May 10, 1989 - Agenda for Health Care in America: Balancing Need and Commitment, ... These textbooks focus .... perhaps even the health-and-fitness movement. ..... Glencoe,. IL, Free Press, 1956. 5. Etzioni, A.: The Moral Dimension: To-.
BULLETIN OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE
VOL. 66, No. 1
JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1990
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIOECONOMICS* AMITAI ETZIONI, PH.D. University Professor George Washington University Washington, D.C.
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH A FAIR NUMBER OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS, several such journals as the
Journal of Economy and Philosophy, the Journal of Behavioral Economics, and the Journal of Economic Psychology, a new section of the American Economics Association, and several symposia (such as the one published by the Journal ofBusiness in 1986) are attempting to develop a new paradigm that will expand the range of sociological, psychological, and institutional factors included in the analysis of economic behavior, above and beyond the variables typically covered by the neoclassical economic paradigm. The new approaches take one of two basic tacks. The first tries to integrate noneconomic variables into the "orthodox" neoclassical economic paradigm. Major examples include Akerlof's works on dissonance,1 Frank's *Presented as the Duncan W. Clark Lecture as part of the Annual Health Conference: The Changing Agenda for Health Care in America: Balancing Need and Commitment, held by the Committee on Medicine in Society of the New York Academy of Medicine May 9 and 10, 1989.
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work on reference groups,2 and, before that, Harsanyi's work on two utilities.3 The other major tack is to develop a new encompassing paradigm that includes both economic and other social (including psychological, cultural, and political) factors. Among these efforts are studies that conceive of the market as a subsystem that follows its own logic within a broader society, culture, and polity,4 and studies that embed rational decision making within a context of values and emotions.5 A third approach is not explored here. It tries to formulate an alternate paradigm, one that studies economic behavior largely using concepts from other social sciences, for instance, the work by Lutz and Lux which builds on humanistic psychology.6 Rather than asking which of the two basic approaches cited above is the more productive or discussing at length the different social philosophies involved, we explore here the policy implications of adding key noneconomic variables to a paradigm that attempts to model economic behavior, a paradigm we call socioeconomics. (For additional discussion, see Etzioni.5 For similar approaches, see Swedberg et al.7 and Hirsch and Friedman.8) This pragmatic stance assumes that paradigms are used as heuristics, to call attention to those factors we take into account in policy analysis and policy formation. Because it is impossible to consider all or even most of the factors that have been identified, paradigms (and theories) are used to emphasize some factors to the neglect of others. Here we explore the differences in policy analysis that result from employing a socioeconomic set of variables, disregarding more theoretical issues -whether these variables can be accommodated by the neoclassical paradigm without undue assumptions and strain or whether they require a new paradigm. A quick example will serve to illustrate this pragmatic approach. Review works on labor economics which summarize the state of the art often discuss efforts to increase incentives for work performance. These textbooks focus almost exclusively on such monetary incentives as differences between wages and salaries, pay-for-time vs. piecemeal pay, and so on (see, for example, Bloom and Northrup;9 Reynolds, Masters and Moser;'0 Marshall, Briggs, and King. 11) For practical policy purposes, one may add to such analyses the concept of reference groups, that is, the observation that people are concerned with their relative (or nominal) wages and not only with their absolute (or real) ones, without asking whether the concept of reference groups or that of the money illusion can be explained in neoclassical terms2 or constitute a basic element of a different, say, sociological, paradigm. The same may be said about recognizing the intrinsic appeal of work (vs. leisure), Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med.
