power raises the same methodological problems as causal analysis. ...... William E. Connolly "The Challenge to Pluralist Theory" in William E. Connolly (Ed.).
Quality and Quantity 8 (1974) 45-64 9 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam
Printed in The Netherlands
POWER AND CAUSALITY* ANDRE BLAIS
Department de Science Politique, Universit6 d'Ottawa
ABSTRACT The article first establishes the conceptual link between power and causality. It then attempts to review the literature on power from the causal modelling perspective. The implications of seeing power as a slope and a constant relationship are developed: the advantages of Harsanyi's measure of power are discussed as well as weaknesses in the pluralists' argumentation. The latter is shown to assume a blockrecursive model. The second part of the article documents the extent to which the study of power raises the same methodological problems as causal analysis. It is argued that pluralists, by ruling out misperceptions, by neglecting the impact of the political structure and by taking a "neutral" stand, do in fact make specific assumptions about feedback effects and error terms. It is suggested that the pluralist-elitist debate revolves around the validity of these assumptions.
Introduction In the study of politics, power is one of the most pervasive concepts. In fact some would argue that the study of power is the study of politics. Yet the concept has lost some of its popularity since the midsixties. Conceptual difficulties would seem to account for this phenomenon 1. At the same time, however, those political scientists who are dissatisfied with the present status of contemporary political science seem to find the concept fruitful. The book summing up most of their criticisms is entitled Power and Community2; Dolbeare and Edelman's "radical" textbook on American politics is subtitled Policies, Power and
Change. 3 The relevance of the concept has not been challenged. What is at issue is whether the concept can be operationalized. The word is associated with two schools of thought, the pluralists and the elitists, who seem to talk past each other without really understanding the other side's argument. To provide a uniform language would thus be a first *I would like to thank Jean Cr~te, Kenneth Hart, Jeff House, Carol Charlebois and Caroline Andrew for their comments on a first draft of this paper.
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step towards a clarification of the debate. We suggest that causal language should be adopted because power can be equated to causality. The advantage of this language is that it is likely to be accepted by both groups. It is attuned to the pluralist mind. Dahl has already stated in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences that it could be fruitful to see power as a causal relationship. Hopefully, this article should convince the elitists to accept the causal language as well. We will try to show that many o f their critiques are relevant, and that they can be translated into causal terms. Most of our points will not be new; they will be translations of other authors' comments into a causal language. The advantage of our approach is that we adopt a language that the pluralists understand and accept. That power and causality are close to each other makes a lot of sense. Hobbes had already noted that " t h e power o f the agent and the efficient cause are the same thing. ''4 Simon analysed the connection somewhat more closely and argues that "for the assertion 'A has power over B' we can substitute the assertion A's behavior causes B's behavior." Intuitively the link is obvious. Let us look at Dahl's definition of influence: it is "a relation among actors in which one actor induces other actors to act in some way they would not otherwise act. ''6 We suggest that if one replaces the word " a c t o r " with the term "variable," he has defined causality. Blalock, for instance, argues that causality implies an idea o f "producing," of "forcing." 7 Some criticisms have been addressed to this connection between power and causality. We will review some of them briefly. One problem according to Quentin Gibson, is that "it is simply not the case.., that to have power to do something is the same as actually to cause it to happen. ''8 This criticism is based on a misconception of causality. Causal statements are of the if... then type; they refer not to actual occurrences, but to the independent variable's "ability" to affect the dependent variable. Others seem to imply that power must be distinguished from causality because it must be accompanied by at least a vague intentionality.9 The argument is based on a too strict conception of causality which views it as external. This is Bunge's conception. 10 Blalock notes that 'externality' is always to some extent arbitrary and excludes it from his notion o f causality. 11 In this way, intentions just become particular types of causes. 12 In fact, it seems to us that the great majority o f the criticisms pertain to a too rigid view o f causality, which, for example, includes necessary and sufficient conditions. 13 For the time being, we will define causality as a constant relationship between two variables in which one produces the variation in the other.
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Martin comes up with a more serious counter argument. He points out instances in which A may "cause" B's behavior without exercising power over him. By shouting a warning for instance, A may "cause" B not to be hit by a car; but there seems to be no power relationship involved. Martin concludes that power and causality are not interchangeable terms. 14 He is probably right. Let us note, however, that he has merely shown that not all causal relationships imply power; he has not refuted the idea that all power relationships are causal ones; which is all we are saying. The fact that power and causality are not quite interchangeable should be kept in mind however. We will come back to this point at the end of our discussion. What is the use of viewing power relationships as causal ones? The main advantage is that the logical problems of causal analysis have probably been better handled than those of the study of power. Blalock has very aptly described the logic of the causal approach. 1 s We will try to see how his work can help us to understand the problems involved in the study of power. In fact our attempt is not new: Dahl, in his discussion of the concept of power in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, has indicated some logical implications of the connection between power and causality. His discussion, however, is not systematic. At the time he wrote it, the logic of the causal approach had not been sufficiently formalized. Moreover, Dahl discussed only certain parts of Blalock's argument; other points of the argument cast doubt on the validity of Dahl's approach to the study of power. Our approach, therefore will be to apply Blalock's teachings to the study of power. We have retained four points he makes and will try to find out their implications. The first two points are logical: causal laws are statements about slopes and they refer to constant relationships. The last two pertain to two basic methodological problems: feedback effects and error terms.
