Representing the October 1917 Russian Revolution ...

The Russian Revolution in School History Textbooks

Joseph Zajda Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus) and John Whitehouse The University of Melbourne Abstract Historians, both locally and globally, have made sense of the October 1917 Revolution in Russia in different ways. These different interpretations reflect the way in which meaning is created in history. Historiography is an important aspect of history teaching in schools, particularly the teaching of the Revolutions course, in the final year of secondary schooling in Melbourne. How do representations of the revolution by different historians, from diverse ideological backgrounds, compare to the depiction of the same events, in this case the October Revolution of 1917, in Russian school textbooks? What are the implications for teaching secondary school students studying Russian history? Although the October Revolution of 1917 played a significant part in the nation-building process in the USSR, as demonstrated by Soviet school textbooks, its political significance was minimized in the first generation post-Soviet history textbooks after 1992. However, current prescribed Russian history textbooks for senior secondary students, which are approved by the Ministry of Education and Science, now regard the Russian Revolution as a significant part of a foundation narrative, representing a re-invented new metanarrative. Methodology In our approach towards the analysis of the social, cultural and political constructs of significant events, national leaders and their symbolic representation in school history textbooks, we critique new historical narratives in Russian history textbooks. We analyse dominant historical narratives and the ‘hero’ concept. In our methodology, we employ critical discourse analysis, and critical theory. This inter-disciplinary methodology can be more effective in analysing the complexity of social and political discourses, dealing with the national identity, and its resultant representation in dominant historical narrative in school history textbooks. Theoretical constructs and assumptions We need to refer to the constructs of the ‘nation-state’, ‘national identity’, ‘nation-building’, ‘collective memory’, and ‘culture’. They are all symbiotically interrelated in their role of constructing a collective sense of historical consciousness (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Anderson, 1991, Halbwachs, 1980; Hall, 1997; Wodak, de Cillia & Reisigl, 1999; Fuchs, 2011, Zajda, 2016). We also need to recognize that these are all mental constructs, defined and made meaningful by our own subjectivities, space (location and place) and the prevailing political, ideological and socio-cultural context. Furthermore, it is necessary to understand the way these 1

social, political and cultural constructs are defined, and used in current history textbooks, both locally and globally. There is also a need to examine the use of language, and symbols to communicate a new perception surrounding the discourse of identity politics, national identity as a sense of national belonging, and nation-building in various countries. The use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in analyzing historical narratives Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) means ‘not taking things for granted, opening up complexity, challenging reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies, being self-reflective in my research, and through these processes, making opaque structures of power relations and ideologies manifest’ (Wodak, 2007). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) provides a theoretical framework through which researchers can critique intersections of society and culture (in this case, history education, national and gender identity) by examining uses of language in social or sociopolitical dynamics (Rogers, 2011). Using CDA approach in analysing historical knowledge and understanding, the textbook is defined through a particular way of writing about the past. In the analysis of discourse of national identity (DNI), we demonstrate how the RF is engaged today in an attempt to construct the new national identity.

The 1917 October Revolution: Setting the Stage Setting the Stage The imperial Russia had a long history autocracy, oppression, power abuse, and rampant social inequality. Russia’s entry into World War 1, with its 5-million men army, and the major defeats that followed (some 2.5 million were killed), was one of the factors contributing to continuing unrest among the people. The war resulted in a deep economic and social crisis, where Russia experiencing numerous internal and external conflicts. As a result of the war, since 1914, Russia was economically ruined by 1917. The industrial output was seven-fold less than in 1913, and the agricultural output was 38% compared with 1913 (Levandovski & Shchetivov, 2013, p. 165). The inflation, by our standards, was an astronomical hyper-inflation: if in 1917 the rouble fell 15 times from the 1913 exchange rate, by 1920, it fell 20,000 (1: 20,000). In short, the impact of the war on Russia and its people, ineffective leadership of Nicholas II, lack of radical economic reforms, and hardship experienced by the people set the stage for the revolution.21 The new discourse of the events of October 1917 in current Russian school history textbooks, is characterised by a new interpretation of the ‘Genesis’, or the creation of the ‘Soviet’ system of government in October 1917 (Levandovski, Shchetinov, & Mironenko (2013). The final year Russian history students learn that the Russian monarchy destroyed itself, without organised action by any of the dominant political parties or revolutionary movements. What the students now discover is the fact that Lenin and his co-conspirators, by careful planning, and with relatively small losses, were able to seize power and topple the Provisional Government forces (Zajda, 2009; Zajda, 2014; Zajda, 2015). Recent developments in the understanding on the 1917 Revolution in Russia There are two new developments in understanding the Russian Revolution. First, the Revolution is now treated as one of the events of ‘great national significance’. Second, the Russia

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Revolution is now understood as a historical continuum that embraced the period between the 1905 Revolution and the end of the Civil War between the Reds and the Whites in 1922. On 2 June, 2014, President Putin directed his cabinet and the Ministry of Education to work together with the Russian Historical Society on revising and updating (by 15 August) the national framework for new standardized textbooks of Russian history. Earlier, on January 2014, Putin, at the meeting with authors of a new framework for a school textbook on Russian history, said: This year (2014) will mark 100 years since the beginning of World War I. Ahead of us are the 70th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, 100 years of the February and October Revolutions [of 1917]. These dates are of great national significance, all of them, regardless of how we assess them. This is a fact, and we should consider together what events, and on what scale should be organised on a national level. I would like to hear your suggestions (file:///H:/President%20of%20Russia.htm).

