Power, wealth and common identity: access to

Ethnic and Racial Studies

ISSN: 0141-9870 (Print) 1466-4356 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rers20

Power, wealth and common identity: access to resources and ethnic identification in a plural society Lynn M. Hempel To cite this article: Lynn M. Hempel (2009) Power, wealth and common identity: access to resources and ethnic identification in a plural society, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32:3, 460-489, DOI: 10.1080/01419870701722422 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870701722422

Published online: 21 Feb 2009.

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Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 32 No. 3 March 2009 pp. 460489

Power, wealth and common identity: access to resources and ethnic identification in a plural society

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Lynn M. Hempel

Abstract Access to resources through ethnic group membership is often presumed to affect the intensity of ethnic identification. We examine this premise using survey data on three ethnic groups in Mauritius: Creoles, Hindus, and Muslims. Two key findings emerge from our research. First, access to material resources explains only a modest proportion of total variation in ethnic identification within each group. Second, the resources that affect ethnic identification differ significantly across groups. Access to political goods through group membership affects Hindu identification but is unrelated to ethnic identification among Creoles or Muslims. Conversely, access to economic goods affects Creole and Muslim identification but has no effect on Hindu identification. Explaining these group differences leads us beyond a basic meansends instrumentalist model to identify conditions that likely mediate the relationship between individual interests and collective identification including the divisibility of economic goods relative to political goods in Mauritius.

Keywords: Ethnic identity; social identification; competition; instrumentalism; ethnic mobilization; Mauritius.

Introduction Competition between ethnic groups over resources such as jobs, housing, and political influence is widely believed to affect the intensity of ethnic boundaries, especially when two or more groups try to acquire the same goods (cf. Olzak 1985, 1992). This, in turn, increases the likelihood of solidarity, organization, mobilization, and even conflict among ethnic groups as they collectively seek to defend or pursue access to these goods in interethnic competitions. The comments of Lake and Rothchild (1996, p. 45) are representative:

# 2009 Taylor & Francis ISSN 0141-9870 print/1466-4356 online DOI: 10.1080/01419870701722422

Power, wealth and common identity

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Property rights, jobs, scholarships, educational admissions, language rights, government contracts, and development allocations all confer benefits on individuals and groups. All such resources are scarce and, thus, objects of competition and occasionally struggle between individuals and, when organized, groups. In societies where ethnicity is an important basis for identity, group competition often forms along ethnic lines . . . groups can also form along class, religious, or other lines. The more politically salient ethnicity is, however, the more likely it is that groups will organize along ethnic lines. Underlying such assertions is the assumption that competition over scarce goods ‘activates’ ethnic identification by linking individual interests with those of the larger group. Individuals whose own interests are advanced by ethnic group membership are more likely to identify with the ethnic group. Collective ethnic identification, in turn, promotes the solidarity necessary to organize and mobilize ethnic groups. Despite the important role ethnic identification appears to play in this process, little analytic attention has focused directly on whether and how access to resources through group membership influences the extent to which individuals identify with the group. We argue this oversight has important implications for the study of ethnicity. Most notably, because the relationship between resource access and ethnic identification is not examined directly, approaches to ethnicity that build on this instrumentalist, meansends, premise rest on an untested foundation. Moreover, such an approach obviates exploration of the conditions that may mediate the assumed relationship between resource competition and collective identification. It thereby limits understanding not only of this relationship but also of the assumed contingent processes of group solidarity, organization, mobilization and conflict. The research presented here attempts to further understanding of these issues by examining whether and how access to resources through group membership influences ethnic identification within and across ethnic groups. We first address the relevance and limitations of current approaches to ethnic mobilization that emphasize resource competition and its linkages to ethnic identification. In subsequent sections, we present a continuous measure of ethnic identification based on the work of Isajiw (1990, 1993) that facilitates analysis of the assumed causal linkages between individual interests, ethnic identification and ethnic mobilization. We then examine and compare the relationship between resource access and ethnic identification across and within ethnic groups using survey data from the multiethnic society of Mauritius.

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A matter of interest Sociological approaches to ethnicity are conventionally divided into two broad perspectives: primordialism and instrumentalism (Young 1983; Tilley 1997; Cornell and Hartmann 1998; Hale 2004).1 Primordialism emphasizes the enduring emotional power of ethnic bonds even in the face of changing economic and political conditions while instrumentalism emphasizes variability in ethnic attachments as a direct result of changes occurring in the broader social context. From this latter perspective, fluctuations in socio-economic conditions alter the instrumental (meansends) value of ethnic group membership and strengthen or weaken identification with the group as individuals weigh the costs and benefits of ethnic group attachment. To the extent that ethnic group membership confers rewards, be they material or psychological, individuals will self-identify with the ethnic group. Conversely, when an ethnic identity confers no particular advantage, identification with the group will diminish (Despres 1975, p. 199). Ethnic identities in this mode of analysis do not reflect traditional bonds based on one’s local place or kinship group generally emphasized by primordialists. Instead, they are built around wider distinctions based on language, religion, or region of origin (Brass 1976). Such wider communities become increasingly relevant to individuals as they respond to resource shifts resulting from increased immigration, urbanization, industrialization, and state expansion (Hannan 1979; Nielson 1985; Olzak and Nagel 1986; Be´langer and Pinard 1991; Olzak 1992). Other individuals competing for the same goods may mobilize along other ethnic lines so that inter-ethnic competition results. The larger ‘ethnic’ groups thus serve as an effective medium for gaining access to scarce goods in a changing and increasingly competitive environment. In short, ethnic groups are interest groups demarcated by ethnic boundaries (see Bates 1974; Cohen 1974; Patterson 1975; Bell 1975; Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Yancey, Eriksen, and Juliani 1976; Bonacich 1979; Kasfir 1979; Banton 1983; Young 1983; Olzak and Nagel 1986; Olzak 1992; Hardin 1995; Nagel 1996; Hechter 2000). Conceiving of ethnic groups as interest groups provides a number of advantages in the study of ethnic relations. Most notably, this approach promotes understanding of why ethnic group boundaries vary considerably across time and space and in intensity. Nevertheless, the links between individual interests and collective action remain underspecified in the literature (Miller et al. 1981; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Malesˇevic´ 2002). Whereas individuals may possess or develop a thin sense of group affiliation out of which little can be demanded or expected when gaining access to resources through the group, what is generally argued to provide the basis for corporate organization and



