Public policy literature review - Bus Rapid Transit

Project Title: EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN

Review on policy-making and process PART I: Public policy literature review (WP1)

Due date of deliverable: July 2012 Actual Submission date: 21st July 2012 Leading Institution for this project:

Instituto Superior Técnico

ABOUT THE DOCUMENT The production of this document has been made possible through the financial contribution of Volvo Research and Education Foundations (VREF) via the Across Latitudes and Cultures - Bus Rapid Transit Center of Excellence in Chile (ALC-BRT CoE). The material presented in this document is part of the on-going doctoral of the PhD student Maria Spandou, under the supervision of Prof. Rosário Macário at Instituto Superior Técnico (IST). All rights reserved.

ABOUT ALC-BRT CoE Across Latitudes and Cultures - Bus Rapid Transit (ALC-BRT) is a Centre of Excellence for Bus Rapid Transit development implemented in Santiago, Chile, and financed by the Volvo Research and Educational Foundations (VREF). This CoE was established in May of 2010 and is working as a consortium of five institutions that include Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (PUC), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Technical University of Lisbon, The University of Sydney and EMBARQ The WRI Center for Sustainable Transport, including its network of centers of sustainable transport.

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process

Table of Contents 1. 2. 3.

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 4 Public goods vs Private Goods ....................................................................................... 4 Decision-making ........................................................................................................... 7 3.1. Decision Typologies ............................................................................................... 7 3.2. Overview of Relevant Theories............................................................................... 7 3.2.1. Decision-making theories............................................................................... 7 3.2.1.1. Pure and Bounded Rationality ........................................................................ 7 3.2.1.2. Incrementalism or Muddling through model .................................................. 8 3.2.1.3. Adaptive (or Mixed scanning or humble) decision making ............................. 9 3.2.1.4. Decision Making Determinants .................................................................... 10 3.2.1.4.1. Conflicts ...................................................................................................... 11 3.2.2. Causal theories............................................................................................. 12 4. Strategy ....................................................................................................................... 16 5. What is public policy? ................................................................................................. 18 6. Public policy types ...................................................................................................... 18 7. Why is there a need for public policy and government intervention?............................ 20 8. Actors in public policy................................................................................................. 21 9. Conflicts in policy making ........................................................................................... 27 10. Public Policy Analysis Models ................................................................................. 29 10.1. Stages or Policy Cycle model................................................................................ 29 10.2. Garbage can model of organizational choice ......................................................... 32 10.3. Multiple streams model ....................................................................................... 34 10.4. Advocacy Coalition Framework........................................................................... 36 10.5. Punctuated Equilibrium Framework.................................................................... 39 10.6. Institutional Rational Choice ............................................................................... 40 10.7. Policy Process Networks (PPN) framework......................................................... 40 11. Policy implementation................................................................................................. 41 12. Information and evidence as determinants of Public policy ...................................... 47 13. Institutions and public policy .................................................................................. 49 13.1. Some definitions .................................................................................................. 49 13.2. Institutional analysis frameworks ........................................................................ 53 13.2.1. Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework ........................... 54 13.2.2. Institutional decomposition and analysis (IDA) framework ......................... 57 13.2.3. Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA) ..................... 60 13.2.4. Social Fabric Matrix Approach..................................................................... 63 13.2.5. Institutional and organizational development process (IO/DP) .................... 70 14. Discussion and conclusions ..................................................................................... 71 15. References ............................................................................................................... 75


1. Introduction As stated by Parsons (1995), policy-making takes place in conditions of uncertainty, flux, unpredictability and variation, that is the analysis of policy design and implementation requires the understanding of a multi-agent complex system often with multi-levels of government. The policy-making approach and the underlying policy process are instrumental for the success of any efficient policy packaging. Besides, policy packaging often means “cherry picking” components governed by different public sector areas, calling for negotiation and concertation whenever hierarchies are absent. So, decision-making plays also a role in this problematic that cannot be ignored. Since its very beginning political science has been concerned with the relation between knowledge – policy making – power. Many authors have dedicated their research efforts to this triad and to have a deeper understanding on policy development we must undertake a complete review of literature that will enable us to better perceive the relation between policies and the instruments and institutions for its materialization. Despite the amount of knowledge in this domain, there is also strong evidence that, as Parsons (2002) observed policy-making in most parts has been more about “muddling through” rather than a process in which social or policy sciences have had an influential part to play. The aim of developing more effective and efficient policy packages has the implicit consequence of trying to enhance the techniques of developing, managing and controlling the policy-making process. The following paragraphs present an overview of the theories, frameworks and models that underlie the issues mentioned earlier concerting knowledge from various scientific fields and disciplines, so as to delineate the public policy-making and implementation topic in its entirety.

2. Public goods vs Private Goods In economics and policy analysis, the fundamental classification of goods lies between public and private goods, based primarily on their attributes of rivalry (or rival consumption) and excludability (or excludable ownership/use). In rough terms, private goods are rivalrous and excludable, while pure public goods are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. This classification depicts the two extreme positions of the spectrum, but as can be seen in Figue 1 there are other intermediate classes of goods. Except for these two parameters, Weimer and Vining (2011) introduced also the parameter of congestion, which differentiates internally each class.


A more parametric description is provided by Samuelson (1954) according to whom: •

ordinary private consumption goods (X1, …, Xn) can be parcelled out among different individuals (1, 2, …, i , … ,s) according to the relations X

•

∑X

public (collective) consumption goods (Xn+1, …, Xn+m) which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good, so that X

X

simultaneously for each and every i-th individual and each collective consumptive good. Another similar classification is introduced by Hayman (2008) on the basis of pure private or public goods, nonrivalry goods and congestible goods and is depicted diagrammatically in Figure 2. RIVALROUS

NONRIVALROUS NE1

NW1 Uncongested: Private Good

Uncongested: Toll Good

EXCLUDABLE

NE2

NW2

Efficient market supply

Congested: Private Good with Consumption Externality Overconsumption because consumers respond to price rather than marginal social cost.

No private supply at efficient price of zero; underconsumption at any positive price.

Congested: Toll Good with Crowding

Private supply can be efficient if price at marginal social cost; peak-load pricing required if congestion variable.

SW1

NONEXCLUDABLE

Uncongested: “Free Good”

SW2

Supply exceeds demand at zero price; no inefficiency until demand grows to Congested: exceed supply at zero price. Private Good with Consumption Externality

SE1 Uncongested: Pure Public Good

SE2

private supply unlikely because exclusion not possible; some private supply in Congested: privileged and intermediate Ambient Public Good groups. with Consumption Externality

Overconsumption because consumers respond to price rather than marginal social cost.

Overconsumption because consumers ignore external cost.

Figure 1: A Classification of Goods: Private and Public1 ,2 (adapted from Weimer and Vining (2011))

1

Notations NW, NE, SW, SE refer to the localization of the quarters in the classification framework of Weimer and Vining (2011) and numbers 1 and 2 denote the different sub-regions that each quarter is divided into based on the existence of congestion or not, e.g. NW2 is the second sub-region of the quarter located in the northwest part of the classification square.

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process 1

A

Excludability

C

H A: Pure private good B: Pure public good C: Nonrival good (e.g. TV transmission) H: Congestible pubic good (e.g. limited access highway)

B 0

Rivalry

1

Figure 2: Classification of Goods according to the degree of rivalry and excludability of benefits from their use (adapted from Hayman (2008))

Similarly, Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) presented a typology, based on the level of excludability of potential beneficiaries and subtractability of use (Table 1), identifying the following categories: •

toll or club goods,

•

private goods,

•

public goods, and

•

common-pool resources

Table 1: Ostrom and Ostrom´s (1977) four basic types of goods (adapted from Ostrom, 2005).

There are many instances, when the economic nature of the good is not clear cut, leading to different approaches towards the policy issues that characterize the social consumption and production of this good (or service). Furthermore, except for the economic nature of the

2

“An externality is any valued impact (positive or negative) resulting from any action (whether related to production or consumption) that affects someone who did not fully consent to it through participation in voluntary exchange. (…) Production externalities affect either firms (producer-toproducer externalities) or consumers (producer-to-consumer externalities); consumption externalities may also affect the activities of firms (consumer-to-producer externalities) or those of other consumers (consumer-to-consumer externalities).” (Weimer and Vining, 2011)


good, another dimension that influences the role of public policy is the right-based aspects of the good (Simon, 2007).

3. Decision-making Since public policy making is primarily based on decisions taken by responsible parties, a very brief overview of the decision-related concepts and theories is presented in the following paragraphs, so as to complement conceptually the part of the literature review related to public policy making and implementation.

3.1.

Decision Typologies

Griffin and Moorhead (2010) distinguish between programmed and non-programmed decisions. More precisely, they define as programmed a decision that recurs often enough for a decision rule to be developed, where a decision rule is defined as a statement that tells a decision maker which alternative to choose based on the characteristics of the decision situation. On the other side, they define as nonprogrammed a decision that recurs infrequently and for which there is no previously established decision rule; the form of decision making in this situation is a problem solving approach, in which the issue is unique and alternatives must be developed and evaluated without the aid of a programmed decision rule. In the same spirit, Mintzberg et al. (1976) characterize unstructured the decision processes that have not been encountered in quite the same form and for which no predetermined and explicit set of ordered responses exists in the organization. In the outset we have to distinguish two theoretical perspectives of decision making: the micro-perspective, i.e. the decisions of one individual and the macro-perspective, i.e. the decisions made in an organizational context, involving more than one individual. Of course, there is a two-way interaction between these approaches in the sense that an organizational (macro) decision, as e.g. investment in certain infrastructure, is heavily dependent on the individual (micro) decisions of each decision maker involved in the process, based on their cognitive, psychological, preferential and cultural characteristics.

3.2. 3.2.1.

Overview of Relevant Theories Decision-making theories 3.2.1.1. Pure and Bounded Rationality

Rationality is one of the most influential concepts in decision making theories, with literature contributions from many disciplines such as social sciences, economics, psychology


etc. Developing a theory that represents human behavior in the most realistic way has been a challenge for scholars for many years. Thus, departing from pure rationality, through bounded rationality and nowadays to behavioral economics, decision making theories are evolving so as to incorporate more sophisticated and complex aspects of individual and collective behavior. Bounded rationality has two main research streams, namely Simon and Lindblom’s perspectives, which focus on how adaptive we can be despite our cognitive constraints and Kahneman and Tversky’s approach, which emphasizes how easily we can err even when confronted by simple problem. The term of bounded rationality is coined by Herbert Alexander Simon, who postulates that “with the discovery of voluminous discordant empirical evidence 3 , maximizing expected utility is rapidly disappearing as the core of the theory of human rationality, and a theory of bounded rationality, embracing both the processes and products of choice, is replacing it”. A central element in Simon’s theory is the concept of satisficing, which assumes that a decision maker has an internal standard, an aspiration level, which partitions all current payoffs into satisfactory and unsatisfactory (Bendor, 2010). According to Simon (1997), theories of bounded rationality can be derived from Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theories by relaxing one or more of the (SEU) assumptions of fixed set of alternatives to choose from, known probability distributions of outcomes or maximization of a utility function and assume instead a process for generating alternatives, introduce estimating procedures or look for strategies for dealing with uncertainty that do not assume knowledge of probabilities and postulate a satisficing strategy, respectively (Simon, 1997). In other words, to satisfice is to pursue not the best option, but a good enough option, thus a satisficer often moves in the direction of maximization without ever having it as a deliberate goal (Schwartz et al, 2002). 3.2.1.2. Incrementalism or Muddling through model Incrementalism is a formal title for what is otherwise known as the science of muddling through, which advocates moving not so much toward a goal as away from trouble, trying this or that small maneuver without any grand plan or sense of ultimate purpose (Etzioni, 2001). The term muddling through was coined by

Lindblom (1959).Another issue

highlighted by Lindblom (1982) is that the concept of incrementalism is widely used in policy 3

For summaries of some empirical research on rationality and bounded rationality the reader is prompted to see Eisenhardt and Zbarack (1992).


analysis but when taken into closer consideration, he identified three meanings; simple incremental analysis, disjoint incrementalism and strategic analysis (see Table 2 for definitions). Table 2: Three meanings of incrementalism as policy analysis (based on Lindblom, 1982; tabulated by the author)

Incrementalism as…

Meaning

simple incremental

Analysis limited to consideration of alternative policies all of which are

analysis

only incrementally different from the status quo

disjoint

Analysis marked by a mutually supporting set of simplifying and focusing

incrementalism

stratagems of which simple incremental analysis is only one, the others being the following: •

Limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives,

•

An intertwining analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects of the problem,

•

A greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive goals to be sought,

•

A sequence of trials and errors and revised trials,

•

Analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible consequences of a considerate alternative

•

Fragmentation of analytical work to many (partisan) participants in policy making

strategic analysis

Analysis limited to any calculated or thoughtfully chosen set of strategems to simplify complex policy problems.

Extended from the decision-making realm to the public policy realm, incrementalism means that policy choice at a particular time is a marginal adjustment from a previous policy choice (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). 3.2.1.3. Adaptive (or Mixed scanning or humble) decision making According to Etzioni (2001) this model of decision making involves two sets of judgments: firstly, broad, fundamental choices about the organization’s basic policy and direction and secondly incremental decisions that prepare the way for new, basic judgments and that implement and particularize them once they have been made. Thus, mixed scanning is much less detailed and demanding than rationalistic decision making, but still broader and more


comprehensive than incrementalism (Etzioni, 2001). He also identifies some adaptive procedures in face of partial knowledge: •

Focused trial and error (knowing where to start the search for an effective intervention, and checking outcomes at intervals to adjust and modify the intervention).

•

Tentativeness (a commitment to revise one’s course as necessary).

•

Procrastination (delay permits the collection of fresh evidence, the processing of additional data, the presentation of new options) through decision staggering or fractionalizing.

•

Hedging bets or maintaining strategic reserves. 3.2.1.4. Decision Making Determinants

Risk and uncertainty are the most important parameters in decision making and they are highly related to the concepts of luck or asymmetry of information, the decision-makers rationality, as well as his/her preferences and expectations. Hammond et al (2001) argue that making wise trade-offs is one of the most important and difficult challenges in decision making, since the more alternatives you’re considering and the more objectives you’re pursuing, the more trade-offs you’ll need to make. Furthermore, they also claim that the consequences of the objectives should be identified and mapped in a consequence matrix. Decision-making is very heavily influenced by the psychology of the decision maker as well as a number of external factors. Payne et al (1988) examine the influence of effort and accuracy in the adaptive use of decision processes. They concluded that highly adaptive in responding to changes in the structure of the available alternatives and to the presence of time pressure. Furthermore, they postulate that the major classes of factors that influence the choice of strategy when it comes to a particular decision problem are the characteristics of the decision problem, of the person and of the social context (Figure 3). (Payne et al, 1993). Thus, the importance of the adaptability attribute is highly recognized not only in adaptable decision making, but also in adaptable public policy making, as well as adaptable governance.


