Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Strengthened Political

VOLUME 17 ISSUE 3

Organizational Cultures An International Journal

_________________________________________________________________________

The Results of a “Fighting Politician”? Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Strengthened Political Leadership and Changes in Japanese National Security Policy LEE HAE-IN AND BENEDICT E. DEDOMINICIS

ORGANIZATION-STUDIES.COM

EDITOR

Peter Kell, Charles Darwin University, Australia

MANAGING EDITOR

McCall Macomber, Common Ground Research Networks, USA

ADVISORY BOARD

Angel Algarra, Universidad CEU San Pablo, Spain Zainal Ariffin, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Malaysia David Boyd, Northeastern University, USA Rob Brooks, Monash University, Australia Bruce Cronin, University of Greenwich Business School, UK Cristina Elorza, Universidad CEU San Pablo, Spain Andrea Fried, Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany David Gurteen, Gurteen Knowledge, UK Sabine Hoffmann, American University of the Middle East, Kuwait Stavros Ioannides, Panteion University, Greece Margaret Jackson, RMIT University, Australia Devon Jensen, Georgia Southern University, USA Martyn Laycock, University of Greenwich, UK Jennifer Rindfleish, University of New England, Australia Alexandra Roth, Northeastern University, USA Claudia Schmitz, Cenandu Learning Agency, Germany Kirpal Singh, Singapore Management University, Singapore Dave Snowden, Cognitive Edge Pte, LTD, USA David Szabla, The George Washington University, USA Alan Zaremba, Northeastern University, USA

PEER REVIEW

Articles published in Organizational Cultures: An International Journal are peer reviewed by scholars who are active participants of the Organization Studies Research Network or a thematically related Research Network. Reviewers are acknowledged in the corresponding volume of the journal. For a full list of past and current reviewers, please visit www.organization-studies.com/journals/editors.

ARTICLE SUBMISSION

Organizational Cultures: An International Journal publishes quarterly (March, June, September, December). To find out more about the submission process, please visit www.organization-studies.com/journals/call-for-papers.

ABSTRACTING AND INDEXING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

www.organization-studies.com ISSN: 2327-8013 (Print) ISSN: 2327-932X (Online) doi:10.18848/2327-8013/CGP (Journal)

First published by Common Ground Research Networks in 2017 University of Illinois Research Park 2001 South First Street, Suite 202 Champaign, IL 61820 USA Ph: +1-217-328-0405 http://cgnetworks.org Organizational Cultures: An International Journal is a peer-reviewed, scholarly journal.

COPYRIGHT

© 2017 (individual papers), the author(s) © 2017 (selection and editorial matter), Common Ground Research Networks All rights reserved. Apart from fair dealing for the purposes of study, research, criticism, or review, as permitted under the applicable copyright legislation, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process without written permission from the publisher. For permissions and other inquiries, please contact [email protected].

For a full list of databases in which this journal is indexed, please visit www.organization-studies.com/journals/collection.

RESEARCH NETWORK MEMBERSHIP

Authors in Organizational Cultures: An International Journal are members of the Organization Studies Research Network or a thematically related Research Network. Members receive access to journal content. To find out more, visit www.organization-studies.com/about/become-a-member.

SUBSCRIPTIONS

Organizational Cultures: An International Journal is available in electronic and print formats. Subscribe to gain access to content from the current year and the entire backlist. Contact us at [email protected].

ORDERING

Single articles and issues are available from the journal bookstore at www.cgscholar.com.

HYBRID OPEN ACCESS

Organizational Cultures: An International Journal is Hybrid Open Access, meaning authors can choose to make their articles open access. This allows their work to reach an even wider audience, broadening the dissemination of their research. To find out more, please visit www.organization-studies.com/journals/open-access-articles.

DISCLAIMER

The authors, editors, and publisher will not accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may have been made in this publication. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein. Common Ground Research Networks, a member of Crossref

The Results of a “Fighting Politician”?: Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Strengthened Political Leadership and Changes in Japanese National Security Policy Lee Hae-in,1 Catholic University of Korea, South Korea Benedict E. DeDominicis, Catholic University of Korea, South Korea Abstract: Since 2012 Japan’s security policy toward China has changed when compared to Shinzo Abe’s first tenure in 2006. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s charismatic leadership is an important factor explaining this change. Abe faltered in his first term because he failed to win public trust due to poor leadership. When he returned to power in 2012, Abe strengthened his political authority by utilizing dynamic international and domestic situations more fruitfully. Abe effectively used the conditions of changing international order, especially China’s rise that created public concerns and defense budget reduction of the United States to normalize Japan’s military power. Abe also achieved equal footing with the United States. Domestically, while Abe appointed politicians with similar views, he included several non-LDP politicians to avoid the stigma of having a “cabinet of friends.” The LDP-CGP coalition’s expanded decisional latitude combined with the Abe-centered cabinet contributed to achieving Shinzo Abe’s political aims. Keywords: Shinzo Abe, Japan, China

Introduction

S

ince 1989, Japanese Prime Ministers Toshiki Kaifu, Ryutaro Hashimoto, Yoshiro Mori, and Junichiro Koizumi won consecutive terms in power. Their successor, Shinzo Abe, experienced a political hiatus between his first and second term. Despite his first political defeat, Abe won re-election as Prime Minister. Shinzo Abe’s total tenure is now second only to Koizumi among postwar Japanese prime ministers as of this writing. How was Abe able to perform so successfully in the political arena, at least on the metric of length of time in office? Wakamiya Yoshibumi insists that relations among regional countries triggered the launch of the current Abe Cabinet (enumerated in Appendix A). “South Korean president Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Dokdo [Dok Island] functioned as the hop, the Chinese provocation around Senkaku Islands functioned as the skip, and North Korean’s missile launch functioned as the jump” for launching the Abe era (Curtis, Yoshibumi, and Park 2013, 42). As of June 1, 2016, Abe’s second term has lasted 1,235 days, for a total of 1,601 days in power including his first, much briefer, term. The article begins with an overview of the concept of domestic political charisma as a factor in the foreign policy-making process. It then presents this individual leadership element as significantly derivative of the dynamic context of the interaction of factors determining foreign policy. These contextual factors operate at the state and international systemic levels of analysis (Waltz 1959). It analyzes public charisma from the perspective of it being a political behavior pattern manifesting itself in the Japanese policy-making process. This case study responds to the political leadership literature that views public charisma as an intrinsic individual characteristic of senior professional politicians (Burrett 2016). In industrialized democracies public charisma emerges as a demonstrated, enhanced public support mobilization capability. It manifests itself in 1 Corresponding Author: Lee Hae-in, 37, Gongdan 1-daero 196beon-gil, Siheung-si, Gyeonggi-do, South Korea, 15112, email: [email protected]

Organizational Cultures: An International Journal Volume 17, Issue 3, 2017, www.organization-studies.com © Common Ground Research Networks, Lee Hae-in, Benedict E. DeDominicis, All Rights Reserved Permissions: [email protected] ISSN: 2327-8013 (Print), ISSN: 2327-932X (Online) http://doi.org/10.18848/2327-8013/CGP/v17i03/1-25 (Article)

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

the state policy-making process during periods of accelerating national and international systemic change. These change factors include the rise of China and Japanese public discontent with relative economic stagnation since the end of the Cold War and the early 1990s financial crisis. The article presents how Shinzo Abe’s power acquisition and policy initiatives reflect the dynamic interaction of these circumstances functioning at Waltz’s three levels (i.e. “images”) of analysis. The article concludes that Abe has thereby overseen an adaptive normalization in realist terms of Japanese foreign policy that has accelerated during his tenure.

Figure 1: Japanese Prime Ministers’ Days in Office Since 1989 Source: “安倍総理の予定 —首相官邸 ” [Prime Minister’s Plan—Prime Minister’s Office] n.d.

