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Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 30 (2005) 872–880 www.elsevier.com/locate/pce

Political challenges to implementing IWRM in Southern Africa Larry A. Swatuk

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Harry Oppenheimer Okavango Research Centre, University of Botswana, Maun, Botswana Accepted 15 August 2005

Abstract Southern African states are undertaking comprehensive water sector reforms. While motives for reform are partially local, they are in large part driven by the interests and ideologies of Western states and civil societies. Within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), national (water, sanitation, irrigation) master plans are being written or revised. In several states, new Water Acts are in place and new institutions have been created to improve delivery. The stated goal of these activities is integrated water resources management (IWRM) defined simply as equitable, efficient and sustainable use of the resource. This article summarizes findings of social science-oriented scholarship on water management in the region, in particular that published in three special issues of Physics and Chemistry of the Earth (vol. 27, nos. 11–22; vol. 28, nos. 20–27; vol. 29, nos. 15–18). Evidence shows, among other things, that governments have been reluctant to devolve power to stakeholders; that rural dwellers are suspicious of the motives behind reform; that already empowered actors dominate new institutions touting broad-based participation; that efforts to fully recover costs in urban areas have been met with widespread civil resistance; and that new institutions have undermined existing forms of cooperation and conflict resolution, making matters worse not better. At the same time, these studies show the utility of decision support tools, capacity building exercises and research and knowledge production—all positive outcomes that should not be discounted. The paper argues that difficulties with reform reflect the highly political nature of the undertaking. Specifically, the new water architecture proposes a profound realignment of decision making power in already fragile, underdeveloped states. As a result, what may have started as a project now constitutes a context wherein differently empowered actors negotiate and renegotiate roles and rights to resources. Thus, to achieve sustainable, equitable and efficient water use in the Southern African region, it is important to reflect on the political nature of these activities and to reconsider (and be prepared to revise or discard) the basic assumptions and ideologies driving the reform process. 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Conflict and cooperation; Localisation; Politics; Integrated water resources management; Institutions

1. Introduction [W]ater management is never ÔneutralÕ, ÔtechnicalÕ or Ôan end in itselfÕ. Neither do neutral water institutions exist, whether they are Catchment Management Agencies, Catchment Management Committees, Water User Associations, forums, or Stakeholder Reference Groups. Nor is DWAF [the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry in South Africa] a neutral facilitator for institution building, limiting its role to that of a constitutional watchdog to ensure demographic representation. Decentralising water *

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management is even less a matter of handing over neutral authority from the state to a neutral public (Schreiner and van Koppen, 2002, p. 975). All policy making discourse is partial in that it is made by coalitions, which reflect those who can best construct and deliver the most persuasive arguments . . . Policy is not made on the basis of rational science. Although well observed science can play a role if its messages are as effectively constructed as those of other participants in the policy-making process (Allan, 2003, p. 2). Water reforms are underway throughout the SADC region (Swatuk, 2002a, for an overview). Whereas these began piecemeal throughout the 1980s (e.g. the development of River Basin Committees in Tanzania in 1981; the

L.A. Swatuk / Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 30 (2005) 872–880