Figure 3: Contingent strategy selection (adapted from Payne et al., 1993)

Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) investigated the heuristics of decision-making and they concluded that individuals and organizations often rely on simple heuristics in an adaptive way, and that ignoring part of the information can lead to more accurate judgments than weighting and adding all information. These interesting results point out the importance of information and the de facto use of heuristic decision making models. They also argue that by identifying common building blocks, from which the various heuristics are constructed, theory is developed on the basis of an organizing principle (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). In this context, they cite the three building blocks proposed by Gigerenzer et al (1999): 1.

Search rules specify in what direction the search extends in the search space.

2. Stopping rules specify when the search is stopped. 3. Decision rules specify how the final decision is reached. Anderson et al (2003) identified four adaptive decision- and problem-solving processes, the characteristics of which are presented in Table 4: 4. Static decision making 5. Passive adaptive management 6. Active (or experimental) adaptive management 7. “Evolutionary” problem solving 3.2.1.4.1. Conflicts Conflicts are also an important aspect of decision making, both in an individual and an organization level. Janis and Mann (1977) developed the “Conflict model of decision making” which identified common patterns of decision making behavior that include defensive avoidance (delaying decisions unduly), overreaction (making decisions impulsively in order to escape the anxious state), and hypervigilance (obsessively collecting more and more information instead of making a decision) (as cited by Etzioni, 2001). Their model is structured on information available and a sequence of logical questions regarding the


existence of serious risks in the case of no change, in the case of change, the existence of a realistic better solution and the existence of sufficient time. Furthermore, Galtung (1967) identified two fundamental types of conflict, namely structure and actor conflicts, which are based on vertical and horizontal interactions respectively. According to Giddens (1984) there is a difference between conflict and contradiction. According to his view, (structural) contradiction is defined as “disjunction of structural principles of system organization”, while conflict is the “struggle between actors or collectivities expressed as definite social practices”. Finally, there are many moments that conflicts can arise, mainly because of differences in preferences and interests, such as for example when one industry is preferred over another, leading to conflict over policy, or conflicts over property rights, or conflicts among consumers with different interests and ability as well as between consumers and producers (Schmidt, 2004). In an intra-organizational context, Rainey (2009) mentions that conflicts exist within a person, between people, and within and between groups and organizational departments or divisions, both in horizontal and vertical direction. 3.2.2.

Causal theories

Stone (2002) distinguishes two models of political society, namely the market model and the polis model.

In rough terms, the former is based on the individual, its self-interest

maximization and competition, while the latter is based on the community, the public interest, loyalty and completion along with cooperation among groups and organizations. She also argues that policy is the rational attempt to attain objectives, the primary of which are equity, efficiency, security, liberty and community, while there are tradeoffs involved among these goals. Problem identification can be approached either through symbols4 / words or numbers, while there are two primary frameworks for interpreting the world, namely, the natural and the social. She also argues that the distinctions between action and consequences and between purpose and lack of purpose can form the base of a framework for describing the types of causal theories into mechanical, accidental, intentional and inadvertent causes (Table 3). Many policy problems, though, require a more complex model of cause, such as for instance complex systems models, institutional models or historical models.

4

Four aspects of symbolic representation are especially important in the definition of policy problems, namely, narrative stories, synecdoches (figures of speech in which part is used to represent the whole, metaphors and ambiguity (Stone, 2002)

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Table 3: Types of causal theories with examples (Stone, 2002)

Consequences

Unguided

Intended

Unintended

MECHANICAL CAUSE

ACCIDENTAL CAUSE

intervening agent(s)

nature

brainwashed people

weather

machines that perform as

earthquakes

designed, but cause harm INTENTIONAL CAUSE oppression Purposeful

conspiracies that work programs that work as intended but cause harm

machines that run amok INADVERTENT CAUSE intervening conditions unforeseen side effects avoidable ignorance carelessness omission

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Table 4: Characteristics of four adaptive decision- and problem-solving processes (adapted from Anderson et al, 2003)

Static decision making

Passive adaptive management

Active (experimental) adaptive management

Evolutionary problem solving

Characteristics related to the nature of the ecological problem Units under consideration Ongoing monitoring

One experiment (usually involving several projects as

One project

One or more projects

Not required

Essential

Essential

Essential; coordinated among projects

Multiple

Multiple

Multiple

replicates)

Many small, independent prototypes

Single—assumptions about all Decision points

future conditions and actions are made at the time of analysis.

A range of management options is explored in early Choice at decision

Best apparent management

Best apparent management

decision points. Inferences are made and best apparent

points

option is chosen at start of

option is chosen at each

management option chosen and applied at later decision point.

Managers copy and adapt features of the most successful prototypes as they share experiences. Particularly promising cases are singled out for intensive study.

Characteristics related to the internal social context Moderate to high; reliability of Analytic

High, if all decision analysis

learning depends on quality of

requirements

steps are completed.

monitoring and time-series analysis.

Social organization required of the decision makers

Decision process is not dependent on social factors, but stakeholders should help develop the decision tree.

Continuity of oversight; timeframe may exceed manager’s professional “lifespan.”

High, including experimental design and statistical analysis at end of experiment when inferences are made

Low to moderate; progress in improving practice depends largely upon design of communication processes

Managers must become scientists, so social organization must nurture curiosity, credit, and checking.

Social organization must facilitate

Timeframe may exceed manager’s professional

innovation, diffusion, and adaptation.

“lifespan”.

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Characteristics related to the external social context Goals must be clearly defined at Goals and objectives

the outset, with quantifi able

Goals and objectives should be

objectives. Outcomes are

clearly defined.

evaluated with a single metric. Uncertainty and learning

Uncertainty is explicitly included in initial choice, but will not be resolved.

Learning is a goal, but information at later decision points may be unreliable, owing to possible confounding factors.

Goals will include a balance between management goals and learning. Hypotheses to be tested must relate to those goals.

Multiple, incommensurable goals are the norm.

Learning is a goal, and a good experimental design

The chief benefit is improved practice

should produce reliable new information for later

over time, but learning about

decision points.

causation will usually occur as well.


4. Strategy In general policy formulation and implementation finally relate to the decisions that are taken and the choices that are made for the strategies that fit best the policy objectives defined beforehand. What is strategy and how it is developed has been extensively covered in the literature, with Mintzberg´s work dominating (deliberate and emerging strategy (Figure 4). A summary of the strategy typologies is presented in Table 5, so as to assist the public policy overview of this paper.

Figure 4: Types of strategies (adapted from Mintzberg and Waters (1985))

Table 5: Summary description of types of strategies (Columns 1&2 adapted from Mintzberg and Waters (1985), Column 3 added by the author, based on Mintzberg and Waters (1985))

Strategy Planned

Major features Strategies originate in formal plans: precise intentions exist, formulated and articulated by central leadership, backed up by formal controls to ensure surprisefree implementation in benign, controllable or predictable environment; strategies most deliberate

Entrepreneurial Strategies originate in central vision: intentions exist as personal, unarticulated vision of single leader, and so adaptable to new opportunities; organization under personal control of leader and located in protected niche in environment; strategies relatively deliberate but can emerge.

Graphical representation


Strategy Ideological

Major features Strategies originate in shared beliefs: intentions exist as collective vision of all actors, in inspirational form and relatively immutable, controlled normatively through indoctrination and/or socialization; organization often proactive vis-à-vis environment; strategies rather deliberate

Umbrella

Strategies originate in constraints: leadership, in partial control of organizational actions, defines strategic boundaries of targets within which other actors respond to own forces or to complex, perhaps also unpredictable environment; strategies partly deliberate, partly emergent and deliberately emergent

Process

Strategies originate in process: leadership controls process aspects of strategy (hiring, structure, etc.), leaving content aspects to other actors; strategies partly deliberate, partly emergent (and, again, deliberately emergent)

Unconnected

Strategies originate in enclaves: actor(s) loosely coupled to rest of organization produce(s) patterns in own actions in absence of, or in direct contradiction to, central or common intentions; strategies organizationally emergent whether or not deliberate for actor(s)

Consensus

Strategies originate in consensus: through mutual adjustment, actors converge on patterns that become pervasive in absence of central or common intentions; strategies rather emergent



Strategy Imposed

Major features


Strategies originate in environment: environment dictates patterns in actions either through direct imposition or through implicitly pre-empting or bounding organizational choice; strategies most emergent, although may be internalized by organization and made deliberate ??????

Legend: V=vision, I=ideology

5. What is public policy? Public policy in general terms is related to the public or government intervention in various aspects involving private, public, toll, common etc goods. Definitions in the literature span from general approaches, as for example Anderson’s (2006) (cited in Kraft and Furlong, 2007) definition of public policy as a “policy adopted by a public institution, typically to address a problem faced by society or by particular groups in society” to a more specific one such as Birkland’s (2005) perception of public policy as a “statement of government of what it intends to do or not to do, such as laws, regulation, ruling, decision or order or a combination of these”. He also argues that “the lack of such statements may also be an implicit statement of policy” (Birkland, 2005). Similarly, Stone (1997) defines policy as the rational attempt to attain objectives and public policy is about communities trying to achieve something as communities. The primary objectives, according to her view, are equity, efficiency, security, liberty and community, while there are tradeoffs involved among these goals.

6. Public policy types There is a great number of public policy typologies in the literature. The most simple classification, is according to the policy area or topic (e.g. transportation policy, land use policy, health policy etc), but as Birkland (2005) puts it, “it did not help us draw general conclusions about the politics that underlie these polices”. This gap was filled in by Lowi´s seminal work (1964), who categorized public policies, as (Parsons, 1995): •

Distributive (of new resources)


•

Redistributive (of existing resources)

•

Regulatory (regulation and control of activities)

•

Constituent (setting-up or reorganization of institutions)

Figure 5: Lowi´s Policy Typologies (adapted from Simon, 2007)

Lowi´s typology has been criticized on its simplicity and the difficulty to clearly separate the types, but proponents of the typology argue that the perception of the types as a continuum constitutes an arguments to the critics (Stewart et al, 2008). This typology was further enhanced by Ripley and Franklin (1982) (cited by Hill and Hupe, 2002) who further disaggregated the regulatory policy type into: •

Protective regulatory,

•

Competitive regulatory

Anderson (2005) proposed an addition to Lowi´s typology, that of suasion policies, which can be manipulative, persuasive or somewhere between, and contrasts to the coercive power of the previously mentioned typologies. He analyzed US Public health policy through the lenses of the suasion approach. Another relevant classification of politics in policymaking is provided by Wilson (1973, 1989) (cited by Mintrom, 2000), who categorized politics in terms of the perceived benefits and costs, namely the level of their concentration or dispersion (Table 6).

Table 6: Wilson´s Classification of the Politics of Policy Issues (adapted from Mintrom, 2000)


Perceived costs Perceived Benefits

Distributed

Concentrated

Distributed

Case 1

Case 2

Majoritarian politics

Entrepreneurial politics

Case 3

Case 4

Client politics

Interest group politics

Concentrated

7. Why is there a need for public policy and government intervention? After defining public, private goods and public policy, the question that emerges is relevant to the existence of a relationship among these concepts. In other words, what are the conditions and necessities that justify government intervention when it comes to the production or supply of goods? It has to be noted that private goods can be provided / consumed by both private and public actors, and correspondingly public goods can me provided / consumed by both private and public actors as well. Thus, the implications of this statement are that the state, while conceiving, formulating and implementing public policy, needs to take into account various actors, representing various interests and having different objectives. According to Weimer and Vining (2011), the presence of nonrivalry, nonexcludability or congestion arising from changes in levels of demand can lead to failure of markets to achieve Pareto efficiency, while the presence of either nonrivalry or nonexcludability is a necessary condition for the existence of public good market failure. Thus, market failure (1-4) and other competitive limitations (5-10) are substantial reasons for public policymaking (Weimer and Vining, 2011): 1.

Public Goods

2. Externalities 3. Natural monopolies 4. Information asymmetries 5. Thin markets (cartelization) 6. Preference problems 7. Uncertainty problems 8. Intertemporal problems


9. Adjustment costs 10. Macroeconomic Dynamics

8. Actors in public policy The actors (official or unofficial) that are involved in the public policy process are many and their roles and behaviors influence the quality, success or even existence of a certain policy. Actors, whether stakeholders or not, may give rise to conflicts or promote cooperation and convergence throughout the process, influencing this way the outcomes or the performance. A very illustrative representation of the above is provided by Considine (2005), though three public policy scenarios that investigate the role of various actors and their engagement in the public policy process, through stances of conflict and convergence. Of course, the categories of the actors involved depend on the specific socio-economic context and the political structure, but there are certain actor categories that are traditionally involved in all public policy processes. For the context of South Africa, Hendrickse (2006) identified the following actors in the public policy process: •

Legislators at national, provincial and local government level (by producing laws, ordinances, and by-laws respectively)

•

(elected) Political office bearers,

•

Public office bearers,

•

The public (individual citizens - through voting or petition drafting – or interest/pressure groups/associations – though public participation)

•

The media,

•

Opposition Political parties,

•

International institutions,

•

Other states and international influences

Hanekom (1987) (cited by Hendrickse, 2006) stresses out that public office bearers have various roles, such as: •

Policy innovators,

•

Policy advisers,

•

Policy formulators,


•

Policy implementers

•

Policy monitors

•

Policy analysts

•

Policy evaluators

Similarly Cahn (2013), distinguishes institutional (Congress, The President and the Executive Bureaucracy, The Courts) and non-institutional actors (public, media, Parties, Interest Groups, Political Consultants), the role of which, as well as the relationship between them, ultimately determine policy outcomes. Finally, Howlett (2011) considers four distinct “communities” of upper level policy advisors, based on whether they belong to the government or not and whether they are close to the decision –makers or not, namely core actors, public and private sector insiders and outsiders (Table 7). Furthermore, in his own words, “different sets of actors, with different sets of ideas are active at different levels of policy formulation and policy design”, as depicted in Table 8.

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Table 7: Howlett´s four communities of policy advisors (adapted from Howlett, 2011)

Proximate actors

Peripheral actors

Public/governmental sector

Core actors:

Public sector insiders:

Executive staff

Central agencies and task

Commission, committees

forces

Non-governmental sector

Professional governmental

Research councils/scientists

policy analysts

International organizations

Private sector insiders:

Outsiders:

Consultants

Public interest groups

Political party staff

Business associations

Pollsters

Trade unions

Donors

Academics Think tanks Media International nongovernmental organizations

Table 8: Howlett´s general model on ideas, actors and instruments (adapted from Howlett, 2011)

Policy level Policy goals Policy ideas

Governance mode

Policy regime

Programme level

High-level

Programme-level

Specific on-the-

abstraction

operationalization

ground measures

General abstract

Operationalizable

Specific policy

policy aims

policy objectives

targets

World views and

Policy paradigms

Causal stories

Public, outsiders

Public and private

Core actors

and insiders

sector

General policy

Operationalizable

Specific policy tool

implementation

policy tools

calibrations

ideologies Policy actors Policy means

preferences


The “Iron Triangle” or subgovernment model is one attempt to establish interrelationships, and it is defined as a triangle of mutually reinforcing relationships between three types of players: the representatives of the regulated or benefit interests, the legislators (the congressional committee or subcommittee in the US context) and the agency that is charged with the regulating responsibility (Birkland, 2005) (or alternatively administration or bureaucracy) (Figure 6).