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employees' desire for dignity and identity, the merits of employee participation in decision making for certain categories of work, and the significant role of corporate culture. The article next explores four major areas that seem to benefit from incorporating studies of social factors. We shall discuss policy implications, but not the theoretical, paradigmatic issues involved. We offer two observations before proceeding. First, either because research on the role of social factors in economic behavior is not thoroughly developed or because they are inherently more difficult to model (especially in mathematical terms), presentation of social factors tends to be much less formal than that of economic factors. Second, we are in a position to provide only a partial outline of the role of social factors, not a full conceptualization. (We suggest, but do not show here, that the same problem is faced by those who use only orthodox neoclassical terms.) We will therefore indicate areas in which additional work is needed to extend this line of analysis. Our main effort, however, remains exploring how existing approximations of socioeconomics enrich policy analysis. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING SHIFTING PREFERENCES
Many neoclassical analyses take individual preferences as given and stable, 12 assuming that persons have a particular and constant set of "tastes, " "values," or "aspirations." Changes in behavior are assumed to result from changes in "constraints" or income, but not in preferences. Thus, for example, a neoclassical analyst investigating the reasons that American consumption of alcohol has declined since 1980 will ask if the price of alcohol has increased or if the age of drinking has been raised and so on, but not whether the desire to consume alcohol has been reduced due to changes in the valuation of "drinking. " The neoclassical model does not reflect the fact that these changes are due largely to two social movements, the health-and-fitness movement and a neotemperance movement, especially MADD and SADD. The reasons that neoclassicists fix preferences should be briefly explicated and arguments for disregarding these reasons provided. Information about preference changes, neoclassicists assert, is "ephemeral," based on "soft," nonbehavioral data such as surveys of attitudes; further, preference changes involve nonobservable states of mind. Without asking if or how such data can be used or made reliable, let us note that the same tools that are used to study economic data can be used to study noneconomic variables as they are reflected in actual behavior. For example, following Lancaster,13 one may disaggregate the attributes of a car to determine the price purchasers are willing to pay for each of the attributes, such as speed, design, and color. The Vol. 66, No. 1, January-February 1990
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same disaggregation can be used to determine the amount people are willing to pay for a car to be American or non-Japanese (say, after World War II) and the change (presumably the decline) in this preference over the postwar years. Neoclassicists argue that incorporating preference changes in the explanation of behavior precludes useful analysis, because whenever behavior changes, presumably we shall state that preferences have changed. There is, however, a satisfactory rebuttal for this argument. If we have several -or, preferably, numerous -observations over time, we can test hypotheses about changes in constraints and in preferences (including value changes that often cause preference changes). For instance, tax compliance has been shown to be affected both by the level of taxation (basically, the higher the tax rates, the lower the level of compliance) and by whether or not taxes are viewed as fairly imposed.14 Thus, if an increase in compliance follows a period in which tax rates have not been reduced, and if in that same period numerous loopholes were closed, all things being equal, we would expect that the change is due, in fact, to an enhanced sense of fairness. The argument of some neoclassicists -that they need not study preference changes or the value changes that drive them because these phenomena belong to "different" disciplines (namely, psychology and sociology)may, indeed, be correct. Yet this argument demonstrates precisely the necessity of a broader paradigm, one that encompasses both social and economic factors. A key policy implication of a paradigm encompassing the study of changes both in constraints and in preferences is that when we design social policies we need not limit our efforts only to providing information (action which relies on the assumption that people have fixed preferences but need to understand better the costs and benefits of the choices they face). Rather, we may also seek to change people's values and preferences by, for example, drawing on public education campaigns, the exercise of leadership, and other means. Several recent social movements and other factors have catalyzed changes in the American public's values, changes that came about years or decades after relevant information was available. The civil rights movement of the 1960s, a grassroots response to the disenfranchisement of blacks, brought not only institutional reform, but a general change in the beliefs Americans held; blacks have come to be viewed more widely as full-fledged citizens, deserving social justice. The woman's movement that accompanied and then followed the blacks' push for civil rights also achieved significant changes in America's values. Large segments of American society now consider the old adage, "a woman's place is in the home," not only outBull. N.Y. Acad. Med.