establishment of ZACPLAN from 1985), they gained considerable momentum at that decadeÕs end. From the early 1990s, local drought combined with global forums (Dublin, Rio) to push water resources management to the front of SADC and global developmental agendas. Political changes in the region and the world facilitated more broad-based dialogue regarding integrated, cooperative approaches to economic development. What seems to have emerged is a nascent epistemic community, with general agreement on basic facts about water (e.g. it is essential, finite, fugitive), the state of water resources in the world (diminishing relative to expanding populations), the impact of current water management practices on natural and human environments (degraded physical landscapes and declining water quality and quantity through waste and crumbling infrastructure), the importance of water in poverty reduction/eradication, the gendered nature of inequitable access to safe water and sanitation, and the actions that must be taken if water resources are to be sustainably managed, with the latter captured quite clearly in the 1992 Dublin Principles (see Savenije, 2002; Falkenmark and Rockstro¨m, 2004; Gleick, 2002). Global networks devoted to water resources management have developed through time and are extensive, interlinking inter alia (I)NGOs, IGOs, government departments, private foundations and think tanks, university based research centres and academic programmes, private companies and consultancies. Visiting a single website (e.g. http://www.righttowater.org.uk) leads one almost immediately to websites maintained by groups such as Water Aid in the UK, the World Water Forum, World Water Council, Global Water Partnership, International Water Management Institute, International Rivers Network, the IUCN, various UN organisations (World Bank, UNESCO, WHO). Each of these sites leads to many others and to a wealth of policy and academic papers devoted to sustainable water resources management. Simply typing in ÔIWRMÕ on the google search engine returned more than 10,000 links. At the heart of most of these efforts is the concept Ôintegrated water resources managementÕ (IWRM), defined as follows: ÔEquitable access to and sustainable use of water resources by all stakeholders at catchment, regional and international levels, while maintaining the characteristics and integrity of water resources at the catchment scale within agreed limitsÕ (Pollard, 2002, p. 943). IWRM encapsulates each of the four Dublin Principles: Principle No. 1—Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment. Principle No. 2—Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels. Principle No. 3—Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water.

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Principle No. 4—Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as an economic good. These four principles inform, if not underpin, the character and content of current water reforms in Southern Africa. Given the multilateral approach to global water governance—through UN, World Bank, World Water Forum, IUCN networks for example—one might argue that together the Dublin Principles constitute a global norm akin to Ôhuman rightsÕ—although argument continues regarding the meaning of water as an economic good and whether that stands in contrast or complement to water as a basic human right (Mukheli et al., 2002). This paper presents some empirical results from attempts to operationalise the Ôaction agendaÕ of the Dublin Statement—providing safe water for all; guarding against natural disasters; building a knowledge base; creating an enabling environment through law and institutional reform; capacity building at the level of state and civil society; resolving conflicts; protecting aquatic ecosystems; increasing agricultural productivity; improving the quality and reach of urban delivery systems; implementing demand management principles—based on its four principles. Data is drawn primarily from social science-oriented papers published in three special issues of the journal Physics and Chemistry of the Earth (vol. 27, nos. 11–22, 2002; vol. 28, nos. 20–27, 2003; vol. 29, nos. 15–18, 2004). These special issues comprise research conducted by (junior and senior) scholars, practitioners and policy makers active in the water sector throughout the SADC region. This research was presented at the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th annual meetings of WaterNET, a region-wide programme funded by the Netherlands Development Agency, with technical assistance from IHE-Delft, and a Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)-funded research arm, the Water Research Fund for Southern Africa (Warfsa) which seeks to build on Dublin action agenda items regarding capacity and knowledge base building. While generalising from the data, it should be noted that the specific basins include the following: the Pungwe, Odzi, Save, Manyame and Mazowe Rivers in Zimbabwe; Lake Chilwa in Malawi; the Rufiji, Usanga, Pangani Rivers and Lakes Victoria and Manyara in Tanzania; the Kuiseb, Cuvelai and Okavango Rivers as managed by Namibia; Angola/Namibia and Angola/Botswana/Namibia; the Olifants, Sand, Crocodile and Sabi Rivers as managed by South Africa; the Komati as managed by South Africa and Swaziland; three unidentified Water Management Areas in South AfricaÕs Kwa-Zulu Natal region; and the cities of Gaborone (Botswana), Maputo (Mozambique), Bulawayo, Harare, Masvingo and Mutare (Zimbawe); Lusaka and Kitwe (Zambia); and Windhoek (Namibia). What will be shown below is the similarity of experience—primarily but not only negative in character—with IWRM and water demand management (WDM) in practice, especially regarding the creation and early