Figure 6: The Iron Triangle (adapted from Schwartz, 2011)

The term of policy community was introduced to express a new approach to public policy making. Indeed, policy community is defined as “[t]he group of actors - such as interest groups, government agencies, the media and the elected officials – who are actively involved in policy making in a particular domain” (Birkland, 2005). In general terms, the issues that should be taken into account when analyzing a policy network are the following: •

Structure

•

Purpose or function

•

Leadership

Coleman and Skogstad (1990), identified five types of policy networks, namely pressure pluralist, clientele pluralist, corporatist, unisonal and state directed networks (Table 9), while Agranoff (2003; 2007) identified four types of networks, based on their purpose: •

informational networks,

•

developmental networks,

•

outreach networks, and

•

action networks


Furthermore, Rhodes (1997) provides a similar classification of policy networks (Table 10), while according to Marsh and Rhodes (1992), public communities and issue networks express the two extremes of the spectrum of policy networks, the differences of which are presented in the comparative Table 11. Leadership in networks is another issue of importance. Silvia and McGuire (2010) compared three types of leadership behavior (organization-, people-, and task-oriented) between network and hierarchical/single-agency structures. They concluded that “while the frequency of organization-oriented behaviors vary widely between the agency and network contexts, leaders in their networks focus more on people-oriented behaviors and less on task-oriented behaviors when compared to leading their agency”.

Table 9: Policy networks typology and characteristics (Coleman and Skogstad, 1990; adapted from Ranaei et al, 2010)

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Table 10: Rhodes policy networks typology (Rhodes, 1997; adapted from Löffler, 2009)

Type of network

Characteristics of network

Policy community/territorial community

Stability, highly restricted membership. Vertical interdependence, limited horizontal articulation

Professional network

Stability, highly restricted membership. Vertical interdependence, limited horizontal articulation, serves interest of profession

Intergovernmental network

Limited membership, limited vertical interdependence, extensive horizontal articulation

Producer network

Fluctuating membership, limited vertical interdependence, serves interest of producer

Issue network

Unstable, large number of members, limited vertical interdependence

Table 11: Types of policy networks compared (Marsh and Rhodes (1992), adapted from Vigar, 2002)

Dimension

Policy community

Issue network

Very limited, some groups

Large

Membership Number of participants

consciously excluded Type of interest

Economic and/or

Encompass range of affected

professional interest

interests

dominate Integration Frequency of interaction

Frequent, high-quality,

Contacts fluctuate in

interaction of all groups on

frequency and intensity


all matters related to policy issue Continuity

Membership, values, and

Access fluctuates

outcomes persistent over

significantly

time Consensus

All participants share basic

A measure of agreement

values and accept the

exists, but conflict is ever

legitimacy of the outcome

present

Distribution f resources

All participants have

Some participants may have

(within network)

resources; basic relationship

resources, but they are

is an exchange relationship

limited, and basic

Resources

relationship is consultative Distribution f resources

Hierarchical; leaders can

Varied and variable

(within participating

deliver members

distribution and capacity to

organizations) Power

regulate members There is a balance of power

Unequal powers reflecting

among members. Although

unequal resources and

one group may dominate, it

unequal access. It is a zero-

must be a positive-sum game

sum game

if community is to persist

9. Conflicts in policy making Policy making is a very diverse and complex process thus it is evident that the existence of various types of conflicts is more than anticipated. Many factors can contribute to this situation, as for example different types of overlaps that create conflicting interests, power conflicts, or even value conflicts. As Gigerenzer (2001) puts it, optimization of goals and aspirations is a difficult and often impossible task, due to a number of reasons, including: •

If multiple competing goals, optimization can become a heavy and unbearable computational burden,

•

If incommensurable reasons (or cues) exist, optimization can be impossible,


•

If the alternatives are unknown and need to be generated in a lengthy process of search, optimization models assuming a finite, known choice set do not apply.

•

If the cues or reasons are unknown and need to be generated in a lengthy process of search, optimization models assuming a finite, known set of predictors do not apply.

•

If future consequences of actions and events are unknown and need to be generated in a lengthy process of search, optimization models assuming a finite, known set of consequences do not apply.

•

If optimization is attempted for the multitude of decisions an organism faces in real time, this can lead to paralysis by computational explosion.

As mentioned before, the existence of overlaps in the institutional and organizational structure of the policymaking system is usually a probable source of conflicts. McConnel (2010) identified the following types of overlaps in the policymaking context: •

Overlap between policy sectors (e.g. industry, environment, transport, commerce, trade)

•

Overlap between constitutional areas of responsibility (e.g. national, state/province, regional, local)

•

Overlap between quasi-constitutional areas of government (e.g. quasi-autonomous non-governmental bodies, public private partnerships

•

Decision-making tradeoffs that need to be made (e.g. allocating resources to one policy area and not to another.

Furthermore, other important aspects of policy making are the ethical issues and the value conflicts that that rise during the process. In the case of the policy analyst whose functions are characterized by a principal-agent relationship, the challenge of value conflicts can be more evident. Indeed, Weimer and Vining (2011) identified two examples of value conflicts, i.e. the demand by the employer/client for cooked results and misrepresentation of results to other participants in the decision-making process. The question of how the agent can overcome this ethical conflict could be addressed by Weimer and Vining’s (2011) framework for alternative responses to Value Conflicts5 (Figure 7), where the analyst/agent chooses pure or mixed strategies from an action set of three major alternatives: protesting (voice), resigning (exit) or sabotaging (disloyalty to the client).

5

This framework draws heavily on Hirschman’s (1970) work (Weimer and Vining, 2011)


Figure 7: Alternative responses to Value Conflicts (adapted from Weimer and Vining (2011))

10. Public Policy Analysis Models Public Policy research demonstrates a collection of Public Policy Analysis models that have been developed in order to address its complexity and disaggregate the process and so as to identify causal relationships among its various components. Herewith we present a summary of the main theories, models and frameworks, that have been developed to address certain, and most often, different, parts (or stages) of the whole public policy process. Furthermore, a number of indicative examples, whenever available, are presented so as to show the implementation of the models in the various transportation policy aspects. However, it should be noted that although there is rich literature on the use of these models in various policy arenas, transportation, exhibits significant limitations in the body of this part of the literature. Hopefully, this gap in the literature will be gradually filled in, as scholars understand the importance of “good” public policy formulation and implementation in all areas, modes and levels transportation.

10.1.

Stages or Policy Cycle model

The Stages or Policy cycle model has been the most widely accepted model for the analysis of public policy. The fist decision-making models, such as Simon´s (1947) can be considered the far origin of this linear approach. Through time and evolution, Lasswell (1956) introduced it in the public policy realm, identifying seven stages; Intelligence, Promotion, prescription, Invocation, Application, Termination and appraisal. Since then a great number of variations was developed by various actors (e.g. Table 12), with a varying degree of differentiation from Lasswell´s model.

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Table 12: Evolution from Simon´s decision making model to the stages or policy cycle model (various sources) MODEL DESCRIPTION Intelligence

AUTHOR Simon (1947)

Design Choice Intelligence

Lasswell (1956)

Promotion Prescription Invocation Application Termination Appraisal Deciding to decide: problem recognition

Mack (1971)

Formulating alternatives and criteria Decision Proper Effectuation Correction and Supplementation Public recognition of a policy to exist

Rose (1973)

How issues are placed on the agenda of public controversy How demands are advanced The form of government involved in policy making Resources and constraints Policy decisions What determines governmental choice Choice in its context Implementation Outputs Policy Evaluation Feedback Initiation

Jenkins (1978)

Information Consideration Decision Implementation Evaluation Termination Deciding to decide (issue search or agenda setting)

Hogwood and Gunn

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process MODEL DESCRIPTION Deciding how to decide (issue filtration)

AUTHOR (1984)

Issue definition Forecasting Setting objectives and priorities Options analysis Policy implementation, monitoring and control Evaluation and review Policy maintenance, succession and termination Identify issues

Bridgman and Davis,

Policy analysis

1998; adapted from

Policy instruments

Nutley and Webb,

Consultation

2000)

Coordination Decision Implementation Evaluation Define the problem

Bardach (2005)

Assemble some evidence Construct the alternatives Select the criteria Project the outcomes Confront the trade-offs Decide! Tell your story Initiation

Fox et al (2006) –

Estimation

Table 13

Selection Implementation Evaluation Termination

Table 13: The six basic phases of public policy process, according to Fox et al. (2006)

Phase Characteristics Initiation Creative thinking about a problem Definition of objectives Option design Tentative and preliminary exploration of concepts, claims and possibilities


Estimation Investigation of concepts and claims Examination of impacts Normative examination of likely consequences Development of program outlines Establishment of expected performance criteria and indicators

Selection Debate of possible options Compromises, bargains and accommodations Reduction of uncertainty about options Integration of ideological and other non-rational elements of decision Decisions among options Assignment of executive responsibility

Implementation Development of rules, regulations and guidelines to carry out decision Modification of decision to reflect operational restraints Translation of decision into operational terms Setting up programme objectives and standards, including schedule of operations

Evaluation Comparison of expected and actual performance levels in terms of established criteria Assignment of responsibility of discovered discrepancies in performance

Termination Determination of costs, consequences and benefits for reductions or closures Editing as necessary and required Specification of new problems created during termination

For reasons of establishing a working hypothesis, we adopt the conventional way to describe the chronology of a policy process (Jann and Wegrich, 2007) •

agenda-setting,

•

policy formulation,

•

decision making,

•

implementation, and

•

evaluation (eventually leading to termination)

10.2.

Garbage can model of organizational choice

Cohen et al (1972) developed the “garbage can model” so as to analyze organizational choice, which later on was extended to other scientific areas such as institutional analysis (March


and Olsen, 1989), governance (Peters, 2002) and public policy (Kingdon, 1984). This model lies between the decision making and public policy analysis spectrum of models, and is directly related to the Multiple Streams model, that is reviewed in the following paragraph. The primary concept that dominates this model is the unstructured character of decisions. The generic model structure is based on four variables, namely; problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. Thus, a simple model, as presented in Cohen et al´s (1972) seminal paper, includes four streams, each one a function of time, and a set of three garbage processing assumptions: 1.

A stream of m (fixed) number choices, characterized by: •

an entry time (the calendar time at which that choice is activated for decision),

•

a decision structure, a list of participants eligible to participate in making that choice.

2. A stream of w problems, characterized by: •

an entry time (the calendar time at which the problem becomes visible),

•

an energy requirement (the energy required to resolve a choice to which the problem is attached and

•

an access structure (a list of choices to which the problem has access).

3. A rate of flow of solutions •

a solution coefficient, ranging between 0 and 1, which operates on the potential decision energies to determine the problem solving output (effective energy) actually realized during any given time period is specified.

4. A stream of energy from participants. •

there is some number, v, of participants and in each time period, each participant can provide some specified amount of potential energy to the organization

The three model assumptions are the following (Cohen et al, 1972): 1.

Energy additivity assumption (each choice requires as much effective energy as the sum of all requirements of the several problems attached to it)

2. Energy allocation assumption. (The energy of each participant is allocated to no more than one choice during each time period)


•

Problem allocation assumption. Each problem is attached to no more than one choice each time period)

10.3.

Multiple streams model

The multiple streams model of policy process was developed by Kingdon (1984) and it aims at explaining the agenda setting process in public policy making, adapting Cohen et al´s (1972) “garbage can model” of organizational choice (Mucciaroni, 1992). The framework is structured on five elements (Figure 8): •

Problem stream

•

Politics stream

•

Policy (Solution) Stream

•

Policy Window

•

Policy entrepreneurs

Figure 8: Kingdon´s Multiple Streams Model (in Zachariadis, 2003; adapted from Zachariadis, 2007)

In summary, if the three independent (see assumptions later on) streams of problems, politics and policies are (successfully or not) coupled by a policy entrepreneur (individual or


corporate actor) at a critical moment in time (policy window), then there is a high probability of the specific problem to enter the political agenda (Kingdon, 1995; Zachariadis, 2007). Elaborating more on the three stream and following Zachariadis (2007), it can be said that issues are identified (or not) as problems, through a series of indicators or through a “focusing event” or crisis (i.e. an incident that drew attention, e.g. an accident etc), or through feedback from other areas or policies (such as spillovers, successes or failures etc). The problem load, namely the “number of difficult problems” influences the level of attention given to an issue-problem by the policy maker(s) (Zachariadis, 2007). In a parallel stream, the national mood and the ideology of the parties create certain political culture conditions. Zachariadis (2007) specifies further the elements that comprise this stream into national mood, pressure group campaigns and administrative/legislative turnover, arguing that the combination of national mood and governmental turnover is the most influential in the agenda setting process. The third parallel stream of policies or solutions to the policy problems that succeeded in receiving attention, complements the streams environment. These solutions, which can vary in number and content, are evaluated against certain criteria, such as the proximity to the decision makers´ values or the technical feasibility of the proposed solution. Furthermore, Zachariadis (2007) points out, the role of the policy networks and the level of their integration, in terms of access, mode, size and capacity. Policy entrepreneurs are active both in the problem and the policy stream (Guldbrandsson and Fossum, 2009), and their success relies on their access to resources and people, as well as the specific strategies they use to achieve the promotion of the policy issues, always in relation to the policy window that opens when the conditions are favorable for the coupling of the streams. There are a number of assumptions that underlie the model, summarized by Zachariadis (2007) as: •

Individual attention or processing is serial, which means that an individual policymaker level, there is a limited capacity in issue consideration. Conversely, systemic attention or processing is parallel, meaning that in a system or organization level, the capacity to process issues is larger (up to a certain limit of course).

•

Policy makers operate under significant time constraints

•

The streams following through the system are independent


Kingdon´s model exhibits similarities to Simon´s bounder rationality approach (esp the satisficing strategy), in the sense that “the sequence in which solutions are considered strongly affects the decision outcome” (Zachariadis, 2007). However, as Zachariadis (2007) argues, the two frameworks differ in the theorizing direction (micro-to-macro in the case of bounded rationality, instead of macro-to-micro level in the case of the multiple streams model). Mucciaroni (1992) criticized Kingdon´s model as being indeterminate to provide fully satisfactory explanations about the attention that some issues receive in the political arena against others, using two case studies, namely tax reform and deregulation to support his arguments.

Similarly, Sabatier (1999) (in Zachariadis, 2007) argues that the Multiple

Streams framework underspecifies the causal processes driving choice, limiting them to attention, search and selection. As far as implementations of the framework in the transportation sector are concerned, some examples are presented herewith. Khayesi and Amekudzi (2011) studied the problem of automobile dependence in the city of Curitiba in Brazil, using the Multiple Streams Framework. They concluded that the political system in Curitiba was mostly responsible for the opening, closing and maximization of policy windows and they highlight the role of the city leaders who have strongly supported transport policy change. Chen (2011) used the Multiple Streams Model to study Policy Windows for High-Speed Rail (HSR) in the US. He states that although HSR has been a policy option for some time, economic recession as well as the transition of the federal government administration that finally opened the policy window. The fact that two perspectives are used to evaluate the HSR policy, namely, long-term (sustainable median distance travel service), and short-term (job creation and economy stimulation) will play a part in the utilization of the window or not and the final implementation of the policy or not.

