Public Relations - Constructivist Foundations

Non-dualism

Public Relations: Between Omnipotence and Impotence Olaf Hoffjann • Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences, Germany • o.hoffjann/at/ostfalia.de > Context • With their response to questions concerning the reality of PR, the realistic and the constructivist paradigms either fall into epistemological traps or do not even tackle some of the relevant questions. > Problem • An epistemo-

logical approach to the reality of PR must particularly answer three questions. Firstly, there is the question of how or why PR descriptions fail. If PR as a communication of self-description is attributed a considerable trustworthiness disadvantage compared to journalistic external descriptions, for example, this implies a second question: How does PR however manage to make people (occasionally) believe in its descriptions? Finally, PR stage-manages events and messages and thus publishes fictions. This leads to the third question: How can these observations of trends such as fictionalization be explained in a plausible manner? > Method • Answers provided by the realistic, constructivist and non-dualistic perspectives to these central questions are identified in order to elaborate on specific problems and advantages of the perspective. > Results • The trustworthiness of PR characterizations may be used to explain, from a nondualistic perspective with regard to PR reality, why PR fails or how it may be successful. Additionally, developments such as fictionalization and theatricalization may be described more unambiguously. > Implications • New answers from the non-dualistic perspective to old questions of PR research reveal that a non-dualistic project is adaptable and could work with numerous findings of PR research, even though a slight re-interpretation would surely be necessary in parts. > Key words • Public Relations, strategic communication, realism, constructivism, truth, trustworthiness.

Introduction PR’s relation to veracity has always been discussed intensively. On the one hand, many PR practitioners proclaim the phrase of their prominent colleague, Georg-Volkmar Graf von Zedtwitz-Arnim (1961): “Do good and talk about it.” On the side of the critics, they rather stick to a phrase by Theodore Upton-Ivory (1992), alias Klaus Kocks: “Just pretend and talk about it.” Talk and action, pretense and reality, facts and fiction, truthfulness and lies – in the end, all these differentiations lead to the conclusion that PR has a persuasive character. Faith is difficult to come by in such cases. On the one hand, this is because many people suspect exactly this strategic character in many commercial messages. On the other hand, many PR topics are difficult to verify for outsiders. For instance, outsiders can hardly judge the security of a production plant. Therewith, epistemological problems are identified where epistemological studies concerning questions of PR reality operate. In strategic communication, this is at first the difference between (idealizing)

talk and (hidden) action. This leads to the first question: How or why do PR descriptions fail? Moreover, strategic communication fights against the concurrent suspicion of motive that underlies all self-descriptions. Therefore, PR – as a communication of self-description – compared to journalistic description of others has a substantial disadvantage in terms of credibility and trustworthiness (Bentele & Seidenglanz 2004: 79). Hence the second question follows: What can PR do so that its descriptions are (sometimes) still believed? And, finally, PR, as strategic communication, orchestrates events and messages and, consequently, publishes fiction. This poses the third question: How may these observations of trends such as fictionalization be explained in a plausible manner? These three pivotal problems concerning PR reality are central to the article. It is intended to identify what answers can be given by the two approaches that Josef Mitterer refers to as dualistic approaches – the realistic and the constructivist paradigms. In conclusion, the answers from non-dualism shall be elaborated and discussed. Consequently, the central question of this

article is: What relevant PR phenomena can be explained better from a non-dualistic perspective than from a realistic or constructivist perspective. Finally, brief reference is made to the comprehension of PR, which is the basis for the considerations that follow. PR is understood here as an organization function: PR legitimizes the organization towards the relevant stakeholders (Hoffjann 2007). If PR assumes that the relevant stakeholders have a normative-critical expectation, PR will try to change the company’s own policy. This can also be modeled – according to systems theory – as corporate self-governance. If PR, however, assumes that the relevant stakeholders have a cognitive expectation, the company can hold on to its corporate policy and can try, using, e.g., the external publication of self-descriptions, to change the environment expectations of these stakeholders towards the company and to thereby legitimize the company. This policy option can – according to systems theory – be described as external context governance (cf. Hoffjann 2009). These descriptions of PR and their reality are essential to the following considerations.