Putin included the 1917 Revolution as an event of ‘great national significance’. This was documented by the ARC 2013 survey of the Russian secondary history teachers across the RF, which revealed that when the respondents were asked to list up to 5 significant events in Russian history of the past 100 years that the history textbooks either ignore or underemphasise, the Russian Revolution was listed as one of them. Teachers listed the collapse of the USSR, the 1917-1922 Civil War, the October Revolution, and the Great Patriotic War (WW2). A number of teachers felt that there was insufficient information provided in historical narratives depicting the 1917 October Revolution (Zajda & Smith, 2013, Zajda, 2016). The new approach to the understanding of the Russian Revolution is to treat the revolution as a complex continuum that embraced the period between 1905-1922 (the 1905 Revolution, the February and October Revolution of 1917, and the Civil War between November 1917- October 1922). In a recent survey and interviews of secondary Russian history teachers it was demonstrated that some teachers felt that the October 1917 Revolution needed more discussion and analysis (Zajda, 2013). Russian history teachers commenting on the 1917 October Revolution (Moscow, June 2013) said that ‘Secondary history teachers are currently engaged in the polemics surrounding the events of 1917’ (Shubin, 2013). Similarly, Liudmila Aleksashkina (June, 2013), the author of the National Standards in History regards the October 1917 Revolution as one of the controversial aspects of historical narrative requiring more analysis and discussion. This is also supported by Tatiana Koval (July 2013), who believed that the October 1917 Revolution was one of controversial events in need of informed discussion. Stages in the 1917 October Revolution We can identify the following seven stages in the October Revolution 1. The Six days of February Revolution (the six days: 23-28 February), with massive strikes (306,000 of the workers, or 75% of the workers in Petrograd), and demonstrations, the use of army and the police to stop demonstrations, and the occupation of the State Duma in Petrograd.

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2. Czar Nicholas II, unable to return to Tsarskoe Selo, abdicates (March 2). The Provisional Government is formed on 2 March. At the same time, the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies (Petrosoviet, like the one in 1905) is formed and the first meeting takes place on 27 February. 3. Lenin returns (also Zinoviev and others) from exile and arrives in Petrograd, at the Finland Station, via a sealed train (April 3) and makes a speech to a waiting crowd, and a delegation headed by Chkheidze, the head of Petrosoviet, at the Finland Station. On April 4, Lenin delivers a speech, known as the April thesis. 4. The June-July Demonstrations (18 June, 500,000 strong political demonstration), with a series of demonstrations (500,000 on 4 July) in Petrograd, with the slogan ‘All power to the Soviet’. The Cossacks and cadets opened fire and some 700 killed. The three major political groups are: Kornilov (the extreme right), Kerensky (the centre, the reformer), and Lenin (the extreme left). 5. Alexander Kerensky is elected Prime Minister of the Provisional Government (8 July). After the July crisis, the dictatorship of the Provisional Government is established. All Bolshevik papers, including Pravda, are closed. Many Bolsheviks are arrested. Lenin and Zinoviev go into hiding. The formation of the second coalition government (24 July), under Kerensky as head of the government. 6. The military coup of Kornilov (25-27 August) is defeated by some 40,000 armed workers and soldiers. 7. The October Revolution: On 10 October, the Bolsheviks’ Central Committee meets and votes for the Revolution. The Red Guards are 75,000 strong. On 26 October, the Bolsheviks, and the Red Guards (12,000-16,000) take over the Winter Palace, the seat of the Provisional Government, and arrest the Ministers. Kerensky left earlier for the front. Lenin and his Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), now in control of Russia Lenin’s Role in the 1917 October Revolution Before 1917, as we know, the chances of a Bolshevik seizure of power were remote (even Lenin thought so in his exile), but for Russia’s disastrous defeats during the war in 1915, the weakness of Tsar Nicholas II in leadership and policy making—especially his inaction in the pressing land reforms, which would have appeased millions of peasants, and the corrupt and exploitative regime, which resulted in the fall down of Tsardom ‘of its own accord’. It had created a favourable environment for a political take over (Nove, 1975, p. 21). At the end of 1916 Lenin, still in exile in Switzerland, in his pessimistic appraisal thought that he will never see the revolution in Russia. A provisional government set up in March 1917, which included Kerensky, released political prisoners, among them Iosif Dzugashvilli (‘Stalin’, his new name of ‘steel-like, as ‘stal’ in Russian means ‘steel’, hence the ‘man of steel’) in Siberia. In April Lenin arrived in Russia in the infamous ‘sealed train’. After Lenin’s inspiring April theses, the Bolsheviks adopted the two winning slogans—‘peace’ and ‘land’. The Provisional Government under Kerensky had lost the initiative. Although some progressive social legislations were adopted, the major policy issues remained unsolved—Russia’s participation in the war, and the land reforms. Most importantly, 4

the Provisional Government lacked the legitimacy in the eyes of the masses, following the disappearance of the ‘semi-divine’ attributes of the Tsar. Having failed to launch major reforms, which were expected, the government lost the support of the masses. Its socialist ‘pretensions’ alienated the middle classes and the military. (Nove, 1975, p. 22). The time was right for seizing power. The Bolsheviks decided to act. Lenin’s hour had arrived (the surname “Lenin” was derived from the river Lena, in Siberia, where Vladimir Ulianov was exiled for his revolutionary activities). The Provisional Government had no chance, once the Bolsheviks had decided to seize the power. It could only count on the support of a small number of volunteers. In the end a very small group remained to defend the Winter Palace: Defenders surrendered to the Red Guards. The Ministers of the Provisional government were all arrested… (Kiseliov & Popov, 2011, p. 73).

Interpretation by different historians, from diverse ideological backgrounds: the Western perspective History is a discipline with its own purpose, content and modes of inquiry (Zajda & Whitehouse, 2009; Zajda, 2012). How does the discipline produce knowledge? What are the issues at work in this process? Teachers must present the discipline as an exploration of the past based on evidence. This means that students use primary and secondary sources to form understandings of the past. The implications of including secondary sources in the history classroom are profound. Historiography is central to historical understanding, not some peripheral aspect of the discipline. Leading students to this understanding creates rich possibilities for historical understanding. As a first step, teachers need to examine key historical works on the topics that they plan to teach. The questions that historians pose about the past can shape curriculum. Rigorous exploration of the past requires distinctive, disciplinary thinking. The 1905 Revolution In The History of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course (1939), the authors argue that the first Russian revolution was a significant event that changed the country: The first Russian revolution constituted a whole historical stage in the development of our country. This historical stage consisted of two periods: the first period, when the tide of revolution rose from the general political strike in October to the armed uprising in December and took advantage of the weakness of the tsar, who had suffered defeat on the battlefields of Manchuria, to sweep away the Bulygin Duma and wrest concession after concession from the tsar; and the second period, when tsardom, having recovered after the conclusion of peace with Japan, took advantage of the liberal bourgeoisie's fear of the revolution, took advantage of the vacillation of the peasants, cast them a sop in the form of the Witte Duma, and passed to the offensive against the working class, against the revolution. In the short period of only three years of revolution (1905-07) the working class and the peasantry received a rich political education, such as they could not have received in thirty years of ordinary peaceful development. A few years of revolution made clear what could not be made clear in the course of decades of peaceful development. The revolution disclosed that tsardom was the sworn enemy of the people, that tsardom was like the proverbial hunchback whom only the grave could cure. The revolution showed that the liberal bourgeoisie was seeing an alliance with the tsar, and not with the people, that it was a counterrevolutionary force, an agreement with which would be tantamount to a betrayal of the people. The revolution showed that only the working class could be the leader of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that it alone could force aside the liberal Constitutional-Democratic bourgeoisie, destroy its influence 5

