Predictive Validity of Goal Orientation and Personality ... - CiteSeerX

C 2006), pp. 769–785 Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol. 29, No. 6, December 2005 ( DOI: 10.1007/s10608-005-9637-6

Dysphoria and Self-Esteem Following an Achievement Event: Predictive Validity of Goal Orientation and Personality Style Theories of Vulnerability Julie E. Lindsay1 and Walter D. Scott1,2

B. M. Dykman (1998) proposed a goal orientation model of depression in which striving to prove self-worth in goal pursuits conferred depression vulnerability. This study replicated and extended the findings of B. M. Dykman (1998) by comparing goal orientation against 2 personality variables: autonomy and sociotropy. In a series of sessions around an achievement event, college students completed goal orientation, autonomy/sociotropy, and measures of dysphoria and self-esteem. For participants who were dissatisfied with the achievement outcome, a greater validation seeking goal orientation predicted increased dysphoria and decreased self-esteem. No such effects were found for autonomy or sociotropy. These findings provide support for the contention that the goal of validating self-worth confers vulnerability to dysphoria and self-esteem loss. KEY WORDS: goal orientation; performance/learning goals; autonomy/sociotropy; dysphoria/ depression.

In the personality and social psychology literatures, goal constructs provide an integrated account of human motivation, affect, and performance (Bandura, 1986, 1997; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1989; Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1999; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Emmons, 1986; Higgens, 1999; Karniol & Ross, 1996; Locke & Latham, 1990; Markus & Nurius, 1986). For instance, in both correlational and experimental studies, moderately challenging, specific, and proximal (or proximal combined with distal) goals have been shown to increase motivation, induce positive affect, and lead to optimal performance. Qualitative goal dimensions such as whether goals are viewed as end states to be approached (i.e., “I want to make more friends”) or avoided (i.e., “I don’t want to be lonely”) have also been investigated, with avoidance framing related to such negative outcomes as lower positive affect 1 University

of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming. should be directed to Walter D. Scott, Department of Psychology, University of Wyoming, P.O. Box 3415, Laramie, Wyoming 82071-3415; e-mail: [email protected].

2 Correspondence

769 C 2006 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 0147-5916/05/1200-0769/0

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and life satisfaction and increased physical distress and illness symptoms (Elliot & Sheldon, 1997). Goal representations have also attracted the interest of clinical researchers, who have investigated the role of goal dimensions and goal content in both dysphoria and depression vulnerability (Ahrens, 1987; Alden, Bieling, & Wallace, 1994; Flett, Hewitt, & Mittelstaedt, 1991; Hewitt & Flett, 1991; Kanfer & Zeiss, 1983; Rehm, 1977; Strauman, 1992). One important goal dimension that has only recently attracted the attention of clinical scientists is the extent to which desired futures are framed as performance or learning goals (Dweck, 2000). Performance goals are aims that focus on obtaining positive judgments of one’s attributes and abilities. Learning goals are aims that focus on developing skills and improving competencies. In the personality–social domain, Dweck and colleagues have conducted a number of naturalistic and experimental studies demonstrating the impact of performance and learning goals on motivation, cognition, affect, and performance (Dweck & Elliot, 1983; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliot & Dweck, 1988). Specifically, when lacking confidence, people who adopt performance goals show a helpless learning pattern in which they are more apt to avoid challenges, use poorer task strategies, denigrate self-abilities, feel badly, persist less, and perform worse. In contrast, even when lacking self-efficacy, people who adopt learning goals are more likely to exhibit a mastery-oriented response that includes seeking challenges, using more effective task strategies, making more solution-oriented self-instructions as opposed to low ability attributions, and feeling more engaged with the task and more positively overall (Dweck, 2000). Extending this work to the clinical domain, Dykman (1998) proposed a goalorientation model of depression. Specifically, Dykman (1998) argued that some people are prone to adopting performance goals across a wide variety of situations. In contrast to Dweck’s model, Dykman views these performance strivings as focused not so much on proving abilities as on proving self-worth. Referring to these tendencies as a validation seeking goal orientation (VS), Dykman argued that people with these goals seek “to prove or establish . . . basic worth, competence, and likeability” (p. 141) and “continually mine the world for information relevant to their worth, competence, and likeability” (p. 153). For VS individuals, then, performance situations are loaded because self-esteem is always on-the-line, contingent on successful performance. Not succeeding translates into appraisals of low self-worth and increased depression. In contrast, other people tend to adopt growth seeking goals (GS) and approach performance situations with a focus on developing potential and skill. For these individuals, poor performance does not call into question selfworth; rather, subpar performance is merely viewed as a learning experience that ultimately leads to self-betterment. Consequently, GS individuals are viewed as more resilient and as less likely to develop depression in response to poor performance. To measure these two goal orientations, Dykman (1998) developed the Goal Orientation Inventory (GOI). After reporting initial evidence supporting the convergent and discriminant validity of the GOI, Dykman conducted several additional studies investigating how goal orientation related to such variables as self-esteem, coping, and affective reactions. Specifically, he found that VS individuals reported

