and Society; Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals; Dr. John Green, ... Furman University; Dr. Lyman Kellstedt, Wheaton College; and Dr. Corwin Smidt,.
Chapter 23
RELIGION AND THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
CORWIN SMIDT, LYMAN KELLSTEDT, JIM GUTH & JOHN GREEN Calvin College, Wheaton College, Furman University, University of Akron
Religion matters in American electoral politics and in the 2004 presidential election it mattered particularly. Such a statement, however, conceals as much as it reveals, as it tells us nothing about the way in which religion may have mattered, the extent to which it mattered, and whether the role of religion in the 2004 presidential election was qualitatively, or simply marginally, different from the role it played in previous presidential contests. Much of the early post-election media commentary on the election focused on the exit-poll finding that 22 percent of voters cited “moral values” as the primary basis for their voting decision. That number eclipsed (though barely) the proportion of voters who cited either the war in Iraq or the economy, usually considered by pundits to be the two main issues of the campaign. As a result, many analysts immediately proclaimed that religious voters (variously labeled by commentators as “fundamentalists,” “religious conservatives,” “the Christian Right,” or evangelicals”) had determined the outcome of the presidential race.¹ Yet other analysts quickly challenged this conclusion, correctly noting that in a close contest many different groups can reasonably claim to have provided the margin of victory. But, while providing a proper correction, some critics moved to the other extreme, almost contending that religion played no significant role at all. The simple truth is that religion did matter in the 2004 presidential election–but in a fashion less threatening, though more profound, than either version of the conventional wisdom suggests. ¹ It is important to recognize that, while these terms are frequently used interchangeably, they are analytically distinct, and not synonymous, terms.
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This chapter seeks to assess the impact of religion in the 2004 presidential election and its broader impact in American politics by addressing four topics. First, it analyzes the basic orientations of the American public about the religious character of presidential candidates and the role of religion in presidential campaigns. Second, it examines how members of different religious groups cast their ballots for the two major presidential candidates in 2004 as well as the contribution that each religious group made to the Republican and Democratic totals. Third, it analyzes the role of secular and religious media as sources of campaign information and voter mobilization among these same religious groups. And, finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of whether the patterns found in 2004 were relatively unique or will likely persist in presidential elections to come.
RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE Astute observers have long noted the unique character of American religion. Both Alexis deTocqueville, in the early nineteenth century, and G.K. Chesterton, in the early decades of the twentieth, emphasized the distinctive religious character of the American people. But this distinctiveness is not simply some relic of past generations. When comparisons are made with citizens of other North American and Western European democracies, the American people are much more likely to describe themselves as religious, to state a belief in heaven as well as a belief in hell, and to state that life is meaningful only because God exists (Smidt et al., 1998). Moreover, despite claims of growing secularization, Americans report the same levels of church membership and attendance at religious services that they did fifty years ago (Smidt et al., 2003, p. 34).² The religious character of the American people has important consequences politically. For many Americans, religion serves as a primary basis for the basic beliefs they express, the values they hold, and the identities they articulate. Their religious characteristics shape the way they interact socially, the kinds of information sources they use for making electoral decisions, and the ways in which they think and act politically. Thus, it should not be surprising that religion continues to play an important role in American politics, shaping expectations about the kind of presidential candidates they are willing to support, the appropriateness of
² While the tendency to report church membership has not changed, there has been, however, some increase in the proportion of the electorate who report no church affiliation (a less formal relationship with religious bodies). See, for example, Hout and Fischer (2002).
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religious discussion in presidential campaigns, and the particular candidates for whom they ultimately cast their ballots. Americans want their President to be a religious person, and, by extension, their presidential candidates to be people of faith. The specific nature of that religious faith is less important than the need to have some kind of faith. This cultural expectation is evident in Table 1, which reports responses from a random survey of 3000 Americans and 3000 Canadians in the fall of 1996, just prior to national elections in the United States and Canada. Respondents in both countries were asked whether they would vote for a candidate for president/ prime minister if their political party nominated a Muslim to be its standard bearer. In this hypothetical scenario, nearly three out of four Canadians (74 percent) indicated that they would vote for their party’s nominee even if the leader were Muslim. Americans were somewhat less likely to do so; nevertheless, more than three out of five Americans (61 percent) reported (prior to 9/11) that they would vote for a Muslim at the top of their party’s ticket. Table 1. Voting for a Muslim and an Atheist as Leader of Country: A Comparison of Canada and the United States, 1996 Question: If a presidential candidate (Canada: party leader and potential prime Minister) belongs to a political party you like, and such a person was… a Muslim Yes Don’t know No
an Atheist Yes Don’t know No
Country Canada
United States
73.6% 5.1 21.3 100.0% (N=3000)
61.1% 5.9 32.9 99.9% (N=3000)
71.9% 3.8 24.3 100.0% (N=3000)
43.1% 3.1 53.8 100.0% (N=3000)
Source: “God and Society in North America, 1996 Survey,” Queens University Principal Investigators: Angus Reid Group with Queen’s University’s George Rawlyk Research Unit on Religion and Society; Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals; Dr. John Green, University of Akron; Dr. Jim Guth, Furman University; Dr. Lyman Kellstedt, Wheaton College; and Dr. Corwin Smidt, Calvin College.
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What is noteworthy, however, is what happens when the hypothetical candidate is an atheist. Among Canadians, it matters little whether the person is a Muslim or an atheist, as about the same percentage report that they would vote for an atheist (72 percent) or a Muslim (74 percent). Among Americans, however, it matters a great deal whether a person is a religious or an atheist. Far fewer Americans would vote for their party’s presidential candidate if that candidate were an atheist (43 percent) than a Muslim (61 percent). Americans are much more willing to vote for someone who is religious, even if that religious faith stands in stark contrast to the religious faiths of most Americans, than to vote for someone who is not religious. Americans clearly desire that their Presidents (and presidential candidates) be persons of religious faith. This conclusion is reinforced by the data in Table 2. This table presents responses to a more direct question on the topic, asked of national random samples of Americans by two different survey organizations at two different points during the 2004 presidential election. Respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement “It is important to me that a President has strong religious beliefs.” In the spring of 2004, more than two-thirds of the American public (68 percent) expressed agreement with the statement; in late summer, as the presidential campaign began to become more intense, nearly three-quarters (72 percent) did. Clearly, the vast majority of Americans desire their President to be a person of strong religious faith.