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operationalisation of river basin organisations (generally denoted Catchment Management Councils or Authorities) and attempts to shift toward (full) cost recovery through for-profit utilities in urban areas. The general argument of this paper is that politics stands at the centre of these problems—so political challenges to sustainable river basin management are great. However, as will be shown below, the sort of politics I am talking about is not simply that of resistance by entrenched interests in favour of the status quo (although that is part of the story). A good deal of the politics involved revolves around the discourse of development and the place of IWRM (including integrated river basin management, IRBM) therein. The concept ÔlocalisationÕ is used to help explain water politics in the region, and why results have been so mixed. According to Acharya (2004, p. 241), Ôlocalisation describes a complex process and outcome by which norm-takers build congruence between transnational norms . . . and local beliefs and practicesÕ. Geographically specific in this case to Southern Africa, IWRM constitutes both a discursive site and multilateral landscape where various forms of power—political, social, cultural—are exercised in the production of new social practices. Framed this way, IWRM is far more than the technical application of good ideas based on sound scientific and managerial methods. Local actors, from landless peasant to NGO operator to national elite—are engaged in a continuous dialogue with national, regional and especially global actors, be they mercenary, missionary or fellow traveller. In terms of ÔlocalisationÕ, the result is that some of these ideas are adopted (but rarely in toto), others are rejected (but rarely outright), still others are modified, and only some find their way beyond protocols and laws into enactment and enforcement by state authorities. Understanding this process is key to achieving sustainable water resources management in the region. 2. Motivations for water reforms in SADC states Motives for reform arise out of a mix of general facts about water resources in Southern Africa and the particular experiences of individual states. In terms of the former, it is generally agreed that there is a mismatch between resource abundance and human settlement: the majority of the regionÕs people reside in areas of relative water scarcity (Gumbo et al., 2004). Population growth rates are said to be putting pressure on existing resources while access to available water resources mirrors historical inequalities (Robinson, 2002). As a result of these factors, conflicts over water resources are said to be increasing at the same time that stocks and flows of natural resources are being depleted and degraded (Mbaiwa, 2004; Madulu, 2003). In terms of country-specific motives, it is clear in the South African case that a massive developmental backlog (where 50% of South Africans are income poor and 10– 12 million people lack access to clean water) in contrast to fully committed water resources in service to the few

(where, for example, 97% of available water resources in the Mhlatuze Basin in Kwa-Zulu Natal are used by 10% of the population) was anathema to the goals of the postapartheid government (data from Schreiner and van Koppen, 2002, pp. 969–970). Changes had to be made (Stein and Niklaas, 2002). Inequalities of access, limited financial and human resources at national level, declining infrastructure and poor service delivery, declining quality and quantity of the resource, a narrow band of stakeholder involvement in the sector, institutional fragmentation, conflicting sector policies, recurrent drought/flood and increasing numbers of stakeholder conflicts were motives common to Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Dube and Swatuk, 2002; Mwendera et al., 2002; Kashaigili et al., 2003; Maganga et al., 2002; Maganga, 2003; Mulwafu et al., 2003; Robinson, 2002). Scarcity and inequality of access were also motives in Namibia (Botes et al., 2003) while scarcity, internationally shared watercourses and regional trends are the driving force behind reforms in Botswana (Swatuk and Rahm, 2004). The stated goals of these reforms are equity, efficiency and sustainability—the essence of IWRM. The means to achieve these goals combine activities undertaken at global, regional, and national levels (Gumbo et al., 2004). While certain of these activities take the River Basin as the basic unit of management, none of these initiatives have evolved to the extent where one may accurately speak of a Ôriver basin levelÕ. They remain national or international activities whose (proposed) management focus is the river basin. 3. Results of the reform process thus far 3.1. Institutions Keohane and Nye (1993, p. 19) argue that localisation processes are more practical than wholesale change because it is easier to maintain and adapt existing institutions than make new ones. The gradual reform of SADCs structure is a case in point. In contrast, water reforms have entailed the creation of entirely new institutions across the region: catchment management councils/authorities. For Dovers (2001, p. 215), Ôinstitutions are both barriers to and opportunities for ecologically sustainable human development. Institutions can pervert or empower human potentialÕ. This hope for empowerment, it seems to me, formed the basis for the creation of new institutions. And, given that existing institutions tend to reflect the past more than anticipate the future, CMAs were necessarily created from the ground up (Dovers, 2001). However, almost without exception they have run into serious difficulty. Dube and Swatuk (2002) and Tapela (2002) highlight how the fast tracking of the process in the Save River Basin, wherein the whole structure was to be in place and operational in six weeks, resulted in a crass scramble for authority among the farming community. As a result, extant power relations were reproduced in the new institution