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The discourse in PR practice and PR research

Public Relations Concepts in Non-dualism

PR reality has traditionally played a central role in both its professional practice and the practitioners’ literature (Bentele 1994b: 241) as well as in scientific literature. In professional practice, this is manifested in professional norms, where the norm of truth has always represented the central idea. So, for example, the first of seven self-commitments of a member of the German Public Relations Society reads: “I shall be truthful.”1 In the practitioners’ literature, the truth postulate is equally important. So Albert Oeckl, for example, demands:

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The truth shall therefore […] be seen as the “ largest and proven approach to the fictitious absolute truth or, pragmatically put: PR statements shall reflect reality in an optimal way and, if possible, shall be verifiable. (Oeckl 1964: 47)

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While codices and practitioners’ literature consider PR reality, especially its normative aspects, PR research is more differentiated. For almost 20 years, German PR research has conducted an intensive discussion on PR reality between a side that argues realistically and primarily normatively, represented especially by Günter Bentele (e.g., 1994b), and a constructivist side, represented, inter alia, by Klaus Merten (e.g., 1992, 2008a, 2008b), Klaus Kocks (e.g., 2007) and Joachim Westerbarkey (e.g., 2003). Although both perspectives may be labelled “realistic” and “constructivist,” a closer investigation quickly reveals that very different approaches underly them. In the past five years, the discussion between realistic and constructivist positions has – tactfully put – intensified (inter alia Bentele 2009; Merten 2006, 2011). As the knowledge gain derived from recent articles related to this discussion seldom exceeds that from earlier studies, the following only sporadically focuses on recent articles. Non-dualistic positions, on the other hand, have hardly been considered in PR research so far. Even a (critical) discussion with non-dualistic positions has rarely been 1 | Retrieved from http://www.drpr-online. de/statische/itemshowone.php4?id=7 on 3 June 2010.

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conducted. Therefore, the following falls back on our own considerations, which were developed in other papers (Hoffjann 2011a, 2013a, 2013b).

The realistic paradigm Realistic concepts still influence a number of contributions in this discourse, even if today almost no PR researcher would refer to his approach as “realism.” The consequences of this realistic paradigm for epistemological core questions of PR will be discussed using the example of Bentele’s research. Bentele developed his approach – at first with regard to general media reality (1988, here: 2008), later also with regard to PR reality (e.g., 1994b) – in order to investigate questions concerning the credibility of media and, respectively, PR. While Bentele also delineates his approach, which he refers to as reconstructive approach, from the realistic position (Bentele 2008: 257–260), his perspective may, ultimately, be interpreted as realistic because his reconstructive approach is essentially based on the assumption that substantiality, or rather reality, contains an infinite amount of different types of information. Bentele illustrated in detail in numerous publications the limitations of PR descriptions and their criteria for success. Let us start with the question of how PR descriptions fail. In Bentele’s approach, PR descriptions ultimately fail due to the reality. In this context, Bentele developed the Thesis of Discrepancy (1994a: 148). Reference persons can perceive discrepancies between directly perceived parts of reality and media reality (reality comparison) or between the different media realities (media comparison). A lack of adequacy of information contained within media reality results in indicators for the perceived credibility of PR (Bentele 2005: 157). Accordingly, a prerequisite for credibility and trust is that “a sort of representation- and isomorphic relationship as well as a consistency-relationship between PR information and underlying facts/events are not only claimed but actually guaranteed” (Bentele 1992a: 164; 1994b: 255). Once outside a certain “reality-corridor” (Bentele 2005: 158), problems of trust arise. Problems from this perspective were widely discussed

in the example of the News Bias Research (e.g., Schulz 1990: 22f). Hence, following directly, are the central success criteria for PR descriptions. Because Bentele (1994b: 254) considers a comparison with reality (reality check) possible, a realistic perception of truth is the central success criterion for PR descriptions. Therefore, PR descriptions ultimately do not differ much or at all from journalistic descriptions: the same rules of adequacy apply to both (Bentele 1992b: 42). It follows that Bentele is very optimistic that the norm of truth is also adhered to in this rule. Because as lies, exaggerations and the like are easily detected by reality checks, loss of trust would hardly be avoidable. Adhering to the norm of truth is, therefore, “essential for the survival, functioning and maintenance” of PR organizations (Bentele 2009: 25). Bentele’s position, which is shared at least implicitly by many authors, may, therefore, be referred to as the thesis of PR impotence because it severely restricts PR’s scope of action by the possibility of a reality check. How are observation of trends such as fictionalization or the increase in orchestrations explained in the realistic paradigm? Ultimately, these trends do not matter from a realistic perspective, even though Bentele concedes that fictional elements do exist. He claims, however, that they are rarely found because they would very quickly lead to implausibility effects and a loss of trust (1994b: 247). In this case, the fictional character appears to be limited to the fact that something cannot be verified. Due to its fixation on reality checks, the realistic paradigm is focused almost exclusively on how – in whatever manner – verifiable descriptions, whereas assessments, prognoses or rumours are largely excluded. However, this leaves out two central aspects of PR.