Table 2. Politicians and Faith President should have strong religious beliefs Agree (Spring 2004) Agree (August 2004)
2004 68% 72%
Uncomfortable when candidates discuss their faith Disagree (Spring 2004)
64%
Sources: Question 1: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute, University of Akron, Spring 2004 (N=4000) Pew Research Center Poll, August 5-10, 2004, (N= 1512). Question 2: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, Spring 2004 (N=4000)
If Americans want a President with a strong religious commitment, do they want that faith to be “public,” or primarily a personal trait, largely “private,” in nature? To what extent, then, do they recoil at presidential candidates talking about their religious faith in the context of a campaign? The bottom part of Table
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2 addresses this question; respondents were asked to react to the statement: “It makes me uncomfortable when politicians talk about their religious beliefs.” Again, the vast majority of Americans (64 percent) disagreed that any such talk grated their sense of propriety or was “improper.” Americans are also quite willing to have religious groups be active in politics. This is evident from the data in the top portion of Table 3. In a national survey in spring 2004, participants were asked to respond to the statement “Organized religious groups should stand up for their beliefs in politics.” An overwhelming majority of Americans (76 percent) expressed agreement that religious groups should voice their opinions and stand up for their beliefs in politics.
Table 3. Churches and Political Activity % Agreeing
2004
Organized religious groups should stand up for their beliefs in politics*
76%
Churches should express their views on political matters**
51%
Churches should be permitted to endorse political candidates**
25%
Sources: ** Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, Spring 2004 (N=4000) ** Pew Research Center Poll, August 5-10, 2004, (N= 1512)
Finally, Table 3 reveals that Americans make some important distinctions about how religious groups should be involved in politics. While Americans hold that religious groups should stand up for what they believe politically, they are less supportive of certain forms of organized religious groups doing so–namely, churches. Only half of all Americans (51 percent) indicated in August 2004 that they agreed that “churches should express their views on political matters.” And, while American are divided about whether churches should express their views on political issues, there is widespread agreement that churches should not endorse political candidates, as only a quarter of all American agreed that churches should be permitted to do so. Clearly, Americans have a high regard for religion and see an important public role for religious faith. They want their public officials to be persons of religious faith. They clearly think that organized religious groups should stand up for religious beliefs within the political arena, though they are more hesitant to have churches themselves become engaged in political expression. And, while half the American people are willing for churches to enter into political discussion, rela-
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tively few believe that churches should go so far as to endorse particular candidates for public office.
THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR This general acceptance of a public role for religion is a unifying force in American politics. However, American society is also characterized by a tremendous level of religious diversity, a feature often associated with political divisions. There is no established church in the United States; nor does one religious faith dominate. In addition to hundreds of different Christian denominations, there are thousands of non-denominational, independent congregations that function as well, as well as a growing array of other major religious faiths (e.g., Jews, Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, and others) and some increases among agnostics, atheists, and the religiously unaffiliated. The simple point is this: there is a tremendous pluralism in religious faiths practices and structures that operate within American social and political life. It is this pluralism, in part, that makes it difficult to grasp the ways by which religion is shaping contemporary American electoral politics. Moreover, religion is a multi-faceted phenomenon, involving patterns of beliefs, behaviors, and belonging. Just what facet of religion should be analyzed when seeking to assess religion’s role within the 2004 presidential election? Our assumption is that the classification scheme that can best capture the central facets of American religion will provide the most insight into how religion shapes the political behavior of the American people.³ But, to construct such a classification requires us first to consider two competing views about the critical components of American religion – that of ethnoreligious traditions and that of religious restructuring.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS Ethnoreligious loyalties have long shaped the voting decisions of the American public; from the early years of the Republic through the New Deal era, an “ethnoreligious order” has prevailed.⁴ The central characteristic of ethnoreligious ³ For a more detailed discussion of this classification scheme, its theoretical basis, and its relative power in explaining electoral choice in the 2004 presidential election, see Guth et al. (2005). ⁴ We use “ethnoreligious” in preference to the “ethnocultural label used by most historians (e.g., McCormick 1974) to keep our focus on the religious aspect of this interpretation of American electoral politics.
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politics is that political conflict is channeled primarily through differences that exist between competing ethnic and religious groups. However, because different ethnic groups have historically been linked to particular religious traditions, such conflict can be examined largely in terms of the broader categories of religious traditions. Accordingly, affiliation with particular religious groups or faith traditions serves as the basis of partisan affiliation, aligning members of some religious groups with one major party, while those affiliated with other religious groups or faith traditions align with the other. A religious tradition is a “group of religious communities that share a set of beliefs that generates a distinctive worldview” (Kellstedt et al., 1996, p. 176). Thus, the concept suggests that those belonging to a particular religious tradition (i.e., those affiliated with religious bodies that are interrelated in some historical and organizational fashion) exhibit a characteristic way of interpreting and responding to the world. It is a characteristic, not a defining, way of responding, as not all members of a religious tradition necessarily think and act alike. Still, political differences across religious traditions are potent, because the particular worldviews and values of those belonging to a religious tradition influence the way people interpret and respond to political stimuli. And, within each religious tradition, social interaction among members serves to strengthen and reinforce these differential perceptions of and reaction to parties, candidates, and issues. The different lifestyles, worldviews, and reference groups associated with people of different religious faiths shape their differential preferences for the two major parties and the governmental programs they advocate. These linkages between religious traditions and partisan loyalties on the part of members of different religious traditions reflect the distinctive culture found within each tradition, strengthened in part by varying degrees of social conflict with other religious traditions. During much of the twentieth century, mainline Protestants provided much of the leadership within the Republican Party as well as its most faithful voters, while Catholics, Jews, black Protestants and other religious minorities–including religious outgroups such as southern evangelicals–constituted the bedrock of the Democratic Party. Thus, among the most important factors in the “building blocs” of American party coalitions have been those affiliated with the various denominations and congregations of different faith traditions. This ethnoreligious perspective directs the analyst toward the real communities in which people live their religious lives, rather than simply positing and employing artificial categories, such as “conservative Christians” or “born-again voters.” By focusing on real communities, one can discern, for example, that members of black Protestant denominations are socialized religiously, understand