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moded but offensive. The recent shift in attitudes toward death further attests to changes in American values. Previously, a person was considered dead if his heart and breathing had stopped. Today, the idea of brain death has assumed primacy, largely because the health care community adopted the standard. Other significant changes occur mainly when the social web of emotive forces found in peer groups supports behavioral changes, such as in Alcoholics Anonymous and the recent condemnation of smoking. Recently the distinction between informing individuals and seeking other means to modify their behavior had been highlighted by the efforts to slow the spread of AIDS. The Surgeon General sent a brochure to every home in the United States and pamphlets were handed out to drug addicts in back streets. While this campaign demonstrates the government's concern and interest in changing American's behavior to stem the tide of AIDS, it is difficult to imagine the psychological processes that would cause an addict to change his ways because of a piece of paper. Beyond this information campaign, finding means to involve such addicts in supportive social groups similar to Alcoholics Anonymous and pregnant teen groups may have to be considered. The nation's homosexuals, much more of a community than addicts, have been much more successful, it seems, in changing their behavior. In response to the argument for working to modify values and preferences, neoclassicists raise another objection, an ethical one. They state that individuals, and not the government, ought to determine their own conduct, and that those who object to consumer sovereignty and seek to influence individual tastes are elitist snobs who wish to impose their values on others. Socioeconomics takes a different normative stance, arguing that some tastes clearly ought to be modified, for instance, those that cause harm to others (e.g., smoking and reckless driving) and those that demonstrate open disregard for community needs (e.g., dumping toxic wastes into lakes). Nor is government the only instrument to seek to influence tastes or coercion the proper means; the community is often the most effective agent, and communication of values is a main tool. Hence, community leadership and education by parents, neighbors, peers, and churches should be included in policy design. For example, smoking was significantly curtailed once its social valuation changed. Peer pressure played a key role in generating the emotive force needed to help people mobilize themselves to overcome this addiction. Further justification for the position that certain preferences can and may be modified can be found in that tastes are neither inborn nor individually developed. For example, the taste for smoking or drinking is heavily proVol. 66, No. 1, January-February 1990
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moted by some peers or subcultures as well as by subconscious motives on which persuasive advertising draws. It therefore seems ethically proper to counter these commercial pressures with education stressing the needs of others and the community's views of the long-run interest of those involved. In sum, education, leadership, and social movements -all factors that tend to encourage value changes-need to be included in policy analyses next to price changes, information flows, and other such factors. While we know many of the variables that affect preferences, we lack a parsimonious conception of the factors that cause preference changes. Numerous factors are cited, but there is little consensus about the list. To illustrate in a very preliminary way the kind of propositions that are needed, it might be stated that social movements tend to have a set "natural history": they rise rapidly and then gradually decay, both through "secularization" (loss of commitment) and through sectarianism (internal divisions and strife). They rarely last. Hence, value changes based only on a social movement, if not followed by institutionalization, will have limited long-run effects and much smaller effects than is widely assumed at the height of the social movement. If these propositions are correct, the longer-run effects of a social-religious movement such as fundamentalist Islam, widely assumed to be a major factor in the Middle east in the coming decades, are likely to be quite limited. The same pattern is visible in the United States, where one can already witness the cresting and the beginning decline of the neotemperance movement and perhaps even the health-and-fitness movement. The "couch potato" trend, a new movement of acquiescence that celebrates the comforts of home as an antidote to a perceived harshness in the economic environment, may be slowly ascending only to follow the same pattern of other social movements -a rapid rise and a gradual decline. It is not argued here that these propositions about the patterns of social movements have been sufficiently validated or are close enough to the data to be relied upon in policy making. Rather, the propositions are used to illustrate the kind of parsimonious theory we need that would enhance the inclusion of the factors that shape preferences in socioeconomic analyses and are used for
policy analysis. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Neoclassical analyses tend to focus on transactions among individuals or small units (such as households and small firms) and their aggregation in anonymous markets, that is, markets that are assumed to have no collective Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med.