Goal Orientation and Autonomy/Sociotropy

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using fewer active coping strategies in response to stressful events, more anticipatory anxiety prior to a midterm examination, and greater self-esteem loss after imagining hypothetical negative life events. Finally, in a 7-week prospective study, he found that individuals high in VS endorsed more dysphoric symptoms but only when they also reported high levels of recently occurring negative life events. In addition to a need to replicate and extend the findings of Dykman (1998), we also wanted to directly compare goal orientation and two personality diatheses that have received extensive attention in the literature (Beck, 1967, 1983; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Coyne & Whiffen, 1995). Beck (1983) uses the terms sociotropy and autonomy to describe these two personality diatheses. Sociotropy refers to the “person’s investment in positive interchange with other people” (Beck, 1983, p. 273). The sociotropic individual values interpersonal relations excessively and is dependent on others for validating self-worth. In contrast, autonomy refers to an “investment in preserving and increasing . . . independence, mobility, and personal rights; freedom of choice, action, and expression; protection of [his] domain; . . . and attaining meaningful goals” (1983, p. 276). Therefore, the autonomous individual values independence and self-determination excessively, and he or she is gratified through the attainment of goals. Beck’s theory specifies a congruency hypothesis that states that these two personality diatheses are vulnerable to different classes of negative life events. Specifically, sociotropic individuals become depressed after interpersonal rejection, whereas autonomous individuals become depressed following achievement-related failures (Beck, 1983). Recent reviews of the congruency hypothesis specified by personality style theories have been mixed (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Coyne & Whiffen, 1995; Gotlib & Hammen, 2002; Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998). This is not surprising as the support for the predictions of personality style theory have also been mixed, with some studies finding evidence of personality style-life event congruence (e.g., Hammen, Ellicott, Gitlin, & Jamison, 1989; Segal, Shaw, Vella, & Katz, 1992), and other studies only finding partial support or none (e.g., Kwon & Whisman, 1998; Mazure, Raghavan, Maciejewski, Jacobs, & Bruce, 2001; Robins, Hayes, Block, Kramer, & Villena, 1995). In their review of the sociotropy and autonomy literature, Coyne and Whiffen (1995) noted this inconsistency and argued that the empirical findings suggested a third variable confounded with personality style might actually be the putative force leading to depression. We believe that one candidate for a third variable is goal orientation. Both the sociotropy and autonomy constructs contain multiple facets. For instance, sociotropy emphasizes excessive concerns about what others think, dependency, and pleasing others. However, we argue that what is most critical in terms of depression vulnerability is not that someone possesses an excessive concern for interpersonal events but why someone might possess such an excessive concern. In short, we propose that when the sociotropic motive is to prove or validate self-worth then, and only then, does sociotropy function to increase depression vulnerability in the context of negative interpersonal events. That is, we suggest that to the extent an excessive concern with interpersonal domains is motivated by a validation seeking goal orientation one is vulnerable to depression.

