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Scientific inquiry on how groups decide: The Davisonian approach Norbert L. Kerr and R. Scott Tindale Group Processes Intergroup Relations 2012 15: 577 DOI: 10.1177/1368430212455119 The online version of this article can be found at: http://gpi.sagepub.com/content/15/5/577
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10.1177/1368430212455119Group Processes & Intergroup RelationsKerr and Tindale
2012
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations Editorial
Scientific inquiry on how groups decide: The Davisonian approach
G P I R
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 15(5) 577–584 © The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1368430212455119 gpir.sagepub.com
Norbert L. Kerr1 ,2 and R. Scott Tindale3
Abstract This special issue of GPIR is a tribute to the many contributions to the scientific study of group processes made by James H. Davis, who died on November 16, 2010. In this brief introductory piece, we will provide a bit of background on Jim’s life and work, describe his characteristic method of inquiry, which we might term the Davisonian approach, and preview the papers in this issue, each of which illustrate aspects of that Davisonian approach and make an original contribution to our understanding of group behavior.
Biographical sketch James Henry Davis was born on August 6, 1932, in the small town of Effingham, Illinois. Besides exhibiting the usual interests of a bright youngster, Jim, who was a tall boy (eventually growing to be 6’3”), became an enthusiastic and skilled basketball player in a region (southern Illinois and nearby Indiana) where the sport is followed with a nearly religious passion. By the time he graduated from high school in 1950, he had developed into an all-conference athlete. He would remain an avid amateur athlete for the rest of his life, first at tennis and later at golf. As an undergraduate at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, Jim studied social science (viz. psychology and sociology) and natural science (viz. chemistry and biology). The year 1954 was an eventful one for him—graduating from the university, marrying his childhood sweetheart Elisabeth (Betty) Bachman, and beginning a two-year term of service as an officer in the US Army. After his stint in the military, which included commands in the Aleutian Islands
and the Arctic, he began graduate work in social and quantitative psychology at Michigan State University, where Frank Restle was his primary academic advisor. He received his PhD in 1961 and launched his professional career at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. Jim flourished at Miami and was soon promoted, but he itched to be in a more researchfocused environment, so in 1966 he made an unusual and professionally risky decision—he would resign his tenured position, uproot his young family, and take a one-year temporary post at Yale University. A year later he moved with Betty and his three children (Kris, Steven, 1
Michigan State University, USA University of Kent, UK 3 Loyola University Chicago, USA 2
Corresponding author: Norbert L. Kerr, Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA. Email:
[email protected]
578 and Leah) to his alma mater, the University of Illinois, where he would remain for the rest of his distinguished career (with occasional leaves of absence––at the London School of Economics, University of Victoria, the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, and the University of Kent). In 1997 he retired. His active retirement years were devoted to reading, writing (including a couple of unpublished mysteries), travelling, golf, and spending time with his children and grandchildren.
The Davisonian approach: Substance Throughout his career, Jim was fascinated by human groups. More specifically, he spent his career pursuing what Floyd Allport (1962) once identified as the master question of social psychology—how to relate the behavior of individuals to the behavior of groups. That preoccupation was evident from the very beginning of his career, when he was a doctoral student at Michigan State University. He wanted to show that you could account for the speed with which a group could solve a puzzle by knowing how fast individuals could solve it. That work (Davis & Restle, 1963; Restle & Davis, 1962) foreshadowed much of what was to come. Jim loved the elegance and precision of mathematical models, and usually found a way of expressing his ideas in those terms. He also liked the idea of using the predictions of those formal models as baselines, against which he could compare actual group behavior. In that early work, Jim began with a model that assumed that groups would solve a problem at the speed of their fastest solving member. When it became clear that this model overpredicted the speed of groups’ solutions, he modified the model by assuming that the more nonsolvers the group contained, the slower solvers could progress; the latter model nicely predicted group solution speed. These early ideas reached fruition ten years later in a seminal paper (Davis, 1973) where Jim unveiled his SDS or social decision scheme
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 15(5) theory. Although it was expressed in what might look like a complex matrix algebra equation, P = π · D, the basic idea was simple—group decisions could often be predicted and understood using simple rules for combining individual preferences (see Stasser, 1999, for an introduction to the SDS). Using the SDS model, Jim and his colleagues were able to shed light on many aspects of that master question of social psychology. He helped us to understand, for example, why group choices are usually more extreme or polarized than individual decisions (Kerr, Davis, Meek, & Rissman, 1975), when and why groups are sometimes more and sometimes less subject to biases in judgment than individuals (e.g., Irwin & Davis, 1995), why groups are often better problem solvers than their average member (e.g., Laughlin, Kerr, Davis, Halff, & Marciniak, 1975), how shifts in member confidence precede and predict shifts