*Political Philosophy. Yunuen MANDUJANO. The Politics of Selling Culture and Branding the National in Contemporary. Japan: Economic Goals, Soft-power ...
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies
Year 5, no. 9
*
Political Philosophy
Yunuen MANDUJANO The Politics of Selling Culture and Branding the National in Contemporary Japan: Economic Goals, Soft-power and Reinforcement of the National Pride Abstract This article presents a contextualization and discussion on the establishment of cultural promotion policies in Japan during the beginning of the 21st century as a strategy to face the exterior and domestic challenges. First, the situation that prompted the recognition from Japanese government of the nationally produced popular culture as a key field for the support of the economy and the road for the development of the governmental plan of Cool Japan aimed at the promotion overseas of Japanese cultural products, practices and services is examined. Then, it is argued that the competition that neighbouring South Korea meant on the same field in the region and domestically, and then the crisis brought by the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, turned the focus of Japanese elites on the internal situation, changing the emphasis of the Cool Japan policy and developing a double discourse - one inviting and friendly to the outside and one dedicated to the strengthening of a national pride and identity for the Japanese citizens. Keywords: popular culture, soft power, public policies, nation branding, nationalism, Japan
culture abroad, but on the international and national context that Japan faced and gave place to the concrete policy for the promotion of the national culture firstly overseas with merely economic aims and how, as the circumstances changed, such policy evolved to include also soft power and nationalistic goals.
Introduction ‘Japan is reinventing superpower-again,’ wrote Douglas McGray on 2002 (p. 44) in his article about what he called National Cool, deriving from Joseph Nye’s notion of soft power. He was talking about Japan’s growing cultural presence abroad and the potential of it being the key for the country to recover from its longterm recession. In the academia, scholars promptly began to discuss the issue of Japanese cultural presence in the markets of Asia, Europe and America from very different angles. Numerous authors have been focusing on the analysis of the expansion of Japanese popular culture particularly in the Asian continent, as well as on that country’s economic and politic influence in that region. This is seen by many as Japan’s attempt to erase the bad impression that still lingers among many Asians about the country’s imperialist era. On the other hand, others perceive it not as a withdrawal of those efforts, but as a new form of imperialism from Japan, waking up concerns.1 Here, I focus not on the impact of Japanese
Cool Japan: a policy to sell culture ‘Sometimes we come to know ourselves less through our own efforts than through the actions of others,’ began a report of the Economic Research Department of the Japan External Trade Organization – JETRO – (2005, p.1) referring to the postulates of McGray (2002). The article had caught a wide-ranging attention on a situation that Japanese scholars and journalists were, by that time, already talking about: the appeal that some Japanese popular culture products were having among consumers in different parts of the world (Igarashi, 1995; Iwabuchi, 2002; Kinto, 1999). But then again, the platform where the article of McGray was presented – the American magazine of international politics and economics, Foreign Policy - and the idea of the ‘Gross National Cool’ (GNC) had come to put the icing on the cake, giving the phenomenon a name: Cool Japan.
1 The debate about the positive and negative aspects of the presence of Japanese cultural products in other Asian countries as a way to redefine Japan’s image in the continent can be followed in Ching (1994), Huat & Iwabuchi (2008), Igarashi (1995), Lam (2007), Ogawa (2010).
31
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies
Year 5, no. 9
These were all the key products of the Cool Japan phenomenon: anime counted for over 60% of animated cartoons broadcasts around the world; manga and literary works were being acknowledged in Asia, North America, and Europe, resulting in important money influxes from licenses for translation and publication; Japanese video games were worldwide leaders; and characters, movies, television programs, music, and fashion were being well sold in East Asia markets. Because of these facts, the content industry was producing a value that was around the double of that produced by the iron and steel industry; it was also having a positive effect in other sectors, such as agriculture which began to face an increasing demand of fruits, vegetables, rice and tea, from East Asia, where the expensive Japanese produce was becoming a brand and, given the rise in personal incomes of people of the region, its consumption had become a symbol of status (JETRO, 2005). Still, by the mid-2000s, while the METI kept reporting on the popularity of Japanese coolness abroad and trying to get its proposals translated into policies, another country in the region was already seeing results of its own. The METI informed that the dynamic strategies that South Korea was implementing to advance in the East Asian markets were jeopardizing Japan’s position (Keisai Sangyōshō, 2004). Korean Wave4, the equivalent to Cool Japan, would be the term used to refer to the phenomenon of popular culture products and contents from South Korea being consumed eagerly in other countries. South Korea had seen a change in regimes during the late 1980s. In 1988, after years of media censorship, it began a process of media liberalization that allowed the arrival of foreign products. This had jeopardized Korean media: its film industry had lost most of the local market to Hollywood and the television programming was increasingly foreign. In 1994, the government noticed the potential contributions that cultural industries could have for the economy and, accordingly, it established the Cultural Industry Bureau dependent on the Ministry of Culture and Sports. Then, among the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, national popular culture was further promoted as part of the export industries destined to rebuild the economy. In 1999, President Kim Dae Jung, selfnominated President of Culture, established the Basic Law for the Cultural Industry Promotion allocating a 1.15 per cent of the government budget for it (Shim, 2005). All these efforts were giving some results on the domestic market - Korean people were turning once again to national cultural products - and began to take small steps towards Asia - Chinese speaking markets being the main receptors at the time (Yasumoto, 2009)5.
