moral legitimacy is highly relevant in controversial projects or business activities. Drawing from .... heart of economic development, planning and approval is social license to operate.â (Ibidem). ..... the application of practical wisdom. Applying ...
Relevance of Moral Legitimacy beyond Social License to Operate in Controversial Projects or Activities: A Case Study
Abstract In some projects or business activities, such as mining or public works, there appears what has been called the NIMBY (‘not-in-my-backyard’) syndrome. Communities or people affected oppose the sitting of a project within their locality or neighborhood area, and ask that an alternative location is used. Facing this syndrome, it makes sense to ask for social license to operate (SLO) from those taking a NIMBY stance, and one argument available is that of moral legitimacy. However while SLO is receiving increasing attention, moral legitimacy has been less considered. This paper argues that moral legitimacy is highly relevant in controversial projects or business activities. Drawing from Aristotelian tradition, this article argues that moral legitimacy can be defined as the evaluation of an organization and its activities; this is done by measuring the contribution to the common good judged with practical wisdom. Moral legitimacy includes four types of evaluations: (1) the contribution of the project or activity to the common good, (2) the morality of the alternative chosen, considering technical means and procedures employed, particularly communication processes, (3) the moral evaluation of the reasonably foreseeable consequences derived from the project or activity and the possibility to minimize possible damages or risks, and (4) uprightness in promoting the project. The arguments presented are illustrated through a case study regarding a controversial construction project of a rail tunnel for a high-speed train near the foundations of the Sagrada Familia, a monumental temple in Barcelona, Spain, part of which is recognized by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site.
Keywords Common good . Corporate Communications . Moral Legitimacy . NIMBY syndrome . Social License to Operate . Sagrada Familia Temple. Truthfulness
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Introduction Social License to Operate (SLO), or in short –although less precise– “License to Operate”, is an expression which has emerged in corporate argot in recent years. Originally it mainly refers to obtaining the approval of people affected by activities with a certain impact on local communities or neighborhoods in different forms. Such activities can include the taking of land or of minerals, fish or other natural resources, or when the actions present risks to safety or a danger due to their impact on the environment. According to Wilburn and Wilburn (2011) the notion of SLO was developed as a response to a United Nations initiative in 2004, requiring industries that operate in the territories of indigenous people to secure free, prior, and informed consent. In this context SLO has often presented as a pragmatic approach to avoiding risks derived from community anger, protest and boycotts, or to increasing reputation. In mining and other industries, including civil works– which will be our focus in this paper– SLO are also relevant, due to concern over the effects of certain activities, particularly those related with safety and environmental impact (Olander and Landin, 2008) Similarly, when questions arise over stakeholder influence on the implementation of construction projects (Olander and Landin, 2005). In some projects we find the appearance of what has been called the NIMBY (‘not-in-my-backyard’) syndrome. This refers to the reaction to new developments by those who recognize that a facility is needed but they are opposed to its execution in their own locality or neighborhood. The NIMBY phenomenon has been observed in industries such as civil works, energy projects, including nuclear-related facilities, marine farming, marble quarrying and hazardous waste disposal facilities, and, of course, mining (Matheny and Williams, 1985; Connor, 1988; Lake, 1993; Dorshimer, 1996; Burningham, 2000; Greenberg, 2009; Allen, 2011; Devine-Wright and Moore, 2012; Pelekasi et al., 2012, among others). Emotions and reactions which arise may be based on founded or unfounded fears, or as a strategy to seek some kind of extra compensation. In such a context, as we will discuss below, it makes sense to ask about the moral legitimacy of the project beyond SLO.
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The call for papers of the 2013 meeting of EBEN1 considered two meanings of license to operate, one which is narrow and the other which is wider. In the former, “the ‘license to operate’ means the stakeholders’ approval of a particular business project that can affect their lives.” This, so far, is probably the most usual understanding of the concept, at least in extractive industries and controversial construction projects, mainly in public works. As we will discuss in the next section SLO has been receiving an increasing attention in management and engineering literature in the context of controversial projects. ‘Moral Legitimacy’ is another key concept for any human activity, particularly for the types of project we listed above. This latter, surprisingly, has received much less attention than the former. The aim of this paper is discuss the relevance of ‘moral legitimacy’ in controversial projects. In addition to theoretical justification we will try to show this relevance through a recent case study in which a planned project was given the go-ahead because of its moral legitimacy, rather than due to the way in which SLO was managed. The case study regards the construction of a railway tunnel near the foundations of the Sagrada Familia, a monumental temple in Barcelona, Spain, part of which was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO. In the elaboration of this case study we have employed published material- mainly from news media, significant documents related with the construction of the tunnel, reports of experts and relevant organizations, personal interviews with people involved in or affected by the project, and with engineers and other experts in this type of construction. We will structure this paper as follow. Firstly we will proceed to a bibliographical review of the concept of SLO, with particular emphasis on the narrow interpretation mentioned above. Secondly, we will discuss the notion of moral legitimacy – conceptually different from ‘legitimacy’- as it is understood in New Institutionalism – and its theoretical relevance. Thirdly, we will describe and discuss the previouslydescribed case study, emphasizing the practical relevance of ‘moral legitimacy’. Finally we will discuss the significance of such legitimacy for management. 1
http://www.eben-net.org/?q=content/eben-annual-conference-2013. Accessed on March 30, 2013. This call mentioned other wider meaning: “the acceptance or non-acceptance of the expansion of profitseeking business into sectors of activity that, at least in Europe, were formerly performed by the state or non-for profit institutions (healthcare, education, utilities, etc).” It added that “broadly, the ‘license to operate’ could refer to an implicit social contract between corporations and society at large.”