over the peasantry, rout the landlords, carry the revolution to its conclusion and clear the way for Socialism. Lastly, the revolution showed that the labouring peasantry, despite its vacillations, was the only important force capable of forming an alliance with the working class. (Source: History of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course. 1939, pp. 94-5).

Richard Pipes (1990), on the other hand argues that the 1905 Revolution had left ‘political attitudes untouched’: The 1905 Revolution substantially alerted Russia’s political institutions, but it left political attitudes untouched. The monarchy continued to ignore the implications of the October Manifesto and to insist that nothing had really changed. Its supporters on the right and the mobs they inspired longed to punish those who had humiliated the Tsar. The socialist intelligentsia, for its part, was more determined than ever to exploit the demonstrated weakness of the government and press on with the next, socialist phase of the revolution. The experiences of 1905 had left it more, not less, radical. The terrible weakness of the bonds holding Russia together was revealed to all: but to the government it meant the need for firmer authority, whereas to the radicals it signalled opportunities to destroy the existing order. Not surprisingly, the government and the opposition alike viewed the Duma, not as a vehicle for reaching compromises, but as an arena of combat, and sensible voices, pleasing for cooperation, were vilified by both sides (Source: Source: Richard Pipes (1990).The Russian Revolution. New York: Knopf. p. 51).

Rex A. Wade (2005) adds that the 1905 Revolution produced ‘mixed results’ and discontent persisted: The Revolution of 1905 produced mixed results. It forced major changes in the political system, including limited civil rights and an elected legislature with the right to approve all laws. The traditional autocracy was ended, though Nicholas retained very extensive power. On the other hand, the imperial government soon chipped away at the changes made in 1905, while demands for a full parliamentary democracy, distribution of land to peasants, basic improvements in the lives of industrial workers and other reforms remained unfulfilled. Nicholas ruled over a sullen populace of permanently politicized workers and of peasants who expressed their discontent through petty harassment of landlords and officials, and sometimes more violently. Moreover, the major ingredients of the revolt persisted after 1905. These included worker discontents, peasant unrest, middle-class aspirations for civil rights and a larger voice in governance, and the government’s own determination to hold on to power. Thus if the other key ingredient of 1905, war and soldier discontent, was again added into the mix, all the elements of that revolution would again be present. (Source: Rex A. Wade (2005). The Russian Revolution, 1917. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 14).

As the above shows, the 1905 Revolution not only failed to resolve Russia’s outstanding economic, social and political problems: the growing polarization and estrangement between rulers and ruled, but aggravated it. The July 1917 events Christopher Hill (1947), when commenting on the July 1917 events observed that a massive demonstrations had resulted in economic, political and social chaos, and that due to repressions that followed, Lenin went ‘into hiding’: On July 16th and 17th a series of spontaneous demonstrations by half a million workers and soldiers in Petrograd urged the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets to assume supreme power: “Take power, you son of a bitch, when it’s given to you,” an irate worker shouted to the Socialist Revolutionary leader, Chernov. The Bolsheviks were taken by surprise by the scale of these demonstrations no less than the Provisional Government, and did their best to prevent the demonstrations turning into an armed rising, since they felt that they had not yet sufficient influence outside the capital to be able to maintain themselves in power…

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The leaders of the majority parties in the soviets did not accept the sole power thus thrown at them. The government forcibly suppressed and disarmed the Bolsheviks and their most active supporters in Petrograd and at the front. Pravda was smashed up and forbidden to resume publication, and forged documents were published alleging Bolshevik connections with the Germans. Lenin had to go into hiding. A new government was formed, which proclaimed its complete independence of the soviets, although it still contained representatives of the leading soviet parties. In Lenin’s view the “July Days” marked the end of dual power and the effective surrender of the soviet leaders. He declared that “all hopes of a peaceful development of the Russian Revolution have definitely vanished,” and urged the abandonment of the slogan “all power to the soviets.” (Source: Christopher Hill (1947). Lenin and the Russian Revolution. London: English Universities Press, pp. 116-7)

Richard Pipes (1990), by contrast, argues that Lenin’s indecision to order for the takeover of the government, was a strategic error in his leadership: But in the ultimate analysis the Bolshevik failure seems to have been caused by factors other than inadequate forces or bad planning: contemporaries agree that the city was theirs for the asking. Rather, it was due to a last-minute failure of nerve on the part of the commander in chief. Lenin simply could not make up his mind: according to Zinoviev, who spent these hours by his side, he kept wondering aloud whether this was or was not the time to “try,” and in the end decided it was not. For some reason he could not summon the courage to make the leap: possibly the dark cloud which hung over him of government revelations about dealings with the Germans held him back. Later, when both of them sat in jail, Trotsky told Raskolnikov, in what Raskolnikov took to be a veiled criticism of Lenin: “Perhaps we made a mistake. We should have tried to take power.” (Source: Richard Pipes (1990). The Russian Revolution 1899-1919.New York: Knopf, p. 431).

Sheila Fitzpatrick (2008) when assessing the political significance of the July Days, argues that the event was a political ‘disaster’ for Lenin and the Bolsheviks: In one sense, the July Days were a vindication of Lenin’s intransigent stand since April, for they indicated strong popular sentiment against the Provisional Government and the dual power, impatience with the coalition socialists, and eagerness on the part of the Kronstadt sailors and others for violent confrontation and probably insurrection. But in another sense, the July Days were a disaster for the Bolsheviks. Clearly Lenin and the Bolshevik Central Committee had been caught off balance. They had talked insurrection, in a general way, but not planned it. The Kronstadt Bolsheviks, responding to the sailors’ revolutionary mood, had taken an initiative which, in effect, the Bolshevik Central Committee had disowned. The whole affair damaged Bolshevik morale and Lenin’s credibility as a revolutionary leader. (Source: Sheila Fitzpatrick, 2008. The Russian Revolution (3rd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 58.