1. Power and Slope One of the points Blalock stresses in his Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research is that we should use the regression coefficient, the slope, instead of the correlation coefficient. This is because the latter is also a function of the amount of variation in both the dependent and independent variables. More basically, however, he argues that the slope is the causal law; it indicates how much change in Y a given change in X brings about. But, again, is it not measuring the power of X? Is not the power of an individual, A, over another individual B, the amount of change brought about in B's behavior by A? 47
Let us accept then that power and slope are analogous. H o w do we measure the latter? It is simply the change in Y divided by the change in X. One finds the same logic in Harsanyi's discussion o f the measurement of power. 16 He distinguishes the strength and the costs of power. The former is what Dahl's definition of influence calls attention to: it is the change in B's behavior, the impact, the equivalent of the numerator of the slope. Harsanyi observes that two different actors might influence a third one to the same extent, without the same effort being involved in the two attempts. It makes sense to argue that the one Who does it more easily is more powerful. The costs of power must be considered; these costs refer to what has changed in A's behavior or, if y o u like, to the change in the independent variable (the denominator o f the slope). Within our causal framework, then, Harsanyi's distinctions are important ones and are an improvement over Dahl's definition. We have already indicated that for Blalock, the causal law is the slope. The former can be translated into mathematics through a set o f recursive equations; these equations are made o f regression coefficients (slopes); these are not-zero-order coefficients, though; they are partial ones. as all the other variables that influence the dependent variable have to be checked. In the study o f power, the same logic applies. When one measures power, one should control for the power o f other individuals; as Blalock has shown, in order to measure the power o f labor over management, one needs a theory about the relative p o w e r of other groups in society, such as the police; 17 these other variables must be controlled for. The necessity o f these controls means that power cannot be equated to o u t c o m e (which would be the equivalent of the zero-order slope). This is one error Dahl commits. In his Who Governs?, an individual is powerful when the o u t c o m e of an issue corresponds to his wishes. 1 s In any issue, there are many individuals who have participated in the debate and who are satisfied with the outcome. F o r them, the zero-order slope between their action and the o u t c o m e is positive. Dahl's procedure gives the same amount o f power to all these individuals. This operationalization, o f course, "gives a 'yes-man' an influence rating equal to that of his boss."l 9 In our terms, this is equivalent to assuming that for each individual the partial slope is identical to the zero-order slope. The relevance o f some o f the criticisms that have been addressed to the pluralist school is thus confirmed. It can also be seen that these criticisms can be translated into the logic of causal analysis.
2. Power and Variation In our definition of the causal law, we stated that it referred to a 48
E
F
I
Figure 1: The Homans Model
constant relationship. At the same time the literature on power seems to stress its variation. Pluralists for instance, will show how a certain actor is more powerful in one field than in another. Our two concepts (power and causality) thus seem to diverge. We will argue that, on the contrary, viewing power as a constant relationship is most fruitful. The power o f an individual is, in our language, the slope in which he is the independent variable. However, there may be m a n y slopes with the same independent variable. It is the same with power; the power o f an individual over other individuals (dependent variables) will vary. His power seems to change because we are looking at different slopes. These slopes define different spheres of power. The pluralists' insistence that one should specify the scope o f power reflects their awareness o f the problem. 2~ What we want to stress however, is that if we are precise enough, if we talk about the power to do something, then power does not vary, it is a constant relationship. At this point, we would like to discuss a particular type of causal model in which the slope seems to vary; this type is described by Blalock in his formalization of Homan's theory. 21 The causal model is presented in Figure 1. As Blalock explains, the three endogenous variables are: I, amount of interaction; F, average level o f friendship, and A, total amount of activity. The exogenous variable, E, is the amount of activity actually required by the "external system" (or environment) in order to justify the group's continued existence. The causal model could be expressed through the following set o f equations: I =alF+a2 A dF d~ = (b (~r_ t3F) dA d~- = Cl ( F -
7A) + c 2 (E - A)
