Jun 25, 2015 - FILMS AND EMBODIED METAPHORS OF EMOTION ... Research in neuroscience and cognitive science increasingly shows that human ...... “Cinéma, esprit et émotion: La Perspective du cerveau. ...... Essai d'une theorie.
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Embodied Cognition and Cinema EDITED BY MAARTEN COËGNARTS AND PETER KRAVANJA WITH A FOREWORD BY MARK JOHNSON
Leuven University Press
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© 2015 by Leuven University Press / Universitaire Pers Leuven / Presses Universitaires de Louvain. Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium) All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated datafile or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers. ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 D/2015/1869/22 NUR: 670 Cover illustration: “The Go-Between” © 1971, Renewed 1999 Columbia Pictures, a division of Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Courtesy of Columbia Pictures © 1970 STUDIOCANAL Films Ltd. Cover design en lay-out: Frederik Danko
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We had the experience but missed the meaning, And approach to the meaning restores the experience In a different form, beyond any meaning We can assign to happiness. T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets
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TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S FOREWORD 9
Mark Johnson ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 15 FILM AS AN EXEMPLAR OF BODILY MEANING-MAKING
17
Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja
PART I
FILM FORM AND EMBODIED COGNITION
FILM NARRATIVE AND EMBODIED COGNITION: THE IMPACT OF IMAGE SCHEMAS ON NARRATIVE FORM
43
Miklós Kiss EMBODIED VISUAL MEANING IN FILM
63
Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja FILM MUSIC AS EMBODIMENT
81
Juan Chattah
PART II
CINEMATIC EMPATHY: ON EMBODIED SIMULATION MECHANISMS AND THE VIEWER
THE FLOATING WORLD: FILM NARRATIVE AND VIEWER DIAKRISIS
115
Hannah Chapelle Wojciehowski MODES OF ACTION AT THE MOVIES, OR RE-THINKING FILM STYLE FROM THE EMBODIED PERSPECTIVE
139
Michele Guerra ART IN NOISE: AN EMBODIED SIMULATION ACCOUNT OF CINEMATIC SOUND DESIGN
155
Mark S. Ward 6 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 6
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THE CHARACTER’S BODY AND THE VIEWER: CINEMATIC EMPATHY AND EMBODIED SIMULATION IN THE FILM EXPERIENCE
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Adriano D’Aloia
PART III
FROM EMBODIED MEANING TO ABSTRACT THOUGHT
FILMS AND EMBODIED METAPHORS OF EMOTION
203
María J. Ortiz EMBODIED CINEMATIC SUBJECTIVITY: METAPHORICAL AND METONYMICAL MODES OF CHARACTER PERCEPTION IN FILM 221
Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja ON THE EMBODIMENT OF TEMPORAL MEANING IN CINEMA: PERCEIVING TIME THROUGH THE CHARACTER’S EYES
245
Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja EMBODIED ETHICS AND CINEMA: MORAL ATTITUDES FACILITATED BY CHARACTER PERCEPTION
271
Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja COGNITIVE SEMIOTICS REVISITED: REFRAMING THE FRAME
295
Warren Buckland NOTES 309 BIBLIOGRAPHY 325 FILMOGRAPHY 357 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS 359 ILLUSTRATION CREDITS 363 INDEX 365
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Embodied Cinematic Subjectivity: Metaphorical and Metonymical Modes of Character Perception in Film MAARTEN COËGNARTS AND PETER KRAVANJA
INTRODUCTION Research in neuroscience and cognitive science increasingly shows that human concepts are rooted in common bodily knowledge, i.e., they are grounded in our sensory-motor experiences (e.g., Barsalou “Grounded”, “Perceptual”; Gallese and Lakoff). For instance, growing empirical evidence in the field of cognitive linguistics suggests that human reasoning about abstract concepts (e.g., mind, time, causality) is structured in terms of concrete concepts related to the functioning of our bodies (e.g., Boroditsky and Ramscar; Lakoff and Johnson; Sweetser). Sweetser, for example, has argued that there is an extensive subsystem of metaphors for the mind in which mental functions are conceptualized in terms of different kinds of physical functioning (28-32). One particular case of this metaphor, which she labels the mind is a body metaphor, is that of mental function is perceptual experience in which internal mental activities (e.g., thinking, knowing, understanding, imagining, etc.) are understood in terms of external perceptual experiences (e.g., hearing, seeing, touching) (Yu “The Eyes” 669). Often cited in this regard is the metaphor understanding is seeing, which underlies many English expressions such as “I see what you’re saying” or “I don’t see the point” (Johnson The Meaning 165; Lakoff and Johnson Philosophy 238; Sweetser 38; Yu “Chinese” 149; Yu “The Eyes” 669). In addition, vision has been categorized and analysed not only as a source domain, but as a target domain as well. Since it is a subjective and abstract activity, some scholars have argued that humans conceptualize the mental process of seeing in terms of the tactile knowledge domains of touch and reception (Lakoff “Reflections”; Sweetser; Yamanashi; Yu “Chinese”, “The Eyes”). Consider, for example, such linguistic expressions as “Their eyes met” or “The view blew me away” (Lakoff “Reflections” 133-135). There is, however, one important challenge to the metaphorical use of perception as both a source domain and a target domain. In order to validate 221 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 221