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Christian doctrines, and practice their religion differently than members of white evangelical Protestant churches–despite the fact that the two share many religious commonalities (e.g., orthodox beliefs and “born again” status). Likewise, those who affiliate with the Presbyterian Church in America, an evangelical Protestant denomination, participate in a very different religious milieu than members of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A, a mainline Protestant body, as do members of the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod (an evangelical Protestant denomination) compared to members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (a mainline Protestant denomination). However, in recent years, a number of sociologists have claimed that the ethnoreligious perspective is losing its analytical utility in capturing the defining characteristics of American religious life. They emphasize that the ascriptive nature of religious affiliation is disintegrating, as Americans increasingly choose their religious affiliations, often ignoring the old ties of family, ethnicity, class, and even doctrine. Nevertheless, we contend (and will soon demonstrate) that location in the historic religious traditions still matters, precisely because such membership is more freely chosen, allowing believers to locate in a congenial religious environment (Green & Guth, 1993). In addition, for many “new” religious communities (e.g., Hispanic Catholics), the tight religious, ethnic, and family bonds that once characterized “old” ethnoreligious groups such as Irish Catholics may still be operative. Thus, for both the historic and newer traditions, the ethnoreligious perspective may still enable the analyst to identify important aspects of American religion. Although many analysts still employ ethnoreligious traditions, variously defined (e.g., Manza and Brooks, 1999; Layman, 2001), an alternative framework has found considerable use among politicians, pollsters, and scholars. The central tenet of this perspective is that American religion is being restructured into two camps, with opposing worldviews. As Robert Wuthnow (1988) and James Davison Hunter (1991) have argued, major religious traditions in American have been increasingly polarized by theological, social and cultural conflicts, so that within such traditions, a “conservative or “orthodox” faction has emerged on one side and a “liberal” or “progressive” on the other. While critics are rightly skeptical about extreme statements of the restructuring theory,⁵ there certainly is evidence of considerable theological stress and conflict within “old-line” American religious institutions. Any quick perusal of ⁵ These extreme statements generally reflect more extreme versions of “cultural wars” imagery, failing to recognize the presence of a significant segment of “centrists” within American culture. For critiques of such a “culture war” perspective, see Williams (1997) and Fiorina (2005),
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the religious press will reveal battles between traditionalists and modernists in almost every major Protestant denomination and the American Catholic Church as well. While rooted in theology and practice, these different approaches also foster opposing moral, social, economic, and political perspectives. Within this restructuring framework of analysis, membership in particular religious traditions is largely irrelevant politically. Rather, traditionalists of all different religious faiths generally align together on one side of the political divide, while modernists, regardless of their religious affiliation, are largely aligned on the other side of that divide. In its most extreme form, what emerges is a religioussecular divide, so that religious people, regardless of religious tradition, fall on one side of the political divide and secular people fall on the other side of that divide.
THE ETHNORELIGIOUS DIVIDE VS. RELIGIOUS RESTRUCTURING We will combine the ethnoreligious and restructuring perspectives to provide a fuller picture of the way that religion influenced electoral choice in 2004. The remainder of this paper will draw primarily on data collected in the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Akron, and co-sponsored by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Additional support for the post-election part of the survey was provided by the Paul B. Henry Institute for the Study of Christianity and Politics at Calvin College and the William R. Kenan, Jr. Endowment at Furman University. The survey’s advantages for the study of religion and electoral behavior are several.⁶ But, most importantly, the religious batteries of the survey permit construction of a classification combining the ethnoreligious and restructuring perspectives. To assess the role of religion in the 2004 election, we employ this elaborated religious classification in Table 4, incorporating both religious traditions and traditionalism with such traditions. The table reports for each ethnoreligious group (1) the proportion it represents of the potential electorate, and (2) the proportion of the two-party vote it cast for Bush. ⁶ First, a large sample allows us to examine religious subgroups with considerable statistical confidence. This study initially polled a random sample of 4,000 adults between February and April 2004; after the fall election we reinterviewed 2,730 respondents. Second, the survey employs detailed affiliation probes for accurate classification of respondents into religious traditions (Kellstedt & Green, 1993; Green et al., 1996) and also includes religious belief, behavior, and movement questions integral to the restructuring approach.
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Clearly, the ethnoreligious divide is still evident within American politics, as members of many religious traditions continue to be quite distinct politically. While Latter-day Saints almost unanimously cast their ballots for Bush, less than one-fifth of black Protestants did so. Evangelical Protestants (constituting about one-quarter of the potential electorate) gave three-fourths of their votes to the GOP, but the religiously unaffiliated (comprising nearly one-fifth of the potential electorate) gave barely more than one-quarter of their votes to Bush. White Catholics (one-fifth of the potential electorate) were once stalwart Democrats, but, in 2004, they gave Bush a narrow majority, while mainline Protestants (one-sixth of the potential voters), once the religious bulwark of the GOP, split evenly for Bush and Kerry. Hispanics aligned in a differential fashion, depending on whether they are Protestants or Catholics, with the former voting heavily for Bush and the latter heavily for Kerry. Table 4. Religious Groups and Electoral Choice in the 2004 Election
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Proportion of Potential Voters (percent)
Bush Percent of Two-Party Vote
Latter-day Saints
1.8
97.0
Evangelical Protestant
25.1
77.5
Traditionalist Centrist Modernist
17.2 6.1 1.8
86.3 56.8 48.4
Hispanic Protestant
2.6
62.9
Mainline Protestant
16.4
50.0
Traditionalist Centrist Modernist
3.7 7.8 4.9
68.7 53.8 29.5
White Catholic
17.3
53.5
Traditionalist Centrist Modernist
3.6 8.0 5.7
81.3 56.4 27.1
Hispanic Catholic
4.5
31.4
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Proportion of Potential Voters (percent)
Bush Percent of Two-Party Vote
17.3 1.9 3.9 9.3
28.1 26.7 22.4 17.2
Total
100.0
51.2
(N=)
(2730)
(1645)
Unaffiliated Jewish All Others Black Protestants
Source: Post-Election Component of the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics (Post election N=2730)
While carefully assigning Americans to their proper religious traditions helps us understand contemporary electoral choices, our understanding is further enhanced if we examine the traditionalist-modernist divide within the three major religious traditions.⁷ Table 5 also reveals that traditionalists⁸ within each of the major religious traditions are, in accordance with the religious restructuring model, aligned in a similar fashion. If we examine the three major religious traditions (accounting for almost two-third of all voters), one finds that traditionalists are the most Republican, while modernists are the most Democratic, within their respective religious traditions. Centrists, as might be expected, fall between traditionalist and modernists in support given to the two major parties. Thus, religious traditions shape voting decisions, but so too do the worldviews linked to the traditional/modernist divide that extends across such traditions.