Rex Wade (2000) when commenting on the July Days events simply refers to them as a ‘dress rehearsal’: The July Days have often been called a “dress rehearsal” for the October Revolution. In reality they were more like February than October. The July Days, like the February Revolution, began as popular demonstrations against the war, the economic situation and a government that had lost credibility. Like February, the political parties were active in stimulating discontent but did not plan the actual revolt. Rather, again like February, socialist political leaders, in the July case the Bolsheviks in particular, stepped forward at the end to try to consolidate the popular revolt in the streets (unsuccessfully this time). The July Days and the February Revolution (and the April Crisis), but not the October Revolution, were characterised by massive popular street demonstrations. Such demonstrations were conspicuously absent in the October Revolution, which began and concluded very differently. The similarity with October rested primarily with the popularity of the demand that the Soviet take full power and create a radical revolutionary government, and with the prominent role played by Bolshevik, Left SR and anarchist 7

agitators; it is in this demand for Soviet power and the support from the radical left that the July Days can be called a “prelude” to October. (Rex A. Wade, 2000. The Russian Revolution, 1917. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 289290).

The October Revolution - A Western Liberal Perspective: Richard Pipes (1990) argued that the Soviet Government, which derived its existence for the October 1917 Revolution had to treat it as a significant event for the nation, which legitimated the Soviet State: The Soviet Government, which controls the bulk of the source materials and dominates the historiography, derives its legitimacy from the Revolution and wants it treated in a manner supportive of its claims. By single-mindedly shaping the image of the Revolution over decades it has succeeded in determining not only how the events are treated but which of them are treated. Among the many subjects that it has confined to historiographic limbo are the role of liberals in the 1905 and 1917 revolutions; the conspiratorial manner in which the Bolsheviks seized power in October; the overwhelming rejection of Bolshevik rule half a year after it came into being, by all classes, including the workers; Communist relations with imperial Germany in 1917-18; the military campaign of 1918 against the Russian village; and the famine of 1921, which claimed the lives of five million people. (Source: Richard Pipes (1990). The Russian Revolution. London: Collins Harvill, p. xxii).

Orlando Figes (1996) offers a very useful overview of the 1905 and 1917 Revolutions: What were the lessons of 1905? Although the tsarist regime had been shaken, it was not brought down. The reasons for this were clear enough. First, the various opposition movements – the urban public and the workers, the peasant revolution, the mutinies in the armed services, and the national independence movements – had all followed their own separate rhythms and failed to combine politically. This would be different in February 1917, when the Duma and the Soviet performed the essential role of co-ordination. Second, the armed forced remained loyal, despite the rash of mutinies, and helped the regime to stabilize itself. This too would be different in future – for in February 1917 the crucial units of the army and the navy quickly went over to the people’s side. Third, following the victory of October there was a fatal split within the revolutionary camp between the liberals and democrats, who, on the one hand, were mainly interested in political reforms, and the socialists and their followers, who wanted to push on to a social revolution. By issuing the October Manifesto the tsarist regime succeeded in driving a wedge between the liberals and the socialists. Never again would the Russian masses support the constitutional democratic movement as they did in 1905. ‘The reaction is triumphant – but its victory cannot last long,’ Gorky wrote to a friend before leaving for New York. And indeed, although the regime succeeded in restoring order, it could not hope to put the clock back. 1905 changed society for good. It was a formative experience for all those who had lived through it. Many of the younger comrades of 1905 were the elders of 1917. They were inspired by its memory and instructed by its lessons. (Source: Orlando Figes (1996). A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924. London: Jonathan Cape).

The October Revolution: A Revisionist Perspective: Alexander Rabinowitch (2007) reminds us that the 1917 October Revolution was a ‘military coup d’état without popular support’: The October revolution in Petrograd has often been viewed as a brilliantly orchestrated military coup d’état without popular support carried out by a tightly knit band of professional revolutionaries brilliantly led by the fanatical Lenin and lavishly financed by the Germans. This interpretation, which was undermined by Western “revisionist” social history in the 1970s and 1980s, was rejuvenated after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Gorbachev era, in spite of the fact that newly declassified Soviet archives reinforced the findings of the revisionists. At the other end of the political spectrum, for nearly eighty years Soviet historians, bound by strict historical canons designed to legitimate the Soviet state and its leadership, depicted the October revolution as a broadly popular uprising of the revolutionary Russian masses. According to them, this upheaval was rooted in Imperial Russia’s historical development and shaped by the universal laws of history as originally formulated by Karl Marx and adapted by Lenin. 8

(Source: Alexander Rabinowitch (2007). The Bolsheviks in Power. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 1213).

The October Revolution - A Second Revisionist Perspective: Sheila Fitzpatrick (2008) argues that the 1917 October Revolution was a ‘a less heroic occasion than later Soviet accounts suggest’, and the fundamental problem was ‘Who were the victors of October?’: By the afternoon of the 25th, the coup was all but accomplished - except, provokingly, for the taking of the Winter Palace, which was still under siege with the Provisional Government members inside. The Palace fell late in the evening, in a rather confused assault against a dwindling body of defenders. It was a less heroic occasion than later Soviet accounts suggest: the battleship Aurora, moored opposite the Palace in the River Neva, did not fire a single live shot, and the occupying forces let Kerensky slip out a side entrance and successfully flee the city by car. It was also slightly unsatisfactory in terms of political drama, since the Congress of Soviets - having delayed its first session for some hours, on Bolshevik insistence - finally began proceedings before the Palace fell, thus frustrating the Bolshevik’s wish to make a dramatic opening announcement. Still, the basic fact remained: the February regime had been overthrown, and power had passed to the victors of October. Who were the victors of October? In urging the Bolsheviks towards insurrection before the Congress of Soviets, Lenin had evidently wanted this title to go to the Bolsheviks. But the Bolsheviks had in fact organized the uprising through the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet; and, by accident or design, the Committee had procrastinated until the eve of the meeting of the national Congress of Soviets. (Trotsky later described this as a brilliant strategy - presumably his own, since it was clearly not Lenin’s - of using the soviets to legitimate a Bolshevik seizure of power.) As the news went out to the provinces, the most common version was that the soviets had taken power. (Sheila Fitzpatrick (2008). The Russian Revolution .Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.64-5).