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What do these equations mean? The second one indicates for instance that friendship is a function of interaction b u t in a very specific way. The impact o f the latter on the former is itself dependent on "the difference between the interaction I and friendship F . " 22 The degree of dependence is constant though. As a consequence the impact o f / o n F (the slope) does vary a lot over time, because there is saturation effects. At the same time, the impact will not vary under similar "circumstances" (when I and F are related in the same way); and the nature of the interaction between the state of the system and the slope is itself constant. When saturation effects are taken into account, what appears to be variation can be shown to be a constant relationship. We are convinced that saturation effects are most pervasive in real life and that such a model should be used more often. We would argue that it would be most fruitful in the study o f power. Power seems to vary because the state of the system varies. It makes more sense to argue that it does not vary, because one should check the state of the system. Many problems could be subsumed under the general type of saturation effects. The formation o f coalitions would be a good example. It often happens that an actor A can control actors B and C up to a certain limit. If he goes b e y o n d that limit, however, he will induce B and C to form a coalition and his power will decrease. In a way, however, his p o w e r does not change if the limiting conditions (the saturation effect) are included in the measure of power. Note in passing that this kind of model is in many ways similar to a dialectical one in which any action creates its own negation. The link between the two would be worth exploring. Whenever one argues that power changes over time, then he is either assuming that this above model is not appropriate to the problem at hand or admitting his ignorance (he shows that power seems to vary but is unable to come up with the set o f equations that proves it to be constant). In any way, a stress on variation indicates a weakness in the argumentation, either at the theoretical level ( no constant relationship is suggested) or at the methodological level (the saturation effect model, which seems to correspond to real life situations, has not been explored). We have talked about over-time variation in power. We will now address ourselves to the problem o f "over-space" variation. This is o f course a central argument in the pluralist school, that there is a specialization of influence, that the p o w e r of an individual varies from one field to the other. We will discuss the logic of the approach from a causal perspective. Let us look at Dahl's method in Who Governs?; it consists in analyzing a few issues, each on its own. He " d e c o m p o s e s " 50
the political system into a few subsystems. Is this a legitimate procedure? O f course, in so doing, Dahl must assume that the system is a nearly decomposable one. Fisher and Ando have analyzed the causal implications of such a procedure; simply it must be assumed that the system is a block-recursive one in which there is no feedback: subsystem A may influence subsystem B but not the reverse. There must be no feedback among issues. 2 3 Pluralists then assume block-recursive models in which there is no feedback effect. It should be pointed out that the saturation effect model we discussed above and which is not used by pluralists is not a block-recursive one. The pluralists' tendency to stress both over-time and over-space variation in power can thus be accounted for. Both emphases reflect the same basic assumption which is that the world is block-recursive. This may be essentially what the elitists take issue with. This is the topic o f the following sections.
3. Power and Feedback The two methodological problems that Blalock discusses the most extensively are feedback effects and error terms. Feedback effects make it illegitimate to rely on the usual set of equations, as the number o f unknowns is greater than the number of knowns. The real world analogue of feedback is interaction; it is the kind of activities - actions, reactions, anticipations - that symbolic interactionists deal with. We should thus expect these activities to raise special methodological problems. We will see that it is so, at least in respect to the study o f power. Two authors have noted that the presence of reactions makes it more difficult to measure power. Simon asserts that "the more accurate the predictions of participants in the system of the reactions o f others, the more difficult it becomes to observe influence. ''24 March has qualified the assertion stating that "the Brown Jones influence relationship becomes obscure only when the action o f Brown in response to his anticipation of Jones' reaction serves to reinforce Jones' anticipation of Brown's action and vice-versa." 25 March's statement is straightforward and fits nicely into our argument. He describes a situation in which there is constant feedback. Brown's action influences Jones' anticipation and action. Blalock has documented the extent to which social research is complicated by the existence o f feedback effects. March is saying exactly the same thing: when there is feedback, it is more difficult to measure power. What about Simon's assertion, however? Is March's qualification really ira51
portant? We will argue that it is not. March merely adds that accuracy of perceptions creates special problems only when it stems from interaction; but can it be otherwise? In our view then, March has clarified the logic of Simon's assertion that when there is interaction (feedback) it is more difficult to observe influence. This is simple enough. It remains, however, that March and Simon are talking about accuracy of perceptions, which is more than interaction. Interaction does not necessarily lead to accuracy of perceptions; the former is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the latter. Why is the issue of perceptions so closely related to the study of power? We will try to elucidate this question through a brief discussion of a remark made by Marcuse: In doing so, the masters only obey the demand of the public, of the masses; the famous law of supply and demand establishes the harmony between the rulers and the ruled. This harmony is indeed preestablished to the degree to which the masters have created the public which asks for their wares and asks for them more insistently if it can release, in and through the wares, its frustration and the aggressiveness resulting from this frustration. 2 6