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A similar argument is made for autonomy. As was the case with sociotropy, autonomy includes multiple facets as well, including perfectionism, self-criticism, need for control, and defensive separation (Robins et al., 1994). However, we propose that autonomy functions as a depression vulnerability variable to the extent that autonomous motives are pursued to validate self-worth. In sum, we suggest that both the sociotropy and autonomy constructs appear to include meaning elements that emphasize a VS goal orientation, in that both view self-esteem as contingent on successful performance in social or achievement domains respectively. We propose that the emphasis the two personality diatheses place on excessive valuing of either social or achievement domains is not the essential component that increases depression vulnerability. Rather, we argue that it is the quality of the goal pursued— to prove self-worth or to learn—that makes one more or less vulnerable to depression. The goal orientation theory of depression is similar to the self-worth contingency model of depression proposed by Kuiper and Olinger (1989). Although the self-worth contingency model focuses on dysfunctional attitudes as opposed to goal orientation, the model similarly emphasizes those specific dysfunctional attitudes that make self-worth dependent on the occurrence of positive external outcomes, such as social acceptance and successful achievement. If someone possesses the belief that he or she is not worthwhile unless someone accepts them or unless they succeed at some important achievement task, it appears probable that this person might enter these situations with the goal of gaining acceptance or success to prove self-worth. Therefore, this study had four major goals. First, we wanted to replicate the findings of Dykman (1998) supporting VS as a cognitive vulnerability for dysphoria when activated by stressful events. In this study, the stressful event was an achievement event: participants’ overall evaluation of their midterm exam scores for the previous week. A VS goal orientation was predicted to be associated with higher levels of dysphoria but only when participants expressed dissatisfaction with exam scores. Second, we also predicted that when people were dissatisfied with their exam scores VS would predict reduced self-esteem. Third, we wanted to provide another test of the personality style congruency hypothesis, namely to examine whether autonomy would outperform sociotropy with an achievement event in predicting increased dysphoria and decreased self-esteem. Finally, if we find evidence supporting both a goal orientation and personality style vulnerability for any outcome, we will predict that the predictive validity of personality style will be significantly diminished when goal orientation is statistically controlled.

METHOD Participants There were three assessment sessions over the course of 2 weeks. Time 1 (T1) occurred during the week prior to midterm exams in participant’s introductory psychology classes, Time 2 (T2) took place within 2–3 days of completing the exam,


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and Time 3 (T3) occurred a week following T2. One hundred and fifty-two introductory psychology students participated in the first session in return for research participation credit. Of those participants, 132 attended the second session. Finally, 129 participants (37 males and 92 females) attended all three sessions. Participants were between the ages of 17 and 35 (M = 19.09, SD = 2.14). Although ethnicity was not assessed, the sample from which the participants were drawn are 92% Caucasion, 3% Hispanic, 1% African American, 1% American Indian, 1% Asian, and 2% Other.

Measures Goal Orientation Inventory (GOI) The GOI (Dykman, 1998) contains 36 items that assess the degree to which an individual is validation seeking (VS) or growth seeking (GS). There are 18 items that assess the degree of VS and 18 items that assess GS. Participants respond to each question on a 7-point Likert scale. Scoring is accomplished by taking the total score for the GS items and subtracting that number from the VS total. Therefore, high scores on the GOI indicate greater VS tendencies. Dykman’s (1998) results supported the predicted unidimensionality of both subscales and provided evidence that the total goal orientation score has higher predictive validity. Initial evidence also supported the reliability and the validity of the GOI. Specifically, Chronbach’s α for both subscales were found to be above .95 in both an initial and a replication sample. In a study in which participants completed the GOI twice 10 weeks apart, the test–retest reliability for both scales was in the range of .80. Finally, the GOI subscales were found to be significantly correlated with measures of similar constructs (e.g., GS: self-actualization, self-esteem, and task persistence; VS: anxiety and depression) and uncorrelated or minimally correlated with measures of unrelated constructs (e.g., authoritarianism, math, and verbal ability), demonstrating acceptable convergent and discriminant validity. The GOI was administered during T1. Personal Style Inventory—II (PSI-II) Robins et al. (1994) developed the PSI-II to assess the constructs of autonomy and sociotropy. Autonomy is measured by three achievement subscales consisting of “perfectionism, need for control, and defensive separation [from others]” (Robins, Bagby, Rector, Lynch, & Kennedy, 1997, p. 289). Three interpersonal subscales that include “concern over what others think, dependency, and pleasing others” measure the construct of sociotropy (Robins et al., 1997, p. 289). Participants responded to the 48 statements on a 6-point Likert scale. Previous research has found the autonomy and sociotropy scales and subscales (with the possible exception of the perfectionism, self-criticism subscale for autonomy) to have good internal consistency, construct validity, and test–retest reliability (Bagby, Parker, Joffe, Schuller, & Gilchrist, 1998; Robins et al., 1994, 1997). The PSI-II was administered during the T1 session.

