PROGRAM ON SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY

PROGRAM ON SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Princeton University

Annual Report

July 2006 – December 2007

Christopher F. Chyba Harold A. Feiveson Laura H. Kahn Zia Mian Frank N. von Hippel (Principal Investigators)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction and Summary

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II. Research and Policy Analysis Nuclear Weapons and Materials The International Panel on Fissile Materials Limiting the weapons arsenals of the nuclear weapon states Reducing the number of locations where fissile material may be found Ending the production of fissile materials for weapons Minimizing the proliferation impact of the spread of nuclear power Phasing out the processing of spent fuel Limiting the spread of national uranium enrichment facilities Nuclear forensics Considering a comprehensive U.S. nuclear weapon policy Understanding key divergent views in U.S. nuclear weapon policy Assessing North Korea’s nuclear test Contributing to the U.K. Trident-submarine replacement debate Nuclear Threat Reduction in South Asia Limiting the potential size and destructiveness of South Asian nuclear arsenals Space Security Potential weaponization of space Deflection of potentially hazardous asteroids Biodefense and Biotechnology Security Developing strategies to address dual-use biotechnologies Strengthening public health protections against bioterrorism and emerging diseases

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III. Fostering the Development of Independent Technical Expertise An International Network of Collaborators Science & Global Security Archiving Arms Control Literature Education and Training

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Appendices: A. Personnel B. Abstracts of Publications and Reports C. Lectures, Talks, Workshops D. Program on Science and Global Security Weekly Seminars E. Biosecurity, Biotechnology and Global Health Seminars F. Sources of Funding

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I. Introduction and Summary The Program on Science and Global Security (PS&GS), within Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, continues to impact policy through its research and analysis and by fostering an international network of independent science and security researchers.

Research and Policy Analysis Since July 2006, research at PS&GS has developed the analytical basis for policy initiatives within several important areas: •

Reducing the danger from nuclear weapons and nuclear materials;

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Nuclear threat reduction in South Asia;

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Space security; and

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Improving biological security, both with respect to dual-use biotechnology and naturally occurring disease.

PS&GS provides research and administrative support to the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), a group of independent nuclear experts from 16 nuclear-weapon and non-weapon states. The Panel’s mission is to educate interested governments on the technical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The Panel is co-chaired by R. Rajaraman of Jawaharlal Nehru University, India, and Frank von Hippel. It is supported by a five-year grant to Princeton University from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. In September 2006, the Panel published its first report, Global Fissile Material Report 2006, on the global situation with regard to efforts to secure and eliminate fissile materials. The Global Fissile Material Report 2007 was released in October 2007.

Fostering a Community of Independent Technical Expertise PS&GS provides training opportunities for post-doctoral and senior scientists interested in science and security as well as for Princeton undergraduate and graduate students. The resulting network over the years has allowed us to contribute to the nuclear policy debates in a number of countries. We also edit Science & Global Security, the international journal of arms-control science.

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Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University

Since July 2006, PS&GS hosted several visitors for periods of one to seven months: Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy, Quaid-i-Azam University, Pakistan; Professor A.H. Nayyar, Quaid-i-Azam University (ret.); Professor R. Rajaraman, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Dr. Tadahiro Katsuta, University of Tokyo, and Professor Houston G. Wood, University of Virginia. Faculty and researchers in PS&GS teach science and security courses and policy workshops for Princeton undergraduate and graduate students. Students with undergraduate or master’s degrees in science or engineering can pursue PhDs with PS&GS by applying to the Woodrow Wilson School’s Science, Technology and Environmental Policy (STEP) Program. Scott Kemp is the first such student. PS&GS also has a fellowship program that enables Princeton science or engineering graduate students to carry out a science and security research project with us while they are pursuing PhDs in their home departments. This fellowship program, initially sponsored by the MacArthur Foundation, provides for one half support for two years for tuition and summer stipends. Babur Habib, an electrical-engineering PhD student, has successfully completed this program as our first fellow. Khosrow Allaf Akbari, an astrophysics PhD student, is our second fellow. Science & Global Security is edited by Feiveson with support from PS&GS. For many science and security researchers, it is the only venue for peer-reviewed publication of technical security studies. It has become an essential institution in the field of sciencebased security studies. It is published in Russian and Chinese, as well as in English and articles are posted to our web site following one year after initial publication in English and immediately in Russian and Chinese respectively.

The PS&GS Research Community PS&GS is directed by Christopher Chyba, who joined the Princeton faculty in 2005 as Professor of Astrophysics and International Affairs. Hal Feiveson and Frank von Hippel co-directed the Program from 1974 to 2006. Feiveson and von Hippel continue their research and teaching as members of the Program. The PS&GS research staff also includes: Zia Mian, who directs the PS&GS Project on Peace and Security in South Asia; Laura Kahn, MD, and Ali Nouri, who work on biodefense, biotechnology and public health issues; and Alexander Glaser, who is an expert on nuclear-reactor and fissilematerial issues. And, as mentioned above, we have had the expertise of Houston Wood and Tadahiro Katsuta as visiting research scholars.

Program on Science and Global Security Annual Report 2007

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II. Research and Policy Analysis

Nuclear Weapons and Materials Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the essential ingredients in nuclear weapons. Limiting access to these fissile materials and reducing the number of locations where they can be found are therefore critical to efforts to prevent nuclear-weapon proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and to make nuclear disarmament irreversible. At the beginning of 2006, PS&GS, with a 5-year grant from the MacArthur Foundation, helped establish an International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) to facilitate international collaboration to advance this agenda. A substantial part of our efforts on nuclear issues during 2006-2007 was accomplished in conjunction with the Panel. Overall, working with the IPFM and independently, we focused on analytical efforts relating to the following issues: •

Limiting the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states;

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Reducing the number of locations where fissile material may be found;

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Providing the technical basis for a verified treaty to end the production of fissile material for weapons;

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Minimizing the proliferation impact of any expansion of nuclear power;

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Phasing out civilian separation of plutonium from spent fuel;

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Limiting the spread of national uranium-enrichment and other fuel-cycle facilities;

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Nuclear forensics;

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Formulating a new comprehensive nuclear weapon policy for the United States;

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Understanding key divergent views of U.S. nuclear weapon policies.

We also helped assess North Korea’s nuclear test, and contributed to the U.K. debate over building a new generation of ballistic-missile submarines.

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The International Panel on Fissile Materials. Funded by a five-year grant from the MacArthur Foundation, the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) officially came into being in January 2006. It is an international group of independent arms-control and nonproliferation experts with a mission to prepare the analytical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The Panel is comprised of members from sixteen countries: Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States (nuclear-weapon states are italicized). PS&GS is responsible for providing research and administrative support for the Panel. Until July 2007, the Panel was co-chaired by Professor José Goldemberg of the University of São Paulo, Brazil and Frank von Hippel of PS&GS. In July, Emeritus Professor R. Rajaraman of Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India succeeded Goldemberg as co-chair. Goldemberg continues as a member of the Panel. The IPFM had its first meeting in March 2006 in The Hague, Netherlands. A second IPFM meeting was held at the end of September 2006 in Ottawa, Canada and included a session with the nonproliferation and disarmament experts of Canada’s Foreign Ministry. The third IPFM meeting took place in March 2007 in Vienna, Austria and included briefings by senior International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts. A fourth meeting took place in London in October 2007 and included meetings with U.K. government and non-government nuclear experts. Members of the Panel briefed the United Nations Conference on Disarmament at its session on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in May 2006 and organized and chaired a technical workshop in Oslo, Norway in June 2006 on elimination of civilian uses of highly enriched uranium. (HEU is currently widely used as a fuel for civilian research reactors and for the production of medical radioisotopes.) The Oslo workshop provided the basis for a follow-on policy discussion by members of the IAEA Board of Directors on the feasibility of promulgating an international policy that would mandate the phase-out of civilian HEU use. Zia Mian, representing the IPFM, made presentations at the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee on Nuclear Disarmament and International Security in October 2006, and at NGO meetings at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Prepcom meeting in Vienna in May 2007. IPFM members also gave papers at the annual conference of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management in Nashville, Tennessee in July 2006. The Panel produces an annual Global Fissile Material Report which summarizes new information on fissile material stocks and production worldwide and presents the technical basis for possible initiatives to reduce the stocks and end production. The 2006 Report


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was released at the Ottawa meeting at the end of September 2006. 1 The 2007 Report was released at the London meeting in October 2007. 2 The Panel also has produced three research studies. Two of these – on Japan’s plutonium policies 3 , and on the arms-control implications of the proposed U.S.-India nuclear deal 4 – were released at the 2006 Ottawa meeting. (IPFM and PS&GS efforts to explain and analyze the U.S.-India deal are discussed in the South Asia section of this progress report.) A third research report by von Hippel, critiquing the Bush Administration’s proposal to reprocess U.S. spent power-reactor fuel, was released in January 2007. 5 Additional research reports that are currently being written and edited and chapters of the Global Fissile Material Report 2006 and 2007 are discussed below. As a result of Alex Glaser’s initiative, a website for IPFM has been established at www.fissilematerial.org, where the Panel’s reports can be found. It also has a “Fissile Material Atlas” that displays national fissile-material stocks and policies through interactive world maps. The objective is to organize data in a way that is both accurate and comprehensible to a non-technical audience. As a part of the IPFM web presence, we have begun to make available to the arms control community important technical and policy documents, which are otherwise hard to find on the internet. These are available at www.ipfmlibrary.org. In late 2007, we also added a “blog” to IPFM’s website (www.fissilematerials.org/blog), in which IPFM members and staff report on activities of the Panel and on other news or developments of interest to the community.

Limiting the weapons arsenals of the nuclear weapon states. Four chapters of the Global Fissile Material Report 2007 address nuclear arms control in the nuclear weapon states: •

Zia Mian explores the possibilities for deeper cuts in the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapon arsenals and how they could be made more irreversible by disposing of excess HEU and plutonium. 6

•

Anatoli Diakov of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology and Matthew Bunn of Harvard University examine in two chapters the

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Global Fissile Material Report 2006, available at www.fissilematerials.org. Global Fissile Material Report 2007, available at www.fissilematerials.org. 3 Tadahiro Katsuta and Tatsujiro Suzuki, Japan’s Spent Fuel and Plutonium Management Challenges, IPFM Research Report #2, September 2006, available at www.fissilematerials.org. 4 Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana, Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal, IPFM Research Report #1, September 2006, available at www.fissilematerials.org, also published as “Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the USIndia Nuclear Deal,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 14, Nos. 2-3, 2006. 5 Frank von Hippel, Managing Spent Fuel in the United States: The Illogic of Reprocessing, IPFM Research Report #3, January 2007, available at www.fissilematerials.org. 6 Zia Mian, “Progress toward Nuclear Disarmament,” Global Fissile Material Report 2007, pp. 56-66. 2

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progress of and obstacles to U.S. and Russian efforts to dispose of the HEU and plutonium that they have already declared excess, 7 and •

William Walker of the University of Saint Andrews and Lawrence Scheinman of the Monterey Institute discuss the status of international monitoring of civilian production facilities and fissile-material stocks in the nuclear weapon states. 8

In order for the elimination of excess fissile materials to be fully effective in facilitating reductions of nuclear-weapon stockpiles, it will be necessary for countries to declare how much fissile material they have. The United States and the United Kingdom have, in fact, declared their stocks of plutonium and HEU. These declarations were initiated in the 1990s in the period of nuclear openness after the end of the Cold War. The U.S. plutonium declaration was published in 1996 but the U.S. report on its HEU stockpile was not completed until January 2001 and only released in 2006 after persistent invocations of the Freedom of Information Act by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists. Chapter 6 of Global Fissile Material Report 2006 lays out the importance of such declarations and assesses the U.S. data. 9 In an invited article in Nonproliferation Review, Aftergood describes this effort and von Hippel provides an overview of the new information in the report and of its significance. 10 In the September 2006 issue of Arms Control Today, Anatoli Diakov and Eugene Miasnikov of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology discussed the possibilities of a new U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that is set to expire in 2009. 11 This paper was largely written during their 2005-6 visits to PS&GS. During 2006-7, while visiting PS&GS, Professor Li Bin of Beijing’s Tsinghua University, wrote an article that has since been published in Science & Global Security on the vulnerability of Chinese mobile missiles to a preemptive U.S. attack guided by spacebased radars. 12 Concerns within China’s nuclear establishment about this possible vulnerability, in combination with concerns about U.S. and Japanese deployment of ballistic-missile defenses nominally directed against North Korea, could trigger a buildup of China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles. Professor Li Bin concluded that, even if the United States were able to deploy enough space-based radars to give it continuous coverage of China, the radars would not be able to track all of the missiles all of the time.

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Matthew Bunn and Anatoli Diakov, “Disposition of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium,” pp. 24-32; and “Disposition of Excess Plutonium,” pp. 33-42, Global Fissile Material Report 2007. 8 William Walker and Lawrence Scheinman, “International Safeguards in the Nuclear Weapon States,” Global Fissile Material Report 2007, pp. 67-81. 9 “Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks,” pp. 51-56, Global Fissile Material Report 2006. 10 Steve Aftergood and Frank von Hippel, “The US HEU Declaration: Transparency Deferred but Not Denied,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2007. 11 Anatoli Diakov and Eugene Miasnikov, “ReSTART: The Need for a New US-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement,” Arms Control Today, September 2006. 12 Li Bin, “Tracking Chinese Strategic Mobile Missiles,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2007.


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Reducing the number of locations where fissile material may be found. PS&GS researchers and others have for years written about the importance of converting reactors fueled with highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Poorly secured HEU poses an especially serious nuclear-terrorism risk because about 60 kilograms is sufficient to make a simple gun-type (Hiroshima) nuclear weapon. Congress has responded by increasing U.S. funding for the reactor-conversion effort ten-fold, and Norway has tried to organize international support for a global “cleanout” of civilian HEU. 13 But it has been necessary to convince reactor operators one at a time. One concern of the reactor operators is that conversion to LEU decreases the useful flux of neutrons from the fuel by about ten percent. Alex Glaser has pointed out however that the reduction can be more than offset by upgrading instruments and other experimental equipment at the facility during the conversion process. Glaser first presented this idea at an International Workshop on Applications of Advanced Monte Carlo Simulations in Neutron Scattering held in October 2006 at the Paul Scherrer Institute in Switzerland. He presented a more developed paper at the Annual Conference of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management in July 2007 and at the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) meeting in September 2007. 14 A journal article is being prepared. Obsolete HEU-fueled reactors should be shut down. To facilitate this, we have joined the IAEA’s research-reactor group in promoting initiatives to convert the best research reactors into centers of excellence where researchers from institutions that shut down their own research reactors could work with state-of-the-art experimental instrumentation. This is already happening in Europe and the United States but is being resisted in Russia. von Hippel helped organize a workshop on the subject at the IAEA supported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative in September 2006. Another limitation of current HEU cleanout programs that has been pointed out by PS&GS researchers is that there are major classes of HEU-fueled reactors that have not as yet been targeted for conversion or shutdown. These include at least 70 critical assemblies and pulsed reactors. Some of these reactors have cores that contain hundreds of kilograms of only lightly irradiated weapon-grade uranium. This issue has been picked up by the IAEA research-reactor group, which organized an international consultation on the problem of HEU-fueled critical assemblies in 2005. The IAEA group hosted a workshop on critical and pulsed reactors in which Glaser and von Hippel participated in early 2008. Significant quantities of HEU are also used in ‘targets” which are bombarded by neutrons to produce medical radioisotopes. Laura Kahn and von Hippel carried out an analysis that showed that conversion of the targets to LEU would increase radioisotope costs to 13

“Global Cleanout of Highly Enriched Uranium,” pp. 67-71, Global Fissile Material Report 2006. Alexander Glaser, “Neutron-Use Optimization with Virtual Experiments to Facilitate Research-Reactor Conversion to Low-Enriched Fuel,” paper submitted to the Annual Conference of the INMM, July 2007; and “Performance Gain with Low-Enriched Fuel and Optimized Use of Neutrons,” Proceedings of the 29th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), 23-27 September 2007, Prague, Czech Republic.

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hospitals by one percent or less. 15 Congress has mandated a National Academy of Sciences study of this question. von Hippel briefed the panel’s first meeting in February 2007. Recently two of the four major producers announced their decisions to convert to LEU. Although civilian HEU is important, because it still can be found at 140 often poorly guarded research reactors scattered around the world, much larger quantities of HEU and plutonium can be found in the nuclear weapons and naval-reactor fuel cycles of the nuclear weapon states. In the past few years, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has accepted as a design-basis threat to the fissile materials in its nuclear-weapon production complex, an attack by a number of heavily-armed terrorists comparable to the nineteen September 11, 2001 hijackers. The cost for guarding a single building against such an attack is over ten million dollars a year, however. This has driven the DOE to begin consolidating its fissile material stocks to a smaller number of sites. Peter Stockton, an associate of the IPFM, has been focusing on this effort as a Congressional investigator, a former DOE official and now as an investigator for the Program on Government Oversight (POGO). In Global Fissile Material Report 2007, Stockton co-authored with von Hippel a chapter on the state of play of the DOE’s consolidation efforts and how they might be carried through. 16

Ending the production of fissile materials for weapons. The five NPT nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China) all suspended production of fissile material for weapons during the 1990s. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would turn this production moratorium into a binding commitment and cap the stockpiles of the three non-NPT weapon states (India, Israel and Pakistan) as well. Negotiation of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been blocked for a decade by an impasse over the agenda, which can only be decided by consensus. Currently, the impasse is principally between the United States on the one side and China, Iran and Pakistan on the other, over the issue of linkages to parallel negotiations on preventing an arms race in outer space, guarantees against nuclear attack for non-weapon states, and nuclear disarmament. In May 2006, the CD held three days of discussions of the issues that would have to be dealt with in FMCT negotiations. In order to lay a technical basis for these discussions, the Dutch delegation sponsored a three-hour briefing by a four-member IPFM panel

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Laura Kahn and Frank von Hippel, “Feasibility of Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in the Production of Medical Isotopes,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 14, 2006; “How the Radiological and Nuclear Medical Communities Can Improve Nuclear Security,” Journal of the American College of Radiology, Vol. 4, No. 4, April 2007. 16 Peter Stockton and Frank von Hippel, “Fissile Material Consolidation in the US Nuclear Complex,” Global Fissile Material Report 2007, pp. 43-55.


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including Rajaraman and von Hippel. A draft IPFM report, The Technical Basis for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, was distributed to all the CD delegations. If negotiations could be launched – either in the CD or in another forum – the most important issues would be verification and how to treat existing stocks of fissile materials. Both issues have been complicated by a draft treaty tabled by the United States in May 2006. This draft proposed an unverified FMCT, and also can be interpreted as allowing pre-existing stocks of civilian and naval fissile materials to be converted to weapon use. The IPFM has launched an effort to elaborate how an FMCT could be framed and verified. Its preliminary conclusions were summarized in one of the chapters of the Global Fissile Material Report 2006 and in the draft IPFM report distributed to the CD. The aim is to publish a more in-depth analysis in the Global Fissile Material Report 2008. Progress reports have been given in various forums, including in the September 2006 Middle Power Initiative meeting in Ottawa, in January 2007 in Washington at a briefing hosted by the Carnegie Endowment, and in April 2007 at the United Nations, Vienna in a briefing to participants in the annual meeting of the General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. IPFM has launched a number of studies relating to the verification of an FMCT. One relates to verification costs, which have been of concern because of the large number of nuclear facilities in the weapon states. An IAEA study in 1995 concluded that extending the monitoring arrangements that it has in the non-weapon states into the weapon states would require an increase of its safeguards budget by a factor of 3.5. Sixty percent of this increase was estimated to be derived from monitoring operating reprocessing plants in the weapon states. We therefore invited Shirley Johnson, a recently retired IAEA expert who had supervised the design and installation of monitoring systems in Japan’s Rokkasho reprocessing plant, to work with us in writing a paper addressing the issue of verifying an FMCT at reprocessing plants in the weapon states. She has shown that the monitoring costs could be greatly reduced by relaxing somewhat the timeliness requirement for detecting a significant diversion in the non-weapon states. 17 We are also examining the limits of various technologies to detect clandestine production of plutonium and HEU. Small clandestine centrifuge facilities are particularly difficult to detect because they do not have a “signature” such as unusually large electricity consumption, or significant gaseous or electromagnetic emissions. If a clandestine centrifuge plant has an associated clandestine UF6 production plant to supply it with feed,

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Shirley Johnson, “Safeguarding Reprocessing Plants in Nuclear-Weapon States Under an FMCT,” IPFM Research Report [in preparation].

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it would be easier to detect the production plant because a much larger fraction of the UF6 passing through it would leak into the environment. 18 Another method of detection was examined by Babur Habib, an Electrical Engineering graduate student with a partial fellowship from PS&GS. Habib examined the detectability of the electromagnetic signal generated by the electric motors that spin the centrifuge rotors. His results were not encouraging for long-distance detection. Even very light shielding, for example by a thin layer of aluminum, would reduce the range of detection to a few hundred meters. 19 The technique might still be of interest, however, for searching a suspect complex for a centrifuge cascade. Our study of how to detect clandestine reprocessing operations has focused on measurements of the 11-year half-life gaseous fission product, krypton-85, which is released when spent fuel is dissolved. At some distance from a reprocessing plant, the emitted krypton will be lost in the background of krypton-85 that has accumulated in the atmosphere mainly from the large Russian and U.S. reprocessing plants that produced plutonium for their nuclear arsenals and the large British and French commercial reprocessing plants. The calculation of this distance under varying assumptions is described in a paper presented by Scott Kemp at the July 2007 annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 20 An overview of our current understanding of the detectability of clandestine enrichment and reprocessing appears in a Global Fissile Material Report 2007 chapter by Martin Kalinowski and Scott Kemp. 21

Minimizing the proliferation impact of the spread of nuclear power. Many energy analysts are predicting a dramatic nuclear “renaissance,” driven by high oil and natural-gas prices and concerns over global warming. We are not at all certain that the expansion will be that large but believe it is important to ensure that whatever expansion or renewal occurs is done in a way that does not exacerbate the nuclear-weapon proliferation problem.