What we want to show is that Marcuse is referring to the very same process described by March and Simon. The whole system is based on accuracy of perceptions. The masters and the masses rightly anticipate each other's reactions; and one's action reinforces the other's anticipation. It seems to us that Marcuse is also saying that because of this fact power is less obvious and more difficult to measure. In our view, then, March, Simon and Marcuse are all pointing to the same phenomenon. Still Marcuse talks about masters and masses. We infer from his vocabulary that, according to him, the masses are relatively powerless vis-avis their masters. It should be noted that Dahl would interpret Marcuse's description very differently. The outcome of the process obviously satisfies the masses (corresponds to their wishes); they are thus powerful. Marcuse would not accept Dahl's conclusion for the following reason. According to Marcuse the present situation is based on former misperceptions at the time when the "harmony" was established. The masters influenced the masses' perceptions and convinced them that it was in their 'true' interest to look for trivial wares. The present accuracy of perceptions obscures real significant power relationships. The point is that power is based on misperceptions. In a society, a complex pattern of symbols circulates among the members. Some members succeed in having their symbols more or less accepted by the whole society. They do so by influencing the perceptions of others. An individual is powerful when his perceptions become the society's perceptions. A powerless individual is one who either abandons his own per52
ceptions and accepts the other's definition of the situation or cannot convince others that his perceptions are "good". Even in the latter case, his failure is probably related to a misperception of the strategies to use in order to convince others. Misperception is not all that there is in a power relationship. There are other elements, like physical force. We would argue, however, that misperception is the most important component of a power relationship. It seems to us that we can now better understand the significance of March' and Simon's assertions. Accuracy of perceptionscomplicates the study of power because the latter is based on misperception. When there is accuracy of perceptions, there seems to be no power. This accuracy may be misleading, though, as it may hide former misperceptions that determined the existing power relationship. This is why it is often necessary to look into the not so recent past in order to measure power. Again elitists seem much more conscious of this problem than pluralists who often neglect to take into account the historical dimension. Marcuse's remark also raises the whole issue of rationality, a question that will be discussed shortly. This section started with an observation to the effect that feedback effects create special problems within the logic of causal analysis. We suggested that the real world analogue of feedback effect is the whole set of reactions and anticipations which is of great concern to symbolic interactionists. That this set of activities also creates special problems has also been documented. March and Simon noted that it makes it more difficult to measure power. We tried to clarify the nature of this difficulty through a brief discussion of an author, Marcuse, with a very different perspective. The main problem, as it emerged, proved to be one of historical dimension. One should always look for some basic misperceptions occurring in the past, which might determine the existing power relationships. It was noted that, unfortunately, the pluralists tend to neglect this aspect. This, of course, is partly due to the lack of data in the not so recent past. The question then becomes whether it is legitimate to rely on criteria like accessibility of data in the decision how to measure power. A comparison of Harsanyi' and Dahl's discussion of power is most enlightening in this respect. The former is quite concerned with feedback effects. Among the costs of power he would include "both the damages caused to him by his opponent's retaliatory strategy to, and the costs to them of his own retaliatory strategy Tb. ''27 On the other hand, Dahl's discussion of the costs of power is short and does not refer to the second aspect (which is properly the feedback effect) mentioned by Harsanyi.28 Again we observe the pluralists' tendency to assume a 53
block recursive world in which there is no feedback among blocks. What we want to stress here, however, is that Harsanyi's approach, because it includes feedback effects, is more demanding. For instance, Dahl's measure of influence sticks to the subjective world: the costs of power "are to be judged.., from the perspective of the person who has to bear them. ''29 Harsanyi's definition, as he notes himself, implies that one should look at b o t h objective and subjective factors. Including feedback effects makes it more difficult to measure power. We suggest, however, that this is the only way to cope adequately with the problem.