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Beck Depression Inventory—II (BDI-II) The BDI-II is a widely used measure of dysphoric symptoms with adequate reliability and validity in both clinical and nonclinical student populations (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988; Dozios, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998; Steer, Ball, Ranieri, & Beck, 1997; Steer & Clark, 1997; Whisman, Perez, & Ramel, 2000). The BDI-II was administered during all three sessions. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) The RSES contains 10 items that assess self-esteem as a unidimensional construct, where higher scores reflect greater levels of self-esteem (Gray-Little, Williams, & Hankcock, 1997; Hensely & Roberts, 1976; Rosenberg, 1965). Research has found the scale to have good reliability and validity as an overall measure of self-esteem (Gray-Little et al., 1997). The RSES was administered during all three sessions. Exam Satisfaction Scale To measure participant’s satisfaction with their recent midterm exam performances, they were asked to evaluate their score for their midterm psychology exam after this score was given to them for the first time by the experimenters. In addition, participants were asked to write the scores for and evaluate their satisfaction with each midterm exam performance they had received in the past week. Specifically, for each exam, participants were asked to report the score they had received and they were then asked to indicate “how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with this score?” Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale with 1 representing not at all satisfied, 3 representing neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and 5 representing very satisfied. A mean satisfaction with exam scores (ES) was calculated for all responses and was used in all analyses. As the vulnerabilities for goal orientation and personality style are theorized to only be activated under negative life event appraisals, we used the overall mean exam satisfaction score to identify two groups: those below 3 (dissatisfied group) and those above 3 (satisfied group). Therefore, exam satisfaction was coded dichotomously for all analyses. As participants who scored exactly “3” were not dissatisfied with their midterm performance, they were classified with the satisfied group. There were 60 participants who indicated overall satisfaction with their midterm performances (M = 4.07, SD = 0.76) and 72 participants who indicated overall dissatisfaction with their midterm performances (M = 1.48, SD = 0.52).

Design and Procedure For all sessions, the presentation order of the measures was counterbalanced with 4 orders possible. All sessions were run in groups consisting of approximately 30 participants.


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T1 Session In the T1 session, the experimenter first described the general purpose of the study and then asked each participant to read and sign a consent form. In T1, each participant was asked to complete the GOI, the PSI-II, the BDI-II, and the RSES the week before a scheduled exam in their Introduction to Psychology classes. Participants were allowed 60 min to complete the measures. T2 Session On the day of the midterm psychology exam or within a few days immediately following this exam, participants appeared for a second session. In this T2 session, participants were provided for the first time with their midterm psychology exam scores. They then completed a second BDI-II and RSES as well as the Exam Satisfaction Scale. T3 Session Approximately 2 weeks after T1 and within a week following T2, participants completed a third BDI-II and RSES. A full debriefing was then provided.

RESULTS Overview Descriptive Statistics The means and standard deviations of all variables for all three experimental sessions are presented in Table I. Missing values were replaced with the individual’s mean score on the particular measure or subscale that corresponded with the missing value. Specifically, where one item was missing on any of the measures, a mean replacement was used. On the PSI-II, mean replacements were employed in 11 participants according to the specific scale. On the BDI-II at T2 and T3 and on the RSES T2 and T3, one mean replacement occurred for one item among four different participants. For the GOI, a mean replacement was used according to the mean on the GS or VS scale and occurred in seven participants. There was one significant difference by gender, with females (M = 92.6) endorsing higher levels of sociotropy than males (M = 83.0). In Table II, Pearson’s product–moment correlation coefficients are reported for all variables. GS and VS were significantly negatively correlated (r = −.45, p < .01), replicating Dykman’s (1998) findings and providing further support for notion that these constructs are not independent. Therefore, for all subsequent analyses using the GOI, we will use the total score, in which higher scores indicate a greater validation seeking goal orientation.

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Lindsay and Scott Table I. Means and Standard Deviations Variable Goal orientation inventory Validation seeking score Growth seeking score Total goal orientation score Personal strivings inventory—II Sociotropy score Autonomy score Beck depression inventory—II Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Rosenberg self-esteem Scale Time 1 Time 2 Time 3

M

SD

54.41a 87.02b −32.61c

23.19 18.80 35.84

89.34 80.01

16.68 14.99

8.30a 8.13a 6.32b

6.56 8.17 6.99

55.30 54.54a 56.70b

9.20 10.68 10.63

Note. Ns range from 131–152 because of missing data; means with different subscripts differ significantly at p < .05.