(also, Manzungu, 2002). Other groups identified by government as key stakeholders refused to participate (Kujinga, 2002). Latham (2002), Manzungu (2002) and Marimbe and Manzungu (2003) reported similar results. Ngana et al. (2003) reported that people in their study area of Lake Manyara, Northern Tanzania, had virtually no knowledge of water reform processes. Nkhoma and Mulwafu (2004) highlight Ôlack of awarenessÕ as a key impediment to irrigation management transfer in Malawi. In their study of the Odzi River Irrigation Company (ORIC), Senzanje and van der Zaag (2004) show how ÔawarenessÕ is key to successful community-run irrigation schemes. Tapela (2002), in her study of institutional change in the Save River Basin, highlights the difficulties inherent in overlaying a new institution on top of a variety of other existing institutions with different jurisdictional boundaries (Rural Development Council; Provincial Government; District Council to name three). Dungumaro and Madulu (2003), in the Tanzanian case, suggest that ÔparticipationÕ was nothing more than a quick brand to legitimise changes predetermined by central government in consultation with donors. Tapela (2002) argues that claims to gender sensitivity were over-stated, while Manase et al. (2003) argue that reforms left little scope for gender mainstreaming from the beginning. Latham (2002) highlights how the Catchment Council Manager, as an employee of the Zimbabwe National Water Authority, was in fact governmentÕs overseer in the whole process: decentralisation perhaps, but certainly not the devolution of power as envisioned in strategy documents. In the Tanzanian case, Sokile and van Koppen (2004), Sokile et al. (2003), Maganga et al. (2004) and Maganga (2003) suggest that traditional, informal institutions and customary law may constitute a more realistic starting point for subsidiarity and popular participation in equitable and efficient decision making and sustainable resource management. However, whereas Sokile and van Koppen (2004, p. 1354) make a strong case for preserving local level decision making and conflict resolution mechanisms, they also show how formal courts tend to nullify the rulings of traditional, informal mechanisms. Maganga et al. (2004), in examining events in the Pangani and Rufiji Basins, show how local people with knowledge of the new water architecture deliberately turn to the formal courts when informal decisions have gone against them. 3.2. Finance In terms of new financing arrangements, Catchment Councils universally were found to be having great difficulties raising funds. Indeed, they were all donor dependent, the dangers of which are only too well known (Dube and Swatuk, 2002; Manzungu, 2002). Mulwafu et al. (2003) reported that attempts to raise funds ran into cultural barriers, particularly in rural areas. van Koppen (2003, p. 1052) suggests that attaching rights to water to fees for that water encourages non-participation. She asks, Ôwhy should rural