Charisma Studies of the evolution of Japanese national security policy mainly consider international factors as a prime cause of policy change. Christopher W. Hughes (2009) argues that China’s rise molded Japan’s engagement strategy toward China. Mochizuki (2007) insists that Japan should disengage from “friendship diplomacy” toward China and should adopt a “hedging strategy” against China. Further, Wallace (2013) claims that Japan is pursuing a “strategic pivot south” by conducting a “dual hedge” between the US and China. According to Kyong-shik Shin (2003), Japan’s security policy was formed by the interaction between American pressure and economic constraints. Other studies focused on the domestic partisan political factors. They consider the changing decision-making dynamics within political parties, or the varying influence of the conservative, Liberal Democratic Party as the main cause of policy change. Ellis S. Krauss and Robert J. Pekkanen (2011) analyzed the LDP’s dynamics of politics that have been influential in policy formation. Park Cheol-hee (2014) analyzed the conservative coalescence of Japanese politics from three different perspectives: relations among political parties, internal dynamics within political parties, and social networks of politicians. He asserted that conservative parties led by the LDP are consolidating while leftist parties are weakening. Yoshihide Soeya (2009) analyzed structural features of the Japanese policy-making process and provides insights into why and how political conservatism affected it. However, it seems that there are few studies on Abe’s personal leadership and his influence on national security policy change. In his book, Abe described himself as a “fighting politician.” Perhaps not surprisingly, a fighting politician is one “who is not afraid of criticism, who does politics for the country and its people, and who will voice for the country” (Abe 2006, 118). Abe’s overweening appeal for

2

LEE AND DEDOMINICIS: THE RESULTS OF A “FIGHTING POLITICIAN”?

public support builds upon a personal, amenable pedigree. Abe’s maternal grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, was Imperial Japan’s Manchukuo economics minister, a wartime munitions minister, and 1957–60 Japanese Cold War-era prime minister. Public charisma is one of the important factors affecting policy decisions. However, as Morgenthau and Thompson (1993, 32) noted, “There has been a tendency to reduce political power to the actual application of force, or at least to equate it with successful threat of force and with persuasion, to the neglect of charisma.” Since leading foreign and security strategy in the diplomatic field is mostly the domain of the Prime Minister, not to consider charismatic leadership is to miss an important piece of the puzzle. Furthermore, “military preparedness requires a military establishment capable of supporting the foreign policies pursued” (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 133). Charismatic leadership is today central to revising the mission of the Japanese military. Max Weber introduced the modern concept of charisma: “In Weber’s view, charisma was a result of a social crisis” (Barbuto 1997, 690). “Charisma responds to the unusual circumstances that have called it into being by destroying existing norms and transforming old values” (Bream 2004, 6). Charismatic leadership transpires not only because of the leader’s personal background but in the context of national crisis. An ability to gain public support and to confront problems in such circumstances demonstrates the charisma of a leader. The charismatic factor, therefore, is a critical occurrence that shapes a leader’s effectiveness. While the notion of threat is subjective, sometimes both the leader and prevailing domestic political constituencies both agree to define a certain situation as a dominant threat. Other times, they cannot reach the same conclusion. In this case, to influence the determination of policy, the national leader uses his (or her) charisma.

Interactive International, State, and Individual-Level Dynamics In the Japanese political milieu, “Abe’s changed Cabinet composition is considered as the reason of his political success” (Kim Hg 2013, 51). Also, “the public supports Abe because of his progressive, Keynesian financial policy which is different from Koizumi’s conservative, neoliberal financial policy” (Son 2014, 14). Abe’s prolonged occupation of power has resulted from a combination of diverse factors. The first and the second Abe cabinet have a similar contextual background in terms of their emergence. In 2006, North Korea’s nuclear test unsettled the Japanese public. In 2012, the North Korean crisis deepened. North Korea successfully placed a satellite in orbit, demonstrating its advances in ballistic missile technology. The Sino-Japanese territorial dispute intensified. However, Abe’s ultimate policy goals have not changed since he entered public service. Despite these situational resemblances, the past and the present Abe administration’s national security policies show only tactical differences.

Sustainability and Change: Shinzo Abe’s Persistent Political Goals Koizumi’s successor, Shinzo Abe, was sworn in as Prime Minister of Japan in 2006, following his successful campaign’s refrain, “toward a beautiful country,” quoting from his 2006 book. Abe considered the postwar regime as a barrier to the further growth of Japan. In 2007, he asserted that “It has become obvious that many of the basic frameworks, starting from the Constitution, down to the administrative system, education, economy, employment, state-local relationship, foreign policy and national security, have become incapable of adapting to the great changes taking place in the 21st century” (Prime Minister of Japan 2007a, para. 3). Thus, the central focus of his political vision was “escape from the post-war regime” (Noh 2014, 70). First, Japan should be afforded the same status as the United States while strengthening the Japan-US alliance. Second, Japan should promote economic cooperation with China on the basis of divisibility of politics from economy. Third, Japan should lead a regional integration process. The first Abe Cabinet was dissolved in August 2007 amid the public distrust of the “cabinet of friends” (otomodachi naikaku), the lost pension records issue, and electoral disaster. 3


Moreover, “He [Abe] returned Japan to ‘old-style’ politics, enabling the return of anti-reformers and making the LDP more vulnerable to factionalism and scandal” (Envall 2011, 154). Despite this political setback, Abe maintained his public positions. In his resignation speech, Abe claimed that “even in the short space of one year, we [Japan] have achieved reforms that no other postwar administrations had been able to achieve…” (Prime Minister of Japan 2007b, para. 4). As Abe noted, there were several achievements for the country’s normalization process. Of particular note, he amended the national referendum law to alter the constitution, revised the education basic law, and raised the status of the Defense Agency to ministry-level (Liff 2015). In 2012, Abe returned to power with the new slogans “towards a new country” and “strong Japan,” as the progeny of “towards a beautiful country.” Abe added a few words regarding policy suggestions to his original book and republished it with new title, Towards a New Country, in 2013. In his New Year’s speech, he stressed the necessity of proactive pacifism as well as educational and constitutional reform (TV Asahi 2014). “The aim is to facilitate international cooperation in the field of arms policy and military affairs” (Sakaki 2015, 6). Shinzo Abe’s attitude to China, however, shifted. Different from his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, who angered China by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, Abe did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine during his first term (2006–2007). In addition, when he took office in 2006, he visited China and South Korea before the United States. This was a reconciliatory gesture to ease tensions in the Northeast Asian region. “Abe’s ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ position in his discussions with his counterparts in Beijing accordingly enabled both countries [Japan and China] to step back from the high-wire politics of the Yasukuni Shrine visits” (Smith 2015, 96). Abe launched historical and military discussions with China aside from the economic relationship. In the 2006 meeting, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Hu Jintao sought to maintain a harmonious public relationship. “Both sides confirmed that they would accelerate the process of consultation on the issue of the East China Sea, adhere to the broad direction of joint development and seek for a resolution acceptable for the both sides” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006a, para. 6). Abe and Hu discussed starting “joint research of history by Japanese and Chinese scholars” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006a, para. 7). Moreover, Abe endorsed the Murayama statement (Xinhua Agencies 2006). The August 15, 1995 statement by Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama apologized for the wartime suffering caused by imperial Japan (Murayama 1995). When Abe returned to power in 2012, Sino-Japanese relations had cooled significantly. Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, emphasized the idea of escape from the post-war regime, and tried to revise the postwar pacifistic constitution. Consequently, ruling circles inside China became alarmed concerning a rightward shift of the Abe cabinet involving a military buildup. Thus, SinoJapan diplomatic ties have deteriorated. For instance, Abe visited China once in 2014 only because the APEC Summit was held in Beijing. Chinese President Xi did not visit Japan in 2013 and 2014 (Kim Jh et al. 2015). Abe’s political ends have not changed. His political slogans, his book, and his policy speeches are confirmation; Abe is dreaming of a strong Japan by escaping from the postwar regime. In Toward a New Country, (2013), the second edition of his original book, he noted that “things I described in my book, Toward a Beautiful Country (2006), show my personal political thought that has not and will not change. Therefore, I did not retouch it” (Abe 2013, 5). Also, in his New Year speech in 2014, Abe reaffirmed his will to amend the constitution to realize military normalization: “We will fully defend the lives and assets of our nationals as well as our territory, territorial waters, and territorial airspace in a resolute manner. We will prepare the foundation that will make this possible” (Abe 2014, para. 13). In effect, Abe claims he changed tactics, adapting to new regional political dynamics. There was an attempt for a rapprochement with China. On June 17–18, 2013, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yachi Shotaro, secretly visited China as a personal emissary of the Prime Minister (Hyung 2013). It is significant in that he was one of the key figures in establishing a

4


Japan-China reciprocal dialogue during the first Abe Cabinet. Nevertheless, there was no improvement in Japan-China relations. The deterioration in relations between Japan and China negatively reinforced the unwillingness to compromise in both countries.