⁷ The table does not report traditionalist-modernist divisions among Hispanic Protestants and Catholics, Jews, Black Protestants, or for the other categories. This is due to both practical and theoretical reasons. The practical reason is that, for many traditions, the number of respondents is too small to subdivide with great confidence; any resulting percentages would be highly unstable. The theoretical basis for not doing so is that ethnoreligious theory suggests that many of these remaining traditions are still shaped more by racial, ethnic or religious solidarity than by religious restructuring. Nevertheless, there is some evident that traditionalist-modernist divide may be encroaching on these groups as well (Guth et al., 2005). ⁸ Traditionalists adhere to orthodox beliefs, participate frequently in normative religious behaviors, and want their religious institutions to maintain traditional beliefs and practices. Modernists, on the other side, reject orthodox beliefs and embrace new religious ideas, participate less frequently in normative religious behaviors, and hope their religious communities will adopt beliefs and practices consistent with modern ideas. Centrists naturally fall in the middle: they hold moderately orthodox beliefs, are somewhat active religiously, but tend not to identify with religious movements on either side. Although centrists are often neglected in discussions of restructuring, they are a critical religious and political group due to their position and numbers.
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SOCIAL VS. RELIGIOUS FACTORS While religion was clearly associated with voting decisions in the 2004 election, was it the most important factor shaping electoral decisions? Table 5 addresses this question, in part, by examining the percentage of the two-party vote cast for President Bush in 2004 by those in various social categories. Clearly voting in the 2004 presidential election was shaped by the socio-demographic characteristics of voters. Each of the six variables examined (race, age, martial status combined with gender, income, education, and religious tradition) are significantly correlated (at the .001 level) with vote choice.⁹ Whites were significantly more likely than black and Hispanics to vote for Bush (eta=.18), while the youngest and the oldest voters (i.e., those under 35 and especially those 66 years and older) were the least likely to do so (eta=.10). Marital status, more than gender, shaped voting decisions, as a majority of single males and females cast their ballots for Kerry, while their married counterparts chose Bush (eta=.14). Family income was monotonically associated with vote choice (eta = .08), with those who lower incomes were more likely to support Kerry than those with higher levels of incomes. Education has a curvilinear relationship to vote choice; those with both the lowest and the highest level of education were the most likely to cast their ballots for Kerry (eta=11). But, of all the variables analyzed, religious tradition, even without incorporating the traditionalist-modernist divide, is most strongly correlated with vote choice (eta=.41).
Table 5. Selected Socio-demographic Variables and 2004 Presidential Vote Choice
Race Black Hispanic Other White
% Bush
(N)
Eta
17.9% 44.8% 50.9% 54.0%
(117) (67) (112) (1594)
.18***
⁹ Technically, the values for the measure of association reported in Table 4 are eta statistics derived from one-way analysis of variance. The dependent variable was the mean score for the ethnoreligious group derived from a dichotomous variable in which a vote for Kerry was scored a value of 0 and a vote for Bush was scored a value of 1. In the case of a dichotomous variable scored in this fashion, the mean score is also the percentage of respondents who exhibit that particular characteristic, and hence the data are presented as percentages rather than mean scores.
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% Bush
(N)
Eta
Age Under 35 36 thru 50 51 thru 65 66+
51.2% 57.1% 52.0% 43.3%
(285) (524) (639) (437)
.10***
Marital Status and Gender Single female Single male Married female Married male
41.4% 45.0% 55.2% 57.9%
(461) (271) (545) (603)
.14***
Income Less than $30,000 $30,000 - $49,999 $50,000 or more
43.1% 50.8% 53.7%
(290) (362) (914)
.08***
Education Less than high school grad High school grad Some college College grad Post-graduate degree
38.0% 58.9% 54.5% 50.6% 43.6%
(50) (309) (574) (532) (424)
.11***
Religious Tradition Latter-day Saints Evangelical Protestant Hispanic Protestant Roman Catholic Mainline Protestant Hispanic Catholic Unaffiliated Jewish Other Black Protestant
97.0%
(37)
77.5% 62.9% 53.5% 50.0% 31.4% 28.1% 26.7% 22.4% 17.2%
(526) (31) (387) (416) (36) (263) (56) (71) (87)
.41***
Source: Post-Election Component of the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics (Post election N=2730)
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RELIGION AND PARTY COALITIONS How important, then, are these different religious groups to each of the two major parties? In Table 6, we examine the voting data from that perspective, analyzing the level of voter turnout within each of the religious categories along with each group’s contribution to the religious makeup of the Republican and Democratic electoral coalitions. The contribution that a group makes to a political party’s electoral coalition is determined by three factors: the size of the group in the electorate, its turnout rate, and the proportion of the vote that it gives to that party (Axelrod, 1972; Leege et al., 2002, p. 231-236). It is clear from Table 6 that the turnout rates¹⁰ of the three largest traditions vary,¹¹ with mainline Protestants still having a slight advantage over white Catholics and a somewhat larger edge over evangelicals. Among the smaller groups, Jews have a very high turnout, with the Latter-day Saints also well above the national average. But black and Hispanic Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, other religions and secular voters trail the national average, an obvious disadvantage for Democratic candidates in the 2004 national election. Table 6. The Religious Composition of Major Party Electoral Coalitions: 2004 Turnout Rate (percent)
Percent of GOP Electoral Dem. Electoral Coalition
Percent of Coalition
Latter-day Saints
70.8
3.8
0.1
Evangelical Protestant
63.2
39.8
12.1
Traditionalist Centrist Modernist
66.8 53.3 61.2
32.1 5.9 1.8
5.4 4.7 2.0
Hispanic Protestant
49.3
2.6
1.6
Mainline Protestant
69.2
18.4
19.1
81.6 62.0 71.4
6.8 8.4 3.3
3.2 7.6 8.3
Traditionalist Centrist Modernist
¹⁰ Like all voting studies, our survey is characterized by over-reporting of turnout by respondents. We have used a statistical routine to correct for this tendency. For further information, contact the authors. ¹¹ The relative size of each of the religious groups can be found in Table 5.