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the claim of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) that this distinction and its corresponding metaphors are primarily a matter of thought and only derivatively a matter of language, CMT needs to expand its research to include not only linguistic examples, but also non-verbal data. Indeed, if the metaphors of perception are primarily conceptual, as Lakoff argues (“Reflections” 134), then it is only plausible to assume that there are other, non-linguistic correlates to the conceptual mappings as well (see also Forceville “Non-verbal”; Johnson The Meaning; Pecher, Boot and Van Dantzig). Only recently, this assumption has found its application into a certain number of papers that consider embodied cognition, and conceptual metaphor in particular, from a non-linguistic and filmic perspective (Branigan “How Frame Lines”; Coëgnarts and Kravanja; Fahlenbrach “Embodied Spaces”, “Emotions”; Forceville ‘The Journey”; Forceville and Jeulink; Forceville and Renckens; Ortiz; Rohdin). However, little attention has been given to the question as to how the metaphors of perception can express themselves in purely filmic terms. This chapter, then, is an inquiry into the metaphorical and metonymical underpinnings of character perception in film. More specifically, our contribution will focus its attention on the different ways in which the abstract target domain of perception can be elicited cinematically. The choice of analysing perception first as a target domain, rather than as a source domain, is instigated by the underlying idea that we first need to know how the perceptual states of characters can be metaphorically and metonymically structured in film, before we can further discuss its metaphorical and semantic extensions, two of which (i.e., time and morality) will be addressed in the two subsequent chapters of this volume. Our contribution is structured as follows. The first part considers CMT and aims to provide the reader with a brief overview of the main literature concerning the metaphorical and metonymical modes of perception. The second part deals with film studies. It attempts to frame the question of perception within Jens Eder’s heuristic core model of characters. Indeed, if we want to consider character perception as the central target domain of our analysis, then it is first necessary to define it before we can relate it to the question of how it can be construed metaphorically and metonymically at the filmic level. The third and final part of this chapter, then, aims to show how both the metaphorical and metonymical relationships of perception, as outlined in the first section, can be addressed cinematically in order to represent the characters’ perceptual activities, as defined in the second section. 222 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 222
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1. METAPHORS AND METONYMIES OF PERCEPTION When considering the commonality of the underlying conceptual systems across languages, visual metaphors or more general metaphors of perception are often hailed as one of the most universal conceptual metaphors. That is, a number of studies indicate that languages, despite their cultural differences, use the same kind of tactile information to structure the concept of perception (Sweetser; Yu; Yamanashi). In CMT this constitution or grounding takes the form of a metaphorical relationship in which perception is perceived as an inaccessible abstract target domain that needs to be clarified by more accessible physical and concrete source domains. In his detailed examination of perceptual metaphors in both Japanese and English, Masa-aki Yamanashi, for example, distinguishes three ways by which our visual or perceptual experience can be conceptualized (158-164). Let us briefly discuss each in turn. The first general relationship involves the human visual field. It states that we conceptualize visual fields in terms of containers, that is, when we look at some object or entity, we conceptualize what we see as being something inside it (Lakoff and Johnson Metaphors 30). As Lakoff and Johnson argue, this metaphorical concept, which they verbalize as visual fields are containers, emerges naturally in that when we look at some territory, our field of vision automatically defines a bounded physical space (i.e., the part that we can see). Examples include such English expressions as “The ship is coming into view,” “That is in the centre of my field of vision” or “There is nothing in sight” (Lakoff and Johnson Metaphors 30). The second and third relationships are grounded in human tactile experiences, and refer to the duality of perception, as first outlined by Lakoff (“Reflections” 139) and further discussed by Yamanashi and Yu (“The Eyes”). They consider a distinction made by Lakoff between two types of metaphors, both involving the physical domain of movement: perceiving is touching and perception is reception (“Reflections” 139; see also Yu “The Eyes” 676). In the first conceptual metaphor there is a mapping from the source domain of touching onto the target domain of perceiving. In this metaphor perception occurs “when the perceiver moves his organs of perception to the thing perceived and touches it” (“Reflections” 139).1 Examples include such expressions as “My eyes picked out every detail of the pattern” or “My gaze is out over the bay” (Lakoff “Reflections” 133). As Lakoff points out, the words ‘gaze’ and ‘eyes’ are conceived metaphorically as visual limbs that can reach out and touch things. Furthermore, he argues that the conceptual metaphor consists of a set of systematic conceptual mappings from the source domain onto the target domain (see Table 1). 223 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 223
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Source domain knowledge Limbs can be directed A limb can go in only one direction at a time Limbs can extend from the body to other objects Tactile perception occurs when a limb touches an object Limbs can pick out objects
Target domain knowledge Vision can be directed Vision can go in only one direction at a time Vision can move from the body to other objects Visual perception occurs when the gaze touches an object Vision can pick out objects
Table 1. The conceptual mappings of the seeing is touching metaphor (after Lakoff “Reflections” 133-134).
By contrast, in the second conceptual metaphor there is a mapping from the source domain of reception onto the target domain of perceiving. In this metaphor perception occurs “when the thing perceived moves to the perceiver’s organs of perception” (“Reflections” 139). Examples include such expressions as “A comet came into my sight” or “The noise came through the walls” (“Reflections” 139). In both sentences, perception is construed in terms of perceptual sense impressions which reach the perceptual organs. Both metaphors are special cases of a more general metaphor, which Lakoff labels the perception is contact between perceiver and perceived metaphor (“Reflections” 139). Using Langacker’s constructional notion of ‘sequential scanning’ (245), then, one can visualize both metaphors as in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1. Sequential scan of visual perception as touch. 224 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 224
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Figure 2. Sequential scan of visual perception as reception.