Figure 2: Public Opinion in Japan and China Source: Genron 2014

As we can see from Figure 2, public opinion in Japan favorable to China was at 11.8 percent in 2006 when Abe first took power, and at 33.1 percent when he resigned. Similarly, public opinion in China favorable to Japan improved from 14.5 percent to 24.4 percent. Public opinion in Japan favorable to China steadily worsened since 2010. Public opinion in China favorable to Japan was negatively exacerbated at an alarming rate during the first year of the second Abe cabinet, from 31.8 percent to 5.2 percent.

Prime Minister Abe’s Institutional Charisma “Although Japan has a centralized political system, and until recently has had a dominant majority party, the Prime Minister has been invariably described as weak” (Krauss and Nyblade 2005, 358). The short tenures of Japanese prime ministers since 1989 imply an overall absence of charismatic leadership and the general lack of strategies for achieving a future vision. The first Abe Cabinet was not an exception. His Cabinet was scandalized for many reasons and, eventually, Abe resigned after just 366 days in office. Since returning in 2012, Abe has been exercising decisive influence over Japan’s security policy decisions, as some of his predecessors, Shigeru Yoshida2 and Junichiro Koizumi,3 did in the past.

2 “…the Yoshida Doctrine, laid the foundations for Japan’s foreign policy. Named for its architect, Yoshida Shigeru, a prewar diplomat and four-time postwar prime minister (1946–47, re-elected three times consecutively between 1948 and 1954), the policies adopted as political compromises proved remarkably durable. Some aspects lasted until the end of the Cold War, others still endure” (Potter 2008, 6). 3 “The arrival of Koizumi Junichiro—Japanese Prime Minister from 2001 until 2006—demonstrated that Japanese leaders can wield influence” (Han 2014, 2).

5


Foreign Policy Continuities Abe’s policy attitude toward China since 2012 has changed compared to his earlier tenure in 2006, but his political goals are the same. China’s rise is a causal factor for the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations. China has been continuously recognized as a threat even under the regime of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The 2010 National Defense Programme Guidelines (NDPG), which were revised under the DPJ regime to include Gray Zone challenges, illustrates this continuity (Liff 2015). By highlighting the changed global power balance and complexities that surround Japan, the 2010 NDPG argued that Japan is located in a “Gray Zone.” In this respect, the 2010 NDPG proposed to set up a “Dynamic Defense Force” to protect Japan in a crisis. Understandably, China’s rise is an important cause for change. Tension in the East and Northeast Asian region has risen since China began to emerge with rapid, international trade-focused capitalist development. But this is not a new phenomenon. Abe’s activation of his hardline policy toward China relates closely to these contextual factors that have prolonged his tenure and allowed him to achieve his goals.

Foreign Policy Strategic Responses Japan managing China’s rise on an equal footing with the United States is one of Abe’s political goals. To actualize this idea and to corral an ascendant China, Abe introduced the “security diamond” national security strategy after his re-election in 2012. The security diamond has Japan, India, United States (with its NATO alliance partners), and Australia as its four vertices, sequestering China amid those four summits (see Figure 5). Responding to it, and to Abe’s effort to normalize Japan’s military posture, China initiated a counter action: the “One Belt, One Road” strategy. Often referred to as “the string of pearls,” it is a response scheme to Abe’s security diamond. The One Belt, One Road strategy has two central axes: “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” Both “are initiatives first introduced by Xi in the fall of 2013 during visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, respectively” (Kennedy and Parker 2015, para. 3). 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, especially, is an integrated strategy to address security and economic problems. As can be seen on the map below (Figure 3), China’s One Belt, One Road strategy has three directions: first, to construct sea lanes by connecting major harbors from Africa to East Asia and to construct a “New Silk Road,” connecting Central Asia and Europe; second, to construct oil and natural gas pipelines; and third, to construct railroads connecting Central Asia and Eurasia.

6


Figure 3: China’s One Belt, One Road Strategy Source: Page 2014

In an interview with the Financial Times, Parag Khanna, senior fellow at the New America Foundation noted that the purpose of China’s strategy is “to smooth the flow of commodities imports and to smooth the outbound flow of goods” (“Chinese Overseas Lending” 2015, para. 9). China would bring benefits to itself through trade and economic cooperation. The One Belt, One Road strategy is an exit plan to escape from Pivot to Asia strategy posed by the US and security diamond posed by Japan through a China-centered initiative. In this project, Japan is not included. Indeed, Xi Jinping never visited or raised the matter with Japan while he promoting this strategy (“Chronology of China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiatives” 2015). China’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, corresponding with Xi’s political ascendency since 2012, is apparently aggravating Japan-China relations. The exact purpose of building artificial islands is unclear. Considering that construction in the disputed Spratly islands includes airstrips, however, it can be inferred as an extension of One Belt, One Road strategy. It connotes China’s intention to break through the encircling net formed by Japan and the US. Additionally, China also pursues building China-led regional organizations like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Strengthened Japan-US Alliance Unlike in his first term as a Prime Minister, Abe started his second term pursuing military normalization vigorously. In the beginning, whether due to concern of a broad critical response from the world or not, the US did not actively express its support for Abe’s strategy. In a 2013 daily press briefing in response to the question of Japan’s constitutional restraints, the US State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell emphasized the longstanding US-Japan alliance and stated, “that’s [revising the constitution] a matter for the Japanese, internally, to look at” (US Department of State 2013, para. 159). Subsequently, the number of officials publicly claiming that Japan’s military normalization will contribute to the improvement of regional defense capabilities has continued to grow. Michael J. Green, a senior aide in the US National Security Council, stated that Japan’s recent conservative swing will contribute to regional security. Since Japan’s elevation of security policy

7


is considered as burden sharing, it has been welcomed by the United States. In addition, Japan has remained the most important strategic base of the US. Understandably, Abe’s policy generated a synergy effect, an enhanced Japan-US alliance. In this context, Japan also became a member of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TTP) multinational trade agreement in 2015 (from which the new US Trump administration withdrew).

Abe’s Tactical Political Adjustments The first and the second Abe cabinet have a similar background for their emergence. In 2006, North Korea’s nuclear test disturbed regional relations. The crisis provided Abe an opportunity to materialize a series of policies. In collusion with the United States, he also promoted the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity to contain rising China. At the same time, however, Abe tried to fortify Japan-China economic relations by promoting reciprocally beneficial relations. But this process ended with the resignation of Abe and changes in government in 2007, leading to discontinuity in Abe’s security policies. The East Asia situation in 2012 was quite similar to the situation in 2006. The level of tension indeed deepened with North Korea’s missile launch and the intensified Japan-China territorial dispute. The United States has long pressured Japan to increase its military capabilities. Nevertheless, public opinion valuing the Peace Constitution opposed it. In such situations, China’s rise, military buildup, and construction of artificial islands in a disputed area fanned public fears. To Abe, this context became the catalyst to prosecute his political goals. “Growing negative views of China among the Japanese public in the wake of Chinese assertiveness in the Senkaku Islands will make it easier for Abe to pursue his defense agenda” (Mochizuki and Porter 2013, 29). Shinzo Abe’s reaction to the changing international systemic order, which revised his policy attitude toward China, actualized his political goal of making Japan into a normalized Great Power. In his memoirs published in Bungei Shunju in 2008, Abe wrote that recurrence of his chronic illness and troubled relations with mass media, not his personnel appointments, were the chief reasons for his resignation. In response to the criticism of his “friends cabinet” (otomodachi naikaku), he emphasized that “to appoint somebody who has the same political view is not a wrong thing” (Abe 2008, 118). He also argued that “suspicion of one politician taking bribes never became the cause of the Prime Minister’s resignation” (Abe 2008, 118). Nevertheless, the composition of the second Abe cabinet partly indicates that Abe himself was influenced by the reputation of his first cabinet. In his first term, Abe could not deflect the accusations of nepotism. Abe appointed Yasuhisa Shiozaki, his close friend, as Chief Cabinet Secretary. Toshikatsu Matsuoka, who helped Abe’s election campaign, was appointed Minister for Agriculture. Additionally, most of the nominees of the first Abe Cabinet, including Hakubun Shimomura, Yuji Yamamoto, Yoshihide Suga, were associates of Abe. In his second Cabinet, by contrast, Abe nominated his political rivals having different political convictions as shown in the nomination of Sadakatsu Tanigaki, a moderate conservative, who is an ex-president of LDP. In addition, “Abe nominated Nobuteru Ishihara as Minister for Environment, and Yoshimasa Hayashi as Minister for Agriculture” (Kim Hg 2013, 51). Some other moderate conservatives including Hiroko Oota and Humio Kishida were appointed to important positions. The political factions of Cabinet members have also experienced a slight change. Firstly, Cabinet members from the Machimura faction, the largest LDP faction, decreased from eight in 2006 to three in 2014 (see Appendix B). Secondly, Abe appointed a politician from Komeito (Clean Government) Party as a Cabinet member in 2012. Lastly, Cabinet members without political factions preserved their proportion. To summarize, Abe appointed several political opponents, politicians with different political leanings, and politicians from different factions, in comparison to his first cabinet. 8