10.4.

Advocacy Coalition Framework

The Advocacy6 Coalition Framework (ACF) was developed by Sabatier and Jenkins Smith (1988), aiming at explaining American Public Policy change that was dominated by coalitions and conflictual relationships. The ACF framework was enriched and modified throughout the years, based on empirical findings, reaching its most recent form that is presented in Figure 9 (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 6

Policy advocacy “involves research and arguments which are intended to influence the policy agenda inside and/or outside government” (Parsons, 1995)


In a nutshell, the unit of analysis is the policy subsystem and the three “foundation” stones of the framework are the following (Sabatier and Weible, 2007): 1.

A macro-level assumption that the broader socioeconomic and political factors affect the behavior of the policy making specialists within the policy subsystem.

2. A micro-level model a socio-psychological approach to individual behavior 3. A meso-level belief that “advocacy coalitions” are to solution to the successful integration of the multiple actors in the policy subsystem.

Figure 9: 2005 diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (adapted from Sabatier and Weible, 2007)

This multiplicity of actors can be described as a number of interest groups, which share common policy beliefs and values, and who support certain interests, which interests are served by a policy change or not. Thus, they form alliances and/or compete in the policy subsystem, utilizing the available resources. The role of the policy broker, who is a form of a mediator, is of particular importance, since (s)he is trying to achieve compromise, in light of the conflicting beliefs, interests and positions of the coalesced parties. As Birkland (2005) notes, “[p]olicy change is much less likely if polarization of advocacy coalitions is so great that there is no room in the periphery of the groups´ belief system in which compromise can be found”. The role of policy brokers is illustrated in Ingold and Varone´s (2012) study on Swiss Climate Policy, who tried to


complement the discussion on public brokers with empirical insights on who the policy brokers are and which institutional rules influence their activities. As mentioned before, the exogenous factors that influence the policy subsystem (macro-level assumptions) are also very important, and can be classified into two categories; the relative stable and the dynamic exogenous factors. Furthermore, these factors influence the policy subsystem through the opportunity structures, defined as “relatively enduing features of a polity that affect the resources and constraints of subsystem actors (Sabatier and Weible, 2007)”. This is the policy change path, namely the exogenous shock path that dominated the original version of the model. Two alternative paths to major policy change were also considered, leading to the modification of the ACF framework. These are the internal shocks path and the negotiated agreement path (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Finally policy-oriented learning is also an important element of the framework, in the sense of “relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavior intentions, which result from experience and which are concerned with the attainment or revision of the percepts of one´s beliefs system” (Sabatier, 1995). Sabatier and Weible (2007) summarize the basic criticisms of the ACF framework found in the literature, as: 1.

Obviousness

2. Constant revision and modification of the framework 3. Collective action problem is not addressed (Schlager, 1995) 4. Lack of conceptualized and operationalized institutional variables , compared to the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005) 5. Limitations in the explanatory power of the framework regarding the causal processes The main criticism of the original framework that it was created on the basis of the American public policy reality was addressed by the revision of the framework (see Sabatier, 1998). Although there is a great number of publications that use the AFC framework to analyze public policy change in various policy subsystems, there is limited bibliographic evidence on implementation in the transportation sector. Dudley and Richardson (1996) investigated British trunk road policy change during the years 1945-1995, under the adversarial effects of the road and environmental lobbies, concluding that although a coalition might hold an advantage during a certain period of time, the situation can change and that factors exogenous to policy communities are more probable to invoke radical changes.


Furthermore, Dudley (2003) analyzed the Oxford Transport Strategy (OTS), where the element of policy learning process was introduced through the policy broker role (or OTS troubleshooter, as the authors call him) whose responsibility was to reverse the adverse climate and alter the perceptions of the Strategy as “repressive “anti-car” regime”. Finally, Stich and Miller (2008) studied US freight transportation policy change towards intermodalism, through the lenses of the advocacy coalition framework and concluded that the formation of a new intermodal coalition would be beneficial to tackle the adversarial relationships between the road and rail coalitions.

10.5.

Punctuated Equilibrium Framework

The Punctuated Equilibrium Framework was developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and using evolutionary biology7 concepts, it aims at explaining public policy change as a combination of stasis and crisis (True at al, 2007). More precisely, the objective of this framework is to “capture this tendency of political systems to drift incrementally most of the time, only to be roused to major action when collective attention became galvanized around an issue” (Baumgartner et al, 2006). Furthermore, the role of institutions in this interchange of stability and crisis is pointed out by True at al, (2007), who note that the periods of instability and major policy change that perturb the long periods of incremental change (considered as stability periods), significantly affect the institutional arrangements, while the new institutions create the basis for a new period of stability. The main elements of the punctuated equilibrium framework are (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Birkland, 2005; True et al, 2007): •

Policy monopoly (policy subsystem, dominated by a single interest and definable institutional structure responsible for policymaking in an issue area)

•

Policy image (empirical information and emotive appeals; driver or change)

•

Institutional policy venues (drivers of change; differentiated according to the context)

Furthermore, Howlett (2009) identified two competing models of punctuated equilibrium policy dynamics, whose differences lie in the different assumptions about the nature, origins and effects of both policy punctuations and the stability of policy equilibria. • 7

Path Dependency

For a review of the conceptual differences between Punctuated Equilibrium in Biology and Public Policy, see Givel (2010)


Although the sequence of events is not a strictly necessary one, predictable from the conditions of the starting point according to general laws, there is nonetheless an explicable pattern which relates one point to another, especially in the later part of the sequence (Howlett, 2009). •

Process-Sequencing Describes a situation whereby normal policy-making involves fairly common, routine, non innovative changes at the margin of existing policies utilizing existing policy processes, institutions, and regimes (Howlett, 2009).

The role of path dependency in agenda-setting research is highlighted by Baumgartner et al (2006), who also claim that it should not be the only way to consider policy agendas, and they also support strongly the application of comparative public policy. An empirical example of the Punctuated Equilibrium Framework in the transport sector is Perl and Dunn´s (2007) study on the auto fuel efficiency policy in the USA and Canada. Regulation, taxation, market, voluntary agreements, incentives and negotiations are analyzed in the context of the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulatory standard for light-duty vehicles.

10.6.

Institutional Rational Choice

The model of institutional rational choice is commonly used in order to explain public policy processes and at the same time analyze the institutions that underlie these processes. Thus, since I consider than conceptually it belongs to the institutional models that are presented in the following paragraphs, the reader is prompted to paragraph 13.2.1, for a more detailed analysis of the institutional rational choice framework of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom´s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework.

10.7.

Policy Process Networks (PPN) framework

Parag (2006) proposed the Policy Process Networks (PPN) framework that is based on the combination of systems thinking (especially the concepts of dynamic process and interdependencies), Policy Cycle and Policy Networks perspectives. The benefits of this combination lie on the combined neutralization of the individual drawbacks of each perspective. More precisely, she argues that the policy process involves several different networks - the Policy Process Networks (PPN), and that each stage of any policy process is governed by a specific network – the Stage Network. “This network structure and


characteristics are shaped by the institutions and the procedures that govern the stage and by the interactions between actors who have interest in the specific stage and who have access to relevant decision making for[a]” (Parag, 2006). The main steps of the framework are the following and it was implemented in the context of Air Emissions policy formation in Israel (Parag, 2006): 1.

policy process is disaggregated to its sequence stages

2. for each policy stage the following actions are taken: a. the essential resources are identified b. the set of outcomes is detected c. the network is identified and examined d. the outcomes are explained by the unique stage’s network characteristics, and e. the network characteristics are viewed and explained in the context of the other stages networks.

11. Policy implementation After the analysis of public policy making in the preceding paragraphs, the question that emerges is how to implement the decisions that have been made in the previous steps of the process, or alternatively, what is the relationship between policy formation and implementation? Indeed, many times, the success or not of a policy or a package of policies, although carefully selected, are finally judged by their efficient implementation. Bardach (2005) identified some of the possible adverse policy implementation outcomes, such as: •

Long delays.

•

Capture of program or policy benefits by a relatively underserving and unintended constituency.

•

Excessive budgetary or administrative costs

•

Scandal from fraud, waste and abuse that undermines political support and embarrasses supporters.

•

Administrative complexities that leave citizens (and program managers) uncertain as to what benefits are available or what regulations must be complied with.

From a theoretical point of view, Hill and Hupe (2009) point out that the debate regarding this relationship lies mainly between the top/down and bottom/up approaches (Table 14), while mixed approaches have also emerged.


Since the description of each of these models is out of the scope of this report, the reader is prompted to the original references, as well as Hill and Hupe (2009). For illustration purposes, in order to draw attention on the complexity of the policy implementation process, I shortly present an overview of Van Meter and Van Horn´s (1975) model, who building up on Pressman and Wildavsky´s work, proposed a top/down policy implementation model that is structured upon six (clusters of) variables, as can be seen in Figure 10 (Hill and Hupe, 2009;2009). This model doesn´t include feedback relationships, since according to the authors, in implementation studies “relationships identified at one point in time must not be extended causally to other time periods” (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; cited by Hill and Hupe, 2009). Thus, according to the model, the following variables should be taken into account when it comes to top/down policy implementation studies (Hill and Hupe, 2009): 1.

Policy standards (for performance assessment) and policy objectives

2. Available resources and incentives 3. Quality of inter-organizational relationships 4. (organizational and inter-organizational ) characteristics of the implementation agencies 5. Economic, social and political environment 6. Disposition or response of implementers, described by their cognition (comprehension, understanding), direction (acceptance, neutrality, rejection) and intensity

Table 14: Top/down and bottom/up approaches in public policy implementation (based on Hill and Hupe, 2009; tabulated by the author)

Key figures

Main points • Concept of “Implementation deficit”, based on the degree of cooperation

Top/down

Pressman and Wildavsky (1984)

• Mathematical representation of implementation (probability theory8) • “rational model” approach (original edition) • “learning, adaptation and exploration” approach (second edition)

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975)

8

among organizations that are interlinked in the process

• Amount of change required and level of consensus • Six clusters of variables (Figure X) are dynamically linked so as to produce an outcome (”performance”)

Bowen (1982) argues that the repeated character of interactions makes game theory a more suitable mathematical tool (Hill and Hupe, 2009)


Key figures

Main points • Significance of participation at a prior policy-formation stage • Implementation needs to be perceived as involving “games”, in a political

Bardach (1977, 1998)

process, where a full “follow-through” must be involved. • Attention should be given to the “scenario writing” process and the “fixing” of the game • Consistency among implementation actions and policy decision, impacts

Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979, 1980)

and objectives) • Principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts (“tractability of the problem”, “non-statutory variables” and “statutory structure implementation”) • Retrospective reformulation of policy based on experience

Hogwood and Gunn (1984)

• Unattainability of “perfect implementation” • Inherent limits to (top/down) control in complex systems • A normative analytical model against which to measure reality • Street-level bureaucracy (front-line staff in policy delivery agencies)

Lipsky (1971, 1980)

• Control from the top to combat alleged failures of street-level staff (accountability) involves intensification of the pressures upon them (aleniation, uncertainty, inadequate time etc) and increases their

Bottom/up

tendency to stereotype and disregard client needs • “Implementation structures” formed from “within pools of

Hjern (1982)

organizations” and “formed through consensual self-selection” (Hjern and Porter, 1981) • Network analysis approach • Challenge hierarchical perspectives

Barrett and Fudge (1981)

• “negotiated order” (Anselm Strauss) • Policy-action relationship • Difficulty to separate implementation from policy formation because of continuing political processes


Figure 10: Van Meter and Van Horn´s model of policy implementation process (adapted from Hill and Hupe, 2002)

Smith (1973) proposed a similar model for the context of the developing countries, arguing that policy implementation can be seen as a tension generated between and within the following components of the implementation process: idealized policy, implementing organization, target group, and environmental factors, and concluded that policy makers need to minimize disruptive tensions so as to ensure the success of the policy outcomes. Figure 11 presents a graphical representation of his model and what should also be highlighted, except for the relation between policy making and policy implementation, is the role that institutions and feedback play in this system.

Figure 11: Smith model of policy implementation (adapted from Smith, 1973)

Finally, Charles (2005), in his study on the implementation of Regional Transport Strategy, proposes a theoretical policy implementation framework, building up on the work of some


prominent scholars, representatives of the top-down approach. His framework is structured on nine elements: context, resourcing, theory, leadership, clarity, coordination, compliance, support and monitoring (Table 15). Through the implementation of this framework to the Brisbane regional traffic incident management program, the impact of the model´s elements as success factors was verified. Table 15: Theoretical Policy Implementation Framework (adapted from Charles, 2005; editing modified by the author)

Context: external

•

Circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling constraints (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984);

circumstances •

Relative priority of objectives not undermined over time (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979);

Resourcing: time,

•

Political stability (Ison and Rye, 2003)

•

Adequate time and sufficient resources are made available; & required combination of resources is actually available (Hogwood

skills, funds

and Gunn, 1984); •

Leaders of implementing agencies possess significant managerial and political skills (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979);

•

Rationalise financing and investment streams: allocate funding in a balanced way (ECMT, 2002);

Theory: cause and

•

Program timing (Ison and Rye, 2003)

•

Policy based upon a valid theory of cause and effect; & Relationship between cause and effect is direct (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984);

effect •

Program based on sound theory (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979)

Leadership:

•

Single implementing agency (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984);

governance,

•

Provide a supportive legal and regulatory framework: ensure the rules and regulations clearly specify roles (ECMT, 2002);

institutions •

Policy champion dedicated to the task of implementation (Ison and Rye, 2003)

Clarity: clear policy

•

Complete understanding of, and agreement upon, the objectives to be achieved, and that these conditions persist throughout the

and strategy

implementation process; & tasks are fully specified in correct sequence (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984); •

Policy contains unambiguous directives and structure the implementation process to maximize success (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979);

•

Establish a supporting policy framework (ECMT, 2002)


Coordination: good

•

elements or agencies involved (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984);

communication and coordination

Perfect communication and co-ordination, between the various

•

Improve institutional coordination and cooperation: with responsibilities commensurate with resources for implementation to occur (ECMT, 2002);

•

flexible and open attitude toward public reaction (Ison and Rye, 2003)

Compliance: require

•

Those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984)

and obtain compliance Support: stakeholder

•

Program is actively supported by constituency groups (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979);

support •

Encourage effective participation, partnerships and communication (ECMT, 2002);

Monitoring: data

•

Public trust and support (Ison and Rye, 2003)

•

Improve data collection, monitoring and research: carry out consistent monitoring (ECMT, 2002);

collection and monitoring

•

Monitoring outcomes (Ison and Rye, 2003)

A number of studies have tried to investigate the parameters that influence and finally lead to a successful policy implementation. There are two streams of literature in this topic, the one that focuses on the ex-ante improvement of public policy implementation and at the other extreme, the one that focuses on the ex-post evaluation and the feedback information that improves implementation in a future stage. An inventory of the empirical studies on public policy implementation is not possible, but the following paragraphs will provide the reader with some literature examples that represent these two streams of policy implementation literature. Mehrizi et al (2009), applied stakeholder mapping (SM), a form of stakeholder analysis, to the ex-ante evaluate of e-commerce policy in Iran. Their proposed framework is divided into six steps (determination of policy goals, identification and description of stakeholders, development of the Stakeholder–Goal matrix, vertical analysis, horizontal analysis, and holistic analysis). Evaluating the strengths (systemic, multi-level and scalable tool; integration of structural and behavioural approaches) and possible limitations (analytical tool, insufficient attention to inter-institutional dynamics, policy goals as inputs etc), the authors support the power of the framework towards consistency, completeness, fitness, redundancy and possible deficiencies in policy implementation.