In both cases, the underlying schema at work is the source-path-goal image schema (e.g., Forceville and Jeulink; Johnson The Meaning 183, The Body 113). Both metaphors involve movement from a starting point (perceiver and object perceived, respectively), over a pathway, towards an end point (object perceived and perceiver, respectively). Successful perception, then, takes place when the character’s gaze or the sense stimuli ‘reach’ the target (the object perceived and perceiver, respectively). Moreover, both metaphorical duals involve metaphorical mappings that are characterized by a typical perceptual mechanism from Gestalt psychology called ‘figure-ground segregation’ (Evans and Green 65), that is, “(1) the mappings in question are based on relative motion between two entities, (2) one of them is fixed while the other moves, and (3) which of the two entities gets fixed or moves depends on the conceptualizer’s cognitive capacity of focusing” (Yamanashi 166). In addition to the three metaphorical relationships discussed above, some scholars have also pointed to the underlying metonymical structure of perception, stating that the perceptual organ usually stands for perception as a whole (Barcelona; Hilpert; Yamanashi; Yu). As Yu argues, “eyes and brows are such important features of the human face that they together stand for the whole face or looks” (“The Eyes” 665). Consider, for example, the following linguistic expression: “They keep an eye on the youngsters” (Hilpert 130). In this example, which involves visual perception, the phrase keep an eye on is mapped onto the metonymical target domain of seeing. Hilpert refers to this metonymical extension of the eye as the instrument for activity metonymy eyes stand for seeing (130), which, in turn, can be subsumed, according to Barcelona, under the more general basic conceptual metonymy body part for its typ225 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 225
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ical functions and for the attributes connected with them (265-6). Similarly, Yamanashi has argued that the Japanese word me, meaning ‘eyes,’ only “metonymically represents a visual field, which in turn is conceptualised as a container” (159). In sum, then, one can schematize the underlying metaphorical and metonymical configuration of perception as in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The metaphorical and metonymical structure of perception.
In what follows, we will discuss both conceptual relationships, the metonymical and the metaphorical, from the perspective of character perception in film. By doing so, we are replacing the general concept of (human) perceptual experience with a narrower concept of perception which has its roots in narration and literary theory. Hence, before we can start analysing the cinematic representation of character perception in the light of the above schema, we first need to define more precisely what the concept of character perception entails.
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2. F RAMING PERCEPTION WITHIN THE ANALYSIS OF CHARACTERS Traditionally speaking, the study of characters’ perception falls into the much debated narratological domain of ‘focalization’ and similar terms such as ‘point of view’ (henceforth POV) and ‘mental perspective.’ Originally developed by the French narrative theorist Gérard Genette, the notion of focalization refers to a typology of three different narrative situations (189-190). The first type is labelled ‘zero focalization’ or ‘non-focalized narrative’ and refers to the ‘omniscient narrator.’ The second type is called ‘internal focalization’ and corresponds to the situation where the narrative is focused through the consciousness of a character. The third type is defined as ‘external focalization’ and describes the situation where the narrative is focused on a character, not through him or her. The discussion of perception from a character’s perspective, then, can be placed under the character based level of focalization: the presentation of the story through the perceptual, conceptual, and other mental equipment of a character. To situate the focus of our chapter within the discussion of characters in film, we would like to draw upon the heuristic core model offered by Jens Eder. For the practice of character analysis, this author has distinguished between four key aspects of characters (21-22). Firstly, as artefacts, they are shaped by audiovisual information. This aspect involves the key question of how and by what means characters are represented. Consequently, this kind of analysis rests upon the description of stylistic devices and others kinds of filmic information. Secondly, as fictional beings they have certain bodily, mental and social features. The central task here is to define those features by means of a formulation of mental models of the characters. Thirdly, as symbols they impart higher-level meanings, i.e., they may function as signs for something else. To analyse this aspect is to find an answer to the question as to what characters stand for and what indirect meanings they carry. Fourthly and lastly, as symptoms they point to socio-cultural causes in their production and to effects in their reception. Underlying this aspect is the following question: what causes characters to be as they are, and what effects do they produce? Within this ‘clock of character,’ as Jeder calls it, the question of character perception can be conceptually related to the level of fictional beings, that is, perception is a feature that the character possesses. Moreover, it involves a mental feature of the character. For this reason it can be further catego227 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 227
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rized under (what Eder labels) the more general property domain of the mind, which overlaps but also distinguishes itself from other property domains of the fictional being such as corporeality (i.e., the external appearance and body language of characters) and sociality (i.e., the group membership of characters) (see Figure 4). These three domains are anthropological in the sense that they correspond to the three most general property domains of humans.
Figure 4. The three most general property domains of characters as fictional beings (after Eder 23-26).
As Eder argues, one way to analyse the minds of characters (i.e., their inner life and personality) is to examine what is distinctive for them with regard to their mental faculties (24). In addition to perception, this includes the interaction of such component mechanisms as memory, imagination, attention, sensibility, and so on (see Figure 5).2
Figure 5. A selection of the mental faculties of the character’s mind. 228 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 228
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It is within the property domain of the mind, then, that one may draw on the theoretical tools of Conceptual Metaphor Theory to help structure the conceptualization of these faculties. As we saw in the previous section, cognitive linguistics proposes a major conceptual system according to which the mental faculties of the mind can be understood metaphorically in terms of bodily knowledge. Especially with regard to the faculty of perception, one might infer the following two premises on the basis of the existing literature within cognitive linguistics: 1) The cinematic construal of character perception is metaphorically and metonymically grounded in bodily knowledge. 2) The cinematic construal of character perception, once itself metaphorically and metonymically clarified, can be further extended to structure other mental faculties of the character (e.g., cognition, imagination, memory, etc.). The intimate connection between the mental faculty of character perception, on the one hand, and other mental faculties of character subjectivity (e.g., cognition, imagination, etc.), on the other (which underlies the second premise), has also been identified by many other scholars in the field of film studies (e.g., Branigan Narrative; Gaut; Grodal Embodied; Kawin; Kuhn; Reinerth; Wilson). However, few have pointed to the underling metaphorical and metonymical structure of these faculties. In the next section, then, we will examine the first premise. More specifically, we will show how the two conceptual models of perception, as outlined in the previous section, namely the conceptual metonymy perceptual organ stands for perception and the conceptual metaphor perception is contact between perceiver and perceived, are cinematically shaped by audiovisual means. Consequently, by addressing the formal question of representation, we are simultaneously analysing the character as an artefact (cf. Jens Eder’s first aspect of characters). 3. T HE METAPHORICAL AND METONYMICAL STRUCTURING OF CHARACTER PERCEPTION IN FILM Having sketched out the underlying metaphorical and metonymical structure of perception (section 1), and having framed the concept within the analysis of characters (section 2), we are now able to consider the following question: how are the metaphorical and metonymical relationships of perception, as outlined 229 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 229
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in the first section, to be conceived at the filmic level? Consequently, this question divides into two sub-questions: I.