The constructivist paradigm In studies ascribed to the constructivist paradigm, the question concerning the reality of PR constructions takes on the central position. Central reference points in the constructivist discourse are certainly the studies of Merten (inter alia, 1992, 2008a, 2008b). Furthermore, there are a number of other elaborations on PR taking on constructiv-

Non-dualism

Public Relations: Between Omnipotence and Impotence Olaf Hoffjann

ist arguments or being influenced by constructivism, such as those by Klaus Jarchow (1992), Andrea Kückelhaus (1998), Kocks (2007) or Westerbarkey (2003), which partly show substantial common grounds with the studies by Merten. What is the central success criterion for PR descriptions in the constructivist paradigm? The central reference point of Merten’s rationale is the “triumphal course of fiction” (Merten 2008b: 5), which started with the era of the media society. PR takes advantage of these fictional structures: “PR is a process of intentional and contingent construction of desirable realities through creation and consolidation of images in public” (Merten 1992: 44; see also Kückelhaus 1998: 372). PR descriptions almost never fail – at least from Merten’s point of view. Merten may, therefore, be seen as an almost euphoric representative of the omnipotence thesis of PR. Sometimes, PR is a MetaCommunicator that decides “what, when, where, how and with which desired effect communication shall take place” (Merten 1992: 44). Sometimes, the advantage of fictional constructs lies “in their simple, fast and cost-efficient production and change” (Merten 2008b: 6). But how plausible is such a thesis of omnipotence? Empirical analyses concerning relations between PR and journalism have shown that PR has limitations in its image structure (Raupp 2008: 204). Additionally, there is another point of criticism regarding Merten, which is surprising given his euphoric assessment of fiction. In the sections where Merten defines core terms such as the “real” reality (Merten 1999: 253), references are found to Merton’s view that constructions may ultimately also be checked against an ontic reality. Thereby, Merten confirms Mitterer’s central criticism of constructivism. Mitterer insinuates that the descriptions of the constructivist paradigm – similarly to those of the realistic paradigm – could fail with reference to reality. He substantiates his point concerning constructivism with the viability concept. On the one hand, the viability concept generally refers to the relation of being compatible with heretofore constructed realities (Glasersfeld 1992: 39). On the other hand, the concept describes a failure with regard to reality:

Strangely enough, a direct contact, a direct “ confrontation with an ‘ontic reality’ becomes feasible exactly then, when our (therefore?) nonviable constructions fail or collapse. (Mitterer 2008: 160)

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How does the constructivist paradigm possibly explain observations of trends such as fictionalization? During the analysis of orchestrations, theatricalizations and fictionalization from the constructivist perspective, constructivism is confronted with a completely different limitation. Constructivism has always contained – at least implicitly – two constructivist practices (Weber 2005: 333). These are, first, the epistemological general statement that, ultimately, everything is a construct. Secondly, the empirical trend message is that more reality is always being constructed, e.g., by mass media. When trends such as fictionalization are investigated, each constructivist consideration is quickly caught up in contradictions because reality itself has always been a construction, which today is being constructed more and more by culture and mass media, for example (ibid: 342). Intentional orchestration is therefore, at the same time, part of a constructivist all-encompassing message and trend message. Therefore, constructivism is an “argumentative dilemma” (ibid: 342). Thus, the constructivist paradigm cannot plausibly answer the important epistemological question of PR either. Generally, a constructivist perspective compared to the realistic perspective offers the central advantage that the constructivist character and thereby also the specific selectivity of PR is illustrated, which can, for instance, identify the difference to journalistic reality constructs.