in their preferences (Stasser & Davis, 1981), how to capture the effects of group member status on social influence in groups (Kirchler & Davis, 1986), and how to predict group memory performance from individual member memory (Vollrath, Sheppard, Hinsz, & Davis,1989). Applying the SDS model, Jim developed an abiding interest in one particularly important decision making group—the jury. Over the next few decades, his work revealed many of the secrets of this rather mysterious decision making group. For example, it shed light on when and why the size and consensus-rule of the jury matter (Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975; Kerr et al., 1976), whether it makes any difference in what order juries consider multiple charges (Davis, Tindale, Nagao, Hinsz, & Robertson, 1984), and how minorities, even small minorities of one, like the Henry Fonda character in Twelve Angry Men, sometimes manage to prevail in juries (Davis, Kerr, Stasser, Meek, & Holt, 1977). One very productive line of research focused on how seemingly minor procedural matters—e.g., whether (Davis, Stasson, Ono, & Zimmerman, 1988) or when (Davis, Stasson, Parks, & Hulbert, 1993) straw polls were taken; the order in which sequential polling of jurors was conducted (Davis, Kameda, Parks, Stasson, & Zimmerman,
Kerr and Tindale 1989)––could strongly influence the process and product of jury deliberation. And because juries not only reach simple verdicts, but often must assess damages in civil cases, he found a way of extending the logic of the SDS model from decision tasks with a few discrete options (e.g., guilty vs. not guilty) to those on a continuous dimension (e.g., a dollar amount in a damage award; Davis, 1996). It’s safe to say that in the coming decades, scholars who continue to wrestle with the master question of social psychology and strive to understand not just juries, but all sorts of performance and decision making groups, will build on the insights provided by this remarkable scientist.
The Davisonian approach: Style We have already noted a couple of the stylistic characteristics of the Davisonian approach—a reliance upon formal mathematical modeling and the regular use of theoretical baselines to test and refine models. Jim was also a strong proponent of using simulations—what he liked to call “thought experiments” (Davis & Kerr, 1986)—to explore the consequences of alternative theoretical assumptions. He argued that it made much more sense to first manipulate model parameters in simulations to explore their likely effects before undertaking empirical studies, particularly in an area like groups research where empirical work is particularly costly. Jim was a co-founder and fixture of what the late Joe McGrath (1997) called the Illinois School of groups research [which Joe contrasted with two other prominent approaches to the study of groups––the Harvard School (Bales et al.) and the Michigan School (Lewin, Festinger, and their colleagues)]. The Illinois School was more than the physical proximity of a set of gifted scholars (which at one time or another included, besides Jim, J. McGrath, P. Laughlin, S. Komorita, I. Steiner, F. Fiedler, C. Hulin, and others). It was an approach to the study of groups with distinctive characteristics, including a receptiveness to formal modeling, frequent use of social combination
579 models like the SDS model (see Laughlin, 1980), a focus on groups that got something done (e.g., made judgments, reached decisions, formed effective coalitions), an insistence on methodological and statistical rigor, and an expansion of interests beyond the typical, short-term, ad hoc laboratory group to larger (e.g., organizations) and real (e.g., juries, teams) groups that interacted across time. Jim’s work embodied all of these themes. Another distinctive feature of the Illinois School was its emphasis on the moderating role of group task— they insisted that there were few (if any) generalizations about group behavior that did not depend crucially upon just what you asked the group to do. Jim and Pat Laughlin applied the SDS to a wide range of group choice tasks. Their work eventually showed that the way in which groups combined the resources (e.g., preferences, proposed solutions) of their members depended crucially upon whether or not there existed a choice or solution that could be reasonably construed as “correct” (e.g., Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) The Davisonian style naturally reflected Jim’s personality and intellect. The latter was sharp and penetrating, curious about matters both close to and far from his own scholarly preoccupations, and quick to see through a weak or poorly structured argument. Many of the readers of this special issue may not have had the good fortune to know Jim, but all have the opportunity to read his published work, which you will find is, like the man, eloquent and elegantly expressed. Personally, Jim was witty and charming, an entertaining host or companion, generous with his time, and genuinely interested in people. In general, he did not suffer fools gladly, with the unfailing exception of his (routinely foolish) students. Jim always referred to his graduate students fondly (although inaccurately) as the “Crack Staff ”. Several generations of Crack Staffers, including several of the contributors to this special issue, arrived at Illinois green and with mostly mush between our ears,(true, at least for this issue’s editors) but wanting to become crack social psychologists. We all had the extraordinary good luck of drawing Jim as our advisor and mentor. Jim taught us how to think more clearly and critically, how to develop
580 our ideas, to translate those ideas into sound research and to communicate our findings effectively. But we were even more lucky to share a mentor who taught us so many important lessons about the art of living: to have patience with those who are beginners; to always be supportive, generous with praise and credit; to take one’s work very seriously, but not to take oneself too seriously; and to live life vigorously, with an active curiosity, and always with a sense of humor.