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Turnout Rate (percent)
Percent of GOP Electoral Dem. Electoral Coalition
Percent of Coalition
White Catholic
67.0
19.8
18.0
Traditionalist Centrist Modernist
79.4 64.5 63.2
7.2 9.4 3.1
1.7 7.6 8.7
Hispanic Catholic
43.1
1.9
4.4
Unaffiliated Jewish All Others Black Protestants
52.4 86.5 55.1 50.4
8.2 1.4 1.5 2.6
21.7 4.1 5.6 13.2
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
(N=)
(2730)
(1645)
(1645)
Source: Post-Election Component of the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics (Post election N=2730)
Within the major religious traditions, turnout also varied along the traditionalist-modernist divide. Within each of the three major traditions, turnout was highest among traditionalists. Modernists, not centrists, ranked second in turnout among evangelical and mainline Protestants. Turnout for centrists and modernists was approximately equal among Catholics, but their rate lagged far behind that of the smaller traditional cohort. Thus, on the whole, the 2004 presidential campaign stimulated a much higher turnout among traditionalists, as across the whole sample, turnout among traditionalists exceeded 67 percent, compared to 55 percent and 59 percent for centrists and modernists, respectively. Given the size of the different religious groups, and the different levels of turnout they exhibit, the two parties have very distinct religious profiles. As the last two columns of Table 6 reveal, those affiliated with the three largest religious traditions contributed nearly four out of every five ballots cast for Bush, but they accounted for less than one of every two ballots cast for Kerry. The major contributors to the Democratic coalition were secular voters (almost 22 percent); all other religious minorities, such as Jews, Hispanic Catholics and Protestants, and other religions (about 16 percent); and black Protestants (over 13 percent). It is particularly noteworthy that secular voters contributed a larger proportion of the Democratic ballots in 2004 than white Catholics, certainly a historic development.
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When one examines the electoral coalitions in terms of the contribution made by traditionalists and modernists, one finds that about a third of Bush’s vote came from evangelical traditionalists alone. If one adds to this mix those ballots cast by mainline and Catholic traditionalists (totaling to 14 percent), Latter-day Saints (3.8 percent) and Hispanic Protestants (2.6 percent), it produces what might be labeled a “traditionalist majority” within the GOP electoral coalition, with another one-quarter of Bush’s total vote coming from centrists in the three major traditions. In addition to the majority of ballots cast for Kerry by the religiously unaffiliated and religious minorities, the Democratic coalition bolsters its base with votes cast by religious modernists (19 percent) and centrists (almost 20 percent) from the three major religious traditions. Thus, it is this religious restructuring that is contributing to the so-called “God gap” in American politics. Of course, such a divide would be insignificant politically, if the different religious groups that anchor the religious divide were relatively small in size. But, the two groups that constitute the largest component of the electoral coalition for each party fall at the opposite ends of the religious spectrum. As can be seen from Table 6, evangelical Protestants serve as the core of the Bush voters–as two out of five votes cast for Bush came from evangelical Protestants. On the other hand, the religiously unaffiliated cast the plurality of votes garnered by Kerry (22 percent).
RELIGION, MEDIA, AND AMERICAN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR One of the many reasons for this strong linkage between religion and politics is the presence of religious media, which are numerous, large, and influential in the United States. Studies about how religious people use and respond to various types of media have revealed that mass media directly influence the ways in which people view various issues, problems, and possible solutions (for a summary, see Buddenbaum, 2001). How issues are framed and how much they are covered shape both the salience and interpretation of such issues and affect the criteria used by audiences in their evaluations. A number of different factors may contribute to these “priming” effects, but certainly two possible factors are (1) the extent to which people draw on media for political information, and (2) the source of such information, particularly whether that source is religious or secular in nature. Respondents in our post-election survey were asked whether certain sources of information were important to their voting decision. Consequently, to address the question of the extent to which media may have shaped decisions related to
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turnout and vote choice, we combined an index of secular media reliance¹² and an index of religious media reliance,¹³ to produce a four-fold classification: low media reliance (low in both secular and religious media use), primarily religious media reliance (high in religious media use, low in secular media use), primarily secular media reliance (high in secular media use, low in religious media use), and high media reliance (high in both secular and religious media use). Table 7 examines patterns of media reliance by Americans generally and by ethnoreligious traditions more specifically. For the general public, a little more than one-quarter (27.3 percent) report low utilization of both secular and religious media as sources of information in making their voting decision, while an equivalent proportion (26.8 percent) claim a relatively high reliance on both secular and religious media. One-third of Americans (33. 5 percent) report relatively high reliance on secular media coupled with low use of religious media, while a little more than one-tenth (12.4 percent) report the converse. Members of different religious traditions exhibit different patterns of media use in terms of seeking information for their voting decisions. Evangelical Protestants are distinctive in their higher reliance on religious media; more than one-fifth of evangelicals (20.9 percent) report a high reliance on religious media coupled with a low reliance on secular sources, more than double the proportion among mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics. And, a plurality of evangelicals (31.7 percent) report high use of both secular and religious media. As a result, less than one-quarter of all evangelical Protestants (22.2 percent) rely predominantly on secular media, basically one-half the level of mainline Protestants and white Roman Catholics. Mainline Protestants exhibit a relatively low reliance on religious media, and a particularly high reliance on secular media solely, while white Catholics most closely mirror the pattern exhibited by the general population. Jews are distinguished by their predominant reliance on secular media, while the unaffiliated are split between those who exhibit low levels of all media use (39.7 percent) and those who rely primarily on secular sources (43.3 percent). Interestingly, black Protestants, despite their relatively high religiosity, are no more likely than the
¹² Respondents were asked a series of questions related to whether certain sources of information were important to their voting decision. The particular items included in the secular media index were the following: television news, radio, newspapers, mail from interest groups, and the political campaign itself. ¹³ The particular items included in the religious media index were the following: religious television, religious radio, religious publications, mail from religious groups, and whether clergy or other leaders at their place of worship urged the respondent to vote in a particular way.
