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Nov 1, 2003 - Guy Lachapelle Ph.D. Concordia University ..... tech companies, for example, will be far more interested in locating in regions where ... Quebec government incentives to support the development of biotechnologies; forty-one.
Quebec’ international strategies: mastering globalization and new possibilities of governance

Guy Lachapelle Ph.D. Concordia University Secretary General of the International Political Science Association Stéphane Paquin, Ph.D. Research Fellow International Political Science Association

Paper presented at the Conference Québec and Canada in the New Century : New Dynamics, New Opportunities

Queen’s University School of Policy Studies Room 202

31 October – 1 November 2003

Quebec’ international strategies: mastering globalization and new possibilities of governance

The objective of this chapter is to summarize the debates and research issues related to the impact of globalization and the crisis of the nation-state and how its redefine the strategies of the Québec governments. The Québec society has become since the Second World War, and especially in the last thirty years, a more global society which simply means that Quebecers understand the importance to act not only locally but also globally. Québec governments have adopted several policies to respond to these challenges. This chapter is divided into three themes. The first theme focuses directly on the globalization debate, on its definition, on its consequences, on the transformation of the Quebec State and the international system. Clearly, globalization is redefining the political relations between Quebec, other nations, the federal government and also between the others communities within the Canadian state. The second theme looks over the issue of governance and upon the political and sociological fragmentation between Québec, as a nation, and the rest of Canada1. Globalization is expanding the set of actions of the sub-state governments and nationalist movements, such as the Parti Québécois, have in hands several means to ensure their survival as a nation. The phenomenon of paradiplomacy translates this new objective of sub-state governments to respond of the challenges of globalization. Moreover, the processes of decentralization imposed by globalization and regional integration are resulting in Québec having more and more areas of jurisdiction but not necessary the fiscal resources to pursue its goals. The strategy of the federal government toward Quebec is clearly to limit its financial capacity. The fiscal disequilibrium between Quebec and the federal government will continue to create more tensions. If it opens the door for new possibilities of governance and strategies for the Quebec government as an international actor, it can also lead to new cooperative approaches between the Quebec government, the federal and provincial governments2.

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The third theme concentrates on globalization and the emergence of identityeconomy. Modernization brought about the idea of all-embracing state national identities rooted in both cultural and civic axes. Such identities are openly questioned and have become problematic. While being corroded by the forces of globalization they are also subject to fragmentation, competition and overlapping elements of a multiple and diverse nature. The incapacity and unwillingness of the Canadian government to recognize that Quebecers form a nation is counterproductive is an era of cultural diversity. There is a noticeable strengthening of local, regional and supranational identities. The discontinuity and dislocation of social arrangement provide that different identities relate to each other in quite an unpredictable manner. In plural societies, such as Quebec, individuals are tied to cultural references group, which might be in competition among themselves. Nowadays identities are shared in various degrees by individuals and are subject to constant internationalization by group members.

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Globalization and the redefinition of the nation-state After the Second World War, the Quebec government was called upon to play an

increasingly important role in regulating the economy. Quebec society, especially at the time of the Quiet Revolution, like most liberal democracies, agreed fairly easily on the new role of the state. It was also argued that the Quebec economy had to operate under free market practices and the protection of private interests. The Quebec State gave also itself a regulatory role in order to correct market shortcomings; it took the task of stabilizing the economy. It worked to promote full employment, economic growth, price stability and external balance. It also set itself the task of ensuring an increase in the standard of living and regional development. The Quebec government also nationalized strategic sectors of the economy (Hydro-Quebec) to ensure better control over the economy and to promote national industrial development. The importance of international trade did varied from country to country, and Canada was no exception. The Quebec and Canadian development models depended