The special issue This special issue is neither a eulogy nor a Festschrift. Rather it is a collection of six original papers on the broad theme of “How Groups Decide”. Our primary goal was to solicit work that is representative of where the field is now and where it will be going in the future. Substantive ties with Jim’s own work were welcome, but by no means essential. We did, however, hope that all the papers would reflect one or more aspects of the general Davisonian approach to science that we have tried to capture in this introduction, and we take some satisfaction that this goal at least has been met. There were several possible ways to organize the issue. We finally settled on starting with papers with the strongest or most direct links with Jim’s own substantive work and finishing with those that explored aspects of “how groups decide” that were more distant from Jim’s usual interests. The first paper, by Kerr and MacCoun (2012), examines a phenomenon that Jim Davis speculated about in his original SDS paper (Davis, 1973), and subsequently confirmed empirically (Davis et al., 1975, Davis, Stasser, Spitzer, & Holt, 1976). He called it the “defendant protection norm”—a tendency for pro-acquittal factions in criminal juries to prevail more often than comparable pro-conviction factions. This asymmetry in the social decision scheme matrix that summarized criminal jury decision making was subsequently replicated several times and shown to be meta-analytically robust (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). However, this early research was based exclusively on jury simulation studies. Later
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 15(5) analyses of actual juries’ decisions seemed to find either no such asymmetry or even an opposite one. After reviewing the relevant research, Kerr and MacCoun suggest that this apparent difference between mock and actual juries may be artifactual, and reanalyse the available field data to test their suggestion. The second paper by Tindale, Smith, DykemaEnblade, and Kluwe (2012) rests clearly within the Davidsonian approach and uses both experimental methods and SDS modeling to challenge a common assumption about why groups make poor decisions. Ever since Janis (1982) published his analysis of notorious group debacles in terms of his construct “groupthink”, the term has become synonymous with poor group decisionmaking. Janis argued that poor group decisions emerged from a convergence of several “bad” aspects of groups, including a very directive leader, excessive cohesiveness and loyalty to the leader, poor information search, and high time pressure, among others. Interestingly, most of the empirical work since Janis’ original treatise has failed to support many of its underlying assumptions (except for poor information search), and some of the “bad” characteristics often turned out to be generally good. Based on work by Jim Davis showing that larger factions tend to win, and work by Laughlin and Ellis (1986) that shared frames of reference can sometimes let minority factions carry the day, Tindale et al. show both theoretically and empirically that the same basic group processes that usually lead groups to perform well (i.e., ourperform individuals working alone), can also, under some circumstances, lead groups to perform poorly (i.e., less well than individuals). Thus, poor performance by groups does not need to be explained by bad processes, but can simply result from groups being groups (i.e., from acting in ways that are functional in most contexts, but turn out to be disfunctional in other contexts). Research utilizing Davis’ SDS model is prototypic of the social combination approach to analysing and understanding how groups decide (cf. Laughlin, 1980). An older approach, more characteristic of the Harvard School and sociological
Kerr and Tindale research on such questions, was the social communication approach—it asked, “who said what to whom?” There have been several attempts to integrate these approaches, none more successfully than the work initiated by Stasser and his colleagues on groups’ propensity to ignore information that the members do not share prior to group interaction (see Stasser & Titus, 2003, for an overview). Much of this research used the hidden-profile task, which manipulated information availability so that the shared information recommended one alternative choice, while the totality of available information recommended a different choice. Of course, in real world decision tasks, it is often the group members themselves, not some external agent like an experimenter, that acquire choice-relevant information. And it is possible that information that is usually shared among members is also distinctive in other ways (e.g., it’s perceived relevance to the decision task; it’s interest value to individuals). In their contribution, Stasser, Abele, and Parsons (2012) examine a group decision setting with much looser constraints on information availability, and are thereby able to explore the relative importance of how many members of the group share a bit of