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controls. To the extent that institutions are studied at all within this paradigm, they are generally perceived as reflecting arrangements made voluntarily and knowingly by individuals in line with their interests and goals. Traditionally, other social sciences tended to view institutions as reflecting historical (macro) processes, society-wide values, and power relations. Socioeconomics seeks to encompass the influence of both individuals and that of society. It attempts to combine aggregative analysis with collective analysis by assuming that collective factors provide the context and are "priors" within which individuals act, but which in turn are affected by them. The significance of systematically including institutional analyses lies in that their existence hinders or assists policy and, hence, even if one does not seek to modify the institutions, their effects on policy must be taken into account. For example, a multiyear economic policy formed within the United States (say, a corporate development plan) that ignored the well-established economic effects of the four-year political cycle driven by presidential elections is less likely to succeed than an economic policy that takes the cycle into account. All other things being equal, the expansive policies of election years provide a much more hospitable economic environment for a new product or newly expanded production capacities than the first year of a new administration. "Bitter medicine" is usually prescribed during this first year; hence, the period tends to be economically restrictive. The cycle, in turn, reflects the constitution and not an aggregation of individual decisions. Similarly, one must expect little success for a policy that ignores differences among institutions, e.g., shifting law enforcement functions from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to local government, because of the widespread corruption institutionalized in many local police forces. The same must be said about a policy that shifts responsibilities from the Internal Revenue Service or the Social Security Administration to local tax collection or welfare agencies. Beyond accounting for the established features of existing institutions and the powerful inertia and vested interests they tend to generate, one must also recognize that institutions can be changed and policy advanced through such changes. Thus, instead of, or in addition to, using education campaigns to encourage one hundred million individual Americans to increase their saving, one can enhance saving by changing the tax laws, under some conditions by reducing corporate outlays of dividends (i.e., by increasing retained earnings) or, more effectively, by reducing government expenditures. Segregating Social Security from the unified budget and investing its surpluses into a portfolio of American corporate and government bonds will do as much or more for the American savings rate than will, say, doubling the Vol. 66, No. 1, January-February 1990
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size of funds individuals can salt away, tax deferred, in their individual retirement accounts. As another example, while a constitutional amendment to balance the budget may well create several new problems, it would modify significantly the institutional context of the struggle to reduce federal deficits. Similarly, aside from working on individual incentive schemes, which may have limited effects,15 corporations often benefit when they also introduce institutional changes such as increased cooperation with labor unions (GM-UAW in recent years), quality circles, or participatory decision making. One may argue whether individuals or institutions are more powerful; however, one conclusion is clear: policy analysis should consider both individual, aggregative factors and institutional factors, as well as their interaction. Working with individual and institution together is likely to be far more effective than working alone with either one. POWER CONCENTRATION: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION VS. ECONOMIC-POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
For the most part, economics recognizes no power differences;'6 the market dominates firms and not vice versa. However, the existence of monopolistic behavior by some firms has been demonstrated, giving evidence of power structures with markets. In the economics literature these structures are referred to as "industrial organization. ' 17 The literature on industrial organization focuses almost exclusively on intramarket, economic, power concentrations. For example, the power of firms is measured by their degree of market control, their ability to deter entry of rivals into the markets, and so on. Evidence shows that there are concentrations of economic power within the American (and other) economic systems. 18 However, the socioeconomic paradigm stresses the need to see the economy as set within a societal capsule,4"19 a capsule composed of shared values, social bonds, and the polity.2' Here we focus on one element, the polity. The polity is a source of considerable power used by some economic actors to advance their goals against other market rivals. Using the polity to intervene in the market we call interventionist power to distinguish it from political power, which means using the polity's influence for general purposes (such as in matters of foreign policy). There are countless examples of powerful economic actors using the polity to affect other economic actors within the market: the introduction of quotas and tariffs to save an American motorcycle manufacturer from Japanese competitors, the creation of a "voluntary" quota limiting the importation of Japanese automobiles to the United States, favored by the UAW and AmeriBull. N.Y. Acad. Med.