4. Power and Error Terms Feedback effects are impossible to handle when one has data only at one point in time; they require the use of simultaneous equation dynamic models and o f longitudinal data. The latter, however, do not solve the problem of error terms, which creeps in any kind of causal analysis. The error terms are the unknowns, the variables that have not been included in the analysis. The only way to deal with these is to make the assumption that they do not disturb the causal patterns that have been found. More precisely it must be assumed that none of these error terms is a single major cause of more than one variable. 3 0 We will argue that much of the pluralist-elitist debate revolves around the issue of error terms. Let us examine Marcuse's quotation more closely. The important factor he points out is the establishment of a false harmony at some point in time. Suppose we are looking at a particular power relationship, through the kind o f issues Dalai suggests choosing, Marcuse's "big factor" as an unmeasured, unknown, error term. N o w Dahl must assume that this error term is not the major single cause of more than one variable. He must assume that Marcuse is wrong, for it seems to us that the latter is saying that the establishment of this false harmony is a major determinant o f practically everything, the actual o u t c o m e of an issue, the actors' goals, resources and strategies. The same point can be illustrated differently. Let us examine, for instance, Dahl's discussion o f apathy. He mentions six reasons for it. They are all attitudes. 31 The third one is particularly interesting; it is a low sense of political efficacy. Could we single out any important error term in this case? It appears to be an easy task. H o w does one come to believe he cannot have any influence in political matters? Is not the political system itself partly responsible? Is it not possible that the 54
political structure, being a closed one, inhibits participation and forces people to acquire the kind of attitudes discussed by Dahl? We would then have an error term causing both the independent and the dependent variables. What we want to stress is that the pluralists try to stick to the subjective world. Their error terms are thus objective factors; they assume that the latter are not too important: ... the subjective of the individual has a style and pattern often connected in loose fashion to his 'objective' situation. 3 2
The elitist attack will thus pertain to the role of the "objective" reality, of some aspect of the political or social structure which may cause both the actors' perceptions and the actual outcome of an issue. At least this seems to us the gist of Marcuse's argument. Some aspects of the political structure make it likely that some problems (economic development for instance) will be dealt with rather than others. At the same time, these issues will form perceptions favourable to the resolution of these problems. This is identical to saying that power also consists in determining which matters will be discussed, a point which has been made by Bachrach and Baratz. 33 The elitists, then, attack the pluralists' assumption that their error terms (i.e. the political and social structures) do not disturb the relationships they find among their variables which are the actors' resources skills, motivations and costs, and the outcome of an issue. The real issue then, pertains to the prevailing consensus in a given society. 34 It seems to us that the elitists argue that this consensus benefits some groups and is linked to some structural factors. These factors determine both the input and the output of a political system. The system is biased toward certain groups both in its input and output. What about the pluralists? Do they argue that the system is responsive? Their stand is not as clear. Their scientific training forbids them to talk about values; values and facts should be clearly separated. Factual judgments are helpful in making value judgments; the two remain logically distinct, though. Moreover scientists should deal only with the former.3 s They should thus not say anything about the "goodness" of the political system. This implies not taking a stand on whether the prevailing consensus is biased or not. This also implies not examining the impact of the political structure on attitudes and perceptions, as it cannot be measured precisely. And in fact, pluralists try very hard to be consistent in their "neutral" stand. The nature of the scientific inquiry, however, forces them to make implicit assumptions which negate their neutrality. We have already talked about these assumptions. The main one is that the error terms do not disturb their findings. This is the equivalent of denying the existence of the kind of process described by 55
Marcuse, to arguing that there is no false harmony, and thus that the political system is relatively "good". In fact, then, the prescription to be value neutral prevents one from dealing with broader problems of the political structure (and of historical dimension). 3 6 The prescription has a conservative overtone. One important reason why pluralists are pluralists, then, is that they refuse to make assumptions about error terms, about the impact of the political system especially. This points out a major flaw in Blalock's logic. He is much concerned with error terms. He stresses over and over again the importance of obtaining a priori knowledge about them. He notes that this looks impossible in most practical situations. His solution is to consider "only the extreme cases where one or the other error variance was assumed exactly equal to zero, but information regarding their relative magnitudes could work as well." The fact, however, is that Blalock always sticks to the "zero" assumption, probably because it looks less pernicious. It should be clear that a rough guess is not less "scientific". In respect to the problem at hand, for instance, we do not have any quantified information about the impact of the process described by Marcuse. This does not justify assuming it is irrelevant, however. Moreover, it is impossible not to take a stand on this question, because not taking a stand leads to assuming it is irrelevant. Our position is that one should not be afraid to make "enlightened" guesses about error terms instead of mechanically assuming they are uncorrelated. In the study of power, this means that one should discuss the responsiveness of the political system before doing his case studies. Making one's assumptions explicit helps to clarify the issue. Our discussion also suggests that Dahl's empirical analysis could be used by Marcuse by simply changing some assumptions about error terms. The pluralists' findings may help the elitists to describe the type of elite domination there is in a society. This is at least how we interpret Dolbeare and Edelman's discussion of their preference for the establishment orchestration model over the economic dominants models. 38 The study of power entails a close examination of the political system as a whole, of the extent to which it may distort or suppress real wants. This is a point also made by John Champlin. He adds that the study of power is closely connected to moral evaluation and to "commonsensical premises concerning rationality." 39 We would like to show that our causal perspective leads us to the same conclusion. How, for instance, did the 'false harmony' take place? It is that at some point in time the masses fooled themselves. They did not realize that their own action would start a causal process leading to the manipulation of their own wants. In order to argue that, however, one must have in mind a 56
certain conception of man's "real" wants and needs, one must rely on a definition of the essential nature o f man. In other words, the study of power is by necessity linked to a conception o f rationality (in the strong sense o f the term). 40 Power consists in not misperceiving one's own true interest; it thus consists in being rational. Dahl's study o f a few issues assumes that the actors are rational in the strong sense that their wants are not the result of some previous basic misperceptions. Marcuse assumes exactly the opposite. This also reminds us that the goal of social science is to examine the dynamics between the objective and the subjective worlds. Dahl starts with the actors' goals; he does not deal with the origins o f these goals. In this he is not different from most political scientists; they take attitudes and perceptions as given, and study how they are transformed into policies. They deal with the process of policy making. It is not surprising then that the elitists stress the impact o f policies on attitudes and perceptions.41 We seem to come to the same conclusions here that have been reached in anthropology. It is impossib!e to stick to the actor's viewpoint. As MacIntyre has shown, at some point, the anthropologist must come up with his own criteria o f rationality in his explanation of belief systems. 42 In a way, the pluralists are guilty of the same mistake the functionalists make in anthropology. The latter are too much concerned with the actors' viewpoints; they are over-charitable. Gelner has pointed out that this blinds them to the possibility that the dominants base their power on their exploitation of absurd beliefs.43 Our own discussion indicates that the same c o m m e n t applies to Dahl.