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Social License to Operate There is great agreement on the importance of social license to operate. RDS Partners, for instance, hold that “the social license to operate has become the buzz term as industries and companies come to terms with changing social expectations about industry development and accountability.” (2012, p. 3) They went on to state: “At the heart of economic development, planning and approval is social license to operate.” (Ibidem). Although this latter statement may seem a little exaggerated, there is no doubt over the increasing importance given to such license. There is not such consensus on providing a definition of SLO, but some examples may give an idea of the content generally associated with the concept. Salzmann et al. (2006) defined SLO as “the degree of match between stakeholders’ individual expectations of corporate behavior and companies’ actual behavior.” This definition is not too far from the above-mentioned narrow meaning of the license to operate proposed for the 2013 EBEN annual meeting. On their part, Wilburn and Wilburn quote from The Ethical Funds Company: “A company can only gain a Social License to Operate through the broad acceptance of its activities by society or the local community. Without this approval, a business may not be able to carry on its activities without incurring serious delays and costs.” (2011, p. 4) Slack (2008) affirms that corporations generally use this expression “to refer to some kind of approval they must obtain from local communities in areas where they operate (as compared to the legal license they must obtain from governments).” A social license to operate has also been also related with interactions initiated by a company with the community where it operates in order to be a better community partner (Aylward, 2011). The Minerals Council of Australia (2006) understands SLO as “an unwritten contract between the industry and the communities in which it operates”, and adds: “This license goes beyond strict compliance with regulation, and requires companies to demonstrate a commitment to sustainable development throughout their operations.” Prno and Slocombe (2012, p. 248) suggested that the SLO can also be seen as an institution (rights, rules and decision-making procedures), where SLO ‘rules’ (i.e., the expectations both parties have in regard to one another). Another perspective is provided by Nelsen who affirmed that the SLO creates “a forum for negotiation whereby the parties involved are heard, understood and respected” (2006, p. 161).
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Corvellec (2007), after reminding us that SLO is still a theoretically unelaborated concept, concedes a practical value to it, since this concept can provide common tenets of stakeholder theory, corporate social responsibility theory or business citizenship theory. According to him, “organizations cannot run their operations unless the communities in which they operate accept their presence.” (2007, p. 138) Furthermore, he added the pedagogical significance of this concept: “Licenses to operate, like medieval corporate charters, are reminders that corporations are social as well as economic institutions and thus subject to public accountability and control.” (2007, p. 139) Benefits of obtaining SLO have often been pointed out, as have the likewise negative consequences that occur when such license is not achieved (Slack, 2008; O’Keefe, 2009). In the mining sector, Ronald Smith, an industry expert who has experience in the activity in developing countries in Africa, especially Ghana, affirms that “the benefits of a social license to operate are almost self-evident: providing support and cooperation to a local community and a regional population who are likely to be directly affected by mining. The local community is a source of labor and services, and people want to contribute, usually in excess of what mines can offer. When a mine is in operation, local community members can frequently suffer from rising prices and costs while access to land for farming and other uses is reduced. Mines have significant impact on communities, hence the need for a social contract to operate” (personal communication to Aylward, 2011). Regarding the negatives consequences of not obtaining SLO, Olander and Landin (2008) described two civil works cases. In the first, the lack of SLO increased the cost by delaying the construction of a tunnel in Sweden for 4 years while a prolonged environmental inquiry and procurement process, including final approval to start construction were conducted. The budget for project costs increased by 7%, mostly because of stricter environmental requirements resulting from a better understanding of the risks involved in the project. In a second case a similar thing happened. There was energetic opposition to the extension of a railway line, which would be an important component of a link between Copenhagen and Oslo. A relatively small group of people who would be affected by the line convinced others to join them in asking for an alternative. The evaluation of this alternative by the National Railroad Administration, who promoted the project, showed that it was worse than that already chosen from both
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economic and technical perspectives. The interest group appealed the municipality’s decision to approve the proposed plan, and the ensuing legal process lasted some six years. The initial evaluations were actually of poor quality and finally the proposed alternative was approved. Indirect costs increased significantly. Of course several degrees of acceptance of a project or activity by the community or stakeholder affected can be distinguished in SLO. SDR partners (2012, p. 5) suggest two levels of acceptance. The lower level of acceptance is characterized by being vulnerable to influence of a project but presenting quiet relationships and untested in times of trouble. The higher level of acceptance is demonstrated by the identification the community with the project; there is advocacy for or defense of the project since people affected consider themselves to be co-owners and emotionally vested in the future of the project. From a practical point of view, several recommendations have been suggested to treat stakeholders affected and to obtain SLO. Olander and Landin (2008), reflecting on the two cases mentioned, pointed out five key factors which contribute to a positive outcome when seeking SLO: (1) analysis of stakeholder concerns and needs; (2) communication of benefits and negative impacts; (3) evaluation of alternative solutions; (4) project organization; and (5) media relations. Similarly, SDR Partners (2012, p. 6), focusing on fish framing but with a more generic perspective, recommended as key success factors for building high levels of SLO the following: (1) robust collaborative partnership between community and company, (2) dialogue, and (3) transparency and accountability. A question arises as to who provides the license to operate. Ronald Smith, the mining expert in mentioned above, points out the variety of conflicting wishes and demands from different interest groups that may concur in a business operation: “Young men are keen to obtain employment. Women are worried about price increases. Local government authorities are worried about erosion of power. And farmers complain about access to land.” In addition, there is often no single representative through which the mine can communicate (personal communication of Ronald Smith to Aylward, 2011). Another relevant question is what to do if it is not possible to get a high level of consensus among stakeholders involved in a certain project or activity. Wilburn and Wilburn (2011) divide stakeholders into two groups: vested and non-vested. Vested
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stakeholder groups have a voice and a vote in the awarding of a social license to operate, while non-vested stakeholder groups would have only a voice. Is it enough to achieve consensus with ‘vested stakeholders’ or is it also important to deal with the non-vested to obtain their acceptance? This latter only if they have sufficient power to delay the project or to prevent it? A final relevant question is as to what role the moral legitimacy of the stakeholder claims should play, beyond the power the stakeholders might possess. Mitchell et al. (1997) have developed the theory of stakeholder salience, which permits the explicit recognition of situational uniqueness and managerial perception to explain how managers prioritize stakeholder relationships by considering one or more of three stakeholder attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency. This theory does not try to identify what is correct but only to describe and make predictions about managerial behavior with respect to each class of stakeholder. Power refers to the ability of those who possess it to bring about the outcomes they desire; legitimacy is related to a desirable social good, that it is something larger and more shared than a mere self-perception, and urgency, is based on the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention (Mitchell et al.,
1997, pp. 865-868). In this work, legitimacy is not ‘moral legitimacy’ based on universal values. It is instead a consensus reached on desirable social good. Thus, the authors affirmed that legitimacy “may be defined and negotiated differently at various levels of social organization.” (Mitchell et al., 1997, pp. 867) However, it is worth stressing that
they introduced ‘legitimacy’ as a key element in stakeholder relationship. Legitimacy is indeed related to SLO, as we will see in the next section as an introduction to the discussion on the relevance of moral legitimacy.