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collective action is a thicker sense of interconnectedness and collective identification among group members. Indeed, it is this sense of ‘weness’ that many refer to when addressing the relationship between resource competition and ethnic mobilization.2 Yet despite the implied relevance of ethnic identification in this relationship, little analytic attention focuses at the level of the individual where ethnic identification occurs (Bentley 1987). This has led to a number of questionable assumptions and gaps in the literature. First, it is not clear whether and how individuals who loosely share ‘large scale cultural identities’ become transformed into solidarity groups capable of collective action. It is not sufficient to assume that access to resources through group membership strengthens collective identification with that group. This must first be demonstrated (Hempel 2004). Second, a questionable uniformity is often implied across ethnic groups in how interests are defined and pursued which enables continuing neglect of the role context plays in defining strategic action. Individual interests surely play a role in support for ethnic movements, but the definition of these interests and their translation into action need to be viewed, at least in part, as reflections of the historical and cultural contexts in which ethnic groups are embedded and out of which perceptions of ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ action are formed (cf. Bourdieu 1977, p. 77, 1983, 1990, 1991, Bentley 1987; Eriksen 1991; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Cornell 1996). Because these contexts are constituted prior to action itself and can orient group members to a particular course of ends and means, their potential influence on ‘strategic’ action within ethnic groups should not be overlooked. Because these contexts vary across ethnic groups based, for example, on their relative position of power within the nation state, the implied uniform relationship between individual interests and collective action is likely to vary as well. Third, an ‘illusion of homogeneity’ is also maintained within ethnic groups as whereby shared interests are imputed to all members despite the potentially diverse interests and experiences individuals have in accessing goods inside and outside ethnic group boundaries (Stinchcombe 1975; Connor 1994; Cornell 1996; Cornell and Hartmann 1998). This homogenization conflates the distinction between collective and individual interests (Gamson 1992) and sidesteps the important issue of how common agendas and common strategies are formed and maintained within diverse ethnic groups. We must acknowledge that individuals hold divergent, competitive, and even contradictory interests within ethnic groups. Additionally, we need to accommodate potential differences in individuals’ perceptions of success or failure in satisfying their interests through the ethnic group, particularly in relation to other forms of group (e.g. class) membership (Banton 2000). Such accommodation no doubt creates a more

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complex field to analyse but this can facilitate identification of underlying patterns that better illuminate the conditions under which ethnic solidarity and mobilization occur. We begin to address these issues below by exploring the relationship between ethnic-based access to resources and ethnic identification in Mauritius. The suitability of Mauritius as the site for this research is first discussed. In subsequent sections, we address data collection and the study’s methods and measures, including a continuous measure of ethnic identification. We then examine and compare the relationship between resource-access and ethnic identification across and within three ethnic groups: Creoles, Hindus and Muslims. Context of Mauritius A measure of ethnic identification can most easily be developed in a place where there is direct contact and competition between ethnic groups. It may be possible later to adapt this measure for use in places where group boundaries are less sharp.3 The multiethnic society of Mauritius provides an ideal context for such research. Located in the Indian Ocean about 500 miles east of Madagascar, Mauritius is considered to be a ‘laboratory of diversity’ that can ‘profoundly’ deepen our understanding of ethnic processes (Eriksen 1998, p.ix). Lacking any indigenous population, the majority of early inhabitants were brought in as slaves or indentured labourers from Africa and Asia during plantation-colonialism, first under French and later under British rule. The plural society that formed is now broadly comprised of six ‘ethnic communities’: Hindus (40 per cent), Creoles of African or mixed African descent (28 per cent), Muslims (17 per cent), Tamils (7 per cent), Sino-Mauritians or Chinoise (3 per cent), and whites (B2 per cent).4 These ethnic distinctions are pervasive in Mauritian society as they serve as the island’s ‘underlying premise for all social classifications’ (Eriksen 1991, p.18; see also Simmons 1982; Bowman 1991; Miles 1999; Teelock 1999; Boswell 2005). They are also highly salient. Among the 1,100 interviews we initiated, only a handful of individuals failed to immediately self-identify as a member of one, and only one, of these groups when asked their ethnicity (posed as an open-ended question). There is much ethnic interaction in Mauritius. Mauritius is one of the most densely populated countries in the world with a population of almost 1.2 million living in an area of 718 square miles (1,865 sq. km). Moreover, its ethnic groups are not regionally segregated.5 When the amount of land dedicated to sugar production (over 50 per cent) is factored in, it becomes clear that Mauritians interact very closely with one another.6 As Bowman (1991, p. 64) observes:


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The sound of the Muslim call to prayer reaches everyone on a daily basis. Ethnic intermingling in the shops, buses, beaches, towns and villages of Mauritius is ubiquitous. These spatial factors . . . provide a commonality to day-in, day-out living experiences. Despite frequent interaction, ethnic groups in Mauritius maintain distinct boundaries through dress, religious beliefs and traditions, and through predominant endogamy within their ethnic communities. Based on a detailed study of interethnic marriages, Nave (2000) found the rate of marriages across ethnic groups to constitute less than 10 per cent of all marriages in Mauritius. Even among those marriages occurring across ethnic groups, Nave found that ethnic group boundaries were often reproduced as children from inter-ethnic marriages tended to adopt the ethnic identity of one parent and to marry someone of that ethnic origin later in life. Hindus In this study, we focus on the three largest ethnic groups in Mauritius: Hindus (Indiens), Muslims, and Creoles. Hindus are an ethnolinguistic group rather than simply a religious community, as they are distinguished from Tamil, Telegu, and Marathi minorities in Mauritius, the majority of who also practise Hinduism (Hollup 1993). Most Hindus descend from indentured migrants who were brought to Mauritius from India, largely from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, between the 1830s and early 1900s following the legal abolition of slavery in the British colonies in 1833. The majority of Hindus are Sanatanists who can be further distinguished into four major castes associated with, but not identical to, Varna categories practised in India. It is important to note, however, that castes in Mauritius are much more flexible than in India. Hollup (1993) observes they are neither strictly endogamous nor occupationally segregated, but rather represent extended social groups interconnected by marriage and kinship that often cut across conventional caste boundaries.7 More than one-third of Hindus in Mauritius are Arya Samajists who believe in a strict monotheism, the reform and simplification of Hindu ritual, and the abolition of castes. In recent years, previous differences between Arya Samajis and Sanatanists have narrowed such that there appears to be ‘no marked difference in the political behavior between these groups’. Hollup (1993) adds that further differentiation is not encouraged as it poses a threat to Hindu unity an important tool for maintaining political influence in Mauritius. Such unity is an explicit goal of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) of Mauritius which attempts to unify Hindus and work for their advancement in Mauritian society an objective that is often

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perceived to be a threat to the well-being of other ethnic communities in Mauritius (Sisisky 2006). Among the languages spoken by Hindus in Mauritius, Kreol, Mauritius’s lingua franca, is predominant, although Bhojpuri and, to a lesser extent, Hindi, and French are also used.8