Conclusions Essentially, this paper was an attempt to show the implications o f causal modelling for the study o f power. Our main points are not new. Most of the time we translated other authors' comments into Blalock's language. This is by no means trivial, however, as it seems to us that one of the basic problems in the debate around power is indeed language. Pluralists and elitists seem to talk past each other without really understanding the other side's argument. This allows the politicians o f political science - those who practice the art o f compromise - to argue that both sides are right, depending on the issues. 44 We hoped to have shown that this is not the case, that the disagreement between the two schools is much more basic. We referred in the introduction to Dahl's acceptance o f the link 57
between power and causality. Dahl works out some of the implications o f this link. At the same time the implications he mentions are most different from ours. For instance, he quotes Blalock to the effect that the notions of direct and indirect causes are always relative to a theoretical system. We are personally more concerned with Blalock's discussion of the assumptions about feedback effects and error terms. Dahl omits discussing the most basic methodological problems Blalock has raised. On the other hand, many of our conclusions are very similar to those o f other authors who have denied the connection between p o w e r and causality; as we noted in the introduction, this is due to the rigid conception these authors have o f causality. One strange aspect of our approach has been to borrow and accept Dahl's definition o f influence and to criticize his measurement technique from different points of view. But is it legitimate to use Dahl's definition at all? Riker suggests it might not. He distinguishes two conceptions o f power, the other-oriented one, which "involves an ability to control the rewards to someone else" and the ego-oriented one, which "involves the ability to control the outcomes of events. ''45 Riker goes on to argue that the latter corresponds to necessary - and sufficient - condition causality (which of course he prefers) and the former to what he calls recipe causality. He adds that Dahl is closer to the other-oriented conception and Harsanyi to the ego-oriented one. We do not fit into Riker's characterization too well. We did adopt Dahl's definition o f p o w e r and stuck to a loose conception of causality. At the same time, we said that Harsanyi was " b e t t e r " than Dahl in his conceptualization of the costs o f power. We think Riker's distinction between other and ego-oriented conceptions o f power is a valid one. This distinction however does not stem from different conceptions of causality. It rather pertains to whether power is analogous to a particular slope, or to a pattern of slopes. Dahl is concerned with how much A's behavior affects B's behavior. Harsanyi looks at the o u t c o m e of a process in which there is feedback. This process is made o f two slopes: the impact o f A on B and the impact o f B o n A. 46 Which is the best definition? We do not think there is a clear-cut answer. We can think o f two criteria. The first is that the definition of power should be as close as possible to c o m m o n sense. 47 On this count we find c o m m o n sense to be most ambiguous: in our every day life, it seems that we do switch from the other-oriented to the ego-oriented conception, depending on the context. We would guess however that Dahrs conception is somewhat more popular. The second criterion is that the definition should sensitize us to measurement problems. On this count, Harsanyi's definition fares better. As his 58
own study indicates, Dahl's definition makes it less likely that one will look for feedback effects or will be concerned with the dynamics between the subjectivity of the individual and the real world. For this reason, we suggest that the ego-oriented definition of power may be preferable. This does not affect our argumentation at all, however, as power is merely the o u t c o m e o f a set o f slopes. What we have said about the estimation of each slope applies afortiori to the estimation of a set of slopes. On the other hand the ambiguity in the common-sense conception of power makes it impossible for any precise definition to satisfy everybody. To come back to the example discussed hi the introduction, an individual who, by shouting a warning, "causes" a stranger not to be hit by a car may not have exercised power in Harsanyi's sense, if there is no feedback effect. In this article we have raised all kinds of methodological issues. One might be tempted to conclude that these problems are just overwhelming and that we would be better o f f forgetting about power. This is March's argument in his discussion o f the power of power. He notes for instance that the concept of power has faced the same kinds o f problems (basically conceptual and measurement ones) as the concept of subjective utility. 