Moral Legitimacy In contrast to SLO, which as noted above is increasingly being considered, legitimacy in controversial projects has received much less attention in management literature. However some authors (e.g., Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005, Salzmann et al., 2006) have pointed out that SLO is related with the concept of legitimacy, although they generally understood this concept is in the context of the New Institutionalism (Powell and Di Maggio, 1991). According to this theory, the main goal of organizations is to survive and this requires not only succeeding economically, but also achieving social
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acceptation, which New Institutionalism relates with legitimacy. Both license to operate and legitimacy are matters of social acceptance, but whereas license to operate remains in the possession of the organization until it is revoked, legitimacy expresses how an organization is perceived by its constituencies at any given moment (Corvellec, 2007, p. 139). Many definitions of legitimacy have been proposed in the organizational context (Suchman, 1995; Bitektine, 2011). Suchman (1995) indentified three primary forms of legitimacy: pragmatic, based on the self-interested calculations of an organization’s most immediate audiences; moral, based on a positive normative evaluation of the organization and its activity; and cognitive, based on comprehensibility and taken-forgrantedness, through the array of established cultural accounts providing explanations for the existence of an organization (Meyer and Scott, 1983, p. 201). Pragmatic legitimacy does not seek to do the right thing but only to get applause from the audience, which can easily lead to a position of cynicism. Moral legitimacy reflects a certain ‘pro-social logic’ that differs fundamentally from the narrow self-interest which is a feature of pragmatic legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy is that “for things to be otherwise is literally unthinkable.” (Zucker, 1983, p. 25) According to Suchman, cognitive legitimacy “represents both the most subtle and the most powerful source of legitimacy identified to date. If alternatives become unthinkable, challenges become impossible, and the legitimated entity becomes unassailable by construction.” (1995, p. 583) However, as he immediately recognized, this type of legitimacy generally lies beyond the real situation: “even organizations engaging in highly objectified and exterior practices may still fail to achieve taken-for-granted status for themselves as practitioners.” (Ibid) Other authors have added other types of legitimacy2, such as technical, sociopolitical, managerial, and so on, which bring about a variety of definitions. Suchman tried to give a comprehensive definition of legitimacy in line with Institutionalism by suggesting that legitimacy can be defined as a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” (1995, p. 574) Taking as normative reference a “socially constructed system of norms and values” leads one to accept cultural relativism, not a moral legitimacy based on objective ethical values and principles. 2
See a list of legitimacy typologies in Bitektine (2011, pp. 154-155).
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Similarly, other authors of this school of thought (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Baron, 1998; Greenwood et al., 2002; Rindova et al., 2006) associate moral legitimacy with “the evaluation of the organization as beneficial to the evaluator’s social group” (Bitektine, 2011, p. 158). It seems problematic to term this legitimacy as ‘moral’. While moral legitimacy reflects a certain ‘prosocial logic’, if it is evaluated by the evaluator’s social group, suspicions may arise over whether it is true moral legitimacy. If a society is tolerant with some forms of corruption, for instance, or is not overly sensitive about labor rights or lacks concern for the environment, such ‘moral legitimacy’ becomes morally flawed. Similar doubts arise in cases of misinformation or emotional reactions. Moral legitimacy should refer to the possession or pursuit of right values, or some other ethical justification, not to what a social group or a society accepts as morally right at a certain moment and in a certain place. Nevertheless, leaving aside the moral awareness of each society or social evaluator’s social group, another problem arises. Who should determine the right values or principles to evaluate moral legitimacy? Moral legitimacy is connected to a normative ethical theory and, as Baur and Palazzo pointed out, this link prevents “the attribute ‘moral’ from boiling down to an empty phrase and provides normative orientation when judging moral legitimacy.” (2011, p. 584). Now, the problem is what normative theory could be appropriate to obtain moral legitimacy. Baur and Palazzo (2006, 2011) suggest adopting discursive ethics as a foundation for moral legitimacy, but this approach presents some shortcomings (Willke and Willke, 2008). Another proposal comes from Rawls (1971), who held that moral legitimacy can be supported by rational and reasonable arguments in the way he explained in his rationalistic theory of justice. Rawls made a good job of trying to connect ethics with social sciences, but his position has also met strong resistance. Michael Sandel (1982) criticized Rawls’ theory arguing that his concept of justice is divorced from the values and aspirations that define who we are as persons, and that is very true. It is the consideration of human flourishing that allows us to determine what justice is, and how a just society should be built. This is what we propose here, in line with the Aristotelian tradition (see e.g., Chappell, 2006). Aristotle focuses his ethics on human flourishing (Aristotle, 1925) and suggests that society should foster it. Far from individualism, he did not see the society as a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life (1984, VII,
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8) and governments, in diverse possible forms, should address their governance to the common benefit and not only to the ruler’s interests. In Aristotle’s words, “governments which have a regard for the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice.” (1984, III, 6) He adds: “a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only.” (1984, III, 9) Thus moral legitimacy for politics is justice-based common interest, could be affirmed about governmental and corporate activities within society. Within the Aristotelian tradition, it is the idea that the state and intermediate associations between the individual and the state find their moral legitimacy in their contribution to the common good. One outstanding contemporaneous proponent of this is Maritain (1947). The common good, object of justice, includes respect for human rights and promoting human relations based on universal common values which can be find in the major religions and wisdom traditions (Melé, 2009, p. 51). One of these values is truthfulness or veracity. It is a precondition for justice and very relevant in the case we discuss below and in other controversial projects. Truthfulness means corresponding with fact or reality, complete honesty. It requires not only telling the truth, but also acting with transparency –as far as people have the right to know something– and avoiding deceptive ‘half-truths’ or indulging in selective omission. Truthfulness also leads one to seek the ‘practical truth’ (also termed ‘moral truth’) to do the right thing in every particular situation. According to Aristotle, two conditions are required to achieve ‘practical truth’: true reasoning and right desire: “both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts.” (1925, VI, 2) This means, seeking rationally the human good and acting with sincere uprightness. Prudence or practical wisdom plays a great role in ensuring to know the practical or moral truth in evaluating particular actions, and its consequences. Thus, we can define moral legitimacy as the evaluation of an organization and its activities, taking as a reference the contribution to the common good measured through the application of practical wisdom. Applying this approach to the moral legitimacy of projects or business activities would need more specific criteria. In order to provide them, we rely on three evaluative aspects proposed for legitimacy: (1) categories or structures, (2) techniques and procedures, (3) outputs and consequences (Scott, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 1991), and (4) personal