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The gas inside a centrifuge is at less than atmospheric pressure, so the leakage is inward, while that inside a UF6 production facility is above atmospheric pressure. For one suggestion that detection of the conversion facilities should be easier than that of covert centrifuge enrichment facilities, see Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 2004, pp. 19-20. 19 Babur Habib, “Estimation of the Electromagnetic Radiation Emitted from a Small Centrifuge Plant,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2007, pp. 31-48. 20 R. Scott Kemp, “Technical Options for Off-Site Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Materials Production,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Tucson, Arizona, 10 July 2007. 21 Martin Kalinowski and R. Scott Kemp, “Detection of Clandestine Fissile Material Production,” Global Fissile Material Report 2007, pp. 101-109.


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An article by Feiveson in Arms Control Today, 22 and a chapter by Feiveson, Josè Goldemberg and M.V. Ramana, in the Global Fissile Material Report 2007, 23 made the following points: •

Nuclear power would have to expand three-fold to offset one billion tons a year or roughly one seventh of the projected “business-as-usual” increase in global releases of carbon in carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by 2050;

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Even if nuclear power did expand by that much or more, there would still be no economic rationale for spent-fuel reprocessing and plutonium recycling and strong security reasons to avoid those activities;

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An expansion of nuclear power would require an expansion of uranium enrichment capacity in the next decades – most likely based on gas centrifuge technology. As is evident from the current confrontation with Iran over its centrifuge-based enrichment program, this capacity will have to be carefully sited and controlled by international agreements if we are to avoid serious proliferation risks.

We have been analyzing the issues related to a nuclear renaissance from two extreme perspectives. For one, we have imagined a very robust nuclear future and describe the kinds of institutional and technical innovations that could make such a nuclear future more proliferation resistant. For the other, we have begun to examine the feasibility and consequences of a global phase-out of nuclear power. Feiveson and Glaser, along with co-authors, Marvin Miller (MIT) and Lawrence Scheinman (Monterey Institute), prepared a paper on the security issues raised by a highgrowth nuclear future for the Security Studies Program of the University of Maryland. 24 This paper was the basis for a workshop that the Maryland program held in mid-January 2008. It analyzes in detail scenarios based on various reactor types and fuel cycles. It concludes that a “once-through” fuel cycle in which spent fuel is not reprocessed is the most proliferation resistant. It also finds that this fuel cycle is sustainable for even the high-growth scenario. Finally, it finds politically unsustainable the vision promulgated in the Bush Administration’s “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership” proposal, in which reprocessing and enrichment would be restricted only to “safe” countries and forbidden to others. With regard to the feasibility of phasing out nuclear power, Glaser and Mian have written an article questioning whether nuclear power could be deployed on a scale sufficient to

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Harold A. Feiveson, “Faux Renaissance: Global Warming, Radioactive Waste Disposal, and the Nuclear Future,” Arms Control Today, May 2007. 23 Harold A. Feiveson, José Goldemberg, and M.V. Ramana, “Managing the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Global Fissile Material Report 2007, pp. 82-91. 24 Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Marvin Miller, and Lawrence Scheinman, “The Future of Nuclear Power,” 28 May 2007, presented to the Security Studies Program of the University of Maryland [manuscript].

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mitigate global climate change without resulting in a large increase in proliferation risks. 25 Glaser presented this analysis at a November 2006 Conference on the Future of Nuclear Energy organized by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the University of Chicago.

Phasing out the processing of spent fuel. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, analyses of the need for and economics of plutonium-breeder reactors by Feiveson and von Hippel and Princeton energy analyst Robert H. Williams helped convince the Carter Administration and the U.S. Congress to end the domestic promotion of plutonium recycling. 26 This made U.S. opposition to the spread of spent-fuel reprocessing to other countries more effective because the United States could now say, “we don’t do it and you don’t need to either.” Since that time, no additional non-weapon state beyond Japan (which began reprocessing in 1977) has built a reprocessing plant; three (Belgium, Germany and Italy) have shut down pilot reprocessing programs; and one nuclear-weapon state (the United Kingdom) has decided to end its very large scale civilian reprocessing program. 27 Driven by delays in the availability of the Yucca Mountain national spent-fuel repository in Nevada, however, the Bush Administration is proposing the construction of a huge government-funded reprocessing plant as an alternative interim destination for U.S. spent fuel. Federal funding would be required for the construction and operation of the reprocessing plant because U.S. nuclear utilities are not willing to pay for more than the cost of direct disposition of spent fuel in an underground repository. The Bush Administration proposal would separate an additional thousand tons of plutonium in a world that is already endangered by 500 tons of separated civilian and weapon plutonium. Half of the existing global stockpile of separated plutonium already is a result of past failed efforts to commercialize plutonium breeder reactors. Furthermore, the United States and Russia have together declared about one hundred tons of their weapon plutonium excess, but their disposition plans have stalled. To separate more plutonium under these circumstances seems irresponsible. The alternative to reprocessing in the United States would be to store older spent fuel in massive casks at reactor sites – as nearly all U.S. nuclear utilities are already doing or preparing to do. Eventually, the spent fuel will have to be moved to a central site, but as long as the reactors operate, spent fuel in dry casks contributes a negligible additional risk to that from the much hotter fuel in the reactor.

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Zia Mian and Alexander Glaser, “Life in a Nuclear-Powered Crowd,” INESAP Newsletter, No. 52, April 2006. 26 See e.g. Harold A. Feiveson, Frank von Hippel and R.H. Williams, “Fission Power: An Evolutionary Strategy,” Science, Vol. 203, 26 January 1979 and T.B. Cochran, R.E. Train, Frank von Hippel and R.H. Williams, Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Power Technologies: Preferred Alternatives to the Plutonium Breeder, minority report of the Steering Committee of the LMFBR Program Review of the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, 6 April 1977. 27 North Korea and Pakistan launched reprocessing as part of their weapon programs and China, a nuclearweapon state, is building a pilot-scale commercial reprocessing plant.


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We have contributed to the U.S. debate over reprocessing during the past two years, including showing that the product of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) much-touted “proliferation-resistant” UREX+ reprocessing system (which would keep the plutonium mixed with other transuranic elements) would not generate a high enough gamma radiation field to be considered “self protecting.” 28 We have also pointed to the huge costs that would be incurred if the DOE carried through on its proposal to not only build a reprocessing plant, but to subsidize the construction of a whole new generation of fast-neutron reactors to fission the plutonium and other minor transuranic elements that the reprocessing would separate from spent fuel. These considerations are laid out in a January 2007 IPFM Research Report, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: The Illogic of Reprocessing by von Hippel, which is the basis of a Scientific American article, currently scheduled for May 2008. 29 von Hippel has given many briefings to congressional staff and a few to key House and Senate members based on this report, helping to turn Congress’s initial enthusiasm for reprocessing as a “solution” to the spent fuel problem to skepticism. In the fiscal year 2008 Omnibus Appropriations bill, Congress cut the Administration’s request for this program by almost two thirds and restricted the use of the funds to R&D. Supported by IPFM and PS&GS, two analyses on reprocessing in other countries are being prepared for publication. One, by Masa Takubo (supported by a consulting contract with PS&GS), explores the political factors that have driven and currently sustain reprocessing in Japan and the prospects that these factors might weaken in future years. 30 This complements the more technical IPFM analysis of the same issue. 31 A second report, by IPFM members Yves Marignac and Mycle Schneider, reviews the history of commercial reprocessing in France and concludes that reprocessing, far from rationalizing radioactive waste disposal – as its proponents often claim – has, in fact greatly complicated radioactive waste disposal in France. 32

Limiting the spread of national uranium enrichment facilities. Glaser has developed an independent capability to analyze the performance of centrifuges as individual machines and in enrichment cascades. Such analysis is critical for the study of the breakout potential of centrifuge facilities, the effectiveness of safeguards on these facilities, and the effectiveness of export controls in stopping the proliferation of centrifuge technologies – all of which Glaser and Kemp are studying. Preliminary results of their research were 28

Jungmin Kang and Frank von Hippel, “The Limited Proliferation-Resistance Benefits of the Nuclear Fuel Cycles being Researched by the Department of Energy’s Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative,” Science & Global Security, 2005, 169-181. 29 Frank von Hippel, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: The Illogic of Reprocessing, IPFM Research Report #3, January 2007, available at www.fissilematerials.org. 30 Masa Takubo, “Wake Up, Stop Dreaming: Reassessing Japan’s Reprocessing Program,” forthcoming in Nonproliferation Review, March 2008. 31 Tadahiro Katsuta and Tatsujiro Suzuki, Japan’s Spent Fuel and Plutonium Management Challenges, IPFM Research Report #2, September 2006, available at www.fissilematerials.org. 32 Yves Marignac and Mycle Schneider, Reprocessing in France, draft IPFM Research Report.

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presented at the Ninth International Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases held in September 2006 in Beijing, China. 33 During the fall of 2007, Glaser and Kemp were joined in this work by Houston Wood, a professor at the University of Virginia and a world-recognized expert on centrifuge technologies. Kemp and Wood are researching the technical history of centrifuge developments in countries around the world. The project will help determine early indicators of centrifuge proliferation, identify opportunities for control, and help to judge the ability of small and developing countries to build centrifuges on their own. Kemp used some of this work to help clarify aspects of Iran’s program at a workshop on verifying Iran’s enrichment program, convened by the American Association for the Advancement of Sciences and the New America Foundation in September 2007. Chaim Braun of Stanford University is preparing an IPFM Research Report assessing the various proposals for multilateral arrangement that could significantly decrease incentives for countries to develop national fuel cycle and especially uranium enrichment facilities. 34 Also, in a chapter for Global Fissile Material Report 2007, Anatoli Diakov and von Hippel examine the developing role of Russia as a supplier of enrichment services. 35

Nuclear forensics. Recently, there has been considerable interest in nuclear forensics and its role and capabilities in identifying the origin of intercepted nuclear material or of debris recovered from a clandestinely emplaced nuclear explosive. Alex Glaser is a member of a study group on this topic sponsored by the American Physical Society (APS) and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), which will publish its final report in early 2008. As part of this effort, Glaser has carried out a number of supporting research projects on uranium and plutonium signatures. He and visiting Professor Houston Wood developed an advanced version of a computer code (MSTAR), which is used by the IAEA and other institutions. The modifications allow them to differentiate between different enrichment processes (e.g. gaseous diffusion versus gas centrifuge) and also to treat the enrichment of the trace isotopes U-232, U-234, and U-236, which may be present in the feed material. Glaser also calculated the difference between the pre- and post-explosion isotopic mixes of uranium used a crude gun-type device. These analyses can support credible assessments of the capabilities and limits of nuclear forensic methods.

Considering a comprehensive U.S. nuclear weapon policy. The book U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats, co-edited by George Bunn of Stanford’s 33

R. Scott Kemp and Alexander Glaser, “The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” in Shi Zeng, ed., Proceedings of the Ninth International Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases, 18-21 September 2006, Beijing, China, Tshinghua University Press, 2007. 34 Chaim Braun, Nuclear Fuel Supply Assurances, IPFM Research Report [in preparation]. 35 Anatoli Diakov and Frank von Hippel, “Russia’s Nuclear-Energy Complex and its Roles as an International Fuel-Cycle Service Provider,” Global Fissile Material Report 2007, pp. 92-100.


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Center for International Security and Cooperation and Christopher Chyba, was published by Brookings in late 2006 with a foreword by William Perry and an endorsement on its back cover by George Shultz. The book considered existing U.S. nuclear weapon policies and, among other important issues, examined the question of whether U.S. nuclear weapon policies are undermining the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Chyba coauthored four of the book’s eight chapters and gave extensive briefings in Washington on the book’s principal recommendations, including an alternative vision for a comprehensive U.S. nuclear weapon policy that would consider the trade-offs among different security objectives that any nuclear weapon policy must confront. Chyba built on the book’s analysis to publish his own recommendations for U.S nuclear weapon policy, as the chapter “Time for Comprehensive Policies on Nuclear and Biological Weapons” in the edited volume Breaking the Nuclear Impasse. 36 In the book Atoms for Peace: A Future After Fifty Years? he contributed a chapter that considered the implications of nuclear smuggling networks on U.S. policy. 37

Understanding key divergent views in U.S. nuclear weapon policy. At the invitation of the directors of the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, Chyba agreed to co-chair, with former Deputy National Security Advisor J. D. Crouch, a working group on “Understanding Key Divergent Views on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” The co-chairs presented the findings of the group on January 31, 2008, to the lab directors and others at the Conference on Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century, held in Washington, D.C.

Assessing North Korea’s nuclear test. At the request of Arms Control Today, Richard Garwin and von Hippel wrote an article on the implications of the very low yield of North Korea’s October 9, 2006 nuclear test. The yield of less than a kiloton indicates that the test was not a full success. They speculated, however, that the relatively low predicted yield conveyed to the Chinese government before the test (4 kilotons rather than the 20 kilotons of the first U.S. test of a plutonium warhead) suggested that North Korea might have tested a compact warhead for one of its ballistic missiles. 38 In a second article, former PS&GS researchers Jungmin Kang and Zhang Hui (now at Stanford and Harvard respectively) and von Hippel showed that, contrary to a claim by a former senior U.S. Government official, 36

Christopher Chyba, “Time for Comprehensive Policies on Nuclear and Biological Weapons,” in Jeffrey Laurenti and Carl Robichaud, eds., Breaking the Nuclear Impasse: New Prospects for Security Against Weapons Threats, Century Foundation Press, New York, 2007, pp. 51-60. 37 Christopher Chyba, “Second-Tier Suppliers and Their Threat to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” in Joseph Pilat, ed., Atoms for Peace: A Future After Fifty Years? Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2007, pp. 117-127. 38 Richard Garwin and Frank von Hippel, “A Technical Analysis: Deconstructing North Korea’s October 9 Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Today, November 2006.

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it would be infeasible to determine from the xenon fission-product isotope ratios measured one to two days after the North Korean test whether the test was of a plutonium or HEUbased device. 39 In October 2007, shortly after the nuclear test, Chyba spoke on a panel “Intelligence Challenges and North Korea: What do we really know about the DPRK?” at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.

Contributing to the U.K. Trident-submarine replacement debate. At the end of 2006, British Prime Minister Tony Blair asked Parliament to support work on a new generation of ballistic-missile submarines, asserting that Britain’s current submarines have a maximum service life of 30 years. Since the service lives of U.S. Trident submarines have been extended from 30 to 44 years, von Hippel wondered why the same would not be possible for the United Kingdom. He interested Richard Garwin in this question, who in turn recruited Phillip Coyle, who had oversight responsibility for U.S. Department of Defense weapon testing and evaluation from 1994 until 2001, and Professor Theodore Postol, who had been a scientific advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations from 1982-84. The four wrote a paper that was presented by Garwin to the U.K. Parliament’s Defense Select Committee on January 10, 2007. 40 The paper was discussed in the Committee’s report and cited in the U.K. press and the subsequent parliamentary debate. In March 2007, Parliament voted preliminary support for Blair’s proposal but the issue will be revisited by subsequent Parliaments.

Nuclear Threat Reduction in South Asia Since their nuclear tests in 1998, India and Pakistan have been through a war and a severe crisis that stopped just short of war. Political leaders in both Pakistan and India issued nuclear threats and took steps seen as preparing for nuclear weapon-use during both the 1999 Kargil war, and the massive mobilization of troops following the December 2001 attack on India’s Parliament by Islamic militants. 41 While both states emphasize their subsequent efforts to improve diplomatic relations, the dangerous and costly India-Pakistan arms race has continued and accelerated. Both countries are managing and expanding their nuclear complexes in ways that will enable them to greatly increase their rate of production of nuclear-weapon materials. India has been negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States that will allow it to import uranium and so divert more domestic uranium to its nuclear weapon 39

Jungmin Kang, Frank von Hippel and Hui Zhang, “The North Korean Test and the Limits of Nuclear Forensics,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2007 (and correction, April 2007). 40 “Comment on the Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent” by Richard Garwin, Phillip Coyle, Theodore Postol and Frank von Hippel, January 10, 2007. 41 M.V. Ramana and Zia Mian, “The Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia,” SIPRI Yearbook 2003, Oxford University Press, 2003.


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program. It has also been building a plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor that can make weapon-grade plutonium (see further below). Recent satellite imagery has revealed that Pakistan is building a second and third plutonium-production reactor at Khushab. 42 Work on the third reactor appears to have started in the past year. Each of these new reactors could produce about 10 kg (roughly 2 weapons worth) of plutonium a year, if they were the same size as the existing reactor at the site. Imagery from late 2006 shows that Pakistan has also been working on a new reprocessing plant at Chashma. 43 Pakistan and India continue to develop missiles to deliver nuclear weapons. Over the past year, the Pakistan Army's Strategic Force Command has tested both short- and long-range missiles. The tests included the Ghaznavi (November 2006, with a range of 290km), Ghauri (December 2006, 1300km), Shaheen II (February 2007, 2000 km) and the Babur cruise missile (March 2007, 700km). In April 2007, India tested its 3000-km range AgniIII missile; the first test in July 2006 had failed. 44 India’s Defense Research and Development Organization states that it has started work on increasing the range of the Agni-III missile by another 1,500 km. 45 Efforts at arms control have been limited and appear designed not to constrain the nuclear build-ups in any significant way. The 2005 Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles commits the two states to give 72 hours notice before a ballistic missile flight test and not to test missiles close to their borders. It does not cover cruise missiles. The 2007 Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons requires the two states to inform each other about accidents involving nuclear weapons, but only if the accident could lead to radioactive fallout that would cross the border or create the risk of nuclear war. Despite the great stakes involved, there are very few independent scientists in India and Pakistan knowledgeable about the technical basis of nuclear-weapon policies. India's Department of Atomic Energy and Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission have nearmonopolies on scientific expertise in the nuclear area. In 1997, PS&GS set up a Project on Peace and Security in South Asia to help inform the South Asian nuclear debate. It was initially co-directed by Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana and has been directed by Mian since 2004, when Ramana took up a position with the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development (CISED), in 42

The second Khushab reactor was reported in July 2006, see e.g. Joby Warrick, “Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program,” Washington Post, 24 July 2006; and “US Disputes Report on New Pakistan Reactor,” New York Times, 3 August 2006. See also, Thomas Cochran, “What is the Size of Khushab II?” NRDC, 8 September 2006, and David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Update on the Construction of the New Large Khushab Reactor,” ISIS, 4 October 2006. Pictures of the third reactor were released in June 2007; David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Pakistan Appears to be Building a Third Plutonium Production Reactor at Khushab Nuclear Site,” ISIS, 21 June 2007. 43 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Chashma Nuclear Site in Pakistan with Possible Reprocessing Plant,” ISIS, 18 January 2007. 44 “Agni-III Ballistic Missile Test Fired Successfully,” The Hindu, 12 April 2007. 45 “India Can Raise Agni-III Range by 1,500 km,” Rediff.Com, 7 July 2007.

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Bangalore, India. Each year the project invites senior South Asian physicists to spend their summers in Princeton exploring technical questions relating to nuclear policy. In recent years, the visitor from Pakistan has been Professor A.H. Nayyar, a Senior Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, having retired from the Department of Physics, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, and until recently, the Executive Director of the non-profit group, Developments in Literacy. From India, the Project has hosted R. Rajaraman, Professor Emeritus, of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Dr. M.V. Ramana continues to collaborate with us, as does Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy, a leading physicist at Quaid-i-Azam University. All of these scientists spent time with us in 2006, and Nayyar, Rajaraman and Hoodbhoy visited in the summer of 2007. Rajaraman and Ramana represent India as members of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, with Rajaraman co-chair, while Nayyar and Hoodbhoy represent Pakistan. A fourth visitor in 2007 was Dr. Sandeep Pandey, a Berkeley trained engineer (PhD, 1992), and founder of Asha for Education, a non-profit group that supports education for poor children in India. Dr. Pandey serves on the National Committee of India’s Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, and is the National Convener of the National Alliance of People’s Movements, a broad-based network of grass-roots groups in India. He was previously with the Princeton program in the summer of 2001. During his five week visit, Dr. Pandey worked on a study of local opposition to nuclear facilities in India and on developing educational materials about nuclear weapons and nuclear energy in India that could help inform the public debate there. In the first study of its kind, Dr. Pandey traced the history, demands and strategies of anti-nuclear groups at four sites in India where there is existing or proposed uranium mining, and nine sites with operating or planned nuclear power plants. An early version of this work was presented at the Indian Social Science Congress, in Mumbai, in December 2007. The most important analytical focus of the work of the South Asia Project over the past year has been on the U.S.-India nuclear deal.

Limiting the potential size and destructiveness of South Asian nuclear arsenals. Over the past year, the South Asia Project has focused on the implications of the U.S.-India deal announced by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005. 46 The deal followed a January 2004 agreement between the United States and India on “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership,” through which the United States committed to help India with its civilian space program, high-technology trade, missile defense, and its civilian nuclear activities. Nuclear trade with India has been restricted for three decades since India used U.S. and Canadian assistance, provided under the Atoms for Peace program, to produce and separate 46

The US-India Nuclear deal can be found at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html.


