement.

Conclusion Barriers to public engagement include perceived beliefs about self and collective competencies to act on a global issue (e.g. Grothmann & Patt, 2005; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). The findings of this study indicate that trust in government and collective efficacy beliefs have a positive influence on citizens’ engagement with the issue of climate change-related impacts on water supplies. Increasing collective efficacy perceptions—for example through mass media (Papa et al., 2000; Singhal & Rogers, 1999)— may increase Indians’ support and demand for government policies that enhance climate change adaptation.

Acknowledgements We thank the anonymous reviewers for suggestions.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding This work was supported by the Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation and the Rice Family Foundation.

ORCID Jagadish Thaker

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4589-7512


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