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(Suchman 1995, p. 581). Although these Institutionalist authors based the evaluation on the audiences’ perception, in contrast to our normative perspective, these aspects seem relevant and could be reinterpreted as follows: The first refers to the contribution to the common good of the organization and the purpose it expresses through its mission, values, vision, strategies policies, and practices. The second refers to the moral evaluation of the technical means and procedures employed, including transparency in the communication process to relevant stakeholders. The third refers to the morality of the reasonably foreseeable consequences. The fourth could be interpreted as the right desire or uprightness in the decision-making process. In more specific terms, and regarding the evaluation of the moral legitimacy of a project or activity, moral legitimacy should include four types of evaluations: (1) the contribution of the project or activity to the common good, (2) the morality of the alternative chosen, considering technical means and procedures employed, particularly transparency in the communication process, (3) the moral evaluation of the reasonably foreseeable consequences derived from the project or activity and possibility to minimize possible damages or risks, and (4) uprightness in promoting the project, that is, the willingness to act well, trying to choose what is sincerely understood as a right goal and right means, after a conscious rational deliberation. Although this is internal to the decision-maker, it can on occasion be identified, e.g, through signs of hidden agendas which show a lack of uprightness. Regarding the relevance of moral legitimacy, at least four reasons can be presented. The first is that morality shows the right thing to do; this goes beyond utilitarian ends, or pragmatic attitudes interested in achieving peer approval rather than in doing good. The second is that it provides an objective reference, while stakeholder perceptions could be influenced by fear, lack of reliable information, or moved by illegitimate interests. The third is that moral legitimacy, if it is well founded, provides solid argument for corporate communications and for negotiating with counterparties from whom the company is seeking to obtain SLO. A fourth reason is that values and principles based on moral legitimacy are timeless, while the moral sensibility of a community can change over time; and when the awareness of some social issues responds to solid moral principles (this is the case of slavery, minority rights, etc.), then the business persisting with the old and wrong moral sensibility is to be criticized.
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With this conceptual framework in mind let us describe a case study, which will be useful to illustrate this type of situations with controversial projects. We will then discuss the SLO in this particular case, and the relevance of moral legitimacy in this context.
Case Study: A tunnel near to the foundations of the Temple of the Sagrada Familia
The route of the AVE through Barcelona The high-speed railway, the AVE (Alta Velocidad Española) has been progressively incorporated into the Spanish railway system since 1992, to connect to the European network of high-speed trains. The section of the AVE between the two principal Spanish cities of Madrid and Barcelona was completed in 2008, with the prevision that this would then be extended to the border to connect with the French network and its direct route to Paris (see figure 1 for a map and dates of completion of the various sections of track). This project was to reopen the movement of goods and passengers from Spain, and specifically from Barcelona, to the rest of Europe and vice versa, without the need for the costly and problematic variable axles3. INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE The crossing of Barcelona was controversial. In the first project the route was to follow the coast, parallel to the Mediterranean Sea, but this was not to the pleasing of the Barcelona city council which had a more ambitious scheme. In response to the petitioning of the municipality, the route was amended in 1998 to one which would pass through the center of Barcelona. This scheme linked the Barcelona-Sants railway station with La Sagrera, a second station in the city where the AVE will call, by a route which follows the street called Carrer Mallorca. The new alternative meant the creation of the new station La Sagrera – bigger than Sants- which would vitalize rail traffic both for goods and passengers, and at the metropolitan level as well as the national and European, and also provide a fast and efficient high-speed link between the airport and the city. In addition, this alternative provided for in this design was another station, this on the Passeig de Gracia–one of the principal avenues in the center of the city (Figure 2). INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 3
The AVE means an improvement related to trade with other countries as it uses the international gauge – previously not present in Spain for historical reasons. During World War I world war the gauge of tracks in Spain was modified to prevent the use of the network to supply troops in the event of an invasion by France or Germany. For many years Spanish trains have employed adjustable axles for international journeys, thus allowing for the switch to the international track size.
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In June 2002 an agreement was signed between the Spanish central government, the Catalan autonomous government and Barcelona city council setting down the route between these two stations located at opposite ends of the city, approximately 5.5 miles apart , This would entail constructing a tunnel of 10.4m in diameter. This agreement was signed by the three administrations with competence over the works–state, regional government and municipal government, and by the Spanish state railway company4. The budget was later fixed at €179.3 million, and the completion date in early 2012. On March 26 2010 drilling began in the subsoil below Carrer Mallorca with the use of a 105m long tunnelling machine5. The state-owned corporation ADIF, belonging to the Ministry of Public Works, was assigned responsibility for the execution of the railway works. The construction was charged to an ad hoc union of three big Spanish construction companies: Sacyr-Vallehermoso, Cavosa Obras y Proyectos and Scrinser.
The controversy arises: Risk for the Temple of the Sagrada Familia The construction of the tunnel is technically very risky, above all in a city like Barcelona which is constructed on low-quality terrain. Nevertheless, the use of the tunneling machine is the least aggressive manner of conducting these types of project. The controversy arose not only on account of the tunnel itself, but because it would pass only meters from the foundations of the Temple of the Sagrada Familia, but at a depth of approximately twice that of the diameter of the tunnel thus giving a certain distance. A pile wall between the tunnel and the temple has been constructed to isolate the foundations from deformations that might be generated by the tunnel. (see figures 3a, 3b, 3c).