Perhaps, the main argument behind McGray’s exposition was that Japan could be expected to make actual use of the soft power derived from the popularity of its culture to ‘serve political and economic ends’ (2002, p. 53). However, Japanese efforts were focused mostly on the last aim for a long time. Japanese public and private sectors were fixated on the benefits of further promoting the national cultural production outside their territory as one way to revive the economy; of course, this idea came at a moment when the Gross Domestic Product dropped to its lowest since the Financial Bubble burst in the early 1990s2. For such reason, it is not surprising that the first series of plans had an industrial approach and were focused in the content industry where most cool products had their origin. In 2003, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)3 published the report Towards the internationalization of the Content industry. Sending Japan brand to the world (Keisai Sangyōshō, 2003), in which the situation of the industry was presented and a proposal was discussed to promote its internationalization. Bureaucrats identified that the expansion of Japanese contents overseas could improve the image of the country, adding value to the Japan brand, and have positive economic effects on other industries. They also took notice on the strategies that the United States, England, Germany, South Korea and Taiwan were applying for cultural internationalization, and stated that while ‘national contents […] have been neglected domestically as an industry because they [were] perceived as something for kids or for play’ (p. 21), other Asian countries were applying policies to back up their respective content industries. Then, the suggestion was for the government to be actively involved, not only by giving funds to promote national contents abroad, but also by starting relations with foreign experts who could help develop know-how and by taking measures to regulate the international trade and to protect the national products from piracy. During the following year, the METI took one more step and prepared a seminar with people related to the main fields of the industry to discuss the possible approaches to capitalize on the popularity of Japanese contents abroad, particularly in Asia, and plan ways to involve other domestic industries. It was established that the core of the strategy should be popular culture products that were already widespread overseas: anime (Japanese animation), manga (Japanese comic books), videogames, music, movies and television dramas (METI, 2004). 2
Data available in the Cabinet Office web page: http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/getsurei-e/index-e.html 3 Or Keisai Sangyōshō in Japanese. In the main text, I will refer in general to METI, but, as it publishes different materials in English and in Japanese, the referential notes are under either name, according to the language in which they are published.
4
Also known as hallyu, hanryu or kanryu. For discussions focused on the Korean Wave, see also Huang (2011), Huat & Iwabuchi (2008) and Shim (2011).
5
32
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies However, by 2003 Japan was the one hit by the incipient Korean Wave that would take force building on its success on the Japanese market. The cultural product that opened it was the television drama Winter Sonata, which caught ratings equivalent to those of popular primetime domestic programs. A very Korean product – in the sense of it being completely produced with Korean inputs (storyline, locations, actors, etc.) -, Winter Sonata was embraced mainly by a sector of middle aged women. According to the findings of Ogawa (2010) and Yasumoto (2009), these consumers were deeply influenced by the drama: it had the effect to wake up their interest in Korean culture or, at least, in the culture that was portrayed in the show. In this sense, Korean popular culture was having the same effect with some Japanese people that Cool Japan was having with some non-Japanese. Besides the drama with its core audience of middle-aged women, a teen Korean singer, BoA, had set records in Japanese music industry by being the first nonJapanese artist to top the national charts with a million seller album in 2002 (RIAJ, 2002). She was also the first one to be presented with a strategy that years later would transform the Korean wave into a tsunami in Japan. She attracted younger Japanese but, contrary to Winter Sonata, she wasn’t particularly Korean in her presence. Actually, the key to her success in Japan could be that she was promoted by one of the biggest domestic music labels, avex, and her songs and interactions with fans and media were all in Japanese language. Even by 2005, when Oricon - the Japanese entertainment and music statistics provider - reported on BoA’s second million seller album in Japan, there was no mention of a Korean Wave whatsoever (http://www.oricon.co.jp/news/ranking/4676/). After four years seeing how Korean cultural products were conquering some domestic market attention, the METI (2007) published its final report on the contents global strategy. In the preface of the document, the contributors - a study group integrated by people working in the industry - urged action to avoid that in the near future ‘the entire Japanese contents industries [were] swallow[ed] up by US and European counterparts’ (p. 1). The main problem they were seeing was that not only the national exports of the content industry were barely growing in the last years, but also the domestic demand was shrinking. They were precise on their concerns; even if they were aware that this industry involved both culture and business, they were ‘focused solely on the side of “business,” and considered how the “culture” [could] be applied to create “economic value”’ (p. 1). The leaders of the content industry presented their analysis of the world context, indicating the prominence of American and European strategies and positions, but they were particularly careful to note the closer threats: South Korea’s national project to expand its contents industries to Asia and China’s censorship and
Year 5, no. 9
quota systems which made it a difficult market to get for the Japanese. The content producers were talking about a crisis of the national industry and the losing of advantages on the global market. They proposed an initiative to focus the policy on the Asia region. Interestingly, when presenting the key strategies to introduce music products there, they stated the importance of releasing versions in the local languages. This had been the approach used by BoA, and later by other Korean singers making their way in Japan, but it was something that most Japanese artists would not do. By 2009, the Korean Wave was all over Japan reinforced by the Tohishinki’s phenomenon. Tohoshinki was a Korean male idol group that had been marketed the same way as BoA. The five members had been splitting their time between Korea and Japan since 2005, when they made their Japanese debut. Over two years, they had released fifteen singles and three albums - all in Japanese - without getting too much attention, although they were one of the most popular idol bands in Korea. Still, they had been steadily growing their Japanese fan base, until they got into the domestic headlines in 2008, when they got four consecutive singles reaching the top of the weekly sales charts6. The following year, their fame continued growing but, unlike Winter Sonata or BoA – who had greatly diminished her activities in Japan due to her focus on other markets -, Tohoshinki attracted people of a wide-range of age, though mainly female as it was evident in their concerts and public events throughout Japan. BoA, Tohoshinki, and later other artist by then already labelled kanryu, arrived under the same strategy: they were scouted and polished by a Korean promotion agency7 which held their Korean and global – except Japanese – activities; after proving successful in their native country, their agency established relations with a Japanese one, or opened a Japanese office with native staff, and this one came to be in charge of all activities and release of products in this country. Consequently, the same artist held two different contracts and had two rather different images, according to the requirements of each market. Even if some songs they released in both countries were just versions in different language, the Japanese activities were typically Japanese style. This showed to be a smart move, at least for some time. 6
