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A volunteer citizens’ group supported by the Wisconsin Grassroots Network Brief report on the

Public verification of electronically tabulated election outcomes in the February 16 Wisconsin Supreme Court Primary in Dane County

Results A public risk-limiting audit conducted by the Wisconsin Election Integrity Action Team has determined with a confidence level in excess of 99.0% that the county’s voting machines identified the correct winner in the February 16 Supreme Court primary. As an unofficial citizens’ audit conducted after the Dane County Board of Canvas had already certified the unaudited output as final election results, the audit’s findings would have had no effect had a miscount been detected. The purpose of the citizens’ audits is to pressure county elections officials to stop certifying unaudited computer output as final election results, by raising public awareness of the situation and demonstrating the practicality of this practice, recommended by all national elections-administration authorities. Because many different types of voting-machine errors or fraud can reveal themselves in a high undervote rate, the audit also examined results from Madison’s Ward 9, a large precinct where votingmachine output indicated no Supreme Court vote on 1.26% of the ballots, although the Supreme Court race was the only race on that precinct’s ballot and the undervote rate among similar precincts countywide was only 0.19%. A recount of 100% of the Ward 9 ballots detected that the voting machine there had accurately counted the votes. One participant with expertise in voter registration explained that the high undervote rate may have been a function of permanent absentee voters, typically elderly people confined to their homes, returning blank ballots simply for the purpose of maintaining their permanent absentee status. A map check determined that a large elderly housing and nursing-home complex is in that ward. The process was the third such public verification conducted for voting-machine output in a Dane County election. Similar efforts are planned to follow all 2016 elections and to continue until Dane County officials adopt an official practice of transparently and routinely checking the accuracy of the computer output before they declare election results final. Public experience The experience of observers continues to be excellent. They express satisfaction— sometimes even relief—that they are able personally to confirm the vote-counting to be valid, fair, and accurate. We also note that being able to see clear images of actual ballots satisfies their curiosity about voters’ ability to mark the ballots unambiguously. In the 3,986 ballots we viewed in this verification, only one was marked so ambiguously that it required discussion. Process The process is sound and workable. Before the day began, a statistician worked with preliminary election results from the Dane County clerk’s website to calculate that we needed to count nine precincts to reach the 99.0 percent confidence level we desired to verify the Supreme Court primary. We started the day by randomly selecting those precincts, inviting observers to participate by [email protected]

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tossing dice. We then projected each precinct’s ballot images on a screen, viewable by all who were present, at a rate of either 1 or 1.5 seconds per ballot. The slower rate worked better while counters were becoming comfortable with the task; the faster rate worked better later. Teams of two counters counted votes, with one team for each of the two top candidates, and one team counting votes for anything else--the third candidate, write-ins, or blank ballots. After 25 ballots were displayed, the ballot display would pause, and the counters would individually call out the total for their candidate from those 25 ballots. If each candidate’s two counters agreed, a tabulator would write the subtotals on an easel at the front of the room and the ballot display would continue to the next batch. If any candidate’s two counters disagreed on how many votes they had seen in the batch of 25, it would be replayed until they agreed. When we had finished counting votes from all the ballots in a precinct, we compared the visual-count totals with the results published on the Dane County Clerk’s website and found no discrepancy in any precinct. Improvements can be made in the following areas: Economy of time. Obtaining valid results in as short a time as possible is important for two reasons: 1) We need to be able to convince county officials they can verify election outcomes during the county canvass process before they certify election results; and 2) We cannot achieve true transparency without citizen observers, and the more tedious the process, the more difficult it will be to attract observers. Verification of the Supreme Court race took longer than we expected based on previous verifications—roughly six hours, not counting a lunch break. However, it is likely that we could have verified the Supreme Court outcome in less than two hours had we: 

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Randomly selected individual ballots from across the entire county rather than randomly selecting entire precincts. Had we randomly selected individual ballots rather than entire precincts, the requisite initial sample size would have been only 683 ballots, approximately two average-sized precincts. We had counted this number of ballots within the first two hours. However, because we selected entire precincts, we needed to count all the ballots in 9 precincts. The ability to select random ballots across jurisdictions is a technological challenge and presents further issues for transparency. We hope to have this resolved before verification of the April election. Stopped less frequently for questions and discussion. The moderator stopped the counting process multiple times, often for ten minutes or more, to take questions from observers and novice counters, and explain the process. Because we had invited observers to drop in at any time during the day, new groups of observers arrived at different times, when the moderator stopped the counting to recap for them what we were doing and what we had accomplished up to that point. A few times, counters stopped the process for resolution of issues, such as how to count one peculiarly marked ballot. In future verifications: 1. Someone who is not participating in the counting process should be designated to explain the process to observers and to answer questions while the counting continues. 2. Novice counters can be better instructed before the verification begins, because we made note of the questions that came up. Experienced fewer software problems. The ballot-display software still has a few rough spots, and ceased functioning as intended when counters needed to repeat a single 25ballot batch and when the memory filled during counting of the largest precincts. We needed to stop several times for as much as 15 minutes while the software developer re-set the computer. The software developer is working on resolving these issues.