INSERT FIGURES 3a, 3b, 3c ABOUT HERE The Sagrada Familia was dedicated by Pope Benedict XVI in person in 2011, and elevated to the status of basilica by Him. It is the masterpiece of the architect Antoni Gaudí (1852 -1926), a great work of architecture and a jewel of art in stone. It is symbolic of Barcelona and recognized worldwide. Although the construction of the temple began in 1882 it is not yet completed. Even so, this monumental work is visited by two million tourists each year. UNESCO has declared the oldest part of the temple, that constructed under the personal direction of Gaudí, as a World
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Specifically by Francisco Álvarez-Cascos –as Spanish Minister of Public Works–, Felip Puig –as Catalan Minister of Territorial Policy–, Joan Clos–Mayor of Barcelona–and Miguel Corsini–President of Renfe (the Spanish Railway Company). None of these continue in the offices held at the time of signing. 5 Includes the front end, or coat of arms, and the back end.
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Heritage site. The temple has three façades, one of which- that of The Glory- which is still to be started, and it is this that the tunnel would pass beside on the route along Carrer Mallorca. The Board of Trustees of the Sagrada Familia (representing the ownership of the temple) and other cultural institutions steadfastly opposed the carrying out of the Project due to the threat it entailed. The president of the Board, Mr. Joan Rigol, explained that he had ‘credible’ technical reports confirming the risk to the temple that the high-speed train route would occasion6. UNESCO, having declared the oldest part of the temple as a World Heritage site, also took a position of acknowledgement of the risks, recommending that the route be changed, and if this was not possible, that security measures be strengthened. The report affirmed: “The World Heritage Centre and the Advisory Bodies consider that while the computerized studies may show a potential to bore a tunnel at this location, it should be a precautionary principle to avoid any potential threats to the World Heritage property.” 7 In conclusion UNESCO recommended the following: “The only way to safeguard the Sagrada Familia with any degree of certainty is to move the location of the tunnel. Assuming however that such a recommendation is not feasible due to the planning and capital that has thus far been expended, it is essential that the proposed Tunnel Boring Method in connection with the Earth Pressure Balancing method should be described in more precise detail, and, as installation of the proposed retaining wall in itself may use damaging vibrations, this part of the project should be reviewed and monitored with the same detail as the tunnel installation.”8 Many studies were conducted, some with positive conclusions and others with conclusions which were negative. Antonio Gens, Professor of Geotechnical Engineering at the Universidad Politécnica de Catalunya, gave an address at the Círculo Ecuestre de Barcelona on January 29 2008 with the title “Will the AVE which is arriving threaten the Sagrada Familia?” He spoke of similar projects (tunnels or excavation work below historic constructions) in London, Amsterdam, Rome, Madrid, Vienna, San Sebastian, etc. With the adequate security measures, such as those that had been taken in the case of the Sagrada Familia, he was able to affirm that “The risk associated with the construction of the AVE tunnel via Carrer Mallorca is reduced to the extent that it does not condition the choice of route”. Similarly, he also explained in the presentation how the pile wall between the drilling works and the façade reduced the settling anticipated below the foundations of the temple.9 Among the opinions that the works would be detrimental, or should not be carried out due to the risks involved were the Sagrada Familia Board of Trustees, as previously mentioned, the 6
Retrieved from http://www.europapress.es/cultura/noticia-ave-presidente-patronato-insiste-hay-riesgosagrada-familia-ofrece-colaboracion-unesco-20100730122122.html. Accessed on April 9, 2013. 7 Retrieved from http://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/714 Accessed on April 9, 2013. 8 Retrieved from http://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/714 Accessed on April 9, 2013. 9 Personal communication from Antonio Gens to the authors.
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Director of the Departament of Mining Engineering and Natural Resources at the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya and numerous engineers, architects, geologists and independent experts. On the other hand many others vouched as to the harmlessness of the works. We might mention here the Spanish government through ADIF and José Blanco, the Minister for Public Works, the Generalitat de Catalunya (the regional government), the consultancy firm INTEMAC, the consultancy grouping INTECSA-INARSA, the University of Oviedo, the Official College of Geologists of Catalunya, the consultancy firms Itasca, Tifsa and D2S Internacional, and the university professors Carlos Oteo Mazo, José María Rodríguez Ortiz and Eduardo Alonso Pérez de Agreda. The engineer Palencia (2008) carried out an assessment in which all information thus far generated was analyzed. Opinions were collected from qualified technical experts. Some of them assured that risks of constructing the tunnel in front of the Sagrada Familia was high, but others, based on rigorous calculations, affirmed that it was not risk at all. They argue that the order of magnitude of 2mm, corresponding to what occurred in the posterior execution of the tunnelling works) are less than the tolerable limits, and less also than that expected merely from the completion of the temple, regardless of whether or not the tunnel was built. Jordi Bonet, chief architect of the Sagrada Familia works, on seeing the report of the UNESCO experts advising that the AVE route should be modified, reminded us that he had been pushing for such a change for a considerable time. He added that the Minister of Public Works had ignored the recommendations of the management team of the temple works. Additionally, he considered it irresponsible to have a tunnel “less than four meters from the foundations”. He added: “I wonder what the Minister would say should some damage occur. I’ve never understood this stubbornness”. Mr Bonet reiterated that the route of the AVE was not only a risk for the Sagrada Familia, but also for the Casa Milà (La Pedrera), another notable Gaudí work, “which has much weaker foundations”. The residents of the area and other social groups were strongly opposed to the plan. Numerous banners appeared in windows and on balconies in the streets close to the route of the tunnel, and to further the protest an association was formed to demand the readoption of the initial plan (“Platform for AVE via the Coast”). The association instigated legal proceedings requesting a restraining order on the Works in view of the risk to the Sagrada Familia. The application was rejected by the Audencia Nacional, the Spanish High Court, on the grounds that although this Heritage site could not be left unprotected, “the protection of other public interests implicit in the construction of necessary infrastructure cannot be forgotten”. The tunnelling machine started its work from La Sagrera toward Sants on April 2, 2010. The UNESCO recommendation to closely monitor the works was strictly followed. Examples of
15
how parts of the structure were monitored and the deformations observed at two ground points as the tunnelling progressed can be found in the Appendix. On May 26 Manuel Melis, Professor of Railway Engineering at the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, agreed to serve as a legal expert in the case, and to analyze 32 points in regard to the possible risks that the AVE posed to the temple. In a letter to the judge in the case Melis requested the detention of the tunnelling machine, on the grounds that “to eliminate the risks to the temple, the tunnel should have been at the furthest possible distance from it”. Regarding the planned protection, based on the technique of a “pile wall”, the professor said that “sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t”. According to Professor Melis “the eventual justifications that could be made for this route on the grounds of cost would not be acceptable, given that any damage to the Temple, however slight, would have a far higher economic and social cost than that of any modification to the route”. He added that justifications for the current route in terms of time of completion would also be invalid as the arrival of the AVE to the French border “is going to take some considerable time”, at least two or three years, and La Sagrera station will not even be finished in 2014. Melis considered that no “detailed and justifiable explanation” had been given for the current route, and saw viable alternatives in streets parallel to Carrer Mallorca, such as the streets of Valencia or Consell de Cent. He also noted that the tunneling machine had set of from La Sagrera for Sants on April 2 and, after a technical stop, restarted on May 23. He argued that “it would have been very simple to stop the machine, modify slightly its course to follow the avenue of Meridiana until the new hub, and from there on to the avenue of Diagonal, then following this to the hub at Carrer Provença and on to Sants. Nevertheless, as these machines move so rapidly, in a few days this was no longer possible”, he added. “Some technical experts have the opinion that it is not possible to have zero-risk in questions of tunnels, but I believe it is”, he affirmed, and went on to say that the first task of the engineer is the total elimination of risk. He also commented on the many tunnels that have been built under major cities like Madrid, without accidents or collapses and within time-frames and budgets that were not thought possible at the outset of the works. He cited the example of the significant expansion of the Metro in Madrid, which the city planned and constructed between 1995 and 2005. He also made reference to the tunnels to relocate the M-30 motorway underground, and others which include some of the most substantial built under any city in the world.10 Several appeals presented by the board of construction of the temple and seeking suspension of the works were dismissed. The High Court considered that the Board had not provided any new evidence to justify the reconsideration they sought. The court stressed that the UNESCO reports 10
La Vanguardia June 8 2010.