Data Analytic Strategy To determine whether goal orientation and personality style led to an increase in dysphoria and to a decrease in self-esteem following a negative achievement-related event,3 hierarchical multiple regressions were computed with the relevant BDI-II and RSES change scores between T1 and T2 and T1 and T3 as the dependent measures. As described earlier, ES was dummy coded for the regression into dissatisfied (M < 3.0) and satisfied groups (M ≥ 3.0). Both goal orientation and the personality style variables—sociotropy and autonomy—were centered prior to being entered in the analyses. As goal orientation and personality style are both viewed as possessing goal orientation components, and including them in the same regression would suppress the critical variance we view as contributing to changes in our outcome variables, separate hierarchical regressions were computed. For each set of hierarchical regressions, two dependent measures were examined, T1 and T2 and T1 and T3 change scores for both dysphoria (BDI-II) and self-esteem (RSES). In the first set of hierarchical regressions examining the role of GOI, GOI and ES were entered in the first step and the GOI and ES interaction term was entered in the second step. In the second set of hierarchical regressions examining the role of autonomy, autonomy and ES were entered in the first step and the autonomy and ES interaction score was entered in the second step. In the third set of hierarchical regressions examining the role of sociotropy, sociotropy and ES were entered in the first step, the sociotropy and ES interaction term was entered in the second step, 3 Because

of their not being as germane to the main objectives of the study, we did not include a description or analyses of two additional outcome measures (i.e., negative mood and psychological well-being). Although there was one exception, the overall pattern of results was identical to those reported for dysphoria and self-esteem.


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Table II. Correlations Between Predictors and Dependent Measures

Dysphoric symptoms 1. BDI T1 Self-Esteem 2. RSES T1 Goal orientation inventory 3. GOI score Personal style inventory—II 4. Sociotropy (SOC) 5. Autonomy (AUT) Exam satisfaction 6. Total satisfaction with score

1

2

3

4

5

6

—

—

—

—

—

—

−.57∗∗

—

—

—

—

—

.50∗∗

−.74∗∗

—

—

—

—

.36∗∗ .33∗∗

−.46∗∗ −.34∗∗

.55∗∗ .39∗∗

— .34∗∗

— —

— —

−.07

—

−.09

−.04

.16

.10

Note. All N = 152 except those with Exam Satisfaction, where N = 132. ∗∗ p < .001.

and third step testing a possible interaction between sociotropy, ES, and gender was also computed. For all of the above analyses, whenever interaction terms were significant, the predicted model was graphically displayed in order to reveal the nature of the interaction (J. Cohen & P. Cohen, 1983). Goal Orientation Table III presents the summary statistics for the hierarchical multiple regression analyses involving goal orientation. Table III. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Goal Orientation Step R2 change

Predictors

β

sr2

T1–T2 BDI-II change scores ES GOI ES × GOI

−.29∗∗ −.04 −.17∗

.09∗∗ .00 .03∗

−3.46∗∗ −0.43 −2.07∗

.09∗∗

T1–T2 RSES change scores ES GOI ES × GOI

.07 −.05 .33

.00 .00 .02

0.74 −0.56 1.42

.00

T1–T3 BDI-II change scores ES GOI ES × GOI

−.22∗ .05 −.59∗

.05∗ .00 .05∗

−2.46∗ 0.57 −2.59∗

.05∗

T1–T3 RSES change scores ES GOI ES × GOI

.16 −.04 .47∗

.03 .00 .03∗

1.81 −0.49 2.03∗

.03

t

.03∗

.02

.05∗

.03∗

Note. Ns range from 128 to 131 because of missing data; β: standardized regression coefficient; sr2 : squared semi-partial correlation. ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01.

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Role of GOI in Predicting Changes in Dysphoria The first specific prediction tested was that for participants who were dissatisfied with their midterm exam performance, those with a higher GOI (higher VS) would indicate an increase in dysphoric symptoms. This hypothesis was supported for both T1–T2 and T1–T3 changes in dysphoria. Specifically, for T1–T2 changes in dysphoric symptoms, the first step of the hierarchical multiple regression that included main effects for ES and GOI was significant, F (2, 128) = 6.25, p < .01, although within this step GOI was not a significant predictor of BDI-II change. However, as predicted, the second step testing the interaction between GOI and ES was also significant, F (1, 127) = 4.29, p < .05, accounting for an additional 3% of the variance in depressive symptom change. For T1–T3 changes in dysphoric symptoms, the first step testing the main effects of ES and GOI was again significant, F (2, 126) = 3.09, p < .05, although once again within this step GOI was not a significant predictor of BDI-II change. As predicted, however, the second step again revealed a significant interaction between ES and GOI, F (1, 125) = 6.72, p < .01, accounting for an additional 5% of the variance in dysphoric symptom change. For both T1–T2 and T1–T3 changes in dysphoric symptoms, graphic displays of the interactions (J. Cohen & P. Cohen, 1983) revealed that for individuals who were dissatisfied with their exam scores, higher GOI scores (greater VS) were associated with larger increases in dysphoric symptoms. Figure 1 provides a graph of this interaction for T1–T3 changes in dysphoria. In interpreting the graph, it is important to note that as the graph represents T1–T3 change scores, a relative increase in T3 dysphoria is represented by a negative as opposed to a positive sloping line (e.g., a T1 BDI-II of 3 and a T3 BDI-II of 9 would equal −6). Role of GOI in Predicting Changes in Self-Esteem