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essentially on domestic markets. The golden age of Fordism increased the importance of the nation-states by the degree of economic interaction within their borders. In short, the trend in Canada was to national and regional integration. The establishment of the welfare state at the time of the Rowell-Sirois Commission served to reinforce the legitimacy of the central state. The “provider state” appeared to be an extension of the nation-state by contributing to social unity and to the dissemination of a feeling of belonging to the national community fashioned by the state. From the welfare state, the population obtained material benefits simply by being citizens. The welfare state limited the negative effects of the market, which, in promoting competition, promoted exclusion. The Canadian system established meant that the federal government had almost a monopoly over international representation, that it was the only players in the international game; the diplomatic activities of the Canadian state were driven by a desire for power expressed primarily in terms of its diplomatic and military capabilities in world conflict. The role of foreign trade varied, but it was not predominant in economic strategies. The society of states also created an international scene dominated by them. This system created by states meant not only the start of the territorial state era, such as Canada, but it also suggested that only the juxtaposition of sovereign political communities was viable and it alone ensured order and security. Since then, the international community has promoted the stability of territorial communities, despite the claims of some sub-state nationalist movements. The desire was for a stable system and the cultural movements operating within the territorial states, the only guarantors of world stability, were marginalized or assimilated. The effect of the international system was then to facilitate the work of the territorial governments, such as the Canadian federal government, by ensuring greater stability for them. The international system thus, through its own construction, effectively channeled national invention. Only the territorial state could represent the nation, thus, eliminating competition by the churches3 and the cultural or ethnic communities from the international stage.

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We acknowledged that the state-centre approach may at times minimize the influence of non-governmental actors in the governance process, and at times overemphasize the role of the public sector in setting the course for society, by arguing that ultimately it is institutions of government which are imbued with the legitimacy to impose the stability that is required in society. The mere fact that governance structures may take many forms (local, regional, national or transnational level), and that in many instances governments do not necessarily completely control actions in both the economy and society, does not necessarily remove governance from the purview of state institutions. The state-centre perspective is therefore particularly salient, as it recognizes that governments are not dead.

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The impact of globalization on governance: paradiplomacy and the new strategies of the Quebec governments Contemporary globalization has dropped this model and is preventing its

reconstruction. The victim of globalization is the nation-state whose capacity to regulate the national economy has been significantly reduced. The Canadian State is no exception. The relationship between state power and territory is of a more complex nature than that of the period of the modern nation-state. Indeed, authority is increasingly spread among the various public and private players on the international, national, regional and local stages.

Faced with all this change, the nation-state began to redefine its role in

connection with market forces and with its citizens. The state changed its role as regulator of the national economy and focused on world competition. Globalization is changing the rules of the game for all the players and this situation is making room for new strategies, for new methods of operating and new possibilities of governance. The effects of globalization are recognized as the most important factor, which fundamentally impacts the government’s ability to respond to an ever-increasing number of public policy issues. As the Treasury Board of Canada argues, “globalization can no longer be regarded simply as an economic or trade issue. Its

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impacts are widespread, and they shape choices from the environment to taxes, from social policy to the allocation of resources across sectors”4. Increasingly, the government’s activities are defined by international frameworks, such as World Trade Organizations (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the OECD, as well as influenced by regional trading blocks like the European Union, NAFTA and APEC. As an offshoot of globalization, comes the transcendence of national borders. No longer bound by the artificial limitations of territoriality, many public issues are seen as requiring the collective actions of numerous stakeholders, in order to protect or advance the interests of individual nations. The Quebec governments have notices this new reality in the last twenty years5. Several governance models are associated with theories that appear to minimize the role of the governments in contemporary society. In particular, they are premised upon a perspective that substitutes the traditional role of formal governmental actors in favor of a number of “self-organizing, inter-organizational networks”. Implicit within these theories is an assumption that governments have lost their capacity to govern, as it has been eroded by the effects of socio-political forces, such as globalization and technology; new institutions of government have emerged, like the market place, supranational organizations, or sub-state’ paradiplomacy. As Henry Teune wrote: “A major long-term consequence of globalization as social development is a more complex set of economic, political, and social entities to which humans belong and their activities are attached. One way of seeing this in or time of purposeful political re-organization and alignment is as a messy re-federating of the world into economic regions, security arrangements as well as local-national relations within countries. In the long run, social development will lead to continuing deterritorialization of social, political, and economic structures and, consequently, the role of physical place as a determinant of human behavior will diminish as is manifest today in the expansion of electronic communications, the rise of global, universal human rights, and the decentralization of production”6.