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general public to report higher reliance on religious media solely for their political information (11.9 percent); rather they tend to couple high reliance on both religious and secular media (54.6 percent).
Table 7. Secular and Religious Media Use by Religious Groups: 2004 Low Sec Low Rel
Low Sec High Sec High Sec High Rel Low Rel High Rel
Total
All
27.3%
12.4
33.5
26.8
100.0%
Latter-day Saints
39.1%
13.0
28.3
19.6
100.0%
Evangelical Protestants
25.2%
20.9
22.2
31.7
100.0%
Traditionalists Centrists Modernists
23.6% 35.5 53.8
25.2 15.0 3.8
23.1 29.0 28.8
28.1 20.6 13.5
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Hispanic Protestants
27.3%
4.5
30.3
37.9
100.0%
Mainline Protestants
29.6%
9.1
42.4
18.9
100.0%
27.5% 32.0% 41.8%
23.2 11.1 1.9
23.2 40.6 44.7
26.1 16.4 11.5
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
23.9%
10.0
38.5
27.6
100.0%
Traditionalists Centrists Modernists
32.1% 34.2% 38.1%
17.9 8.6 5.6
22.8 39.9 48.4
27.2 17.3 7.9
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Hispanic Catholic
17.2%
18.9
23.0
41.0
100.0%
Unaffiliated
39.7%
5.8
43.3
11.2
100.0%
Jewish
22.0%
8.0
56.0
14.0
100.0%
All Others
26.8%
12.4
43.3
17.5
100.0%
Black Protestants
15.4%
11.9
18.1
54.6
100.0%
Traditionalists Centrists Modernists White Catholic
Source: Post-Election Component of the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics (Post election N=2730)
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Once again, however, there are some similarities across religious traditions, as might be expected from the religious restructuring framework. Traditionalists within each religious tradition are the most likely to report using religious media as important information sources in making their electoral decision, whether coupled with a low or a high reliance on secular media. Modernists, on the other hand, are the most likely among mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics to report a high reliance on secular media solely, while centrists and modernists among evangelical Protestants are essentially tied in their level of reported reliance on secular media. These differences in patterns of media use are linked to important differences in voting decisions. The top portion of Table 8 reports the level of voter turnout according to their patterns of media reliance, and the two are clearly associated. As we might expect, those who exhibited low levels of media use for gathering political information are the least likely to turnout out to vote. However, their relatively low level of turnout (54.9 percent) is mirrored by those who relied heavily on religious media alone (55.2 percent). Those who relied solely on secular media were the most likely to have voted (71.3 percent), while those who relied heavily on both religious and secular media ranked second in terms of level of voter turnout (60.2 percent).
Table 8. Religious Groups and Voting Turnout Controlling for Patterns of Media Use: 2004
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Low Sec Low Rel % Turnout
Low Sec High Rel % Turnout
High Sec Low Rel % Turnout
High Sec High Rel % Turnout
All
54.9%
55.2%
71.3%
60.2%
Latter-day Saints
70.4%
88.5%
58.3%
78.2%
Evangelical Protestants
58.7%
65.5%
68.3%
64.5%
Traditionalists Centrists Modernists
73.5% 43.2% 65.0%
66.0% 60.6% 0.0%*
75.9% 55.8% 74.1%
69.6% 57.9% 53.8%
Hispanic Protestants
58.1%
82.3%
43.3%
43.3%
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Low Sec Low Rel % Turnout
Low Sec High Rel % Turnout
High Sec Low Rel % Turnout
High Sec High Rel % Turnout
61.9%
72.7%
74.6%
74.8%
68.8% 62.5% 60.5%
85.7% 76.9% 33.3%*
75.8% 73.9% 86.7%
85.7% 74.2% 61.1%
55.6%
47.9%
76.7%
70.6%
Traditionalists Centrists Modernists
60.9% 50.0% 59.5%
70.6% 31.3% 30.8%
96.8% 63.4% 83.8%
75.9% 66.7% 66.7%
Hispanic Catholic
41.1%
22.4%
62.2%
42.0%
Unaffiliated
46.8%
19.9%
67.0%
33.2%
Jewish
93.9%
60.0%*
91.7%
75.1%
All Others
51.3%
32.0%
68.6%
58.6%
Black Protestants
41.6%
53.5%
74.1%
52.4%
Mainline Protestants Traditionalists Centrists Modernists White Catholic
* Number of respondents falling within the cell is five or less. Source: Post-Election Component of the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics (Post election N=2730)
Furthermore, when one examines the level of voting turnout of different ethnoreligious traditions, these general patterns hold within each ethnoreligious tradition. Regardless of tradition, those who rely predominantly on secular media generally exhibit the highest level of turnout on Election Day. And, those who rely heavily on both secular and religious media tend exhibit the second highest. There are some exceptions to these patterns. In some cases, those who relied predominantly on religious media exhibited the highest turnout within their groups (e.g., Latter-day Saints, Hispanic Protestants). And, Jews who reported a low reliance on both secular and religious media exhibited the highest rate of turnout among their co-religionists. In each exception, however, the numbers within these particular categories were relatively small, and so caution must be exercised in extrapolating too much from these deviations. When we shift our focus to the traditionalist-modernist divide, the patterns are less stable. For example, those modernists who rely predominantly on secular media, regardless of their particular religious tradition, exhibit the highest level of turnout. But those traditionalist evangelicals and traditionalist Catholics who rely heavily on
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secular media also exhibit the highest level of turnout within their religious cohort. Among centrist evangelicals and centrist mainliners, those who relied heavily on religious media exhibited the highest rate of turnout, while among centrist Catholics it was those who relied heavily on both secular and religious media. Different patterns of media use are also associated with different vote choices. Table 9 reports the percentage of respondents that voted for Bush according to their pattern of media reliance. As can be seen in the top of the table, those who relied solely on religious media were the most likely to have voted for Bush (77.8 percent), while those who relied predominantly on secular media were the most likely to have chosen Kerry (60.5 percent). On the other hand, those who relied heavily on both secular and religious media voted for Bush at about the same rate as those who reported little reliance on either form of media (54.2 percent versus 54.4 percent, respectively).