Muslims Muslims in Mauritius descend in large part from Urdu-speaking indentured labourers who emigrated from the Gangetic plain of northern India. Over 95 per cent of Muslims in Mauritius are Sunnis. The remaining 5 per cent includes Shiites who are descendants from various parts of India, Aga Khanites from East Africa, and Ahmadists from Punjab. As with all ethnic communities in Mauritius, the majority of Muslims speak Kreol and, to a lesser extent, French, although older Muslims living in rural areas often speak Bhojpuri and there is a trend towards learning Urdu and Arabic among highly educated Muslims. A more recent and gradual process of ‘Islamization’ can be also observed in Mauritius through changes in dress, increasing popularity of pilgrimage to Mecca, an emphasis on reading of the Koran in Arabic, and a growing number of mosques, schools and Islamic centers. In addition to this religious revivalism, Hollup (1993, pp.1529) suggests that Islamization among Muslims in Mauritius may reflect HinduMuslim political rivalry as competition for political power encourages further expression of distinctiveness between these groups. Indeed, Muslims are highly organized on a religious basis and the mosque serves a focal point for the Muslim community not only in terms of coordinating political power but also as a source of financial and other forms of assistance for its members and the disadvantaged. Creoles Creoles in Mauritius are of African or mixed-African descent whose ancestors were slaves taken largely from Mozambique and Madagascar during the 1700s to the early 1800s.9 The majority of Creoles speak Kreol or French and are Roman Catholic, although a growing number are Anglican, Assembly of God, Seventh Day Adventists, or Pentecostal. Importantly, although most Creoles are Catholic, not all Catholics are Creole, as the majority of Chinese and FrancoMauritians small but powerful ethnic communities in Mauritius also practise Catholicism. This heterogeneity inhibits ethnic political coordination through religious organization within the Creole community relative to the Hindu and Muslim communities (see Laville 2000). The relative lack of unity within the Creole community is



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further exacerbated by internal class divisions that continue to deter ethnic solidarity despite more recent attempts to foster a ‘prise de conscience’ within the Creole community (Simmons 1982; Laville 2000; Boswell 2005). Such efforts draw attention to the contributions made by Creoles to Mauritius, including the Kreol language and sega, a musical style developed by African and, in particular, Malagassy slaves (see Teelock 1999). It is relevant to note, however, that these contributions are generally not regarded as aspects unique to or solely emblematic of Creole culture, but have become symbolic of Mauritian culture. This raises another issue important to the capacity Creoles have to become a unified community: of all the ethnic communities in Mauritius, Creole ethnic boundaries are the most (inwardly) permeable and, therefore, less definite such that the term ‘Creole’ is sometimes used to mean ‘islander’, a status that all Mauritians share. In a national discourse that calls for ethnic distinctions in almost all aspects of public life, such ‘hybridity’ undermines the potential for collective recognition and organization relative to other major ethnic groups in Mauritius (Boswell 2005). Competition in the economic sphere Most Mauritians have had direct experiences with inter-ethnic competition, especially during the period of economic expansion and development of an independent polity that followed independence from Britain in 1968. Historically, ethnic membership was strongly correlated with the division of labour in Mauritius, although, today, such ethnic divisions are not as well defined (see Hollup 1993; Eriksen 1998). Increasing ethnic integration of the labour force has resulted largely from economic diversification in Mauritius, much of which occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, Mauritius shifted from a monocrop economy based on sugar production to an economy with substantial manufacturing and tourism sectors. This shift increased employment opportunities across ethnic boundaries, particularly among low-skilled workers in manufacturing. Nevertheless, jobs and promotions within firms are still commonly accessed via ethnic networks (see Eriksen 1992; Bunwaree 2002). The economic success Mauritius experienced in the 1980s and 1990s led many, including the World Bank, to view Mauritius as a model for economic development (World Bank 1989, 1992). Mauritius currently remains one of Africa’s strongest economies, yet its economic outlook is clouded by a number of emerging problems and uncertainties. Prominent among these is Mauritius’s economic dependence on preferential access to external markets and constrained competition resulting from trade agreements that bolstered its agricultural and manufacturing sectors. These advantages are in the process of being


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phased out, or have been phased out, by trade liberalization. In addition, employment opportunities in the manufacturing sector have declined in recent years as firms shifted production to countries with lower wages. Rising unemployment and a slowing economy have increased economic inequality in Mauritius and this inequality is viewed increasingly along ethnic lines (see Bunwaree 2002).10 There are reports of growing resentment within the Creole population due to the perception that they are being systematically excluded from jobs and opportunities for social mobility relative to other ethnic groups, especially in the public sector (Miles 1999; Laville 2000; Bunwaree 2002; Srebrnik 2002; Boswell 2005). These perceptions are echoed in the comments of the respondents we interviewed. When asked to rank the economic situation of their ethnic group relative to other ethnic groups in Mauritian society, respondents, including Creoles, generally ranked Creoles as being worse off economically than all other major ethnic groups in Mauritius (see Table 1). Competition in the political sphere Ethnicity is integral to the political system in Mauritius due, many argue, to the structuring of ethnic politics under the colonial system (see Bowman 1991; Mukonoweshuro 1991; Mathur 1991, 1997; Nave 1998). Prior to independence, a prominent concern among smaller ethnic groups was that Mauritius would become a Hindu-dominated Table 1. Relative group position Relative group position

Creoles N 268

Hindus N 275

Muslims N 264

In your opinion, does the government represent the interests of (group): (1) much more, (2) a little more, (3) the same, (4) a little less, (5) or much less (5) than the following groups: Chinese 3.61 (0.95) 2.84 (0.87) 3.26 (0.74) Creoles n.a. 2.69 (0.91) 2.95 (0.75) Hindus 4.05 (0.94) n.a. 3.80 (0.90) Muslims 3.65 (0.83) 3.00 (0.81) n.a. Whites 4.26 (1.01) 3.56 (1.06) 4.02 (0.88) In your opinion, is the economic situation of (group): (1) much better, (2) a little better, (3) the same, (4) a little worse, or (5) much worse than the following groups: Chinese 4.35 (0.68) 3.59 (0.86) 3.59 (0.84) Creoles n.a. 2.18 (0.79) 2.24 (0.69) Hindus 4.21 (0.67) n.a. 3.26 (0.72) Muslims 4.08 (0.69) 3.22 (0.70) n.a. Whites 4.78 (0.43) 4.30 (0.84) 4.36 (0.71)



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country after the British relinquished rule (Bowman 1991). To allay these fears, the Constitutional Conference of 1965 instituted the ‘best losers’ system to ensure adequate representation across ethnic groups. This system provides for up to eight additional seats in the legislative council to be awarded to ethnic communities underrepresented following each national election in order ‘to correct any imbalance in the representation of the various communities that may result from the direct election’ (Mathur 1997).11 The ‘best loser’ system is particularly relevant to ethnic relations on the island as it is seen to reinforce ethnic divisions by ensuring that each ethnic group has an established stake in the political system (Mukonoweshuro 1991). Institutional politics remain organized along ethnic lines or, more precisely, along class and ethnic lines (see Simmons 1982; Bowman 1991), both in terms of voting and the internal organization of parties and political organizations (Eriksen 1991), leading one analyst to comment that ‘Mauritian politics are, above all ethnic politics’ (Minogue 1987, p.133).12 Furthermore, as Hollup (1993, p. 288) observes, Mauritians frequently expect government officials and representatives from their ethnic group to defend and pursue the interests of their ethnic group, and policy initiatives are continually assessed by members of the public for the material and/or symbolic implications these initiatives have for their own ethnic community (see also Carroll 1994; Carroll and Carroll 2000). Those initiatives that are seen to unfairly privilege one ethnic group over others or to threaten an ethnic group’s position are often a central source of tension and conflict on the island, particularly in relation to Hindus who dominate the civil sector including the police force (Carroll and Carroll 2000; Laville 2000).13 As in the economic sphere, Creoles generally share a feeling of disenfranchisement relative to the other ethnic communities on the island. When asked to rank the political situation of their ethnic group relative to other ethnic groups, respondents, including Creoles, generally ranked Creoles as being worse off than all other major ethnic groups in Mauritius. In sharp contrast, Hindus were ranked and ranked themselves, on average, as being more politically advantaged than all other ethnic groups except whites (see Table 1). Data and methods Data used in this study were collected during two extended phases of research in Mauritius. In Phase I (May to December 1997), sixty openended interviews were conducted with Mauritians from various ethnic backgrounds to learn about the meanings and definitions given to ethnicity by Mauritians. These data were then used to develop a survey instrument on ethnic identification used in Phase II. Prior to its