16
showed that “everything rests on taking measures of correction, safety and control over the works in relation to the Sagrada Familia and the Casa Milà” but nothing has been proven against the public works in progress, the detention or paralysis of which would involve very significant economic harm”.11 Fernández Díaz, deputy for the Spanish Partido Popular (conservative) then in opposition, backed an existing alternative route which followed Carrer Valencia -parallel to Carrer Mallorca- which in its day had received wide support and there were no contentions against its suitability. This scheme would have been possible without significant financial repercussions, and without delaying the construction project. According to the deputy this alternative, which had previously had a wide consensus of support, would only have delayed the construction works by six or seven months, and had an impact of €10-€12M on the €400M estimated total cost of the construction project.12 In contrast Jordi Hereu, the Mayor of Barcelona, affirmed that he didn’t understand the “obsession of the Right” with achieving the halting of the AVE works, and pointed out that the scheme which would see the tunnel pass below the Sagrada Familia were subject to more technical controls than any other construction project. José Blanco, the Public Works minister affirmed that there was no risk to the Sagrada Familia, as had been demonstrated by many reports. He also stressed that UNESCO had determined that the precautionary measures in place met with established safety normatives, and that any change would have meant the stalling of the works for months with the attendant highly significant and unaffordable waste of economic resources.13 The Partido Popular presented a motion in the Spanish Parliament calling on the government to provisionally suspend the Works, but this was rejected on June 22. The communication media reflected the various opinions, mentioning principally the technical reports that recommended caution and written in a language that few understood. Many remembered the attention-grabbing accident in works on an urban tunnel in Barcelona in January 2005 (the tunnel of Carmel), and this contributed to a fear among the population in spite of the existence of technical reports vouching for the safety of the works in the AVE project. All of this touched public opinion in the city, where a great pride is felt in the Sagrada Familia. As has been seen, a multitude of agents have given different and contradictory information. The experts do not share a common position, and the politicians reveal the different interests which brings them into action.
11
Ibid. Ibid. 13 Cf.La Vanguardia June 22 2010. 12
17
The situation took on a social and political importance without precedent. The handling of technical information by non-experts together with the confidentiality of the information in the hands of the specialists provoked serious doubts and fear among the population. ADIF, the state company responsible for the tunnel project and for all other railway works was very parsimonious in its communications. They were sure that the operations were completely safe regarding the integrity of the structure of the temple. Additionally, they took further measures which were not strictly necessary such as the pile wall and a large array of sensors to monitor any deformations of the structure of the temple. Similarly, they were not concerned about other fears that had been voiced, among which the effects of vibrations caused by the AVEs when passing the edifice, or a rise in subsoil water levels. The courts had always found in their favor in the five legal actions raised against them, and there had been no obligation to suspend the works.
Was the risk real? In October 2010 the tunnelling machine bored the section of tunnel that passed in front of the Sagrada Familia. It didn’t produce the incidents that some had predicted when they foresaw problems with the works and the structure of the temple. This was highlighted in the journal of the professional association of Civil Engineerings of Catalonia which, in the December 2010 edition expressed satisfaction “for the thus far successful progress of the tunnelling between Sants and La Sagrera, especially in the section which passes the Sagrada Familia. This association has always had confidence in the viability of these works and throughout the process has asked for the due respect for the technical experts responsible for the execution of the Project. These are professionals of worldwide renown and have here acquired great experience in the boring of tunnels in urban environments.” 14 On September 21 2011 the President of the Board of Trustees of the Sagrada Familia announced his resignation, without linking this to the tunnel. In declarations to radio media he recognized that effects of the AVE route remained to be shown, but he saw two far from insignificant risks: “the vibrations due to the tunnel passing so closely to the foundations” and that “subsoil water levels rise” On January 8 2013 the section of the AVE track between Barcelona and Figueres–a town close to the Spanish-French border–was officially inaugurated. It came in to service the following day without any signs of the problems that had stirred such controversy.
14
Revista del Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos de Catalunya, no. 18, December 2010.