Continued LDP-CGP Coalition In 1999, the LDP proposed to the CGP to form a coalition to stabilize its political position. Since then, the LDP-CGP coalition became a central axis of Japanese politics. As Krauss and Pekkanen (2011) illustrate, within the Japanese political party milieu, the CGP is centrist while the LDP dominates the entire right-wing of the Japanese political spectrum. The far left is occupied by the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), with the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ, formerly the Japanese Socialist Party) midway between the JCP and the center-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Table 1: Basic Policy Direction of LDP and CGP Party Name

LDP

CGP

External Relations

Perception on History and Territory

International Contribution

National Defense Capacity

- strengthen JapanUS alliance

- amendment of territorial sovereignty law

- contribute to world peace through justice and order

- constitutional reform

- recognition of collective selfdefense rights

- revision of Kono Statement of 1993

- international symbiosis

- establishment of national defense force

- strengthen JapanUS alliance

- cool, restrained response to the territorial sovereignty issue

- Gradual withdrawal of US military bases - active Asiafocused diplomacy - Economic Partnership Agreement

- contribution to the human security sector

- Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

- strategic diplomacy

- support Afghan rehabilitation

- strengthen NonProliferation Treaty

- peaceful settlement of the problem

- active participation in UN peacekeeping operations

- maintenance of defense

- gain international publicity

- disapproval of collective selfdefense rights

Source: Data Adapted from Lee 2014

Table 1 shows the intersection and differences of basic policies proposed by the LDP and CGP. Above all, the basic policy of the two political parties is similar. Both the LDP and CGP stress the importance of the Japan-US alliance, trying to solve the territorial sovereignty issues, and emphasize defense capability. However, their ways of achieving these goals show discrepancies. The CGP prefers to resolve disputes in a more peaceful and diplomatic way. “The LDP has been at the core of Japanese politics, pre- and post-reform, ever since its formation” (Krauss and Pekanen 2011, 4). The LDP prefers to approach conflicts more assertively, including military normalization. According to The Times, Abe told reporters that “revising the constitution [which put restriction on Japan’s defense methods] has always been an objective since the Liberal Democratic Party was launched” (Parry 2014, para. 3). In his first term, Abe could not accelerate the constitutional reform process. Instead, he concentrated on improving relations with China and South Korea as the CGP advocated. During Abe’s first term, the CGP acted as a brake on the LDP. When Abe’s second term started in 2012, the role of the CGP weakened. “This means that the political influence of conservative parties is starting to outpace the political influence of progressive parties” (Park 2014, 73).

9


Table 2: Proportion of Parliamentary Seats of three major parties First Abe Cabinet

Second Abe Cabinet

Reshuffled Cabinet

House of Representatives

House of Councilors


House of Councilors


House of Councilors

LDP

296

109

294

115

290

-

CGP

31

20

31

20

35

-

Coalition

327

129

325

135

325

-

DPJ

113

83

57

59

73

-

Source: Data Adapted from “The First Abe Cabinet,” “The Second Abe Cabinet,” and “The Third Abe Cabinet” n.d.

Table 2 above shows the Japanese general election results in 2005, 2012, and 2014.4 The proportion of DPJ held seats in the House of Representatives greatly diminished in the 2012 election from 113 to seventy-three. In the 2005 elections in the House of Councilors, the gap between LDP and DPJ was twenty. In 2012 election, DPJ won fifty-nine parliamentary seats while LDP won 115. The political power of the DPJ, the biggest opposition party, continues to erode.

Evolution of National Security Policy The overall structure of security strategy under Abe has aimed to enhance the alliance with the United States and contain China. The main national security strategy under the first Abe Cabinet, the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, was suggested by the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Taro Aso, in 2006. This arc stretches from Northeast Asia to Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkey, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states. According to the data from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the arc of freedom’s goals included cooperation between European Union and NATO; support the “Community of Democratic Choice” (CDC); support peace operations for the states of the former Yugoslavia; support reconstruction of Iraq; stabilize Afghanistan; hold dialogue between Japan and Central Asian countries; support self-sustaining development of Central Asian countries; deepen relations with India; support ASEAN countries economically; and hold JapanCambodia/Laos/Vietnam talks (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Jiyuuto” 2006b). The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity borders the southern part of China (see Figure 4). Japan has steadily worked to increase its restraining influence toward China by intensifying relations with the US, EU, and NATO and establishing strategic alliance with India and ASEAN countries. The foreign policy of Japan at the time was closely associated with the security policy. Correspondingly, most of the countries that Abe visited during his first term, as shown in Table 3 below, were included in the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity strategy. Foreign policy under the first Abe Cabinet can be divided into two categories: Value Oriented Diplomacy and New Asia Diplomacy.

4 The number of House of Representatives members in the reshuffled cabinet is the same as the number of House of Representatives members in the second Abe Cabinet.

10


Figure 4: The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity Source: “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan” 2006a, 2006b

Together with the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, Aso proclaimed a “Value Oriented Diplomacy.” It was a plan to support the goal of democracy and a positive image of Japan in Central Asia, Middle East, and the states of the former Yugoslavia by supporting their revival and stability. Subsequently, Abe did communicate with the EU, NATO, and the US to enhance the security alliance with the United States and visited Middle Eastern countries to guarantee energy security. Table 3: A Sample of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Summit Diplomacy: 2006–2007 Year 2006

Region Northeast Asia

Nation China South Korea

Southeast Asia

Vietnam

North America

United States

Southwest Asia

India

Southeast Asia

Indonesia Malaysia France

Europe

Belgium Germany United Kingdom

2007

Kuwait Qatar Middle East

Egypt United Arab Emirate Saudi Arabia NATO

Regional Organizations

EU

APEC Source: Data Adapted from “Prime Minister’s Plan—Prime Minister’s Office” [安倍総理の予定 - 首相官邸] n.d.

11


In line with Value Oriented Diplomacy which mainly focused on the relations with nonAsian countries, “New Asia Diplomacy” puts much importance on Southeast and Northeast Asia. In this context, Abe visited South Korea and China in 2006. Through Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with Southeast Asian countries, Abe tried to “strengthen solidarity in the field of investment, intellectual property, and open the labour market” (Abe 2013, 161). Abe visited India because he thought that “heightened relations with India is essential to further Japan’s national interests” (Abe 2013, 163). Despite the extended period of political interregnum, Abe’s restoration keynote address on security policy is similar to what he pursued in his first term: strengthening the Japan-US alliance and checking China’s rise in tandem with other nations. In the article he contributed to Project Syndicate in December 2012, Abe introduced the concept of “Democratic Security Diamond” and said, “I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific” (Abe 2012, para. 8). Extending from the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity strategy that formed an invisible barrier below China, the Democratic Security Diamond strategy encircles China by incorporating the US and its global alliance system.