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implementation, the survey instrument was first pre-tested on five focus groups (ethnic-based and ethnically mixed) and using a multiethnic sample in the field. The final survey was implemented in 2000 by a team of research assistants recruited from the University of Mauritius who were trained over a one-week period.14 The team included seven Hindus, three Creoles, two Muslims, and one Tamil. Nine of the research assistants were male and four were female. Survey interviews took place inside or around the respondent’s home and lasted between one and two hours.


Sampling A guiding issue in constructing the sampling plan was our research objective to compare ethnic groups. A disproportional stratified sampling plan was adopted to obtain equal-sized random samples from the three largest ethnic groups in Mauritius. This approach allocates a sufficient sample size for obtaining separate estimates of adequate precision for each group (roughly 250). Because this sampling frame does not reflect the Mauritian population (i.e. it is disproportional and limited to three ethnic groups) our results cannot be generalized to the larger Mauritian public. Respondents were selected in a multistage process. Sixty enumerated areas were randomly selected from the 3,472 defined by the Department of the Census and Statistics in Mauritius. Using maps of these areas provided by the Department of Census, a coordinator from one of three research teams ‘walked’ each of the enumerated areas, marking off interview areas and selecting starting points for each of their team members. Interviewers made initial contact at every third household in rural areas and every fifth household in urban areas within their marked area. Respondents within these households were then selected in a two-stage process. Interviewers first used a respondent selection form to identify eligible household members. Eligible respondents were Mauritian citizens over 17 years of age who were Creole, Hindu, or Muslim, as indicated by the first contact. Interviewers then identified a target respondent among eligible household members using Kish selection tables (Kish 1965). This method gives equal probability for selection of all eligible members within a household and leads to relatively equal proportions of males and females and individuals across age cohorts in the sample. A total of 1,048 individuals were selected and 805 interviews were completed, including 286 Creoles, 275 Hindus, and 264 Muslims.15 Descriptive statistics for each of these ethnic groups are provided in Table 2.


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Table 2. Descriptive statistics Creoles N 268


Demographics Age Sex (0 Male, 1 Female) Education Location (0 Urban/ Semi-urban, 1 Rural) Household Income Access to economic resources (Group) help other (group) obtain jobs. (Group) help other (group) obtain loans and/or credit. (Group) help other group members obtain housing or land. (Group) help other (group) to start businesses. Access to political resources (Group) are provided with many services and facilities by the government (Group) have a lot of influence on government decision-making. (Group) are well-represented in government. The government works hard on issues important to (group). Ethnic identification I look at life the same way as other (group). I identify strongly with the values of (group) values. I feel more at ease with (group) than I do around other ethnic groups. In general, being (group) is not an important part of who I am (reversed coded). It is important for me to do work that benefits the (group) community.

39.44 0.48 3.97 0.32

(14.73) (0.51) (1.56) (0.47)

Hindus N 275

36.44 0.48 5.10 0.36

(13.59) (0.50) (2.24) (0.48)

Muslims N 264

37.34 0.48 4.41 0.27

(13.87) (0.50) (1.65) (0.45)

3.37 (1.46)

3.62 (1.57)

3.64 (1.49)

3.13 (1.12)

3.34 (1.00)

3.51 (0.95)

2.85 (1.08)

3.09 (0.96)

3.00 (0.99)

2.98 (1.14)

3.10 (1.05)

3.16 (1.04)

2.76 (1.13)

3.10 (1.02)

3.43 (0.96)

2.17 (0.93)

3.09 (1.14)

2.58 (1.05)

2.36 (0.96)

3.43 (1.10)

2.61 (1.08)

2.23 (0.88)

3.81 (0.83)

2.62 (1.10)

2.31 (0.98)

3.11 (1.13)

2.59 (1.06)

3.13 (1.08)

3.36 (1.06)

3.38 (1.05)

3.58 (1.01)

3.68 (0.97)

3.85 (0.86)

2.73 (1.20)

3.02 (1.20)

2.68 (1.15)

3.48 (1.07)

3.75 (0.98)

3.97 (0.85)

3.79 (0.83)

3.76 (0.90)

3.92 (0.74)

Note: Items assessing access to resources and ethnic identification are measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Education is coded as 1no schooling; 2standard 1-5; 3 CPE/Standard 6; 4Form I-IV or Ecole technique; 5Form V; 6HSC; 8University certificate or higher. Average monthly household income is in Mauritian Rupees and coded 1less than 3,500; 23501-5000; 3 5001-8000; 48001-15,000; 515,001 or greater.

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Analytic strategy Analyses of the data were conducted using structural equation modelling [SEM] with LISREL 8.54, given the advantages SEM presents over typical regression techniques (see Bollen 1989). Foremost among these advantages is that SEM facilitates the use of latent variables.16 This is critical because of the position being taken here that the substantive variables of interest are multifaceted constructs that cannot be measured adequately by single indicators. In addition, SEM enables the isolation of measurement error when evaluating causal hypotheses and thereby increases the probability of detecting associations and obtaining estimates of parameters close to their population values (Hoyle 1995). Lastly, structural equation modelling is ideally suited for comparative research as it allows for simultaneous estimation and comparisons of a model’s measures and causal hypotheses across independent groups (see Bollen and Hoyle 1990). There were limited problems with missing data among the variables used in this study, with none of the indicators having greater than 5 per cent of observations missing. Mean replacement was used for indicators with one per cent or less data missing. All other missing data were handled using listwise deletion. Given that the data are ordinal and the samples sizes are moderate, models were estimated using the maximum likelihood fitting function with standard errors and chi-square corrected for non-normality using the asymptotic covariance matrix (see Satorra and Bentler 1994; Chou and Bentler 1995; West, Finch and Curran 1995; Jo¨reskog and So¨rbom 1996). Models are assessed by the model’s corrected chi-square value (x2). Two additional indices are also used to assess the fit of the models to the data: the comparative fit index [CFI] (Bentler 1990) and the root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] (Steiger and Lind 1980; Browne and Cudeck 1992). Following Hu and Bentler (1999), a cutoff criterion of .95 for the CFI and B.06 for the RMSEA is used before concluding there is a relatively good fit between the hypothesized model and the observed data. The structural equation modelling process centres around two steps: validating the measurement models for the latent variables and fitting the structural model in which relationships among the latent variables are specified. The first is accomplished primarily through confirmatory factor analyses although we also use exploratory factor analyses (see below). Fitting the structural model is accomplished primarily through path analysis. Presentation of our results begins first with the measurement models used for the latent constructs in the study. We then address the ‘structural’ paths depicted in Figure 1.