The 5th Framework European Project under the title “Transport Institutions in the Policy Process” (TIPP) examined three groups of implementation issues (insufficient acceptability, inappropriate or non-optimal government structure, endemic industry characteristics) in the context of 20 European case studies or all modes (Niskanen, 2005). They provide an extensive number of conclusions and recommendations on the processes, structures, as well as other issues such as information, public participation, conflict and advocacies, highlighting the importance of these concepts in the effective implementation of the established policy goals, in an ex-ante, as well as ex-post perspective. Furthermore, a research study by Tuominen and Himanen (2007), regarding the interaction between transport policy targets and policy implementation, in the context of Finnish transport policy. Using target analysis methods and basing their analysis on the premises of bounded rationality, they argue that the solution towards bringing transport policy targets closer to policy implementation lies in the consideration of policy measures (in conjunction with their acceptance) that meet the targets.

12. Information and evidence as determinants of Public policy The role of information in public policy – and not exclusively – is stressed out by Hale (2011). In her own words, “[…] integration between the [information] network and public administrators extends deeply into the traditional understanding of the public policy process; it implicates the network in many stages of the public policy process, from problem definition to solution, through design, implementation, and evaluation”. Through her work on the relationship between a national, nonprofit, information network, policy implementation, and policy outcomes, she argues that the information brings a political dimension to all stages of the public policy process. Her view of the role that national nonprofits play is summarized in a typology that is based on the particular initiatives for policy change and distinguishes between champions, challengers, supporters, or bystanders (Figure

high preference

Low preference to

12). Supporters

Champions

Bystanders

Challengers

Low engagement to high engagement

Figure 12: The Information Position Typology (adapted from Hale, 2011)


Furthermore, as Nutley and Webb (2000) point out, “[t]he role of evaluation in the postdecision phase provides an important source of evidence for subsequent rounds of policy analysis”. Thus, information is not used as an input to the straightforward public policy process, but it functions also as an input to the feedback process that corrects the process regarding its path. The term evidence is used so as to highlight the elaborate character of the information, i.e. the fact that it constitutes output of an analysis process. Thus, evidencebased policy making goes most of the times hand in hand with research evidence. However, the fact that evidence might exist, does not mean that it is properly utilized. In Nutley and Webb´s (2000) words, “[a] problem arises when certain groups in society do not have access to research evidence and, even if they did, their ability to use this evidence is restricted due to their exclusion from the networks that shape policy decisions”. An overview of evidence-based policy making in the context of road transport policy in the UK is presented by Terry (2000) and the main points of his analysis are summarized in Table 16. Table 16: Evidence-based policy making in the context of road transport policy in the UK (excerpt from Terry (2000) Transport (focus on roads policy) Methodological

Multidisciplinary area. Policy related research is often rooted in

preferences and -

economic modeling and statistical forecasting methods. Tends to focus on technical and operational issues relating to the design

Nature of the evidence

of the transport infrastructure.

base

Up until the late 1990s, largely reliant on internal government sources only, chiefly the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL).

Dissemination strategies

Initially centrally driven via the Department of Transportation (DoT). Now more pluralist, for example,using professional networks. Research results on operational issues passed to highway planners and

Main initiatives for

engineers in the form of guidance notes.

ensuring that evidence impacts on practice

The implementation of research-based standards and codes of practice are monitored and controlled. Largely top-down diffusion of centrally determined practices.

Direction of diffusion of EBP

Some horizontal diffusion of local innovations (such as city pedestrianisation).

Role of central government

Very much hands-on and interventionist.


13. Institutions and public policy What is the influence of institutions on policymaking and vice versa? According to Weaver and Rockman (1993) institutions matter and policy outcomes are determined by the institutional constraints and decision-making attributes of political systems. Thus, the different types of institutions involved in the policymaking process (political, social, economic etc) and their interactions can be seen as the catalytic component for a successful public policy, in terms of social welfare objectives, citizens’ needs identification and implantation. Vigar (2002) provides a good overview of the relationship between institutions and public policy, from a social institutionalism approach 9 , while Healey (1997) distinguished two types of institutional infrastructure of policy making, i.e. hard and soft institutional infrastructure (Table 17).

Table 17: The institutional infrastructure of policy making (Healey (1997), adapted from Vigar (2002))

Hard Infrastructure

Formal organizational structures, departments, formal committees, laws, taxes and subsidies

Soft infrastructure

Social relations, informal networks, informal arenas, administrative routines, professional cultures, social worlds

13.1.

Some definitions

Institutions have been defined in various ways (Williamson, 2000) and an appropriate definition of institutions is far from a settled issue (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). Indeed, many scholars in the literature show different understanding of this concept, based primarily on their beliefs and background in reference with the economic theory schools that they follow. Aoki (2001) identified at least three different meanings that economists have attached to the word ‘‘institution’, which he interprets into three conceptualizations, from a gametheoretic point of view, i.e. analogizing economic process with a game. Thus, economists have regarded an institution as comparable to either player of a game, the rules of a game, or equilibrium strategies of the players in a game (Aoki, 2001). The most prevailing

9

Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three broad strands of new institutionalisms: historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism (from Vigar, 2002)


conceptualization is the second one, with Douglas North as the most prominent representative. North (1990) defined institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic”. He also argues that there is a distinction between institutions, identified as rules of the game, and their players. Furthermore, he defines these players as organizations, i.e. “groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives”. The fact that this approach has been adopted by a major part of the scholars might lie heavily on the fact that North´s perspective is considered to bridge old and new institutionalism, or, according to Mantzavinos (2006), the correspondent theory has greater empirical content. Nevertheless, North´s underlying rationale and methodology, as well as his commitment to the neoclassical theory have received some criticism (see Zouboulakis, 2004; Prasad and Tisdell, 2006). Hurwicz (1994) focuses more on the enforcement aspect, expressing the rules of the game as a triplet, which he calls ‘‘mechanism’’ or ‘‘game form”. Thus, specifications are required so as to who plays the game, what actions players can choose (choice set) and what physical outcome corresponds to each profile of the players’ choices (outcome function) (Aoki, 2001). As far as the game equilibrium of institutions is concerned, Aoki (2001) identified two streams of thought; one that lies on the development of the evolutionary and the repeated game approaches, and another that relies on sophisticated concepts of equilibrium, such as sub-game perfect equilibrium, in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. Aligning more with the game-theoretic perspective, along the economic, social, or political domains, he defines institutions as “self-sustaining, salient patterns of social interactions, as represented by meaningful rules that every agent knows and incorporated as agents’ shared beliefs about the ways how the game is to be played” (Aoki, 2001). In a similar context, Alexander (2007) defines institutional design as “the devising and realization of rules, procedures, and organizational structures that will enable and constrain behaviour and action so as to accord with held values, achieve desired objectives, accomplish set purposes or execute given tasks”. By this definition, institutional design is pervasive at all levels of social deliberation and action, including legislation, policymaking, planning and program design and implementation (Alexander, 2007). Many scholars provide classifications of the institutions based on various attributes, some examples of which we provide herewith. North (1990) distinguishes between formal


(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and informal (constitutions, laws, property rights) institutions and their enforcement aspect; Roland (2004) classifies institutions as slowly and continuously (“slow-moving” – technology and culture, including values, beliefs and social norms) or rapidly and irregularly (“fast-moving” – political institutions) changing; Ostrom et al (1994) characterize institutions based on the aim of the rules, classified as position, boundary, choice, aggregation, information, payoff and scope rules; Scott (2001) argues that regulative, normative and cultural/cognitive systems constitute vital ingredients of institutions, denoting them as pillars. Thus, in this regulative-normativecultural/cognitive context, institutions: (i) constrain and regularize behaviour (rule-setting, monitoring and sanctioning), (ii) develop normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life (values and norms), also imposing constraints on social behaviour and (iii) are primarily influenced by a socially mediate construction of a common frame of meaning (ibid), respectively. He also considers that the regulative and normative pillars can be mutually reinforcing (ibid). Williamson (2000) provides a comprehensive contextual framework of institutional analysis, presented in Figure 13. He also follows Douglas North and New Institutional Economics in distinguishing between institutional environment (political, social, and legal ground rules of the game and institutional arrangements (governance) (Williamson, 2000). Although he tackles the issue from a broader perspective than usual transport-related analyses, we consider it constitutes an appropriate approach as a starting point towards analyzing the institutional setting of urban public transport. Furthermore, the hierarchy and feedback elements of the system are also important since higher levels impose constrains on lower levels and lower levels ‘‘feedback’’ to higher levels to provide adaptation to (Stone, 2008). Under this approach, we position the elements of funding and financing primarily in the rules of the game, governance and resource allocation levels. In relation to transportation, a great part of transportation-related authors refer primarily to the formal actors that influence the “game” and corresponds to the governance level (L3) of Williams´ framework, while the formal rules of the game (L2) are usually referred to as legal and/or regulatory environment that complements the institutional arrangement it formulates and supports.


Figure 13: Economics of Institutions (based on Williamson, 1996)

Decision-making plays also a vital role in institutional arrangements, whilst the structure of the decision-making process (centralization, state intervention) is a strategic characteristic which can influence and, to a certain extent, impose the features of the decision making process (i.e., interest group influence, conflict resolution, knowledge and information availability etc) (Zografos et al, 2004). Aoki (2001) developed a comparative institutional analysis framework, arguing that the nature of institutional dependencies is captured in explicitly evolutionary game-theoretic ways, individual agents are not only constrained but also informed by institutions, and institutional evolution may be characterized by path-dependence and novelty, as well as by critical junctures and evolutionary selection (equilibrium). His analysis is based on a definition of institutions that was presented earlier in this paper, and which was developed along five building blocks: (i) endogenicity, (ii) information compression, (iii) robustness with respect to continual environmental change and minor deviance, (iv) universality of relevance and (v) multiplicity. From an organizational architecture perspective he identified three generic modes of information connectedness among task units in an organization, i.e. hierarchical decomposition, information assimilation and information encapsulation, on the basis of complimentary or competitive tasks, as well as systemic and idiosyncratic segments of the environment. Lane and Ersson (2000) also sustain a game theoretic approach, arguing that the distinction between institutions, on the one hand, and interests or preferences, on the other, are nested


within a basic principal-agent interaction, where political leaders act as agents of their principal, the population, with institutions regulating this interaction. Institutional stability is also an important parameter in the framework of institutional analysis. Furubotn and Richter (2000) state that an institutional equilibrium, if any, that would represent a complete institutional arrangement, would mean that an original set of formal rules remains in active use despite the fact that a supplementary set of informal rules and enforcement characteristics has emerged to complete the total structure. They also identify two states of institutional equilibrium; (i) when new informal rules evolve to reach a stable endpoint without destroying the original formal framework and (ii) after a disturbance of an initial institutional equilibrium a new equilibrium will be reached (ibid). Furubotn and Richter (2000) also argue that the general perception on institutional change is that it results from the institutional instability derived by bad institutional design, but in reality this instability might emerge as a consequence of economic growth/decline, or even technical, intellectual and cultural shifts (ibid). North (1993) identified five propositions on institutional change: •

The continuous interaction between institutions and organizations in the economic setting of scarcity, and hence competition, is the key to institutional change.

•

Competition forces organizations to continually invest in skills and knowledge to survive. The kinds of skills and knowledge individuals and their organizations acquire will shape evolving perceptions about opportunities and hence choices that will incrementally alter institutions.

•

The institutional framework provides the incentives that dictate the kinds of skills and knowledge perceived to have the maximum payoff.

•

Perceptions are derived from the mental constructs of the players.

•

The economies of scope, complementarities, and network externalities of an institutional matrix make institutional change overwhelmingly incremental and path dependent.

13.2.

Institutional analysis frameworks

This paragraph provides the reader with a brief overview of the institutional analysis frameworks that exist in the literature and are considered to be relevant to the topic under study and the research questions in particular. In the end of this paragraph a table can be


found that summarizes and attempts to compare the basic elements of each institutional framework. At this point it has to be noted that there is no complete match between the steps or stages, and these frameworks can function complementary one with the other in a sense that there are some conceptual and procedural overlaps, but there are also elements that each framework can contribute to the holistic perspective of this work. 13.2.1.

Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework

The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework was developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues in the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, in order to analyze common-pool resources and the known tragedy of the commons. Before describing the framework per se it is worth mentioning some important topics that delineate the way of thought and the underlying premises of the framework, derived from various sources of Ostrom´s work throughout the years. As Ostrom (2007) points out, there are certain challenges that the institutional analysis has to face, when dealing with institutions and they are summarized herewith: 1.

multiple definitions of the term of institutions in the literature,

2. invisibility of institutions, creating difficulties in their identification and measurement; differentiation between rules-in-use (informal) and rules-in-form (formal). 3. Multiple disciplines an multiple languages, 4. Multiple levels of analysis (diverse analytical levels, diverse geographic domains, nested structure of rules within rules, and constitutional, collective choice & operational decisions) 5. Configural relationships; unlike other disciplines, institutional analysis cannot be based just on the ceteris paribus principle, but a value of other variables is required, although the relationship among element is not additive. As mentioned before, there is a definitional ambiguity regarding the concept of institutions. The definition of institutions adopted in Ostrom´s work and consequently to the IAD framework that is described here, sees institutions as the “shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations, organized by rules, norms and strategies” (Crawford and Ostrom, 2005, cited by Ostrom, 2007). There is one more conceptual distinction that is presented in the outset by Ostrom (2007); that is the difference between frameworks, theories and models and pinpoints the pitfalls that can arise from the misuse of the terms. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is a multitier conceptual map (Ostrom, 2007) that aims at the identification of the structural variables of the institutional


arrangements (Figure 14). The description provided herewith lies heavily on the description provided in Ostrom et al (1994), Ostrom (2005) and Ostrom (2007). The analysis starts with the identification of a number of external variables, clustered into three categories: 1.

Physical/material or biophysical conditions

2. Attributes of the community or culture 3. Rules in use (or working rules that might be different from the rules-in-form)

Figure 14: Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (adapted from Ostrom, 2005)

These variables are directly related to a conceptual unit called action arena, which consists of the action situation and the actors in that situation (Figure 15). The action situation can be further disaggregated into seven cluster variables: 1.