information (the focus of most prior laboratory research) vs. other important informational features (e.g., whether individuals actively select the information from a larger pool). Their findings both confirm some older insights, and also extend our understanding of how groups acquire and use information when they decide. Davis’ SDS model usually assumes that the choice options available to the group are the same as those available to the individual group members. However, early in his research on the jury, Jim had to deal with the fact that juries sometimes hang—i.e., fail to achieve a sufficient level of agreement for any particular verdict. And he later found that some variables are more strongly related to this failure to reach a decision than to the any particular verdict; for example, the size of the jury is not strongly related to conviction rates, but is strongly related to hung jury rates, at least for very close cases (Davis et al., 1975; Kerr & MacCoun, 1985). Such work illustrated that
581 sometimes the failure or refusal of groups to decide could often be just as interesting as what successful decision making groups do decide. Until fairly recently (e.g., Nijstad, 2008; Nijstad & Kaps, 2008), there has been very little systematic research on group decision refusal. Nijstad and Oltmanns’ (2012) paper contributes to this small but fascinating literature. Using insights derived from the Motivated Information Processing in Groups (MIP-G) model (DeDreu, Nijstad, & Van Knippenberg, 2008), they examine the effects of two kinds of member motivation— epistemic motivation or the desire to “get it right” when making a decision, and social motivation or the desire to strive for good joint vs. good personal outcomes—on decision refusal. They also examine how these member motivations affect the reliance on two strategies that decision making groups may employ to handle conflicts in preferences among members—viz. forcing (trying to force one’s personal preferences on the other members) and problem solving (trying to find a mutually-rewarding collective choice). In most of his research, Jim Davis focused on the question of how groups decide at what McGrath (1984) called Choose tasks—essentially making a choice among several alternatives. In his taxonomy of group tasks (the group task circumplex), McGrath called another, neighboring category of group tasks Negotiate tasks—contexts where group members must resolve conflicts of interest. In both task contexts there are conflicts: in Choose tasks, the conflicts are usually disagreements among group members about the best choice; in Negotiate tasks, there are often complex conflicts of interest (e.g., choice A is most rewarding for one member, choice B is most rewarding for another member). A particularly interesting and common Negotiation task is the social dilemma (Dawes, 1980), a mixed-motive context in which one course of action (the noncooperative or defecting choice) maximally benefits individual group members, but another (the cooperative choice) maximally benefits the group as a whole. In Choose tasks, there is usually a requirement that groups move from dissensus to consensus—agreement on a choice is seen as
582 desirable or necessary. In social dilemmas, there is usually no such requirement for agreement, and certain forms of agreement (viz., on the noncooperative, personally-“rational” choice) will lead to worse outcomes for everyone than other forms of agreement (viz., on the cooperative, collectively-“rational” choice). Many social dilemmas involve the collective management of some shared resource. Sometimes, the shared resource has to be conserved for the benefit of all (e.g., a shared fishing ground), and cooperative behavior takes the form of restraining how much individual members take for themselves. Such commonpool resource problems can be studied with any of several variants of a “take some” experimental game (e.g., see Dawes, 1980). In other social dilemmas, the shared resource is something that must be provided through the cooperative contributions of group members (e.g., public radio). Such public-good problems have been studied with some variation of a “give some” experimental game. Recently, McCarter, Budescu, and Scheffran (2011) introduced a novel give-or-takesome (GOTS) game that permits both forms of cooperation, and explored the effect of several variables on game behavior. In their current contribution, Budescu and McCarter (2012) build on their earlier empirical work in a markedly Davisonian fashion. They develop a mathematical model of individual choice in the GOTS dilemma, and then carry out simulations using this model to provide several insights into how people approach such dilemmas. The final contribution, by Kameda, Wisdom, Toyokawa, and Inukai (2012), employs an evolutionary perspective to suggest that the study of how human groups decide could be informed by the study of how non-human groups decide, and vice versa. They provide several examples of animal group decision making, distinguishing between combined decision making (where individual choices are affected by other animals’ behavior, and the aggregated effect of those choices affect the entire group, but for which no consensus of choice is required) and consensus decision making (where a consensus binding on all group members is required). They then explore the