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plutonium for its first nuclear test in 1974. In exchange for the lifting of U.S. and international restrictions, India’s government offered to identify and separate civilian nuclear facilities and programs from its nuclear weapon complexes, and place the civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards. The U.S. House of Representatives approved the deal in July 2006 by a vote of 359 to 68, and it was approved by a vote of 85-12 in the Senate in mid-November 2006 and signed by President Bush in December 2006. This cleared the way for the United States and India to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement. 47 The U.S. Congress must endorse this agreement, but before it does so, India and the IAEA must negotiate a safeguards agreement to cover facilities India chooses to declare as civilian, and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group must approve by consensus a change to its guidelines on nuclear trade to make a special exemption for India. As of the end of December 2007, India and the IAEA had not finalized the safeguards agreement. The deal is also in trouble in India. India’s communist parties, which are part of the ruling coalition, are concerned that the deal, and the U.S.-India strategic relationship which it seeks to cement, could limit national sovereignty and policy options. There are also likely to be problems at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The deal is supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia, while several members (including Austria, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and New Zealand) are opposed, and other countries (among them are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Finland) are concerned. Australia, for instance, has announced that it will not sell uranium to India unless it signs the NPT. 48 The New Agenda Coalition countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) made a statement at the May 2007 NPT Prep Com indicating that they consider the deal to be a contradiction of the unanimous decision of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference that states “should not enter into new nuclear supply arrangements with parties that did not accept IAEA full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities.” 49 China has proposed that instead of an Indiaspecific exemption from NSG rules, a criteria-based approach be adopted. This presumably would open the door for the NSG to eventually consider lifting restrictions on nuclear trade with Pakistan (whose nuclear-weapon and nuclear-power program China has supported). Israel has also lobbied for an exemption from NSG restrictions. Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA), which is chaired by President Pervez Musharraf and has responsibility for its nuclear weapon policy and production, declared that “In view of the fact the [US-India] agreement would enable India to produce a significant quantity of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence

47

The 3 August 2007, Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy is available at www.armscontrol.org/projects/india/20070803_123.asp 48 Sandeep Dikshit “Australia Refuses to Supply Uranium to India,” The Hindu, 17 January 2008. 49 Statement by Paul Kavanagh on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, NPT Prepcom, Vienna, 1 May 2007, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/statements/1mayNAC.pdf.

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requirements will be met.” 50 This suggests a worsening of the nuclear arms race in South Asia, if the nuclear deal goes ahead without any new conditions being attached to it. During 2006, Mian, Nayyar, Rajaraman and Ramana developed a detailed technical analysis of how India’s capacity for producing weapon grade plutonium may change in coming years and the impact the U.S.-India deal. This was published in September 2006 as an IPFM research report. 51 They found that, within a few years, India could annually produce about 40-50 weapons worth of weapon grade plutonium in its unsafeguarded facilities – up from perhaps seven weapons worth a year today. The major contributors to the increase would be from weapon grade plutonium produced in the blanket of the prototype fast breeder reactor that is expected to be completed in 2010, and the diversion of freed-up domestic uranium to produce weapon-grade plutonium in some of India’s unsafeguarded heavy-water power reactors. The IPFM report was revised and published as a peer-reviewed paper in the journal Science & Global Security. 52 The results were also presented by Professor R. Rajaraman at the July 2006 conference of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. 53 An updated and revised analysis focusing on plutonium production capability in India appeared in March 2007, as a chapter in the book Gauging US-Indian Strategic Cooperation, edited by Henry Sokolski of the Washington-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. 54 Alexander Glaser of PSGS and Ramana developed a detailed three-dimensional computer model of the core region of India’s fast breeder reactor and used it to confirm the results of the earlier estimate that it could produce about 140 kg/year of weapon-grade plutonium. 55 The work of the South Asia Project on the U.S.-India deal was announced to the media in an official release by Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. 56 The Arms Control Association (ACA) put both the IPFM draft and the final report on the deal on its website, referred the media to it, and used it to inform

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Shakil Sheikh, “Pakistan Vows to Maintain Credible N-Deterrence,” The News, 13 April 2006. Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal, IPFM Research Report #1, op. cit. 52 Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal,” Science & Global Security, op.cit. 53 Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, The 2005 India-US Nuclear Agreement and its Implications for Indian Nuclear Capability, presented by R. Rajaraman, INMM 47th Annual Meeting, Nashville, Tennessee, 20 July 2006. 54 Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, M.V. Ramana, R. Rajaraman, “Plutonium Production in India and the US-India Nuclear Deal,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Gauging US-Indian Strategic Cooperation, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2007. 55 Alexander Glaser and M. V. Ramana, “Weapon-Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 15, 2007. 56 “Zia Mian Co-Authors Report Assessing Implications of US-India Nuclear Deal,” Princeton University, www.princeton.edu, posted 13 July 2006. 51


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Congress. 57 Mian presented the report at a meeting organized by ACA in Washington, D.C. 58 The results were cited in the Congressional debate on the nuclear deal. This work resulted in invitations to Mian to meet with policy makers, media and civil society groups in Japan in early 2007. As a member of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, Japan will have to approve any change in international nuclear trade rules. Mian, Ramana and von Hippel wrote an op-ed for the Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, arguing that Japan and other NSG members could reduce the negative consequences of the U.S.-India deal by requiring that India stop all production of fissile materials for weapons as a condition for approval of the deal by the NSG. 59 This generated newspaper articles and questions by members in both the Japanese and Australian parliaments. In May 2007, Mian organized a briefing session for NGOs and diplomats on the U.S.-India deal at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna, Austria. This is the first of three annual meetings in which states prepare the agenda for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. This meeting led to a decision by Abolition 2000, a network of over 2000 groups in over 90 countries working for the abolition of nuclear weapons, to launch a one-year campaign on the deal, focused particularly on countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It has organized a letter to NSG member states from more than 130 experts and nongovernmental groups from 23 countries arguing that the U.S.India deal “would damage the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation system and set back efforts to achieve universal nuclear disarmament” and calling for governments to insist that before India is exempted from the NSG's full-scope safeguards requirement “it should join the other original nuclear weapon states by declaring it has stopped fissile material production for weapons purposes and [...] make a legally-binding commitment to permanently end nuclear testing.” 60

Space Security The United States National Space Policy announced in October 2006 makes clear the importance attributed to space capabilities for national security. It states that “The United States considers space capabilities – including the ground and space segments and supporting links – vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and 57

www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2006/20060726_India_House_Debate.asp. “The Senate and the US-Indian Nuclear Deal: Issues and Alternatives,” Arms Control Association Press Briefing, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C, 14 November 2006. 59 Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana and Frank von Hippel, “Feeding Potential for South Asia's Nuclear Fire,” Asahi Shimbun, 29 March 2007. 60 The letter is at www.cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindiafiles/nsgiaea7jan08.html. 58

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deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests.” 61 China successfully tested an antisatellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007, destroying an aging weather satellite in orbit 850 km above the Earth and thereby doubling the amount of large (greater than 10 cm in size), especially hazardous space debris in the 800 – 900 km altitude range. The potential weaponization of space is an important security issue in its own right, and has also been tied by China for a decade at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland to the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Space security issues and nuclear weapon issues are therefore strongly intertwined.

Potential weaponization of space. Because of the growing salience of the space weaponization issue, Chyba has increasingly been devoting time to it. Chyba was invited to brief the U.N. Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters in July 2007 on outer space weapons, providing a technically based briefing accessible to the diplomats that comprise the Board. There is a growing core of interest in space weapon issues at Princeton; Chyba is now supervising a senior thesis by Mr. Ross Liemer on the Chinese ASAT test, and a new postdoc in Astrophysics, (where Chyba holds his joint appointment with the Woodrow Wilson School) Dr. Michael McElwain, has already become a regular PS&GS seminar participant and anticipates working on technical aspects of space weaponization with Chyba.

Deflection of potentially hazardous asteroids. Perhaps the ultimate “space security” issue is the unlikely (about 0.01% probability in this century) possibility that Earth would be struck by an asteroid with a diameter ~1 kilometer. Such a collision would cause a global catastrophe. Nuclear explosions, and a wide range of technologies not yet realized, have been proposed to deflect such potentially hazardous asteroids (PHAs) off of collision with Earth. Working with astronautical engineer Jesse Koenig, Chyba has published in Science & Global Security a definitive study of asteroid interception using simple kinetic energy impact deflection, titled “Impact Deflection of Potentially Hazardous Asteroids Using Current Launch Vehicles.” 62 Koenig and Chyba show that, considering likely future lead times prior to Earth collision for PHAs, simple impact deflection using current launch vehicles is a viable strategy to sufficiently deflect asteroids up to a kilometer in diameter. This method has important advantages over other proposals: it requires no new technologies, would not require nuclear warheads, and would likely be the fastest to effect were we to discover a PHA truly on a collision course with Earth.

61

US National Space Policy 2006, www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf. Jesse Koenig and Christopher Chyba, “Impact Deflection of Potentially Hazardous Asteroids Using Current Launch Vehicles,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2007, pp. 57-83.

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Biodefense and Biotechnology Security Our biological research program has two principal foci: (1) Developing strategies to assure that advances in biotechnology are not misused for weapon purposes; and (2) Strengthening the ability of the U.S. public-health system to cope with bioterrorism and emerging diseases.

Developing strategies to address dual-use biotechnologies. Chyba has been seized by the challenge to biological arms control posed by the exponential increases in the power of dual-use biotechnology. He recently served on a National Research Council Committee, which published a study exploring the current status and future projections of biomedical research in areas that can be applied to the production of biological weapons. 63 The report also identifies limited strategies aimed at mitigating such threats. Other publications by Chyba include an overview article addressing dual-use biotechnology, which, due to its increasingly accessible and affordable nature, provides unprecedented challenges to arms control. 64 The article reviews a number of strategies that are aimed at managing biotechnology risks, paying particular attention to potential technological bottlenecks for synthesizing pathogenic genomes. This article, together with Chyba’s formal role as advisor to the executive office of the U.N. Secretary-General, helped to develop a framework for Kofi Annan’s proposals on creating a biotechnology and human security forum, dedicated to safeguarding biotechnology risks and promoting its benefits. In June 2007, Chyba moderated a panel on dual-use biotechnology and its security implications at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Annual Nonproliferation Conference, and gave the keynote talk in October 2007 at the conference “Transparency in Current and Emerging Approaches to Biosecurity.” The Program on Science and Global Security continued the Carnegie Corporationsponsored seminar series, organized by Laura Kahn, as a venue to explore, together with the molecular biology community, possible approaches to strengthening protections against misuse of biotechnology. The immediate impact of the series has been, and will continue to be, the engagement of the life sciences community on security issues. Evaluations of the seminars have consistently ranged from good to excellent. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS) has provided an important venue for profiling the seminar series. For 60 years, BAS’ mission has been to provide global security news and analysis for policy makers and the public. In its March/April 2007 issue, BAS published a roundtable discussion transcribed from videotaped excerpts of four of the PS&GS biodefense seminars. In addition, as of January 2007, Kahn has been writing monthly 63

National Research Council. 2006. Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences. Washington, D.C., National Academies Press. 64 Christopher F. Chyba, “Biotechnology and the Challenge to Arms Control,” Arms Control Today, October 2006.

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online columns in BAS. She frequently profiles the seminar series. While it is too early to say what impact these columns will have, they are getting widespread attention and are being profiled in online websites such as Wired Science, YaleGlobalOnline, and Arts and Letters Daily. Over the course of the 2007-2008 academic year the seminar series will continue to provide a forum for discussing biotechnology issues that range from potential misuse of biology to its beneficial applications to global health and food security. Speakers will include internationally renowned scientists and policy makers from academia and industry devoted to promoting safe and secure applications of biotechnology and life science research. The seminars will be organized by Dr. Ali Nouri, who recently completed his dissertation in Princeton’s Department of Molecular Biology and has joined PS&GS as a research associate. Before becoming a full-time member of the program, Nouri divided his time between PS&GS, Princeton’s Molecular Biology Department, and the United Nations office of the Secretary-General, where, between September 2006 and May 2007, he helped to develop the Secretary-General’s biotechnology and human security initiative. Nouri’s current research at PS&GS focuses on preventing the use of biotechnology for the production of biological weapons by state and non-state actors. Nouri is working to identify and propose safeguards on a particular class of biological experiments and technologies that may constitute potential risks. Since advances in biotechnology are largely driven by its beneficial applications to human health, safeguards that don’t unnecessarily hinder the advancement of science will be investigated. Nouri recently coauthored a book chapter 65 with Chyba dealing with biotechnology and biological security, to appear in the forthcoming Oxford University Press book, Global Catastrophic Risks. The essay reviews areas of potential risk posed by nefarious uses of biotechnology, and proposes a number of strategies that are aimed at safeguarding against these risks.

Strengthening public health protections against bioterrorism and emerging diseases. Laura Kahn continued her assessment of ways to improve U.S. public health preparedness for outbreaks of naturally occurring and deliberately set infectious diseases. She is focusing on two areas: “One Health” and leadership dilemmas. Many of the “emerging infectious diseases” and bioterrorist threat agents are “zoonotic,” animal pathogens that can infect people. 66 However, aside from some collaborative activities in public health, physicians and veterinarians rarely communicate or collaborate

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Ali Nouri and Christopher F. Chyba, “Biotechnology and Biosecurity,” in Nick Bostrom and Milan Circovich eds., Global Catastrophic Risks, Oxford University Press, in press. 66 Existing zoonotic agents include anthrax, plague, tularemia, the encephalitis viruses (Western, Eastern, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis viruses), West Nile virus, Nipah virus, Hanta virus, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and avian influenza.


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with each other. Kahn has authored, 67 and co-authored, 68 papers that deal with linking human and veterinary medicine by building bridges across these communities. Kahn has also been engaged with advocacy efforts for a “One Medicine/One Health” initiative. Her collaborators on the project include Tom Monath, former Director of the Division of Vector-Borne and Viral Diseases at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and former Chief of Virology at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, as well as two veterinarians, Drs. Bruce Kaplan and James H. Steele, former Assistant Surgeon General and Professor Emeritus at the University of Texas School of Public Health, respectively. Kahn testified before an American Medical Association (AMA) House of Delegates meeting on June 24, 2007 to urge them to pass a “One Health” resolution that she helped write. This resolution would provide the impetus for the AMA to work with its veterinary counterpart, the American Veterinary Medical Association, to address the challenges posed by the growing threats of zoonotic diseases. Kahn also published a detailed study of the preparedness of four states, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. 69 This study provided the theme for a jointly sponsored conference by the New York Academy of Medicine and the Royal Academy of Medicine. She is currently writing a book tentatively titled, Who’s in Charge? Leadership during an Epidemic or Bioterrorist Attack, exploring the fundamental dilemmas in crisis leadership; the book will be published by Praeger Security International.

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Laura Kahn, “Confronting Zoonoses, Linking Human and Veterinary Medicine,” Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 12, No. 4, 556-61, April 2006. 68 Laura Kahn, Bruce Kaplan and James Steele, “Confronting Zoonoses Through Closer Collaboration Between Medicine and Veterinary Medicine (as ‘One Medicine’),” Veterinaria Italiana, Vol 43, No. 1, pp. 5-19, January-March 2007. 69 Laura Kahn, Final Report: A Comparative Study of Four States’ Public Health Systems: Survey Results form Local Health Departments, Physicians and Veterinarians, Princeton University, September 2006, www.princeton.edu/~globsec/Macy/index.html.

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III. Fostering the Development of Independent Technical Expertise

PS&GS regularly recruits scientifically trained post-doctoral researchers for periods of two years or more and invites more senior foreign scientists who are interested in security policy to visit Princeton for a summer, semester, or sabbatical year to deepen their expertise. As a result, PS&GS has spawned a worldwide collaborative network of independent technically trained security policy analysts. We also edit Science & Global Security, the international journal of “arms control physics.” We recently started an effort to survey and electronically archive the arms control literature. Finally, PS&GS faculty and researchers educate Princeton undergraduate and graduate students in the area of science and security.

An International Network of Collaborators Our collaborators since July 2006 have included: •

Professor Anatoli Diakov, who directs the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (Russia’s MIT), is a frequent visitor to the Program. Professor Diakov holds the Russian seat on the IPFM.

•

Professor José Goldemberg of the University of São Paulo has long been one of the leading scientist-statesmen in Brazil. He is a member of the IPFM.

•

Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy, a theoretical physicist based at Pakistan’s leading public university, Quaid-i-Azam University, and prominent critic of Pakistan’s nuclear policies. He shares Pakistan’s seat on the IPFM with Professor A.H. Nayyar (see below).

•

Dr. Tadahiro Katsuta, from the graduate school of law and politics at the University of Tokyo, is spending the academic year 2007-2008 at the Program on a prestigious Abe Fellowship. He is researching and writing on issues of Japanese nuclear power and nuclear proliferation and is an active colleague of IPFM and co-author of IPFM reports.

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•

Professor Li Bin, who established and directs the Arms Control Program at Tsinghua University, spent academic year 2006 at PS&GS. He shares the Chinese seat on the IPFM with Professor Shen Dingli.

•

Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, Associate Director of the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (Russia’s MIT), recently visited the Program for a semester.

•

Professor A.H. Nayyar, who retired in 2005 from the Physics Department at Quaid-i-Azam University and is a regular summer collaborator with our Project on Peace and Security in South Asia. Nayyar shares Pakistan’s seat on the IPFM with Hoodbhoy.

•

Professor R. Rajaraman, one of India’s leading theoretical physicists, is a regular summer collaborator with our Project on Peace and Security in South Asia and co-chairs the IPFM, on which he also shares India’s seat with Dr. Ramana (see below).

•

Dr. M.V. Ramana leads a research program on nuclear-energy policy at the independent Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development in Bangalore, India. Formerly with PS&GS, he continues to collaborate with our Project on Peace and Security in South Asia and shares India’s seat on the IPFM with Professor Rajaraman.

•

Professor Houston Wood, one of the world’s leading experts on the uranium gas centrifuge and Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Virginia spent the fall of 2007 with PS&GS collaborating on a series of centrifuge-related proliferation topics.

Our involvement with the International Panel on Fissile Materials is furthering our collaborations with technical nuclear policy analysts worldwide, including now in Europe.

Science & Global Security PS&GS is the editorial home of Science & Global Security, the international journal of “arms control physics.” Feiveson has edited the journal since it was first published in 1989. The journal has, from the beginning, been translated and published in Russian and we have now established a Chinese edition under the supervision of Li Bin.


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The English edition is electronically available immediately to institutional subscribers and freely available on the PS&GS website to all after one year. 70 In addition, authors may post, without delay, their articles on their own personal web pages. The Russian and Chinese editions are posted openly without delay. Science & Global Security is for many researchers the only venue for peer-reviewed publication of technical-security studies and, as such, is essential to the field of security studies. It provides an intellectual common ground in which the entire technical-security community can come together nationally and internationally. Its articles are often referenced for backup technical analysis in articles in journals such as Arms Control Today, whose audience is the arms control community, and Scientific American, whose audience is the educated public. Since July 2006, Science & Global Security has published articles on a wide variety of topics including: detection of radioactive sources in cargo containers; reducing the risk of accidental nuclear missile launch; fissile materials in South Asia; eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium in the production of medical radioisotopes; the impact deflection of potentially hazardous asteroids; and the survivability of Chinese strategic mobile missiles.

Archiving Arms Control Literature An important fraction of the literature on arms control was written prior to the 1990s. Many of these texts remain highly relevant today, especially when more recent studies and analyses do not exist. Often, these publications are out-of-print and do not exist in electronic form. We have begun an effort to survey this literature and, if copyrights permit, make them available electronically. Zia Mian and Alexander Glaser have collected and reviewed the key literature on nuclear arms control for a Resource Letter published in the American Journal of Physics. These Resource Letters are guides for college and university physicists and other scientists to literature, websites, and other teaching aids. They are intended to help teachers develop and improve courses in specific fields of physics and to introduce non-specialists to this field. The letter provides over 100 references to books and articles on nuclear weapons, fissile materials, nonproliferation, missiles and missile defenses, verification, disarmament, and the role of scientists in arms control.

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www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/index.shtml.

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Our main electronic resources are: •

Science & Global Security. With the exception of the most recent issues, every article published in this journal since it appeared in 1989 (more than 150 articles) is on our website at www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/SciGloSec.shtml.

•

IPFM Library. We collect and retain literature related to fissile material issues at www.ipfmlibrary.org. In addition to reports published by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, the collection seeks to organize important technical reports and government documents, which are otherwise hard to find.

Education and Training PS&GS faculty and researchers teach undergraduate and graduate science-based security studies courses and policy workshops. This includes a graduate course, “Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction,” and semester-long graduate policy workshops and undergraduate policy task forces. The Program’s integration with the Woodrow Wilson School’s Science, Technology and Environmental Policy (STEP) program makes it possible for students with science or engineering undergraduate or master’s degrees to pursue PhDs in our group. Scott Kemp, who holds a BA in physics from the University of California at Santa Barbara, is pursuing a PhD with us doing policy and technical analyses related to strengthening the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle. We also are engaging graduate students in science or engineering with interests in security policy. A PS&GS fellowship program was established with MacArthur Foundation funding that supports qualified students half time, for two years, to take courses relating to science and security policy and to carry out a research project, under our guidance, on a security subject. Thus far, we have given out two such fellowships: •

Babur Habib (2004-6), an Electrical Engineering PhD student, who did a project with us to assess the feasibility of detecting the electromagnetic signals given out by the electric motors in a clandestine centrifuge plant; and

•

Khosrow Allaf Akbari (2006-8), a PhD student in Astrophysics, who has examined Iran’s energy choices and their relationships to its nuclear ambitions.