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The phenomenon of paradiplomacy is not recent. The Quebec Government, for instance, began to play a role on the international stage as early as the 19th century. To explain this stepping-up or broadening of paradiplomatic efforts of Quebec governments, especially since the 60’s in Quebec and in Europe in the 1980’s several explanations are proposed. Three variables stand at the forefront of the expansion of paradiplomacy. The first and most significant is certainly globalization and the nation-state crisis; secondly, nationalism; and thirdly the internationalization processes. However, at this stage of research, it is not easy to generalize, owing to differing objectives and motivations of sub-governmental powers such as Quebec. The current paradiplomacy era, that is to say the period extending from the early 60’s to date, is considered a distinct historic period defined in terms of growth, dynamism and its repercussions on the international behaviour and activities of sovereign players. Some of the sizeable paradiplomatic files that we can identify are economic and commercial policy, foreign investment promotion, the attractiveness of decision-making centres, export promotion, as well as science and technology, energy, the environment, education, issues of culture, and immigration, population mobility, multilateral relations, international development and human rights. Today, players on the paradiplomatic stage are becoming similarly interested in matters of human safety. Competition to attract foreign investments is not a universal fact. Only a limited number of regions take part in the race. Each one of these regions must meet certain criteria to make them attractive to potential investors7. Investors despise uncertainty; they try at all costs to limit the amount of risk involved in their investments. To keep these risks at a minimum, investors set down a number of investment prerequisites such as stability of the political and economic regime, and an efficient and impartial justice system. Potential investors may also consider other factors such as access to a broad market, quality communication and transportation systems, the consistent success of local businesses as well as real-estate costs and availability, the price of manpower regulation, environmental policies, quality of life within the community, taxation, as well as utilities and their cost, business services and their costs, government incentives, education and

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training infrastructures, and proximity to suppliers and raw materials, and finally, university resources8. Governments will thus do their utmost to meet these criteria. In a world of limited rationality and muddled information, governments must also look for ways to assist investors by means of investment incentive policies. In general, government or multilateral agencies issue these policies; their techniques come under the heading of marketing. The marketing of countries, regions or cities is a fundamental component of a territory’s attractiveness. Promotional techniques play a more and more significant role and are even high on the agenda of many countries, regions or even cities. Promotional policies consist of four components: 1) The creation of an appealing image or openness to business for the territory; 2) the implementation of services geared to potential investors; 3) a policy aimed at targeting potential investors; 4) financial incentives. Investment promotion agencies such as Invest-Quebec, in Quebec, or COPCA in Catalonia, underwrite these activities9. Creation of a positive image is indispensable. The frequent visits of Quebec’ Prime ministers and ministers to the World Economic Forum or to New York are part of this strategy. For example, the fact that Jean Charest, the new Quebec premier has travelled three times to New York during his first six months in office translate clearly this objective10. A policy of this type is designed to correct conventional wisdom and stereotypes that tend to paint a bleak picture of the investment climate in the region11. Prejudice often critically influences investment decisions. To counter the effects of a negative image, many regions will implement policies aimed at informing potential investors about the region’s advantages from an investment point of view, and to track down potential investors. We can expect a plethora of business activities such as development of Internet sites, attendance at trade fairs and countless economic missions with politicians, business people and members of the civil society, such as unions. The Davos summits will no doubt attract Quebec and Catalan politicians. The former Quebec Minister of Finance, Pauline Marois, declared in 2002 that she returned from a special world economic summit held in New York with contracts for the Province of Quebec worth 750 million dollars12. Moreover, in 1998 alone, the Quebec Government led more than 120 foreign trade missions. 8