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people pay for a resource they have long used for free if there is no evident benefit to them?Õ Kashaigili et al. (2003) argue that issuing rights for numerous smallholders is not feasible from an administrative or cost-effective standpoint. Maganga et al. (2004), make the same point in regard to farmers in the Pangani and Rufiji Basins. Robinson, in the Zimbabwe case (2002) points out how support for state run smallholder irrigation projects are riddled with corruption and favouritism and asks why, somewhat rhetorically, that 20,000 smallholder families can be guaranteed access to water and support services while the balance of peasant families are left to their own devices—and now to be levied for water use? Farmers involved in irrigation management transfer in the Lake Chilwa area of Malawi complain that government devotes no resources to the project. Their perception is that irrigation management transfer (IMT) is designed to help government (by offloading management costs) rather than the farmers concerned (by making irrigation more efficient and productive) (Nkhoma and Mulwafu, 2004). Most of the case studies focussing on Zimbabwe highlighted the way in which land reform had thrown the entire water reform process into disarray, hence raising questions regarding the wisdom of treating land and water as separate resource use issues. Some questioned the commitment of donors to reforms, since funding was frozen due to power political issues at national level (Dube and Swatuk, 2002). In contrast to the experiences of Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania highlighted above, studies by Botes et al. (2003), Amakali and Shixwameni (2003) and Schreiner and van Koppen (2002), show that more deliberate approaches to institutional development—in particular detailed stakeholder awareness/outreach meetings held regularly with entrenched feedback processes—can help build consensus even where government has predetermined the institutional form. Machingambi and Manzungu (2003, p. 1046) identify rural peoplesÕ sense of communal responsibility for water point management, but also their abiding belief that government must help—an unconscious ideology in most of post-colonial Africa. Lankford (2003), in examining intended directions in irrigation development in Tanzania, suggests that both government and Ôthe international irrigation communityÕ have key roles to play. This contrasts with evidence from Malawi regarding government plans to ÔdevolveÕ power to smallholder irrigation projects. While most people there believe that this is simply a code word for cutting funding, government officials themselves report skepticism as to whether government will really let go of these projects (Mulwafu and Nkhoma, 2002, p. 843). Urban areas located within the boundaries of new institutions were equally reluctant to participate in the deliberations of these councils (Tapela, 2002; Dube and Swatuk, 2002). Gumbo and van der Zaag, reporting on Mutare (2002), Robinson in examining Lusaka (2002), Dube and van der Zaag in their study of Masvingo (2003), and Mwendera et al. (2002) in their overview of the region, all show how City Councils are dependent upon revenues

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from water sales to subsidise other council activities. They also show how eager they are to engage in new supply-side projects rather than embark on water demand management practices (e.g. leak detection; information activities regarding water saving devices), so ÔsolvingÕ poor delivery systems with new water. Gumbo and van der Zaag (2002) show quite clearly how a constellation of powerful actors— provincial administrators, city mayor, donors, commercial developers—came together to push through a new supply project (the Pungwe River inter-basin transfer scheme) when other options were available (the existing Osborne Dam). Swatuk (2004) and Swatuk and Rahm (2004) show how the move toward for-profit delivery, either through public– private partnerships (Nelspruit) or the creation of a public utility corporation (Gaborone) leads to a narrowing of services (in the case of the former) and massive waste of treated water (in the case of the latter), the developmental and environmental costs of which outweigh any monetary profits made. In his study of Kitwe and Lusaka (Zambia), Ntengwe (2004) shows how Ôwillingness to payÕ is linked not only to awareness (e.g. why consumers should pay for delivered water), but also other key factors such as ability to pay and quality of service. It is clear from this study that raising tariffs without a corresponding rise in service quality will result in unwillingness to pay. Evidence from Sakubva, a high density township adjacent to the Zimbabwean city of Mutare, suggests that where historical class and race differences continue to determine resource access, any attempts to impose user-pay fees on poorer people will elicit a confrontational, political response (Mukheli et al., 2002). In their study of four cities in Southern Africa—Bulawayo, Mutare, Maputo, Windhoek—(Gumbo et al., 2003, p. 828) state that while a well thought out Management Information System may help overcome some of these practices, it can only be successful if located within Ôan effective and dynamic institution which is guided by a healthy legislative frameworkÕ—something to be found in Windhoek, perhaps, but in short supply in the rest of the region. Jewitt (2002) in his study of South AfricaÕs water reform programme demonstrates just how far away South AfricaÕs Ôcommand and controlÕ approach to water resources management remains from holistic, ecosystem perspectives, no matter how viable (see also, McDonald and Ruiters, 2005). 3.3. Conflict resolution One of the primary motivators for reform, particularly the adoption of basin level institutions, was the claim that water scarcity is leading to increased instances of violence in the region. It is interesting to note that of all the basins considered in this paper, only four papers directly addressed the transboundary nature of resource management—all highlighting the cooperative potential of sharing water (also, Swatuk, 2002b). Gumbo and van der