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 15(5) underlying similarities and differences between human and non-human decision making in an attempt to better understand when collective choice improves on individual choice (i.e., when there is wisdom in crowds), and when it does not (i.e., when herd behavior can be destructive). Early SDS work (e.g., Davis, 1973; also see Tindale et al. in the current issue) illuminated one such prerequisite for collective intelligence— there must be a moderately high level of individual accuracy; simple aggregation of individual preferences will usually not lead to a high quality group decision if most individuals begin with a poor quality preference. Kameda et al. (2012) identify additional prerequisites, and make the sobering assessment that these may be harder to achieve in human than in non-human groups. We hope that Jim would have been proud of this special issue created as a tribute to his many contributions to our understanding of how groups decide. We are confident, though, that he would have read these papers with interest and have been stimulated to think in new ways about the master question to which he dedicated his career. We hope you will, too. References Allport, F. (1962). A structuronomic conception of behavior: Individual and collective: I. Structural theory and the master problem of social psychology. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 64(1), 3–30. doi: 10.1037/h0043563 Budescu, D. V., & McCarter, M. W. (2012). It’s a game of give and take: Modelling behavior in a give-or-take-some social dilemma. Group Processes and Intergroup Behavior, 15(5): 653–671. doi: 10.1177/1368430212442106 Davis, J. H. (1973). Group decision and social interaction: A theory of social decision schemes. Psychological Review, 80(2), 97–125. doi: 10.1037/ h0033951 Davis, J. H. (1996). Group decision making and quantitative judgments: A consensus model. In Witte E. H., Davis J. H. (Eds.), Understanding group behavior: Vol.1. Consensual action by small groups. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Davis, J. H., Kameda, T., Parks, C., Stasson, M., & Zimmerman, S. (1989). Some social mechanics of
Kerr and Tindale group decision making: The distribution of opinion, polling sequence, and implications for consensus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(6), 1000–1012. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.57.6.1000 Davis, J. H., & Kerr, N. L. (1986). Thought experiments and the problem of sparse data in small-group performance research. In P. Goodman (Ed.), Designing effective work groups. New York, NY: Jossey-Bass. Davis, J. H., Kerr, N. L., Atkin, R., Holt, R., & Meek, D. (1975). The decision processes of 6- and 12-person mock juries assigned unanimous and 2/3 majority rules. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 114. doi: 10.1037/h0076849 Davis, J. H., Kerr, N. L., Stasser, G., Meek, D., & Holt, R. (1977). Victim consequences, sentence severity, and decision processes in mock juries. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 18, 346–365. doi: 10.1016/0030-5073(77)90035-6 Davis, J. H., & Restle, F. (1963). The analysis of problems and prediction of group problem solving. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66(2), 103– 116. doi: 10.1037/h0046354 Davis, J. H., Stasser, G., Spitzer, C. E., & Holt, R. W. (1976). Changes in group members’ decision preferences during discussion: An illustration with mock juries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 1177–1187. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.34.6.1177 Davis, J. H., Stasson, M. F., Ono, K., & Zimmerman, S. (1988). Effects of straw polls on group decision making: Sequential voting pattern, timing, and local majorities. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(6), 918–926. doi: 10.1037/00223514.55.6.918 Davis, J. H., Stasson, M. F., Parks, C. D., & Hulbert, L. (1993). Quantitative decisions by groups and individuals: Voting procedures and monetary awards by mock civil juries. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29(4), 326–346. doi: 10.1006/ jesp.1993.1015 Davis, J. H., Tindale, R. S., Nagao, D. H., Hinsz, V. B., & Robertson, B. (1984). Order effects in multiple decisions by groups: A demonstration with mock juries and trial procedures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47(5), 1003–1012. doi: 10.1037/00223514.47.5.1003 Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169–193. doi: 10.1146/annurev. ps.31.020180.001125 De Dreu, C. K. W, Nijstad, B. A., & Van Knippenberg, D. (2008). Motivated information processing in group judgment and decision making. Personality