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APPENDIX A. Personnel Research Personnel Christopher Chyba (Professor of Astrophysics and International Affairs) is the Director of PS&GS. Before coming to Princeton, Chyba co-directed Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) for five years, where he was also Associate Professor of Geological and Environmental Sciences. Chyba serves on the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee for International Security and Arms Control. In October 2001, he was named a MacArthur Fellow for his work in both planetary science and international security. Harold Feiveson (Senior Research Policy Scientist) is the editor of Science & Global Security, and a lecturer in Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He has a PhD in public affairs from Princeton University (1972). Along with Professor von Hippel, he was the co-founder of the Program on Science and Global Security and co-director until July 2006. Alexander Glaser (Associate Research Scholar) joined the program in February 2005. Previously, he was associated with the Interdisciplinary Research Group in Science, Technology, and Security of Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany, where he did his master’s and PhD theses on technical aspects of arms control and nuclear nonproliferation. Between 2001 and 2003, he was an SSRC/MacArthur pre-doctoral fellow with the MIT Security Studies Program and Nuclear Engineering Department. Glaser advised the German Federal Ministry of Environment and Reactor Safety during 2000 and 2001 and served on the Council of the German Physical Society. He is on the Editorial Board of the INESAP Information Bulletin, the main publication of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, and Associate Editor of Science & Global Security. In 2007, Glaser participated in a study on nuclear forensics sponsored by the American Physical Society (APS) and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Pervez Hoodbhoy (Consultant) is a Professor of Physics at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan and Pakistan’s leading popularizer of science. He is a long-time collaborator with Mian and Nayyar in an effort to educate the Pakistani public on the dangers of nuclear weapons. In 2001, with support from the Center for Defense Information, Hoodbhoy and Mian completed the documentary film, Pakistan and India Under the Nuclear Shadow, which Hoodbhoy directed and narrated. In 2004, with MacArthur Foundation support, they completed a second film, Crossing the Lines:

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Kashmir, India, Pakistan on the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, the most likely flashpoint for a South Asian nuclear war. Laura Kahn (Associate Research Scholar), an MD with Masters Degrees in public health and public policy, joined PS&GS in September 2002. She founded the PS&GS Biosecurity, Biotechnology and Global Health Program and runs the PS&GS CarnegieCorporation-funded seminar series which explores, with the molecular-biology community, the possibilities for raising barriers to the misuse of biotechnology. In the spring of 2006, Kahn co-directed and co-taught a course on zoonotic diseases to medical and graduate students at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine. In June 2007, Kahn co-wrote the “One Health” resolution for the American Medical Association (AMA) and testified on its behalf before the AMA House of Delegates. One June 25, 2007, the AMA House of Delegates unanimously approved the resolution promoting the partnership between human and veterinary medicine. Tadahiro Katsuta (Visiting Research Scholar) is spending the academic year 2007-2008 at the Program on the prestigious Abe Fellowship, supported by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership and the Social Science Research Council. He is researching and writing on issues of Japanese nuclear power and nuclear proliferation. Katsuta previously was a visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo starting in 2005, where he studied barriers to past proposals of multilateral approaches by the nuclear fuel cycle. In 2006, he researched Japan’s spent fuel and plutonium management challenges for the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). From 1999-2005, he conducted research on the economics of nuclear power relative to other sources of electrical power, and on energy scenarios in Japan through 2050 as an analyst at the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC). Katsuta received his PhD in experimental nuclear fusion physics from Hiroshima University in 1997. Katsuta is a representative of the non-governmental organization Peaceful Energy in Japan. R. Scott Kemp (PhD Candidate) has an undergraduate degree in physics from the University of California at Santa Barbara, and has been a doctoral student in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University since the fall of 2005. Kemp joined the science and security field as a research associate with Richard Garwin at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in 2002. He came to PS&GS in June 2004 after completing a year as a Fulbright Fellow in England. Kemp is a charter member of the Independent Group of Scientific Experts for the Detection of Clandestine Fissile Material Production (iGSE), a research contributor for the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), a Director for the nation’s largest undergraduate science-research journal, JYI, and a Trustee of the JYI Foundation for the promotion of science literacy. Zia Mian (Research Scientist and Director of PS&GS’s Project on Peace and Security in South Asia) joined PS&GS in September 1997. Previously, he spent 1993-96 in Pakistan as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute


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in Islamabad and was a Research Fellow at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Cambridge office during 1996-97. Abdul Nayyar (Summer Visiting Senior Research Scholar) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, having retired in 2005 as Professor of Physics at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He has worked with us every summer since 1998 except for 2004, when visa delays prevented his arrival. During the summer of 1999, he and Mian co-authored an examination of the safety issues of a new nuclear power plant that was built in Pakistan by China. This work inspired a public debate in Pakistan and a rethinking within Pakistan's government of how it deals with nuclear safety. Nayyar has also been working on reforming the curriculum and textbooks used in Pakistan’s public schools. He currently serves as President of the Pakistan Peace Coalition, a national network of peace groups, and is the Co-Convener of Pugwash, Pakistan. Ali Nouri (Associate Research Staff) works on issues related to biological security. Prior to joining the program, Nouri was engaged with biotechnology-related activities at the United Nations Office of the Secretary-General. Nouri holds a PhD in molecular biology from Princeton University, where he studied the role of various tumor suppressor genes during animal development. Prior to Princeton, he was a research assistant at the Oregon Health Sciences University where he studied the molecular basis of retroviral entry into cells. He holds a BA in biology from Reed College. R. Rajaraman (Summer Visiting Senior Research Scholar) is Professor Emeritus of Theoretical Physics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. He is a Fellow of both the Indian Academy of Science and the Indian National Science Academy. He has been contributing articles to India’s nuclear-weapon debate since 1970 and has been a regular summer visitor with Princeton’s Program on Science and Global Security since 2000. He is co-chair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. M.V. Ramana (Visiting Research Collaborator) obtained his PhD in Physics from Boston University in 1994 and joined PS&GS in 1998. He co-edited with C. Rammanohar Reddy and contributed three chapters to the book, Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream, which critically examines some of the strategic, political, social, economic and environmental costs of the nuclear arms race in South Asia. During 2003-2004, Ramana held a Guggenheim Fellowship for a project to do a technical assessment of India's nuclear energy program. He left our Program in 2004 to head the Energy Policy Program at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development in Bangalore, India, where he has been doing research on the costs of India’s nuclear-power program. He continues to visit and collaborate on research relating to fissile-material production in South Asia. He also shares the Indian seat on the IPFM with Professor Rajaraman.

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Frank von Hippel (Professor of Public and International Affairs) is co-chair of the International Panel on Fissile Material. Along with Harold Feiveson, he was the cofounder of the Program on Science and Global Security and co-director until July 2006. Houston Wood (Visiting Research Scholar) is Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Virginia. He worked on the U.S. Department of Energy’s gas centrifuge development program from 1967 until 1985, when the program was terminated. Over the last 15 years, he has been active in teaching, lecturing and consulting on issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation.

Administrative Personnel Dorothy Davis (Program Manager) has been with PS&GS since November 2002. Prior to that, she spent 20 years in the Treasurer’s office of the University as a manager in the Controller’s Office. She manages all administrative and financial affairs for the Program. Barbara Zelt (Administrative Assistant) is a ten-year veteran of the Program. She provides administrative support to the faculty, senior researchers and program manager. Ahnde Lin (Librarian) retired from PS&GS in 2002, but still works part-time with us maintaining our expansive library of arms control and related volumes. She has been with the Program since 1994. Anita Kelly (Administrative Assistant) has provided administrative support to PS&GS faculty, senior researchers, and the program manager since November 2006. Susan Nichols (Temporary Program Manager) served as the acting program manager for PS&GS in November and December 2007.


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APPENDIX B. Abstracts of Publications and Reports July 1, 2006 – December 31, 2007

Christopher F. Chyba

Proliferation-Resistant Biotechnology: A Novel Approach to Improve Biological Security, (with Ali Nouri), submitted to Nature Biotechnology. See abstract under Nouri.

Biotechnology and Bioterrorism, (with Ali Nouri), in Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Cirkovic, eds., Global Catastrophic Risk, Oxford University Press, in press. See abstract under Nouri.

Impact Deflection of Potentially Hazardous Asteroids Using Current Launch Vehicles, (with Jesse D. Koenig), Science & Global Security, Vol. 15, 2007, pp. 57-83. Nuclear explosions, and a wide variety of technologies not yet realized, have been proposed to deflect asteroids away from collision with Earth. In contrast, this article presents realistic models for simple kinetic energy impact deflection, using the actual orbit elements of 795 catalogued Potentially Hazardous Asteroids (PHAs), and impactor masses launched to intercept trajectories by Atlas V HLV rockets or equivalent. Considering likely future lead times for PHAs, simple impact deflection using current launch vehicles is a viable strategy for up to kilometer-diameter asteroids.

Time for Comprehensive Policies on Nuclear and Biological Weapons, in Jeffrey Laurenti and Carl Robichaud, eds., Breaking the Nuclear Impasse: New Prospects for Security Against Weapons Threats, Century Foundation Press, New York, 2007, pp. 51-60. The United States needs comprehensive policies for its approach to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These weapons present a wide range of risks that must be managed, and decisions made in responding to them sometimes trade off against one another. This chapter sketches comprehensive policies for the nuclear and biological weapons cases, and argues that decisions about particular nuclear programs (such as the nuclear weapons complex or the “Reliable Replacement Warhead”) cannot be made well without an understanding of U.S. goals and intentions with respect to nuclear weapons and their role in national and international security.

The Second-Tier Suppliers and Their Threat to the Nonproliferation Regime, in Joseph F. Pilat, ed., Atoms for Peace: A Future After Fifty Years? Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, pp. 117-127. This chapter discusses second-tier proliferation and the threat that it poses to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

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Nuclear Weapons: Moving Toward Security, Science, Vol. 317, 2007, p. 599. A book review of Cirincione’s Bomb Scare, with a discussion of the lack of consensus in the United States on the role of nuclear weapons in the world today.

What I’m Reading, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2007, p. 56. Readings recommended by the author relevant, in broad terms, to nuclear weapons policy, nonproliferation, and international security.

Empirical Constraints on the Salinity of the Europan Ocean and Implications for a Thin Ice Shell, (with Kevin P. Hand), Icarus, Vol. 189, 2007, pp. 424-438. This work combines magnetometer and gravity data from the Galileo mission to Jupiter with three- and fivelayer models for Europa to argue that Europa’s ocean must be near-saturation in salt content and beneath no more than 10 kilometers of ice.

Energy, Chemical Disequilibrium, and Geological Constraints on Europa, (with Kevin P. Hand and Robert W. Carlson), Astrobiology, Vol. 7, 2007, pp. 1-18. This article reviews sources of energy at Europa, especially that available to its ocean, and argues that the ocean may in fact be oxidized, rather than reduced. Potential oxygen concentrations in the ocean could be high enough to support macrofauna.

Does ‘Life’ Have a Definition? (with Carol E. Cleland), in Woodruff T. Sullivan III and John A. Baross, eds., Planets and Life: The Emerging Science of Astrobiology, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, U.K., 2007, pp. 119-131. This chapter, written with the University of Colorado philosopher Carol Cleland, uses philosophical investigations into the nature of language to argue that there is a good reason why scientific attempts to define ‘life’ have been unsuccessful.

Europa, (with Cynthia B. Phillips), in Woodruff T. Sullivan III and John A. Baross, eds., Planets and Life: The Emerging Science of Astrobiology, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, U.K., 2007, pp. 388-423. This chapter reviews our current understanding of the physics, chemistry, geology, and potential biology of Jupiter’s moon Europa, with an emphasis on the physics behind Europa’s tidal heating.

Epilogue, in Woodruff T. Sullivan III and John A. Baross, eds., Planets and Life: The Emerging Science of Astrobiology, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, U.K., 2007, pp. 558-559. NASA defines “astrobiology” as “the study of the living Universe.” If so, the discipline must also learn to speak to the human future, a thing uniquely precious regardless of whether humanity is entirely alone or part of a grand biological Universe.

US Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats, (with George Bunn, eds.), Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2006, 340 pp. What role should U.S. nuclear weapons policy play in the world today? What related policies should the United States follow to promote international security while safeguarding its national interests? This volume addresses those questions, with an emphasis on the interactions among nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons policy.


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A World of Risk: The Current Environment for US Nuclear Weapons Policy, (with Karthika Sasikumar), in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba, eds., US Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2006, pp. 1-33. U.S. nuclear weapons policy should be assessed in the context of present international security risks. These risks include challenges left over from the cold war era, challenges posed by states that are newly growing in power, and the dramatic new presence of non-state actors. The salient features of this new environment, the context of technology and international politics in which nuclear weapons decisions must now be made, are the subject of this chapter.

New Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime, (with Chaim Braun and George Bunn), in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba, eds., US Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2006, pp. 126-160. This chapter examines the new world of risk faced by the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the vulnerability to theft of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, as well as nuclear smuggling networks and mass casualty terrorism.

Strategies for Tackling Proliferation Challenges, (with Chaim Braun and George Bunn), in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba, eds., US Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2006, pp. 161-219. This chapter explores responses to nuclear dangers via national and international policies to prevent or curtail the spread of nuclear weapons, technologies, and materials.

US Nuclear Weapons Policies for a New Era, (with George Bunn), in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba, eds., US Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2006, pp. 297-324. This concluding chapter provides recommendations, growing from the book’s previous chapters, for how the United States should pursue its nuclear weapons policy in the early years of the twenty-first century.

Biotechnology and the Challenge to Arms Control, Arms Control Today, Vol. 36, No. 8, October 2006, available online at www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/BioTechFeature.asp, reprinted in The 2006 Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference: An Arms Control Today Reader, Arms Control Association, Washington, D.C., November 2006, pp. 53-59. The spread of biotechnology will inevitably put increasing power into the hands of small groups of the technically competent. Because the technology is so accessible, models from the Cold War to control the spread of nuclear weapons are not well suited to the coming biological challenge. This paper reviews and critiques a wide variety of suggestions for how we are to cope with this new world.

Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats, Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life Sciences, National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2006, 318 pp. Chyba served as a member of this Institute of Medicine/National Research Council panel that produced this report, which concentrates on describing the most challenging (from the point of view of international

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security) biotechnologies of the coming decade, and the globalization of this technology that is now taking place.

Committee on Preventing the Forward Contamination of Mars, National Research Council, Preventing the Forward Contamination of Mars, National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2006, 153 pp. Chyba chaired this panel of the National Research Council that provided technical and policy recommendations to NASA on how to prevent the forward biological contamination of Mars by microorganisms that could be present on spacecraft at launch and survive the journey to Mars. The panel also called for an international meeting to consider whether the current focus of planetary protection on “protecting future science” should be expanded to “protecting other potential biospheres.”

Book Review: Agents of Bioterrorism: Pathogens and Their Weaponization, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 3, October 2006, pp. 165-167. A book review of a recent text that endeavors to make the basic microbiology of the key potential biological agents accessible to the non-specialist.

Comets and the Origin and Evolution of Life, (with Paul J. Thomas, R.D. Hicks, and Christopher P. McKay, eds.), 2nd ed., Springer-Verlag, New York, 2006, 346 pp. This volume considers the role that comets may have played in the origin and evolution of life on Earth, making use of the most recent spacecraft, ground-based, laboratory, and theoretical results.

Impact Delivery of Prebiotic Organic Matter to Planetary Surfaces, (with E. Pierazzo), in Paul J. Thomas, R.D. Hicks, Christopher F. Chyba, and Christopher P. McKay, eds., Comets and the Origin and Evolution of Life, 2nd ed., Springer-Verlag, New York, 2006, pp. 143-176. Hydrodynamic simulations suggest that under certain circumstances, organic molecules contained within comets could survive those objects’ collisions with Earth or other worlds, with possible relevance to the origin of life.

Comets and Prebiotic Organic Molecules on Early Earth, (with Kevin P. Hand), in Paul J. Thomas, R.D. Hicks, Christopher F. Chyba, and Christopher P. McKay, eds., Comets and the Origin and Evolution of Life, 2nd ed., Springer-Verlag, New York, 2006, pp. 177-214. This chapter compares endogenous and exogenous sources of prebiotic organic molecules and their potential importance for the origin of life on Earth. Uncertainties are emphasized and, where possible, quantified.

Clathrate Hydrates of Oxidants in the Ice Shell of Europa, (with Kevin P. Hand, Robert W. Carlson, John F. Cooper), Astrobiology, Vol. 6, 2006, pp. 463-482. This article used space- and ground-based measurements to estimate the fraction of Europa’s ice shell that could be made up of oxidant-hosting clathrates.


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Anatoli Diakov Professor Diakov, of the Center for Arms Control Studies of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, spent the spring semester of 2006 as a PS&GS visitor. The following cover story was a result of research during that period. ReSTART: The Need for a New US-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement, (with Eugene Miasnikov), Arms Control Today, September, 2006. The 1991 START agreement has provided the verification backbone for current U.S.-Russian efforts at slashing weapons arsenals, but it is due to expire in 2009. The authors support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent call for a new strategic arms control agreement. A new pact would bolster bilateral disarmament efforts and a relationship undergoing considerable turmoil.

Harold Feiveson Global Fissile Material Report 2007, (with Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian and Frank von Hippel), International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), September 2007, www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr07.pdf. This is the second Global Fissile Material Report published by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). It includes chapters on IPFM estimates of current national stockpiles and production rates of fissile materials, efforts to eliminate excess stocks of HE and plutonium by the United States and Russia, consolidation of the number of U.S. sites with fissile materials, progress towards nuclear disarmament, international safeguards in nuclear weapon states, management of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, Russia as a nuclear fuel service provider, and the detection of clandestine fissile material production.

Fissile Materials: Global Stocks, Production and Elimination, (with Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank von Hippel), Appendix 12C in SIPRI Yearbook 2007, Oxford University Press on behalf of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007. This section of the 2007 SIPRI Yearbook reviews some basic background information on fissile materials and their use in nuclear weapons. It looks at the need for better information on military and civilian holdings of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium and provides estimates for current global holdings of these materials. The section describes the production of HEU by gas centrifuge, the creation of plutonium in nuclear reactors and its subsequent separation, and the current approaches to disposition of these materials.

The Future of Nuclear Power, (with Alexander Glaser, M. Miller, and L. Scheinman), Report for the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), May 2007. The objective of this report is to describe a nuclear power system of a scope to contribute significantly to global-warming mitigation, while plausibly addressing issues of economics, sustainability, safety, and proliferation resistance. The analysis is based on several scenarios, i.e. not on predictions of the future B-5


development of the global energy system, and its principal focus is on proliferation resistance. Both country proliferation and the implications for the terrorist threats are explored in some detail. The specified scenarios are different in capacity (1500 GWe and 4500 GWe), but are also based on different nuclear power technologies and nuclear fuel cycle arrangements.

Faux Renaissance: Global Warming, Radioactive Waste Disposal, and the Nuclear Future, Arms Control Today, May 2007. The principal rationale for reprocessing at present is to allow the recycling of plutonium in mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for light water reactors. This disposition strategy is now being pursued by France and envisioned for Japan – but it has several environmental and economic limitations. In particular, MOX provides fewer environmental benefits than it might seem because spent MOX fuel is not reprocessed. For the same cooling-off period, the space in a repository required to store MOX is three or more times greater than the space for uranium-oxide fuel. In addition, the depleted uranium obtained from the reprocessed uranium-oxide spent fuel generally is not recycled. The alternative to reprocessing is dry-cask storage. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has deemed such storage to be safe and secure for many decades, and there is now considerable industry experience with dry casks. Indeed, virtually every currently operating reactor in the United States either already had dry-cask storage as of the end of 2004 or has now such storage under construction or planned. The dry cask alternative appears less expensive and far less complex than the MOX route. It therefore appears illogical for countries to undertake reprocessing today. The once-through fuel cycle has the inestimable proliferation-resistance advantage that no nuclear-explosive material appears anywhere. Although not absolutely precluding diversion paths to support country proliferation, it does provide a nearly intractable barrier to sub-state acquisition of fissile material from the power-reactor fuel cycle. By contrast, reprocessing puts separated weapons-usable material into the civilian fuel cycle. This danger is widely recognized even by the advocates of reprocessing who, while sending the message that reprocessing is essential for the future of nuclear energy, argue that not all countries participating in that nuclear future can be trusted with reprocessing.

A Wasteful Endeavor, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2007. Review of Robert Alvarez, “Radioactive Wastes and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.”

Managing the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle, (with M.V. Ramana and Jose Goldemberg), Global Fissile Material Report 2007, International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), 2007. Even if nuclear power expands substantially, there is no economic rationale for reprocessing, for the recycle of plutonium in light water reactors, or for the adoption of closed fuel cycles of any type. Furthermore, there are compelling security reasons to avoid reprocessing and recycling.

Global Fissile Material Report 2006, (with Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank von Hippel), International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), September 2006, www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr06.pdf This is the first Global Fissile Material Report published by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). Part I of this report is a fissile-material primer: what are they, how are they used in nuclear weapons, and how are they produced and disposed. The report also provides estimates of current national stockpiles and production rates and a brief overview of the agreements and institutions that have been set up to control the production and use of fissile materials. Part II describes four goals toward which significant progress can be made in the near future: a cutoff in production of fissile materials for weapons, and placement under international safeguards of all civil stocks of fissile material, and stocks that are excess to military requirements; declarations by Russia and the United States (and eventually by the other nuclear weapon states) of their total fissile-material stockpiles; measures to limit the proliferation of national uranium centrifuge enrichment and reprocessing plants; and total or near-total elimination of the use of highly enriched uranium as a civilian reactor fuel.


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Alexander Glaser Resource Letter PSNAC-1: Physics and Society: Nuclear Arms Control, (with Zia Mian), American Journal of Physics, Vol. 75, No. 12, December 2007. Resource Letters are guides for college and university physicists, astronomers, and other scientists to literature, websites, and other teaching aids. Each Resource Letter focuses on a particular topic and is intended to help teachers improve course content in a specific field of physics or to introduce nonspecialists to this field. This Resource Letter provides a guide to the literature on nuclear arms control. Journal articles and books are cited for the following topics: nuclear weapons, fissile materials, nonproliferation, missiles and missile defenses, verification, disarmament, and the role of scientists in arms control.

Global Fissile Material Report 2007, (with Harold Feiveson, Zia Mian, and Frank von Hippel), International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), September 2007, www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr07.pdf See abstract under Feiveson. Additionally, Glaser was a lead author of Chapter 1, “Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production.”