The four singles they released in 2008, all number one in the weekly charts, sold an average of 60,000 copies; not comparable to the top Japanese singers who were selling around 300,000 during the release week. Nevertheless, Tohoshinki’s sales were consistently increasing. (Oricon weekly rankings available in http://www.oricon.co.jp) 7 S.M. Entertainment, YG Entertainment and JYP Entertainment are the three biggest talent producer companies in South Korea. Most Korean artists debuting in Japan come from these agencies. Perhaps the one with the closest relations with Japanese counterparts is S.M. Entertainment, the producer of BoA and Tohoshinki. It is also the one that distributes some Japanese artists in Korea. (Poole, 2010)
33
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies In 2009, when Tohoshinki was steadily winning terrain on the Japanese market, they had conflicts with their Korean management and decided to split, but, as they had a contract with the Japanese recording label avex, they had to continue their activities together in Japan until the end of that agreement (Oricon, 2009). As Japanese fans were aware that they would not have Tohoshinki for long, there was an explosive increase in their popularity and the sales of their multiple compilation releases8. Also, the other groups that had been preparing to make their Japanese debut capitalized that whole K-pop fever, creating a true tsunami9: the Korean cosmetic brands made their way to the Japanese malls, the Korean town in Tokyo – Shin Okubo – became a trendy place for the Japanese to get everything from food to the latest posters of the Korean idols, and the tourism from Japan to Korea greatly increased with many tours being offered by Japanese and Korean agencies. According to the statistics of the Korea Tourism Organization, taking as sample the first month of every year, in January of 2003, before any Korean Wave hit Japan, the Japanese female visitors were just a 41% of the 153,703 Japanese who entered Korea. In January 2008, after the Winter Sonata phenomenon but before the Tohoshinki boom, the numbers for male and female were almost even, with female counting for the 47% of the total visitors. However, one year later, in January 2009, when Tohoshinki was competing in popularity with the Japanese idols, the Japanese female visitors to Korea were almost 59%, maintaining the majority against their male counterparts from then on and increasing to around 200,000 visitors in total until January 2013, latest data checked (http://kto.visitkorea.or.kr/eng/tourismStatics/keyFacts/K oreaMonthlyStatistics.kto). All of that was a clear result of the policies that the Korean government was taking to export its country’s contents. Just as years before the Cool Japan phenomenon, the Korean Wave was making the foreign news. Joseph Nye, the one who coined the term of ‘soft power’, wrote: Korean popular culture has also crossed borders, particularly among younger people in neighbouring Asian countries [...] As a result, South Korea is beginning to design a foreign policy that will allow it to play a larger role in the international institutions. (2009) Then, The Economist reported: Exports of Korean video games, television dramas and popular music (K-pop) have all doubled since 1999 [...] In terms of market share, these numbers
Year 5, no. 9
still rank modestly against the Japanese comic-book industry [...] but sales of Japanese manga have halved since reaching their apex in 1995. (Penh, 2010) The Japanese government knew it; they were losing internationally and, even worse, domestically there were struggles too (METI, 2010). In music, J-pop artists had to face the competition that meant the arrival of several Korean artists under the rush of the Korean Wave. There were some who believed that Japanese music and talent industry was not keeping pace with the trends, risking losing its market position (Poole, 2010). So finally, in June of 2010, the METI established the Creative Industries Promotion Office under the name Cool Japan; it would be in charge of designing and applying plans and measures to promote cultural industries as a strategic sector, facilitating their expansion inside and outside Japan (Keisai Sangyōshō, 2010). As it should be noticed, with the establishment of the office, the term of Cool Japan expanded from referring to certain types of products from the content industry to involve all the range of the creative industries, which were defined as including everything from the original popular culture products (fashion, music, video games, television dramas and programs, anime and manga) to architecture, antiques, crafts, publishing, computer software and services, furniture, jewelry, food products and tourism. From this holistic view, Japanese creative industries were more important to the national economy than the automobile or the consumer electronics industries, in terms of sales and people employed (METI, 2012). Searching for a source of soft power After losing its economic momentum during the 1990s, the Japanese government had been struggling with finding ways for the country to grow. At the same time, the rapid industrialization of its neighbours had been, on the one hand, a threat for Japan’s position in the region, and on the other, the opportunity of new potential markets. In 2010, the Cabinet released a new growth strategy that stated the importance of the Asian market and the flow of people, goods, and money from Asia into Japan to boost ‘Japan’s brand power and diplomatic strength’ (Cabinet, 2010, p. 28). It identified the Japanese creative industries, the promotion of the country as a tourism-oriented nation, and the development of skilful human resources in fields including sports and culture, as some of the key areas to achieve the goal of getting foreign capitals at different levels. Japanese companies could hardly grow if they did not find external demand for their products and services; however, no strategy would work unless Japan acquired the ability to appeal to the exterior at different levels. In the diplomatic area, the government had to be able to negotiate the arrival of Japanese companies and products and the conditions that allow them to profit from the incursion in Asian markets;
8
Their Best Selection 2010 album made it to the top five selling albums of 2010 and their Tohoshinki Video Clip Collection – The one – was the 3rd best in the annual ranking of Music Videos (RIAJ, 2011). Both were released after the announcement of their split. 9 During 2010 and 2011, many K-pop artists debuted in Japan: Kara, Shoujo Jidai, Big Bang, Shinee, Super Junior, among others.