Zaag (2002) discuss the way in which the governments of Zimbabwe and Mozambique arrived at an agreement whereby the former was allowed to draw a fixed amount of 700 l/s from the Pungwe River for drinking water purposes only for the city of Mutare. This amount constitutes a mere fraction of the riverÕs total flow through Mozambique, particularly as tributary flows from rivers originating in Mozambique are very high (for details, see Swatuk and van der Zaag, 2003). Swatuk (2003) examined the Ramsar Agreement as a multilateral tool for sustainable resource use in the Okavango River Basin, while Mbaiwa (2004) looked at ways in which several institutional arrangements (SADC water protocol; Ramsar agreement; Convention on Biological Diversity preservation; the Okavango River Basin Commission) may contribute to sustainable transboundary water resources management. Nkomo and van der Zaag (2004) used a simple spreadsheet model (Waflex) to suggest how water may be shared more equitably in the Komati River basin among South African and Swazi stakeholders. This is not to suggest that transboundary conflicts do not exist; they do (Giordano and Wolf, 2003). However, these pale in comparison to the numerous, primarily nonviolent intra-basin user conflicts within states (sometimes on each side of an international river, such as the Pungwe or Songwe). Perhaps the reason for this is the immediacy of user concerns, as most conflicts tend to arise in the dry season. Conflicts tend to emerge in a number of ways along the course of a river. In a representative case, in the Rufiji Basin in Tanzania, there are upstream conflicts between pastoralists, irrigators, and farmers returning to land from which they were at one time removed during the colonial period. There are also conflicts in the Usangu sub-basin between the environment (wetlands) and farmers who are turning the wetland into cultivated rice paddy. Upstream users conflict with downstream hydropower generation. Maganga et al. (2002) report that these farmers believe that water reforms are designed for the sole benefit of TANESCO, the Tanzania Electricity Supply Company. And furthest downstream, burgeoning coastal towns and cities often see their water supply run dry. Similar user conflicts are to be found in each of the other basins listed at the beginning of this paper with PollardÕs study on the Sabi (2002) and ManzunguÕs (2002) on the Inkomati being particularly informative. Proposed solutions stemming from water reform practices are to prohibit those not holding water rights from drawing water from the river. Aside from the typically punitive demand-control approach, given the large number of users this hardly seems feasible (Kashaigili et al., 2003). Kashaigili and co-authors document two recent initiatives designed to raise awareness and liaise with people at water point level. WAMISHI (Wawezeshaji Mipango Shirikishi) is a Ômultidisciplinary district participatory teamÕ that engages in technical assistance and other outreach programmes. The team is active in the Mbarali district of Mbeya region in the Rufiji Basin. Another initiative


operative in the Kimani sub-catchment of the Usangu Basin is the Sub-Catchment Resource Management Programme (SRMP). The SRMP brings together different users and associations involved in the use and management of the Kimani River. According to the authors, Ôthe idea of SRMP builds upon the existing concerns over water scarcity demonstrated by users at the lowest scales of the hydrological system, which in turn helps to reduce conflicts among various water users and leads to improved management of water resourcesÕ (Kashaigili et al., 2003, p. 846). Whereas policy makers in the SADC region demonstrate a willingness to put in place formal arrangements for conflict resolution where transboundary water resources are concerned—e.g. the Okavango, Orange, Kunene, Limpopo and Zambezi river basin commissions (Heyns, 2003)—structures at local level are slower in developing. One reason for this, it seems to me, is that at the level of inter-state relations major users (e.g. hydropower, plantation agriculture, industry, affluent urban centres) in each state continue to command the lionÕs share of water resources. As such, they are not likely to ÔfightÕ over water with similar users in neighbouring states. So, conflicts arise between (empowered) major and (disempowered) minor users within states. This is clearly evident in the Rufiji Basin described above, but holds for many other basins in the region as well. Policy makers, already lacking financial, technical and human resource capacity, seem content to let conflict resolution structures evolve by those who need them most. However, evidence from Maganga et al. (2004) and Sokile and van Koppen (2004), suggests that the imposition of new institutional mechanisms for water allocation at once creates new conflicts among users in rural areas and undermines historically effective methods of conflict resolution. 3.4. Knowledge SADC states are primarily a collection of economically weak, primary commodity exporting, debt distressed countries with unconsolidated democracies (SADC, 2000; UNDP, 2003). Many face the catastrophe of HIV/AIDS virtually unarmed. Since its inception, SADC as an organisation has been arguing in support of international programmes that build human resource capacity, particularly through health and education. However, at all levels of society there remains a substantial knowledge deficit in the region. Informed decisions regarding resource use require reliable, valid data. Their interpretation requires a corps of skilled nationals, for it is the residents of this region that will ultimately have to live with decisions made and actions taken. Levite et al. (2002) and Kamara and Sally (2003) present preliminary applications of decision support tools available to water resources managers (Water Evaluation and Planning Model, WEAP, and Podium, the policy dialogues model). Other decision support tools are fast becoming available in the region, mostly but not only through the scientific network in South Africa. Many of

