One of the conclusions that can be derived from the literature on media imperialism is that we cannot simply assume that foreign media have deleterious ...
International Journal of Public Opinion Research Vol. No.
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PERCEPTIONS OF FOREIGN MEDIA INFLUENCE IN ASIA AND EUROPE: THE THIRD-PERSON EFFECT AND MEDIA IMPERIALISM Lars Willnat, Zhou He, Toshio Takeshita, and Esteban Lo´pez-Escobar ABSTRACT This study investigates how young Asians and Europeans perceive the strength of US media effects on their culture. Based on Davison’s () third-person effect hypothesis, this study proposes that most respondents will attribute greater effects of the US media upon others than upon themselves. Data for this study were collected by asking , Asian and European students about their US media consumption, and about their perceptions of how exposure to the US media might influence themselves and others. Findings show that most Asian respondents believe that their cultural values are positively influenced by exposure to the US media, while most European respondents think that their cultural values are negatively influenced. Effects of mediated US violence, on the other hand, were perceived to be negative on self and others among all respondents. Findings also indicate that European respondents tend to believe that the US media influence the cultural values of others more than their own, while Asian respondents generally think that the US media affect their own cultural values more than those of others. As predicted, all respondents perceive the effects of mediated US violence to be stronger on others than on themselves.
At the heart of the long-standing debate on the validity of the cultural imperialism theory is the assumption that foreign media products can inflict deleterious effects on indigenous cultures. Proponents of this theory contend that the one-way flow of Western cultural products and the supposedly undesirable, foreign values embodied in those products often challenge or undermine traditional cultural and ideological beliefs in non-Western communities (Hamelink , Schiller , , , Tunstall ). We would like to thank Professors Hans-Bernd Brosius, Holli Semetko, Marta Martin, and Karen Sanders for their help in collecting this data. In addition, we would like to thank various reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this study. The article was submitted to IJPOR December , . The final version was received October , . World Association for Public Opinion Research
Although this argument is rhetorically powerful and politically attractive, it has been supported only by limited empirical evidence (see reviews by: Salwen , Salwen and Dupagne ). The few empirical studies that have tried to measure the effects of foreign media exposure on beliefs and values of individuals have produced mixed evidence, much of it challenging the central idea of cultural domination through Western media (Katz et al. , Ogan , Willnat et al. ). Moreover, numerous ethnographic studies found that Western audiences actively reconstruct meanings from media messages to fit with and bolster their own self-conceptions (Ang , Katz and Liebes , Lull , Morley ). One of the questions that has received little attention in previous studies of international media consumption is how audiences perceive the effects of foreign media on their cultural values. To further the understanding of the mechanisms and potential consequences of foreign media effects across cultures, this study investigates how young audiences in Asia and Europe perceive the influence of US media products. The analysis is based on the assumption that Asian and European audiences differ significantly in how they perceive these media effects. However, in line with Davison’s () third-person effect hypothesis, we also assume that most people attribute greater effects of US media products upon others rather than upon themselves. Data for this study were collected from almost , students in eight Asian and European countries who were asked about their US media consumption and their perceptions of how exposure to the US media might influence themselves and others. While such an analysis of audience perceptions does not allow the testing of the possible foreign media effects on indigenous cultures, the authors believe that even the perceived impact of foreign media can be important. Governments whose citizens ask for more and better access to foreign media, for example, might be hard pressed to restrict such access if people feel positive about the influence of foreign media on themselves and their culture. Governments, on the other hand, who believe that exposure to foreign media has negative cultural or social consequences might be inclined to limit the amount of foreign media products in their countries. Thus, the cultural and social effects of foreign media—assuming there are any—might be less important than what governments and audiences believe about the strength and characteristics of these effects.