Table 9. Religious Groups and Voting for President Controlling for Patterns of Media Use: 2004 Low Sec Low Rel % Bush
Low Sec High Rel % Bush
High Sec Low Rel % Bush
All
54.5%
77.8%
39.5%
54.2%
Latter-day Saints
91.7%
100.0%
87.5%
100.0%
Evangelical Protestants
74.7%
92.3%
63.0%
78.8%
Traditionalists Centrists Modernists
80.0% 61.9% 83.3%
95.5% 80.0% 0.0%*
82.5% 58.1% 30.0%
89.7% 62.8% 42.9%
Hispanic Protestants
80.0%
66.7%
50.0%
63.6%
Mainline Protestants
59.0%
61.2%
41.2%
51.7%
76.2% 70.0% 30.8%
83.3% 50.0% 0.0%*
48.0% 56.3% 17.3%
70.8% 47.8% 27.3%
51.6%
85.7%
45.3%
57.8%
78.6% 53.8% 31.8%
100.0% 83.3% 33.3%
66.7% 50.0% 25.9%
69.2% 60.0% 30.0%
Traditionalists Centrists Modernists White Catholic Traditionalists Centrists Modernists
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High Sec High Rel % Bush
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Religion and the 2004 Presidential Election
Low Sec Low Rel % Bush
Low Sec High Rel % Bush
High Sec Low Rel % Bush
High Sec High Rel % Bush
Hispanic Catholic
33.3%
60.0%
11.1%
42.1%
Unaffiliated
32.1%
40.0%
24.8%
37.5%
Jewish
30.0%
100.0%*
16.0%
20.0%
All Others
33.3%
0.0%
25.0%
33.3%
Black Protestants
33.3%
33.3%
26.0%
6.2%
* Number of respondents falling within the cell is five or less. Source: Post-Election Component of the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics (Post election N=2730)
Moreover, these patterns hold when one examines the votes cast for the two presidential candidates within each religious tradition. Thus, within each ethnoreligious tradition, those who relied predominantly on religious media were the most likely of their religious cohort to report having voted for Bush, while those who relied heavily on secular media were the most likely to their cohorts to report having cast their ballot for Kerry. There are some notable exceptions to these patterns. Hispanic Catholics who relied heavily on religious media deviated from the Democratic tendencies of their religious cohort and voted for Bush. On the other hand, black Protestants who relied heavily on both secular and religious media for gathering campaign information were the least likely of their co-religionists, despite their use of religious media, to have voted for Bush. At other times, those who were low media users were the most likely of their religious cohort to report voting for Bush (e.g., modernist evangelicals and centrist mainliners). Nevertheless, overall, the data in Table 9 suggest that there are important consequences associated with different patterns of media reliance. Where one gets one’s political information helps to shape and color one’s voting decisions, and different religious groups exhibit different patterns of media use. Thus, part of the reason why different religious groups exhibit different voting patterns is that ethnoreligious groups have varied patterns of reliance on media as information sources.
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RELIGION AND AMERICAN ELECTIONS OVER TIME Was the role that religion played in the 2004 election qualitatively different from its role in recent presidential contests? To address this question, we employ our elaborated religious classification, incorporating both religious traditions and traditionalism within such traditions, and examine the relationship between our religious variable and the GOP presidential vote over the past three presidential elections. It should be noted at the outset, however, that the context of the 1996 election was different from those of 2000 and 2004, as the third-party candidacy of Perot in 1996 was much more significant than those of Nader in 2000 and 2004. To insure greater comparability across the three elections, then, the analysis is limited to the two-party division of the vote. These data are found in Table 10.
Table 10. A Comparison of Presidential Voting by Religious Group over Time 1996 % Dole
2000 % Bush
All
48%
50%
51%
Latter-day Saints
90%
94%
97%
Evangelical Protestant
67%
76%
78%
76% 47% 41%
83% 61% 68%
86% 57% 48%
53%
60%
50%
Traditionalist Centrist Modernist
70% 50% 44%
79% 55% 53%
69% 54% 30%
Hispanic Protestant
30%
38%
63%
Roman Catholic
54%
54%
54%
Traditionalist Centrist Modernist
67% 47% 50%
74% 48% 32%
81% 56% 27%
Hispanic Catholic
23%
24%
31%
6%
21%
27%
Traditionalist Centrist Modernist Mainline Protestant
Jewish
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2004 % Bush
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1996 % Dole
2000 % Bush
Other Religions
10%
31%
22%
Black Protestant
2%
4%
17%
44%
34%
28%
Unaffiliated
2004 % Bush
Sources: Post-election components of the Second, Third, and Fourth National Surveys of Religion and Politics ( N for 1996= 2412; N for 2000=2925; N for 2004= 2730)
Several important conclusions can be drawn from Table 10. First, the general pattern of religious voting is quite similar across the three elections, with a few exceptions. Evangelical Protestants, as a whole, overwhelmingly supported the Republican candidate in 2004, just as they had done in 2000 and in 1996. Mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics, as broad traditions, voted in 2004 in a similar fashion to what they had done in 1996. And the very high rate at which the Latter-day Saints voted for Bush in 2004 is reflective of their voting pattern in 1996 and 2000. And, the members of minority religious faiths who overwhelmingly supported the Democratic candidate in 2004 did the same in 1996 and 2000 (the exception being Hispanic Protestants). On the other hand, this continuity masks some important changes occurring within the ranks of the major religious traditions. First, those who belong to the two large religious traditions that anchor the partisan divide in American politics have become even more polarized in their level of support for the two major parties. Evangelical Protestants, while overwhelmingly Republican in 1996, become even stronger GOP supporters in 2000 (and retained that same level in 2004). And, the religiously unaffiliated or secular component of the American electorate, while Democratic in 1996, moved in an increasingly stronger Democratic direction across each subsequent presidential election. Second, there appears also to have been increasing polarization along the traditionalist-modernist continuum within each of the three largest religious traditions, though this pattern is not totally uniform. Traditionalist evangelicals were more Republican in 2004 than they had been in 1996; traditionalist mainline Protestants were more Republican in 2000 than in 1996 (though their level of GOP support fell back to its 1996 levels in 2004); and, traditionalist Catholics were more Republican in 2004 than they had been in 1996. On the other hand, modernists, regardless of religious tradition, appear to be moving in a more Democratic direction. This is best seen among Roman Catholics, as Republican support among modernist Catholics has been cut in half across the past three presidential
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elections (from 50 percent in 1996 to 23 percent in 2004). Modernist Protestants were also less Republican in 2004 than they had been in 1996, though they were divided between Bush and Gore in 2000. Only modernist evangelical Protestants appear to be somewhat more Republican in 2004 than in 1996. Of course, the analysis presented in Table 10 does not take into account the influence of other factors in shaping voting decisions in these last three presidential elections. Have religious factors, relative to other factors, grown in importance in shaping presidential election outcomes over the past three elections? This question is addressed in Table 11 which presents the results of a Multiple Classification Analysis.¹⁴ This analysis assesses the relative influence of six socio-demographic variables in shaping the presidential vote cast by voters in the 1996, 2000, and 2004 presidential elections. These variables are the same variables analyzed in Table 4, and include race, age, marital status and gender combined, income, education, and religious tradition. The statistics presented in the table are the resultant beta coefficients associated with each socio-demographic variable in each of the last three presidential elections. The beta coefficient reflects the relative importance of that particular variable in accounting for variation in vote choice, once the effects of the other five socio-demographic variables have been taken into account. Thus, the larger the beta coefficient, the greater the influence of the variable.