II.
How is the conceptual metonymy character’s perceptual organ stands for perception shaped by the devices and techniques of filmmaking? How is the conceptual metaphor character’s perception is contact between perceiver (PR) and the object being perceived (OP) shaped by the devices and techniques of filmmaking?
The first question can be answered in a relatively uncomplicated manner. From a non-verbal and filmic perspective, the abstract target domain of perception can be triggered indirectly or metonymically by showing enough distinctive bodily features of the character so as to enable the viewer to recognize or infer the perceptual organs of the character (e.g., eyes, ears).3 This condition, however, is rather vague and could suggest mistakenly that every visualization of a perceptual organ is metonymically intended. Hence, in order to avoid being too generic some additional conditions are necessary. A first important condition concerns the distance between the camera and the character’s perceptual organ. The shorter the distance between the camera and the character’s facial features, the likelier it is that the shot will be conceived of as standing for perception as a whole. By contrast, if a person, for example, is rendered in a very long shot, it is much less likely that the target domain of perception will be triggered for the viewer, as the perceptual organ is less visible due to the larger distance between the camera and the organ. Shot size, albeit crucial, is, however, not the only condition to be fulfilled before the metonymical connection to the target domain of perception can be made. The perceptual organ represented also has to be directed towards something (i.e., the perceived object). Perceiving, like any other type of consciousness, entails intentionality: seeing is seeing something, hearing is hearing something, and so on. The character’s perceptual organ needs to be directed towards the perceived object. In film this object can be located either on-screen or offscreen. Often the direction of the perceptual organ is helpful in triggering this intentional act. For instance, a character seeing something which is off-screen for the viewer, will most likely gaze towards the side of the frame where the object is situated. This bodily gesture in turn allows the viewer to deduce the location of the perceived object (and by extension the idea that the character 230 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 230
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is probably engaged in the act of perceiving). In addition, the act of perceiving can also be further accentuated by attributes belonging to the visual content of the shot such as a window or binoculars (i.e., looking through something). The answer to the second question is of a more complex nature. Strictly speaking, the contact between PR and OP can be elicited cinematically by four main strategies divided into two categories: the category of the single shot and the category of two shots (see Table 2).
Single shot
Two shots
Homospatiality By showing PR and OP together in one shot (e.g., framing or mise-
Non-homospatiality By moving from PR to OP (e.g., tracking, panning, tilting, zoom-function)
en-scène) By cutting from PR to OP By presenting PR and OP, each occupying (e.g., editing) a different shot, as co-present or homospatial entities in the same frame (e.g., superimposition, split screen)
Table 2. Categorization of the cinematic ways in which the contact between PR and OP can be elicited.
Within each category both participating elements can be shown simultaneously on-screen or not. As in the previous section, the former case will be labelled ‘homospatiality.’4 However, we use the concept in a slightly different manner here to refer to the co-presence of PR and OP in the same larger frame (rather than to the co-presence of source and target). Thus, if each entity occupies a different space in a different shot, albeit in the same larger frame (for example, in the case of split screen or superimposition), homospatiality is applicable. We now proceed to a more detailed discussion of each strategy. The various devices have been differentiated for analytical purposes, but they often work together or are intertwined. We commence our discussion with the category of the single shot.
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3.1. Framing and mise-en-scène In the first strategy the source domain of perception, contact between perceiver and perceived, is construed cinematically by showing both entities simultaneously on-screen in one single uninterrupted shot. Theoretically speaking, this strategy entails seven possibilities, each depending on (1) the type of shot (subjective, semi-subjective, or objective) and (2) the presence of a reflective surface in the visual content of the shot (e.g., mirror, water, etc.) (see Table 3). Reflective (OP=PR) Subjective POV shot (I) Semi-subjective Non-POV shot (III) Objective Non-POV shot (V)
Reflective (OP≠PR)
Non-reflective (OP≠PR) POV shot (II) Non-POV shot (IV)
Non-POV Non-POV shot (VII) shot (VI)
Table 3. Categorization of the cinematic ways in which the contact between PR and OP can be elicited in one single shot with homospatiality (i.e., via framing or mise-en-scène).
Either the relationship between PR and OP is established in a POV shot or it is not. In the former, subjective case, the visual content of the shot is wholly determined by the perceiver’s perceptual field of vision (i.e., the perceived objects). This type designates two forms depending on whether or not the perceiver perceives his own perceptual organs in the POV shot. In the first case, the reflective variant of the subjective shot (type I), the perceiver coincides with the object perceived (OP=PR). The perceiving character sees himself or herself mirrored in the surface of a reflective object in the mise-en-scène. For instance, Robert Montgomery’s Lady of the Lake (1947) contains several moments in which the visual content of the subjective POV shot overlaps with the main character’s reflection, as when, for example, he looks at himself in the mirror. By contrast, in the non-reflective variant of the subjective shot (type II), the perceptual organs of the perceiver are not visible on-screen. Here, the physical presence of the perceiver is suggested metonymically by elements in front of the camera such as body parts (e.g., hands or feet as in Figure 6) or cigarette smoke. 232 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 232
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The Shining (Stanley Kubrick, 1980)-
Figure 6. Subjective, non-reflective shot (II).
Figure 7. Semi-subjective, non-reflective shot (IV).