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Figure 1. Access to material resources and ethnic identification (Group) help other (group) obtain employment. I look at life the same way as other (group).

(Group) help other (group) obtain housing and/or land.

(Group) help other (group) obtain loans or credit.

Access to Economic Goods

(Group) help other (group) start businesses.

I identify strongly with (group) values.

Ethnic Identification


(Group) are provided with many services and facilities by the government. (Group) have a lot of influence decision-making in the government.

I feel more at ease around (group) than I do around ethnic groups.

Being (group) is not an important part of who I am (reversed coded).

Access to Political Goods

(Group) are wellrepresented in government.

It is important for me to do work that benefits the (group) community.

The Mauritian government works hard on issues important to (group).

Measures The primary objective of our research is to examine whether and how access to resources through ethnic group membership influences ethnic identification across and within ethnic groups. Two broad constructs exist in this relationship: access to resources through group membership and ethnic identification. The measurement of each is addressed, respectively, below. Because items used to tap into these constructs refer specifically to the ethnic group of the respondent, we asked each respondent their ethnicity posed as an open-ended question (i.e. no response categories were provided) at the beginning of the interview. Questions about access to resources and ethnic identification were then asked in relation to their given response.17 Access to resources through group membership Although researchers vary in identifying the resources over which ethnic competition occurs, emphasis in the relevant literature is chiefly given to political goods, including political access and influence (cf. Rothschild 1981; Nagel 1986; Brass 1991; Espiritu 1992; Banton 1994; Breuilly 1994) and economic goods, defined largely in terms of labour market access but also access to housing, loans, and education (cf. Bonacich 1972, 1979; Hechter 1975; Banton 1983; Olzak 1983, 1992; Nielsen 1985; Olzak and Nagel 1986).18 We could find no strong theoretical or empirical justification for treating access to these goods as distinct factors and therefore first conducted exploratory analyses


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on half of the sample, randomly selected, on all items addressing ethnic-based access to political and economic goods.19 The results of these analyses were then cross validated using confirmatory factor analyses on the second half of the sample. Combined, the results indicate two very distinct constructs concerning access to economic goods and political goods. Table 3 provides the results of the confirmatory factor analyses for the full sample. Results of the exploratory analyses are available upon request. The first construct, termed Ethnic-based access to economic goods, refers to the actor’s subjective perception that ethnic group membership is instrumental for accessing economic goods. The measure is made up of four items in which individuals were asked if they agree or disagree on a 5-point Likert-type scale with the following statements about their own ethnic group (interviewers would substitute each respondent’s ethnic group for ‘(group)’ in the questions): 1) 2) 3) 4)

(Group) (Group) (Group) (Group)

help help help help

other other other other

(group) (group) (group) (group)

obtain employment; obtain housing and/or land; obtain loans or credit; start businesses.20

Items were later recoded so that higher numbers reflect stronger beliefs in ethnic-based economic instrumentalism. The second construct, termed Ethnic-based access to political goods, refers to the actor’s subjective perception that ethnic group membership is instrumental in accessing political resources. The measure is made up of four items in which respondents were asked if they agree or disagree on a 5-point Likert scale with the following statements about their ethnic group: 1) (Group) are provided with many services and facilities by the government; 2) (Group) have a lot of influence on decision making in the government; 3) (Group) are well-represented in government; and Table 3. Result of confirmatory factor analyses. Overall fit for alternate measurement models of access to economic and political resources through group membership. N402 Model M1 M2

One-factor model Two-factor model, separate dimensions for access to economic and political resources

x2 (df)

p-value

RMSEA

CFI

286.44(19) 14.71(18)

.00 .68

.19 .03

0.81 1.00


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4) The Mauritian government works hard on issues that are important to (group). Response categories for these items range from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) and are recoded so that higher numbers reflect stronger belief in ethnic-based political instrumentalism.


Ethnic identification The second major construct in our study is ethnic identification. Although instrumentalist approaches to ethnicity suggest that individuals vary in the degree to which they self-identify with an ethnic group, the majority of research in this area tends to employ discrete categorical measures of ethnic identity (e.g. Muslim, Creole) that cannot gauge this variability. Yet insofar as ethnic identification reflects a contingent process instead of a fixed state, its measurement needs to be based on a continuous scale capable of gauging the degree to which the individual identifies with the group (see also Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Jenkins 2000; Brubaker 2002; Hale 2004). To develop this measure, we drew on the work of Isajiw (1990, 1993), who conceives of ethnic identity as a multifaceted construct comprised of three internal components: a cognitive dimension, reflecting one’s perceived similarity to others in an ethnic group; an affective dimension, representing one’s feelings of attachment to the group; and a moral dimension, reflecting one’s feelings of group obligation. Five items are used to assess these components of an ethnic identity: 1) I look at life the same way as other (group); 2) I identify strongly with the values of (group); 3) I feel more at ease around (group) than I do around other ethnic groups; 4) Being (group) is not an important part of who I am (reversed coded); 5) It is important for me to do work that benefits the (group) community. Each of these items is based on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree and are coded so that higher numbers reflect higher levels of ethnic identification. Given the strong theoretical framework provided by Isajiw for the measure, it was only necessary to conduct confirmatory factor analyses. The results of these analyses indicate a very good fit between the conceptual measurement model and the data (x2 10.1/5 d.f, p.07, CFI .99, RMSEA 0.035) with each of the indicators significant at the p B.001 level and item reliabilities ranging from .25 to .60 (see Table 4).

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Table 4. Measurement model of ethnic identification, N805


Parameter estimate

Standard error

R2

Standardized estimates

I look at life the same way as 0.90 .06 .40 .67 other (group). I identify strongly with 1.00$ .60 .77 (group) values. I feel more at ease with .80 .07 .25 .50 (group) than I do around other ethnic groups. In general, being (group) is .70 .06 .26 .52 not an important part of me (reversed coded). It is important for me to do .55 .05 .24 .41 work that benefits the (group) community. Model fit x2 10.1/5 d.f, p .07, CFI 0.99 RMSEA 0.035 Note: The symbol $ denotes a fixed parameter. All parameter estimates are significant at pB.001 level.