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can automobile manufacturers; and the use of congressional contacts by some aerospace corporations (e.g., Rockwell International, General Dynamics, and Lockheed) to obtain large military contracts at the expense of their competitors. Corporations also often use interventionist power to become the exclusive providers of cable television, local telephone services, or electricity in a given jurisdiction. In other words, companies use the government, rather than large capital outlays or research and development, to create a monopoly. The means by which some corporations build up their power to the disadvantage of others range from the legitimate to the illicit to the outright illegal. Petitioning a member of Congress to enact a law in effect according one corporation advantages over others, say, on the grounds that the preferred corporation provides jobs in the Congress member's district, is part and parcel of the American political process and is considered legitimate. Concocting elaborate briefs in favor of a particular corporation, based on twisted facts and fanciful interpretations of the evidence, is not illegal, but not particularly ethical, either. Bribes are rare but not unknown. Campaign contributions, a major factor, include all of the above: those that are proper, those that are technically legal, and those that are neither. Socioeconomic analysis takes into account both intramarket economic power and interventionist power. It seeks to determine the structure of markets, to study the dynamics of relations among economic actors and their effects on prices, innovation, and concentration, in short, the same subjects as economic literature on "industrial organization" typically explores. However, socioeconomics considers not only acts within the market, but also acts by market contestants within the polity. Among its major policy implications, the socioeconomic approach makes clear that it is insufficient to try to curb the concentration of economic power; one must also limit the interventionist influence of powerful economic actors, preventing them from using the political system to their advantage and disrupting economic processes. Thus, instead of relying heavily on antitrust policies, one must look for ways to curb interventionist power. One key strategy is to introduce voluntary public financing of congressional campaigns, the same financing system used for presidential elections. In this way, elected officials become less dependent on powerful economic (and other) actors. Other measures include prohibiting outright the campaign contributions of corporations and labor unions (regulation currently in place); disallowing the use of corporate infrastructure to help organize PACs (no such regulation exists); and limiting the size of PAC contributions (regulation exists but is easily violated). Other measures may well be devised; here the Vol. 66, No. 1, January-February 1990
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goal is to broaden the perspective on power in the marketplace to include the political power of corporations and its use in the market rather than to work out in full detail the policies that curb such power (for additional discussion, see Etzioni2O). MACRO AND STRUCTURAL POLICIES
Neoclassical economic theory tends to favor macro policies (if any public policy) over so-called "structural" ones. Thus, if unemployment is considered excessive, neoclassical economics will generally advocate a policy such as reducing interest rates to stimulate the whole economy, letting the market work out the "details," for example, which industries are going to expand. Neoclassical economists usually disfavor structural policies aimed at what other social scientists perceive as distinct problems concentrated in one structural segment or another (for example, unemployment among high school dropouts or in ghettos). Such policies, for instance, a program to train welfare mothers, address specific difficulties. Structural policies, neoclassical economists argue, tend to cause distortion in resource allocation, involve intervention in the market, and are often inefficient because they rely on government bureaucracies. Socioeconomics, which recognizes the significance of structure both within the economy and within the polity and society, presupposes that effective policies require a combination of macro and structural policies. Considering both types of policies is useful and important for several reasons. First, the differences between the two are often exaggerated. Both involve a departure from the "natural" state of the economy; both entail interventions based on public policies. It follows that both kinds of policies may be used either to correct market imperfections or market failures. Either type of policy may also "distort" the economy. Further, structural policies do not necessarily require the use of governmental bureaucracies; for example, one may use private contractors in competition with one another to train the unemployed. Or one may use vouchers to provide housing to the poor. Second, macropolicies taken alone have their own problems. For instance, one may "overheat" the whole economy before the general stimuli will "trickle down" to the hard-core unemployed. If the goal is to reduce this core, it might be more effective to combine structural policies with macro policies. For example, we might put greater emphasis on training programs that lead to secure, meaningful jobs with reasonable pay, a step toward a "career" (rather than a dead end). Such training programs are fashioned by corporations for their own future labor force and are more effective than Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med.
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training programs that stand on their own and rely on the market to place their graduates. Assuming it would be public policy to support the first kind of programs while simultaneously stimulating the economy, one would expect better results (especially a lesser need for stimulation) than without such complementary structural policy. On the other hand, structural policies alone are unlikely to work; for instance, if there are no jobs, training is likely to be counterproductive, alienating those who cannot find jobs or undercutting the motivation of those in training. The debate over how to treat unemployment is old and of less current interest because other economic problems loom larger, at least as judged by the public. In recent years several countries have tolerated relatively high levels of unemployment (levels previously considered unacceptable) in exchange for progress on other goals more highly favored by the middle class, especially