THEORETICAL CONCEPTS A P M I One of the conclusions that can be derived from the literature on media imperialism is that we cannot simply assume that foreign media have deleterious
effects on indigenous cultures. Rather, audiences are likely to differentiate foreign media effects in terms of influences on cultural, social, or political values, and in terms of learning or knowledge gain. A survey study by Lee (), for example, found that audiences in Hong Kong were quite open to the presence of foreign television programs, and that only a small minority favored restriction on the importation of foreign media products. While some respondents thought that US television programs contained more obscenity and more violence than comparable programs in Hong Kong, few people actually believed that foreign programs had negative effects on their personal values, behaviors, or way of living. Instead, many of the respondents thought that foreign programs could increase their knowledge of foreign cultures and enrich their own culture. Similar results have been found in audience studies conducted in Japan (Hagiwara ), Malaysia (Karthigesu ), the Philippines (Kenny ) and India (Joshi ). The first question addressed in this study deals with the potential relationship between exposure to the US media and respondents’ opinions or beliefs about media effects. While most studies have shown that audiences prefer local media fare and that foreign media effects are limited, exposure to foreign media might significantly shape individuals’ perceptions of media effects. Based on the assumption that those who use more US media are also less concerned about their possible impact, we propose that respondents who are more exposed to the US media are less likely to feel that US media content influences them. The first hypothesis therefore states that: (H) Asian and European respondents who are more frequently exposed to the US media are less likely to believe that they are influenced by US media content than those who are less exposed. A related question addressed in this study is whether audiences differentiate between positive and negative effects of foreign media programming. Based on the above mentioned studies of foreign media perception in Asia, we expect to find that Asian audiences will perceive the US media to have positive effects on their cultural values. We also expect to find that Asian respondents generally will believe that exposure to mediated US violence will have negative consequences. The second hypothesis therefore proposes that: (Ha) Asian respondents will perceive the effects of the US media on cultural values to be positive on self and others while perceiving the effects of mediated US violence to be negative on self and others. In addition, this study focuses on whether Asian and European audiences evaluate the impact of US media content differently. While the influx of US cultural products into Europe has been a long-standing concern, to our knowledge there are currently no empirical studies that have analyzed the perception of
US media influence in Europe. However, European policy makers did try to restrict the amount of US television programming shown in Europe with the Television Without Frontiers directive (Commission of the European Communities ). This directive obligated European Union (EU) members to ‘ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works . . . a majority proportion of their transmission time’. While the quota limiting US programming to percent of European television was ignored by many EU members, countries such as France and Great Britain strongly supported limits on US media imports. Since the attempts at creating a protective cultural policy reflect a certain level of concern about the potentially negative influence of US culture in Europe, we hypothesize that: (Hb) Unlike Asian respondents, Europeans will perceive the effects of the US media on cultural values and those of mediated US violence to be negative on self and others. T T-P E M I This study argues that the common fears about the possibly negative effects of the US media can be partially explained by Davison’s () third-person hypothesis. The hypothesis states that individuals who are exposed to a persuasive communication will expect the message to have greater effects on others than on themselves. The third-person effect has been documented in a large number of studies with a variety of messages and in different cultural settings (for an overview see: Paul et al. , Perloff , ). Important to this analysis is the fact that people apparently minimize the effect of messages on themselves that they perceive as coming from biased sources, but regard others as less able to detect this bias and thus more likely to be persuaded (Cohen et al. , Gunther , Perloff , Vallone et al. ). Based on the assumption that the US media are perceived to have a powerful impact by audiences around the world, most people should be psychologically predisposed to believe that US media content affects others more than themselves. This may be particularly true when the US media are perceived to carry persuasive messages with potentially deleterious effects on culture or society, or if those messages are perceived to be biased toward a US point of view. Applying the third-person effect to perceptions of foreign media effects, we predict that: (H) Both Asian and European respondents will believe that the perceived negative effects of the US media will be stronger on others than on themselves. Another interesting facet of the third-person effect hypothesis is the possible impact of psychological proximity or distance between the respondent and the