48 Is it possible, though, to do without these concepts in social science? Our analysis also indicates that these basic methodological problems are not specific to the study of power. It could be, however, that one becomes more aware o f them in the study o f power. The emphasis we put on assumptions about error terms is important in this respect. It was this problem that led us into the rationality issue. One might object on the grounds that we might find ourselves in an infinite regression towards the finding o f the "real" cause. We accept the validity o f such an objection but suggest that there may be no alternative. This, of course, reflects our view of the cognitive status o f theories. We hold to a realist and not an instrumentalist (or operationalist) conception o f science. While we agree with Nagel that the distinction between the two schools is at least partly verbal, 49 we also believe that it reflects one's sensitivity to some methodological issues. A concern with error terms is highly conducive to a realist stand. On the other hand, if power and cause are analogous and if the aim of social science is to discover the causes of human behavior, is not any study in a way a study of power? If so why bother about power and not just talk about the methodology of social science? Especially of the common sense view of it is ambiguous, is not a concern with the concept likely to confuse the issues? We think there is some truth in these objections. Just look at voting behavior studies for instance. Hardly any o f them uses the concept o f power. Still they do tell us something about power 59
relationships. If the voters tend to be uninformed, inconsistent and more or less irrational. 50 they are not likely to be powerful. It makes it unlikely that there is a pluralist " p o w e r structure". If the voters do not vote on issues, they will not punish those representatives who have not defended their interests on these issues; the political elite then has much leeway. These studies do not prove the elitist model; there are many other aspects to take into account. They do give it some support however. All political theories are then, in a way, power theories. We would still argue that it is fruitful to think explicitly in terms o f power. It is our impression that in doing so, one becomes sensitized to substantive theoretical and methodological issues. A concern with power will also tend to broaden one's framework. Again if one is concerned with the power relationship between the mass and the elite on some issue, he will realize easily that this cannot be done without looking at both groups. The rationality o f the mass cannot be assessed without also examing the rationality o f the elite. The one who is concerned with the distribution o f power in a society is likely to study elections, for instance, in a special way. He would have to examine in detail the dynamics between policy-making and electoral results. Merely interviewing voters would not be sufficient (though, as we suggested above, it may tell us something); their rationality must be assessed contextually; it would have to be related to what policy makers do. The real problem to study becomes the influence of policy outputs on public opinion and vice-versa. We would argue then that if voting behavior studies had integrated the concept of power into their analysis, they would have come up with much more interesting results and would have contributed more significantly to our understanding o f politics. One central argument of this paper has been that the pluralist-elitist debate pertains to the kind of assumptions about error terms one should make. This suggests that the distinction between philosophy and science may be a most hazy one. Quite often philosophers seem to be concerned with putting things in a larger context; in our language they are concerned with error terms. They talk about the kinds of problems Blalock has discussed so extensively. This interpretation may look overly pessimistic. The disagreement does not pertain to empirical findings but rather to "philosophical" assumptions. Pluralists and elitists do not agree, not because they do not look at the same aspects o f reality but rather because their whole perspectives are different. In a way then a common language will not help very much in the two sides understanding each other. Yet, perspectives and assumptions are not completely unrelated to facts. Some do change their assumptions; some pluralists 60
have become elitists and vice-versa. There is some interaction between findings and assumptions. This reminds us o f Alan Ryan's comment about the relationship between conceptual claims and facts: In this sence conceptual claims do not seem vulnerable to factual p r o o f or disproof; n e w facts m a y m a k e us change our minds about what it m a k e s sense for us to say about facts. But sadly there seems nothing m o r e than this to be said about the process; if w e c a n n o t say h o w w e should have to change our minds - w h i c h is the essence o f the claim that a c o n c e p t u a l shift is involved - then that is all we can say. 51
For that reason, communication should be encouraged between the two schools, though one should not be too naive about the probability o f a real understanding taking place.