Control variables A number of sociodemographic covariates are also taken into account in the models for their potential confounding influence. These include age (years), sex, residence (rural/nonrural); household income, and education. Education in Mauritius is based on the British model and is coded as 1no schooling; 2 Standard 15; 3 Certificate of Primary Education (CPE)/Standard 6; 4 Form IIV or Ecole technique; 5 Form V; 6Higher School Certificate (HSC); 7 University certificate or higher. Average monthly household income is in Mauritian Rupees and coded 1less than 3,500; 23,5015,000; 3 5,0018,000; 4 8,00115,000; 5 15,001 or greater. Structural models Figure 1 depicts the hypothesized model relating the exogenous latent constructs to ethnic identification. If access to economic goods and/or political goods through ethnic membership influences the extent to which individuals identify with an ethnic group, a positive and significant relationship should exist between one or more of these forms of instrumentalism and ethnic identification within and across ethnic groups. Specifically, we examine the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: Ethnic-based access to economic goods is positively and significantly related to ethnic identification across ethnic groups


477


Hypothesis 2: Ethnic-based access to political goods is positively and significantly related to ethnic identification across ethnic groups. We test the hypotheses using independent samples of Hindus, Creoles, and Muslims. Table 5 provides the LISREL-estimated parameters for the ‘structural’ paths depicted in Figure 1 for each of these ethnic groups. The model fits the data well for each group as indicated by the fit indices also presented in Table 5. The results provide support for the very general assertion that access to resources through group membership is positively related to ethnic identification. Ethnic-based access to economic or political resources is significantly related to ethnic identification within each ethnic group. However, it is Table 5. Model fit, unstandardized and standardized parameter estimates of effects of ethnic-based access to economic and political resources on ethnic identification within and across ethnic groups with selected covariates Creoles Rural

0.14 (0.11) [0.09] Education 0.13** (0.04) [ 0.28] Female 0.04 (0.10) [ 0.03] Age (years) 0.00 (0.00) [0.01] Income 0.07 (0.04) [0.14] Economic resources 0.44*** (0.08) [0.46] Political resources 0.18 (0.11) [ 0.14] N 258 R2 0.26 Model fit x2 112.54/111d.f. (p .44) CFI 1.00 RMSEA 0.01

Hindus

Muslims

0.10 (0.11) [0.06] 0.03 (0.05) [0.07] 0.17 (0.11) [0.11] 0.02*** (0.00) [0.26] 0.01 (0.04) [0.03] 0.16 (0.10) [0.13] 0.42*** (0.12) [0.28] 258 0.22 x2 165.24/111d.f. (p .00) CFI0.98 RMSEA0.04

0.06 (0.09) [0.05] 0.10** (0.04) [0.30] 0.10 (0.08) [0.09] 0.00 (0.00) [0.03] 0.02 (0.03) [0.06] 0.22*** (0.07) [0.32] 0.09 (0.05) [0.13] 256 0.26 x2 131.72/111d.f. (p.09) CFI 0.99 RMSEA 0.03

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Numbers in brackets are standardized parameter estimates. *pB.05 **pB.01 ***pB.001


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important to note that ethnic-based access to economic and political resources, along with the sociodemographic characteristics of sex, age, education, income, and region, account for 27 per cent or less of the variance in ethnic identification within each of the ethnic groups examined. In addition, the relationships between these perceptions and ethnic identification differ across ethnic groups. Ethnic-based access to economic resources is significantly related to ethnic identification among Creoles (g* .46, p B.001) and Muslims (g* .32, p B.001), but has no significant effect on Hindu identification. In direct contrast, ethnic-based access to political resources is significantly related to ethnic identification among Hindus (g* .28, pB.001), but not to ethnic identification among Creoles and Muslims. The results are therefore consistent with Hypothesis 1 for Creoles and Muslims, but not Hindus. Conversely, the results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 for Hindus, but not Creoles or Muslims. One potential source of this variation is that ethnic groups may not conceptualize and define the key variables (e.g. ethnic identification) in a similar manner, in which case the relationships among the variables cannot be validly compared across ethnic groups. We explore this issue by first assessing measurement invariance among the groups. Assessment of measurement invariance involves a continuum of nested models with each model imposing an additional constraint of equivalence across groups. Two tests of measurement invariance are required to reliably compare relationships among the latent constructs: configural and metric equivalence (see Bollen 1989; Bollen and Hoyle 1990).21 Both conditions are met for each of the latent variables (economic instrumentalism, political instrumentalism, and ethnic identification) in our analyses. The next step of our analyses addresses whether the relationships between the forms of instrumentalism and identification differ significantly between ethnic groups. Whereas the initial set of analyses addresses whether the relationships between the forms of instrumentalism and identification differ significantly from zero for each ethnic group (i.e. test of the null hypotheses), the second set of analyses addresses whether these relationships differ significantly between ethnic groups. Assessment of this issue involves constraining the path between each form of instrumentalism and ethnic identification to be equal across each possible pair of ethnic groups. A significant loss of fit in the model when each of these constraints is imposed indicates the relationships differ significantly between the groups in that pair. Results of these analyses provide strong evidence of ethnic group differences in the relationship between the forms of instrumentalism and identification. When the path relating ethnic-based economic instrumentalism to ethnic identification is constrained between Hindus


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and Creoles, a significant loss of fit (Dx2/df 4.62/1df, pB.05) occurs, indicating that access to economic resources through group membership affects Creole identification significantly more than it does Hindu identification. When the path relating ethnic-based political instrumentalism to ethnic identification is constrained, a significant loss of fit (Dx2/df 13.27/1df p B.001) occurs between Hindus and Creoles as well as between Hindus and Muslims (Dx2/df6.43/1df pB.05), suggesting that access to political resources affects Hindu identification significantly more than it does Creole or Muslim identification. In short, the relationship between ethnic-based access to goods and ethnic identification varies significantly across ethnic groups. Discussion of findings A common premise in the study of ethnicity is that ethnic identification varies as individuals respond to the costs and benefits of ethnic group membership. Individuals may not always be free to ‘choose’ their ethnicity, but they can and do vary in the extent to which they identify with the ethnic group. Insofar as ethnic membership is seen as advantageous in accessing scarce resources, it is assumed that individuals will identify strongly with the ethnic group. Conversely, when no particular advantage is conferred, identification with the group will diminish. Despite the prevalence of this underlying meansends premise in much of the literature on ethnic relations, little analytic attention has focused directly on whether and how access to resources through group membership affects the extent to which individuals identify with the group. This, we argue, limits understanding not only of ethnic identification but of the assumed contingent processes of ethnic organization, mobilization, and conflict as well. To address these issues, we constructed a continuous measure of ethnic identification that is comparable across ethnic groups and examined whether and how perceptions of access to economic resources (e.g. jobs, housing) and political resources (e.g. political representation and influence) through ethnic group membership affects ethnic identification across three ethnic groups in Mauritius. The results of our research provide two key findings. First, our research suggests that a meansends approach to ethnic identification provides very limited insight into why individuals identify with their ethnic group. Ethnic-based access to political goods and economic goods, along with a number of socio-demographic variables, explain a relatively modest amount of the variance (less than 27 per cent) in ethnic identification in each of the three ethnic groups examined. Of course, the ability to access other ‘goods’ such as prestige, protection, or even the feeling of solidarity itself may affect