T1-T3 BDI-II Change Score

The prediction was that for participants who were dissatisfied with their midterm exam scores, those with a higher validation-seeking goal orientation would show greater losses of self-esteem. For T2 changes in self-esteem, neither the main 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5

Dissatisfied Satisfied

-2

-1

0

1

2

GOI in SD Units

Fig. 1. Changes in T3 dysphoria as a function of goal orientation and exam satisfaction.

T1-T3 RSES Change Score


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7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7

Dissatisfied Satisfied

-2

-1

0 GOI in SD Units

1

2

Fig. 2. Changes in T3 self-esteem as a function of goal orientation and exam satisfaction.

effect terms in the first step, F (2, 129) = 0.40, ns, nor the predicted interaction between GOI and ES in the second step, F (1, 128) = 2.02, ns, were significant. However, for T3 changes in self-esteem, although the main effect terms in the first step were not significant, F (2, 126) = 1.70, ns, the predicted interaction between GOI and ES was significant in the second step, F (1, 125) = 4.14, p < .05, accounting for 3% of the variance in self-esteem change. The interaction revealed that for individuals who were dissatisfied with their exam scores, a greater validation seeking goal orientation was associated with a greater loss of self-esteem (see Fig. 2 for a graph of T3 changes in self-esteem, although in this case a positive sloping line indicates a decrease in self-esteem: e.g., T1 RSES of 55 − T3 RSES of 48 = +7). Autonomy Table IV presents the summary statistics for the hierarchical multiple regression analyses involving autonomy. Role of Autonomy in Predicting Changes in Dysphoria Given that the nature of the event was achievement related, personality style theory would predict that for participants who were dissatisfied with their midterm exam performance, those with higher autonomy would experience greater increases in dysphoric symptoms. As shown in Table IV, these hypotheses were not supported. For T1–T2 changes in dysphoric symptoms, the first step of the hierarchical multiple regression that included main effects for ES and Autonomy was significant, F (2, 128) = 7.84, p < .01, although within that step autonomy was not a significant predictor of dysphoric change. However, the second step testing the predicted interaction between ES and autonomy was not significant, F (1, 127) = 2.57, ns. For T1–

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Lindsay and Scott Table IV. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Autonomy Step R2 change

Predictors

β

sr2

T1–T2 BDI-II change scores ES Autonomy ES × Autonomy

−.30∗∗ −.02 −.23

.09∗∗ .00 .02

−3.48∗∗ −0.20 −1.59

.09∗∗

T1–T2 RSES change scores ES Autonomy ES × Autonomy

.06 −.01 .14

.00 .00 .01

0.70 −0.09 0.97

.00

T1–T3 BDI-II change scores ES Autonomy ES × Autonomy

−.21∗ −.03 −.27

.05∗ .00 .03

−2.46∗ −0.32 −1.90

.05

T1–T3 RSES change scores ES Autonomy ES × Autonomy

.15 .07 .09

.02 .01 .00

1.72 0.84 0.62

.03

t

.02

.00

.03

.00

Note. Ns range from 128 to 131 because of missing data; β: standardized regression coefficient; sr2 : squared semi-partial correlation. ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01.

T3 changes in dysphoric symptoms, the first step testing the main effects of ES and Autonomy was again significant, F (2, 126) = 4.07, p < .05, and as previously within that step autonomy was not a significant predictor of dysphoria change. Although close to significance, the second step testing the predicted interaction between ES and autonomy was again not significant, F (1, 125) = 3.72, p = .06. Role of Autonomy in Predicting Changes in Self-Esteem Given that the event was achievement-related, the prediction was that for participants who were dissatisfied with their midterm exam scores, those with a more autonomy-oriented personality style would show greater losses of self-esteem. However, as shown in Table IV, none of the main effect terms or predicted interactions was significant for either T2 or T3 changes in self-esteem. Specifically, for T1–T2 changes in self-esteem, the first step of the hierarchical multiple regression that included main effects for ES and Autonomy was not significant, F (2, 129) = 0.49, ns, nor was the second step testing the predicted interaction between ES and autonomy, F (1, 128) = 0.32, ns. For T1–T3 changes in self-esteem, the first step testing the main effects of ES and Autonomy was significant, F (2, 126) = 3.34, p < .05, although as before within that step autonomy was not a significant predictor. However, the second step testing the predicted interaction between ES and autonomy was again not significant, F (1, 125) = 0.50, ns. Sociotropy Given that we did not make predictions for sociotropy, we do not provide a table summarizing the statistics for the hierarchical multiple regression analyses involving sociotropy.