Governments have also created a number of financial incentives to draw companies to their territory13. For example, every year, American states and cities spend billions of dollars to attract and sustain foreign companies or companies that have come from elsewhere in the country. Today, the United States invites the highest rate of foreign trade in the world. Foreign companies have helped create 5 million jobs in the United States14. They also provide capital, technology, business management, and marketing strategies. American states and cities offer foreign companies very lucrative incentives even though these companies seriously intend to set up business in the United States to compete in that country’s marketplace. From local politicians’ perspective, there can be only one winner at this game in the United States. Therefore, if financial inducements can secure, for these politicians, the establishment of a foreign business enterprise on their territory, they are prepared to engage in a battle of unhealthy competition against other American states and cities. A number of politicians believe that financial inducements are the best if not the only way in which a state or a city can achieve international recognition. Foreign high tech companies, for example, will be far more interested in locating in regions where there already exists a solid concentration of this type of business. In the United States, these regions are: Silicon Valley, Boston, and the greater New York area. In Canada, this concentration is situated in Montréal. Other regions hoping to form an industrial cluster may be tempted to resort to substantial inducements, which, it is believed, will make all the difference in the world. A Montana politician expressed it very well in these words: “Montana and Wyoming might as well be on a different planet as far as the Japanese are concerned”15. Quebec is also attempting to set up a development model based on a partnership between the government, its economic agencies and the private sector. This particular strategy is reinforced by a culture and a political project toward nation-building. While the goal of such policies might to be perceived to ensure that the citizens retain control over their economy, today, they are integrated into an overall plan to include Quebec in international markets16. The most advanced model, according to Michael Keating, is the Quebec model known as the Québec inc. Quebec companies benefited and still benefits from a number of advantages that enable them to meet and deal with the challenges of 9

globalization simply by tapping the creative potential of social consultation. One of its basic tenets is international policy-making17. For example, the governor of the Minnesota, Tim Pawlenty, declared recently during a visit in Québec that he was impressed by the Quebec government incentives to support the development of biotechnologies; forty-one (41) American states have similar policies to attract foreign investments18. Substate governments also frequently make international loan requests to help consolidate their region’s economic development. Major hydroelectric projects in Quebec have had financial backing from Wall Street. The amount of the loans requires that Quebec Government officials travel to New York on a daily basis to put investors’ minds at rest19. These days, cities and regions act in the same manner as any other country when the time comes to make international loans. The cost of borrowing today is set on an international rate based on bond and credit markets. As suggested: “Regions today differ from countries only in ways that are quite subtle”20. Cross-frontier regions also set up transborder policies in order to lay out communication infrastructures as well as road network infrastructures. The Quebec Government and the State of New York have agreed to improve commercial trade along the North-South corridor. There is even talk of building a high-speed train system. There are approximately twenty (20) commercial trade corridors at present between Canada and the U.S. They were created between Canadian provinces and American States following ratification of the Free Trade Agreement and the growth of North-South trade. Other substate government, such as the Catalan government, also encouraged this policy formula with French transborder regions; we will soon see high-speed trains (TGV) zooming to Barcelona. A few short hours separate the Catalan city from such commercial trade centres as Montpellier, Lyon and Paris. These trends also lead to the emergence of new forms of regionalism which are a response to new trading agreements. As Adam Gwiazda suggests, this “new regionalism” has been pursued on a much larger scale than the old regionalism since the 1960s, and its most important characteristics is the search for new forms of economic, political and social partnerships between nations/regions and citizens21. Issues of competitiveness,

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development of “super regions” and transnational strategic alliances show signs of globalization; this, in turn, enhances the role that regions play. Quebec is looking toward such strategies of transborder cooperation. Model such as the Quatre moteurs pour l’Europe help to fuel the dissemination of knowledge, principally at the technological and scientific levels. This type of alliance has fostered a redefinition of space for regions and cities involved in a global economy. These same regions or cities choose their strategies based more on challenges that stem from globalization than on the diktats of a domestic economy. Montréal International has played a central role in the development of Montréal as an international city; since its creation in 1996, by attracting foreign investments and international organizations22.