Figure 5: Democratic Security Diamond Source: Abe 2012

The Democratic Security Diamond strategy supports the US strategy that re-emphasizes relations with Japan, India, and Australia. The Democratic Security Diamond thus enables further Japan-US relations and helps Abe’s military normalization process. This strategy enables checking China’s advance abroad by encompassing China and helps Japan to protect its maritime interests. Some describe this strategy as a “dual hedge strategy.” “At the level of analysis of political ideology and in the broader intellectual community, the strategy will also be acceptable throughout most of the ideological spectrum” in Japan (Wallace 2013, 507). Since Abe’s national security strategy satisfies different actors along the political spectrum inside Japan, the Democratic Security Diamond strategy will be continued until Abe completes his term. While past and present structure of security strategy under Abe shows continuity, there are some changes. First, Abe’s summit diplomacy shows more assertiveness compared to his first administration. According to research from the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), Abe visited eighteen countries during his first term (Kim Jh et al. 2015) with sixteen not being EU or NATO members. In his second term, in contrast, Abe visited forty-nine countries, which is a quarter of the world’s sovereign states. 12


Table 4.1: Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Summit Diplomacy: 2013–2014 Region

2013

2014

Vietnam

Vietnam

Thailand (twice)

Malaysia

Indonesia (twice)

Singapore

Brunei

Philippines People’s Republic of Bangladesh (twice) Myanmar

Singapore (twice) Southeast

Myanmar Malaysia Philippines Cambodia (twice)

Asia

Laos (twice)

Southwest

Northeast Central

Republic of Palau

Republic of Palau

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka

India Mongolia (twice) Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan United States (twice) Canada

America

The Kingdom of Bhutan

North

Mexico Jamaica

South

-

Maldives India Mongolia China United States (twice) Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Mexico Jamaica Antigua and Barbuda Colombia

Russia (twice) The Czech Republic East

Slovakia Hungary (twice)

Russia

Poland Rumania France

Europe

West

United Kingdom Ireland

France Switzerland (twice) United Kingdom Netherlands (twice) Belgium (twice) Turkey

Turkey(twice)

Kosovo

South

Portugal Spain

North Central

Spain

Latvia Slovenia

Italy (twice) Macedonia Estonia Germany

13


Table 4.2: Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Summit Diplomacy: 2013–2014 Region

2013

2014 New Zealand

Oceania

Africa

-

East

The Republic of Djibouti

West

Benin

South

The Republic of South Africa

Mozambique

Bahrain (twice)

Oman

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirate

Israel

Middle East

Kuwait Qatar Regional Organization

ASEAN EU Federated States of Micronesia

Others

Australia (twice) Independent State of Papua New Guinea Ethiopia

Palestine TICAD Source: Data Adapted from Kim JH et al. 2015

Somalia République de Côte d’Ivoire

Jordan Republic of the Marshal Islands Georgia

“By the end of 2013, he had visited all ten ASEAN countries” (Przystup and Yuki 2015, para. 25). Even though the structure of security strategy under Abe shows consistency, his summit diplomacy tactics have changed since 2012. He even visited Palestine, which many other countries refuse to recognize. He built relations with small countries in Africa and Central Asia. Those initiatives originated before his term of government. Table 4 confirms that Abe selected Southeast Asian countries to visit first when he made his comeback in national politics. Further, Abe has promoted active energy diplomacy with African, Middle Eastern, and Central Asian countries to secure natural resource supplies and to interrupt China’s political expansion. For example, “China is planning a $16.3 billion fund to finance railways, roads, and pipelines across Central Asia […] Improved infrastructure would help link China to European markets and give China increased access to the region’s rich natural resources” (Matlack 2014, para. 2–3). Similar things are happening in Africa. Those are the situations Abe tries to counter via active diplomacy. Second, detailed security policies have changed. Above all, Abe established the first National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2013. On the same day, he established both the National Defense Programme Guidelines (NDPG) and Mid-Term Defense Programme for 2014– 2019 (MTDP). All the revised strategies emphasize the construction of “Comprehensive Defense Architecture.” The 2013 NDPG highlighted security threats posed by North Korea, Russia, and China and emphasized Gray Zone low-level coercion territorial disputes, as well as nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation and piracy (Liff 2015). To cope with such threats, the 2013 NDPG declares “Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of flexibility and readiness based on joint operations” (Ministry of Defense 2013). Since 2012, Abe has published defense documents that have the Comprehensive Defense Architecture at their core while revising guidance and principles for security. First, Abe established the National Security Council (NSC) in December 2013 (Liff 2015). In 2014, the

14


Japanese Diet approved the “Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS).” According to the bill submitted to the 185th Diet, “This law aims to create a legal system to prevent the leaking of national security information.”5 This law carries important implications in regard to Abe’s domestic charisma. First, it was a law passed only with votes from the LDP-CGP coalition.6 Second, as Japanese Social Democratic Party (SDP)’s leader Mizuho Fukushima said, “There are few specifics in the law, which means it can be used to hide whatever the government wishes to keep away from public scrutiny” (McCurry 2013, para. 13). Overall, SDS demonstrates the strong policy-making ability of Abe and his Cabinet. Simultaneously, SDS indicates the LDP’s will to preserve its regime. In July 2014, the Abe Cabinet approved “Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” which is the NSS-derived law that aims to strengthen and expand Japan’s capabilities and roles. “Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” replaces “Three Principles on Arms Exports and Their Related Policy Guidelines” declared in 1967, the reform of which began in 2011 under DPJ rule during 2009–12 (Liff 2015). According to the press releases of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, each principle contained the following: Table 5: Principles of “Arms Exports and Their Related Policy Guidelines” and “Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” Three Principles on Arms Exports and Their Related Policy Guidelines Under the Three Principles, “arms” exports to the following countries shall not be permitted: (1) Communist bloc countries, (2) Countries subject to “arms” exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions, and (3) Countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (1) Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when: i) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded, ii) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or iii) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack). (2) Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure. The transfer contributes to: i) to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or ii) Japan’s security. (3) The Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. Source: Data Adapted from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2014a, 2014b.

5

The House of Representatives. 2011. “ 特別安全保障秘密の適正な管理に関する法律案要綱 ” [Secrecy Law], November 19. According to the data from the House of Councillors, among the 130 yes votes, the LDP recorded 110 and CGP recorded 20. On the other hand, among the eighty-two “no” votes, DPJ recorded fifty-eight and other parties recorded twenty-one. House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. 2013. “ 第185回国会2013年 12月 6日投票結果 ” 6

15


As seen in Table 5, all three principles of 1967 “Arms Exports and Their Related Policy Guidelines” are condensed into the first principle of 2013 “Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.” In addition, the second and third principles indicate that regulations on arms export or transfer are mitigated. The point to examine closely: “significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014b, para. 9). Given that the NSC makes important decisions and Shotaro Yachi, who leads the NSC, is the closest security advisor to Abe, it is possible to infer that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s opinion will be highly reflected in the policy made by the NSC. In April 2015, New Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation were announced. In accordance with this new guideline, when either the US or Japan face an external threat, the ally fully aids the threatened one militarily and diplomatically. Under the guidelines before the revision, the United States had precedence to handle all security threats against Japan and Japan itself played an assistant role to deal with those threats. From Japan’s point of view, therefore, the guidelines have transformed into a more equal relationship. To be on equal footing with the US was a long-cherished wish of both Shinzo Abe and Abe’s maternal grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi. Eventually, they attained their desired goal. Revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation increased Japan’s military deterrence credibility and raised Japan’s position in the Southeast Asian region. Lastly, in September 2015 the Abe government issued “newly determined three conditions for the ‘use of force’ as measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution” (Ministry of Defense n.d., para. 17). According to NHK announcement (Table 6 below), this has changed through three phases. Table 6: Three Phases for Use of Force Phase 1 When an armed attack against Japan has occurred and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness → Phase 2 When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness → Phase 3 When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness [emphasis added (authors)]. Source: Data Adapted from NHK Online 2014

In a broadcast debate, Yoshihide Suga, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, commented that “the U.S. is included in the category of ‘foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan.’ In the case of other countries, the government will decide situationally” (NHK Online 2014, “At Present, Collective Self-Defense” [なぜ今集団的自衛権]). In sum, regarding national security policy, Abe reinforces the basic structure of strengthening Japan and containing China. But at the same time, in a detailed way, he intensified the leverage of his Cabinet and revised several laws to materialize his political objectives. For instance, the “government” that Yoshihide Suga mentioned might mean the NSC. Also, when the “Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets” comes into force, security policy enforcement will be easier than previously.

