Paper can be downloaded at: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~trp/belief-elicitation.030507.pdf. On Eliciting Beliefs in Strat
On Eliciting Beliefs in Strategic Games Thomas R. Palfrey and Stephanie W. Wang Division of Social Sciences, Caltech and Department of Economics, Princeton Paper can be downloaded at: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~trp/belief-elicitation.030507.pdf
CDFs of Individual Forecast Dispersion 100 Cumulative Probability (%)
90 80 70 Quadratic
60
Logarithmic
50
Linear
40
NS
30 20 10 0 0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Deviation from 50/50
• • • • •
Perfect calibration: slope = 1 All forecasters are overconfident (slope < 1) Quad and log better calibrated (0.4 > slope >0.3) Linear less well calibrated (slope = 0.16) N-S poorly calibrated (slope not significantly different from 0)
• CDFs of individual forecast dispersions • Stochastic dominance order of dispersion – linear > N-S > quad > log • Supports results 3a & 3b