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Globalization and the rise of Quebec identity-economy As we argued elsewhere, globalization is also reshaping identities to the point that

nation-state who refused to recognize the specificity of their sub-national culture have a tendency to exclude themselves from the world economy. Nations-state with weak national identity, like Canada, will not be able to face the challenges of a global economy. The Quebec economic model is also responsible for the development of what we have defined as “identity economy” that is a share sense of belonging to a “national community” among citizens23. It is not a coincidence if Quebec has seen the continentalization of its economy, following the signature of FTA (Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement) and NAFTA(North American Free Trade Agreement), as a mean to escape the internal Canadian pressure and limitations. Nations with strong identity support economic integration. Moreover, nations cannot rely only of their department of foreign or external affairs to carry their diplomacy. This role of promoting this “identity economy” is now in the ends of several “policy entrepreneurs” (business peoples, intellectuals, artists, etc.). A similar concept was proposed by the former Flemish’ Minister-President, Luc Van den Brande, as a mean to define and shape Flanders’ role as a player on the international

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scene24. Mr. Van den Brande took a series of initiatives to enhance the image of his country25. He formulated a policy to emphasize the concept of “economic culture” or “cultural economy” through which he attempted to place Flanders on the European political map, primarily by setting up an international foundation known as “l'Europe des cultures 2002”, by launching l’Assemblée des Régions de l'Europe, and by nominating cultural ambassadors26. All foreign relations vehicles (political, cultural, and economic with elements of foreign trade and foreign investments, and development cooperation) were settled solely on the shoulders of the Minister-President. This brand image was used as an instrument to reach fundamental objectives. It is mainly the distinctly arrogant, antiWalloon feature of such a policy, however, that left a strong impression on the public as well as on the media. The present government regime has chosen, first and foremost, a more consensual domestic policy and an open dialogue between the Flemish and the Walloons. Another distinctive element is the definition of a nation’s needs or interests. When regions maintain international relations, they are required to identify a “national interest” that may come into conflict with that of the central State. For example, Quebec political parties’ unanimous endorsement of NAFTA facilitated its ratification; this unleashed a great deal of opposition in the rest of Canada. The culture and definition of the national interest have a bearing on the choice of negotiators. Scots are more in favour of European integration than their neighbours to the south. At the time of a vote on the introduction of the Euro, the Scottish population may have tipped the scales. While developing strong ties with the French Government, the Government of Quebec has forced the Canadian Government to include the Hexagonal factor (France) in its international priorities27. Conversely, the Flemish government will promote solid bilateral linkage with the Netherlands and South Africa, because of its cultural affinities with these countries. Flanders is even looking to develop permanent anchor points in Dutch embassies based on the model of foreign cultural centres. The objective is to create a type of DutchFlemish house that encourages the dissemination of culture throughout both countries. In return, they will contest the granting of credits to intrude act in Africa in French spheres of influence.

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The development of paradiplomacy is also a power struggle between sub-state nationalist movements and players on centre stage. The attitude of central governments relative to the intrusion of sub-state nationalist movements into the private preserve of their foreign policy and the country’s foreign representation is, from the offset, basically negative28. Loss of monopoly gives central governments cause to perceive a great danger for the nation’s foreign image. It is important to remember that players in the middle are also nationalists. The hostile attitude of central governments allows entrepreneurs seeking an identity to carry out social mobilization against the centre’s argument over a policy of supremacy. Because foreign policy is perceived as a domain reserved to the State, the development of paradiplomacy becomes, in this context, a struggle for power and legitimacy29. The FTA, as well as the NAFTA, was subject to the same logic. In fact, a number of provisions of the FTA and the NAFTA require that provincial governments make adjustments to their statutes. This situation has led the Ontario government, who was against ratification of the NAFTA, to envisage the possibility of challenging the constitutionality of the NAFTA before Canadian tribunals. The Ontario government determined with reason that the NAFTA cuts across provincial jurisdiction in matters of labour, the environment, services and financial institutions. The GATT agreements of 1947 and the NAFTA of 1994 have had a significant impact on provincial jurisdictions and the balance of powers, because these treaties presuppose a more powerful Federal government to enact these agreements. Thus, these treaties have had major impact on Canada’s internal constitutional order30. More recently, the issue of cultural diversity has been a success of the Quebec paradiplomacy. This statement was made by both the new Quebec liberal minister of International Relations, Monique Gagnon-Tremblay, the minister of Culture and Communication, Line Beauchamp31, and the former Parti québécois’ minister of International Relations, Louise Beaudoin32. In December 1998, during his visit in Québec, the fomer French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, signed with the Quebec Prime minister, Lucien Bouchard, an agreement to establish a working group on cultural diversity. The report of this group, co-chaired by Catherine Lalumière, French socialist deputy and Quebec former deputy, Marie Malavoy, was published in June 2002. Several 13