Performance Gain with Low-Enriched Fuel and Optimized Use of Neutrons, Proceedings of the 29th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), 23-27 September 2007, Prague, Czech Republic. For almost three decades, there have been significant international efforts to convert research reactors from weapon-usable highly enriched fuel to a fuel based on uranium enriched to less than 20% in the isotope U235 (LEU). The most challenging type of reactors to convert are high-flux research reactors, which, along with some spallation sources, are the most important neutron sources for modern neutron scattering experiments. Advanced Monte-Carlo computer codes are now available that make it possible to track neutrons from the reactor core, through a beam tube, to the instrument and detector. These “virtual experiments” allow optimizing the performance of a research facility as a whole instead of the reactor alone. This may open additional reactors for conversion and could significantly accelerate the “global cleanout'” of civilian HEU. This article briefly reviews performance gains obtained for high-flux reactors during previous facility-upgrades. The Monte-Carlo code VITESS is used to compare results for typical neutron scattering experiments using obsolete versus state-of-the-art technologies. The analysis shows that performance gains due to instrument upgrades or neutron guide renewals dwarf potential neutron flux losses due to conversion to low-enriched fuel.

Neutron-Use Optimization with Virtual Experiments to Facilitate Research-Reactor Conversion to Low-Enriched Fuel, Annual Conference of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), July 2007, Tucson, Arizona. This is an earlier, less detailed version of the paper presented in September 2007 at the RERTR meeting.

The Future of Nuclear Power, (with Harold Feiveson, M. Miller, and L. Scheinman), Draft Report for the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2007. See abstract under Feiveson.

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Weapon-Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, (with M. V. Ramana), Science & Global Security, Vol. 15, 2007. India is building a 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) that is scheduled to be operational by 2010. India has refused to accept international safeguards on this facility, raising concerns that the plutonium produced in its uranium blankets might be used to make nuclear weapons. Based on neutronics calculations for a detailed three-dimensional model of the reactor, we estimate that up to 140 kg of weapon-grade plutonium could be produced with the PFBR each year. We show how modest amounts of India's large stockpile of separated reactor-grade plutonium from its unsafeguarded spent heavy-water reactor fuel could serve as makeup fuel to allow such diversion of the weapon-grade plutonium from the PFBR blankets. We describe and assess the most plausible refueling strategies for producing weapon-grade plutonium in this way.

Fissile Materials: Global Stocks, Production and Elimination, (with Harold Feiveson, Zia Mian, and Frank von Hippel), Appendix 12C in SIPRI Yearbook 2007, Oxford University Press on behalf of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007. See abstract under Feiveson.

The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (with R. S. Kemp), pp. 88-95 in Shi Zeng (ed.), Proceedings of the Ninth International Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases (SPLG), 18-21 September 2006, Beijing, China, Tshinghua University Press, 2007, www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/2007aglaser_splg.pdf. The gas centrifuge is a particularly challenging technology for the institutions of the existing nonproliferation regime. Centrifuge facilities can be reconfigured for the production of weapon-grade uranium in a comparatively short time-frame, while clandestine facilities are virtually impossible to detect with technical intelligence tools. A potential expansion in nuclear power and the natural maturing of states' technical abilities suggest a world where centrifuge proliferation could become an even more serious threat to global security. This overview reviews the proliferation-relevant technical characteristics of the gas centrifuge and examines how effective control strategies must differ from traditional approaches. A well-informed policymaking process is needed to address these issues. We outline current gaps in understanding that ought to be closed in order to formulate robust nonproliferation policies.

Nuclear Terrorism: The Preventable Catastrophe? (in German, with Frank von Hippel), Spektrum der Wissenschaft, August 2006, pp. 68-75. See also exchange of letters to the editors, December 2006, pp. 8-9. German translation and extended version of an article previously published in Scientific American. Terrorists who acquired less than 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) could build and detonate a rudimentary but effective atomic bomb relatively easily. HEU is also attractive for states that seek to develop nuclear weapons secretly, without having to test them. Unfortunately, large quantities of HEU are stored in nuclear research facilities worldwide – especially in Russia, often under minimal security. In addition, a new HEU-fueled reactor was commissioned in Germany in 2005, the first such reactor built in more than a decade worldwide. The United States and its allies have established programs to bolster security measures, convert reactors to use low-enriched uranium and retrieve HEU from research-reactor sites around the world. Dangerous gaps remain, however. High-level governmental attention, plus a comparatively small additional monetary investment could go a long way toward solving the problem for good.


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Global Fissile Material Report 2006, (with Harold Feiveson, Zia Mian, and Frank von Hippel), International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), September 2006, www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr06.pdf See abstract under Feiveson.

Brave New Nuclear World, (Schöne Neue Nukleare Welt), (with Zia Mian), published in German, Wissenschaft und Frieden, 3/2006, 24, Jahrgang, August 2006. German translation and extended version of the article previously published in English as “Life in a Nuclear-Powered Crowd,” see below. Final Report to the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF): Investigations on the Technical Options for the Conversion of the FRM-II Research Reactor, (with M. Englert and W. Liebert), published in German, Interdisciplinary Research Group on Science, Technology, and Security (IANUS), Darmstadt University of Technology, June 2006. This research project, which is summarized in this 80-page final report for the German Federal Ministry, evaluates the potential of new high-density fuels (uranium-molybdenum fuels) and specifies conversion options for the German research reactor FRM-II. According to a government-to-operator agreement, this reactor has to be converted to a fuel with the lowest possible enrichment level, but not higher than 50%, by the end of 2010. Ideally, the reactor would then use low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel enriched to just less than 20% U-235. Based on an overview and assessment of the ongoing research and development efforts for these new fuels (both dispersion-type and monolithic), the practicality of the identified conversion options is evaluated. Furthermore, this project contributes to the international conversion efforts more generally in providing the first systematic analysis of the potential (and limits) of high-density fuels for other high-flux reactors that still use HEU today.

Optimization Calculations for the Use of Monolithic Fuel in High-Flux Research Reactors, (with M. Englert and W. Liebert), Transactions of the 10th International Topical Meeting on Research Reactor Fuel Management (RRFM), European Nuclear Society (ENS), 30 April - 3 May 2006, Sofia, Bulgaria. The use of monolithic UMo fuel might be a viable option for the conversion of high-flux research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel. Considering the example of the German FRM-II, the initial reactivity is reduced, when only changing the fuel meat. The core life of 52 days could only be maintained if the fuel is enriched above 20% or the fuel element itself has to be redesigned in a suitable way. Redesigning the fuel element would not only allow operators to minimize enrichment requirements, but also to minimize flux losses and to optimize power density distribution. In our simulation using M3O we first modify several fuel element design variables and calculate the impact on the relevant parameters to search for promising initial modifications. Secondly we use linear programming techniques and vary several design variables. Thus we identify thinkable modification options (preliminary) to optimize the contradicting objectives of a maximal flux and a minimal enrichment, without reducing the cycle length.

Life in a Nuclear Powered Crowd, (with Zia Mian), INESAP Information Bulletin, Issue No. 26, June 2006, pp. 4-8. This article has first been published in INES Newsletter, No. 52, April 2006, www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/2006aglaser_nuclearcrowd.pdf. A large-scale expansion of nuclear energy is now being urged by some proponents as a way to grapple with the problem of climate change being brought on by the accumulation of greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels over the past hundred or so years. But amidst the talk of a second chance for nuclear energy, there is some recognition that a nuclear future may be dark. We outline some particular concerns about nuclear safety

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and nuclear proliferation and suggest that any large-scale global expansion of nuclear energy generation will bring new dangers and not be of much help in dealing with climate change.

On the Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel for Research Reactors at Various Enrichment Levels, Science & Global Security, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2006, pp. 1-24. This article reviews the rationale of selecting an enrichment of just less than 20% (low-enriched uranium) as the preferred enrichment level for research reactor fuel in order to minimize overall proliferation risks. The net strategic value of the nuclear material associated with reactor operation is evaluated for a variety of enrichment levels, ranging from slightly enriched to weapon-grade fuel. To quantify the proliferation potential, both the demand of fresh uranium fuel, as well as the plutonium buildup in the irradiated fuel, are estimated via cell burn up calculations. The analysis confirms the usefulness of the current enrichment limit and challenges a recent trend to reconsider fuel enrichment levels between 20% and 50% for new research reactor projects.

Laura Kahn Comparative Medicine: A Much Needed Veterinary Discipline, Journal of the American Veterinary Association, Vol. 229, 1 July 2006, p. 29. This letter to the editor encourages the veterinary community to educate policy makers and the public on the important role veterinarians play in animal and human health. It encourages more veterinarians to pursue careers in comparative medicine and biomedical research.

Feasibility of Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in the Production of Medical Radiopharmaceuticals, (with F.N. von Hippel), Science & Global Security, Vol. 14, May-December 2006, pp.151-162. Significant quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) – more than enough to make a Hiroshima type bomb – are used annually as neutron target material in Canadian, European and South African reactors to produce the short-lived fission products used in nuclear medicine. The most important of these fission products is 99Mo, which decays into 99mTc, which is used in most radiopharmaceuticals. The United States supplies weapon-grade uranium to the Canadian radioisotope producer and might, in the future, provide it to the European producers as well. As a condition of receiving such HEU, the 1992 Schumer Amendment to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act requires that a foreign producer cooperate with the United States in converting to low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets. Some smaller producers have already done so. The Canadian producer asserted, however, that the cost of conversion would be too high. The 2005 Burr amendment therefore exempted radioisotope producers in Canada and Europe from the Schumer amendment’s requirements, but requested a National Academy of Sciences study of the feasibility of conversion, setting as a feasibility test that the production cost be increased by no more than 10 percent. We show that this cost estimate is easily met for the largest European production facility and that it is also met for the Canadian facility if the “production” cost is interpreted as the cost of the final 99mTccontaining radiopharmaceutical. It is also pointed out that, if the production facilities were subject to the same security standards as US Department of Energy facilities that contain significant quantities of HEU, the cost of converting to LEU would be dwarfed by the annual savings in security.


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The Unrecognized Medical Professionals of Animal and Human Health, CourierJournal Opinion Page, Louisville, Kentucky, 7 July 2006. This opinion piece educates policy makers and the public on the important role veterinarians play in animal and human health in the public health and biomedical research arenas.

How the Radiologic and Nuclear Medical Communities Can Improve Nuclear Security, (with Frank N. von Hippel), Journal of the American College of Radiology, Vol. 4, 2007, pp. 248-251. To date, only the U.S. Government has been working seriously to persuade medical radiopharmaceutical companies around the world to convert, from using weapon-useable highly enriched uranium in molybdenum-99 targets, to low enriched uranium. The recent passage of the Burr Amendment seriously jeopardizes this effort. The Canadian, European, and South African governments should all require independent assessments of the costs of adapting their facilities to use LEU and should require that any new facilities be designed to use LEU. U.S. physicians also could help remedy this situation. First, they could explain to their Representatives and Senators that the Burr Amendment’s waiver of HEU export restrictions should be repealed so that foreign commercial producers that use U.S. HEU would be forced to resume their cooperation with the United States to convert their facilities to use LEU. Physicians were important in getting the Burr Amendment passed. If they aligned themselves with groups working on preventing nuclear terrorism, they could be equally effective in getting it repealed. Second, physicians could urge their legislators to support the creation of a domestic supply of medical radioisotopes that uses LEU. Although there is commercial interest on the part of at least one U.S. company, to build new reactors for this purpose, such efforts may require government support to get started. Finally, U.S. hospitals could help accelerate a transition to a safer world by making clear, that as soon as they have a choice, they will choose to purchase technetium-99m made with LEU. Given that the United States represents more than half of the global market, that would send a powerful signal.

Pandemic Influenza School Closure Policies, Emerging Infectious Disease, Vol. 13, February 2007, pp. 344-5. Although recent evidence suggests that school children play a major role in respiratory illness transmission, including influenza, in communities, current state and federal policies regarding this issue during an influenza pandemic are inconsistent and conflicting. A nationwide survey of states’ school closure policies showed that states vary widely on this issue and lack school closure guidelines. For an influenza pandemic with a high mortality rate, a consistent national policy as to what criteria states should use when deciding when to close schools might help to reduce unnecessary disease transmission and deaths.

The Zoonotic Connection, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 63, March/April 2007; p. 68. The critical role that zoonotic infections play in emerging infectious diseases and bioterrorism is discussed in this essay.

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Confronting Zoonoses through Closer Collaboration between Medicine and Veterinary Medicine (as ‘One Medicine’), Veterinaria Italiana Vol. 43, 2007, pp. 5-19. Physicians and veterinarians need to work together in order to address the challenges posed by zoonotic diseases. This article discusses the historical overview, current status, and future needs for “One Medicine.”

The Scourge of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 17 December 2007. Antibiotics combat bacterial infections such as pneumonia, but their misuse and overuse actually harms public health.

Why Evolution should be Taught in Public Schools, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 13 November 2007. The constant struggle against intelligent design dogma hinders efforts to prepare the next generation to understand the life sciences.

The Sewer: Guardian against Disease, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 18 October 2007. As more and more people inhabit overpopulated megacities, innovative sewage removal and treatment systems might serve as the best way to prevent an epidemic.

Children: The Bioterrorists We Love, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 17 September 2007. Given their aversion to cleanliness and a dislike for hygiene, kids play a major role in spreading disease such as influenza.

The Spread of Mosquito-Borne Diseases, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 20 August 2007. Think of a mosquito as a flying hypodermic needle that can inject disease from one individual to the next.

The End of Vaccines? The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 9 July 2007. With profits dwindling and litigation pending that could harm those vaccine makers still in business, vaccines may go the way of the diseases they prevent.

Pathogens on a Plane, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 14 June 2007. A hollow tube 30,000 feet in the air filled with people sneezing, coughing, and talking while breathing recirculated air provides the perfect environment for disease transmission.

The Exodus of General Medical Physicians, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 1 June 2007. The United States could better protect itself against epidemics and bioterrorism by supporting the people who will diagnose and treat the victims.


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Bring Back the Office of Technology Assessment, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 21 May 2007. Without an effective advisory body such as OTA, Congress continues to make decisions about scientific and technological advancements it doesn't fully understand.

How the Pet Food Scare Affects Global Health, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 7 May 2007. When a company decides to sell food on the international market (pet or otherwise), it better understand that everybody’s health is at stake.

Mother Nature’s Bioterrorism, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 27 April 2007. The alarming decline of honeybees and other species demonstrates that dangerous biothreats can originate from more natural, innocuous sources than Al Qaeda.

The Evolution and Consequences of Synthetic Biology, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 17 April 2007. Synthetic biology could drastically alter our way of life. It's up to the scientific community to determine how.

Establishing a Code of Conduct in the Life Sciences, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 2 April 2007. A Hippocratic Oath is merely lip service; rigorous ethical standards need to be developed to properly vet those pursuing a career in the life sciences.

Animals: The World’s Best (and Cheapest) Biosensors, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 14 March 2007. If health professionals want to identify an epidemic as early as possible, they need only look to their local zoo.

A Dangerous Biodefense Path, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 5 March 2007. The Bush administration claims its biological research initiative will help fight terrorism, but does this research violate the Biological Weapons Convention?

The Security Impact of the Uninsured, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 2 February 2007. How universal health care might prove to be an effective defense against bioterrorism.

Government Oversight and the Life Sciences, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online, 9 January 2007. Could increased U.S. regulation endanger research in the life sciences – á la human subject research?

A Comparative Study of Four States’ Public Health Systems: Survey Results from Local Health Departments, Physicians, and Veterinarians, final report to the Josiah H. Macy Foundation, Princeton University, September 2006. This two-year study surveyed all local health departments and over 4000 physicians and veterinarians in four northeastern states – New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. The surveys were designed to assess the level of engagement between public health and the human and animal health professionals, since these professionals would be the key participants in future outbreaks, whether naturally occurring or resulting from bioterrorism. The study found that for human public health, there

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was confusion between political and professional leadership. This confusion did not exist for animal public health: in all four states, all the leaders would be professional appointees, not elected officials. The study also found that there is minimal physician and veterinarian engagement with local public health organizations. More than a quarter of physician and veterinarian respondents did not even know if their community had a local public health agency. And of those that did know, their opinions of local public health agency capabilities during a crisis were uniformly low. With the exception of New York State, few local public health agencies were able to provide incidencerate data for many vaccine-preventable diseases in humans. The study found that local public health agencies that depended upon local sources for their primary funding were 11 times less likely to have received federal biodefense funds than agencies that received most of their funding from their state. Local public health agencies that had received federal biodefense funding were more likely to have hired new surveillance staff and purchased new equipment, and consider themselves more capable of responding to a severe outbreak than were other agencies that had not received such funds.

Teaching One Medicine, One Health, accepted for publication in The American Journal of Medicine. To confront the 21st century threats of emerging zoonotic diseases and bioterrorist agents, professors of medicine should learn from their predecessors in the 18th and 19th centuries. Visionary leaders and educators of medicine, such as Rudolf Virchow and Sir William Osler, embraced the fact that zoonotic pathogens infect both humans and animals. As a result, they encouraged their physician colleagues to work closely with their veterinary medical colleagues. This paper outlines the concept of “One Medicine, One Health,” for professors of medicine as a way to encourage them to work with their veterinary medical colleagues.

One Medicine, One Health, Applied to Vaccinating Livestock and People as a Strategy for Improving Vaccine Coverage in Africa, accepted for publication in The Lancet. This letter to the editor describes how combining human and animal health efforts would improve childhood vaccination rates in Africa. Many human health efforts have failed for various reasons including inconsistent policies, poor understanding of diseases, poverty and cultural values among others. Most of the African populations live in rural areas and have strong psychosocial and emotional attachments to their livestock. Communities that boycotted polio vaccinations will nonetheless vaccinate their cattle against major animal diseases. If childhood vaccination programs were tied with animal vaccination programs, acceptance would be much more likely.

The Disaster Response Matrix, (with Dr. Jeremiah Barondess, President Emeritus of the New York Academy of Medicine), in progress. This paper is the proceedings of a conference held in June 2007 that was jointly sponsored by the New York Academy of Medicine and the Royal Society of Medicine in London. It explores how the vertical and horizontal interfaces between federal, state, and local agencies must coalesce into smoothly functioning matrices for effective disaster responses. Unlike the U.K. which has centralized command and control at the national level, the U.S. must function with decentralized leadership across multiple levels of government. Using case presentations from the conference, the paper discusses how the U.S. could more effectively handle its constitutional and legal constraints when responding to disasters.

Who’s in Charge? Leadership During an Epidemic or Bioterrorist Attack, Book in progress that investigates the different roles and responsibilities of elected officials, public health professionals, physicians, and others in responding to crises involving deadly infectious pathogens. To be published by Praeger Security International.


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Tadahiro Katsuta Plutonium and Spent Fuel Management Option in Japan: Implication of Rokkasho Operation, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 47th Annual Meeting, Nashville, TN, 16-20 July 2006. In order to clarify the needs and timing of Away From Reactor (AFR) spent fuel storage in Japan, the future generation of spent fuel and storage capacity at reactor sites as well as at reprocessing plant was assessed. We found that there will be sufficient spent fuel storage capacity up to mid 2020's. Without reprocessing, there will be a need for up to 30,000 tons of AFR spent fuel storage capacity by 2050. Given the political difficulties of spent fuel storage, we also estimate when Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) sites will run out of storage capacity without reprocessing. At PWR sites, storage pool will be filled up by 2014, and BWR sites will be filled up by 2019. If the Rokkasho plant starts operation as planned, Japan’s plutonium stockpile is likely to grow to more than 70 tons by 2020 from 43 tons in 2005. Deferring operation of the Rokkasho plant with an appropriate spent fuel storage plan, at least until the plutonium stockpile is worked down to the minimum required level, would be the best option. We conclude that such strategy is feasible if spent fuel management and the mixed oxide fuel program are better coordinated by the utilities. This would reduce pressure on utilities and minimize proliferation concern regarding Japan's plutonium programs.

The Economics of Nuclear Power: The Validity of Calculation by the Government in 1999 and 2003, (published in Japanese), Journal of Public Utility Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1, July 2007, pp. 1-12. We verified the report on electricity generating cost estimation by the Nuclear Subcommittee (1999) and the Electricity Utility Industry Subcommittee (2003) of the Advisory Committee for Resource and Energy. We found that these reports use unclear construction cost and fuel cost in favor of nuclear power. In addition, we found that electricity generating cost of nuclear is higher than Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Coal (Nuclear: 5.9 Yen/kWh, LNG and Coal: 4.9 Yen/kWh each, in the case of 80% capacity factor, 40 years of operation). Furthermore, we highlighted the problems of nuclear power in the case when utilities are able to choose freely from among many kinds of power supplies based on electricity liberalization; for example, nuclear power needs 3 Yen/kWh more than LNG for the expenditure of the first year of operation.

History of International Control on Nuclear Energy, (in Japanese), Journal of World Affairs, Kaigai Jijo, Vol. 55, No. 5, 2007, pp. 57-78. A multilateral nuclear fuel cycle is currently being proposed in an attempt to balance nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful use. This analysis of barriers to previous efforts to promote a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle suggests that non-universality and distrust are key concerns and need to be included in evaluating desirable nuclear fuel cycles. This paper suggests we need to make a proposal that focuses on spent fuel management, including proposals such as the take-back system (fuel lease system) by Russia and the U.S. GNEP scheme. Japan's role is also important, because it is the only non-nuclear weapon state that has a large commercial reprocessing facility.