The October Revolution - Further Reflection Rex A. Wade (2005) notes that the October 1917 Revolution would not have happened but for Kerensky’s decision on the 24th July to form of the second coalition government, with himself as chairman. This created a new sense of political instability: More critically, the October Revolution would not have commenced nor ended as it did without Kerensky’s decision on the 24th. It was Kerensky’s attack on the Bolshevik newspapers that forced the issue of Soviet power before the congress met, galvanised its supporters and gave Lenin the revolution which he otherwise had little hope of getting. Indeed, Kerensky’s action had more to do with the launching and outcome of the October Revolution than did Lenin’s own unsuccessful attempt to plot a Bolshevik seizure of power before the Congress of Soviets. Kerensky’s blunder provoked the armed struggle that transferred power before the congress met. This changed the nature of the transfer of power and altered the role of the Congress of Soviets and the essential character of the revolution. It gave Lenin the seizure of power before the congress that he had so long, and unsuccessfully, demanded. Kerensky, not Lenin, began the October Revolution. It allowed Lenin to turn a revolution for Soviet power into a Bolshevik Revolution. (Source: Rex A. Wade (2005). The Russian Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 302-303).

In Reinventing Russia (2007), the authors are under no illusions about the farcical nature of events surrounding of the ‘storming’ of the Winter Palace: In his cinematic epic, October: Ten Days That Shook the World, Soviet film director Sergei Eisenstein portrayed the overthrow of the Provisional Government as a triumphant ‘storming’ of the Winter Palace by heroic soldiers, sailors and workers. The Great October Socialist Revolution, and the legend of this massrevolutionary onslaught, was thereafter celebrated by Soviet historians. In reality, the attack on the Winter Palace was characterised by confusion and an embarrassing lack of organisation (Perfect, Ryan & Sweeney, 2007, p.107).

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The October Revolution - A Socialist Perspective The course of the preparations conducted by the Party in accordance with Lenin’s plan showed that the rising would begin as a massive, organised action by revolutionary troops, as a resolute assault on the enemy’s key installations and strong points…(The Great October Socialist Revolution (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, p.163).

The preparations of the Bolsheviks for the overthrow of Kerensky’s Provisional Government, represented, as depicted by various history textbooks, many voices, different political parties and factions and different ideas and strategies. Most agree that Lenin played a decisive role in orchestrating the attack on the Winter Palace, the seat of the Provisional Government: Rather than an immediate seizure of power, Trotsky favoured waiting until the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets in late October. The majority of the committee, including Lenin, eventually adopted Trotsky's proposal. Often represented as a decisive plan to seize power, the meeting on 10 October resolved to agree on the principle of an armed insurrection - 'the order of the day' - but did not set an exact date.

Historians Rex Wade (2005) and Alexander Rabinowitch (2007) argue that it was a declaration of intent to overthrow the government at the most suitable opportunity. By contrast Richard Pipes (1990) interprets the meeting on 10 October as a definite resolution to seize power to coincide with the Soviet Congress (p.102). As we see, the approach used in the above textbook highlights the different views of historians. In terms of the end-of-year exam, the Assessment Report (2008), focused on the link between historical views and specific details, by making the following comments: In relation to historiography, students must link historical views with specific details about the event portrayed in the representation, rather than making generalised comments about ‘historians’ schools of thought’ or just using labels such as ‘liberal historians’ to discuss a school of thought without any link to the representation... Students need to provide accurate identification, recognition and discussion of the period and event named in the question, make links to the representation and discuss the ways historians might side with the view expressed in the representation or oppose the view of the representation and what they might say about the period raised by the question.

Using some archival material students are encouraged to offer a balanced and critical interpretation of events leading to the October 1917 change of government. These events are reconstructed as follows, in a new generation history textbooks, substantially revised after 1991: On the eve of uprising, the Central Committee (of the Bolshevik’s Party) voted on the resolution (10th October 1917) for an armed uprising. ‘Lenin, Sverdlov, Stalin, Trotsky and others voted for it, and Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others voted against it. They felt that the revolution had insufficient forces, and were in favour of waiting for the opening of the Constituent Assembly (when the elections to this Assembly were held, resulting in an anti-Bolshevik majority, Lenin did not hesitate to dissolve it—JZ) and there decide the question of governance’ (Zharova & Mishina, 1992, p. 168).

Crucial leadership roles in the October 1917 Revolution were played by both Lenin and Trotsky. Lenin, having learned that the February Revolution occurred (he did not believe that it could happen, yet it did), and the tsar abdicated, returned from exile in Switzerland, and travelling 10

through Germany in a sealed train, arrived in Petrograd, at the Finland Station on 3 April. He made a revolutionary speech to a waiting crowd, and a delegation headed by Chkheidze, the head of Petrosoviet. On April 4, Lenin delivered a speech, known as the April thesis. After Lenin’s inspiring April theses, the Bolsheviks adopted the three winning slogans—‘peace’, ‘land’, and ‘bread’. In February 1917, Trotsky was in exile, and living in New York City. Inspired by the events of the February Revolution, he returned to Russia on 4 May, and on 8 October he was elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet (Zajda, 2014). Images of the October 1917 Revolution in Russian School textbooks Many Russian contemporaries, who lived at the time, already regarded the October 1917 events as another political perevorot, (coup), which temporarily brought to the top one of the Russian parties, namely the Bolsheviks, or the Majority Party (who were actually the minority party in 1917, and did not have the majority at the Congress of the Soviet). The Bolsheviks “won” over the other parties by arming itself with popular propaganda slogans for the masses, and by using conspiratorial, forceful and effective military strategies: The Bolsheviks were quick to declare the October Revolution as the socialist one…But did this third revolution bring in the end the creation of the socialist society? We will find the answer when we analyse further events in Russia (Levandovski & Shchetinov, 2013, p. 116).