Participants

2. Positions 3. Outcomes 4. Action-outcome linkages (or allowable actions) 5. Control the participants exercise 6. Information 7. Costs and benefits assigned to outcomes The concept of (individual or corporate) actor presupposes the following assumptions: 1.

The resources brought to an action situation by the actor

2. The valuation that actors assign to states of the world and to actions 3. The way actors acquire, process, retain and use knowledge contingencies and information 4. The process actors use for selection of particular courses.


Or in other words, preferences, perceptions, beliefs and decision rules of the actors, as explained in the individual choice theory under the premises of bounded rationality. The outcomes that are predicted within an action arena should be evaluated in light of a number of different alternative institutional arrangements, while these evaluative criteria should be applied to both the outcomes and the processes that lead to these outcomes. The IAD framework focuses on the following six evaluative criteria, without excluding the use of other relevant criteria: 1.

Economic efficiency

2. Equity through fiscal equivalence 3. Redistributional equity 4. Accountability 5. Conformance to general morality 6. Adaptability

Figure 15: The internal structure of an Action Situation (adapted from Ostrom, 2005)

Focusing now on the rules, two issues need to be identified; the configurations of the rules and the way these working rules affect the action situation variables. To answer the first issue, IAD identifies seven types of working rules and it argues that “the cumulative effect of these seven types of rules affects the seven elements of the action situation” (Ostrom, 2007): 1.

entry and exit rules

2. Position rules 3. Scope rules 4. Authority rules 5. Aggregation rules


6. Information rules 7. Payoff rules

13.2.2.

Institutional decomposition and analysis (IDA) framework

The Institutional decomposition and analysis (IDA) framework was developed by R. Maria Saleth and Ariel Dinar R. Maria Saleth to tackle the institutional economics of water management through the work performed in the World Bank. The framework aims at establishing the linkage between water institutions and performance. Saleth and Dinar´s (2004) work is based on Ostrom´s IAD framework and New Institutional Economics Theory. They adopt the common institutional perspective (Figure 16) and identify the following features of institutions: subjective construction, path dependency, stability & durability, hierarchic nature & nestedness, embeddedness and complementarity. Regarding the last issue, they argue that “‘Institutional thickening’ in terms of increasing interlinkages and complementarity among institutions determines their ultimate performance efficacy”.

Figure 16: Economics of institutions (adapted from Saleth and Dinar, 2004)

Furthermore, according to their view, the body of literature so far on institutional economics neglected some important issues, such as reckon of the role of perception, underestimation of the role of individuals, absence of an ex-ante approach, inadequate treatment of institutional


linkages, need for institutional decomposition, and ignored supply side of institutional change.

Figure 17: Subjective theory of institutional change (adapted from Saleth and Dinar, 2004)

Thus, using the decomposition approach,

the

analytical

decomposition

of

water

institution is performed at two levels; firstly, the water institution is decomposed in terms of its three broad institutional components (water law, water policy, and water administration or organization) and secondly, these institutional components is decomposed further to identify its constituent institutional aspects. Furthermore, Institutional Performance is also decomposed into a set of performance aspects that capture the overall effectiveness or performance not only of each of the three institutional components but also of the water institution taken as a whole:. They are: 1.

Overall effectiveness of water law

2. Overall effectiveness of water policy 3. Overall effectiveness of water administration 4. Overall effectiveness of the water institution, which are further decomposed to their physical, financial, economic, and equity dimensions.


Figure 18: Institutional linkages within a water institution (adapted from Saleth and Dinar, 2004)

In light of this framework, Saleth and Dinar (2004) developed a number of empirical models, derived from a cross-country analysis of a number of water institutional and gerenal environment variables. Because of the informative character of this document, the reader is promted to the Saleth and Dinar´s work for more information on the structure of the equations and the detailed description of the variables. In a nutshell, the variables used were clustered in the following categories: •

Water law (L variables),

•

Water policy (P variables),

•

Water administration (A variables)

•

Performance (W variables)

•

exogenous variables


13.2.3.

Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA)

The Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA) was developed in the framework of the EU SEAMLESS10 project, in the context of agri-environmental policies. It is a standardized procedure for ex-ante modelling institutional aspects for policy implementation, and as being an explorative tool, it enables policy-makers to identify, at an early stage, potential institutional incompatibilities (Theesfeld et al., 2010a). In a nutshell, the procedure provides indications on whether or not a new policy will be able to effectively change the existing institutional arrangements (or establish new ones) that guide actors’ behaviour in such a way that the policy objectives can be reached (ibid). Analyzing the approaches and tools for policy assessment, the gap of which PICA is trying to fulfill, Theesfeld et al. (2010a) identified three main approaches in the literature: 1.

approaches which do not explicitly consider institutional aspects at all, such as e.g. Cost of Policy Inaction (COPI) method, Cost–Benefit Analysis (CBA) and other supporting valuation methods for monetization of goods without market value.

2. approaches that consider institutional aspects, including multi-criteria analysis 3. experimental approaches, which are more comprehensive and much more flexible in their choice of variables, yet do not entail a systematic search process for discovering relevant institutional aspects. The cornerstone of PICA is the concept of institutional compatibility, thus in this context Theesfeld et al. (2010a) identified the following four broad categories of determinants for institutional policy options’ (in)compatibilities: 1.

Incentives, shaped by the formal and informal rules, can be affected by the existence of countervailing rules or policies (designed at other administrative levels) that provide incentives detrimental to the objectives of the newly introduced policy.

2. Suitable governance structures intended to monitor and coordinate the implementation of a new policy, may not have the necessary capacities or the appropriate design to reduce information asymmetries sufficiently, or may even be absent. 3. Institutional incompatibilities may occur if the design of the institutional arrangements implemented with the new policy does not correspond with actors’ characteristics. 10

SEAMLESS stands for “System for Environmental and Agricultural Modelling; Linking European Science and Society”, the project was funded by the EU Framework Programme 6 (Global Change and Ecosystems) and it ran from 2005 till March 2009 (www.seamless-ip.org).


4. The performance of institutional arrangements induced by the new policy is closely related with the characteristics of the transactions targeted by this policy, which in Williamson´s (1985) terms are characterized by asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency.

Figure 19: Scheme of the procedure for institutional compatibility assessment (adapted from Theesfeld et al., 2010a)

Figure 20: Three dimensions of a policy type (adapted from Theesfeld et al., 2010a;2010b)

PICA comprises of the following four steps (see Figure 19) (Theesfeld et al., 2010a; 2010b):

Step 1: Classification of policy options


The policy options are clustered to identify the generic structure of a policy option. They are classified according to the type and area of intervention, the possibly induced property rights changes and the attributes of the natural resource(s) addressed (Hagedorn et al. 2002; Theesfeld et al., 2010b). Then, this formalized structure is used in the next step so as to identify the relevant crucial institutional aspects (CIA). A policy type matrix is constructed, where the policy instruments under study are allocated in one of three categories of interventions (regulatory, economic and advisory/voluntary 11 ), and the three areas of intervention, or governance structures (hierarchy, market and hybrid/self-organized network12) a policy is supposed to have an impact on (see also Figure 13).

Step 2: Crucial institutional aspects (CIA) Each policy type is characterized by a specific set of crucial institutional aspects (CIA).There is an initial library of 42 CIA linked to respective policy types in agriculture, environment, and rural development. These indicators, as well as the assumed relationships are derived from a broad range of theoretical literature and empirical studies of institutional economics, social theories as well as (particularly ex-post) policy assessment literature and studies. Indicatively, two examples of crucial institutional aspects are the “Bargaining power of farmers’ associations” and the “Information asymmetry between state and firms”.

Step 3: Indicators Indicators help to evaluate the potential of respective CIA to constrain or foster the implementation of a policy option. Currently, there is a library of about 100 indicators, i.e. variables and proxies that are used as input to the institutional assessment within PICA. The linkages between a CIA and the respective suggested sets of indicators are derived again from the theoretical literature and empirical studies of institutional economics, social theories as well as (particularly ex-post) policy assessment literature and studies.

Step 4: Aggregating information on institutional compatibility The information provided by the indicators is used for a qualitative assessment of each identified CIA and is further aggregated. This leads further to qualitative statements about the probable effectiveness or not of a policy option and the institutional fit or lack thereof between policy options and institutional contexts. This step combines many methodologies, such as expert judgment, quantitative & qualitative analysis, benchmarking, focus groups and other participatory methods etc. More precisely, the PICA expert team, based on the 11

Taxonomy is based on Stone (2002) Taxonomy is based on Williamson (1995)

12


information acquired in the previous steps, assesses qualitatively the institutional compatibility between the policy option under scrutiny and the regional institutional context. This is achieved by compiling the various indicator values, for each CIA, and assessing them in relation to a reference value derived from comparing the indicator values between the region under scrutiny, higher geographical scales or other regions at the same geographical scale. Then, a qualitative statement on the extent of each CIA is derived by the assessment of all indicator values related to this particular CIA. After that, a number of thematic categories of institutional compatibility are defined by the PICA team members, resulting in the grouping of at least one CIA and the respective qualitative statements, while focus groups and/or scientific experts’ judgment may be used to assess the relative importance of CIAs and thematic categories. Since PICA was developed recently, there are some difficulties in the validation of the process, while there are also limited applications so far. According to Theesfeld et al. (2010a), another limitation is that the process doesn´t provide detailed insights into the concrete causalities that lead to the institutional incompatibilities pointed out. Examples of the implementation of PICA concern the assessment of trade liberalization of the agricultural market and implementation of the EU Nitrate Directive (Council Directive 91/676/EEC) in Auvergne, France (Amblarda and Mannb, 2011).

13.2.4.

Social Fabric Matrix Approach

The Social Fabric Matrix Approach (SFM-A) (or influence map or matrix (Hayden, 1982)) is a rigorous and comprehensive methodology for undertaking policy-relevant, research on complex real-world problems, developed by F.G. Hayden (2006) (Fullwiler et al., 2009). More precisely, the SFM is “an integrated process matrix, designed to express the attributes and relationships of the parts, as well as the integrated process of the whole, in order to define and appraise the real-world social, technological, and ecological system context that contains the problem of interest” (Hayden, 2006). According to Hayden (2006), “social beliefs are not vague abstractions, rather criteria embedded in rules, regulations and requirements as expressed and enforced in contractual obligations”. From an institutionalist perspective, this framework satisfies the following three sets of concerns (Hayden, 2006): 1.

the first set includes: a.

philosophical,


b. theoretical, c. statistical & mathematical techniques, as well as d. policy concerns; 2. the second set includes concerns about a. criteria, b. transactions and c. (evolutionary) transformations, expressed through social institutions; 3. the third set includes a. cultural values, b. social beliefs, c. personal attitudes, d. social institutions and e. the ecological system. The starting point for the development of the framework is Hayden´s (2006) argument that there is a problem with utility maximization model of analysis for a number of reasons, which he explains in his book. Among them, are the inexistence of utility in the real world, and the fact that it represents action and bargaining among atomistic individuals in the marketplace through fixed processes, while in policy analysis, interest should be shifted towards reaching a reasonable consensus among overlapping institutional organizations and changes in the procedures so as to reach the desirable outcomes. In his own words, “Ideas like utility maximization ignore culture, social beliefs, institutions, power relations, traditions, procedures, and so forth, and, therefore, are not useful with regard to real-world policy analysis and decision making”. In this framework, the process of policy analysis, as envisaged by Hayden is represented schematically in Figure 21. Furthermore, SFM-A considers all components of a socioeconomic system and their corresponding relationships, taking account the fact that all these components need to be integrated in order to understand a problem, in a particular context, and plan the policy that will solve this problem (Hayden, 2006). This is depicted in Figure 22, where the integrated perspective of the system is presented, along with the deliveries and flows among components. The most prominent elements are the three normative sets of criteria for the judgment of social institutions, that is social belief criteria (N B), technological criteria (N T), and ecological system criteria (NE), which are expressed through institutional structures and patterns, are necessary for a social system to establish efficiency and may exhibit conflicts among various criteria (Hayden, 2006).


Figure 21: Policy Analysis (adapted from Hayden, 2006)

Figure 22: Policy Analysis Paradigm with Primary Criteria (adapted from Hayden, 2006)


Figure 23: Integrated system (adapted from Hayden, 2006)

Figure 24: Six Integrated Social Policy Areas (adapted from Hayden, 2006)

Other important issues, pointed out by Hayden (2006) is that the policy criteria for evaluating one policy need to be consistent with the beliefs, policy criteria, and evaluation in all the other societal areas while problem solving usually requires changes in institutions, beliefs, and technology, aka in the context. To illustrate this, he provides a thorough description and explanation of the framework and its implementation in 6 Policy areas


(Figure 23), aiming at the design of policies and programs that more efficiently and effectively solve problems, in light of the conceptual triad of context, criteria, and consequences13. The basic premises of the framework are consistent with general systems analysis (GSA), and more precisely the following twelve principles: 1.

System definition (Objects, Attributes, relationships)

2. Openness (Non-equilibrium, State and environment) 3. Nonisomorphism 4. Equifinality 5. System Components (cultural values, social beliefs, personal attitudes, technology, social institutions, and the natural environment) 6. Control and Regulation (through relationship and requirement linkages or system control) 7. Hierarchy 8. Flows, Deliveries, and Sequences (or flows of sequenced deliveries) 9. Negative and Positive Feedback 10. Differentiation and Elaboration (evolution and higher complexity) 11. Real Time (timeliness and sequential events) 12. Evaluation As far as the SFM-A is concerned, Social Fabric Matrix comprises of the following six (6) components:

cultural values, societal beliefs, personal attitudes, social institutions,

technology, and the natural environment. These components are integrated through the flow levels and delivery among the component parts, creating an integrated process matrix, designed to express the attributes of the parts as well as the integrated process of the whole, as presented in Figure 18 (Hayden, 2006). Furthermore, after the identification of deliveries in the cells, the matrix can be used to define the system sequence through a Boolean digraph (closed or unidirectional) (Figure 25). Thus, generally speaking, SMF “provides a means to describe the general context, to define connections among components in the context and to convert cellular information to mathematical expression, where appropriate” (Hayden, 2006).

13

“The policy tool kit must be able to (1) define the context that is producing the problem and the context that will exist after policies and programs are implemented to solve the problem, (2) apply criteria in order to judge which programs will achieve the desired ends, and (3) judge program efficiency by the consequences resulting from the policy actions” (Hayden, 2006).


NOTE: rows identified by i represent the components which are delivering, and the columns identified by represent the components which are receiving. Figure 25: Noncommon-Denominator Process Matrix (adapted from Hayden, 2006)

NOTE: Each node in the digraph represents a row and column entry in the matrix and each edge represents a cell delivery. Figure 26: Simple Social Fabric Matrix Digraph (Hayden, 2006)

A summary of SFM´s characteristics are presented herewith (Hayden, 2006): 1.