Japan’s Spent Fuel and Plutonium Management Challenges, (with Tatsujiro Suzuki), Research Report #3, International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006. Japan's utilities are under pressure to deal with their accumulating spent fuel. According to government and industry estimates, some nuclear power plant storage pools will be filled up by the end of 2006. This is the main reason given for starting operation of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. In addition, because the Rokkasho plant, even operating at full capacity, will not be able to keep up with the projected discharges of spent fuel, Japan's utilities have decided to build an interim away-from-reactor (AFR) spent-fuel storage facility. Our analysis shows that, with optimum use of available at-reactor and away-from-reactor storage capacity, there would be no need for reprocessing until the mid 2020s. There would be sufficient spent fuel B-15


storage capacity up to 2025 (low spent-fuel burn-up case) or 2028 (high burn-up case). With an additional 30,000 tons of AFR spent fuel storage capacity (the equivalent of six more Mutsu type facilities but potentially at a smaller number of sites or even all at Mutsu), reprocessing could be avoided until 2050. Japan's recovered plutonium is to be recycled in Light Water Reactor mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel and in Japan's Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) R&D program. Due to delays in the MOX and FBR programs, however, Japan has accumulated a large stockpile of separated plutonium. If the Rokkasho plant goes into full-scale operation in 2007, Japan’s plutonium stockpile will likely grow to more than 70 tons by 2020 from 43 tons in 2005. Deferring operation of the Rokkasho plant with optimal spent-fuel storage, at least until the plutonium stockpile had been worked down to the minimum required level, would minimize international concern about Japan's plutonium stockpile. We recommend postponing the full-scale operation of Rokkasho for about a decade, and we found this feasible even under the current spent fuel storage management planning. This would give Japan sufficient time to re-consider plutonium and spent fuel management.

R. Scott Kemp Detection of Clandestine Fissile Material Production, Chapter 9, Global Fissile Material Report 2007, International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), 2007, pp. 101–109. One of the greatest challenges in the verification of the current nuclear nonproliferation regime is to detect clandestine production of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Additional Protocol, introduced in 1997 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was developed to meet this challenge. It provided the agency with the ability to conduct environmental sampling in order to facilitate detection of covert fissile material production. While the agency does collect samples of surface residues at known facilities, it does not sample air, water, vegetation, or soil, locally or over a wide area, to search for indications of clandestine activity at the facility or elsewhere. Such sampling, if conducted over a wide area outside of a declared facility’s boundaries, would require the prior consent of the IAEA Board of Governors and procedural arrangements would have to be developed. This chapter examines some of the technical methods and constraints on using novel types of environmental sampling for the detection of undeclared facilities in a large region, and the detection of undeclared activities at known facilities. Such techniques could also be used to verify a future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

Performance Estimate for the Detection of Plutonium Separation by 85Kr, Proceedings of the 48th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Material Management (INMM), 8–12 July 2007, Tucson, AZ. This paper gave new estimates of 1) the lower limit of detection and 2) the probability of detecting plutonium separation using atmospheric krypton-85. The analysis was based on two 6.5 year datasets. Results were reported for different separation rates, different false-alarm rates, and for distances between 50 and 200 km, all under conditions of low background variability. It was found that increasing the false-positive rate does not usefully increase the detection rate. An analysis of the krypton-85 background in a region of high krypton-85 variability (i.e., near to commercial reprocessing sites) suggests that a similar arrangement would be 15 to 20 times less sensitive in these areas. These results support the recommendation of IAEA-STR-351 that the agency not pursue noble gas monitoring for wide-area detection of undeclared reprocessing activity when the detection goal is as currently established for non-weapon states. Simultaneously, the results form the basis for future discussions if the IAEA is charged with verifying the absence of large-scale plants for a future FMCT.


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Initial Analysis of a Method for Detecting Clandestine Enrichment and UF6 Conversion Plants, submitted to Science & Global Security, May 2007. Cascades of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium, such as those now at the center of the controversy with Iran, can make highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons. A clandestine plant is also very difficult to detect, creating a verification weakness in the nonproliferation regime. Centrifuge plants do not have distinctive characteristics or infrared signatures that would distinguish them from other industrial facilities when using overhead imaging. Furthermore, most of the pipes in centrifuge plants operate below atmospheric pressure, so there is very little leakage of the process gas to the atmosphere. At present, there is no publiclyknown way to detect or identify a centrifuge plant at distances of more than a few kilometers. This article argues that detection may be more feasible by searching for the facilities that produce the uranium feedstock for centrifuges instead of the centrifuges directly. The method proposed is atmospheric sampling of UO2F2 aerosols. This article considers source terms for a covert-scale plant, the atmospheric chemistry and thermodynamics of the effluent released, and its atmospheric dispersion. Potential sampling methods and analytical chemistry are briefly discussed. Research is recommended that could improve these estimates.

The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (with Alexander Glaser), in Shi Zeng, ed., Proceedings of the Ninth International Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases (SPLG), 18–21 September 2006, Beijing, China, Tshinghua University Press, 2007, pp. 88-95. See abstract under Glaser.

A Performance Estimate for the Remote Detection of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing by Atmospheric 85Kr, (with C. Schlosser), submitted to Journal of Environmental Radioactivity. Measurements of atmospheric krypton-85 taken in Tsukuba Japan were analyzed to determine: 1) a lower limit of detection for discovering anthropogenic 85Kr emissions, 2) the probability of detecting plutonium separation at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant, and 3) the extent to which these results can be generalized to other sites. For the lower-limit of detection, the value of at least 3.4 standard deviations (0.14 Bq/m3 at Tsukuba) with a theoretical false-positive rate of 0.05% is recommended for purposes of detecting clandestine reprocessing in the region around Tsukuba. Using this and other detection thresholds, correlations were found between the Tsukuba samples and 85Kr released at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant 61 km away. For the recommended 3.4 standard deviation threshold, the continuous separation of 100, 300, and 900 grams-equivalent weapon-grade plutonium per day were found to correspond to 10%, 50%, and 80% probability of detection respectively. The smallest detected concentration was for the continuous separation of 42 grams per day, with a probability of detection of about 2%.

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Li Bin Professor Li Bin, who directs the arms-control program of Tsinghua University in Beijing, spent the academic year 2005-6 as a PS&GS visitor. The following article was a result of his research during this period. Tracking Chinese Strategic Mobile Missiles, Science & Global Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2007, pp. 1-30. This paper analyzes the maneuverability, capabilities, and survivability of Chinese DF-31 mobile missiles and the ability of a proposed U.S. Space Radar system to persistently track them. Possible defense strategies for the Chinese military are posited. The paper concludes that the survivability of the mobile DF-31’s is not guaranteed during a nuclear attack given the huge U.S. strategic arsenal, and questions the ability of the proposed U.S. Space radar system to persistently track the DF-31’s if the Chinese military engages in relatively simple countermeasures. Neither China nor the United States can be completely confident of a strategic advantage. The two countries need strategic dialogues to improve relations on this topic.

Zia Mian Resource Letter PSNAC-1: Physics and Society: Nuclear Arms Control, (with Alexander Glaser), American Journal of Physics, Vol. 75, No. 12, December 2007. See abstract under Glaser. Global Fissile Material Report 2007, (with Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, and Frank von Hippel), International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), October 2007, www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr07.pdf. See abstract under Feiveson.

Progress toward Nuclear Disarmament, in Global Fissile Material Report 2007, International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), October 2007. This chapter in the 2007 IPFM report explores the possibilities for deeper cuts in the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapon arsenals and how they could be made more irreversible by disposing of excess HEU and plutonium and the need to increase the current slow rate of warhead dismantlement.

Fissile Materials: Global Stocks, Production and Elimination, (with Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, and Frank von Hippel), Appendix 12C in SIPRI Yearbook 2007, Oxford University Press on behalf of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007. See abstract under Feiveson.


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How Not to Handle Nuclear Security, Foreign Policy in Focus, 14 December 2007. In recent years, the United States has been helping Pakistan secure its nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and production complex. The op-ed outlines some problems the U.S. has had in securing its own nuclear weapons, materials, information and personnel, and suggests that U.S. assistance may end up encouraging a false sense of security and confidence about nuclear weapons security in Pakistan.

A Review of “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan, and the Rise of Proliferation Networks,” Mark Fitzpatrick, ed., International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Online, 19 November 2007 This essay reviews a report on the A.Q. network, its role in Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and its subsequent sales of nuclear enrichment technology, materials and information, including a nuclear weapon design. While generally in agreement with the assessment in Nuclear Black Markets about the role and consequences of the A.Q. Khan network and the problems involved in stemming its activities, the essay suggests that the report fails to see how U.S. nuclear weapons policy is also a driver for proliferation. It emphasizes the need to counter the spread of a system of values that seeks security with and profits from nuclear weapons.

Foreword, Project Butter Factory: Henk Slebos and the A.Q. Khan Nuclear Network, Frank Slijper, Transnational Institute and Dutch Campaign Against the Arms Trade, Amsterdam, Briefing 2007. www.tni.org/reports/militarism/butterfactoryproject.pdf This Foreword introduces a study that uses Dutch public records and local media reports to trace the thirty years of activity in Holland of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. It highlights the enduring nature of the network, the large number of companies involved in nuclear sales to the network, and the limited capability of government to intervene.

Pakistan Needs Real Democratic Government, Philadelphia Inquirer, 17 August 2007. A invited op-ed on the sixtieth anniversary of Pakistan’s independence reflecting on the need for greater democracy in that country, and an end to U.S. support for the Musharraf regime, if Pakistan is to be able to confront its multiple and worsening crises.

Triumph of Fear, (with M.V. Ramana), Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007. This invited contribution argues that the U.S. Reliable Replacement Warhead Program represents an effort by a declining nuclear weapons complex to justify mission and budgets and, if successful, presents a grave danger that weapons program managers in other countries will be encouraged also to seek support for the design and development of a new generation of nuclear weapons.

Towards a Fissile Material Treaty, Disarmament Times, Summer 2007. This review essay for the journal of the United Nations NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security lays out estimates of global fissile materials stocks and traces the long effort by the international community to end production of these materials for nuclear weapons. It analyses the possibilities of a fissile material cut-off treaty and suggests that while there may be challenges in verification of such a treaty, these are not likely to insurmountable.

Feeding Potential for South Asia’s Nuclear Fire, (with Frank von Hippel and M.V. Ramana), Asahi Shimbun, 20 April 2007, p. 77. This op-ed for the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun outlines how the U.S.-India nuclear deal could allow to significantly increase its production of fissile materials for weapons and drive an arms race with Pakistan.

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It proposes that Japan and the other NSG members, who must approve the deal for it come into force, could reduce this negative impact by requiring that India stop all production of fissile materials for weapons as a condition for approval of the deal by the NSG.

Plutonium Production in India and the US-India Nuclear Deal, (with A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana), in Gauging US-Indian Strategic Cooperation, ed. H. Sokolksi, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 2007. This draws on the IPFM Research Report Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the USIndia Nuclear Deal and describes current plutonium production capabilities in India and how these may be affected by the U.S.-India nuclear deal.

Material Danger, (with Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, and Frank von Hippel), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007. This center-spread in the journal featured a map and chart showing fissile material production sites and national stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium based on the work of the IPFM.

Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal, (with A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana), Research Report No. 1, International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Princeton, September 2006. A revised version was published in Science & Global Security, Vol. 14, Nos. 2-3, pp. 117-143, 2006. The July 2005 U.S.-India nuclear deal represents a fundamental transformation of U.S.-India relations, and at the same time, a challenge to the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. In this analysis we look at current stockpiles of fissile materials in India and Pakistan and estimate the changing capacity for future fissile material production as India progressively places some of its heavy water reactors under safeguards. We assess India’s uranium resource constraints and the additional weapon grade plutonium production in its unsafeguarded heavy water power reactors that would be made possible by imports of uranium allowed by the deal. We also estimate the weapon plutonium production from India’s fast breeder reactor that is under construction and is to be unsafeguarded.

Global Fissile Material Report 2006, (with Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, and Frank von Hippel), International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), September 2006,. See abstract under Feiveson.

Brave New Nuclear World (Schöne Neue Nukleare Welt), (with Alexander Glaser), published in German, Wissenschaft und Frieden, 3/2006, 24. Jahrgang, August 2006. German translation and extended version of the article previously published in English as “Life in a Nuclear-Powered Crowd.” See abstract under Glaser.

Life in a Nuclear Powered Crowd, (with Alexander Glaser), INESAP Information Bulletin, Issue No. 26, June 2006, pp. 4-8. This article has first been published in INES Newsletter, No. 52, April 2006, See abstract under Glaser.


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Challenges and Opportunities for Nuclear Disarmament, INESAP Bulletin, Vol. 27, December 2006. The text of an invited presentation to the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) on behalf of civil society and NGOs. It recalls that the first resolution of the General Assembly called for nuclear disarmament and that sixty years later this has still not been fulfilled. The presentation covers the current dangers posed by nuclear weapons, the need to teat all nuclear weapons equally, the status and future of the NPT, and the future of nuclear energy, among other issues.

The UN's Unfinished Nuclear Business, The Daily Princetonian, 1 December 2006. An invited op-ed for the Daily Princetonian responding to a speech delivered at the University on November 28, 2006, by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan on nuclear disarmament. The article outlines some of the many obstacles that have prevented the elimination of nuclear weapons, noting in particular the problems posed by secrecy, arguments about the deterrence role of nuclear weapons, and the recurring resort to armed force in international relations despite the injunctions of the U.N. Charter.

Foreword, Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security: An Assessment of the Final Report of the WMD Commission and its Implications for US Policy, Michael Spies and John Burroughs, eds., Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York, 2007. This foreword introduces the civil society review and assessment of the 2006 Final Report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Hans Blix, conducted by the Lawyers Committee for Nuclear Policy, the Western States Legal Foundation and the Reaching Critical Will Project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. The Foreword suggests that the elimination of nuclear weapons is necessary, and would be feasible if the United States would take the lead. It notes that this, in turn, will require educating the public about existing commitments under the NPT to disarm, about the size and posture of U.S. nuclear forces, and overcoming the opposition of the nuclear weapons complex.

The Empire of Fear, in Selling US Wars, A. Vanaik, ed., Olive Branch Press, Northampton, 2007. Published in India, as “Masks of Empire,” A. Vanaik, ed., Tulika Books, New Delhi, 2007. This chapter looks at how the fear of weapons of mass destruction was used by the Bush administration to organize public support for its war on Iraq in 2003. It traces the sources for this policy towards Iraq and the pressure for a more militarized U.S. foreign policy and the role played by key figures in the Bush administration. It investigates how public misunderstanding of basic issues connected to the war against Iraq is linked to sections of the media that seemed intent on fostering public opinion in favor of war. The successful mobilization of nuclear fears to build public support for war shows how widely shared these fears are. This chapter also looks briefly at the way these fears have been expressed in American culture for the six decades since the atomic bomb was first invented and used by the United States to destroy the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Dreams of the Future: The Coming of the Atomic Age to Pakistan, in Atomic Power and Nuclear Publics: Culture, State and Society in India and Pakistan, I. Abraham, ed.,Indiana University Press, in press. In October 1954, Pakistan announced the setting up of an Atomic Energy Research Organization. This came a few months after the United States had launched its Atoms for Peace program to share nuclear technology, and Pakistan and the United States had signed an agreement on military cooperation and a new program to bring American economic advisers to Pakistan. This chapter focuses on how prevailing ideas of an imminent atomic age, characterized by unlimited prosperity made possible by nuclear B-21


technology and the strategic and economic relationship with the United States, shaped aspirations and institutions in Pakistani that then laid the basis for Pakistan to seek both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. This work is part of a project organized by the Social Science Research Council that brings together scientists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists and activists to develop a framework for understanding nuclear South Asia.

Pakistan and the Energy Challenge, (with A.H. Nayyar), in L. Mez, M. Schneider, and S. Thomas, eds., Chernobyl +20: International Perspectives of Energy Policy and the Role of Nuclear Power, Multi-Science Publishing, forthcoming. This chapter looks at energy policy in Pakistan over the two decades since the Chernobyl disaster. It describes the current energy situation in Pakistan and shows how its main sources of electricity (especially hydroelectricity and natural gas) are increasingly enmeshed in struggles over the rights of local communities and have created a growing crisis that has become violent in some places. The chapter describes Pakistan’s energy plans for the next twenty years, which include increasing nuclear capacity twenty-fold to 8800 MW by 2030. It argues that while nuclear energy is currently a small, almost negligible part of Pakistan’s energy sector, in terms of generating capacity, it has acquired importance because of the enormous and unaccountable power of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission that manages it and its link to the nuclear weapon program. These factors have made it difficult to sustain a significant energy policy debate that includes critical scrutiny of the utility of nuclear energy in Pakistan and challenge plans for such a large expansion and the high economic and environmental costs that will come with it. The failure to develop strong public policies favoring energy efficiency and renewable energy suggest that the Pakistan energy crisis is likely to endure.

Eugene Miasnikov Dr. Miasnikov of the Center for Arms Control Studies of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology spent the fall semester of 2005 as a PS&GS visitor. The following cover story was a result of research during that period. ReSTART: The Need for a New US-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement, (with Anatoli Diakov), Arms Control Today, September, 2006. See abstract under Diakov.

Abdul Nayyar Plutonium Production in India and the US-India Nuclear Deal, (with Z. Mian, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana), in Gauging US-Indian Strategic Cooperation, H. Sokolksi, ed., Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 2007. See abstract under Mian.


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Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal, (with Z. Mian, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana), Research Report No. 1, International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Princeton, September 2006. A revised version was published in Science & Global Security, Vol. 14, Nos. 2-3, pp. 117-143, 2006. See abstract under Mian.

Pakistan and the Energy Challenge, (with Z. Mian), in L. Mez, M. Schneider, and S. Thomas, eds., Chernobyl +20: International Perspectives of Energy Policy and the Role of Nuclear Power, Multi-Science Publishing, forthcoming. See abstract under Mian.

Ali Nouri Proliferation-Resistant Biotechnology: A Novel Approach to Improve Biological Security, (with Christopher Chyba), submitted to Nature Biotechnology. To prevent the application of pathogenic genes and genomes to the production of biological weapons, some commercial DNA providers now screen orders so that potentially dangerous sequences are not synthesized. However, new innovative approaches and declining development costs could enable the diffusion of synthesizers, from a few centralized locations to an increasing number of facilities and perhaps even individual laboratories, rendering the current risk-management framework obsolete. To prepare for this possibility, we propose the development of “proliferation-resistant biotechnology”—safeguards intrinsic to emerging technologies so that nefarious applications are hindered, while benefits are preserved. As biotechnologies become increasingly automated, such safeguard strategies can become effective tools for managing risks in the life sciences.

Biotechnology and Bioterrorism, (with Christopher Chyba), in Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Cirkovic, eds., Global Catastrophic Risk, Oxford University Press, in press. This chapter surveys the implications of biotechnology for security, and includes a discussion of possible approaches to mitigating the risks while not blocking advances important for medicine, food security, and other areas.

R. Rajaraman The Basics of Nuclear Reactors, Weapons and Their Fuel, Course Manual for GOI Officials, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2007. The 123 Agreement in Perspective, Course Manual for GOI Officials, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2007.

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The India-US Nuclear Deal: The Perspective of a Non-Governmental Scientist, in Sasikumar and Huntley, eds., Canadian Policy on Nuclear Cooperation with India, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, 2007. Rescue Nuclear Disarmament from the Backburner, The Hindu, 13 November 2006. This article calls for renewing interest in nuclear disarmament, which has drastically diminished in recent years. This has happened in India because the Indo-US deal has saturated the nuclear agenda, and in the West because of fears of nuclear terrorism and horizontal non proliferation. We argue that it would be unwise to neglect disarmament and expect to be able to make any long term headway on fissile material control or preventing nuclear terrorism.

Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal, (with Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, and M.V. Ramana), Science & Global Security, Vol. 14, Nos.2-3, 2006. See abstract under Mian.

So, What is the Big Deal? The Hindustan Times, Editorial Page, 21 November 2006. This article analyzed the concerns expressed in India regarding the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal.

Fallout from Nuclear Deal, The Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 3351, 5 August 2006 This article examines the less-noted but important consequences of the nuclear deal on the quality of public debate and accountability of the nuclear establishment in India.

M.V. Ramana Feeding the Nuclear Fire: Resuming Nuclear Cooperation with India, in Wade L. Huntley and Karthika Sasikumar, eds., Nuclear Cooperation with India: New Challenges, New Opportunities, Vancouver, Canada: Simons Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, 2006. The paper describes the state of the domestic debate in India about the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the implications of the deal for nuclear energy in India. It then looks at the failures of India's nuclear energy program and the desperate requirement for uranium to keep reactors operating, and the consequent motivations to import nuclear fuel and technology, as well as the increased capacity for producing weapons grade plutonium that would come with such imports.

Dealing with the Nuclear Deal, Peace Now - The Bulletin of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, Vol. 4, Issue 3, November 2006. The article begins the history of the international nuclear export control regime and the role that India's 1974 nuclear weapons test played in catalyzing those developments. After elaborating on the nuclear energy potential and the fissile material stockpiles under the deal, the article discusses the U.S. foreign policy goals


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that have driven the deal as well as the Indian nuclear establishment's motivations for ensuring that a large fraction of its facilities are not put under safeguards.

Frank von Hippel Fissile Materials: Global Stocks, Production and Elimination, (with Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian), SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 558. See abstract under Feiveson.

In Memoriam, in Hans Bethe and His Physics, (with Richard Garwin), Gerald E. Brown and Chang-Hwan Lee, eds., World Scientific Publishing Company, 2006. An appreciation of Hans Bethe’s contributions to nuclear arms control.

Feasibility of Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in the Production of Medical Radioisotopes, (with Laura Kahn), Science & Global Security, Vol. 14, 2006, pp. 151-162. See abstract under Kahn.

How the Radiological and Nuclear Medical Communities can Improve Nuclear Security, (with Laura Kahn), The Journal of the American College of Radiology Vol. 4, No. 4, April 2007, pp. 248-251. See abstract under Kahn.

The US HEU Declaration: Transparency Deferred, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 149-161. In February 2006, the Department of Energy released its historical account of U.S. production and disposition of highly enriched uranium (HEU) through 1996. The report was unclassified and had been completed in 2001 but it required five years of petitions and appeals under the Freedom of Information Act before the Bush Administration was forced to release it. According to the report, the U.S. had in 1996 a stockpile of 741 metric tons of HEU with an average enrichment of 84 percent. Of that stockpile, 178 tons of HEU with an average enrichment of 62 percent had been declared excess for military purposes. In 2005, an additional 40 tons was declared excess and 160 tons was put into a reserve for future use as naval-reactor fuel. An estimated 5 tons of HEU was lost due to “normal operating losses” and there was a residual discrepancy of about 3 tons between the number obtained by subtracting cumulative disposition from cumulative production and the actual 1996 stockpile. The value of this information is discussed, including the insights that it provides about the feasibility of declaring additional U.S. weapons HEU excess and the ultimate limits of verification of nuclear disarmament.