16


Conclusion In his book, Abe described himself as a “fighting politician.” A fighting politician is one “who is not afraid of criticism, who does politics for the country and its people, and who will voice for the country” (Abe 2006, 118). In his first term, Abe was more of normal politician than fighting politician. His abstract political vision toward a beautiful nation, and political scandals of his allies disappointed the public. In 2009, the LDP handed over power to the DPJ. Since 2012, however, Abe started to promote the normalization process strategically. Table 7 below briefly indicates Abe’s reaction to each factor: Table 7: Abe’s Reaction to Influence Factors

International systemic factors

2006–2007

2007–Present

Change

Background

North Korean provocation

Similar, level of intimidation is different

Relations with China

Friendly, tries to solve conflict between Japan and China in a peaceful way

North Korean Missile threat, territorial dispute with China Tries to solve conflict by adopting hardline policy toward China

Strategic change to proceed normalization process

Relations with the US

Tries to strengthen Japan-US alliance

Tries to strengthen Japan-US alliance

Abe achieved equal footing with the United States in his second term

Concept for national security

The Arc of freedom and prosperity

Security diamond

Security diamond surrounds China

Public support

Cabinet fell from the people’s favor in Oct. 2006

High approval ratings based on Abenomics

Public support was increased on the back of Abenomics.

Cabinet composition

Cabinet of friends

Domestic factors

Abe appointed politicians from CGP or cliqueless politicians

Strengthened influence of conservative parties, Tendency of politics relatively weakened DPJ’s political position Source: Data Adapted from Lee and DeDominicis 2017 DPJ and CGP put the brakes on the LDP’s political influence

By appointing nonLDP politicians, Abe showed his effort to restore public confidence. But still, Abe Cabinet takes a form of presidential government LDP and Cabinet centered policy making

To learn from past failure, domestically Abe more effectively considered public opinion and trends in party politics. First, Abe gained public support by suggesting a concrete economic policy (Abenomics). Second, Abe appointed politicians from CGP or cliqueless politicians. He also tried to prevent manifestations of factionalism inside the Cabinet. Third, nevertheless, LDP gained more political influence at the expense of other, minor parties. Concurrently, fourth, close staff members are still appointed to key positions. Internationally, Abe appropriately used the conditions of international order. First, China’s rise created public concerns that facilitated promotion of the normalization process. Second,

17


along with China’s rise, the defense budget reduction of the United States gave Japan a reason for rearmament. Third, this also became a cause for establishing a Japan-US “equal” alliance. In conclusion, international systemic factors and domestic factors created an appropriate background to promote a normalization process. Abe viewed this as a chance to implement it. Based on appropriate public support, the US’s active support, and increased LDP influence, Abe realized his political goals. As a result, old security policies that restrained Japanese military activity have transformed into a new form. Japan is now almost in the role of a “normal country.” Under Abe’s leadership that effectively used international and domestic factors surrounding Japan, Japan has benefited in many ways. For example, Japan paved the way to restore its military strength and achieved equal footing with the US. In this sense, accelerating international systemic and state-level change has boosted Abe’s charisma to make him the fighting politician he has claimed to be.

Acknowledgement This article was produced with the support of the Research Fund of the Catholic University of Korea. The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their insightful critiques and suggestions as well as McCall Macomber at Common Ground Research Networks for editorial oversight. Any mistakes and omissions are solely the responsibility of the authors.

REFERENCES “Abe

Cabinet Register” [安倍内閣閣僚名簿 ] n.d. Accessed September 27, 2017. http://www.asahi.com/special/060926. Abe, Shinzo. 2006. 美しい国へ [Toward a Beautiful Country]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunju. ———. 2008. “独占手記, わが告白総理辞任の真相” [An Exclusive Story: The Truth about Resignation]. Bungei Shunju (文芸春秋) 86, no. 2 (February): 114–23. ———. 2012. “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.” Project Syndicate, December 27. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india -by-shinzo-abe. ———. 2013. 新しい国へ美しい国へ完全版 [Towards a New Country]. Tokyo: Oguchi Book Binding & Printing Co. ———. 2014. “New Year’s Reflection by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.” Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister, January 1. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201401 /newyear_e.html. Barbuto, John E. Jr. 1997. “Taking the Charisma Out of Transformational Leadership.” Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 12 (3): 689–97. Bream, Erin. 2004. “Personalistic Political Leadership in Castro’s Cuba.” Leadership Review 4 (Fall): 132–37. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.499.3911&rep =rep1&type=pdf. Burrett, Tina. 2016. “Explaining Japan’s Revolving Door Premiership: Applying the Leadership Capital Index.” Politics and Governance 4 (2): 36–53. http://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v4i2.575. “Chinese Overseas Lending Dominated by One Belt, One Road Strategy.” 2015. FTChinese, June 19. http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001062628/ce. “Chronology of China’s “Belt and Road” Initiatives.” 2015. Xinhuanet, February 5. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-02/05/c_133972101.htm. Curtis, Gerald L., Wakamiya Yoshibumi, and Park Cheol Hee. 2013. 아베의 일본은 어디로 향하고 있는가? [Where Is the Abe Administration Headed?]. Seoul: J and C.

18


Envall, David P. 2011. “Abe’s Fall: Leadership and Expectations in Japanese Politics.” Asian Journal of Political Science 19 (2): 149–69. http://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2011.600164. “The First Abe Cabinet—Approved September 26, 2006” [第１次安倍内閣－平成１８年９月２６日成立]. n.d. Accessed September 24, 2017. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidai/kakuryo/90.html. “The First Time Abe Cabinet” [第1次安倍內閣]. n.d. Accessed September 26, 2017. https://wikivisually.com/lang-zh/wiki/%E7%AC%AC1%E6%AC%A1%E5%AE%89 %E5%80%8D%E5%85%A7%E9%96%A3. Genron NPO, and China Daily. 2014. “The 10th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll: Analysis Report on the Comparative Data.” The Genron NPO (2014): 3. Han, Eui-suok. 2014. “Changes in Japanese Politics and Party-Voters Linkage: Japanese Party Politics since the 2000s.” Korean Political Science Review 48 (4): 75–95. http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/ArticleDetail/NODE02489782. Hughes, Christopher W. 2009. “Japan’s Response to China’s Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision.” International Affairs 85 (4): 837–56. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00830.x. Hyung, Jo-jun. 2013. “아베 자문역 방중후 귀국…다이빙궈와 회동” [Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Returned to Japan After Visiting China…Secret Meeting between Two Countries]. 연합뉴스 [Yonhap News], June 20. http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr /international/2013/06/20/0602000000AKR20130620199651073.HTML. Kennedy, Scott, and David A. Parker. 2015. “Building China’s ‘One Belt, One Road.’” CSIS, April 3. http://csis.org/publication/building-chinas-one-belt-one-road. Kim, Hyeon-gi. 2013. “제2차 아베 내각의 고공행진 비결, 달라진 내공과 용인술” [The Key to Second Abe Cabinet’s Success, Abe’s Perseverance and Changed Cabinet Composition Strategy]. 월간 전경련 [Monthly Publication of the Federation of the Korean Industries] 580: 50–51. Kim, Jin-ha, Cheol Jung-sung, Hyeon Sung-su, and Shin Jong-ho. 2015. “최근 2년간 미 일 ∙ 중 ∙ 러 4개국 정상외교 분석 및 한국 통일외교에 대한 시사점” [Analysis of Summit Diplomacy of the Four Countries, the US, Japan, China, and Russia, in the Past Two Years and Its Implication on South Korea’s Diplomacy for Reunification]. Korea Institute for National Unification Act (KINU) 2: 41–51. Krauss, Ellis S., and Benjamin Nyblade. 2005. “‘Presidentialization’ in Japan? The Prime Minister, Media and Elections in Japan.” British Journal of Political Science 35: 357– 68. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123405000190. Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2011. The Rise and Fall of Japan’s LDP: Political Party Organization as Historical Institutions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Lee Meon-wu. 2014. “일본 정계의 ‘우익’ 성향 강화와 동북아: 보수세력 확산의 배경과 의미, 그리고 대외적 파급효과에 대한 연구” [Increased Power of Right-Wing Forces in Japan’s Political Arena: Background and Meaning]. 세종정책연구 [Sejong Policy Research] 3: http://www.sejong .org/boad/bd_news/1/egoread.php?bd=13&itm=&txt=&pg=3&seq=783. Liff, Adam P. 2015. “Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary.” The Washington Quarterly 38 (2): 79–99. http://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1064711. Matlack, Carol. 2014. “Putin Is Losing Out to China in Central Asia’s Latest ‘Great Game.’” Bloomberg Business, November 6. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11 -06/putin-loses-his-grip-on-central-asia-as-china-moves-in. McCurry, Justin. 2013. “Japan Whistleblowers Face Crackdown under Proposed State Secrets Law.” The Guardian, December 5. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/05 /whistleblowers-japan-crackdown-state-secrets. Ministry of Defense. n.d. “Fundamental Concepts of National Defense.” Accessed October 19, 2015. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp01.html.