The matrix is based on the concept of delivery and process

2. The components listed on the left are delivering to those listed across the top. 3. It is a noncommon-denominator matrix without common flow properties and all the information in the rows and columns are not summative 4. The empirical observations contained in the cells of the matrix are the flows of the system (direct deliveries)


5. The number and kinds of component entries in the rows and columns of the matrix will depend on the problem being studied and the policy analysts' interests. 6. The SFM approach defines the system as it exists 7. The matrix allows for model building and data collection consistent with theory Herewith I present a number of applications of the SFM-A in various contexts, but the sample is indicative and non-exhaustive. Hayden (2006) in his book provides four examples of studies, using SFM. The first study is related to the contracts and costs in a corporate/government system network (waste disposal system) (Hayden and Bolduc, 2000). Through the analysis of the contracts per se, the construction of SFMs and the application of a system dynamics tool, they concluded that under the current contractual arrangement, there are excessive cost overruns, due to costplus contract adders, which in turn indicates that for the 30-year analysis undertaken, the policy alternative of building a new waste facility under these terms, is not viable. The second study aims at the analysis of the daily Federal Fund´s Market, a crucial element for the Federal Reserve Policy by using the SFM-A in a macroeconomic setting (Fullwiler, 2001; Hayden, 2006). Utilizing system dynamics and developing an extensive SFM and model, he reached certain conclusions regarding the reserve balances. The third study concerns a Socioeconomic Analysis of Rural Poverty and Livelihood Strategies in the Indian Village of Theethandapattu, aiming at the identification and understanding of the causal relationships among economic, social, cultural, and ecological factors that cause and intensify poverty. Many insightful conclusions were drawn about agriculture policy in rural India and the reader is prompted to the detailed study for more information. The fourth study relates to the assessment of Institutional Performance for Surface Water Management of the Platte River in Nebraska and aims at showing how changes in rules and regulations affect the extensive and complex policy network in water allocation systems (Yang, 1996; Hayden, 2006). Briefly, this study investigates the structure, function and performance of the surface water systems, from the instrumental efficiency of the institutional authority and competing interests perspectives. By using SFM-A, digraphs and Boolean algebra techniques, the system is analyzed and assessed in terms of the consequences produced.


Gill (1996) used an integrated SFM/system dynamics approach to policy analysis, in the Australian honeybee pollination market context. The analysis is based on five general influence groupings: institutions, technology, environment, beliefs and attitudes, and values, and by representing the various uni- or bidirectional deliveries among these components, the SFM and the corresponding digraph can be constructed. However, as Gill (1996) argues this form of representation corresponds to qualitative system dynamics, so he proceeded one step further, and created a quantitative systems dynamic model through which he tested various policy options. More detailed information about the model can be found in Gill (1993).

13.2.5.

Institutional and organizational development process (IO/DP)

The Department for International Development published on March 2003 the Institutional and organizational development process sourcebook of tools and techniques, aiming at assisting institutional developers. This framework is based on a cyclic process which begins with the analysis and diagnosis of the institutional framework and the organizational framework embedded in this institutional setting, moving on to the design process, the implementation of the design and finally, the monitoring and evaluation phases of the process. Various tools and techniques can assist towards the achievement of the tasks of the process, and the authors are presenting some of them.

Figure 27: DFID’s Institutional Development Process Framework (based on DFID (2003) and modified by the author)


14. Discussion and conclusions The complexity of the policy making process can be partly attributed to the numerous actors and their attributes (objectives, interests and influence power) and partly to the environment that they act and interact within, approximated by the institutional, organizational, cultural and socioeconomic parameters that define this environment. Public policy addresses a great variety of policy areas, thus what is next to be investigated, based on the theoretical endowment of the various disciplines that were outlined here, is the way these issues play out in the context of transportation policy, how policy is defined, its evolution throughout the decision-making process and its final outcomes and impacts compared to a certain performance concept that will indicate success of the policy per se and of process. Finally, the various types of barriers and constraints, with emphasis on the decentralization of policymaking, the role of policy networks with emphasis on participatory and collaborative and evidence-based policy-making, are considered quintessential for analyzing the complexity of policy-making and its success. The policy models that have been presented in the previous paragraphs are characterized by richness of approaches and assumptions, exhibiting sometimes similarities in basic theoretical concepts, and sometimes differences, since they refer to different parts or stages of the decision making process, whether formulation or implementation. Thus, the researcher´s task is firstly to acquire an overview of the theoretical base in public policy, which is the main objective of this document, and then select and adjust accordingly the methods, tools and frameworks that fit better the specific research problem, or context of the public policy problem or situation she wishes to analyze. The unit of analysis, the perspectives and approaches adopted, the specific focus and the underlying assumptions are drivers for the selection of the respective theoretical explanation. The indicative examples, wherever possible, is a helpful link between public policy theory in general, public policy in transportation and real world transportation problems that were analyzed throughout the years. However, there is a gap between the theory formulation and the theory implementation, as was made evident by our literature scan, thus there is a need to promote empirical analysis. The task of comparing these frameworks in confronted with the following issues. Which part of the public policy making and implementation process do these frameworks refer to and what are they trying to explain? What are the underlying assumptions for each model and how do they function compared with each other? Are they alternatives for the study of the same issue, adopting different approaches and perspectives or are they complementary in the sense that combined they provide a powerful tool for achieving a holistic approach towards


public policy analysis? Table 18 provides a macroscopic comparison of the frameworks, which means for detailed criticism and epistemological-level remarks the reader is prompted to the references and to the literature in general. In general, the Stages or Policy Cycles model has been the prevailing model for public policy making research in the past years, although it has been severely criticized for its linearity and ideal representation of the process sequencing that in some cases is far away from the real system. All frameworks assume the rationality of the individuals involved in the process, which, in light of information asymmetries, is bounded and so are the choices that the individual is making in this context. However, the stages model is more process-oriented than behavior-oriented. Thus, in general terms, the Policy cycle model constitutes the starting point, and then depending on the unit and level of analysis, as well as how policy change is initiated, the appropriate framework is to be chosen. Another interesting fact is that sometimes different frameworks provide different analysis outputs for the same case study, which is one of the benefits of multi-lenses approach. Indeed, since policy issues are not clear cut and the influencing factors are many, this practice is encouraged, at least for the cases that it makes sense. Another conclusion is that the lack of empirical evidence on the implementation of the various frameworks in real case studies, does not allow for the identification of the whole spectrum of weaknesses and strengths. This is of particular importance, if we consider the fact that some of these public policy making frameworks were revised and improved in light of such empirical studies. For instance, the Advocacy Coalition Framework was revised so as to incorporate the fruitful criticism of the scholar community, as well as to enhance its applicability and entail the particularities of non-US policy making processes. Similarly, as far as policy implementation is concerned, the theoretical implementation models are either strategic or completely operational, with the tactical or planning level, either overlooked or undertreated. Thus, the role of the planning processes and their outputs, such as official planning documents, that are “fed” from the strategic or higher level processes and then “feed” the operationalization of the planned policy objectives, needs to be taken into account. Furthermore, the different particularities of implementing policies in different administrative and spatial scales are another issue that needs to be taken into account. Finally, research in public policy will continue in quest of the identification of the causal mechanisms driving policy change, and in a dynamic and evolutionary path, taking into account actors, actions, structures, networks, behaviors, preferences and relationships, to ensure efficient and effective policy making and implementation.


The previous section of this report provided the reader with the basic theoretical and empirical concepts that are related to many institutional and public policy making and implementation issues. Thus, at this point, the implications of the public policy theory and practice in the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) context should be considered. BRT as a transport system is characterized by a complex public policy process, since the nature of the infrastructure and the services offered involve a great number of stakeholders and policy areas (or arenas, or subunits). In generic terms, transport policy, needs to be aligned with land use and urban development policies, as well as budgetary, labor and other policies. Thus, the need for an integrated policy approach (in the form of policy measures, whose implementation satisfies the public policy goals and objectives) is beyond any doubt. Furthermore, the plurality of interests - most of the time conflicting ones - increase the complexity of the process and require for careful and subtle choices in the policy measures that will be adopted, whether considered from an acceptability or implementation effectiveness perspective. Since each BRT system represents different socio-economic and political context and, considering the implementation of the system as an act of policy change, the frameworks that were presented earlier, provide useful analysis guidelines. For instance, in cases of the existence of coalitions with high lobbying influence and political entrepreneurs then the ACF should be preferred against Punctuated Equilibrium model, where the policy monopoly is what characterizes the political monopoly. As a final concluding remark, it should be noted that the tools that public policy literature provides us should be used in an optimal and complementary way, so as to minimize the individual limitations and weaknesses of the analysis frameworks and highlight the particularities and synergies of the policy areas that need to be addressed. BRT systems are a very good example of various socio-economic and political fermentations and stable, dynamic, as well as turbulent environment, which demand careful analysis, design and strategies and implementation actions, so as to achieve a sustainable and highly performing BRT system, with all the beneficial implications to the user, the economy and the society as a whole. Table 18: Macroscopic comparison of Public Policy frameworks

Policy

Focus

stage

Behavioral

Change

Weaknesses

Incentives

Rational choice does not guarantee

assumptions

Institutional

Decision

Institutions

Bounded

Rational

making

Individuals

rationality

efficiency and might lead to

Choice

(Expected)

suboptimality (Miller, 2000)

model

utility

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Policy

Focus

stage

Behavioral

Change

Weaknesses

Feedback

Linearity

assumptions maximization

Stages of

All

Policy cycle

stages

Process

model

More processoriented

Static, incorporation of feedback

Bounded

increases dynamics

rationality Incremental

Decision

Path

Bounded

Small

Short run, limited variations

ism or

making

dependency

rationality

increments

(Etzioni, 1967),

muddling

Organized

Satisficing

through

anarchy

Encouragement of inertia and continuation of status quo (Dror, 1954), May overlook the role of elites, systematic stages in the process, and possibility of innovative policy changes (House, 1987)

Multiple

Agenda

Problem

Policy

Circumstantial (Howlett and

streams

setting

Policy

window

Ramesh, 1995; in Ridde, 2009) etc

model

Politics

Advocacy

Policy

Common or

Dynamic

Potential bias toward pluralistic

Coalition

subsystems

competing

Policy

political

Framework

Advocacy

beliefs/values

networks

Systems (Weible et al, 2008)

coalitions

Bounded

External

etc

Policy

rationality

events

brokers

Internal

Policy

events

Learning Punctuated

Agenda

Policy

Bounded

Dynamic

Sometimes difficult to

Equilibrium

setting

monopoly

rationality

Path

operationalize (Robinson, 2006)

Framework

Policy image

dependent

Institutional

or process

policy

sequencing

venues Policy

Policy Cycle

Bounded

Stage

Process

and Policy

rationality

networks

Networks

Networks

(PPN) framework

n/a


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BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Presented to the Bi-Annual Meeting of the International Political Science Association, “Taking Temporality Seriously: Generational Models of Policy Change”, Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009 Howlett, M. (2011). Designing Public Policies: Principles and Instruments. Routledge House, V. W. (1987). Models of Policy Making. Increasing Understanding of Public Problems and Policies, available at http://purl.umn.edu/17839 Hurwicz, L., 1994. Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions. In: Review of Economic Design, 1(1), pp. 1-14 Ingold, K., and Varone, F. (2012). Treating Policy Brokers Seriously: Evidence from the Climate Policy. In Journal of Public Administration Research Theory, 22(2), pp. 319-346 Ison, S., and Rye, T. (2003). Lessons from travel planning and road user charging for policy making: through imperfection to implementation. In Transport Policy, Volume 10, pp. 223-233 Janis, I. J., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision-making: a psychological analysis of conflict, choice and commitment. New York: Free Press. Jann, W. and Wegrich, K. (2007).Theories of the Policy Cycle. In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, Fischer, F., Miller, G. J., Sidney, M.S. (Eds.). CRC Press Jenkins, W. I. (1978), Policy Analysis: A Political and Organizational Perspective, Martin Robertson, London Johnson, R. B., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., Turner, L. A. (2007). Toward a definition of mixed methods research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(2), pp. 112-133. Jones, B.D. And Baumgartner, F.R. (2005). A Model of Choice for Public Policy. In Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 325-351 Joskow, P.L. (2007). Regulation of Natural Monopoly. In Handbook of Law and Economics, Polinsky, A.M., Shavell, S. (Eds), Elsevier, 2007, Volume 2, pp. 1227-1348 Khayesi, M., and Amekudzi, A.A. (2011). Kingdon’s multiple streams model and automobile dependence reversal path: the case of Curitiba, Brazil. In Journal of Transport Geography, Volume 19, Issue 6, pp. 1547–1552 Kingdon, J. W. (1984), Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, Little Brown, Boston Kingdon, J.W. (1995). Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. 2nd ed. Harper Collins, NY Kingston, C., Caballero, G., 2009. Comparing theories of institutional change. In: Journal of Institutional Economics, 5(02), pp.151-180. Kraft M.E. and Furlong S. R. (2007), Public Policy: Politics, Analysis and Alternatives, 2nd Edition, CQ Press, Washington DC Lane J.E. and S. Ersson (2000). The New Institutional Politics: Performance and outcomes, Routledge Lasswell, H.D. (1956), The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis, University of Maryland, College Park Leiblein, M. J. 2003. “The Choice of Organizational Governance Form and Performance: Predictions from Transaction Cost, Resource-based, and Real Options Theories.” Journal of Management 29(6): 937-961. http://jom.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/29/6/937 (Accessed June 8, 2012). Lindblom, C.E. (1959). The Science of "Muddling Through". In Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, No. 2. pp. 79-88.