In the latter case, we can make a further distinction between two types of nonPOV shot: the ‘personal or semi-subjective non-POV shot’ and the ‘impersonal or objective non-POV shot.’ In both cases, the perceiver’s body as the locus of perception is present as a distinguishable physical entity on-screen. The first type of non-POV shot recalls what Jean Mitry refers to as the ‘semi-subjective shot’ (77-78). This type usually has the camera placed somewhere behind a character in the foreground, while the object of his or her gaze is also included in the background of the frame. In this case, the link is created by using the depth of field. In practice, this tension is often further increased by such deep focus techniques as the use of racking focus or the split-field diopter lens, the latter allowing an approximation of depth of field by bringing both near and far planes into focus simultaneously (for a good discussion of this technique see Ramaeker). Similarly, this type can be either reflective (type III) or not (type IV). In the first case, the object of the character’s gaze coincides with the perceiving character. Again the character sees himself or herself reflected (cf. type I), except that the camera is situated behind the person. Examples of this type include the shot from Reflections in a Golden Eye (John Huston, 1967) in which the character of Marlon Brando talks to himself in front of the mirror, or the shot from Bigger Than Life (Nicholas Ray, 1956) in which the face of James Mason’s character is reflected in the shattered mirror of his medicine cabinet. In the second case, by contrast, the object perceived does not involve a reflective surface. In other words, the visual field of the character is occupied by something other than the character’s reflection. Consider, for example, the moment from The Shining (Stanley Kubrick, 1980) in which the tracking shot of little Danny riding his tricycle halts around the corner. In 233 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 233
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a very symmetric composition, the camera, which is placed behind the boy, shows the content of his visual field (i.e., the two Grady sisters standing across the hallway) (see Figure 7). The second type of non-POV shot, the impersonal or objective shot, can take three forms. In the first, reflective form, there is still an overlap between PR and OP (type V). The perceiver still watches himself or herself reflected (cf. types I and III), only this time the connection between PR and OP is filmed in an objective way. In addition, the reflective form can also manifest itself as an objective shot in which the perceiver is not the object perceived (type VI). In this variant, the object perceived is reflected in (1) a reflective surface which can be situated next to the perceiving character, (2) the reflective surface of a window or other piece of glass through which the character sees something, or (3) the eye of the beholder. An illustration of the first case can be found in, for example, Carl Theodor Dreyer’s Getrud (1964). The film shows an objective shot of Gabriel Lidman (Ebbe Rode) as his gaze is directed towards the title character (Nina Pens Rode) who is located off-screen (see Figure 8). The literal distance between PR and OP, however, albeit still present, is reduced cinematically through framing, as her body is reflected in the mirror next to him. In the second case, by contrast, the distance is further neutralized to the point that both PR and OP are optically bound together. The camera sits on the opposite side, so that the viewer sees what the perceiver is seeing (i.e., the reflection) as well as the expression on his or her face as he or she sees it. In Steven Spielberg’s Jaws (1975), for example, there is a shot in which the character of Roy Scheider looks through the window of a boat, while the object of his gaze (i.e., the sea, the habitat of the shark) is reflected in the window (i.e., over his face). Nevertheless, one might label this case as indirect as there is still an intermediate object between PR and OP, which prevents it from becoming direct. The latter case, however, also leaves out the reflective object between PR and OP, as the object perceived by the character is directly reflected in the eye of the beholder. Famous examples of this case can be found in Reflections in a Golden Eye (John Huston, 1967), Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982) (see Figure 9), or more recently War Horse (Steven Spielberg, 2011).
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Getrud (Carl Theodor Dreyer, 1964)
Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982)
Figure 8. Objective, reflective shot (VI).
Figure 9. Objective, reflective shot (VI).
However, the non-reflective form (type VII) is probably the most common way to depict an objective and homospatial link between PR and OP. This form is usually centred round the horizontal axis, and has the camera placed next to the character, showing his or her face in profile on one side of the frame (left or right), while the object of his or her gaze (albeit not the perceiving character) occupies the opposite side.
3.2. Camera movement In the second strategy, the conceptual metaphor seeing is touching is instigated by moving the camera’s point of view from the perceiver’s standpoint towards the perceived entity. The movement can be elicited from a fixed position (i.e., the zoom function) or not (i.e., the mobile camera). Both stylistic solutions involve movement from a starting point (the perceiver), over a pathway, towards an end point (the perceived object). Successful perception, then, takes place when the character’s point of view “reaches” the target: that is, by the time the mobile camera or the zoom function has continued to decrease the distance between the camera’s, or the character’s, perspective and the perceived object. Like the previous strategy, this device can be viewed as a way to connect two entities without interference of editing. However, it differs from the first in that PR and OP are not simultaneously present during the whole length of the shot. Depending on the way the perceiver is filmed at the beginning of the shot (profile, front or back), there are four different ways of eliciting the seeing is touching metaphor in film (see Table 4).5
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Type I II
Shot type Objective Objective
PR Profile Front
Source PR PR
Path Mobile camera (lateral) Zoom function or mobile camera (backward)
III
SemiBack subjective
PR-OP Zoom function or mobile camera (forward)
IV
Subjective
PR
Zoom function or mobile camera (forward)
Goal OP PROP OP OP
Table 4. Categorization of the cinematic ways in which the contact between PR and OP can be elicited in one single shot with non-homospatiality (i.e., via movement).
The first type has the character filmed in profile as he or she looks at something off-screen. The camera then turns towards the object of his or her gaze, thus connecting the character’s gaze with the object. As the camera moves in a lateral way, the perceiver’s presence is abandoned to the off-screen space. Think, for example, of the shot at the end of The Conversation (Francis Ford Coppola, 1974) that preceeds the moment when Harry Caul (Gene Hackman) breaks open his small statue of the Virgin Mary. The film shows a front profile image of Harry as he stands in the ruins of his devastated apartment. Still desperately in search for the hidden bug, he now turns his eyes to the off-screen space on the left, towards the location of the statue (see Figure 10). The conceptual metonymy eyes stand for seeing articulates itself. As he looks, the camera pans horizontally to the left, thus replacing the perceiver by the object of his gaze (see Figure 11). Perception is now also construed metaphorically, as both entities, PR and OP, are now connected to each other. The Conversation (Francis Ford Coppola, 1974)
Figure 10. Source (PR).