583 and Social Psychology Review, 12, 22–49. doi: 10.1177/1088868307304092 Irwin, J. R., & Davis, J. H. (1995). Choice/matching preference reversals in groups: Consensus processes and justification-based reasoning. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 64(3), 325–339. doi: 10.1006/obhd.1995.1109 Janis, I. (1982). Groupthink (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin. Kameda, T., Wisdom, T., Toyokawa, W., & Inukai, K. (2012). Is consensus-seeking unique to humans?: A selective review of animal group decision-making and its implications for (human) social psychology. Group Processes and Intergroup Behavior, 15(5), 673–689. doi: 10.1177/1368430212451863 Kerr, N. L., Atkin, R., Stasser, G., Meek, D., Holt, R., & Davis, J. H. (1976). Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: Effects of concept definition and assigned decision rule on the judgments of mock jurors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 282–294. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.34.2.282 Kerr, N. L., Davis, J. H., Meek, D., & Rissman, A. (1975). Group position as a function of member attitudes: Choice shift effects from the perspective of social decision scheme theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 574–593. doi: 10.1037/h0076483 Kerr, N. L., & MacCoun, R. (2012). Is the leniency asymmetry really dead?: Misinterpreting asymmetry effects in criminal jury deliberation. Group Processes and Intergroup Behavior, 15(5), 585–602. Kerr, N. L. & MacCoun, R. (1985). The effects of jury size and polling method on the process and product of jury deliberation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 349–363. doi: 10.1037/00223514.48.2.349 Laughlin, P. R. (1980). Social combination process of cooperative, problem-solving groups at verbal intellective tasks. In M. Fishbein (Ed.), Progress in social psychology (Vol. 1), Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum. Laughlin, P. R., & Ellis, A. L. (1986). Demonstrability and social combination processes on mathematical intellective tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 177–189. doi: 10.1016/00221031(86)90022-3 Laughlin, P. R., Kerr, N. L., Davis, J. H., Halff, H. M., & Marciniak, K. A. (1975). Group size, member ability, and social decision schemes on an intellective task. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 522–535. doi: 10.1037/h0076474
584 MacCoun, R. J., & Kerr, N. L. (1988). Asymmetric influence in mock jury deliberation: Jurors' bias for leniency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 21–33. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.54.1.21 McCarter, M. W., Budescu, D. V., & Scheffran, J. (2011). The give-or-take-some dilemma: An empirical investigation of a hybrid social dilemma. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 116(1), 83–95. doi: 10.1016/j. obhdp.2011.02.002 McGrath, J. E. (1984). Groups: Interaction and Performance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. McGrath, J. E. (1997). Small group research, that once and future field: An interpretation of the past with an eye to the future. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 1(1), 7-27. Nijstad, B. A. (2008). Choosing none of the above: Persistence of negativity after group discussion and group decision refusal. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 11(4), 525–538. doi: 10.1177/1368430208095404 Nijstad, B. A. & Kaps, S. (2008). Taking the easy way out: preference diversity, decision strategies and decision refusal in groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 860–870. doi: 10.1037/00223514.94.5.860 Nijstad, B. A., & Oltmanns, J. (2012). Motivated information processing and group decision refusal. Group Processes and Intergroup Behavior, 15(5), 637–651. doi: 10.1177/1368430212454588
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 15(5) Restle, F., & Davis, J. H. (1962). Success and speed of problem solving by individuals and groups. Psychological Review, 69(6), 520–536. doi: 10.1037/ h0043862 Stasser, G. (1999). A primer of social decision scheme theory: Models of group influence, competitve model-testing, and prosepective modeling. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 80(1), 3–20. doi:10.1006/obhd.1999.2851 Stasser, G., Abele, S., & Parsons, S. V. (2012). Information flow and influence in collective choice. Group Processes and Intergroup Behavior, 15(5), 619–635. doi: 10.1177/1368430212453631 Stasser, G., & Davis, J. H. (1981). Group decision making and social influence: A social interaction sequence model. Psychological Review, 88(6), 523–551. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.88.6.523 Stasser, G & Titus, W. (2003). Hidden profiles: A brief history. Psychological Inquiry, 3–4, 302–311. doi: 10.1207/S15327965PLI1403&4_21 Tindale, R. S., Smith, C. M., Dykema-Engblade, A., & Kluwe, K. (2012). Good and bad group performance: Same process––different outcomes. Group Processes and Intergroup Behavior, 15(5), 603–618. doi: 10.1177/1368430212454928 Vollrath, D. A., Sheppard, B. H., Hinsz, V. B., & Davis, J. H. (1989). Memory performance by decisionmaking groups and individuals. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 43(3), 289–300. doi: 10.1016/0749-5978(89)90040-X