18
Jäger y Katzenbach (2011) carried out a technical analysis of the tunnel project and the works on their completion, and of their influence on the Sagrada Familia. To a similar end, one of the authors of this article (NAME) interviewed Professors Gonzalo Ramos and Antonio Gens of the School of Civil Engineering of the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, who had acted as consultants to ADIF for these works. Without wishing to go too deeply into purely technical information, it is still worth noting that ground deformation levels due to the activity of the tunnelling machine were measured at 2.5 times less than the permissible limit (Jäger y Katzenbach, 2011). The appendix (Figure 4) shows how surface settlement is produced when excavating a tunnel. The report by Jäger y Katzenbach states: “Concluding the interpretation of all measured deformations at Sagrada Familia and at the Mallorca Street, all systems show a similar value of app. 0.10 to 0.20 cm of settlements, which is at least 2.5 times less than the strictest predefined threshold value and is in the range of or slightly above the measurement accuracy.” The report also considers the vibrations and oscillations of groundwater levels as possible sources of damage to the structure of the Temple, but these effects are rated as negligible. Similarly, the rate of deformation or cracking in the structure of the Temple was studied, and again, it was concluded that the effect of the tunnelling works, even months after the boring process, was also negligible. Further, it states that the level of preventative safety is extremely high and that levels of monitoring and follow-up are exhaustive. From the interviews with Professors Gens and Ramos it appears that the level of risk control is more than sufficient. Even the judges visited the works to obtain direct and immediate information about the progress of the project, as is indicated in the said interviews. The reports of Palencia (2008) and Jäger y Katzenbach (2011), together with our two mentioned interviews suggest the following:
The Carrer Mallorca solution is correct as a railway route and has significant advantages over other alternatives.
The threats accompanying these types of works consist of: o
Movements of earth around the excavation which could affect the foundations of the Sagrada Familia Temple (see figure 4, in the Appendix).
o
Alterations of groundwater levels which could have a negative effect on the foundations of the Temple.
o
Vibrations produced both by the works themselves and also by passing trains which could result in damage to the structure of the Temple.
19
The execution of the tunnel by means of the tunnelling machine, in accordance with the draft project and as was the case in practice, is the most suitable manner of dealing with the threats mentioned above. The risk of damage to the edifice is negligible.
The level of security measures demanded in the project is even greater than the tolerable. It can be said that the expense produced by the desire for security was even excessive. The pile wall which isolates the tunnel from the foundations of the Temple (figure 3) increases the level of security of the works.
These types of works have been successfully carried out in numerous cities.
In summary, the works now complete, it can be stated:
The tunnel works were designed in such a way that excessive security measures were applied to seek to remove the risks. Consequently the cost of the works was higher than was strictly necessary.
The monitoring of the works was exhaustive, and consequently work could have been halted had damage to the Temple been detected.
The damages foreseen by some technical experts, maybe not too rigorous in their analyses, have not been produced.
Discussion Did ADIF managers act correctly, paying attention to the recommendations cited above to obtain SLO? Did they act with moral legitimacy? As noted, Olander and Landin (2008) suggested five key factors in successfully obtaining SLO which can be understood as recommendations. Let us consider how these factors were (or were not) taken into account by the company which managed the issues related to the tunnel: (1) Analysis of stakeholder concerns and needs. In this case, there were vested (with voice and vote) and non-vested stakeholders (only with voice). The vested stakeholders (governments and stockholders) were fully in agreement. Among the non-vested stakeholders, there was no problem for the common stakeholders of each firm (basically employees, suppliers) either. The neighborhood and the Sagrada Familia Board were the problem, as well as many Barcelona citizens, and this ‘public opinion’ was predominantly that the works posed a risk for their landmark. The neighborhood feared for the possible damage to their homes. The main concern of Sagrada Familia Board was the safety of the Temple in the face of tunneling, future vibrations and so on. Their
20
needs derived from feeling responsibility to do their best to avoid any risk to the Sagrada Familia. All of these concerns and needs were well-known. (2) Communication of benefits and negative impacts. On this point the policy of the ADIF –the company in charge of the tunneling–, as well as that of the governments involved- was far from excellent. It lacked a sense of accountability and no convincing technical reports were made public. Simply, they said that this was the best solution and that there was no risk at all. (3) The evaluations of alternative solutions were made and the outcome was that the Carrer Mallorca option was the best in both technical and economic terms. (4) The project organization was excellent, as noted, even exceeding required safety measures and reducing the time-frame for the works. (5) Media relations were poor. However the media reaction was not too bad. Faced with two opposing views and a debate associated with political ideology they generally did not take one or other side. If we look at the recommendations from SDR Partners (2012, p. 6) for gaining high levels of SLO, the conclusion is that ADIF followed these even less. The company did not by any means build a “robust collaborative partnership” between community (neighborhood, Sagrada Familia board, citizens) and company, nor did they enter dialogue, and transparency and accountability were completely absent. Pressure from the non-vested stakeholders and public opinion may have contributed to ADIF’s decision to introduce certain unnecessary measures which increased the total cost. In addition, ADIF had to face various legal proceedings, although the courts always found in favor of the company, and so the position of the company regarding the safety of the project was repeatedly confirmed. This over cost may have been be a consequence of not following the recommendations, but it may also have been the result of fears of the Sagrada Familia board and even of a certain politicizing of the project. However, the additional cost was moderate and it is not comparable in any way with the corresponding increase of cost of the two related cases mentioned above and studied by Olander and Landin (2008). There are similarities in the ignoring of the recommendations in those cases and in this, but there is a big difference in two issues regarding moral legitimacy: truthfulness and due diligence. If we focus on the second Olander and Lading’ case and we could remember that the evaluation of the alternative
21
initially approved by the National Railroad Administration was poor and it was shown that it was worse than the alternative proposed by the community. There may have been a lack of due diligence and falsehood in defending the project as the best possible. In contrast, ADIF carried out a rigorous study and risk calculations trying to seek the ‘practical truth’ on the risks for the Sagrada Familia and, of course, for the neighborhood. This rigor may be why ADIF did not feel the need to pay too much attention to communications policy, which should be criticized. We agree with the above-cited article of the Magazine of the Professional Association of Civil Engineers of Catalunya, where, on behalf of this Association and after encouraging avoiding political controversy over the tunnel project, it adds a comment connected to moral legitimacy: With this request, the Association is aware that citizens are to receive all necessary information and demand the highest security for involvement in their daily activity is negligible or minimal. However, this right cannot be replaced by civic organizations interested opinions or policies that defend specific interests.15 These two points –safety of tunneling and communication of relevant information– are related to some evaluation criteria suggested above for moral legitimacy. We will remember that the first criterion refers to the contribution of the project to the common good, and there is no doubt that it did contribute. As noted above, the alternative chosen will permit the creation of a bigger station –La Sagrera– vitalizing rail traffic both for commodities and passengers, and a new station for the AVE
the city center of
Barcelona –Passeig de Gracia– in addition to providing a fast and efficient high-speed link between the airport and the city. The evaluation according to the second criteria, regarding the morality of the alternative chosen, is also correct regarding technical means, but not so related to the communication process. As noted, the use of the tunneling machine is the least aggressive manner of conducting these types of project and it is safe enough. However the communication process was poor. People affected have the right to know about the risks or the absence of risks through access to the relevant studies. Limiting the information to affirmations that there are no risks is not enough. Obviously, a good communication process does not guarantee freedom from irrational fears, but it can limit them significantly. 15
Loc cit.