interest groups, such as the Union des artistes, and its president, Pierre Curzi, played a key role in the discussion. In October 2002, during the Francophone summit in Beyrouth, the former Quebec Prime minister, Bernard Landry, brought this issue and the Francophonie adopted the idea of an international treaty on cultural diversity33. As Louise Beaudoin wrote it, for first time a bilateral agreement signed between France and Québec has become an international treaty. It is strange to observe Sheila Copps talking recently about a “personal” victory34. 4.

Conclusion Globalization is reshaping the social basis of political conflict and the strategies of

sub-state governments. Therefore, the “question nationale” in Québec is not a “concept dépassé”, as suggested by one Canadian Prime Minister; Quebec sovereignty remains for many Quebecers a “viable and compelling challenge”. Globalization is one of the key factors explaining the growing support toward Quebec independence in the last ten years. The latest poll by the Centre for Research and Information on Canada indicated that the support for sovereignty-partnership was at 47 %35. By cutting the benefits of integration and by reducing the obstacles to independence or the various forms of autonomy, globalization and regional integration promotes Québec sovereignty. As several public opinion specialists have observed, the key explanation for the growing support toward sovereignty in the last twenty-five years is the decrease in the risks associated with Quebec independence36. Therefore, even if the federal government continues to deprive Quebec for its economic resources, by reducing its transfer payments and increasing taxes, the fact that Quebec is one of the more open economies in the world makes Quebec an international trade partner less dependent on the Canadian domestic market. Quebec has become an international actor and has adopted strategies similar to many sub-states entities. New forms of partnership will certainly emerge in the next few years.

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Endnotes 1

The Quebec society has never been recognized by the Canadian government as a nation. Quebec constitutes at the utmost for federal politicians a cultural component of Canada. Hélène Buzzetti, « Les élus fédéraux se prononcent sur le statut du Québec: une simple province ou une nation? », Le Devoir, 28 octobre 2003, p. A3. 2

Guy Lachapelle and Stéphane Paquin (eds.), Mastering Globalization: New Sub-States’s Governance and Strategies. London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2004 (fortcomimg).

3

There have been few mentions how religious communities in Quebec were among the first to play an international role. It was especially the case of Sister Bernadette Morin in Chili in the 19th century and members of other religious communities in Africa in the early nineteen-sixties. 4

Treasury Board of Canada.

5

Ministère des Relations internationales du Québec, Le Québec dans un ensemble international en mutation: plan stratégique, 2001-2004. Québec, 2000.

6

Henry Teune, « Local Responses to the Globalization of our Era », in Guy Lachapelle and Stéphane Paquin (eds.), Mastering Globalization: New Sub-States’s Governance and Strategies. London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2004 (fortcomimg). See also H. Teune and Z. Mlinar, « The Developmental Logic of Globalization », in J. Ciprut (ed.), The Art of the Feud: Reconceptualizing International Relations. Westport, CT, Praeger, 2000. 7

Charles-Albert Michalet, La séduction des nations ou comment attirer les investissements étrangers, Paris, Économica, 1999, 47. 8

Charles-Albert Michalet, Ibid., 85.

9

Stéphane Paquin, La paradiplomatie identitaire en Catalogne, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2003. 10 11

Martin Ouellet, « Le Québec, société ouverte au capital », Le Devoir, 4-5 octobre 2003, p. A5. Michel Venne, « L’image du Québec », Le Devoir, 6 October 2003, p. A7.