34
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies and, evidently, the Japanese products and services had to be attractive for people in those countries. To such ends, the soft power was crucial. Joseph Nye’s (2004a; 2004b) notion of soft power belongs to the theory of politics, diplomacy and international relations; it denotes the ability to shape the preferences of others and create a positive influence by means of attraction. More than simple influence or persuasion, which can also be obtained by hard power (military or economic resources), soft power uses intangible assets such as personality, culture, or values, to attract people to follow the lead of the one with it, giving advantages of manoeuvre to the one who possess it; in talking about nations, it ‘arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies’ (2004a, p. x). Soft power is, by definition, a non-coercive force; it implies that the other voluntarily turns to the one with the power. In talking about soft power in the world, Nye (2004a) had praised Japan as the one with more latent resources in Asia. He also identified that ‘Japanese cultural attraction [was] not limited to its pop culture. [Its] traditional arts, design, and cuisine [had] long found followers outside the country’ (p. 86). Nevertheless, he did point a limit: its military past. Indeed, according to a survey of 2008, around 60 per cent of Chinese, South Korean and Indonesians perceived Japan as a potential military threat (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008, p. 8). Even if not in the armed terrain, the presence of cultural contents and products from Japan had been criticized by some as a cultural façade of its new imperialist intentions (Ching, 1994). Japan has been seen with resentment by the nations that suffered under its colonialist regime and constant frictions had arisen with them since. One of the main critiques towards the government has been its reluctance to express regret for the atrocities that Japan caused during that period. In the first half of the 1990s, Emperor Akihito and then Prime Minister Murayama released statements with apologies (Ching, 1994; Yasumoto, 2009), but that has not been of much help because other actions have been seen as withdrawing such goodwill words: ministers paying public visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where people accused of war crimes are enshrined, the government publishing History textbooks that minimize Japan’s actions during the wars of the first half of the 20th century (Shibuichi, 2005, 2008; Tamamoto, 2001), or unfortunate declarations of Japanese officials (Foster, 2013). South Korea and China, Japan’s two most important foreign markets in the region, are also the ones that involve the most problematic affairs. At the political level, there are continuous tensions and disagreements, but they are also highly co-dependent; in the economic sphere, they are Japan’s strongest rivals, but also two of its most important markets; and on the cultural side, there
Year 5, no. 9
is a remaining animosity from certain sectors of those societies toward anything Japanese, but also those ethnicities constitute the biggest non-Japanese communities living in the country. Even when the Japanese diplomats have tried to build an identity of a peaceful nation that is promoter of democracy and freedom when relating to other Asian nations (Yoshimatsu, 2012), it can hardly be perceived that way when so many problematic situations persist. For Japanese leaders’ economic goals to be attainable, they needed to dedicate some effort in building an image of the country that allowed them to apply the larger strategies. According to Nye (2004a), there are three central tactics of public diplomacy to create an attractive image of a country, the source of the soft power: daily communications to keep the public aware of domestic and foreign policy decisions; to apply a strategic communication similar to the political or advertising campaigns; and, the development of lasting relationships with key individuals by exchanges, training, and access to media channels, etc. It is evident that the success of those tactics depends greatly on an adequate media use, but also that they are highly compatible with popular culture. An obviously nationalistic promotion would probably not raise the attraction of a country among other nations and could inspire dangerous xenophobic feelings in its society. On the other hand, if the campaign is softened, by not appearing evidently political or ideological, and it is inserted in the images and discourses related to popular culture phenomena that already have a vast reserve of attraction power, then the chances of obtaining soft power increase. The key to this popular culture strategy is a close cooperation among cultural producers, media, corporations, and government. That had been the procedure that Korea had followed since the end of the 1990s, and was giving results. The Korean government had been working closely with cultural producers and big corporations to promote cultural exports, tourism and the Korean brands around Asia and, gradually, other markets. In 2010, the Korean Wave was gaining terrain in Japan against the national products and was conquering the South East of Asia and those places previously fascinated with Cool Japan in the West. The Korean Culture and Information Service (2011) reported in a pamphlet about the Korean Wave that, by 2010, the Korean Music Videos had the biggest YouTube non-Asian audiences in the United States, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Brazil, Germany and the United Kingdom; but the most hits worldwide, including South Korea, had come from Japan. There is even a declaration of a ‘Neo-Korean-wave’ from 2010 with that expansion further from Asia. The growing attraction of South Korea was being noticed and talked about, but the active role of the government was also known, including the economic grants that it was giving
35
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies to companies for cultural promotion overseas. This aggressive cultural campaign was interpreted by some as a hard nationalistic strategy10. The Japanese government, on the other hand, would follow a more subtle approach. As it was previously argued, Japanese bureaucrats had been analysing the situation for a long time, but had not made any clear movement so far. At the beginning of the 2010 fiscal year, even before the establishment of the Cool Japan Office by the METI, Japanese media reported that the Japan Tourism Agency11 (JTA), part of the Ministry of Land Infrastructure Transport and Tourism (MLITT), had designated an idol group, Arashi, as ‘Japanese Tourism Promotion Representative,’12 a quite descriptive title for the ambassadors of a tourism campaign called Japan. Endless Discovery. The five member male group was perhaps the most popular and successful Japanese artist at the time, not only in Japan, but also in East Asia, which was a reason openly stated by the JTA for its election. As the official declarations and media reports said, it was expected that Arashi, acting as the ‘face of Japan’ and holding of a strong appeal inside and outside the country, would help increase the visitors to tourism spots. It was also specified that the group and its management agency were contributing to the whole campaign without any remuneration. (Kankōchō, 2010, April 8; Kankōchō Keizai Shimbun, 2010, April 17; Sponichi Annex, 2010, April 9) A few days later, the JTA announced that it would be joining forces with the Tokyo International Airport13 to promote domestic tourism by locating informational offices inside it (Kankōchō, 2010, April 22). By September of the same year, Japan Airlines (JAL)14, one of the main providers of domestic flights in that airport, began using Arashi’s music and image in one of the planes serving three important national destinations. In the press release from JAL, it was stated that Arashi’s image was chosen to be printed on the plane because the group and its agency had the same intention that JAL of sending a joyful message from Japan and, also, because they had a wide popularity and they were the face of tourism (JAL, 2010, September 4). This was a flawless example of cooperation among government-businessmedia-cultural producers, but it was not a manifest
Year 5, no. 9
manipulation that could be offensive neither for the followers of the group nor for the general Japanese citizens nor for foreign viewers; for the audiences, the contribution of Arashi members for the JTA was for goodwill towards their country, their discourse in their role as tourism representatives was welcoming, not imperialistic, and the campaign with JAL was a usual marketing move which just happened to rely on the high intertextuality characteristic of Japanese media. During the same month, the JTA published a book of national cultural promotion and sent it to all elementary, middle and high schools in the country with the objective of inspiring in the students the love for their country and their interest in keeping it developing (Kankōchō, 2010, September 1). The book was called ‘The Arashi of Japan’15 and it was, of course, a production involving Arashi in which the members made a trip to ‘rediscover’ Japan and share their experiences; the essays and conversations were supplemented with photos of the members in different regions of the country, performing diverse occupations or chatting with local people, and also with pictures or descriptions of the local products. The book closes with the words: ‘Japan is very beautiful, Japanese people are very kind. Could we be able to communicate our feelings to everyone? We want to know more and more about this Japan that we are living in’ (Arashi, 2011, p. 194). This incipient campaign towards the revitalization of national tourism would become an ideological one for the reinforcement of Japanese identity just a few months later. The Japan brand for Japan Less than one year after the establishment of the Cool Japan Office, the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11th of 2011 posed new challenges to Japan. The earthquake caused a tsunami that had demolished villages, damaged the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, and killed more than 15 thousand people16, all of which produced another series of troubles that the Japanese had to face amid the emotional shock of having part of their country destroyed. As much as people around the world felt sympathy for the Japanese, many feared the economic, environmental and health threats that the disaster could mean at the international level. Even inside the country, there was a fear of radiation released from the nuclear plant affecting the water and produce, potentially hurting the domestic demand of the few crops that had survived in the north-eastern region. The Cool Japan Advisory Council (CJAC), formed by a strong private sector membership including business people, scholars and journalists, as well as representatives from different ministries, responded
10 See the comments of Professor Choi in the article of Nakagawa (2010, October 27) or the remarks mentioned in the report of Penh (2010, January 25). Other interesting journalist writings about the popularity of the Korean Wave are the rest of the series of articles of Nakagawa (2010, October 19; 2010, October 22; 2010, October 25; 2010, October 26) and the report of Constant (2011, November 14). 11 Kankōchō. 12 Kankō rikoku navigator 13 The Tokyo International Airport, or Haneda Airport, serves for most domestic flights and some international, mostly regional. http://www.tokyo-airport-bldg.co.jp/ 14 Japan Airlines was established and owned by the government until 1987. Currently, it is fully private capital owned, but the close relation continues. http://www.jal.com/en/history/history/
15
Arashi means storm, so literally, the title could be translated as ‘The storm of Japan’. 16 Detailed data on casualties and damage: METI (2011, May 16), NPA (2013, March 11).