Figure 11. Goal (OP).
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The second type by contrast involves backward movement and shows the character filmed from the front. In this case, the camera moves in a backward direction from the front side of the character, and his or her perceptual organs (source), towards the object perceived (goal), thereby usually ending with a shot in which both entities are shown together (PR-OP) (cf. framing or mise-en-scène). Consider, for example, the way in which the following shot from Stanley Kubrick’s Vietnam war drama Full Metal Jacket (1987) is constructed. Private Joker (Matthew Modine) stands looking down into a large open grave at a row of white, lime-covered corpses. The shot opens with a medium shot of the front side of Joker’s face as his gaze is directed to the off-screen space below (cf. the metonymical rendering of perception) (see Figure 12). Then, the camera zooms out. As the shot size gradually enlarges, the dead bodies reveal themselves to the viewer (see Figure 13). The perceiver’s gaze is now connected to the object perceived (cf. the metaphorical rendering of perception). Full Metal Jacket (Stanley Kubrick, 1987)
Figure 12. Source (PR).
Figure 13. Goal (PR-OP).
The third type differs from types one and two in that the initial shot does not concern an objective front or profile shot of the perceiver, but a semi-subjective rendering of the back of the perceiving character. Consequently, the opening image involves foreground-background segmentation with both the perceiver (front) and the object perceived (back) shown simultaneously in frame. However, as in the first way, the perceiver’s presence is subsequently replaced to the off-screen space as soon as the camera moves closer to the object perceived. To illustrate this, let us consider, for example, the underlying constructional schema of the shot from Barry Lyndon (Stanley Kubrick, 1975) in which Redmond Barry (Ryan O’Neil) first notices Lady Lyndon (Marisa Berenson) in the garden of a baroque castle. The shot opens with the symmetric image of 237 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 237
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Redmond, screen right, and his patron Chevalier de Balibari (Patrick Magee), screen left, as they sit opposite each other at a table against a balustrade. At first their eyes are directed towards each other. But then, they both simultaneously turn their faces inward – thus giving expression to the intentionality of their gazes – towards the background of the frame, where in the middle of the frame, amongst others, the small figure of Lady Lyndon can be discerned (see Figure 14). As they both turn their heads, the camera starts zooming in towards the object of their perception until the latter almost fills the screen (see Figure 15), thus yielding the conceptual metaphor perceiving is touching or perception is contact between perceiver and perceived.6 Barry Lyndon (Stanley Kubrick, 1975)
Figure 14. Source (PR).
Figure 15. Goal (OP).
In addition to the objective and semi-subjective types, the conceptual metaphor perceiving is touching can also be elicited, through movement, within a subjective POV shot. Because the visual content is wholly determined by the perceptual experience of the character, the latter cannot be discerned physically as a whole (except metonymically via the presence of body parts, or in the case of the presence of a reflective surface). Again the work of Stanley Kubrick offers us some insight. In Full Metal Jacket, for example, there is a scene in which a female Vietnamese sniper (PR), whose facial features are only communicated to the viewer at the end of the film, observes her perceived target on the ground, an American private named ‘Cowboy’ (Arliss Howard) (OP), from the higher floor of a ruined building. The latter is hiding behind a huge hole in the wall, thus giving the sniper a clear shot. The contact of her eyes with Cowboy is rendered visually by a straight and fast zoom-in from the sniper’s point of view (see Figure 16) toward the target (see Figure 17). Again this shot, which precedes the actual literal killing of the soldier, is subject to 238 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 238
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a metaphorical interpretation, both involving spatial movement and physical contact. Like the bullet that will kill the victim some seconds later, the sniper’s “eye light” that moves through space, and that is represented by the zoom in, has force.7 Full Metal Jacket (Stanley Kubrick, 1987)
Figure 16. Source (PR).
Figure 17. Goal (OP).
So far we have been dealing with the level of the single shot. The relationship between perceiver and the object perceived is established within the spatial unity of one shot. However, the conceptual metaphor perception is contact between perceiver and perceived can also be realized on the level of two shots: shot A establishes the origin of the perceiver and shot B shows the perceived object. This relationship between A and B can take two forms. Either shot A and shot B are shown simultaneously in the larger frame of the screen (i.e., homospatially), usually via such cinematic devices as superimposition or split screen imagery, or they are shown successively which is a defining characteristic of editing. We will consider each strategy in turn.
3.3. Superimposition and split screen or multiple frame imagery In the strategies of superimposition and multiple screen imagery, or split screen imagery, two images, one containing the perceiver (shot A), the other the perceived object of his vision (shot B), appear simultaneously within the larger frame. Like the first strategy, this process enables the viewer to see both the observer’s gaze and the object of his gaze at exactly the same moment (i.e., homospatially). It differs from it, however, in that the two entities are separated by their own frame dimensions and shape. The difference between superimposition and split screen lies in the way both shots are connected within 239 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 239
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the larger frame. In the first strategy, the image of the object perceived is laid over the image of the perceiver. One can discern this strategy, for example, in the superimposed image from La Signora di Tutti (Max Ophüls, 1934), in which the orchestra (OP) is exposed over the main protagonist Gaby Doriot (Isa Miranda) (PR) as she looks through her opera glasses (see Figure 18). In the second strategy, the two entities are placed next to each other with the perceiver situated on one side of the frame while the perceived object is located on the other side of the frame, as in, for instance, many films of Brian De Palma. In Femme Fatale (2002), for example, there is a scene in which the character of Antonio Banderas (PR) is taking pictures from Laure/Lily (Rebecca Romijn) (OP). In order to capture both entities simultaneously on-screen, split screen is used, showing the perceiver, screen left, and the object perceived, screen right (see Figure 19). La Signora di Tutti (Max Ophüls, 1934)
Figure 18. PR-OP.