Table 11. The Relative Effects of Selected Socio-demographic Variables on Presidential Vote Choice over Time: an MCA Analysis
Race Age Marital Status and Gender
1996 Beta
2000 Beta
2004 Beta
.20 .03 .10
.18 .04 .21
.12 .09 .07
¹⁴ Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) enables one to use categorical variables in multivariate analysis. It first provides the mean score on the dependent variable for each category of the independent variable. This procedure yields a bivariate measure of association (eta) between the independent and dependent variable. It then provides deviations from the mean score on the dependent variable for each category of the independent variables after controls for each of the other independent variables have been entered in the analysis, with the statistic beta being the multivariate equivalent of eta. Table 11 presents only the beta values for each of the independent variables, as these as the values that reflect the strength of the relationship once the other variables have been entered into the equation.
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Income Education Religious Tradition R2
1996 Beta
2000 Beta
2004 Beta
.09 .04 .34 .21
.09 .07 .40 .30
.05 .04 .46 .26
Sources: Post-election components of the Second, Third, and Fourth National Surveys of Religion and Politics ( N for 1996= 2412; N for 2000=2925; N for 2004= 2730)
Overall, Table 11 shows that the two most important socio-demographic factors shaping voting decisions over the past three presidential elections have been race and religious tradition. However, whereas the beta coefficient for race in 1996 was .20, the beta coefficient for religious tradition (.34) was nearly double that. Moreover, while the value of the beta for race has consistently declined over each of the last three presidential elections, the beta for ethnoreligious tradition has monotonically increased over the same period of time. As a result, age (beta=.09) came to almost rival race (beta=.12) in shaping voting decisions in 2004, but neither variable exhibited the same power as religious tradition (beta=.46). The influence of ethnoreligious traditions in shaping voting decisions in the 2004 presidential election far exceeded that of any other major social trait.
CONCLUSION Both scholars and pundits agree that religion matters in American elections and, in particular, that it mattered in 2004. Yet, grasping the complex ways by which religion shapes contemporary electoral politics, as well as the ways in which such influence may be changing, has remained largely unaddressed. We have outlined two competing theories about the way that religion shapes American electoral politics, namely, the ethnoreligious and the religious restructuring models, and have shown that both influence American politics. Religion is both an individual and a social attribute. Our religious classification scheme recognizes both the religious context within American voters live and (for many) worship, while also recognizing the individual religious response of members within that tradition along a traditionalist-modernist continuum. People make decisions about their voting choices and whether or participate politically based not only on their personal interests, their political knowledge, and personal skills, but also as a result of being part of social and organizational
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webs that serve to channel information, reinforce group preferences, and stimulate participation. To understand and assess the role religion plays in American electoral politics requires a multi-dimensional understanding of the ways in which religion can, and does, shape American electoral behavior. Americans political culture shapes the contours within which presidential election contests are conducted. And Americans want their President to be a religious person, and, by extension, they want their presidential candidates to be people of faith. And they believe that religious people and groups should voice their beliefs in politics. But, religion is also strongly linked to political divisions within American politics. However, the extent of this religiously-based cleavage should not be exaggerated. Clearly, there are many people of strong religious faith who vote Democratic, and there are people who are religiously unaffiliated who vote Republican. Still, it does appear that religious restructuring is creating elements of a new religious order that is currently “superimposed on top” of the older ethnoreligious order. These different means by which religion can “order” political alignments are not mutually exclusive, as religious traditions and traditionalism can both matter at the same time. As a result, facets of both the “ethnoreligious” and the “religious restructuring” models are currently evident within American politics. What is unclear is the extent to which the new order may erase the old order, continue to operate in conjunction with the older order, or subside as a factor in American politics. Certainly it remains to be seen whether, and to what extent, the Democratic Party will seek to re-capture and reconnect with religious voters, particularly those who may be otherwise be inclined to support their candidates. There are, however, real and unfortunate consequences associated with this religious divide in American politics. Americans, as a whole, are a fairly religious people. Consequently, if the Democratic Party or its candidates appear to be “antireligious” in their stance or policy positions, it is likely to have politically disadvantageous consequences for them. But the consequences of this religious divide in American politics move far beyond the relative partisan advantages or disadvantages associated with it. More importantly, as the potential results of an election are interpreted to be more foundational (and less incremental) in nature, political debate becomes much more heated, relationships with those affiliated with the opposite party become much less civil, and the potential for political abuses become greater, as “the ends,” for some partisans, may come to “justify the means.”
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