22
Moving on to the third criterion regarding the evaluation of the reasonably foreseeable negative consequences of the project, we have observed above that the risks were in a range that was absolutely acceptable. The company went even further in constructing a separating wall and extensively monitoring the Sagrada Familia to make sure that deformations will be within the permissible limits. Regarding the fourth criteria, there is no evidence of a lack of uprightness in executing the project. To sum up, the construction of the tunnel near the Sagrada Familia had moral legitimacy, except partially in the communication process. ADIF took all possible steps to make themselves aware of the risk to so important a monument, acted with practical wisdom through reliable calculations, and went even further than required to minimize any risks. The case makes the relevance of moral legitimacy clear. The company did the right thing, using objective tools as a means to face the relatively unfounded fears of the Sagrada Familia Board and neighbors, and they finally succeed. They had the ‘practical truth’ as a solid argument for corporate communications and to negotiate with their counterparties to obtain SLO, but did not take sufficient advantage of it. This argument, accompanied by the evidence of the outcomes present, and possibly future, will remain. If all goes well, consciousness of the risks will disappear over time, and the company will no longer be criticized for this project.
Conclusion The case study on the construction of a tunnel crossing Barcelona near the foundations of the Temple of Sagrada Familia, makes clear that, once again, the NIMBY (‘not-inmy-backyard’) syndrome appears in projects like this. It also shows the convenience of seeking social license to operate. However, as with some others cases mentioned, it can sometimes be difficult to gain the acceptance of those who take a NIMBY position. In situations like this, and always, moral legitimacy is highly relevant, as this case shows. We have argued, in contrast with New Institutionalism, that moral legitimacy cannot rely only on social approval in each particular context but should be founded on a solid moral system. Drawing from Aristotelian tradition we defined moral legitimacy as the evaluation of an organization and its activities taking as references the contribution to
23
the common good- which is measured through the application of practical wisdom, and we have emphasized the centrality of truthfulness. As practical implications for managers we suggested considering four criteria to evaluate the moral legitimacy of a project of activity. These apply to the project as a whole, how it contributes to the common good or doesn’t, the technical means and processes employed in comparison with other alternatives, and the
rationally
foreseeable consequences of the project. All of this should carried out with uprightness in seeking to do the right thing. Future research would entail going into the foundation and application of moral legitimacy in more depth and developing new case studies to prove the relevance of moral legitimacy in addition to SLO. It would also consider practical ways to implement such a notion in managing business and engineering projects.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Professors Gonzalo Ramos and Antonio Gens for their willingness to be interviewed and for their valuable contributions on the subject. Thanks also to NN and NN for their assistance in documentary research.
APPENDIX Monitoring of structural deformations Figure 4 shows how surface settling is produced on excavating a tunnel. Figure 5 shows how a zone of the façade of the Temple has been monitored for the purpose of detecting movement due to the passing of the tunneling machine by the front of the edifice, in accordance with the calendar shown in figure 6. The movements detected at the points in figure 5 were negligible. Nevertheless, on moving down through the subsoil toward the excavation, the movements predicted by general theory (figure 4) were detected, as can be seen in figure 7. These movements were inferior to the permissible below the foundations of structures such as the Temple. Even the movements produced in the works of the Temple itself are greater than those caused by the tunneling.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
24
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE Figure 7 shows how the movements at depth, in close proximity to the tunnel, dissipate as we approach the foundations of the Temple, where the vertical descent becomes negligible. Consequently movements are produced in close proximity to the foundations but their values at the moment of the calculation (prevision) as well as in monitorizing the real situation make them harmless. INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
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Figure 1. Section of the AVE line Madrid-Barcelona-French border (Source: Jäger and Katzenbach, 2011)
Figure 2. Route of the line between Sants and La Sagrera (Courtesy of El Periódico).
30
Figure 2. Route of the line between Sants and La Sagrera (Courtesy of El Periódico).
Figure 3a. Section of the Sagrada Familia works and corresponding photograph. (Source: Kurze, 2012)
31
The Complex The pile wall is connected to a concrete block, and this in turn to a volume of earth with injected concrete to better isolate the tunnel.
FAÇADES
TUNNEL OF THE METRO (L 2)
CONCRETE BLOCK PILE WALL
The pilings are driven in to a great depth and are so close to each other that they form a solid barrier.
TUNNEL OF THE AVE
The tunnel of the AVE passes below the L2 line. In this section the barrier is interrupted.
Comparative depth of a piling with Christopher Columbus memorial in Barcelona 41m high
Figure 3b. Drawing of the tunnel and its relative position in the subsoil. (Extracted from the presentation by Professor Antonio Gens in 2008. (Courtesy of El Periódico)
FAÇADE OF LA GLORIA
TIE BEAM
CONCRETE BLOCK
REINFORCED SOIL PILE WALL FOUNDATIONS OF SAGRADA FAMILIA
TUNNEL OF AVE
Figure 3c. Detail of the composition. (Taken from the presentation by Profesor Antonio Gens in 2008. Courtesy of El Periódico)
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Figure 4. Surface deformations induced by the excavation (Kurze, 2012)
Figure 5.Example of monitoring: measurement points of deformations on the façade of the Temple (Jäger and Katzenbach, 2011).
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Figure 6. Advance of the tunnelling machine on passing in front of the Temple. (Jäger y Katzenbach, 2011).
Figure 7. Deformations of the ground at depths of 12 and 24m. At 12m below the surface, the deformation is in the order of 1mm–a value which is insignificant in terms of risk to the structure (Jäger y Katzenbach, 2011)
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