12

Éric Desrosiers, « Forum économique mondial. Des projets de 750 millions pour le Québec », Le Devoir, 5 February 2002.

13

Peter S. Fisher and Alan H. Peters, Industrial Incentives: Competition Among American States and Cities, Kalamazoo, MI, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1998.

14

Earl H. Fry, The Expanding Role of State and Local Governments in U.S. Foreign Affairs, New York, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1998.

15

Earl H. Fry, Ibid., 66.

16

Louis Balthazar, « Conscience nationale et contexte international », dans Louis Balthazar, Guy Laforest and Vincent Lemieux (eds.), Le Québec et la reconstruction du Canada, 1980-1992, Québec, Septentrion, 1991.

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17

Michael Keating, « Regions and International Affairs: Motives, Opportunities and Strategies », in Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating, Paradiplomacy in Action. The Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 1999.

18

Alec Castonguay, “Développement des biotechnologies – Le Minnesota songe à imiter le Québec », Le Devoir, 30 September 2003, B3.

19

Canadian Press, “Le gouvernement Charst inspire confiance à l’agence Moody’s – la cote « A1 avec perspectives positives » du Québec est maintenue », Le Devoir, 4-5 October 2003, p. C1. 20

Brian Hocking, « Patrolling the ‘Frontier’: Globalization, Localization and the ‘Actor ness’ of NonCentral Governments, in Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating, Ibid., 20.

21

Adam Gwiazda, Globalization and Regionalization of the World Economy, Torun, Adam Marszalek, 1998.

22

Montréal International, Bilan des activités 2002, Montréal, 2002.

23

Guy Lachapelle, “Identity, Integration and the Rise of Identity Economy: The Quebec Case in Comparison with Scotland, Wales and Catalonia”, in Guy Lachapelle and John Trent (eds.). Globalization, Governance and Identity: The Emergence of New Partnerships, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2000, 211-231.

24

Françoise Massart-Piérard, “Politique des relations extérieures et identité politique: la stratégie des entités fédérées de Belgique”, Études internationals, 30: 4 (December), 1999, 715.

25

Luc Van den Brande, “La Flandre et sa vocation internationale », Minister of the Flanders Government responsible for External Policies, European Affairs, Science and Technology, and Political Priorities 19951999, October 1995. David Criekemans and Timon Bo Salomonson, The Foreign Policy of Federations: Flemmish Versus Belgian Image Building, University of Anvers, 2000, unpublished document.

26

Michael Keeting, “Paradiplomacy and Regional Networking”, Forum of Federation: An International Federalism, October 2000, unpublished document, 3. 27

Sophie Niquette, Québec-France: Portrait d’une relation en movement, Gouvernement du Québec, Ministère des Relations internationales du Québec, 2002.

28

Stéphane Paquin, “Devrait-on fermer les délégations du Québec à l’étranger?. Le Devoir, 11 octobre 2002, p. A9.

29

André Lecours and Luis Moreno, “Paradiplomacy and Stateless Nations: A Reference to the Basque Country”, Working paper 01-06, Unidad de Politicas Comparadas (CSCI), 2001, 5.

30

Guy Gosselin and Gordon Maca, “Souveraineté et mutation de territoire: le cas canadien”. In J.-P. Augustin, L’institutionalisation du territoire au Canada, Montréal and Bordeaux, Université de Montréal and Université de Bordeaux, 1996, 61.

31

Monique Gagnon-Tremblay et Line Beauchamp, « Diversité culturelle - Un succès pour la diplomatie québécoise », Le Devoir, 24 October 2003, p. A9.

32

Louise Beaudoin, « Diversité culturelle – La mémoire courte », Le Devoir, 22 October 2003, p. A7.

33

Louise Beaudoin, « Il nous faut un Kyoto de la culture », Le Devoir, 20 September 2002, p. A9.

34

Nicole Vulser, “Un axe franco-canadien pour la diversité culturelle”, Le Monde, 14 October 2003.

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35

Centre for Research and Information on Canada, October 2003.

36

Maurice Pinard et coll., Un combat inachevé, Sainte-Foy, Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1997.

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