Ongoing tabulation of subtotals. As counters complete batches of 25 ballots, they call out their counts, so that observers can hear and verify accuracy. Someone must record each candidate’s [email protected]

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subtotals as they are called out and, when all the ballots in the precinct or sample have been counted, tabulate a total. In this verification, one person recorded the subtotals on an easel and large paper tablet, tabulating the results either with a hand-held calculator or in her head. While everyone in the room could view the subtotals as they were recorded, the tabulator made mistakes in addition that required additional time to correct, and felt nervous on occasion that she might not have correctly recorded the numbers called out by the counters. In future verifications, we should use a spreadsheet program attached to a second projector, to ensure that everyone in the room can see the subtotals as they are recorded and that the ongoing tabulation is correct. Attendance. Observers were free to come and go any time between 9AM and 4PM; a total of approximately 30 people participated or observed at various parts of the day. For three candidates, we needed continuously to have 6 counters, a slide-show operator, and a tabulator present, in addition to the statistician. We had that many at all times. New participants and observers—those who had not heard of or attended previously events—came from word-of-mouth or a promoted Facebook event. For the first time, the public audit attracted participation from some invited county officials: one county board supervisor, Tim Kiefer, and one county board of canvass member, Gretchen Lowe, observed during the day. We were delighted with their curiosity, interest, and questions, and hope that other county officials will ask them about their observation experience and their conclusions. No municipal clerks have yet attended any events, although we have received strong interest and some participation from several elections inspectors, state elections officials, and national elections-administration authorities. Costs Costs were covered by participants’ contributions. The largest cost—room rental—would not be an issue if the event were sponsored by the county. Other one-time costs (e.g., mailing invitations, printing flyers and handouts) would likely be less. Only the labor itself—the statistician, the moderator/tabulator, the counters, the operator of the ballot-projection software—would cost more if the event were sponsored by the county rather than by a volunteer citizens’ group. At $40/hour, the statistician’s and software developer’s services might cost around $600, and at $12/hour, the remaining personnel costs might be around $500, although serious consideration should be given to retaining volunteer counters. The vote-counting task can be learned in a few minutes; transparency is so complete that risk of biased counters corrupting the results is nil; and providing observers with the opportunity to count votes will increase attendance and voter confidence.

Conclusion Confirmation of the accuracy of the voting machine output in this February 2016 contest in no way reduces or eliminates the need to verify output in future elections. Any fraud-deterrence value of the election record is sacrificed when potential election thieves know that election officials are planning to accept the voting machines’ vote totals without checking their accuracy. And no sensible voter would dream of depositing his or her paycheck in a bank that, having had one clean audit, ceased routinely monitoring its computers’ accuracy in crediting deposits to the correct accounts. County officials must abandon the illogical argument that there is no need to look for computer errors affecting our election results unless and until they suspect they will find one. If elections administrators are to earn, rather than just demand, the voters’ and candidates’ trust, they need to do what all other computer-dependent administrators do: Routinely verify the accuracy of their computers’ output. Verification using risk-limiting audits and public display of the digital ballot images is: 

Effective—observers report complete satisfaction with their ability to confirm for themselves that the correct election outcome was identified;

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Efficient—the process can be completed in an amount of time that is tolerable for both participants and observers and is feasible to complete within the statutory time limit for the county canvass process; and Economical. This verification would have cost the county less than $1200, including the costs of duplicating handouts for the public. When put into context of the election-related expenses incurred by the municipalities and counties before and during Election Day; the potential benefits of a transparent official verification; and the potential costs to the County if an incorrect outcome is ever certified as final, that cost is immaterial.

The Dane County Clerk and Board of Canvass should adopt this procedure as a routine part of the canvass process following every election for two purposes: Preventing themselves from unknowingly certifying electronic miscounts as final election results; and promoting public confidence in the elections process. A more detailed report will follow. For the Wisconsin Election Integrity Action Team: Coordinator and contact person- Karen McKim; 608-212-5079 Software developer - Paul Lindquist Statistician - Andrew Bersch Logistics - Julie Crego, Barbara Wright, and Adam Grabski

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