Femme Fatale (Brian De Palma, 2002)
Figure 19. PR-OP.
3.4. Editing We conclude our list of cinematic devices with editing. This technique differs from the previous one in that both entities are not shown simultaneously within the same larger frame, but successively. A shot of the perceived object is pasted after a shot of the perceiver. Usually this takes the form of the shot/ reverse shot or the eye line match. Shot A shows an objective and external shot of a character looking off-screen. Shot B shows what the character is looking at, from a position which is either occupied by the character (subjective shot) or not (eyeline match). Because the two entities are not co-present in the same frame, homospatiality is not appropriate. Theoretically speaking, shot A can be presented semi-subjectively, or subjectively. In practice, however, the perceiver in shot A is usually depicted in an objective way. That is, in order to elicit the idea in the viewer that the visual content of shot B coincides with the perceiver’s perceptual perspective, it seems that an objective representation of the perceiver 240 Reprint from Embodied Cognition and Cinema - ISBN 978 94 6270 028 4 - © Leuven University Press, 2015 Kravanja_FINAL_DEF.indd 240
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is desired. As Deleyto rightly points out: “It is as if film narratives required a constant return to objective presentation for a better understanding of the internal gazes that occur in the text” (170). In order to accentuate the subjective quality of the visual content of shot B, this shot is often given movement from the perceiver’s point of view towards the object of his or her perception (cf. type IV of the strategy of movement). In this case, the viewer initially might think that the suggested movement, elicited either by the mobile camera or by the zoom-in function, coincides with the physical movement of the character’s face and body. Often this presumption is, however, subverted in a subsequent shot showing the character still stationary at the same position. As with the second strategy, this kind of movement has to be interpreted metaphorically, i.e., as a concrete means to convey and imitate the character’s abstract perceptual experience. To sum up, then, one can schematize the relationship between the underlying conceptual metaphorical structure and the different cinematic devices as in Figure 20.
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Figure 20. A cinematic model for analyzing a character’s perception in film.
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CONCLUSION This chapter presents a metaphorical and metonymical examination of character perception in film. Using insights from CMT we have argued that the perceptual experience of a character (as part of the larger domain of character subjectivity) can be represented cinematically via audio-visual expressions of metaphors related to the physical functioning of our human bodies. More specifically, we have demonstrated how a pair of conceptual mappings, namely, the metonymy perceptual organ stands for perception and the metaphor perception is contact between perceiver and perceived, can manifest itself non-linguistically by means exclusive to the cinematic medium (e.g., camera movement, editing, etc.). By providing non-verbal evidence for conceptual metaphor, our analysis helps to validate CMT’s dictum that the metaphors of perception are primarily a matter of thought and only derivatively a matter of form. CMT also has some important merits for film studies. As a theory concerned with the bodily underpinnings of meaning-making, CMT provides insight into the question of how abstract meaning is construed in film. The study presented in this chapter only reflects one such case. However, systematic studies of visual data may reveal how other abstract concepts are grounded in sensory-motor knowledge as well. For instance, other studies should be able to shed light on how perception, once itself clarified metaphorically, can be mapped onto other abstract target domains. Indeed, if perception, according to CMT, is used in language as a source domain for such mental functions as thinking and knowing, then it is plausible to assume that the same processes of embodied meaning underlie the filmic representations of these abstract target domains as well. The two subsequent chapters will consider this issue in detail.
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NOTES F I L M A S A N E X E M P L A R O F B O D I LY M E A N I N G -M A K I N G 1 For a good overview of these studies see Davis et al. 2 Lakoff and Johnson originally speak of ‘levels’ instead of ‘dimensions’. However, because the word ‘level’ might assume a hierarchical order, a positioning of one level above the other, we prefer to use the more neutral word ‘dimension’ instead. 3 Following Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings we will define abstract concepts as “entities that are neither physical nor spatially constrained” (129). 4 In Conceptual Metaphor Theory it is common to use small capital letters to indicate that these particular wordings are not a matter of language, but of concepts, belonging to the realm of human thought. These concepts underlie the very nature of our daily metaphorical expressions (linguistic or otherwise). 5 As the author stresses, the order of both stages (first, body and second, culture) is at this point still a proposal. Future experimental research will have to address to what extent this order is empirically legitimate (“The Relationship” 323). 6 We thank Ibarretxe-Antuñano for giving us permission to use this image. 7 As we shall demonstrate in our own contribution about time metaphors in film, evidence from various films seem to suggest a spatial model of time, very similar to the one reported in the Aymara language, in which the past appears to be in front of the character or Ego on-screen. 8 Although the discipline of cognitive science began to acquire an institutional identity in the 1970s, as the term was first coined by Christopher Longuet-Higgins, it roots can be traced back to the 1940s and 1950s, to Gestalt psychology and the work of such scholars as Jean Piaget and Frederick Bartlett, among others. For a good historical overview see Bechtel and Herschbach. 9 For a good overview of some of the current views and issues within cognitive media theory see recent volumes such as The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film (Livingston and Plantinga), Psychocinematics: Exploring Cognition at the Movies (Shimamura), and Cognitive Media Theory (Nannicelli and Taberham). 10 Within the phenomenological dimension one should further distinguish between those film studies that are primarily inspired by the embodied phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, and those studies that are centred on the Henri Bergson-inspired work of Gilles Deleuze. Although the work of the latter is usually considered as a phenomenological study of cinema in its emphasis on the felt and sensuous qualities of film, Deleuze himself rejected this characterization for the reason that phenomenology, in contrast to cinema, is based on “natural perception” and the “anchoring of the subject” (Cinema 1 57) (for a discussion see also Sobchack The Address 30-31). F I L M N A R R AT I V E A N D E M B O D I E D C O G N I T I O N : T H E I M PA C T O F I M A G E S C H E M A S O N N A R R AT I V E F O R M 1 In its relation to neuroscience, embodied cognitive theory operates at the level of abstract generalisation without the need for a neural mapping of the brain’s hardware. Still, the theory’s claims about psychological processes, stemming from cognitive psychology’s empirical investigations, certainly outdo armchair speculations. 2 B eing consistent with Johnson’s guideline (The Body 23), I use the terms schema, embodied schema, image schema, and kinesthetic image schema interchangeably.