19


———. 2013. “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond.” Accessed September 30, 2015. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2006a. “Japan-China Joint Press Statement.” Accessed September 2, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/china/joint0610.html. ———. 2006b. “「自由と繁栄の弧」をつくる ” [To Build Arc of Freedom and Prosperity], November 30. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/18/easo_1130.html. ———. 2014a. “Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports.” Accessed October 22, 2015. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy. ———. 2014b. “The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.” Accessed September 22, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press22e_000010 .html. Mochizuki, Mike M. 2007. “Japan’s Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China.” Journal of Strategic Studies 30 (4/5): 739–76. http://doi.org/10.1080/01402390701431832. Mochizuki, Mike M., and Samuel P. Porter. 2013. “Japan under Abe: Toward Moderation or Nationalism?” The Washington Quarterly 36 (4): 25–41. Morgenthau, Hans J., and Kenneth W. Thompson. 1993. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill. Murayama, Tomiichi. 1995. “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama ‘On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War’s End.’” Accessed August 5, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html. NHK Online. 2014. “集団的自衛権菅官房長官に問う” [Interview with Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga about Collective Self Defense]. NHK Online, July 3. http://www.nhk.or.jp/gendai/kiroku/detail02_3525_all.html. Noh, Daniel. 2014. “아베신조의 일본” [Abe Shinzo’s Japan]. Seoul: Sechang Media. Page, Jeremy. 2014. “China Sees Itself at Center of New Asian Order: Beijing Builds Roads, Pipelines, Railways and Ports to Bind Itself to Region.” The Wall Street Journal, November 9. http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-new-trade-routes-center-it-on -geopolitical-map-1415559290. Park, Cheol-hee. 2014. “일본정치 보수화의 삼중구조” [Tripartite Model of Conservatization of Japanese Politics]. 일본비평 [Criticism in Japan] 10: 70–97. Parry, Richard Lloyd. 2014. “Shinzo Abe Sets Sights on Japan’s Pacifist Constitution after Election Win.” The Guardian, December 15. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/snap -poll-victor-abe-set-to-scrap-japans-pacifist-constitution-k273867zn8w. Potter, David M. 2008. “Evolution of Japan’s Postwar Foreign Policy.” The Bulletin of the Center for International Education (9): 31–49. “Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet: 歴代内閣: 歴代総理と歴代内閣閣僚名簿” [Successive Cabinet: Prime Minister and Past Cabinet Minister List] n.d. Accessed September 24, 2017. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidainaikaku/index.html. “Prime Minister’s Plan—Prime Minister’s Office” [安倍総理の予定—首相官邸] n.d. Accessed September 24, 2017. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/abeyotei/kousikiyotei.html. Przystup, James, and Tatsumi Yuki. 2015. “The Foreign Policy of Abe Shinzo: Strategic Vision and Policy Implementation.” The ASEAN Forum, February 5. http://www.theasanforum .org/the-foreign-policy-of-abe-shinzo-strategic-vision-and-policy-implementation. Sakaki, Alexandra. 2015. “Japan’s Security Policy: A Shift in Direction under Abe?” Stftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Research Paper. Accessed September 3, 2016. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2015_RP02_ skk.pdf. “Second Abe Cabinet Minister Register” [第２次安倍内閣閣僚名簿]. n.d. Accessed September 24, 2017. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/96_abe/meibo_a/index.html.

20


“The Second Cabinet of Shinzo Abe” [제2차 아베 신조 내각]. n.d. Accessed September 24, 2017. https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%A0%9C2%EC%B0%A8_%EC%95%84%EB%B2 %A0_%EC%8B%A0%EC%A1%B0_%EB%82%B4%EA%B0%81. Shin Kyong-shik. 2003. “Defense Policy Determinants of Japan: An Analysis of the Main Factors in Japan’s Defense Policy Formation: The Motivation and Constraint Factors in its Military Buildup.” Korean Political Science Bulletin 37 (5): 241–65. Smith, Sheila A. 2015. Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China. New York: Columbia University Press. Soeya, Yoshihide. 2009. “Japanese Domestic Politics and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia.” Council on Foreign Relations (December): 1–11. https://www.cfr.org/content /publications/attachments/NEAsiaSecuritySoeya.pdf. Son, Yeol. 2014. “ 중국 부상과 자국쇠퇴의 안보 딜레마 극복 위한 선택 동북아 불안 야기” [Choice to Overcome Dilemmas resulted from the China’s Rise and Japan’s Decline: Causing anxiety in Northeast Asian Region]. CHINDIA Plus 90: 14. “The Third Abe Cabinet Register.” n.d. Accessed September 24, 2017. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/97_abe/meibo_a/index.html#headerArea. “The Third Cabinet of Abe Shinzo” [제3차 아베 신조 내각]. n.d. Accessed September 24, 2017. https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%A0%9C3%EC%B0%A8_%EC%95%84%EB%B2 %A0_%EC%8B%A0%EC%A1%B0_%EB%82%B4%EA%B0%81. US Department of State. “Daily Press Briefing.” 2013. May 2. https://20092017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/05/208885.htm. Wallace, Corey J. 2013. “Japan’s Strategic Pivot South: Diversifying the Dual Hedge.” 479–517. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 13 (3): http://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lct011. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. Man, the State and War. New York: Columbia University Press. Xinhua Agencies. 2006. “Abe Endorses Murayama’s War Apology.” China Daily, October 7. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-10/07/content_702556.htm.

21


APPENDIXES Appendix A The First Abe Cabinet (September 26, 2006–August 27, 2007) Position

Name

Political faction

Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe

House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction

Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications

Yoshihide Suga

House of Councilors, LDP Koga Faction (古賀派)

Minister for Justice

Jinen Nagase

House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派)

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Taro Aso

Minister for Finance

Kouji Omi

Minister for Education

Bunmei Ibuki

House of Councilors, LDP Ibuki Faction (伊吹派)

Minister for Health

Hakuo Yanagisa


Toshikatsu Matsuoka

House of Councilors, LDP Ibuki Faction (伊吹派)

Norihiko Akagi (2007.6.1~) Masatoshi Wakabayashi (2007.8.1~)

Yuriko Koike (2007.7.4~)

House of Councilors, LDP Komura Faction (高村派) House of Representatives, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP Yamazaki Faction (山崎派) House of Councilors, LDP Aso Faction (麻生派) (公明党) House of Representatives, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP Tsushima Faction (津島派) House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派)

Chief Cabinet Secretary

Shiozaki Yasuhisa


Cabinet Deputy Secretary

Hakubun Shimomura


Seiji Suzuki


Junzo Matoba

Minister for Agriculture

Minister for Economy

Akira Amari

Minister for Land

Tetsuzo Fuyushiba

Minister for Environment

Masatoshi Wakabayashi

Minister for Defense

National Public Safety Commissioner Okinawa/Northern Territories, Technology, Birth Rate, Youth and Gender Equality

Fumio Kyuma

Kensei Mizote

House of Councilors, LDP Aso Faction (麻生派) House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派)

House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Representatives, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP Komura Faction (高村派) House of Representatives, LDP Koga Faction (古賀派)

Sanae Takaichi


Financial Policy

Yuji Yamamoto

House of Councilors, LDP Komura Faction (高村派)

Economic and Fiscal Policy

Hiroko Oota

Civilian, No political faction (無派閥)

Kenichiro Sada

House of Councilors, LDP Tsushima Faction (津島派)

Regulatory Reform

Yoshimi Watanabe House of Councilors, No political faction (無派閥) (2006.12.28~) Source: “Abe Cabinet Register” [安倍内閣閣僚名簿] n.d., “The First Abe Cabinet—Approved September 26, 2006” [第１次安倍内閣－平成１８年９月２６日成立] n.d., and “The First Time Abe Cabinet” [第 1次安倍內閣] n.d.