As we glance back to the October Revolution of 1917 in the section Shturm vlasti (the Attack on the Government) this crucial moment in the world history, which brought the Bolsheviks to power, is now described as a low-key event, in radical contrast to the accepted Soviet versions, which typically portrayed it as one of momentous significance (Levandovski & Shchetinov, 2001). In contrast to Soviet pictorial representations of the mass storming of the Winter Palace, students now learn that in fact, only small detachments, organised by the Military-Revolutionary Committee (which was directed by Trotsky, whose role is finally acknowledged in the new generation textbooks, published in the 1990s and after 2000) actually ‘seized’ the Winter Palace. The 1917 Provisional Government, lead by Kerensky (who was not present), simply ‘ceased to exist’ and its ministers were arrested. However, students are not invited to reflect further on the reasons for such different versions of the same event, or to consider that while the coup itself was not a mass event, it did set in train drastic and far-reaching changes in the political, economic and social structure and culture of Russian society. Representation of the 1917 Revolution in Grade 9 history textbooks In their 2007 edition of Istoriia Rossii (History of Russia), by Danilov, Kosulina & Brandt—the history textbook for Grade 9 (recommended by the Ministry of Education), which is one of the key school texts, with the print run of 50,000 copies, Russian 15 year-olds learn, among other things, about the ‘October Revolution’. The events of October 1917 are described on pp. 89-92. However, the October Revolution is described in two paragraphs (p. 92), a little bit more than in an earlier edition of 2001, which had a half page. Students now learn that the armed detachments of the Red guards took over the capital (Petrograd) and there was no opposition, and that the Winter Palace was taken during the night of 26 October:

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The Winter Palace was defended by a small Junker (cadets) detachment and a volunteer women’s battalion…Kerensky, prior to the storming of the Winter Palace, left for the front. The remaining members of government were arrested (Danilov, Kosulina & Brandt, 2007, p. 92).

In the 2013 edition of Istoriia Rossii (History of Russia), by Danilov, Kosulina & Brandt—the history textbook for Grade 9 (recommended by the Ministry of Education), which is one of the key school texts, with the print run of 50,000 copies, Russian 15 year-olds learn among other things, about the ‘October Revolution’. The events of October 1917 are described on pp. 89-92. The October Revolution is described in two paragraphs (p. 92), a little bit more than in an earlier edition of 2001, which had a half page. Students now learn that the armed detachments of the Red guards took over the capital (Petrograd) and there was no opposition, and that the Winter Palace was taken during the night of 26 October: The Winter Palace was defended by a small Junker (cadets) detachment and a volunteer women’s battalion . . . Kerensky, prior to the storming of the Winter Palace, left for the front. The remaining members of government were arrested (Danilov, Kosulina & Brandt, 2013, p. 89).

Similar accounts of the October 1917 are found in earlier Russian history school textbooks. Zharova & Mishina (1991) write that on the night of 25th October, the revolutionary detachments occupied various central buildings—railway stations, banks, central electricity station, and the telephone exchange. ‘In the words of Trotsky, “people were blissfully asleep, unaware that the government was changing” (Zharova & Mishina, 1991, p. 171). The Winter Palace, was defended by a small force of volunteers. On October 26 (by the old Julian calendar, then still in use, or 7th November by the new calendar) after midnight, a small group of the Red Guard entered the Palace—the few defenders having surrendered, and arrested the government. Antonov-Ovseenko, one of the leaders said to the Ministers: I announce that in the name of the Military-Revolutionary Committee you are all under arrest”, to which, A. Konovalov, one of the Ministers, replied: “Provisional Government yields to force and surrenders (Zharova & Mishina, 1991, p. 172).

Representation of the 1917 Revolution in Grade 10/11 (final years of secondary schooling) history textbooks In the current Russian history textbooks, in their introduction, Levandovski, Shchetinov & Mironenko (2013) summarise some of the significant events, and the “bright” and the “dark” pages: Russia, prior to 1917, the bright and the dark pages, the revolutionary whirlwind of 1917, the establishment of the Soviet Russia . . . massive terror, the testing years of the Great War of the Fatherland, the reconstruction of the Fatherland ruined by the war, the great achievements and mistakes of post-war period, the years of the creation of a new, democratic Russia . . . (p. 5).

The theme Velikaia rossiiskaia revolutsiia. Sovetskaia epokha (The Great Russian Revolution. The Soviet era), contains a small section 12 (pp. pp.84-89), Bolsheviki berut vlast (the Bolsheviks assume the power) pp. 85-90). However, a mere paragraph is allotted to describing the taking of the Winter Palace (6 sentences, p. 86). This suggests that the historical narrative dedicated to the October Revolution has been significantly minimised.

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However, the section, explaining the historical significance of the 1917 Revolution, suggests a new and expanded interpretation of the event (also reflected in the current single Russian history text debate), which refers now to both the February and the October Revolutions, as in principle they ‘do not contradict one another’ (p. 89). While acknowledging the world significance of the October Revolution, the authors are questioning whether the event contributed to the legitimation of socialism, and a ‘socialist society’ in the country: In the final analysis, did this new and second period of the Great Russian Revolution contribute to the creation of the Soviet Society, the framework of which was constructed by the foundational Marxist thinkers? (Levandovski, Shchetinov & Mironenko, 2013, p. 89).

It is clear, that unlike the treatment of the October Revolution in Grade 9 textbook, here we have an attempt to engage students in a more open and discursive analysis of the event, as demonstrated by the questions for class work. It is now well-documented that the Bolsheviks were able to seize power and topple the government—with very small forces. While the Soviet textbooks persisted in a myth-making and nation-building narrative of “storming” of the Winter Palace (the seat of the government), the reality was very different—a relatively bloodless and peaceful change of government. The army stood by, indifferent and demoralised, and the only defenders of the government were small detachments, including a women’s battalion. This new portrayal of the events leading to and the ‘taking’ of the Winter Palace—as a relatively peaceful, and unopposed occupation of the seat of government is vastly different from the image of heroic storming (‘shturm’) of the Winter Palace, by the revolutionary sailors, soldiers, and the workers, depicted on the paintings, and in the cinema during the Soviet era. Representation of the 1917 Revolution in Soviet school history textbooks Under the Soviet regime, school education, through a centralised completely unified system of instruction, was one of the key means used to invent the Soviet state: to use Anderson’s model (Anderson, 1991, p. 205), its biography or foundation narrative, beginning with its bloody revolutionary birth to its maturity in the continued building of the USSR. For seven generations, a traditional Soviet image of the October revolution was much more grandiose and heroic: Lenin had ordered to take the Winter Palace…The Read Guards, sailors, and soldiers, lead the Bolsheviks, surged forward to storm the Winter Palace…The Winter Palace was taken. The pathetic and frightened group of the ministers was arrested...(Pankratova, 1956, p. 176).