‘third’ person. Based on the assumption that people judge the media to have greater effects at the societal rather than the personal level, Brosius and Engel () suggest that third-person effects should be especially strong for perceptions of persons who are psychologically not close to the respondent. The authors’ findings confirm that psychological distance can increase the strength of the third-person effect, especially so for channels with low credibility. The present study adopts the concept of psychological proximity by constructing two hypothetical types of ‘others’: (a) people living within the respondent’s country, and (b) people living in other Asian (for Asian respondents) or European (for European respondents) countries. According to the notion of psychological proximity, third-person perceptions of media effects on those ‘others’ living outside a respondent’s country should be stronger than on those ‘others’ living within a respondent’s country. We therefore propose that: (H) The third-person effect will be more strongly demonstrated in the perceived differences between self and others outside the respondent’s country than in the perceived differences between self and others within the respondent’s country. The final question addressed in this study concerns the influence of individual media use on third-person perceptions. A number of studies suggest that media use, and especially newspaper reading, is positively associated with third-person effects (Atwood , Cohen et al. , Cohen and Davis , Glynn and Postman , Innes and Zeitz , Mutz , Perloff , Rucinski and Salmon , Salwen , Tiedge et al. ). Other studies, however, failed to find a significant relationship between media use and third-person perceptions (Paxton , Brosius and Engel ). Consistent with most previous studies, we propose that exposure to the US media should be positively associated with the third-person effect because people who are more frequent users of the US media are likely to see themselves as less affected, thus increasing the perceived gap between themselves and others. The final hypothesis therefore states that: (H) The tendency to perceive the effects of the US media on others to be stronger than on oneself (third-person effect) will be more pronounced among subjects with higher levels of US media exposure. METHODS S Questionnaires were distributed to undergraduate students enrolled in large communication or language classes at ten major universities in Japan (Meiji University, N=), Indonesia (University of Indonesia, N=), Hong Kong (City University of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Baptist University, N=),
China (People’s University, Beijing and Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, N=), Spain (University of Navarra, N=), Germany (University of Munich, N=), Great Britain (University of Sheffield, N=) and the Netherlands (University of Amsterdam, N=). The questionnaire was originally written in English and then translated into Chinese, Bahasa Indonesian, Japanese, German and Spanish by native speakers. Students in the Netherlands received the original English language questionnaire because of their excellent English language skills. A total of , students completed the survey in April/May and in October on a voluntary basis. M F M E To accommodate the possibility that—besides television—other types of media can influence foreign media audiences, the questionnaire included categories of exposure to the local and the US media, namely television, newspapers, radio (news, entertainment, and music), recorded music (CDs and cassettes), movies, videos (cassettes, digital video disks, and laserdiscs), and news magazines. Individual exposure to local television, newspapers, radio and recorded music was measured by asking respondents how many ‘minutes per day’ they usually spend with each medium. Exposure to local videos and movies was measured in terms of the number of videos or movies watched ‘per week’, while the use of news magazines was measured by the number of magazines read ‘per month’. To assess the amount of US media exposure, respondents were then asked to estimate the percentage of total media use time devoted to each of the US media. The percentage of media exposure for each medium was then converted into the number of ‘minutes per day’ respondents were exposed to US television, radio, and recorded music, the number of US videos respondents watched ‘per week’, and the number of US news magazines respondents consumed ‘per month’. M P M I To test whether people ascribe greater media influence to others than to themselves, respondents were asked how much influence (=‘no influence’ to =‘a lot of influence’) they thought the US news and entertainment media have on (a) their own cultural values, (b) the cultural values of other people in their country, and (c) the cultural values of people in other Asian (for Asian respondents) or European (for European respondents) countries. A similar set of three questions asked how much influence they thought the US news and entertainment media containing a lot of violence have on (a) themselves, (b) other people in their country, and (c) people in other Asian/European countries.