The North Korean Test and the Limits of Nuclear Forensics, (with Jungmin Kang and Hui Zhang), Arms Control Today, January/February 2007, pp. 42-43 and correction, April 2007, p. 48. B-25


The U.S. detected radioactive xenon fission products from North Korea’s Oct. 9, 2006 test two days later. This paper shows that, contrary to claims made by a former U.S. government official in an article in Arms Control Today, it was not feasible by that time to tell the difference between the isotope mix produced by a plutonium or HEU-based bomb.

Deconstructing North Korea’s October 9 Nuclear Test, (with Richard Garwin), Arms Control Today, November 2006, pp. 15-17. It was argued that the October 9, 2006 seismic event detected in North Korea was a nuclear test. It was also suggested that one possible interpretation of the low yield of the test was that North Korea was testing a compact, light-weight design that could be carried by one of its short or medium-ranged missiles.

The Stuff of Bombs, Review of Jeremy Bernstein, “Plutonium: A History of the World’s Most Dangerous Element,” American Scientist, May-June 2007. In his short new book Plutonium, Jeremy Bernstein, a physicist and veteran science journalist, tells the story of the discovery of the element and its properties. He also sketches in the larger background of the development of atomic and nuclear physics during the first half of the 20th century and includes capsule biographies of the atomic and nuclear physicists who made the big discoveries—Henri Becquerel, Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, Lise Meitner, Leo Szilard, Glenn Seaborg and others. Their names are already familiar to physicists interested in nuclear matters, but Bernstein's anecdotes reveal their human sides. He also brings to life such lesser-known figures as William Zachariasen, who determined the crystal phases of plutonium and its various compounds.

Feeding Potential for South Asia’s Nuclear Fire, (with Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana), Asahi Shimbun, 20 April 2007, p. 77. See abstract under Mian.

Global Fissile Material Report 2007, (with Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian), International Panel on Fissile Materials, (IPFM). See abstract under Feiveson.

Managing Spent Fuel in the United States: The Illogic of Reprocessing, International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), January 2007, 48 pp. Since 1982, it has been U.S. policy, for nonproliferation and cost reasons, not to reprocess spent powerreactor fuel. Instead, the Department of Energy (DOE) is to take spent power reactor fuel from U.S. nuclear utilities and place it in an underground federal geological repository. The first U.S. repository is being developed under Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Originally, it was expected to begin taking fuel in 1998. However, project management problems have delayed its opening for at least two decades. In 2006, the U.S. Department of Energy therefore proposed reprocessing as a “solution” to the U.S. spent fuel problem. The construction of plants to reprocess light-water-reactor spent fuel was originally justified in the 1970s as a way to obtain plutonium to start up liquid-sodium-cooled plutonium-breeder reactors. The transition to breeder reactors did not occur, however, because their capital costs, and those of reprocessing plants, were much higher than had been projected. Today, where plutonium is being recycled, it is being recycled as fuel for the light-water reactors (LWRs) from which it was extracted. Even with the cost of the reprocessing ignored as a “sunk cost,” plutonium fuel is generally more costly than conventional lowenriched uranium fuel. The French nuclear combine, Areva, has proposed that the U.S. build a reprocessing plant and recycle the plutonium once in light-water reactors, as is done in France. The resulting spent “mixed-oxide” fuel, which would still contain two thirds as much plutonium as was used to fabricate it, would then remain indefinitely in interim storage at the reprocessing plant. Thus the reprocessing plant would serve as a costly type of interim spent-fuel storage facility.


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Worldwide, about half of the plutonium being separated is simply being stockpiled at the reprocessing plants along with the associated high-level waste from reprocessing. In effect, those sites also are interim spent-fuel storage sites – except that much of the spent fuel is being stored in separated form. As of 2005, the global stockpile of separated civilian plutonium had grown to 250 tons – sufficient to make more than 30,000 nuclear weapons. The DOE proposes that the federal government subsidize the construction of tens of sodium-cooled fastneutron “burner” reactors – basically the same sodium-cooled reactors that could not compete economically as plutonium breeder reactors. Plutonium and other less abundant transuranic elements extracted from spent light-water reactor fuel would be recycled repeatedly through these reactors until, except for process losses, they were fissioned. Such a program would require government subsidies of hundreds of billions, however. It is quite possible that would stop -- as previous efforts to commercialize sodium-cooled reactors have – after only one or two “demonstration” reactors have been built. In this case, the reprocessing plant would, once again simply become an interim storage site for the reprocessed spent fuel – as has happened in the United Kingdom and Russia after their breeder-reactor commercialization programs failed. The principal alternative to reprocessing, until U.S. spent fuel can be shipped to Yucca Mountain or some other centralized storage, is simply to keep older spent fuel in dry storage on the reactor sites. There is ample space inside the security fence at all U.S. power-reactor sites to store all the spent fuel that will be discharged, even if the reactor licenses are extended to allow them to operate until they are sixty years old. At an operating reactor site, the incremental safety and security risk from dry stored fuel is negligible relative to the danger from the fuel in the reactor core and from the recently discharged fuel in the spent fuel pool.

Global Fissile Material Report 2006, (with Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser and Zia Mian), International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), 2006. See abstract under Feiveson.

Steps to Strengthen Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Testimony before the House Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Washington, D.C., 26 September 2006. Other countries’ nuclear weapons represent a danger to us. They could be used without authorization or by an irresponsible or incompetent leadership. Highly enriched uranium and plutonium in the nuclear complexes that support those nuclear weapons could be stolen and used to by terrorists to make improvised nuclear explosives. Our own nuclear weapons are a threat to ourselves as well as others for the same reasons. The Nonproliferation Treaty represents a common understanding of this danger and a commitment to do something about it: to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries and to reduce their numbers and supporting infrastructure in the countries that possess them – ultimately to zero. Recently, the South African Ambassador to the IAEA, in response to a call from the U.S. for South Africa and other non-weapon states to forego the use of highly-enriched uranium as a reactor fuel, said, “The NPT is not an a´ la carte menu from which States Parties may choose their preferences, while ignoring other aspects…It is in this context, that South Africa has continued to call for the soonest commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, without preconditions, on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.” The U.S. should take its NPT commitment to irreversible nuclear-weapons reductions by being willing to negotiate a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. It should ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It should be willing to reduce in parallel with Russia to 1000 total nuclear warheads. Finally, for nonproliferation reasons, it should continue its three-decade moratorium on plutonium separation from spent nuclear fuel.

B-27


Comment on the Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, (with Richard Garwin, Philip Coyle and Theodore Postol), Presentation to the U.K. Parliament Defense Select Committee, 10 January 2007. On December 4th, Prime Minister Blair announced in Parliament his Government’s decision to replace Britain’s four Vanguard-class ballistic-missile submarines with a successor fleet. He asserted that the service life of these submarines can be extended to only 30 years, which would mean that the submarines all would have to be retired by 2029. We explain why we believe it likely that the Vanguard-class submarines can safely and economically be operated for 40-45 years rather than 30. This would not only save funds for other defense needs but would provide additional time for the United Kingdom to debate the decision whether or not to maintain its nuclear deterrent for another 40 years. We touch also on the question of maintaining the U.K.’s submarine-manufacturing infrastructure and skill base.

Houston Wood Analysis of the Proposed Gas Centrifuge Plant at Natanz, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, 8-12 July 2007, Tucson, AZ. Iran has disclosed it plans to construct a gas centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz with 50,000 centrifuges, but at this time has not agreed to IAEA inspections. Therefore, it is of interest to know with some accuracy what the production capabilities of the plant are likely to be. Earlier research has been conducted to study the maximum concentration of 235U that might reasonably be obtained in a cascade designed to produce enrichment appropriate for fuel for a nuclear power reactor. In the earlier research, a hypothetical gas centrifuge, the Iguaçu centrifuge, was used as the model. The centrifuge parameters were chosen at the 5th Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gases held at Iguaçu, Brazil in 1996. With this model centrifuge, which is 0.5 m in length and operates at 600 m/s, the cascade calculations show that by reducing the feed rate to about 10% of the design feed rate a 235U product concentration of 15% can be achieved. If the centrifuges are re-optimized for lower feed rate by adjusting the scoop and wall temperature gradient, then at about 10% of the design feed rate a 235U product concentration of greater than 50% can be achieved. A number of sources have reported some reasonable parameters describing the P1 gas centrifuges likely being installed in the Natanz facility. There have been recent reports about more advanced gas centrifuges (P2 and P3) developed in Pakistan, and it is conceivable these centrifuges may be used by Iran. In this paper, the PANCAKE code [Sep. Sci. & Tech., 35(8), 2000, pp. 1207-1221] is used to predict performance maps and separation factors of the P1, P2 and P3 centrifuges. Because of the uncertainty of the actual operating conditions of these centrifuges, parametric studies of the three models are presented to produce a matrix of results. An M* cascade model is used to study potential enrichment levels based on each of the three centrifuge models.


B-28

APPENDIX C. Lectures, Talks, Workshops July 1, 2006—December 31, 2007

Christopher Chyba Date October 19, 2007

September 27, 2007 July 16, 2007

June 28, 2007 June 25, 2007 June 8, 2007 May 29, 2007 April 9, 2007

March 8, 2007 March 6, 2007

January 29, 2007

January 27, 2007 January 26, 2007 January 25, 2007 January 16, 2007

Title Keynote Address: The Biotechnology Dilemma, the Stakeholders, and the Role of Transparency A New Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation Strategy for the United States Briefing on Outer Space Weapons

Kinetic Interception of Earth-Crossing Asteroids Chair: Biotechnology Proliferation: Benefits, Dangers, and Management History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine Biotechnology, Arms Control and the State of Nature Impact Deflection of Potentially Hazardous Asteroids Using Current Launch Vehicles

The Impact Hazard in the Context of Global Threats Proposals for Global Harmonization of Biosecurity: New International Mechanisms Panelist, The Future of Nuclear Weapons

The Fate of the Universe and the Search for Life Moderator, Entering a New Age of Human Spaceflight Moderator, The Changing Military Calculus on the Korean Peninsula Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: Lessons from Human Rights and Transnational Corporations?

C-1

Organization / Occasion Conference on Transparency in Current and Emerging Approaches to Biosecurity, George Mason University, Arlington, VA Center for American Progress/Peace and Security Initiative, Washington, DC Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, United Nations, New York NY MacArthur Grantees Meeting, AAAS, Washington, DC Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, DC American Physical Society Annual Meeting, Jacksonville, FL Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL David Bradford Seminar in Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Planetary Defense Conference, George Washington University, Washington, DC Developing Options for Global Biosecurity, Partnership for Global Security, Washington, DC Paul H. Nitze – A Centennial Commemoration – Nuclear Weapons: The Road Ahead, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Baltimore, MD World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland 20th ISODARCO Winter Course, Andalo, Italy


December 19, 2006

December 13, 2006

December 11, 2006

Planning Meeting for Conference on Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Threats and International Security Champions Meeting for the Secretary General’s Global Initiative on Biotechnology and Human Security Future Weapons of Mass Destruction

December 2, 2006

Keynote Address: Astrobiology, the Study of the Living Universe

November 29, 2006

Impact Deflection of Potentially Hazardous Asteroids Using Current Launch Vehicles

November 27, 2006

Panel on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

November 8-9, 2006

America and the Challenge of Major Powers Averting Doomsday

October 13, 2006

October 13, 2006 October 10, 2006

July 14, 2006

Panelist, Intelligence Challenges and North Korea Twentieth Annual Abrams Lecture: Bioterrorism, Biotechnology, and Biodefense Presenter, IPA-CIC Strategy Meeting on Misuse of Biotechnology: Possible Solutions, Their Strengths and Weaknesses, and Their Prospects

Center for American Progress, Washington, DC

Office of the Secretary General, United Nations, New York, NY The Stanley Foundation and the Potomac Institute, Arlington, VA Astrobiology Colloquium, Department of Astrophysics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Program on Science & Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Stanley Foundation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA Doomsday Reconsidered, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Keck Center, Washington, DC National Press Club, Washington, DC Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Boston, MA

Greentree Conference Center, Maryland

Harold Feiveson Date October 23, 2007 October 19, 2007

Title The Future of Nuclear Energy and the Plutonium Problem The Future of Nuclear Energy and the Plutonium Problem

October 10-13, 2007

Panel Participant

September 19-21, 2007

Panel Participant

July 30-31, 2007

Panel Participant

June 29, 2007

The Folly of Nuclear Weapons


C-2

Organization / Occasion Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Toward a Global Cleanout of Nuclear Weapon Materials, a Report from IPFM to the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security, U.N., New York, NY International Panel on Fissile Materials, London, U.K. Security Implications of Renewed Reliance on Nuclear Power, CISAC, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA Toward a Plan B for U.S. Nuclear HLW Disposal, George Mason University Stonebridge Assisted Living, Princeton, NJ

June 28, 2007 June 24, 2007 June 21, 2007

June 15, 2007 June 7, 2007 June 1, 2007

Energy, Climate Change, and Proliferation Transparency The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Iran, Nuclear Power, and Latent Proliferation Participant

March 11-12, 2007

The Place of the Athlete in the University (panelist) Comments on the Future of Nuclear Power through the Lens of GNEP Nuclear Power, Climate Change, and Proliferation Will Homer Have a Job? Nuclear Power’s Future in America Participant

January 23, 2007

Declarations and Transparency

December 3, 2006

North Korea, Iran, and Who’s Next?

November 30, 2006

Some Issues on the Future of Nuclear Power

September 11, 2006

Proliferation Implications of U.S. Policies with respect to Civilian Nuclear Power

April 19, 2007 April 16, 2007 April 11, 2007

MacArthur Foundation Meeting, June 27-29, 2007, Washington, DC IPFM Meeting, Washington, DC The Role of Nuclear Power, Summer Workshop, Washington and Lee University and Council on Foreign Relations, Lexington, VA Princeton Alumni Group, Calgary, Canada Quaker Energy Policy Roundtable, Friends Center, Philadelphia, PA Princeton Reunions Alumni Forum, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware Society of Woodrow Wilson Scholars, Princeton University, Princeton NJ Roosevelt Institution, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Forum on Iran, the West, and the Region, Liechtenstein Center, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Carnegie Endowment, Lunch Presentation on a Fissile Cutoff Treaty Princeton International Relations Group, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Los Alamos Workshop, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC Keystone Workshop, Washington, DC

Alexander Glaser Date November 16, 2007


September 25, 2007

Title Signatures of Plutonium and Uranium Compositions for Pre- and PostExplosion Nuclear Forensics Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Reductions Toward a Global Cleanout of Nuclear Weapon Materials: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Reductions, Performance Gain with Low-Enriched Fuel and Optimized Use of Neutrons

C-3

Organization / Occasion APS/AAAS Nuclear Forensics Study, Washington, DC Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ United Nations, New York, NY

29th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), September 23-27, 2007, Prague, Czech Republic


July 12, 2007

July 10, 2007

June 24, 2007 April 16, 2007

April 9, 2007

March 11, 2007

February 26, 2007

February 12, 2007

December 13, 2006

November 1-2, 2006

October 3-4, 2006

September 20, 2006

Weapon-Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Neutron-Use Optimization with Virtual Experiments to Facilitate Research Reactor Conversion to Low-Enriched Fuel FMCT Verification: Safeguarding Centrifuge Facilities Detection of Special Nuclear Materials, Lecture for Topics in International Relations: Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WWS-556d) Dynamics and Control of Infectious Diseases, Lecture for Topics in International Relations: Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WWS-556d) The Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear Proliferation, Presentation to the Workshop “Iran, the West, and the Region” Making Highly Enriched Uranium, Lecture for Topics in International Relations: Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WWS-556d) Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Lecture for Topics in International Relations: Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WWS-556d) Weapon-Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Brave New Nuclear World. The Expansion of Nuclear Power and its Relevance for the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Conference on the Future of Nuclear Energy The Role of Neutron Scattering Simulations in Identifying Optimum Strategies to Convert Research Reactors to Low-Enriched Fuel Highly Enriched Uranium, the Gas Centrifuge, and Nuclear Nonproliferation (with R. S. Kemp)


C-4

48th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), Tucson, AZ 48th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), Tucson, AZ Workshop of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, Washington, DC Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

The Liechtenstein Institute on SelfDetermination (LISD) at Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Princeton University, Princeton, NJ



The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the University of Chicago, Chicago, IL

International Workshop on Applications of Advanced Monte Carlo Simulations in Neutron Scattering, Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), Switzerland Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Laura Kahn Date November 7, 2007

Title One Medicine – A Brief Historical Overview

November 6, 2007

One Medicine

August 17, 2007

Confronting Zoonoses

June 24, 2007

Testimony for support of “One Health” Resolution How Codes of Conduct for Biological Scientists Could Be Operationalized

June 22, 2007

June 13, 2007

Summary of Panel Discussions

May 23, 2007

Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies and Thyroid Cancer Risk: What New Jersey Physicians Need to Know Workshop Participant

April 30-May 1, 2007 April 16, 2007 March 26, 2007

Communication During an Epidemic or Bioterrorist Attack Science, Technology and U.S. National Security: Engaging the Next Generation

March 12, 2007

Introduction to Biodefense and Security Issues

February 28, 2007

Preparing for Zoonotic Disease: An Assessment of Physician and Veterinarian Communication Microbe World

February 28, 2007

Organization / Occasion One Medicine Symposium at American Society for Tropical Medicine and Hygiene Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, PA University of Pennsylvania School of Veterinary Medicine, Philadelphia, PA Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Association Scientific Meeting, Hershey PA AMA House of Delegates, Chicago, I International workshop on Constructing Improved Global Biosecurity, sponsored by Partnership for Global Security at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC Leadership and Responsibility in Disaster Management: Lessons Learned from the U.S. and U.K., conference jointly sponsored by the New York Academy of Medicine and the Royal Academy of Medicine, New York, NY Medical Grand Rounds, Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, New Brunswick, NJ Emerging Infectious Diseases Case Study Workshop, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA Freshman Seminar 120, Guest Lecturer, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Women in International Security (WIIS), Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC Molecular Biology 561, Lewis Thomas Lab, Room 118, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 5th Annual American Society of Microbiology Biodefense and Emerging Diseases Conference, Washington, DC Radio interview at American Society of Microbiology Biodefense and Emerging Diseases Conference, Washington, DC One hour radio interview with WILL-AM 580 on Zoonotic Diseases, Urbana, IL

January 22, 2007

Veterinary College sees University Role in Public Health, “One Medicine”

January 9, 2007

Confronting Zoonoses

Keynote Speaker, “One Medicine” Colloquium, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL

November 20, 2006

Biodefense Research and Activities at Princeton University

7th NJ Universities Homeland Security Research Consortium Symposium, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ

C-5


September 22, 2006

How the Medical Community Can Improve Nuclear Security

September 20, 2006

Pandemic Influenza: An Overview

August 15, 2006

Human and Animal Public Health in Four U.S. States

Department of Community and Preventive Medicine, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York, NY Princeton Public Library, Princeton, NJ Swiss Tropical Institute, Basel, Switzerland

Tadahiro Katsuta Date July 16, 2007

Title Nuclear Proliferation and Japan's Separated Plutonium Policy

May 17, 2007

Japan's Separated Plutonium and International Concern Problems on Rokkasho Reprocessing and Nuclear Power in Japan

April 30, 2007

March 14, 2007

January 23, 2007 December 23, 2006

We Should Not Conceal the Potential of the Diversion of Nuclear Power to Military Uses DPRK Nuclear Test and Japanese Nuclear Policy Postpone The Full Operation of Rokkasho

Organization / Occasion Seminar Lecture at the Rikkyo Institute for Peace and Community Studies, Rikkyo University, Tokyo, Japan Lecture at the Workshop on Nuclear Disarmament, Tokyo, Japan Lecture at the Workshop "Environmental Impact by Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant," Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan Opinion to The Asahi Shimbun, Japan

Television Interview, Finland National Broadcasting (YLE) Opinion to The Japan Times

R. Scott Kemp Date September 5, 2007

Title Workshop on Verifying Iran’s Centrifuge Program

July 10, 2007

Performance Estimate for the Detection of Plutonium Separation by 85Kr Verifying a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, Lecture for Topics in International Relations: Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WWS-556d) IAEA Safeguards, Lecture for Topics in International Relations: Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WWS-556d) Great Debates in Deterrence, Lecture for Topics in International Relations: Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WWS-556d)

March 12, 2007

February 26, 2007

February 19, 2007


C-6

Organization / Occasion American Association for the Advancement of Science, the New America Foundation, and the Stanley Foundation, Washington, DC 48th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Tucson, AZ Princeton University, Princeton, NJ



February 12, 2007

November 5, 2006

Nuclear Weapons: Design and Function, Lecture for Topics in International Relations: Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WWS-556d) Space Weapons – A Threat?