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ethnic identification and, if so, this would provide support for an instrumentalist approach to identification that emphasizes the relations between means and ends, albeit a less conventional one than commonly adopted in the literature. Nevertheless, the assertion that ethnic identification reflects the pursuit of material interests is insufficient within the context of Mauritius and, likely, other contexts as well.22 Second, while our results are consistent with the general assertion that access to resources through ethnic membership is related to ethnic identification, we find significant differences in this relationship across ethnic groups. Specifically, the perception that group membership is instrumental in accessing economic goods affects Creole identification significantly more than it does Hindu identification. Conversely, ethnic-based access to political goods is significantly related to Hindu identification but exhibits no effect on Creole or Muslim identification. Such group differences are not easily reconciled using instrumentalist approaches to ethnic identification that broadly suggest that ethnic identification is strengthened when individuals perceive membership as advantageous in accessing valued goods. Although an individual may rationally conclude that s/he can best attain resources through group membership, our results indicate that this conclusion is neither necessarily nor consistently related to social identification with others in the group. Instead, intervening mechanisms appear to be at work and it is these mechanisms that likely determine the strength of the relationship between individual interests and ethnic identification not simply the perception that group membership is instrumental for obtaining valued goods. To identify these mechanisms, it is germane to ask how the context or characteristics of the ethnic groups differ and how this variation might account for the observed differences between ethnic groups. An intriguing suggestion lies in Hechter’s concept of group dependency (Hechter 1987, 2000; see also Hirschman 1970; Hechter, Friedman and Appelbaum 1982; Be´langer and Pinard 1991). Hechter maintains that group solidarity is strengthened when actors see ethnic membership as a means for gaining access to valued resources but adds that this relationship is contingent on the availability of these resources to the individual outside the ethnic group: the more costly it is for members to leave the group in terms of opportunities foregone, the stronger their commitment to that group.23 Within an ethnic group, the average level of dependency is determined in part by the limits of supply of close substitutes outside group boundaries (Hechter 1987, p. 46; see also Banton 1994). From this perspective, it can be argued that access to economic goods affects Creole and Muslim identification not simply because ethnic membership is instrumental for accessing these goods but because limited



481

opportunities exist for accessing economic goods outside group boundaries, making Creoles and Muslims more dependent on their group than Hindus. In contrast, Hindus may be generally less dependent than Muslims and Creoles because alternative, less costly, means for accessing the economic goods are more available outside Hindu ethnic channels.24 Consequently, ethnic-based access to economic goods has a weaker effect on Hindu identification than it does on Muslim and Creole identification. This proposition resonates well within the context of Mauritius where Hindus, on average, tend to possess more human capital (e.g. formal education) than Muslims and Creoles (see Table 2) and may therefore be less dependent on ethnic ties in accessing jobs, loans, and housing. In applying the same logic in relation to political goods, a dependency hypothesis would suggest that the relationship between ethnic identification and ethnic-based access to political goods is significantly weaker among Muslims and Creoles because less costly/ more beneficial means for accessing political goods exist outside ethnic boundaries, making Creoles and Muslims less politically dependent on ethnic membership than Hindus. This suggestion is more difficult to reconcile within the context of Mauritius where Creoles and, to a lesser extent, Muslims consider themselves to be comparatively more disenfranchised from the political system and the allocation of its goods (see Table 1) and where access to political power outside ethnic ties remains limited. The significantly weaker relationship between the ethnic-based political instrumentalism and identification may not be due to the existence of political opportunities outside group boundaries, but to a perceived lack of political opportunities period. In this sense, the perception that one can access political goods through ethnic membership may be unrelated to ethnic identification because the group may be viewed by many as a relatively ineffective means for obtaining political goods not necessarily because alternative, less costly, channels exist outside group boundaries.25 The concept of group efficacy raises a related issue about the divisibility of the resources being examined. Many goods are clearly non-divisible in that the fate of individual group members is closely tied to the fate of the group. This is particularly the case with political instrumentalism where the political influence of an ethnic group is largely a nondivisible collective good.26 Attempts to pursue collective interests aimed at changing the fate of the group (i.e. accessing greater political power) require far greater coordinated action than do attempts to defend or pursue goods that can be distributed unevenly among members of that group, such as jobs or housing. Given the more divisible nature of economic goods, ethnic membership is more likely to be seen as instrumental in promoting access to economic goods over other, more collective, goods and, therefore, ethnic groups are


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perceived as a more dependable means for accessing economic goods relative to political goods. In contrast, a collective perception of group efficacy in accessing political goods is likely to be much harder to attain and sustain, particularly among politically disadvantaged and/ or less unified ethnic groups, making ethnic membership a less dependable and predictable source for attaining political goods. Drawn together, the concepts of group dependency and collective efficacy suggest a homo economicus in her or his prime weighing not only preferences and interests but calculating and comparing the probabilities of meeting these interests through various means. This, of course, is instrumentalism in its strongest sense. To address these mediating factors, however, instrumentalist approaches need to be refined to better address, as Banton (1994, p.17) notes, ‘the supply side represented in the social structure as well as the demand side expressed by actors responding to their opportunities as they see them’. This is a more precise and conditional form of instrumentalism in which actors weigh various probabilities of return relative to their own interests, expectations, and observations. It is also one that requires greater examination of the sources of information upon which instrumental action rests that shape how opportunities are perceived and acted upon. Such analytic refinements are demanding, but promise a far sturdier foundation on which to build theories of ethnic solidarity and collective mobilization than current, less determinate, accounts provide. Acknowledgements An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2004 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Philadelphia. The research presented here was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (NSF 92-114) and the Social Science Research Council. I would like to thank all those who participated in the study and assisted in data collection. I would also like to thank Humphrey Costello, the Editors of this journal and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful and helpful comments. Notes 1. The terms ‘circumstantialism’ or ‘situationalism’ are often used in place of ‘instrumentalism’ to reflect newer approaches to ethnicity that focus on the conditions under which ethnic-based interests and identities emerge. These approaches maintain an instrumentalist foundation by suggesting that ethnic identification is strengthened when interests are perceived to be furthered by ethnic membership (see Hempel 2004). The term ‘instrumentalism’ is used throughout the paper because this term focuses analytic attention on this core foundation which, we argue, has not been adequately tested.