Notes 1 cf. Eugene Meehan, Contemporary Political Thoughts, Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1967, p. 100-105, and Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, New York: Random House, 1967, p. 29. 2 cf. Philip Green and Sanford Levinson (Eds.), Power and Community, New York: Random House, 1970. 3 cf. Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Murray J. Edelman, American Politics: Policies, Power and Change, Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1971. 4 Thomas Hobbes, "Of power" in John R. Champlin (Ed.), Power, New York: Atherton Press, 1971, p. 69. 5 Herbert Simon, Models of Man, New York: John Miley, 1967, p. 5. 6 Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 17. In this paper we will not try to distinguish between concepts like power and authority. 7 cf. Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969, ch. 1. 8 Quentin Gibson, "Power", The Philosophy of Social Science, 1971, p. 102. 9 cf. D.M. White, "Power and Intention", American Political Science Review, 1971, p. 758. 10 cf. Mario Bunge Causality, Cleveland: World Publ. Co., 1963, p. 17-19. 11 cf. Hubert M. Blalock, op cit., p. 11. 12 For arguments along this line, cf. Donald Davidson, "Action Reasons and Causes" in May Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, New York: Macmillan, 1968 and Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, London: Macmillan 1970, p. 146 especially. 13 cf. John R. Champlin, "On the Study of Power", Politics and Society, Nov. 1970, p. 9 1 113. Many of our conclusions will be similar to his thus suggesting that his criticism of the analogy between power and causality does not apply to our loose notion of causality. 14 cf. Roderick Martin, "The Concept of Power: a Critical Defence", British Journal of Sociology, Sept. 1971, p. 241. 15 cf. especially Hubert M. Blalock, Theory Construction, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 16 cf. John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games", Behavioral Sciences, 1962, p. 6 7 - 8 1 . 17 cf. Hubert M. Blalock, "The Measurement Problem: a Gap Between the Language of Theory and Research", in Blalock and Blalock (Eds.), Methodology in Social Research, New York: McGraw Hill, 1968, p. 17.
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18 cf. Robert Dahl, Who Governs? New Haven: Yale U. P. 1966. 19 James G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence", American Political Science Review, 1955, p. 448. 20 cf. Robert Dahl, Modern PoliticalAnalysis, p. 18. 21 Hubert M. Blalock, Theory Construction, p. 132 ff. 22 Hubert M. Blalock, Theory Construction, p. 133. 23 cf. Franklin M. Fisher and Albert Ando, "Two Theorems on Ceteris Paribus in the Analysis of Dynamic Systems", in H.M. Blalock (Ed.), Causal Models in the Social Sciences, Chicago: Aldine, 1971. 24 Herbert Simon, op. cit., p. 78. 25 James March, op. cit., p. 444. 26 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, Beacon Press, 1969, p. 12. 27 John C. Harsanyi, op. cir., p. 76. 28 cf. Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 18, 21-22. 29 Ibid., p. 22. 30 cf. Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research, p. 48. 31 cf. Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 79-84. 32 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? p. 275. The same assumption seems to prevail in voting behavior studies: the possibility that people vote according to a thoughtful consideration of the objective political reality is not seriously examined; cf. Walter Berns, "Voting Studies" in Herbert J. Storing (Ed.), Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962, p. 16-17. 33 cf. Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power", American Political Science Review, 1965, p. 448. 34 cf. William E. Connolly "The Challenge to Pluralist Theory" in William E. Connolly (Ed.) The Bias o f Pluralism, New York: Atherson Press, 1969. 35 cf. Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, ch. 8. 36 for a similar argument, see M. Gunther and K. Reshaur, "Science and Values in Political Science", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1971, p. 120. 37 Hubert M. Blalock, Theory Construction, p. 55. 38 cf. Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Murray J. Edelman, op. cit., ch. 16. 39 John R. Champlin "On the Study of Power" p. 101: see also his introduction in John R. Champlin (Ed.), op. cit. 40 This is the third sense of rationality distinguished by Fred M. Frohock, The Nature of Political lnquiry, Homewood, The Dorsey Press, 1967, p. 45. This third sense is the one which refers to the essence of man. 41 cf. Kenneth M. Dolbeare "Public Policy Analysis and the Coming Struggle for the Soul of the Postbehavioral Revolution", in Phillip Green and Sanford Levinson (Eds.). Power and Community, New York: Random House, 1970, and Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964. 42 cf. his two articles, "Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing?" and "The Idea of a Social Science", in Bryan Wilson (Ed.) Rationality, New York: Harper, 1970. 43 cf. Ernest GeUner, "Concepts and Society", in Bryan Wilson, op. cit., p. 43 especially. 44 cf. especially Theodore Lewi, "Distribution, Redistribution, the Functions of Government", in Randall B. Ripley (Ed.), Public Policies and their Politics, New York: Norton, 1966. 45 cf. William H. Riker, "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power", American Political Science Review, 1964, p. 343. 46 The feedback need not be direct. It could come through the influence of a third actor. 47 cf. John R. Champlin, "Introduction", in John R. Champlin (Ed.) op. eit. 48 el. James March. "The Power of Power", in David Easton (Ed.), Varieties o f Political Theory, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966, p. 64. 49 cf. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961, p. 139.
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50 cf. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics"', in David E. Apter (Ed.), Ideology and Discontent, New York: The Free Press, 1964. For objections and qualifications, see Gerald M. Pomper "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters: 1956-1968", American Polotical Science Review, June 1972, p. 4 1 5 - 4 2 9 . 51 Allan Ryan, op. cit., p. 167.
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