The non-dualistic perspective The discussion of the realistic and constructivist paradigm has firstly shown that an epistemological perspective that does not renounce a reality check is problematic. After all, who is able to look behind business facades? And who can conclusively judge whether insider reports by a dismissed employee “represent the truth” more than the official PR statements? Explanation

attempts that refer to the “real” and “true” are quickly entangled in an infinite regress process. Therefore, an epistemological perspective that renounces a reality check and strictly sticks to the here-and-now is more promising. Secondly, it became apparent that there is much evidence that described differences, e.g., between PR self-descriptions and journalistic descriptions of others, may weaken their ascribed trustworthiness. Obviously, there are descriptions that have a tendency to be assessed as more trustworthy if PR selfdescriptions are inconsistent with them. An epistemological perspective that renounces a reality check has to make clear how such trustworthiness attributions may be attained. Thirdly, and finally, observations of trends such as theatricalization and fictionalization are – generally put – associated with the assumption that mass media reality and its mode of production are changing. Here, the question is raised of alternative ways of explaining that do not lead us again into the epistemological trap of “true” and “less true.” In the following, answers to the abovementioned questions shall be elaborated from a non-dualistic perspective. As the non-dualistic perspective has so far not been widely received, relevant basic arguments will be commented on respectively.

Why and how do PR descriptions fail? It was elaborated above that in the realistic and even in the constructivist paradigms, theses fail when confronted with reality. Due to the “absence” of reality in non-dualism, this reference is missing. So how else can descriptions and theses then still fail? Realists in particular may consider Mitterer’s position as a provocation: “Perceptions are true because and as long as we support them and they are wrong because and as long as we do not support them” (Mitterer 2001: §152). In another section, Mitterer explains the strict temporalization of this idea even more clearly: The distinction between appearance and real“ ity, between perceiving something as real and actual reality, are argumentative differentiations denoting the relation between former and con-


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temporary perceptions and which possibly led to the revision of former perceptions. (Mitterer 2001: §67)


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(Scientific) testing methods can be developed to “test” theses. The foundation of such tests is a common basis – generally the concurrent descriptions that are not subject to review at the moment (Mitterer 1992: §50). Ideally, the testing procedure – for example an investigation design – is also itself concurrent. If both conditions exist, there is a good chance that the result will be commended as “true” on a broad basis. If descriptions are to a large extent concurrent – therefore no longer or not being seriously doubted – they develop into something like a neutralistic launching pad or basic consensus for further descriptions (ibid: §§36–43). This may also be referred to as truth. This includes perceptions “we have to support in order to survive in our society” (Mitterer 2001: §154). This reveals the contingency and arbitrariness of descriptions. When the ontic reality is missing as a comparative benchmark, the question follows, how it can be explained that descriptions fail or that some descriptions are preferred over others. This and the consequences of these general considerations for PR descriptions will be elaborated in the context of the success criteria for PR descriptions.

Which are the success criteria for PR descriptions? What are the decisive aspects in an epistemological construct of ideas without a reality check that determine whether existing descriptions become a successful basis for future descriptions? And what explanation is there for the empirically noticeable evidence that, for example, journalistic descriptions are supported for a longer term than PR descriptions? This is largely attributed to the self-descriptive nature of PR descriptions, which, like all self-descriptions, are seen as generally less credible and trustworthy than the description of others, such as journalistic media reports. On which basis do we decide about attributes of trustworthiness – if not based on a reality check? In the following, the thesis shall be elaborated that – similarly


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to Bentele’s approach – a comparison of, for instance, PR descriptions and media descriptions is conducted but that – in contrast to Bentele – it strictly adheres to the here-andnow, thereby renouncing any kind of reality check. These descriptions serve as a comparative benchmark and are altogether assessed as tending to be more trustworthy than PR descriptions. They may be (a) descriptions of own experiences and observations, (b) descriptions of personally known individuals or (c) other media descriptions (Merten 1999: 249). Descriptions of own experiences, (a), are recognized as particularly relevant with regard to questions concerning the assessment of trustworthiness or image changes (ibid: 249). While the realistic and constructive paradigm differentiate between the object and the description, non-dualism is not interested in ulterior objects: the object of description is not different in its reporting or “linguistic” style, but is rather that part of description that has already been conducted (Mitterer 1992: §14). In other words: “To describe an apple means to continue the (already conducted) description / an apple/” (ibid). Hence, those descriptions relating to own experiences are also nothing else than the continuation of already existing descriptions. Therefore, PR descriptions are no longer compared to a directly accessible different reporting sphere, as suggested by Bentele in his view of an isomorphic relation between media descriptions and events (Bentele 1992a: 164). In this article, PR descriptions are rather compared with “own” descriptions. Even if some facts favour the idea that in many cases “own” descriptions are seen as more trustworthy and, therefore, proclaimed as basic consensus, ultimately, both descriptions are contingent. The nondualistic perspective therefore also provides a possibility for a fresh look at the normative requirement of the concurrence of word and action frequently mentioned in PR (e.g., Hundhausen 1951: 160f). In the construct of ideas introduced here, the “word” stands for PR descriptions and the “action” is depicted as descriptions of own experiences or descriptions of “affected persons,” e.g., dismissed employees. Ultimately, descriptions are compared here, too. Such comparison between several descriptions is ultimately also present in the