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2. Thus, for example, Banton (1983) writes of the presence of ‘group consciousness’, Hechter (1975) of ‘status solidarity’ and later (2000) ‘group solidarity’, Olzak (1992) of ‘ethnic solidarity’, Gurr (1993) of ‘strong sense of group identity’, and Hardin (1995) of ‘group identification’. 3. We would like to express our appreciation to an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing these points. 4. In an effort to discourage ethnic communalism, the Central Statistics Office of Mauritius, which conducts the national census, has not collected data on ethnicity since 1983. The percentages reported are based on estimates cited in a number of sources (see Eriksen 1991; Hollup 1993; Carroll and Caroll 2000). 5. The area described refers to the main island of Mauritius where more than 99 per cent of Mauritians live. The Republic of Mauritius is also composed of Rodrigues Island, the Cargados Carajos Shoals, and Agalega. These areas were not included in the study. On the main island, neighbourhoods tend to be more class than ethnically based, although there are some ethnic-based residential patterns in Mauritius: most members of the Chinese community live in urban areas; a majority of whites live in the more affluent sections of Curepipe and Floreál; Muslims constitute a strong majority in Plain Verte, an area on the outskirts of the capital of Port Louis; many rural villages are predominantly Hindu; and Creoles living in rural areas tend to be concentrated along the coastline. These patterns aside, there is no ethnic group that is distinctively removed from other ethnic groups in Mauritius. 6. Many actually live on top of one another. Construction of homes in Mauritius often takes place vertically for all but the most advantaged as families add stories to their home to accommodate the families of grown children. 7. Hollup (1993, p.110) further argues that although caste identities are less important that those based on ethnic affiliation, castes or caste associations have emerged for political purposes as pressure groups along the same lines as other ethnic communities. As such, caste association is also likely to influence voting patterns in Mauritius. 8. The Central Statistics Office of Mauritius reports that between 1990 and 2000, the number of Mauritians who reported that Creole was the ‘usual or most often spoken language at home’ rose from 62 per cent to 70 per cent while the use of Asian languages, including Hindi and Bhojpuri, declined (Mauritius CSO 2000). 9. There is some suggestion (Laville 2000; Boswell 2005) that the label ‘Creole’ may be rejected by some who adopt the label ‘Catholique’ to bring themselves semantically on par with Hindus and Muslims. We found little evidence of this in our interviews, however. This may be due to our asking respondents their religion prior to asking their ethnicity. 10. Official statistics on income, education, and occupation by ethnicity are not available (see note 4). Descriptive statistics from the survey are provided in Table 2. 11. Following each election, the Electoral Supervisory Commission looks at the selfreported ethnic background of the sixty elected members and determines how many come from the four recognized communities in the Constitution: Hindus, Muslims, Chinese, and the ‘General Population’, a residual category mainly including Creoles and FrancoMauritians. If the proportion of elected members is less than that community’s proportion of the Mauritian population, ‘best losers’ candidates from the underrepresented ethnic communities who stood for election but who were defeated make up the difference (Srebrnik 2000; see also Mathur 1991). To determine which communities are underrepresented, authorities use the 1972 official population census, as this was the last census that required Mauritians to report their ethnicity. 12. Because no single party can get the majority alone or by relying on mobilizing support from one ethnic group, political parties have to forge strategic alliances and coalitions in order to obtain and maintain political power (Hollup 1993, p. 263). For an extensive historical account of coalitions in Mauritius see Bowman (1991) and Srebrnik (2002). 13. A striking illustration of this occurred recently when the Government redesigned the nation’s paper currency. Previously, Mauritian currency included denominations written in English, Arabic, Hindi, and Tamil along with an illustration of Mauritius’ first Prime


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Minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam. In 1998, a newly designed currency was released which featured drawings of leaders from each of Mauritius’s major ethnic communities and a small but significant change altering the positions of the languages so that the Hindi demarcation now appeared above the Tamil demarcation. This alteration was seen as a sign of Hindu usurpation by many in Mauritius, both Tamil and non-Tamil alike (Bunwaree 2002). Demonstrations held in protest of the new currency shut down the capital of Port Louis for two days and resulted in the forced resignation of the governor and director general of the Central Bank as well as the removal of the bank notes from circulation at an estimated cost of over $2 million (Rs 58 million) to the Mauritian economy. 14. Prior to its implementation, the questionnaire was translated into French and Creole the two most widely spoken languages in Mauritius. This gave respondents the option of conducting the interview in either language. Two experienced translators worked independently to translate the questionnaire into both languages. These translations were then compared, edited, and synthesized in direct consultation with the translators. A language expert from the University of Mauritius then reviewed each of the final translations to ensure consistency in meaning. 15. Of those interviews not completed, 181 were non-responses and 58 were refusals or a non-response/refusal rate of 23 per cent. The remaining 4 interviews were terminated early by the respondent or the interviewer. 16. Latent variables are variables that are not directly observable and, therefore, cannot be measured directly. Multiple manifest or observable indicators are used instead as approximate indirect measures. Common examples of latent variables include social status, intelligence, and economic development (Bollen 1989). 17. Given the overlap between religion and ethnicity in Mauritius, respondents were first asked their religion prior to being asked their ethnicity. 18. In addition to political and economic resources, psychological motivations including self-esteem, social status, optimal distinctiveness, or uncertainty reduction are also emphasized in the literature (see, for example, Tajfel and Turner 1979; Horowitz 1985; Brewer 1991; Hogg 2005). Indeed, there is very suggestive evidence in this literature that collective identification is motivated primarily by the desire for ‘psychic satisfactions’ that come from positive social comparison potentially involving, but not limited to, the relative economic and/or political status of an ethnic group. 19. A number of criteria were used for defining the number of factors underlying these indicators: first, each factor had an eigenvalue over one and fell above the ‘break’ in scree test plots; second, each factor accounted for over 10 per cent of the common variance; and, third, the factor could be interpreted, i.e. at least three indicators loaded significantly on the factor, the factor has substantive meaning that is shared by the indicators, and indicators loading on other factors were distinct. 20. Ancillary analyses indicated the need for an additional parameter correlating the errors between access to homes and loans. The rationale for this specification is that access to housing is predicted, in part, by access to loans. 21. Tests of configural equivalence examine whether the groups being compared employ a similar conceptual framework. Tests of metric equivalence examine whether the slopes relating the observed variables to the corresponding latent construct differ significantly across groups. Detailed tables with results of these tests for the measures are available upon request. 22. Although specifying additional factors that contribute to a more complete explanation of variation in ethnic identification is beyond the scope of this paper, we are attracted by arguments that address the ‘assumed givens’ (Geertz 1963) of ethnic membership, most notably those that examine the relationship between social categorization and cognition (e.g. Jenkins 1994, 2000; Gil-White 1999; Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov 2004; Horowitz 2002). 23. Additional factors include lack of information about alternatives, costs of moving (transfer costs), and the strength of personal ties (see Hechter 1987, pp. 467).


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24. Alternatively, economic opportunities could be so available they require no signalling. 25. These perceptions are likely to be exacerbated by the relative lack of national coordination among Creole associations and organizations and by internal cleavages based on class and skin-tone within the Creole community (see Laville 2000; Boswell 2005). Hindus also have strong corporate groups with extensive ties of mutual commitments while Creole kin groups are less extensive and based on a stronger individualism (see Hollup 1993). These factors may contribute to the continuing popular support among many Creoles for the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM), a multiethnic political party which mobilizes on class rather than ethnic-based commonalities. 26. Where a collective good is defined by Olson (1965, p.14) as ‘any good such that if any person . . . in a group . . . consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from others in that group’.

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LYNN M. HEMPEL is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work at Mississippi State University. ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work, Mississippi State University, Mississippi State, MS 39762, USA. Email: [email protected]

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