Each question about the perceived strength of US media effects on self and others was followed by a question asking respondents to evaluate whether these effects were positive (score=), negative (score=−) or neutral (score=). The respondent’s score for the perceived strength of US media influence on self and others was then multiplied by the perceived direction of US media influence. The resulting scores measure the perceived direction and strength of US media content (i.e., culture and violence) on self, others within the respondent’s country, and others in Asia/Europe on a nine-point scale ranging from − (=‘strong negative influence’) to+ (=‘strong positive influence’). M T-P E C V To test the third-person effect, respondents’ scores for perceptions of US media effects on others were subtracted from their scores for perceptions of US media effects on self. The resulting scores measure the degree of the third-person effect for the topic of culture and violence on a seven-point scale ranging from − (more influence on self than others) to + (more influence on others than on oneself). Higher scores on these two third-person effect variables indicate that respondents believe that US media affect others more than themselves. In addition to media exposure and third-person effect measures, respondents’ sex, age, the number of previous visits to the United States, relatives living in the United States (yes=), and fluency in English (=‘not fluent at all’; = ‘very fluent’) were assessed to control for possible external influences on perceptions of US media effects. FINDINGS Because the subjects in this study were undergraduate students, the mean age of the , respondents was years, with very little variation between the subjects (SD=.). Although attempts were made to balance the sex distribution of subjects in this study, a majority of the respondents were female ( percent). To compensate for the uneven distribution of male and female respondents in each country, the final sample was weighted by sex. Most students claimed to have at least some fluency in English ( percent), but more than two-thirds of them reported that they have never visited the United States. Among those students who have been to the United States, most stayed about one month. F M E Table indicates that US media exposure differed significantly from country to country and that most of this exposure was associated with television, videos, movies and recorded music. The highest level of exposure to US television was
T Average time spent using US media within each country
Indonesia Hong Kong China Japan Great Britain Germany Spain Netherlands Total average
TV
Newspapers
Radio
Recorded Music
Videos
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Movies Magazines . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Note: Use of US television, newspapers, radio, and recorded music is measured in minutes per day. Use of US videos is measured as videos watched per week, use of US movies as movies watched per month, and use of US magazines as magazines read per month.
found among Indonesian students, who spent about an hour a day watching US television programming. Students from other countries watched much less US television, ranging from about ten minutes in Japan to about half an hour in Spain and the Netherlands. The consumption of US movies, on the other hand, was led by students from China and Hong Kong, who saw about five to six US movies per month. This contrasts with about two US movies watched per month by students from other countries. Exposure to US videos was somewhat higher and ranged between one and two per week in most countries. While most students reported listening to US recorded music about minutes a day, exposure to US radio programs was generally much smaller. As expected, the consumption of US newspapers and magazines among Asian and European students was rather limited. A majority of students reported that they usually do not read US newspapers ( percent) or news magazines ( percent). M E P M E Table presents hierarchical OLS regression estimates for exposure to the US media on scores of the perceived strength of US media influence on self. Separate regressions were run for perceptions of US media effects on cultural values and perceptions of the effects of mediated US violence. Both regression models control for the potential effects of respondents’ age, sex, previous visits to the United States, relatives in the United States, fluency in English, and cultural background (i.e., Asian or European). Overall, no support was found for the hypothesis that respondents who consume more US media will be less likely to believe that they are influenced
T Predicting perceived strength of US media effects Perceived strength of US media effects on own cultural values Upon-entry
Final
Perceived strength of effects of mediated US violence Upon-entry
Final
Demographics Age Sex (female=) Time in US US relatives (yes=) English fluency Incr. R (%)
.∗∗∗ . . . .
.∗∗∗ . . −. −.∗∗ .∗
−. −.∗∗∗ . . .∗∗∗
−. −.∗∗∗ −. −. .∗∗ .∗∗∗
US media exposure Television Newspapers Radio Music Videos Movies Magazines Incr. R (%)
. .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ . .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗
. .∗ .∗ . . . .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗
. .∗∗∗ .∗∗ −. .∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗
. .∗∗∗ . −. −. . .∗∗ .∗∗∗
−.∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .
−.∗∗∗
−.∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .
Cultural background Region (Europe=) −.∗∗∗ Incr. R (%) Total R (%) N
∗p