other two cases – in descriptions of personally known individuals, (b), as well as in the case of media descriptions, (c). In the latter case, one could check a PR description by reading reports on the same subject in a newspaper. If the PR description is verified, this could result in the creation of a new basic consensus (Weber 2005: 318). Journalistic reports in particular, in contrast to PR descriptions, have the enormous advantage that they are descriptions of other things and not self-descriptions and, therefore, tend to be described as more trustworthy. Hence, PR will in most cases probably steer its orientation towards journalistic reporting especially – because a deviation from this norm could appear as untrustworthy and, therefore, highly risky. This illustrates that the less tangible the subjects described are for external reference groups and the more the concrete project was considered highly trustworthy in the past, the more PR in its PR descriptions may tend to deviate from what it would refer to as “true” itself. This demonstrates clearly that trustworthiness is the central criterion for success for PR descriptions. PR descriptions mainly fail because of a lack of trustworthiness – or, more precisely, because they are assessed as trustworthy more seldom than, for example, journalistic descriptions. The problem of trustworthiness is relevant on different levels. First, it is basically a competition about trust between PR self-images and journalistic external images in addition to a competition between PR descriptions by different organizations. Hence, trustworthiness is the central epistemological reference point of PR in a non-dualistic perspective. In a non-dualistic perspective, PR expounds on the problems of – only presumed or inferred – trustworthiness of PR descriptions rather than on the truth. PR is only interested in the chances a description may have, according to its assessment, to be considered trustworthy by relevant reference groups. Therefore, Simone Huck identifies PR as the organizational “credibility gatekeeper” (Huck 2006: 50) or, specifically, as the “gatekeeper of trustworthiness,” 2 however, without any test of the 2 | While attributions of credibility are restricted to adequacy of facts, attributions concerning trustworthiness consist of a general description (Kohring 2004).

Non-dualism


ontic truth. In addition to the “competing” descriptions outlined above, PR will also consider aspects that have been described by research on faith and trustworthiness in different publications (Hovland, Janis & Kelley 1953; Köhnken 1990) but that might benefit from further research. This includes, for example, the consistency of descriptions, and the consideration of counter-arguments or presentation issues. When differing between trustworthiness assumptions of different orders, the enormously reflexive character of trustworthiness assumptions becomes obvious (cf. Table 1). So the character of strategic communication is barely demonstrated by the fact that PR tries to anticipate the possible assumption of a lie, the possibility of a lie or of a veritable description. Conversely, stakeholders will just assume this as a first- or third-order assumption about PR. On the one hand, this shows concretely how complex attributions of trustworthiness finally are (for details Hoffjann 2013a). On the other hand, you can see here more fundamentally how important reflexive phenomena are in a non-dualistic perspective. Because whether something – in a non-dualistic meaning – is thought to be true and therefore not called into doubt determines significantly, in a non-dualistic perspective, whether you believe that others do not call it into doubt either. In keeping with the system-theoretical perspective, trustworthiness would not be the primary selection criterion, but would rather be assessed according to the key differentiation, e.g., legitimation on the programme level. The assessment regarding trustworthiness from an epistemological perspective is the central achievement of PR. PR reviews existing descriptions as to whether they may be considered trustworthy by reference groups. Thereby, PR strives to ensure the attribution of trustworthiness to the organization. PR descriptions do not fail because the press officer did not pay any attention or because a PR construct was “pushed against the wall” due to a lack of viability but simply because a PR description was not considered trustworthy and therefore concurrent and, therefore, was not a positive basis for future descriptions. It was illustrated that, in a non-dualistic perspective, trustworthiness is the central

PR

Stakeholder

First order PR assumes that the stakeholder Second order assumes a lie/trustworthiness/the possibility of a lie

← → ←

Third order

stakeholder assumes PR to lie / be trustworthy / possibly lie.