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these are relatively simple to use. They facilitate, as one advocate told me, the democratisation of decision-making regarding water resources planning (Soderstro¨m, personal communication, 2003). Where once only the province of highly trained ÔexpertsÕ, scientific tools for water resources management and planning are becoming available to more stakeholders. Yet these computer applications remain simply Ôsupport toolsÕ. Questions of methodology, epistemology and ontology remain: if you build a dialogue around a belief in absolute scarcity you are going to get a limited range of outcomes specific to those assumptions. Yet what do we mean by scarcity? Mwendera et al. (2002) state unequivocally that SADC states use too little water and that this is an incontrovertible sign of underdevelopment. According to van Koppen (2003, p. 1048), AfricaÕs available water resources have hardly been harnessed at all. ÔWater scarcityÕ, she argues, is more accurately understood as Ôeconomic water scarcityÕ—the resources are available but the economic resources and incentives to develop that water is lacking. Robinson (2002) argues that free or under-priced water benefits the rich who already enjoy services, as such the inability to recover costs prohibits the extension of services to the poor: in other words, free water harms the poor. Savenije (2002, p. 744) argues that assuming that the water issue is merely about drinking water, and particularly about urban water supply leads us to believe that water— mistakenly—is simply an economic good. ÔAlthough the drinking water and sanitation issue is one of the largest societal challenges of the 21st century, it is a minor issue with regard to global water scarcityÕ. These are unconventional ideas. They are new ways of looking at old and evolving problems. Perhaps the biggest challenge the region faces is training students how to be good physical and social scientists while instilling in them an ability to think Ôoutside the boxÕ. Inter-disciplinary activities like the annual WaterNET/Warfsa meeting, now actively supported by Global Water Partnership— South Africa, and the associated M.Sc. in IWRM mark the beginning of such essential departures from past practice. 4. Summary In this paper the motives and methods behind Southern AfricaÕs current water reforms have been described. It is argued that IWRM constitutes an emerging global norm. As such, it is not simply a policy or method, but a site where power—political, social and cultural—is exercised through discourse, knowledge creation and social practice. It throws up a series of contradictions that are not easily resolved. In particular, empirical evidence highlights how policy makers in the region are willing to make new laws, devise new strategies and put in place new institutions— but are less inclined to commit resources which may give fuller form to these skeletal rules, norms and procedures. This reluctance may be partly explained by the evident