the curbing of inflation. Britain during the Thatcher regime is a clear case in point, with unemployment often at 11% or higher. Other economic goals accorded higher priority in the United Kingdom include the quest for ways to encourage saving and to promote exports (in the United States the trade and domestic deficit problems are of greatest concern). The main policy options currently under the U.S. government's consideration are macro policies: reduce government expenditures, or raise taxes, or both. Structural approaches, such as promoting the infrastructure, restraining certain kinds of consumption, or providing specific incentives for savings, are not nearly as much in favor. One serious defect of the government's almost exclusive focus on macro policies is that it will likely cause another recession. Four such recessions were induced between 1970 and 1983 to curb inflation, and higher taxes with or without significant reduction in government expenditures late in the business cycle are widely expected to bring about yet another. A recession would reduce the trade deficit by reducing imports and it would enable the shifting of resources from domestic consumption to exports without adding inflationary pressures (which might result if a fuller employment society would raise its exports). However, such relief tends to last only as long as the recession and for a short period thereafter. If there are no significant changes in the structure of the economy, it is difficult to see why the trade deficit and inflationary pressures would not rise again once the nation had worked its way out of the recession. Moreover, the price of the recession itself, in economic and human terms, is considerable. Let us now examine a structural approach that, rather than replacing macro policies, seeks to supplement them, mitigating their undesirable side effects. Vol. 66, No. 1, January-February 1990
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Such an approach would entail shifting resources from consumption to saving and to export in conjunction with lowering the interest rates. This goal can be achieved by policies such as further limiting the deductibility of interest on home mortgages (in effect, a consumer good) and by requiring larger down payments as well as shorter repayment schedules on automobiles and possibly major household goods (e.g., major appliances), following the system in Japan. These two structural policies have their own inherent difficulties (e.g., loan regulations are relatively easy to circumvent). A major topic for socioeconomists is to explore whether these difficulties can be overcome or at least reduced or whether more effective structural policies can be devised. In addition, yet another question remains: given that both macro and structural policies have major costs, which costs are lower, and which of the two approaches is least costly in human and economic terms? Whatever the outcome, these subjects are clearly worth exploring in the codetermination approach that socioeconomics suggests. CONCLUSION We have used as a test criterion the ability to generate public policies that seem useful. We examined an approach that encompasses both economic variables (of the kind neoclassical economists typically study) and other social, psychological, and political factors, and found that this combination, called "socioeconomics, " may yield more effective policies in several arenas. While it seems worthwhile to move toward the broader perspective afforded by socioeconomics, it is also evident that additional work must be done to develop fully what here has only been outlined. REFERENCES
1. Akerlof, G.A. and Dickens, W.T.: The economic consequences of cognitive dissonance. Am. Econ. Rev. 72:307-19, 1982. 2. Frank, H.: Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985. 3. Harsanyi, C.: Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and international comparisons of utility. J. Pol. Econ. 63:309-21, 1955. 4. Parsons, T. and Smelser, N.J.: Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of
Economic and Social Theory. Glencoe, IL, Free Press, 1956. 5. Etzioni, A.: The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics. New York, Free Press, 1988. 6. Lutz, M. and Lux, K.: Humanistic Economics: The New Challenge. Croton-onHudson, N.Y., Bootstrap Press, 1988. 7. Swedberg, R., Himmelstrand, U., and Brulin, G.: The Paradigm of Economic Sociology: Premises and Promises. Research Reports from the Department of Sociology, Uppsala University, 1985, pp. 1-62. Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med.
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8. Hirsh, P. and Friedman, R.: CollaboraNew York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. tion or Paradigm Shift?: Economic vs. 15. Baker, G.P., Jensen, M.C., and MurBehavioral Thinking About Policy. In: pny, K.J.: Compensation and IncenAcademy of Management Best Papers tives: Practice vs. Theory. Boston, Proceedings, Pearce J.A., II, and RobDivision of Research, Harvard Business inson, R., Jr., editors. Chicago, AcadSchool, 1988. emy of Management, 1986. pp. 31-35. 16. Stigler, G.J.: Competition. International 9. Bloom, G.F. and Northrup, H.R.: EcoEncyclopedia of Social Science, vol. 3. nomics of Labor Relations. Homewood, New York, Macmillan, pp. 181-82, IL, Irwin, 1981. 1965. 10. Reynolds, L.G., Masters, S.H., and 17. Scherer, F.M.: Industrial Market StrucMoser, C.M.: Labor Economics and Lature and Economic Performance, secbor Relations, ninth ed. Englewood ond edition. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1986. 1980. 11. Marshall, F.R., Briggs, V.M., Jr., and 18. Sheperd, W.G.: Causes of increased King, A.G.: Labor Economics, fifth edicompetition in the U.S. Rev. Econ. Stat. tion. Homewood, IL, Irwin, 1984. 64:613-26, 1982. 12. Stigler, G.J. and Becker, G.S.: De 19. Polanyi, K.: The Great Transformation. gustibus non est disputandum. Am. Boston, Beacon Press, 1957 (1944). Econ. Rev. 67:76-90, 1977. 20. Etzioni, A.: Capital Corruption. New 13. Lancaster, K.: A new approach to conYork, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, sumer theory. J. Pol. Econ. 74:132-57, 1984. 1966. 21. Etzioni, op. cit., chapters 12 and 13. 14. Lewis, A.: The Psychology of Taxation.
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