The stakeholder assumes that PR assumes that the stakeholder assumes a lie / trustworthiness / the possibility of a lie.

Table 1: The reflexivity of assumption regarding assumptions of trustworthiness in the example of the assumed trustworthiness of PR descriptions

criterion for success. While the relevance of trust and trustworthiness for PR is also emphasized in constructivist paradigms, especially in the realistic studies by Bentele, the relevance of trust is, at the same time, weakened in a realistic perspective by the possibility of reality-checks. How importance is trust when the recognition of reality provides certainty? Furthermore, most studies that stress the relevance of trust are based on a different relationship between PR and trust. While this article focuses on trust in PR or trustworthy PR, Bentele, for example, is mainly interested in trust through PR in organizations (Hoffjann 2011b).

How does non-dualism explain observations of trends such as fictionalization? One could presume that the classic duality pairs such as reality and appearance, the real and the unreal, facts and fiction have no place in a non-dualistic perspective. This would have the consequence that trend observations such as fictionalization or the increase in orchestrations cannot be explained either. In his non-dualistic media theory, Stefan Weber has elaborated how these duality-pairs may be re-interpreted: reality and facts do not refer to different objects of description but are perceived as

a basis of consensus. Both sides of differentiation always stay in the here-and-now of discourse (Weber 2005: 340f). Consequently, they are only different modi of descriptions: while – in the sense outlined above “true” – descriptions are referred to as real and factually concurrent, fictional descriptions are not yet concurrent. However, all descriptions always follow on from former descriptions and these new descriptions may then be awarded attributes such as “fictional,” etc. (ibid: 341). But how may observations of trends such as fictionalization or increasing orchestration be explained? In contrast to constructivism, which differentiates between general and trend messages, non-dualism is only interested in the trend message (Weber 2005: 337–350). Fictionalization would then be but an increase in not yet concurrent descriptions. In a non-dualistic reconstruction, the related complaint about a separation from reality would be but a reaction to contingency experiences that were made due to numerous new descriptions developed ever faster (ibid: 340). With every new media description, the distance from reality – the original (existing) description – increases (ibid: 318). Furthermore, the empirical orchestration and construction levels may be described less ambiguously. One actual example is as follows: one could empirically investigate the construction levels of events by combining a survey of event organizers


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description for mode of production of a PR description

stage-managed

non-stage-managed

Figure 1: Levels of stage-management of PR descriptions.


description for mode of production of a PR description

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stage-managed

description of a recipient to a PR description

inauthentic

non-stage-managed

vs.

authentic

Figure 2: (In-)authenticity description of (non-)stage-managed PR descriptions.

with an observation of the event. Thereby, deliberate construction levels or levels of orchestration for PR events can be examined, as Weber (1999) did for journalism. Indicators could include contentual preparation of statements, programme schedules, the media image and the positioning of photo and TV cameras etc. By way of comparing two events, the conclusion could be reached that event A was orchestrated to a bigger extent than event B (cf. Figure 1). Such a result does not represent another dualization of ulterior reality vs. wordly orchestration. Consequently, this also means that there is no approximation to the “real” event. If one, as a second step, differentiates between the production side and the reception side, the respective descriptions may be compared with one another: on the production side, the compared aspect is the (non-)orchestration of an event; on the reception side the compared aspect is the (non-)attribution of authenticity by the observer. In order to examine this, one