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inverse relationship between complexity and capacity: fundamentally overhauling water resources management and practice is a task beyond the budgets and human resource capacities of most SADC states. South Africa—driven by an abiding developmental deficit—and Namibia—driven by acute resource scarcity—are exceptions to this rule. Each state has embarked on what it feels to be central tasks (new legislation; new institutions; key interventions). Moreover, much of South AfricaÕs reform programme rests on moral arguments—lifeline supply and the water reserve as essential to the health of the society. Elsewhere, policy makers seem content to let donors drive the process, actively engaging wherever they see an opportunity to enhance their political power—new water laws where water is held by the state in trust for the nation; international river basin commissions which enhance prestige locally and globally and devise a framework wherein future allocations for major users (large-scale farming) or developments (hydropower development) may be discussed. There are, indeed, a great many supporters of sustainable water resources management in the SADC region. This is evident in the many scientific papers discussed here. But states lack capacity and policy makers most often follow the line of least resistance. This may not lead to the rampant corruption Adams highlights in the opening to this paper, but it does lead to the inevitable conclusion— verified in numerous cases discussed above—that halfhearted interventions create more problems than they solve. At the same time, supporters of IWRM must acknowledge that what they are asking states in Southern Africa to do is fundamentally reconstitute how resource access, allocation and use decisions are made. This is a profoundly political act which challenges the very bases of power in many of these societies. Resistance is to be expected. Earlier I used the term ÔlocalisationÕ to explain outcomes in water reforms. Actors throughout the region support those ideas that are morally appealing and/or serve their political interests—e.g. Ôpeace parksÕ, Ôtransboundary natural resources managementÕ—without threatening extant configurations of power nationally or regionally. Where certain transnational norms are ambiguous in impact—such as the commitment to equity in water resources management—elites may adopt the language of the norm, without immediately giving it content. At the same time, inside proponents of the norm (e.g. a local NGO or community based organisation) may place pressure on government to Ômake good on their promiseÕ. Equity may be grafted to other norms, such as Ôgood governanceÕ, or reframed to appeal to a wider audience (Ôwater as a human rightÕ) in order to force governmentÕs hand and draw in interest from influential transnational forces, particularly donors. Given the profound power asymmetries that exist within SADC states (e.g. rural/urban; urban/peri-urban; white/ black; male/female), between states (in particular South Africa and Ôthe restÕ), and between the region and the world (in particular between SADC and the U.S. and SADC and

the EU), strategies of localisation, while desirable, are not always possible. According to Wolfers (1999, p. 56), localisation is a broad, evolutionary process akin to the Ôendless elaboration of new local-foreign cultural wholesÕ. In some instances, however, policy makers must simply adapt to changing circumstances in order to deal with the foreign impact in the short/immediate term. The clearest instance of this was the grudging acceptance of structural adjustment programmes as the new development orthodoxy of the 1980s. Bankrupt SADC states faced little choice. Yet localisation remains a viable practice throughout the region—though clearly frustrating for those Acharya (2004) labels Ômoral cosmopolitansÕ, i.e. transnational actors who regard their perspective as universal in space and time and regard any resistance as immoral and unacceptable. Supporters of IWRM thus face several key political challenges: • To recognise the political content of their actions. • To recognise that to make certain truth claims may challenge the existing form and character of social relations and so meet with resistance. • To recognise that our own interests in IWRM blind us to the processes of global norm purveyance and localisation. • To therefore be willing to think reflexively and, if necessary, abandon pet projects in the face of hard facts. In his opening address to the 5th Annual Meeting of WATERNET, van der Zaag (2004) suggested that perhaps the creation of wholly new institutions for water resources management was a mistake. Rather, the new institutions might be more effective if they were endowed with advisory powers only, and that more effort should be made to introduce IWRM practices to existing bureaucratic forms and procedures. This is a bold statement. In my view it shows a degree of reflexivity not yet evident among the balance of the SADC water community. We would do well to reflect on his words, for institutional change challenges political power and so may account for the broadly negative experience with the new water architecture in SADC states. References Acharya, A., 2004. How ideas spread: whose ideas matter: norm localisation and institutionalisation in Asian regionalism. International Organisation 58 (2), 239–275. Allan, T., 2003. IWRM/IWRAM: A New Sanctioned Discourse? Discussion Paper No. 58. Water Issues Study Group, University of London. Amakali, M., Shixwameni, L., 2003. River basin management in Namibia. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 28, 1055–1062. Botes, A., Henderson, J., Nakale, T., Nantanga, K., Schachtschneider, K., Seely, M., 2003. Ephemeral rivers and their development: testing an approach to basin management committees on the Kuiseb river, Nambia. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 28, 853–858. Dovers, S., 2001. Institutional barriers and opportunities: processes and arrangements for natural resources management in Australia. Water Science and Technology 43 (9), 215–226.

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