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Lindblom, C.E. (1982). Still Muddling, not yet through. In Decision Making: Approaches and Analysis McGrew, A.G. and Wilson, M.J. (Eds). Manchester University Press, Manchester UK Lipczynski, J., J. Wilson and J. Goddard (2005). Industrial Organization: Competition, Strategy, Policy. Second edition. Prentice Hall Lipsky, M. (1971). Street-level bureaucracy and the analysis of urban form. In Urban Affairs Quarterly, 6, pp. 391-409 Lipsky, M. (1980). Street level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. Russel Sage Foundation Löffler, E. (2009). Governance and government: Networking with external stakeholders. In Public Management and Governance, Bovaird, T and Löffler, E. (eds.)., 2nd ed., Routledge Lowi, T.J. (1964), American Business, public policy, case studies and political theory, in World Politics, 16, pp. 677-93 Lowi, T.J. (1970), Decision-making vs pubic policy: towards an antidote for technocracy, in Public Administration Review, 30, pp. 314-325 Macário R. (2005), Quality Management in Urban Mobility Systems: an integrated approach, Ph.D dissertation, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon Technical University, cesur.civil.ist.utl.pt/tvc/ Macário R. (2007), Restructuring, Regulation And Institutional Design: A Fitness Problem, in Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport: Selected Papers from the 9th International Conference (Thredbo 9) Lisbon, September 2005, Macário R., Viegas J. and Hensher D. A. (Eds.), Elsevier Macário R. and Viegas J.M. (2006), Political and planning interventions in urban mobility: weighing local context in the transferability of local solutions, CODATU XII, Coopération pour le développement et l'amélioration des transports urbains and périurbains, Lyon, France (www.codatu.org/english/publications/proceeding/conference/codatu12/actesconf12.htm) Macário, R. (2011). Quality Management in Urban Mobility Systems, Emerald Publishers Mack, R. (1971), Planning and Uncertainty, Jonh Wiley, NY Manheim, J.B., Rich, R. R. (1995). Empirical Political Analysis: research methods in political science, 4th ed., Logman Mantzavinos, C.(2006). The Role of Definitions in Institutional Analysis. In: (eds.) Daumann, Frank, Mantzavinos, C. and Okruch, Stefan: Wettbewerb und Gesundheitswesen: Konzeptionen und Felder ordnungsökonomischen Wirkens. Festschrift für Peter Oberender zu seinem 65. Geburtstag, Schriftenreihe Andrássy Universität, pp. 85-92 March, J.G. and Olsen G.P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The organizational Basis of Politics. The Free Press, New York Marsh D., and Rhodes, R., (1992) Policy Networks in British Government. Oxford University Press McConnell A. (2010), Understanding Policy Success: Rethinking Public Policy, Palgrave Macmillan Mehrizi, M.H.R., Ghasemzadeh, F. and Molas-Gallart J. (2009). Stakeholder Mapping as an Assessment Framework for Policy Implementation. In Evaluation, Vol 15, pp. 427-444

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Miller, G. (2000). Rational Choice and Dysfunctional Institutions. In Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 535–547 Milne, D., E. Niskanen and E. Verhoef (2000), Operationalisation of Marginal Cost Pricing within Urban Transport. Project AFFORD, funded by the European Commission, 4th Framework Transport RTD. VATT Research Report No 63. Helsinki. Mintrom, M. (2000). Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice. Georgetown Univesity Press, Washington D.C. Mintzberg, H., Raisinghani, D., and Theoret, A. (1976). The structure of “unstructured” decision processes. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21, pp. 246-275 Mintzberg, H., Waters, J.A. (1985). Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent. In Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 257-272 Molitor, G.T.T. (1977). How to Anticipate Public Policy Changes. In S.A.M Advanced Management Journal, Summer, pp. 4-13, available at www.metafuture.org/articlesbycolleagues/graham%20mollitor/Molitor%20how% 20to%20antici pate%20public-policy%20changes.pdf, accessed on 27 June 27, 2012 Molitor, G.T.T. (2010). Timeline 22-Step Model for Tracking and Forecasting Public Policy Change. In Journal of Futures Studies, 14(3), pp. 1 – 12 Mucciaroni, G. (1992). The Garbage Can Model & the Study of Policy Making: A Critique. In Polity, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 459-482 Nagel S. (2002), Handbook of public policy evaluation, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications Nelson, B.J. (1984). Making an issue of child abuse. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL Nickerson, J. A., Hamilton, B. H., & Wada, T. 2001. Market position, resource profile, and governance: Linking Porter and Williamson in the context of international courier and small package services in Japan. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 251–273. Niskanen, E. (2005). Toward Efficient and Effective Implementation of Transport Policy. TIPP Final Report, available at www.transportresearch.info/Upload/Documents/200909/20090917_164232_36667_TIPP%20%20Final%20Report.pdf, accessed on 16July 2012 North D. J. (1990), Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge North D. J. (1993), Five Propositions about Institutional Change, in Economic History, EconWPA, 129.3.20.41/eps/eh/papers/9309/9309001.pdf) North, D. C. (1994): Institutional Change, A Framework of Analysis, working paper, https://econwpa.wustl.edu:8089/eps/eh/papers/9412/9412001 North, D. C. (2005): Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton, New Jersey. Nutley, S. And Webb, J. (2000). Evidence and the policy process. In What Works? Evidence-based policy and practice in public services, Davies, H.T.O., Nutley, S.M. And Smith, P.C. (Eds), The Policy Press, Great Britain Oates, W.E., 2005. Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism. International Tax and Public Finance, 12(4), p.349-373

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Ostrom, E. (2007). Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. In Theories of the Policy Process, Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.)., Westview Press Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., Walker, J., 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. University of Michigan Press Ostrom, V. And Ostrom, E. (1977). Public Goods and Public Choices. In Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance, Savas, E. S. (ed), Westview Press, Boulder, CO. Parag, Y. (2006). A system perspective for policy analysis and understanding: the policy process networks. In The Systemist, 28(2), pp.212-224 Parsons, D.W. (2002). From Muddling Through to Muddling Up - Evidence Based Policy Making and the Modernisation of British Government. In Public Policy and Administration, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp. 43-60. Parsons, W. (1995). Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis. Edward Elgar Publishing Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., and Johnson, E. J. (1993). The adaptive decision maker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., Johnson, E. J. (1988). Adaptive strategy selection in decision making. In Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, Vol 14(3), pp. 534-552 Perl, A., & Dunn, J. A. (2007). Reframing auto fuel efficiency policy: Punctuating a North American policy equilibrium. Transport Reviews, 27, 1–35. Peters, B. G. (2002). Governance: A Garbage Can Perspective. Working Paper No. 84, IHS Political Science Series Prasad, B. C., Tisdell, C., 2006. Institutions, economic performance and sustainable development: a case study of the Fiji Islands. Nova Science Publishers Pressman, J. L., and Wildavsky, A.B. (1984). Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland : or, why it's amazing that federal programs work at all, this being a saga of the Economic Development Administration as told by two sympathetic observers who seek to build morals on a foundation of ruined hopes. University of California Press, Berkeley Prud’homme, R. (1995). The Dangers of Decentralization, World Bank Research Observer 10, pp. 201– 20 Rainey, H.G. (2009). Understanding and Managing Public Organizations. 4th Ed. Jossey-Bass, USA Ranaei, H., Faghihi, A., Mortazavi, M. (2010). Designing a Feasibility Study Model for Creating Policy Networks in Public Policy-Making Systems "Iranian Public Policy Making System Case Study". In European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, Issue 22, pp. 136-145 Reinhart, C.M., Rogoff, K.S., 2010. From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis. NBER Working Paper 15795, March 2010. Forthcoming in American Economic Review. Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997). Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability. Open University Press Ridde, V. (2009). Policy Implementation in an African State: An Extension of Kingdon’s multipleStreams Approach. In Public Administration Vol. 87, No. 4, pp. 938–954

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Riker, W., 1964. Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance. Little, Brown and Co, Boston, MA. Ripley, R.B., and Franklin, G.A. (1982). Bureaucracy and policy implementation. The Dorsey Press, Homewood, IL Robinson, S.E. (2006). Punctuated Equilibrium Models in Organizational Decision Making. In Handbook on Human Decision-Making. Ed. Goktug Morcol. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, pp. 133149 Roland, G., 2004. Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions. In: Studies in Comparative International Development, 38, 4, pp. 109-131 Rose, J. (1999). Towards a structurational theory of IS, theory development and case study illustrations. In: Pries-Heje et al. (Eds.) Proceedings of the 7th European Conference on Information Systems. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School. Rose, R. (1973), Comparing Public Policy: an overview, in European Journal of Political Research, 1, pp. 67-94 Sabatier, P. A. and Jenkins-Smith H.C. (1999), The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment, in Theories of the Policy Process, Paul A. Sabatier (ed), Westview Press, Boulder Sabatier, P.A. (1995). An advocacy coalition frameworkof policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein. In Public Policy Theories, Models, and Concepts: An Anthology, McCool, D.D. (Ed.). Prentice Hall Sabatier, P.A. (1998). The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 98-130 Sabatier, P.A. (2007), Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd Edition, Westview Press Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1988). An Advocacy Coalition Fraemwork Model of Policy Change and the Role of Policy Orientated Learning Therein. In Policy Science, Issue 21, pp. 129168 Sabatier, P.A. and Mazmanian, D. (1979). The Conditions of Effective Implementation: a guide to accomplishing policy objectives. In Policy Analysis, Volume 5, pp. 481-504 Sabatier, P.A. and Mazmanian, D.A. (1979). The conditions of effective implementation: a guide to accomplishing policy objectives. In Policy Analysis, 5(4), pp. 481-504 Sabatier, P.A. and Mazmanian, D.A. (1980). The implementation of public policy: a framework of analysis. In Policy Studies Journal, 8(special issue), pp. 538-60 Sabatier, P.A. and Weible, C.M. (2007). The Advocacy Coalition Framework. In Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd Ed., Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.). Westview Press Saleth, R.M., Dinar, A., 2004. The institutional economics of water: a cross-country analysis of institutions and performance. Elgar Pub., co-publication with the World Bank, Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA Samuelson, P. A. (1954), The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, in The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Nov., 1954), pp. 387-389 Schlager, E. (1995). Policy making and collective action: Defining coalitions within the advocacy coalition framework. In Policy Sciences, 28(3), pp. 243-270

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Schmid, A.A. (2004). Conflict and Cooperation: Institutional and Behavioral Economics. Blackwell Publishing Ltd Schwartz, B., Ward, A., Monterosso, J., Lyubomirsky, S., White, K., and Lehman, D. R. (2002). Maximizing versus satisficing: Happiness is a matter of choice. In Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, pp. 1178-1197. Schwartz, M.D. (2011).The Rules of the Game. In Health Care Advocacy: A Guide for Busy Clinicians, Sessums, L., Dennis, L., Liebow, M., Moran, W., Rich, E. (Eds.), Springer Scott, W. R. (2001). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications Silvia, C. and McGuire, M. (2010). Leading public sector networks: An empirical examination of integrative leadership behaviors. In The Leadership Quarterly, Volume 21, Issue 2, pp. 64–277 Simon HA. (1947). Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan Simon, H.A. (1997), Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Making Processes in Administrative Organization, 4th Edition, The Free Press Simon, S.A. (2007). Alternative Energy: Political, economic and Social Feasibility. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., US Smith, T.B. (1973). The Policy Implementation Process. In Policy Sciences, 4, pp. 197-209 Spandou, M., Macário, R. (2011). Decentralization as an institutional determinant for the performance of urban mobility systems. Presented in the 12th Thredbo Conference, 11-15 September 2011, Durban, South Africa & the VREF CoE Workshop 26-29 October 2011, Beijing, China Stewart, J., Hedge, D.M., and Lester, J.P. (2008).Public Policy:An Evolutionary Approach, 3rd ed. Thomson Wadsworth Stich, B. and Miller, C.R. (2008). Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework to Understand Freight Transportation Policy Change. In Public Works Management Policy, vol. 13 no. 1, pp 62-74 Stone A. (2008), Institutional reform: A decision-making process view, in Research in Transportation Economics, Vol. 22, Issue 1, pp. 164-178 Stone, D. (2002). Policy paradox. The art of political decision making. New York/London: W.W. Norton Stough R. R. and Rietveld P. (1997), Institutional issues in transport systems, in Journal of Transport Geography, Volume 5, Issue 3, NSF-ESF Strasbourg papers on Social Change and Sustainable Transport, September 1997, pp. 207-214 Sussman, J. M. (2000). Introduction to Transportation Systems. Artech House Publishers, Boston and London Terry, F. (2000). Transport: beyond predict and provide. In In What Works? Evidence-based policy and practice in public services, Davies, H.T.O., Nutley, S.M. And Smith, P.C. (Eds), The Policy Press, Great Britain Theesfeld, I, Schleyer, C., Aznar, O. (2010a). The procedure for institutional compatibility assessment: ex-ante policy assessment from an institutional perspective. Journal of Institutional Economics (2010), 6: 3, 377–399 Theesfeld, I., Schleyer, C., Hagedorn, K., Callois, J-M., Aznar, O., Alkan Olsson, J. (2010b). The Institutional Dimension in Policy Assessment. In Environmental and Agricultural Modelling:

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Integrated Approaches for Policy Impact Assessment, F.M. Brouwer and M. van Ittersum (eds.), Springer Science+Business Media B.V. Thompson F., and M.T., Green (1998). Handbook of Public Finance. Kindle Edition Topan, A. (2001) The European Integration Process: A Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis, Münster: Lit. True, J.L., Jones, B.D. And Baumgartner, F.R. (2007). Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining stability and change in policy making. In Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd ed, Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.). Westview Press Tuominen,A., Himanen, V. (2007). Assessing the interaction between transport policy targets and policy implementation—A Finnish case study, in Transport Policy, Volume 14, Issue 5, pp. 388398 Ubbels B., M. Enoch, S. Potter and P. Nijkamp, (2004), Unfare Solutions: Local earmarked charges to fund public transport, Spon Press, London, 2004 UNHD, 2011. International Human Development Indicators, hdr.undp.org Van De Klundert, T., 2010. On the determinants of institutional design. In: European Journal of Political Economy, 26(2), pp.167-175. Van Meter, D. and Van Horn, C.E. (1975). The policy implementation process: a conceptual framework. In Administration and Society, 6(4), pp. 455-88 Verbeek M. (2008). A guide to modern econometrics. John Willey & Sons Ltd Vigar, G. (2002). The Politics of Mobility: Transport, the Environment, and Public Policy. Weaver, R.K and Rockman, B.R. (1993), Assessing the effects of Institutions, in Do institutions matter?: government capabilities in the United States and abroad, Weaver, R.K and Rockman (Eds), The Brooking Institution Weber, K. and Glynn, M.A. (2006). Making Sense with Institutions: Context, Thought and Action in Karl Weick’s Theory. In Organization Studies, 27(11), pp.1639–1660 Weible, C. M., Sabatier, P. A. and Flowers, J. (2008). Advocacy Coalition Framework. In Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Second Edition,1:1,pp. 1 - 10 Weimer D.L. and Vining A.R. (2011), Policy Analysis, 5th Edition, Pearson Education Inc. Weingast, B.R., 2009. Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives. Journal of Urban Economics, 65(3), p.279-293 Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press Williamson, O. E. (1990). A comparison of alternative approaches to economic organization. J of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146(1990), 61-71. Reprinted in Furubotn, E.G. and R. Richter (1991). The New Institutional Economics: A Collection of Articles from the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Texas A&M University Economics Series Williamson, O. E. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. USA, Oxford University Press Williamson, O. E. (2000). The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead, in Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), pp.595–613 Williamson, O.E. (1995). ‘Hierarchies, Markets and Power in the Economy: An Economic Perspective’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 4.1, 21-49.

BRT - ALC LS2 - EXPOD - EXPLORING THE COMPLEXITY OF POLICY DESIGN WP 1 - Literature review on policy-making and process Wilson, J.Q. (1973). Political Organizations. Basic Books Wilson, J.Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It. Basic Books Zachariadis, N. (2003). Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy: Political manipulation in Democratic Societies: Georgetown University Press. Washington, D.C. Zachariadis, N. (2007). The multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations and Prospects. In Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd ed, Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.). Westview Press Zografos K.G., A.D.May, G. Marsden, J. Kallioinen, and H. Tegner (2004), Surveys of Transport Institutional Systems in Europe. Deliverable 3, Transport Institutions in the Policy Process (TIPP), www.strafica.fi/tipp/TIPP-D3.pdf Zouboulakis, M., 2004. Who is Afraid of the New Institutional Economics' Idea of Institutional Change. Presented in 2004 EAEPE Conference, University of Crete, www.econ.uoa.gr/ua/files/1725340212.pdf