36
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies
Year 5, no. 9
a cultural approach: it was relying on the attraction power of a popular culture product towards both foreign and local potential tourists, but with two different, yet complementary, discourses – one friendly and inviting towards foreigners, one aimed to inspire a soft national pride focused on the culture for the Japanese. Even though the underlying objective of both ministries and projects kept being to improve the economy through the soft power derived from the attractiveness of the national culture, after the earthquake the first goal to achieve became to reinforce the Japan brand, which was also redefined to emphasize traditional characteristics of Japanese society. Not much would be achieved without first regaining the confidence of people around the world in the quality of the products and the future of the country. Certainly, on the inside there were even more immediate problems to solve, for which the government had to get the citizens willing to collaborate and to focus on the reconstruction of Japan. Thus, the ‘Japan brand’, that until then had put stress on the building of attraction of foreigners, now had to be combined with an internal campaign to ‘return the Japanese people to the essential spirit that they traditionally possessed’ (CJAC, 2011, p. 1). Therefore, national media, cultural producers and companies began numerous projects aimed at the revitalization of the affected zones, using a discourse of Japanese solidarity, effort and love for the country. The campaign that began with the JTA was reinforced, as were the collaborations of Arashi with different media and corporations in productions related to the reinforcement of the national identity and pride. Another move was made to support this discourse, the Japan brand project, and the development of the country’s soft power, the Tokyo 2020 Olympic bidding campaign, which was built around the message: Right now, the strength of this dream is crucial for Japan. The Olympics and Paralympics give us a dream. The dream gives us strength. The strength builds the future. At this moment, for us, this strength is crucial. To become one. To become strong. Let’s communicate to the world the strength of Japan. Because, for sure, that will give courage to the world. (Tokyo 2020 Candidate City, 2011) This would be a medium term strategy invading Japanese media and landscape from late 2011 until late 2013, when the election of the host for the 2020 Olympic games were announced.17 During that time, it would function together with the rest of the projects that were
quickly with a plan meaningfully called Creating a New Japan Tying together ‘culture and industry’ and ‘Japan and the world’. Here, there was a clear shift from mostly economic indicators, which had dominated all the reports and plans related to the Japanese culture popularity overseas, to recommendations with a strong ideological content. The CJAC noticed the potential damage that all this uncertainty could have, not only in the economic sphere, and were prompt to suggest measures to reinforce the Japan brand project: The spiritual strength and depth of the Japanese people as they calmly deal with the disaster is being praised by people around the world. […] Domestically, the earthquake has had the effect of reviving ‘empathy and solidarity’ and a ‘spirit of cooperation,’ qualities that traditionally existed among the Japanese people. […][I]t is such ordinary aspects of Japanese society that are the hearth of the ‘Japan brand.’ What is needed at this time [is an] accurate supply of information […], action[s] to promote [the] restoration of the affected regions and the revitalization of Japan, and steps to restore [the] shine [of] the ‘Japan brand.’ […] All concerned government ministries will need to stand together in implementing relevant measures toward these ends. […][T]hey should return the Japanese people to the essential spirit that they traditionally possessed, while also achieving new ‘evolution’. (CJAC, 2011, p. 1) The council members perceived the needs and opportunities that the situation was presenting to transfer the core of the Japan brand from the superficial cool to the deeper traditional qualities of the Japanese: The ‘Japan brand’ should be restored and new fans of Japan created by broadcasting a new Japan ‘story’. This should be achieved through various media and in a multi-tiered and dynamic manner that reaches people both in Japan and abroad. (CJAC, 2011, p. 14) The proposal is a complete reflection of the positive traditional characteristics that have been associated to Japan and its people since the writings of Ruth Benedict (2006 [1946]), Chie Nakane (1973, 1974) and Takeo Doi (1973, 1988). From Japanese syncretic nature to their unique aesthetic sense, the suggestion was to reinforce Japanese people’s identity and self-image and then show it to the world, to support the already admired innovative and postmodern side of Japanese culture. The earthquake came to give a new focus to the project of the country’s cultural promotion which was, until that moment, fairly new and segmented. First, it was the METI with its Cool Japan Office, focusing mainly on the promotion of creative industries overseas for its potential economic boost to national production in general; even if culture was the main product of those industries, and it had all began for the popular culture appeal to foreign markets, culture itself had not been as important as business in the earlier plans. On the other hand, the MLITT was in a strong campaign centred in the expansion of national tourism for which it had taken
17
During fieldwork performed from September 2013 to January 2013 in Tokyo, I was witness of this campaign. All major buildings, streets, train and metro stations, and the same trains and metro cars had posters with the message and images of athletes or media personalities supporting the bidding. There were continuous television spots and special events in the different sectors of the city, inviting neighbours to share time with former Olympic champions.