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could – in addition to the investigation scheme outlined above – ask the audience for their assessment regarding the attribution of (un-)authenticity. Accordingly, the connection between orchestration levels and the description of recipients can be examined. Possible results of such an examination may include: PR descriptions with a high level of orchestration are described by the recipients as orchestrated; or PR descriptions with a high level of orchestration are described by recipients as non-orchestrated/authentic (cf. Figure 2). The second result would substantiate a thesis that has been expressed repeatedly in past years regarding “authenticity through orchestration” (Fischer-Lichte et al. 2007). The latter can, according to Weber, be described as game of shake-ups: that which today is described as authentic, will tomorrow be described as stage-managed (Weber 2005: 344). Viral spots in web 2.0 seem to be a further example: for a long time, spots with blurred and shaky pictures were described as au-

thentic. Since the media has now repeatedly reported on the (commercial) backgrounds of those spots, the authenticity attributions may also change here. How differently levels of stage-managing descriptions and authenticity attributions turn out supports Weber himself, who, in another place stated that the seemingly real reality, when it appears to be as authentic and unaffected as possible to us on the screen, just requires the highest level of apparent artificiality in order to appear realistic. Conversely, the little, amateurish or low-tech use of media technology leads to the impression of constructedness of the images increasing (Weber 2002: 14). What is the position of such non-dualistic PR perception with regard to the realistic thesis of impotence and the constructivist thesis of omnipotence? In a non-dualistic perspective, opportunities and risks are equally in focus. Opportunities result when PR successfully establishes descriptions that it would itself refer to as “fictitious.” Risks result because, for example in times of crises, PR will probably have a slim chance of correcting a description that it would, from its own perspective, consider as “wrong.” So it is not surprising that, according to this concept, a press officer may be confronted with the accusation of lying in a PR description – even if he had drafted it to the best of his knowledge and conscience. That is exactly the reason why “the best of knowledge and conscience” are not favoured here as selection criterion. This would hardly be conceivable with regard to the realistic paradigm. Therefore another central idea of nondualism is highly ambivalent for PR. Josef Mitterer juxtaposes the pursuit of truthfulness in constructivism and realism with a pursuit of change (Mitterer 1992: §97). The viral spots in web 2.0 just mentioned confirm the plausibility of this thought. Another example is that journalistic reports change on political subjects or in the assessment of persons for a longer period of time. Here, the journalistic pursuit of change also seems to explain commentary cycles much more plausibly than the pursuit of truthfulness. The pursuit of change is ambivalent because, on the one hand, PR can be successful with new, surprising descriptions, but, on the other hand, it may also become a “victim” of journalistic herd instincts.

Non-dualism


Conclusion The article outlined answers from the three epistemological candidates to questions regarding PR reality. In the realistic paradigm, reality-checks are insufficiently plausible. The consequence would be a largely impotent PR. Exaggerating, one could ask whether PR is still needed if we can all recognize the truth. Additionally, the realistic paradigm is hardly interested in relevant monitoring of trends such as fictionalization and theatricalization. While these take on a central role in the constructivist paradigm, constructivism faces an “argumentative dilemma” (Weber 2005: 342) between its epistemological general statement that, ultimately, everything is a construction, and the empirical trend statement that, for example, mass media is constructing more and more. Furthermore, the constructivist viability concept does not, ultimately, exclude reality checks. This criticism is particularly surprising in Merten’s studies, as he otherwise sees hardly any limits for PR reality constructions. The non-dualist perspective is not interested in an ontic reality, thus avoiding such problems, but rather focuses on descriptions. This results in a complete contingency of any description. It was outlined that trustworthiness is of central importance in this situation. As journalistic descriptions are generally perceived as clearly more trustworthy than PR descriptions, PR largely focuses on them. PR is only interested in what chances a description has, according to its assessment, to be referred to as trustworthy by relevant reference groups. Trustworthiness as the reference point may also explain why at times PR feels omnipotent and at times impotent with regard to its descriptions. Finally, it was outlined how monitoring of trends such as fictionalization or theatricalization may be explained and empirically examined from a non-dualistic perspective. By comparing descriptions and renouncing the epistemological general statement of constructivism that, ultimately, everything is a construction (Glasersfeld 1995: 1), these phenomena may be explained in a distinctly more unambiguous way.

Acknowledgement This is the revised translation of the paper titled “Die Wirklichkeit der Public Relations” (Hoffjann 2013b).

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Olaf Hoffjann studied, inter alia, Communication Sciences in Münster, Germany. From 2006 to 2011 he was Professor of Communication Management at the Mediadesign College in Berlin. Since 2011, he has been Professor for the Media Management study course at Ostfalia University for Applied Sciences in Salzgitter, Germany. He received his Ph.D for a system-theoretical study on relationship between PR and journalism. Since then, one of his research focus areas has been the reality of PR. Additionally, he has published several articles in recent years, as well as the book Trust in Public Relations.

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