On page 177, there is a familiar picture of the ‘storming’ of the Winter Palace on 25 October, 1917, taken from the film. The caption reads ‘The Read Guards firing at the Winter Palace’. In the authoritative and prescribed Soviet school textbook (1956), only Stalin, and not the above mentioned leaders, is given a major role in the organisation of the October uprising, and Trotsky and his followers are labelled as ‘traitors’, the same Trotsky, who becomes the ‘hero’ of the Revolution in the post communist history texts, was ‘written out’ of history: 13

The preparations for an armed uprising was going full speed ahead. According to plan, worked out by Stalin…Stalin was assisted by Ya. Sverdlov, F. Dzerzhinski, V. Molotov, G. Ordzhonikidze, M. Kalinin and others (Pankratova, 1956, p. 172). The Provisional Government, warned by the traitors—Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky, believed that the uprising of the proletariat will be on the day of the opening of the 2nd Congress of the Soviet—25th October. On the day it was preparing to rout the uprising… To prevent Kerensky from being able to deliver his speech on the day of the opening of the Congress of the Soviet, 25th October, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik’s Party has issued the instruction to the Military-Revolutionary Soviet to commence the uprising immediately (Pankratova, 1956, p. 173).

At the same time, Soviet history textbooks attempted to discredit Kerensky and his Provisional Government. In the Soviet school history textbook, Kerensky is described, to quote Lenin, as a ‘little Bonapart’ and a ‘braggart—Kerensky’, who headed the new government. There is no mention of his brief but eventful political life, except that he escapes from Petrograd, and organises a ‘counter-revolutionary coup’, lead by general Krasnov. When the coup failed, Kerensky ‘dressed in women’s clothes’ escapes (Pankratova, 1950, p. 180). In reality he escaped, dressed in a sailor uniform, and wearing automobile goggles to avoid being recognised. The author remembers during his schooling in the USSR the way Kerensky was vilified in all Soviet school history textbooks, being labelled a counter-revolutionary, a coward and a traitor in the official discourse. A Historical Repositioning of the Grand Narrative in Russia From a cultural history perspective, one needs to ask an ideological question—What is the role of re-inventing the past and its significant and defining moments for a given nation? One answer could be an ideological succession, where in the place of the “bourgeois subject” of a particular type, we promote an egalitarian ideal—captured by the slogan ‘All power to the people’. To promote this new ideological shift, we need to use powerful instruments of propaganda. Hence, the 1917 re-enactment in art and cinema during the 1920s was designed to demonstrate the ultimate significance of the event, which would activate the imagination and the collective mind of the 1917 revolution’s values to be fully realized in history. The Soviet revolutionary festivals became a nation-building exercise—avant-garde (futurism, cubism in art) experiments in mass pageantry. The purpose of this dramaturgical approach to historiography, a “theatricalization of everyday life” was both egalitarian and utopian—to forge a “new generation of harmoniously developed individuals” who would be active nation-builders (Schnapp, 1993, p. 90). The most dramatic example of a historical repositioning of the Grand Narrative in Russia, where art was serving the state and its new ideology, was a modernist-inspired and hyperrealist, yet metaphoric, re-enactment of the Storming of the Winter Palace, performed in Petrograd’s Palace Square in 1920. This multimedia spectacle, performed before a public of some 100,000, involved “8,000 protagonists with gunfire, artillery, rockets and panoply of lightening effects’ and its climatic moments, featuring “a white truck carrying the fleeing Kerensky government with a platoon of Red Army trucks in hot pursuit” (Schnapp, 1993, p. 112).

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In January 2014, Putin, at the meeting with authors of a new framework for a school textbook on Russian history, said that certain events, including the February and October 1917 Revolutions, were of ‘great national significance’: th

This year (2014) will mark 100 years since the beginning of World War I. Ahead of us are the 70 Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, 100 years of the February and October Revolutions [of 1917]. These dates are of great national significance, all of them, regardless of how we assess them. This is a fact, and we should consider together what events, and on what scale should be organised on a national level. I would like to hear your suggestions (file:///H:/President%20of%20Russia.htm).

A study of significant historical events that defined the nation is linked with the national identity and the nation-state, or the ‘desire to establish and perpetuate a cultural identity rooted in common past that serves specific purposes in the present’ (Parker, 2004, p. 50). Similarly, in the Russian Federation, history lessons in schools play a significant role in the nation-building process, citizenship education, patriotism, and values education, which is closely monitored by the state (Putin, 2014; see also Zajda, 2015) was systematically and uniformly taught in all Soviet school textbooks in history, literature and where possible in other subjects. Conclusion The above comparative analysis of the Russian Revolution, demonstrates that historians, based on the sources available, have made different interpretations of the October Revolution in Russia (Zajda, 2016). Historiography and the discursive construction of the nation-state have become an important dimension of historical thinking and re-imagining of historical events. As the above shows, there are ideological differences in representations of the revolution by historians. The event played a significant part in the nation-building process in the USSR. The latest Russian school textbooks, in their search for a foundation narrative, draw on significant events that may have played a role in this process. The Russian Revolution has become, once again, a significant part of a foundation narrative, and an ideologically re-invented new metanarrative. Attributing a new and ideologically defined meaning to the Russian Revolution as an event of ‘great national significance’ reflects the unresolved tensions between globalisation and nationalism in the RF under President Putin. For the RF, the teaching of newly re-interpreted significant events, such as the Russian Revolution, within the context of globalisation and localisation, is a rediscovery of the golden era of the past, and a deeply patriotic and emotional sense towards modern Russia. References Aleksashkina, L. and Zajda, J. (2015). National History Curriculum and Standards for secondary schools in the Russian Federation. In Zajda, J. (Ed.), Nation-building and history education in a global culture (pp. 169-181). Dordrecht: Springer. Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso. Billington, James (1970). The Icon and the axe: An interpretative history of Russian culture. New York: Vintage Books. Blokhin, V. et al. (1994) Istoriia otechestva (vypusk 2). Briansk: Grani. Danilov, A. & Kosulina, L. (1999). Istoriia Rossii: XX vek (History of Russia: 20th Century: Grade 9 textbook). Moscow: Prosveshchenie