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Role of Sociotropy in Predicting Changes in Dysphoria Given that the nature of the event was achievement-related, personality style theory would not predict that sociotropy would be able to account for changes in dysphoric symptoms. For T1–T2 changes in dysphoric symptoms, the first step of the hierarchical multiple regression that included main effects for ES and sociotropy was significant, F (2, 128) = 8.09, p < .001, although within this step sociotropy was not a significant predictor of BDI-II change. The second step testing the predicted interaction between ES and sociotropy was not significant, F (1, 127) = 2.57, ns. The third step testing a three-way interaction between ES, sociotropy, and gender was also not significant, F (1, 126) = 0.53, ns. Similarly, the same three steps were tested for T1–T3 changes in dysphoria with significant findings at the first step, F (2, 126) = 4.07, p < .05), although within that step sociotropy was not significant, and nonsignificant findings at both the second, F (1, 125) = 0.58, ns, and the third steps, F (1, 124) = 0.006, ns. Role of Sociotropy in Predicting Changes in Self-Esteem As with dysphoria, given that the stressful event was achievement-related, personality style theory would not predict that sociotropy would account for changes in self-esteem. This is what we found. For T1–T2 changes in self-esteem, the first step of the hierarchical regression testing main effects of ES and sociotropy, F (2, 129) = 1.18, ns, the second step testing the interaction between ES and sociotropy, F (1, 128) = 0.24, ns, and the third step testing the interaction between ES, sociotropy, and gender, F (1, 127) = 1.99, ns, were all nonsignificant. Similarly, for T1–T3 changes in self-esteem, the first step of the hierarchical regression testing main effects of ES and sociotropy (F (2, 126) = 2.95, ns, the second step testing the interaction between ES and sociotropy, F (1, 125) = 0.40, ns, and the third step testing the ES, sociotropy, and gender interaction were all nonsignificant, F (1, 124) = 1.92, ns. DISCUSSION Our study had a number of purposes. First, we attempted to replicate the main finding of Dykman (1998) in which VS predicted dysphoria in the context of stressful life events. In fact, we found that individuals who endorsed greater VS goal orientations reported larger increases in dysphoric symptoms at both T2 and T3 but only when they were dissatisfied with their exam performances. Overall, these results provide further support for Dykman’s (1998) original hypothesis regarding the relationship between goal orientation and dysphoria, and for the classification of a validation seeking goal orientation as a cognitive vulnerability to dysphoria when activated by stressful events. Second, we examined a validation seeking goal orientation as a vulnerability for changes in self-esteem. Although the predicted interaction did not occur when predicting T2 changes in self-esteem, those with a validation seeking goal orientation who were dissatisfied with their midterm exam scores did endorse greater