September 13, 2006

How Centrifuges Change Our Understanding of Nuclear Proliferation

September 19, 2006

The Gas Centrifuge and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons


Coalition for Peace Action and the Global Cinema Café, Princeton, NJ Lunch Seminar Series, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ The Ninth International Workshop on Separation Phenomena in Liquids and Gasses, Beijing, China

Zia Mian Date November 28, 2007

Title A Global Cleanout of Nuclear Weapons Materials

November 11, 207

Progress Toward a Global Cleanout of Nuclear-weapon Materials

October 11, 2007

Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials: Stocks and Reductions,

August 25, 2007

Implications of the U.S.-India nuclear deal

June 20, 2007

The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Theirs and Ours The U.S.-India deal and the Nuclear Suppliers Group The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal and Its Implications for Nuclear Proliferation

May 5, 2007 May 4, 2007

May 3, 2007

Fissile Materials

May 2, 2007

Future Energy Supply: Nuclear Energy and Renewable Energy in the light of the NPT

April 11, 2007

A Verifiable Fissile Material Treaty as a Foundation for Nuclear Disarmament

February 2, 2007

India-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation

February 2, 2007

The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

February 1, 2007

Thinking about a Nuclear Armed Japan

C-7

Organization / Occasion Congressional Staff Briefing sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, DC Stopping Nuclear Terrorism & Proliferation, Coalition for Peace Action Annual Conference, Princeton, NJ Briefing to launch Global Fissile Material Report 2007 by International Panel on Fissile Materials, 4th Plenary Meeting, IISS, London Democracy on India, conference organized by Asha Parivar and Association for India's Development, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Coalition for Peace Action of Monroe Township, Monroe, NJ Abolition 2000 Annual General Meeting, Vienna, Austria NGO Briefing by IPFM, INESAP and Gensuikin, NPT Preparatory Committee, Vienna, Austria NGO Briefing by IPFM and iGSE, NPT Preparatory Committee, Vienna, Austria NGO Briefing by Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen (Peace Workshop), Mayors for Peace, INESAP and Eurosolar, NPT Preparatory Committee, Vienna, Austria NGO Committee on Disarmament , Peace and Security and UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY Citizens Nuclear Information Center, Tokyo, Japan Briefing of Social Democrat members of Parliament, the Diet, Tokyo, Japan Peace Boat, Tokyo, Japan


February 1, 2007


January 31, 2007


January 30, 2007 January 29, 2007 December 11, 2006

Nuclear Weapons and the World Nuclear Weapons and the World Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament

November 28, 2006

Nuclear Weapons and Ideas of Development and Progress

November 14, 2006

The Senate and the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal U.S.-India-Pakistan: Feeding The Nuclear Fire Global Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament

November 13, 2006 November 4, 2006

October 19, 2006


August 9, 2006

Challenges and Opportunities for Progress on Nuclear Disarmament and Related Issues Mahatma Gandhi and the Post-9/11 World U.S. Strategy: Feeding the Nuclear Fire in South Asia Dangers of Nuclear Terrorism

Briefing at Center for Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan Briefing for Nuclear Disarmament Caucus, Democratic Party of Japan, the Diet, Tokyo, Japan Public Lecture, Hiroshima, Japan Public Lecture, Nagasaki, Japan Keynote, 10th anniversary of Foreign Policy in Focus, Washington, DC Symposium on “Deconstructing Nuclear Weapons,” School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC Arms Control Association Briefing, Washington, DC Seminar, Dept. of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Think Outside the Bomb Conference, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Pace University, New York, NY Statement before the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, United Nations New York, NY Coalition for Peace Action, Hunterdon Chapter, Flemington, NJ International Workshop and Roundtable on Cooperative Stability in South Asia, Landau Network Centro Volta, Como, Italy Hiroshima-Nagasaki Commemoration, Coalition for Peace Action, Princeton, NJ

Ali Nouri Date October 19, 2007

Title Workshop Participant

June 22, 2007

Workshop Participant

March 12, 2007

Speaker: A UN Biosecurity Initiative

March 5, 2007

Speaker: Safeguarding Biotechnology

January 15, 2007

Speaker: UN Secretary-General’s Initiative on Biotechnology and Human Security


C-8

Organization / Occasion Conference on Transparency in Current and Emerging Approaches to Biosecurity, George Mason University, Arlington, VA International Workshop on Constructing Improved Global Biosecurity, Partnership for Global Security at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC Molecular Biology 561, Lewis Thomas Lab, Room 118, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Program on Science & Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ United Nations Policy Planning Unit; Executive Office of the Secretary General, United Nations, New York, NY

December 13, 2006

December 4, 2006

July 22-August 4, 2006

Organized Champions Meeting for the Secretary General’s Global Initiative on Biotechnology and Human Security Workshop Participant

Summer Course Participant

Office of the Secretary General, United Nations, New York, NY Synthetic Genomics: Risks and Benefits for Science and Society; MIT, CSIS, and the Venter Institute, Washington, DC University of San Diego Public Policy and Biological Threats, San Diego, CA

R. Rajaraman Date October 4, 2007 August 11, 2007 August 10, 2007

March 19-20, 2007

Title Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement –An Overview Indo-US Deal –A Primer Nuclear Reactors, Weapons and Their Fuel – A Pedagogical Introduction to Fissile Materials The Indo-U.S. nuclear Deal – The Perspective of a Non-Governmental Nuclear Scientist

March 16, 2007

Prospects of Steps Towards Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia

February 24, 2007

Reducing Nuclear Dangers in the Subcontinent

January 22, 2007

The Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement

December 11, 2006

Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia

November 30, 2006

Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia

November 10-15, 2006

Nuclear Arms Reduction must Go Hand in Hand with FMCT

October 13, 2006

The Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement and its Ramifications Uranium Enrichment and Centrifuges – an Introduction

October 12, 2006

C-9

Organization / Occasion British High Commission, New Delhi, India Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India Conference on “Nuclear Cooperation with India: Canadian and Global Implications,” Simons Centre for Disarmament and NonProliferation Research and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Canada Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA Seminar on “Defence, Security, Diplomacy: India’s National Interests,” Association of Indian Diplomats, New Delhi, India A.V. Lagu Memorial Endowed Lecture, Benaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India Symposium on “Stabilizing the India-Pakistan Peace Process,” Pakistan Studies Program, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India Public lecture for the Festschrift for Professors McKellar and Joshi, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia 56th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs on “A Region in Transition: Peace and Reform in the Middle East.” Cairo, Egypt Invited Colloquium, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India Seminar, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India


October 2-3, 2006

September 28-29, 2006 September 26, 2006

The Indo-U.S. Agreement and its Implications for India's Nuclear Capability Nuclear Arms Reduction Must Go Hand in Hand with FMCT The India-U.S. Nuclear Deal and its Implications for Indian Nuclear Capability

August 18-26, 2006

Implications of the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement

July 16-20, 2006

The 2005 India-U.S. Nuclear Agreement and its Implications for Indian Nuclear Capability

International Workshop and Round Table on “Cooperative Stability in South Asia,” Landau Network Centro Volta, at Como, Italy Presentation to the Middle Powers Initiative Article VI forum, Ottawa, Canada Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA Invited Lecture, 36th Session of the International Seminars on Planetary Emergencies organized by the Ettore Majorana Centre, Erice, Italy 47th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Nashville, TN

M.V. Ramana Date March 29, 2007

Title The U.S. India Nuclear Deal: Debates and Implications

April 19, 2007

Implications of the U.S. India Nuclear Deal

Organization / Occasion Presentation at the meeting on “Forging a New Consensus for the NPT,” Article VI Forum, Vienna International Center, Vienna, Austria Presentation to Citizens for Alternatives to Nuclear Energy, Bangalore, India

Frank von Hippel Date December 6, 2007

December 6, 2007

Title As a First Step Toward Nuclear Disarmament and To Reduce the Danger of Nuclear Terrorism, the World could Reduce Global Inventories of NuclearWeapon-Usable Materials by 99% A Civil Nuclear Power Renaissance?

December 5, 2007

Bohr and Nuclear Weapons

November 28, 2007

Toward a Global Cleanout of NuclearWeapon Materials: Report from the International Panel on Fissile Materials


C-10

Organization / Occasion Symposium on Nuclear Futures: Realities and Choices, Royal Society, London, England

Symposium on Nuclear Futures: Realities and Choices, Royal Society, London, England Invited Commentary after Showing of the BBC film, Copenhagen, at the Royal Society, London, England Congressional Staff Briefing Sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington DC

November 28, 2007

Why Reprocess? The Once-Through Fuel Cycle is Low Cost and Proliferation Resistant

November 20, 2007

Managing Nuclear Waste: The Illogic of Reprocessing Spent Fuel

November 18, 2007

Insiders vs. Outsiders- Activists and Analysts: An Inquiry into the Determinants of Effectiveness in Advising the Government and the Public Toward a Global Cleanout of NuclearWeapon Materials (Highly-Enriched Uranium and Plutonium): A Progress Report Two Plutonium Problems: Weapon and Civilian Toward a Global Cleanout of NuclearWeapon Materials: Report from the International Panel on Fissile Materials The International Panel of Fissile Materials A Global Cleanout of Nuclear-Weapon Materials A Multinational Enrichment Plant in Iran? Some Questions and Considerations

November 11, 2007

November 1, 2007 October 19, 2007

October 11, 2007 September 11, 2007 September 5, 2007

July 30, 2007

Managing Spent Fuel in the United States: The Illogic of Reprocessing

June 27, 2007

Two Policy Issues: 1) Safety of RTG Earth Flybys; 2) HEU vs. LEU spacereactor fuel Managing Spent Fuel in the United States: The Illogic of Reprocessing

June 26, 2007

June 12, 2007


June 1, 2007

When Nuclear Fears Come Into Conflict: Fears of Radioactive Waste vs. the Fear of Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation

May 25, 2007

A Global Cleanout of Nuclear-Weapon Materials

May 17, 2007

What Can Be Learned from the DOE Report: Highly Enriched Uranium, Striking a Balance: A Historical Report?

C-11

Workshop on Nuclear Power Growth: Advanced Technologies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas, Inaugural Lecture, Austin, TX Freshman Seminar, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

Coalition for Peace Action Conference on Stopping Nuclear Terrorism & Proliferation, Princeton, NJ Japanese Diet Member Upper House Seminar United Nations, Presentation for Members of the First Committee, New York, NY International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, England BA Festival of Science, University of York, England Workshop on Iran: Fuel Cycles, Verification and Multinational Fuel Assurances, Stimson Center, Washington, DC Workshop: “Toward a Plan B for High-Level Wastes,” George Mason University, Arlington, VA American Nuclear Society: Space Nuclear Conference 2007, Boston Marriot Copley Place, Boston, MA Panel, 2007 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference Ronald Reagan International Trade Center, Washington, DC Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fuel Cycle Information Exchange Conference, Universities at Shady Grove, Rockville, MD 2007 International Symposium on Technology and Society: “ Risk, Vulnerability, Uncertainty, Technology and Society,” University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV AAAS Science and Security Seminar for Congressional Staff, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC Panel, Luncheon talk hosted by the Nonproliferation Review, Stimson Center, Washington, DC


May 9, 2007


April 19, 2007

Opportunities to Minimize Stocks of Nuclear-Explosive Materials

April 11, 2007

A Verifiable Fissile–Material Treaty as a Foundation for Nuclear Disarmament

March 27, 2007


March 19, 2007


March 19, 2007

Comments on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Proposed Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) Initiative The Physicists’ Efforts to Control Nuclear Weapons: A Walk through History and an Inquiry into the Determinants of Effectiveness The Physicists’ Efforts to Control Nuclear Weapons: A Walk through History and an Inquiry into the Determinants of Effectiveness Cost of Converting from HEU to LEU Targets for Medical Radioisotope Production

February 24, 2007

February 19, 2007

February 15, 2007

February 13, 2007

Iran’s Nuclear Program

January 23, 2007

A Verifiable Fissile-Material Treaty as a Foundation for Nuclear Disarmament Reprocessing as an Alternative to Interim Spent-Fuel Storage in the United States

December 6, 2006

November 30, 2006

November 29, 2006

The Physicists’ Efforts to Control Nuclear Weapons: A Walk through History and an Inquiry into the Determinants of Effectiveness The DPRK Nuclear Program

November 27, 2006

The DPRK’s Plutonium Program


C-12

Workshop on Nuclear Power Growth: International Cooperation, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC Green Cross/Rosatom “Nuclear National Dialogue on the Atom, Society, and Security,” President Hotel, Moscow, Russia Panel, Presentation to members of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament, United Nations, New York, NY American Chemical Society National Meeting, Hyatt Regency McCormack, Chicago, IL House of Representatives Appropriations Committee hosted briefing for Congressional Staffers, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC US Department of Energy Meeting, Hotel Washington, Washington, DC

Workshop on Science Advising and International Security, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY Science, Technology and Environmental Policy Cluster PhD Seminar, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Presentation to the National Academies’ Committee on Medical Isotope Production without Highly Enriched Uranium, National Academies Headquarters, Washington, DC Presentation to a Woodrow Wilson School Junior Policy Taskforce, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Panel, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC First Annual Global Nuclear Renaissance, sponsored by the Exchange Monitor Publications, Washington, DC Tenth Anniversary Celebration of FONAS, the Research Association on Science, Disarmament and International Security, Berlin, Germany Pugwash Workshop on Security, Disarmament and Arms Control after the North Korean Test, Berlin, Germany Panel discussion, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

November 11, 2006

25 Years of Bob Moore


Iran and the Nonproliferation Treaty GNEP and the U.S. Spent Fuel Problem

October 17, 2006

GNEP: Why the Focus on Early Reprocessing? The U.S. Spent Fuel Problem

October 13, 2006 October 4, 2006 September 28, 2006

The Importance of Getting Russia on Board in Eliminating Civilian HEU Use International Panel on Fissile Materials Fissile Material Cutoff Verification

September 27, 2006

International Panel on Fissile Materials

September 26, 2006

Steps to Strengthen Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

September 5, 2006

HEU in Critical Assemblies & Institute Laue/Langevin as a Model Research Reactor Center of Excellence Fissile Material Cutoff Verification

July 18, 2006 July 18, 2006

The International Panel On Fissile Materials

Coalition for Peace Action celebration, Princeton, NJ Panel: Princeton Club, New York City, NY East Asia Security Initiative, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China National Academy of Sciences-Russian Academy of Sciences Committee on Internationalization of the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Washington, DC World Security Institute, Washington, DC United Nations, New York, NY Middle Powers Initiative Article VI Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, Canada Press Conference, Ministry Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, Canada Testimony before the House Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Washington, DC Consultancy on Research Reactor Coalitions and Centers of Excellence, IAEA, Vienna, Austria Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Nashville, TN Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Nashville, TN

Houston Wood Date December 6, 2007 September 19-21, 2007

Title The Role of Gas Centrifuges in Nuclear Proliferation: Past, Present & Future Current and Future Uranium Enrichment Technologies

July 17, 2007

The PANCAKE Model for Gas Centrifuge Flows

July 10, 2007

Analysis of the Proposed Gas Centrifuge Plant at Natanz

C-13

Organization / Occasion Program on Science & Global Security, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Security Implications of Increased Global Reliance on Nuclear Power workshop, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA Program Review for the National Uranium Enrichment Modeling and Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 48th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Tucson, AZ


APPENDIX D. Program on Science and Global Security Weekly Seminars July 1, 2006—December 31, 2007 Date December 13, 2007 December 12, 2007 December 6, 2007

November 29, 2007


November 6, 2007 November 2, 2007 November 1, 2007 October 25, 2007

October 18, 2007

October 4, 2007 July 18, 2007

July 2, 2007

June 13, 2007

Speaker David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security, Washington, DC David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security, Washington, DC Houston Wood, University of Virginia and Visiting Research Scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University Ambassador Norman A. Wulf, Former President’s Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Washington, DC David Wright, Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Cambridge, MA Gregory Mello, Executive Director Los Alamos Study Group (LASG), Albuquerque, NM John T. Mihalczo, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN James Acton, Department of War Studies, King's College, London Trita Parsi, National Iranian American Council (NIAC), Washington, DC Frank von Hippel, Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University Michael Whitaker, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and DOE/NNSA, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, Oak Ridge, TN Gilbert Rozman, Sociology Department, Princeton University Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Department of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, NY Li Hua and Wu Jun, Institute for Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, Beijing, China Avner Cohen, Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD

D-1

Title Nuclear Proliferation Today and Tomorrow A Tour d'Horizon Preventing an Iranian Atomic Bomb: Sculpting Effective, Acceptable Strategies The Role of Gas Centrifuges in Nuclear Proliferation: Past, Present and Future

Nonproliferation at the State Department

Space Debris and Anti-Satellite Weapons Los Alamos in Crisis – The Decline and Fall of a Nuclear Weapons Laboratory Portable Neutron Imaging for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Curiosity Killed the Bomb: Re-Evaluating Iraq's Nuclear Program The U.S.-Israel-Iran Triangle: High Politics in a Nuclear Age Towards a Global Clean-Out of Nuclear Weapons Material New Safeguards Approaches for Centrifuge Facilities

The North-Korean Nuclear Crisis and the Inter-Korean Summit The U.N. Biosecurity Program

Nuclear Terrorism

Israel and Nuclear Transparency


June 6, 2007

May 16, 2007

May 10, 2007

May 9, 2007 May 2, 2007 April 25, 2007

April 18, 2007

Allison Macfarlane, Environment Science and Policy Program, George Mason University, Washington, DC Tom Bielefeld, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA Chaim Braun, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, Palo Alto, CA Ali Nouri, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University Gregoire Mallard, Sociology Department, Princeton University Kai Barth, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC Michael Gordin, History Department, Princeton University

April 4, 2007

Michael Wheeler, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC

March 23, 2007

Pavel Podvig, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA David Mosher, Senior Nuclear Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation, Washington, DC Randy Rydell, Office of the UnderSecretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York Kennette Benedict, Executive Director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago, IL Jonathan Medalia, U.S. Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC

March 14, 2007

February 28, 2007

February 22, 2007

February 14, 2007

January 31, 2007

December 6, 2006


Dean Wilkening, Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA Alexander Glaser, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University Christopher Chyba, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University Doug Mercado, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University


D-2

Geologic Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste Nuclear Attribution as a Security Policy Tool: Possibilities and Limitations

Nuclear Fuel Supply Assurance: Proposals and Prospects Safeguarding Bio-Technology European Nuclear Sovereignty and Its Discontents Scientists, Clerics, and Nuclear Decision Making in Iran

Nuclear Forensics: The American Reconstruction of the First Soviet Nuclear Explosion The Role of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in Counterproliferation, Counterterrorism, and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction US Plans for a "Prompt Global Strike" Capability with Conventionally-Armed Trident Missiles: A View from Russia Deterrence Challenges in a Proliferated World

Security through Disarmament: The Story of the WMD Commission It is 5 Minutes to Midnight

Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program Sverdlovsk Revisited: Understanding Human Inhalation Anthrax Weapon-Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Non-Nuclear Deflection of Earth-Crossing Asteroids Darfur: No Way Out?

October 25, 2006

October 18, 2006

October 11, 2006

September 13, 2006

September 12, 2006 September 5, 2006

Gregory Mello, Executive Director Los Alamos Study Group (LASG), Albuquerque, NM Alan Robock, Department of Environmental Sciences, and Center for Environmental Prediction, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ Steve Leeder, Professor of Public Health and Community Medicine at the University of Sydney, Director of the Australian Health Policy Institute, and Co-Director of the Menzies Centre for Health Policy, Sydney Benn Tannenbaum, Center for Science, Technology & Security Policy, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, DC Scott Kemp, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University Pavel Podvig, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA

D-3

The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex 2.0: From Plutonium Pit Production to the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Wars

Research and Development Priorities for Addressing the Global Health Crisis

Informing the U.S. National Security PolicyMaking Process: The Role of the AAAS Center for Science, Technology & Security Policy The Gas Centrifuge and Proliferation Did Star Wars Win the Cold War? New Evidence on Strategic Competition in the 1980s


APPENDIX E. Biosecurity, Biotechnology and Global Health Seminars July 1, 2006—December 31, 2007 Date December 18, 2007

Speaker David Franz, Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City, MO

December 11, 2007

Beth Scott, U.S Department of Commerce, Washington, DC Nina Fefferman, Center for Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science, Piscataway, NJ Kathleen Vogel, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

November 27, 2007

May 18, 2007

May 11, 2007 May 4, 2007 April 27, 2007 April 13, 2007

March 9, 2007 February 16, 2007 February 9, 2007

December 8, 2006 December 1, 2006 October 27, 2006

Leonard A. Cole, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ Arturo Casadevall, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, NY Ken Alibek, George Mason University, Arlington, VA James A. Roth, College of Veterinary Medicine, Iowa State University, Ames, IA Drew Endy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA Harvey Rubin, University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA Gerald L. Epstein, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC W. Ian Lipkin, Columbia University, New York, NY Dennis Kasper, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA Jens Kuhn, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA

October 20, 2006

Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC

October 13, 2006

Milton Leitenberg, University of Maryland, College Park, MD Stanley Lemon, University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, TX

October 6, 2006

E-1

Title Global Biosecurity: Challenges and Opportunities— Options for Reducing Natural and Intentional Biological Risks Biotechnology Nonproliferation: U.S. Export Regulations and International Collaboration Plague in a Virtual World: What Real World Biosecurity Can Learn from Warlock Night Elves Dual-Use Biotechnology Threats in a Post 9/11 World: Synthetic Genomics and Bioterrorism Terror Medicine The Weapon Potential of a Microbe and the Select Agents Act Defense Against Infectious Diseases and Biological Threats Emerging Exotic Diseases of Food Producing Animals: Global Implications Synthetic Biology and Biological Security The New Arms Race: Making the Case for an International Compact for Infectious Diseases Governance for Biological Threat Reduction: A Comprehensive Interdisciplinary, International Approach Pathogen Surveillance and Discovery The Dual-Use Research Issue Integration of Former Soviet Bioweapons Facilities into the International Research Community – Success or Failure? The Debate over the Role of the Biological Weapons Convention in Today’s Bio-Defense Equation Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat Biosecurity vs. Bioinsecurity: BSL4 Research in the 21st Century


APPENDIX F. Sources of Funding During 2006-2007, PS&GS research was funded by the Carnegie Corporation, Ford Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, New-Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. In previous years, we have also received support from the Garfield Foundation, John Harris IV, the JJJ Foundation, the Max and Anna Levinson Foundation, the Josiah Macy Foundation, the Ruth Mott Fund, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Rockefeller Family Fund, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the John Merck Fund, Margaret Spanel, and an anonymous Rockefeller. All teaching and other academic activities of the faculty and research staff of the Program on Science and Global Security are funded by Princeton University.

F-1


PROGRAM ON SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY

PROGRAM ON SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY

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