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Danilov, A. & Kosulina, L. (2000). Istoriia Rossii: XX vek (History of Russia: 20th Century: Grade 9 textbook). Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Danilov, A. Kosulina, L. & Brandt, M. (2011). Istoriia Rossii: XX vek (History of Russia: 20th Century: Grade 9 textbook). Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Danilov, A. Kosulina, L. & Brandt, M. (2013). Istoriia Rossii: XX vek (History of Russia: 20th Century: Grade 9 textbook). Moscow: Prosveshchenie. De Cillia, R. Reisigl, M. & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identities. Discourse and Society, 10(2), 149-173. Dolutsky, I. (2002). Otechestvennaia istoriia. XX vek: Uchebnik dlia 10 klassa (History of the Fatherland—20th Century: Grade 10 textbook). Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Erokhina, M. and Shevyrev, A. (2006). Old Heritage and New Trends: School History Textbooks in Russia. In J. Nicholls, J. (Ed.), School History Textbooks across Cultures. Oxford: Symposium Books. Figes, O. (1996). A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924. London: Jonathan Cape. Fitzpatrick, S. (2008). The Russian Revolution (3rd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Great October Socialist Revolution (1977). Moscow: Progress Publishers. Hill, C. (1947). Lenin and the Russian Revolution. London: English Universities Press. Ionov, I. (2000). Rossiiskaia Tsivilizatsiia (Russian civilization). Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Kiseliov, A. & Popov, V. (2011). Istoriia Rossii (History of Russia) Moscow: Drofa. Levandovski, A. & Shchetinov, Y. (2001). Rossiia v XX veke (Russian in the 20th Century). Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Levandovski, A. Shchetinov, Y. & Mironenko, S. (2013). Istoriia Rossii: XX-nachalo XXI veka (History of Russia: 20th century to the beginning 21st century, 5th Ed.). ). Moscow: Prosveshchenie. Macintyre, S. and Clark, A. (2003). The History Wars. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Mishina, I. & Zharova, L. (1999). Istoriia Otechestva (History of the Fatherland: Grade 10 textbook). Moscow: Russkoe Slovo. Nicholls, J. (2006). School history textbooks across cultures. Oxford: Symposium Books. Nove, A. (1975). Stalinism and after, London: George Allen and Unwin. Pankratova, A. (ed.) (1950) Istoriia SSSR, (Grade 10 textbook), 9th edition. Moscow: GUPIMP. Pankratova, A. (ed.) (1956) Istoriia SSSR, (Grade 9 Textbook), 15th edition. Moscow: GUPIMP. Perfect, L. Ryan, T. & Sweeney, S. (2007). Reinventing Russia (A Study in Revolution Series). Melbourne: HTAV. Parker, C. (2004). History curriculum reform during educational transition in Poland. Political Crossroads, 10–11(1), 43–62. Pipes, R. (1990).The Russian Revolution. New York: Knopf. Putin, V. (2014). Meeting with the authors of a new concept for a school textbook on Russian history. Retrieved from: file:///H:/President%20of%20Russia.htm. Rabinowitch, A. (2007). The Bolsheviks in power. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Schnapp, J. (1993). 18 BL: Fascist mass spectacle. Representations 43, 89-125. Shestakov, V., Gorinov, M. & Viazemski, E. (2002). Istoriia Otechestva: XX vek (History of the Fatherland: 20th Century: Grade 9 textbook). (2nd edition). Moscow: Smith, A. (1991). National identity. London: Penguin Books.

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Smith, A. (1998). Nationalism and modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism. London: Routledge. Smith, A. (2001). Nationalism: Theory, ideology, history. Oxford: Polity Press. Stalin, J. (1939). History of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course. New York: International Publishers. Wade, R. A. (2000). The Russian Revolution, 1917. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Wade, R. A. (2005). The Russian Revolution, 1917. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zajda, J. (2007). The New History School Textbooks in the Russian Federation: 1992-2004. Compare, 37(3): 291-306. Zajda, J. (2009). Teachers and the politics of history textbooks. In L. Saha and A. Dworkin (Eds.), The New international handbook of research on teachers and teaching. (pp. 373-387). New York: Springer Science+Business Media. Zajda J. & Smith, K. (2013). Globalisation, ideology and history school textbooks: The Russian Federation. Educational Theory and Practice, 35(1), 5-20. Zajda, J. and Whitehouse, J. A. (2009) Teaching History. In L. Saha and A. Dworkin (Eds.), The New international handbook of research on teachers and teaching (pp. 933- 945). New York: Springer Science+Business Media. Zajda, J. (2014). The Russian Revolution. In G. Ritzer & J. M. Ryan (Eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization Online. Zajda, J. (2015a) (Ed.). Nation-building and history education in a global culture. Dordrecht: Springer. http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789401797283 Zajda, J. (2015b). Globalisation, Ideology and History School Textbooks: The Russian Federation. In Zajda, J. (Ed.), Nation-building and history education in a global culture (pp. 2950). Dordrecht: Springer. Zajda, J. (2016). Globalisation, National Identity and the Politics of History Textbooks. Dordrecht: Springer. Zajda, J. & Whitehouse, J. A. (2009). Teaching history. In L. Saha and A. Dworkin (Eds.), The New international handbook of research on teachers and teaching (pp. 953–965). New York: Springer Science+Business Media. Citation: Zajda, J & Whitehouse, J. The Russian Revolution in School History Textbooks. Paper to be presented at the AARE, November, 2016 Correspondence address: Joseph Zajda Faculty of Education and the Arts Australian Catholic University (Melbourne Campus) 250 Victoria Parade, East Melbourne, Vic 3002. E-mail: [email protected] and John Whitehouse Melbourne Graduate School of Education The University of Melbourne [email protected] 17

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