37
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies filling citizens’ lives with the ‘Japanese unity’ discourse lightened by the use of the attractive power of popular culture personalities and images. Joseph Nye (2011) visited Japan some months after the earthquake and wrote that it could have resulted in a stimulus for Japan’s soft power. Certainly, that was the goal of the government; and, even if it was too early to know the outcomes of the cultural policies in the attraction power of Japan in the world, inside the country there was a clear recovering of the national spirit, at least, as portrayed by domestic media and government propaganda. The Japan brand project within the country would become, in fact, a continuous low density discourse of the national identity that would be finding vessels of all-around the popular culture: from successful idols as Arashi to talented athletes, many attractive media personalities would be wrapped with a discourse that praise their appeal and accomplishments at the same time that would emphasize their role as Japanese representatives. Nye (2004) had suggested that one way for a government to keep control while presenting the illusion of absence in the public diplomacy for the building of soft power was to use agencies for applying of measures and projects; that was what Japan was doing. The discourse was present in such diverse sources – private media, public media, corporations, culture producers, ministries, non-governmental committees, etc. –, that for the common citizen it becomes difficult to recognize any kind of ideological movement. Just when the obviously governmental, and arguably imperialistic, strategy of the Korean Wave was gaining force in Japan conquering market shares in different cultural fields, the projects of the Cool Japan and Japan. Endless Discovery had been formulated in a much more moderate manner. However, the earthquake had created the perfect chance for the extensive, but still subtle, project of Japan brand to take form and build strength.
Year 5, no. 9
overseas demand for Japan’s attractive products or services that make full use of the unique characteristics of Japanese culture and lifestyle’ (METI, 2013). These measures would be applied almost immediately to promote the expansion of the Japan brand not only with economic aims, but now in the whole sense of a soft power policy, just what McGray had implied back in 2002. However, it is evident that, contrary to what it is proposed in his article of Japan reinventing itself in an active way through its culture, this actually occurred as an outcome of the liquid modernity that Bauman (2004) talked about. Japanese imaginaries had been captivating people around the globe traveling on the ‘airplane of light capitalism’, for a long time without a planned destination, without a planned message or a planned audience. McGray compared what he saw as a reinvention of superpower prepared by Japan in the cultural realm with the prevalence of its management method in the 1980s, which he supposed ‘the key to Japan’s economic ascendance’ (2002, p. 47). But, if the so called Japanese Miracle had been the result of continuous organization and reforms done by the Japanese bureaucratic and economic elites with that goal in mind, the case of Cool Japan had been developing with barely any plans or objectives guiding it, until his article triggered the acknowledgement of Japanese popular culture in leading sectors of Europe and North America; only then, the government began to put attention to the phenomenon. The road to transforming the Cool Japan into a concrete soft power strategy was long and centred most of the time in its economic growing potential, but the sudden disaster of 2011 changed the priorities of the ruling sector: to be able to get any economic benefit from the national culture they needed to strengthen such culture; they had to make citizens embrace their Japaneseness, their identity, so to be used to ‘continuously tell the world of the unshakably strong qualities of Japan, and strategically and comprehensively engage in proactive public relations that highlight Japan’s recovery’ (CJAC, 2010, p. 7).
Conclusion In March of 2013, the Japanese government passed a bill to establish the Japan Brand Fund, its aim being ‘to support business activities for cultivating References
ARASHI (2011), Nippon no Arashi Pokettoban [The Arashi of Japan pocket edition]. Japan: M.Co. BAUMAN, Z. (2004). Modernidad líquida. Argentina: Fondo de Cultura Económica BENEDICT, R. (2006 [1946]), El crisantemo y la espada. Patrones de la cultura japonesa. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. CHING, L. (1994), “Imaginings in the Empires of the Sun: Japanese Mass Culture in Asia”, Boundary 2, 21(1), 198-219. CHUA, B. H. (2010), “Engendering an East Asia pop culture research community”, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 11(2), 202206. CHO, Y. (2011), “Desperately Seeking East Asia amidst the Popularity of South Korean Pop Culture in Asia”, Cultural Studies, 25(3), 383-404. CONSTANT, L. (2011, November 11), “K-pop: Soft Power for the Global Cool”, The Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/linda-constant/kpop-soft-power-for-the-g_b_1088238.html Cool Japan Advisory Council (CJAC). (2011, May 12a), Creating a New Japan. Tying together ‘culture and industry’ and ‘Japan and the world’. Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2011/pdf/0512_02b.pdf
38
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies
Year 5, no. 9
_____ (2011, May 12b), Atarashii Nippon no sōzō. ‘Bunka to sangyō’ ‘Nippon to Kaigai’ wo tsunagu tame ni. [Creating a New Japan. Tying together ‘culture and industry’ and ‘Japan and the world’). Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/05/20110512004/20110512004-3.pdf _____ (2011, May 12c), Cool Japan Kanminyūshikishakaigi teigen no matome ni tsuite [About the resume of the proposal by the Cool Japan Advisory Council]. Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/05/20110512004/20110512004-1.pdf DALIOT-BUL, M. (2009), “Japan Brand Strategy: The Taming of ‘Cool Japan’ and the Challenges of Cultural Planning in a Postmodern Age”, Social Science Japan Journal, 12(2), 247-266. DOI, T. (1973). The Anatomy of Dependence. Tokyo: Kodansha International. _____ (1988). The Anatomy of Self. The individual versus society. Tokyo: Kodansha International. FOSTER, M. (2013, May 14), “Japan mayor: Wartime sex slaves were necessary”, Yahoo! News. Retrieved from http://news.yahoo.com/japanese-mayor-wartime-sex-slaves-were-necessary-042050746.html HAYASHI, K. & Lee, E.J. (2007), “The Potential of Fandom and the Limits of Soft Power: Media Representations on the Popularity of a Korean Melodrama in Japan”, Social Science Japan Journal, 10(2), 197-216. HORNE, J. & Manzenreiter, W. (2002), “Global governance in world sport and the 2002 World Cup Korea/Japan”, In Horne, J. & Manzenreiter, W. (Eds.), Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup (pp. 1 – 26). New York, NY: Routledge. HUANG, S. (2011), “Nation-branding and transnational consumption: Japan-mania and the Korean wave in Taiwan”, Media, Culture & Society, 33(1), 3-18. HUAT, C. & K. IWABUCHI (Eds.) (2008), East Asian Pop Culture: Analyzing the Korean Wave. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. IGARASHI, A. (Ed.). (1998). Hen’yo suru Asia to Nihon: Asia shakai ni Shinto suru Nihon no popyuraa karuchaa [Los cambiantes Asia y Japón: La penetración de la cultura popular japonesa en la sociedad asiática]. Tokyo: Seori Shobo. IWABUCHI, K. (2002). Recentering globalization. Popular culture and Japanese transnationalism. London: Duke University Press. Japan Airlines (JAL). (2010, September 4), Tokubetsu tosōki ‘Jal Arashi JET’ ga shūkō [The special coated plane ‘JAL Arashi JET’ goes in commission!]. Retrieved from http://press.jal.co.jp/ja/release/201009/001620.html _____ (2011, October 30). Tokubetsu tosōki ‘Kaibutsukun JET’ 11 gatsu tsuitachi shūkō [The special coated plane ‘Kaibutsukun JET’ goes in commission on November 1st ]. Retrieved from http://press.jal.co.jp/ja/release/201110/001927.html _____ (2012, October 23). Tokubetsu Dekaruki ‘JAL Arashi JET’ Daisandan honjitsu shūkō [The special plane ‘JAL Arashi JET’ the third goes into commission today]. Retrieved from http://press.jal.co.jp/ja/release/201210/002282.html Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). (2005, March). “Cool” Japan’s Economy Warms Up. Tokyo, Japan. KANKŌCHŌ. (2010, April 8). Arashi x Kankōchō ‘Kankō Rikoku Navigator’ to shite Arashi wo Kiyō [Arashi x Agency of Tourism, the appointment of Arashi as ‘Japanese Tourism Promotion Representative’]. Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/kankocho/en/news01_000038.html _____ (2010, April 22). ‘Kankō Promotion in Haneda Kūkō’ no Jisshi dantai ga Kettei! [The association for the enactment of ‘Tourism Promotion in the Airport of Haneda’ is decided!). Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/kankocho/news05_000059.html _____ (2010, September 1). Kankō Rikoku Kyōiku ni shisuru tosho no sōfu to gakkō ni okeru sono katsuyō ni tsuite [Concerning the sending of books to contribute to the education designed to make the country a tourism destination and its use in school]. Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000124160.pdf _____ (2010, September 10). Kankō Rikoku Navigator Arashi no minnasan ni yoru tosho ‘Nippon no Arashi’ no zenkoku no shō, chū, kōtōgakkō he no kizō he no kōryoku [Arashi, Japanese Tourism Promotion Representative, collaborate to donate to elementary, middle and high schools of all the country the book ‘Arashi of Japan’]. Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/kankocho/news08_000048.html _____ (2011, July 11). Gaikō no saizensen iikura kōkan yori Arashi kara, sekai he todoke Nippon no kokoro message film ‘ Message from Japan’ honjitsu kara zensekai 133 kakoku chiiki de dōji [From the official residence Ikura, from Arashi to the world, a video message to send Japanese spirit ‘Message from Japan’ is transmitted today at the same time in 133 countries and regions of the world]. Retrieved from http://www.mlit.go.jp/kankocho/topics08_000065.html KANKŌ, Keizai Shimbun(2010, April 17), Hōnichi kankō PR ni Arashi Kiyō [Appointment of Arashi for the tourism promotion ‘Visit Japan’]. Retrieved from http://www.kankokeizai.com/backnumber/10/04_17/kanko_gyosei.html KEISAI, Sangyōshō (2003, July), Contentsu Sangyō no kokusaitenkai ni mukete. Sekai he hasshin, Nippon burando [Towards the internationalization of the Content industry. Sending Japan brand to the world]. Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/media_contents/ _____ (2004, March). Waga Kuni Contentsu Sangyō no Kokusai tenkai ni muketa teigen nit suite [About the Proposal towards the international development of our nation’s Contents Industry]. Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/press _____ (2007, January). Contentsu Sangyō no bunya betsu chiiki betsu ichiba dōkō [Tendencies of the market by region and by sphere in the Content industry]. Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/media_contents/ _____ (2008, July), Asia Contentsu Inishiatibu [Initiative of Asian contents]. Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20080723001/20080723001-3.pdf / _____ (2010, June 8). Cool Japan Shitsuno Secchi ni tsuite. [About the establishment of the Office of Cool Japan). Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/mono_info_service/mono/creative/index.htm KINTO, S. (1999, November 29), “Bei no Pokemon Geshō [The Phenomenon of Pokemon in America]”, Asahi Shinbun, p.4.
39
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies
Year 5, no. 9
KISHI, H. (2004) Pop Culture as a Security Treaty. Retrieved from Stanford Japan Center Web site: http://www.ppp.am/pproject/japanese/paper/sakai-paper.pdf Korean Culture and Information Service. (2011). The Korean Wave: A New Pop Culture Phenomenon. Republic of Korea: Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. LAM, P. E. (2007), “Japan’s Quest for ‘Soft Power’: Attraction and Limitation”, East Asia, 24, 349-363. LAUNEY, G. De (1995), “Not-so-Big in Japan: Western Pop Music in the Japanese Market”, Popular Music, 14(2), 203225. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). (2007, July), Contents Global Strategy. Final Report. Retrieved February 2, 2012, from http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/g71015a02j.pdf _____ (2010, May 14), Report on the Content Industry’s Growth Strategy. Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/data/20100514_01.html _____ (2011, May 16), Economic Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Current Status of Recovery. Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/recovery/pdf/20110516_impact.pdf _____ (2012, January), Cool Japan Strategy. Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/mono_info_service/creative_industries/pdf/120116_01a.pdf _____ (2013, March), Overview of the Bill of the Act on Establishment of the Japan Brand Fund. Retrieved from http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2013/pdf/0315_04a.pdf McGRAY, D. (2002), “Japan’s Gross National Cool”, Foreign Policy, 130, 44-54. NAKAGAWA, U. (2010, October 19), “Riding the Korean Wave”, The Diplomat. Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/new-emissary/2010/10/19/riding-the-korean-wave/ _____ (2010, October 22), “The Seeds of Hallyu”, The Diplomat. Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/newemissary/2010/10/22/the-seeds-of-hallyu/ _____ (2010, October 25), “Korean Drama Zeal in Asia”, The Diplomat. Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/newemissary/2010/10/25/korean-drama-zeal-in-asia/ _____ (2010, October 26), “Korean Wave Ripple Effect”, The Diplomat. Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/newemissary/2010/10/26/korean-wave-ripple-effect/ _____ (2010, October 27), “Korea’s Hallyu Boom?”, The Diplomat. Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/newemissary/2010/10/27/koreas-hallyu-boo/ NAKAMURA, I. (2004). Introduction to Pop Culture Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2008, from Stanford Japan Center Web site: http://www.ppp.am/p-project/japanese/paper/sakai-paper.pdf NAKANE, C. (1973). Japanese Society. Middlesex: Penguin Books. _____ (1974), “Cultural Anthropology in Japan”, Annual Review of Anthropology, 3, 57-72. NAPIER, S. (2000), ANIME from Akira to Princess Mononoke. Experiencing Contemporary Japanese animation. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. National Police Agency (NPA). (2013, March 11), Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures associated with 2011 Tohoku district off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake. Retrieved from http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf NYE, J. S. (2004a), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. _____ (2004b), The Benefits of Soft Power. Retrieved from http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html _____ (2009, November 13), “South Korea’s Growing Soft Power”, Korean Times. Retrieved from http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/11/137_55438.html _____ (2011, November 15), “A reviving Japan?” CNN World. Retrieved from http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/11/15/nye-a-reviving-japan/ OGAWA, R. (2010), “Re-imagining the relationship between Japan and Korea: Popular culture and civic engagement”, in H. Vinken, Y. Nishimura, B. White & M. Deguchi (Eds.). Civil Engagement in Contemporary Japan. Established and Emerging Repertoires (pp. 189-202). New York, NY: Springer. ONOUCHI, M. (2004), A Pop Culture Relationship. Retrieved September 13, 2008, from Stanford Japan Center Web site: http://www.ppp.am/p-project/japanese/paper/sakai-paper.pdf Oricon Style. (2009, August 6), Eibekkusu, Tohoshinki no Nippon deno Katsudō Shien wo semete happyō. [Avex announces once again that will support Tohoshinki Japanese activities]. Retrieved from http://www.oricon.co.jp/news/music/68236/full/?cat_id=ytp _____ (2010, April 4), Tohoshinki, Katsudō Kyushi happyō. [Tohoshinki announces a stop in activities]. Retrieved from http://www.oricon.co.jp/news/music/74975/full/?cat_id=ytp _____ (2011, July 7), Arashi ‘Nippon no Arashi pokettoban’ ga hatsubai yokka de 20 man koe kotoshi saikou no shukan uriage wo kiroku [The book of Arashi ‘The Arashi of Japan pocket edition’ sells more than 2 hundred thousand copies in four days getting this year record of higher weekly sales]. Retrieved from http://www.oricon.co.jp/news/ranking/88340/full/ PENH, P. (2010, January 25),“South Korea’s pop-cultural exports Hallyu, yeah! A ‘Korean wave’ washes warmly over Asia”, The Economist. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/15385735 POOLE, R.M. (2010, April 30), “Only got 4 Minutes to take the world. Girls make ‘candy funk’ Korea’s new export”, The Japan Times Beta. Retrieved from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/culture/2010/04/30/culture/only-got-4minutes-to-take-the-world/ Public Relations Office Government of Japan. (2009, November), ‘Cool Japan’ Goes global. Retrieved from http://www.gov-online.go.jp/pdf/hlj_ar/vol_0028e/21-23.pdf
40
The Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies
Year 5, no. 9
Recording Industry Association of Japan (RIAJ). (2002). Nendobetsu Million Serā Ichiran. [Summary of annual million sellers]. Retrieved from http://www.riaj.or.jp/data/others/million_list/2002.html _____ (2010). RIAJ Yearbook 2010. Statistics Trends. Retrieved from http://www.riaj.or.jp _____ (2011). RIAJ Yearbook 2011. Statistics Trends. Retrieved from http://www.riaj.or.jp SHIM, D. (2005), “Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia”, Media, Culture & Society, 28(1), 25-44. _____ (2011), “Waxing the Korean Wave”, Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series, 158. Retrieved from http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/pub/wsp.htm Sponichi Anex. (2010, April 9), Arashi member ga gaikokugo speech! Matsumoto Serifu tonda… [The members of Arashi give speech in foreign languages! Matsumoto forget his lines…]. Retrieved from http://www.sponichi.co.jp/entertainment/news/2010/04/09/kiji/K20100409Z00002250.html The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. (2008), Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion. Retrieved from http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/Asia%20Soft%20Power%202008/Chicago%20Council %20Soft%20Power%20Report-%20Final%206-11-08.pdf _____ (2009). Anxious Americans Seek a New Direction in United States Foreign Policy. Results of a 2008 Survey of Public Opinion. Retrieved from http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202008/2008%20Public%20Opinion%202008_U S%20Survey%20Results.pdf The Yomiuri Shimbun (2010, January 24), Descent into Japan Airlines Bankruptcy. Retrieved from http://www.asiaone.com/Business/News/Story/A1Story20100124-194074.html Tokyo 2020 Candidate City (2011), Message, concept. Retrieved from http://www.tokyo2020.jp/jp/message/ _____ (2011, November 28), Japanese Government Lends its weight to Tokyo’s Olympic Bid with the Establishment of the Tokyo 2020 Council. Retrieved from http://www.tokyo2020.jp/en/news/index.php?mode=page&id=52 _____ (2011, December 13), National Government officially Declares Support for Tokyo’s Olympic Bid. Retrieved from http://www.tokyo2020.jp/en/news/index.php?mode=page&id=56 _____ (2012, June 7), Tokyo 2020 Games Worth Nearly $38bn to Japanese Economy. Retrieved from http://www.tokyo2020.jp/en/news/index.php?mode=page&id=193 _____ (2013, April 5), All-Time Cartoon Hero ‘Doraemon’ Joins Tokyo 2020 as Special Ambassador. Retrieved from http://www.tokyo2020.jp/en/news/index.php?mode=page&id=718 YASUMOTO, S. (2009), “Japan and Korea as a Source of Media Cultural Capital”, The Sixth Biennial Korean Studies Association of Australia Conference, Global Korea: Old and New proceedings, 311-321. Retrieved from http://sydney.edu.au/arts/korean/downloads/KSAA2009/Global_Korea_Proceedings_311-321_Yasumoto.pdf YOSHIMATSU, H. (2012), “Identity, policy ideas, and Asian diplomacy: Japan’s response to the rise of China”, International Area Studies Review, 15(4), 359-376.
41
Copyright of Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies is the property of Cormos Gratian iONUT PFA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