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decrements in T3 self-esteem. Therefore, a validation seeking goal orientation combined with midterm dissatisfaction appeared to have a delayed impact on selfesteem. This is interesting because a validation seeking goal orientation was a cognitive vulnerability for both immediate and delayed dysphoric reactions. Third, we investigated whether autonomy and sociotropy interacted with an achievement-related event (midterm exam performance) in predicting changes in dysphoria and self-esteem. Given that the event examined in this study was achievement-related, personality style theory would predict that autonomy would outperform sociotropy. However, with the exception of one marginally significant interaction with midterm exam satisfaction for T3 dysphoria, neither autonomy nor sociotropy were found to have main effect or interaction effects on either dysphoria or self-esteem. Further, it is important to note that goal orientation outperformed autonomy in predicting both dysphoria and self-esteem change. The current results may provide some clarification for the sociotropy and autonomy literature. Despite numerous studies investigating these personality constructs and their predicted interactions with life events in conferring depression vulnerability, the empirical data has been equivocal in its support (Coyne & Whiffen, 1995; Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991). Both the autonomy and sociotropy constructs include meaning elements that may overlap with a VS goal orientation, in that both view self-esteem as contingent on successful performance in achievement and social domains respectively. The difficulty is that neither the autonomy nor sociotropy constructs has items that sufficiently tap the motivation for valuing those domains. In a study that used an alternative measure of autonomy/sociotropy (i.e., Sociotropy–Autonomy Scale; Beck, Epstein, & Harrison, 1983), Mazure et al. (2001) found that “concern about disapproval” was the critical factor in sociotropy that directly predicted clinical depression. An examination of the items of this subscale reveals the similarity of this factor to the VS goal construct: “I am concerned that if people knew my faults or weaknesses they would not like me,” “If somebody criticizes my appearance, I feel I am not attractive to other people.” We believe the goal orientation construct may provide a reason as to why individuals excessively fear and monitor disapproval from others: namely, that their self-worth is dependent on approval. However, these items do not allow one to make the inference that the reason people are concerned about being disliked or feeling unattractive is that their self-worth is dependent on being liked and feeling attractive. We see a number of future directions for this line of research. One obvious direction is to investigate goal orientation as a cognitive vulnerability for clinical depression. If goal orientation emerges as a cognitive vulnerability for clinically defined depression, then this would have practical implications for focusing on goal framing in psychotherapy and the excessive need for self-validation. In addition, there is a need to investigate whether goal orientation interacts with negative interpersonal events, such as rejection, in predicting changes in dysphoria and selfesteem. Finally, we believe that additional research needs to be conducted examining the extent to which people’s goal orientations are consistent across domains. Dykman’s model presents goal orientation as a trait-dispositional construct and confines it to mean-level tendencies that operate across domains. In contrast, Carol


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Dweck’s work on judgment and learning goals, which inspired Dykman’s goal orientation theory of depression, is reflective of other social cognitive personality conceptualizations in explicitly recognizing that there may well be considerable and meaningful variability across domains (Grant & Dweck, 1999). For example, one may very well adopt a GS goal orientation when learning about the American Transcendentalists (achievement domain) yet adopt a VS goal orientation when interacting with an acquaintance (social domain). Indeed, it is quite possible that there is meaningful variation even within domains (e.g., different goal orientations when interacting with John than with Jane). In terms of understanding depression vulnerability, a social cognitive personality assessment approach would argue for a more bottomup and person-in-context assessment strategy than the Goal Orientation Inventory currently permits (Cervone, Shadel, & Jencius, 2001). A more context-sensitive assessment strategy might also be of more practical use to the clinician, who could then examine how domain specific VS goal orientations might account for problematic depressive reactions with certain types of life events (e.g., social, achievement, etc.). In conclusion, we found further support for Dykman’s (1998) original hypotheses regarding the influence of goal orientation on depression. Specifically, the results replicated his findings that individuals with greater VS goal orientation tendencies exhibited greater vulnerability to dysphoria following a negative achievement event. As Dykman (1998) noted, goal constructs have not been a primary focus of cognitively oriented research in depression. Yet the ways in which individuals mentally represent desired futures has been related to many of the affective, motivational, and cognitive characteristics frequently observed in clinical depression. Along with Dykman’s findings, our results lend further support to Dykman’s appeal for more investigations into the possible role of motivational cognition in the etiology of depression. REFERENCES Ahrens, A. xH. (1987). Theories of depression: The role of goals and the self-evaluation process. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 11, 665–680. Alden, L. E., Bieling, P. J., & Wallace, S. T. (1994). Perfectionism in an interpersonal context: A selfregulation analysis of dysphoria and social anxiety. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 18, 297–316. Bagby, R. M., Parker, J. D. A., Joffe, R. T., Schuller, D., & Gilchrist, E. (1998). Confirmatory factor analysis fo the revised Personal Style Inventory (PSI). Assessment, 5, 31–43. Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York: Freeman. Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinical, experimental, and theoretical aspects. New York: Harper and Row. Beck, A. T. (1983). Cognitive therapy of depression: New perspectives. In: P. J. Clayton & J. E. Barrett (Eds.), Treatment of depression: Old controversies and new approaches (pp. 265–290). New York: Raven Press. Beck, A. T., Epstein, N., & Harrison, R. (1983). Cognitions, attitudes, and personality dimensions in depression. British Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 1, 1–16. Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Garbin, M. (1988). Psychometric properties of the BDI: Twenty five years of evaluation. Clinical Psychology Review, 8, 77–100. Cantor, N., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1989). Social intelligence and cognitive assessments of personality. In: R. S. Wyer Jr. & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (pp. 1–59). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: A control process view. Psychological Review, 97, 19–35.

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