22


The Second Abe Cabinet (December 26, 2012–September 3, 2014) Dec. 26, 2012 launched

Position Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe


Yoshitaka Shindo


Sadakatsu Tanigaki


Humio Kishida


Taro Aso


Hakubun Simomura

Minister for Health

Norihisa Tamura


Yoshimasa Hayashi


Toshimitsu Motegi

Minister for Land

Akihiro Ota


Nobuteru Ishihara


Itsunori Onodera


Yoshihide Suga

Disaster Reconstruction

Takumi Nemoto

Public Safety, Measures for National Land Strengthening and Disaster Management

Political Faction House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP Nukaga Faction (額賀派) House of Councilors, LDP Tanigaki Faction (谷垣グループ) House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, LDP Aso Faction (麻生派) House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP Nukaga Faction (額賀派) House of Representatives, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Representatives, LDP Nukaga Faction (額賀派) House of Councilors, CGP House of Councilors, LDP Ishihara Faction (石原派) House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥) House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派)

Sep. 3, 2014 reshuffled Shinzo Abe

Sanae Takaichi Yoko Kamigawa Humio Kishida (Renominated) Taro Aso (Renominated) Hakubun Simomura (Renominated) Yasuhisa Siozaki Koya Nishikawa

Youichi Miyazawa Akihiro Ota (Renominated) Yoshio Mochizuki Akinori Eto Yoshihide Suga (Renominated) Wataru Takeshita

Furuya Keiji

House of Councilors, LDP Nikai Faction (二階派)

Eriko Yamatani

Okinawa/Northern Territories

Ichita Yamamoto

House of Representatives, LDP, No political faction (無派閥)

Shunichi Yamaguchi

Birth Rate, Youth and Gender Equality

Masako Mori

House of Representatives, LDP, Machimura Faction (町村派)

Haruko Arimura

Economic and Fiscal Policy and Economic Revitalisation

Akira Amari

Regional Economy

Tomomi Inada

House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥) House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派)

Akira Amari (Renominated) Sigeru Ishiba

Political Faction House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥) House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, LDP Aso Faction (麻生派) House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, LDP Nikai Faction (二階派) House of Representatives, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, CGP House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, LDP Oshima Faction (大島派) House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥) House of Councilors, LDP Nukaga Faction (額賀派) House of Representatives, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP Aso Faction (麻生派) House of Representatives, LDP Oshima Faction (大島派) House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥) House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥)

Source: “Second Abe Cabinet Minister Register” [第２次安倍内閣閣僚名簿] n.d. and “The Second Cabinet of Shinzo Abe” [제2차 아베 신조 내각] n.d.

23


The Third Abe Cabinet (December 24, 2014–)

Position

Dec.24, 2014 launched

Political Faction

Oct.7, 2015 reshuffled

Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe


Shinzo Abe


Yoshitaka Shindo

House of Councilors, LDP Nukaga Faction (額賀派)

Sanae Takaichi


Sadakatsu Tanigaki

House of Councilors, LDP Tanigaki Faction (谷垣グループ)

Yoko Kamigawa


Humio Kishida

House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派)

Humio Kishida (Renominated)


Taro Aso

House of Councilors, LDP Aso Faction (麻生派)

Taro Aso (Renominated)


Hakubun Simomura


Hakubun Simomura (Renominated)

Minister for Health

Norihisa Tamura


Yasuhisa Siozaki


Yoshimasa Hayashi

House of Representatives, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派)

Koya Nishikawa


Toshimitsu Motegi


Youichi Miyazawa

Minister for Land

Akihiro Ota

House of Councilors, CGP

Akihiro Ota (Renominated)


Nobuteru Ishihara

House of Councilors, LDP Ishihara Faction (石原派)

Yoshio Mochizuki


Itsunori Onodera


Akinori Eto


Yoshihide Suga

House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥)

Yoshihide Suga (Renominated)

Disaster Reconstruction

Takumi Nemoto


Wataru Takeshita

Public Safety, Measures for National Land Strengthening and Disaster Management

Furuya Keiji

House of Councilors, LDP Nikai Faction (二階派)

Eriko Yamatani

Okinawa/Northern Territories

Ichita Yamamoto

House of Representatives, LDP, No political faction (無派閥)

Shunichi Yamaguchi

Birth Rate, Youth and Gender Equality

Masako Mori

House of Representatives, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派)

Haruko Arimura

Economic and Fiscal Policy and Economic Revitalisation

Akira Amari

House of Councilors, LDP, No political Faction (無派閥)

Akira Amari (Renominated)

Regional Economy

Tomomi Inada


Sigeru Ishiba

Political Faction House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥) House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, LDP Aso Faction (麻生派) House of Councilors, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, LDP Nikai Faction (二階派) House of Representatives, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, CGP House of Councilors, LDP Kishida Faction (岸田派) House of Councilors, LDP Oshima Faction (大島派) House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥) House of Councilors, LDP Nukaga Faction (額賀派) House of Representatives, LDP Machimura Faction (町村派) House of Councilors, LDP Aso Faction (麻生派) House of Representatives, LDP Oshima Faction (大島派) House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥) House of Councilors, LDP, No political faction (無派閥)

Source: “The Third Abe Cabinet Minister Register” n.d. and “The Third Cabinet of Abe Shinzo” [제3차 아베 신조 내각]

24


Appendix B Political Faction of Cabinet Members First Abe Cabinet

Second Abe Cabinet

Reshuffled Cabinet

Sep.26, 2006 launched

Dec.26, 2012 launched

Sep.3, 2014 launched

Koga Faction (古賀派)

4

-

-

Komura Faction (高村派)

3

-

-

Nukaga Faction (額賀派 )

-

3

1

Nikai Faction (二階派)

-

1

1

Tanigaki Faction (谷垣グループ)

-

1

-

Machimura Faction (町村派)

8

4

3

Tsushima Faction (津島派)

2

-

-

Aso Faction (麻生派)

3

1

2

Yamazaki Faction (伊吹派)

1

-

-

Oshima Faction (大島派)

-

-

2

Ibuki Faction (伊吹派)

3

-

-

Kishida Faction (岸田派)

-

4

5

Politician without Faction (無派閥 )

2

4

3

Komeito Party (公明党)

-

1

1

Political Factions

Source: Compiled from Appendix A

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Lee Hae-in: Master’s Graduate, Department of International Studies, Catholic University of Korea, Bucheon, Gyeonggi-do, South Korea Benedict E. DeDominicis, PhD: Associate Professor, Department of International Studies, Catholic University of Korea, Bucheon, Gyeonggi-do, South Korea

25

Organizational Cultures: An International Journal is one of three thematically focused journals in the family of journals that support The Organization Studies Research Network—its journals, book series, conference, and online community. The journal explores success factors in the management of organizational culture in responsive, productive, and respected organizations. As well as papers of a traditional scholarly type, this journal invites case studies that take the form of presentations of management practice—including documentation of organizational practices and exegeses analyzing the effects of those practices.

Organizational Cultures: An International Journal is a peer-reviewed, scholarly journal.

ISSN 2327-8013 447-9524