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3 S ee Bordwell’s skepticism about the encompassing precision of identifying only 7 plots (Booker), and about the usefulness of discriminating as many as 36 ‘basic’ structures (Polti). 4 The same canonical neuron that fires when we see an object is the one that would fire (and activate our motor system) when we actually grasp that object. The same mirror neuron that fires when we see (or hear) somebody is doing (or feeling) something is the one that would fire (and activate our own motor system) when we actually perform the same action ourselves. 5 I t is not easy to define the pleasure one feels while encountering pictorial, or, for that matter also, textually represented symmetry. From an embodied cognitive angle, symmetry and balance are pleasing to the eye or the mind as they imitate the symmetry and balance of the perceiver’s physiological makeup (which is projected to the visual or textual information). 6 Th ese latter, higher order schemas are literary and cinematic equivalents of real-world segmentations’ habitual scenarios, described by mental models (Johnson-Laird) or situation models (Dijk and Kintsch) s for how this cognitively impenetrable bodily resonance works through our Mirror Mech7 A anism, that is best left to neuroscientific explanations and evidences, and even a brief case study exemplifying the theory’s applicability to narrative analysis – see Rizzolatti et al., Gallese (“The Manifold”), Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, and Wojciehowski and Gallese, respectively. rough their cognitive development, children acquire their first narrative schemas from 8 Th about the age of seven (Branigan Narrative 18-19). lthough it seems that the part-whole schema functions as a prerequisite for apprehending 9 A a hierarchic centre-periphery structure, their primary gestalts appear on the same category-level both in Lakoff’s and in Johnson’s standard inventory. The same applies to the link schema, which is also part of the core set in Lakoff and Johnson’s list, even though it is clear that a collection of parts can only constitute a whole if the parts are somehow linked with each other in advance. 10 About the degrees of narrativity, from non-narrative to minimally narrative and to fully narrative, see Monika Fludernik’s sub-chapter (243-248). 11 Taking the same visual approach in their study on virtual reality, Alison McMahan and Buckland contemplate upon our changing reliance on the container schema. When it comes to new media’s immersive 3D experiences, they claim that “VR environments (…) eliminate one level of container projection demanded by the viewer of the film.” 12 For a detailed overview of extended and embedded cognitive theories see Shapiro (Embodied 193-197). 13 Bordwell sees narrative complexification (in forking-path stories) as a ‘cognitively manageable,’ ‘pretty limited affair (“Film Futures” 90, 89). In their reactions Edward Branigan (“Nearly True”) and Kay Young (“That Fabric of Times”) both argue that Bordwell has this mostly right (hence the title of Branigan’s article, “Nearly True”), however his examples are restricted to classical Hollywood narratives and thus neglecting “other types of plotting not dependent on the ‘river of time’ metaphor” (Branigan “Nearly True” 107). 14 Naturally, Grodal does not mean that the experience of art cinema is fully detached from embodied cognition. Although he talks about ‘disembodiedness’ (Embodied 208-211), what he describes is the detachment of our comprehension from an actual and concrete bodily immersion (see how mainstream narrative films offer ‘concrete embodiment’ [208]), where the experience finds outlets in more abstract, somewhat ‘disembodied’ meaning making strategies (see how art cinema gives rise to feelings of ‘deep significance’ [149-150]). 15 See Johnson’s argument for the flexibility of image schemas (The Body 30).
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EMBODIED VISUAL MEANING IN FILM 1 F or a detailed discussion and critique of the conceptual/propositional view of meaning see Johnson (The Body, The Meaning). 2 F or this reason the linguistic fallacy has also been related to anti-intentionalism, i.e., the view according to which the artist’s actual intention is irrelevant to the interpretations of artworks (e.g., Wimsatt and Beardsley “The Intentional”). 3 I n this way one might argue that CMT is closely related to other theories of meaning that are primarily psychological rather than linguistic or semiotic. This recalls, for example, Paul Grice’s inferential model of communication, John Searle’s theory of speech acts or, more recently, Wilson and Sperber’s relevance theory. In the same derivative sense, Searle, for example, speaks of the distinction between ‘sentence meaning’ or ‘word meaning,’ on the one hand, and ‘speaker meaning’ or ‘utterance meaning,’ on the other (140). For Searle utterance meaning is a form of derived intentionality, in that it is defined by the mental content of the speaker, namely, his original intentions. When a speaker performs a speech act, he inflicts meaning by transferring the original or intrinsic intentionality of his or her thoughts (the conceptual) to the sounds emanating from his or her mouth or the marks made on paper (the form of expression). It differs from sentence meaning or word meaning in that it is related to the speaker’s mental stock, whereas the meaning of a sentence is entirely determined by linguistic and literary conventions. If uttered meaningfully, Searle writes, those sounds and marks “have not just conventional linguistic meaning but intended speaker meaning as well” (141). For an application of these insights to art see also Carroll (“Art Interpretation”). 4 Arnheim was obviously influenced by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). 5 F or a discussion of the containment schema in other Westerns of John Ford see Coëgnarts and Kravanja (“On the Embodiment”). FILM MUSIC AS EMBODIMENT 1 In describing the music, I avoid delving into complex music-theoretical explanations. The reader might benefit from knowledge of musical notation, yet this is not indispensable to an understanding of the annotated scores. These scores, however, are by no means intended to replace experiencing the music in the context of the film; I strongly encourage the reader to consult the various films. Timings for the scenes under discussion are supplied after the title of the film. These timings are not time-code based; they provide the hour, minutes, and seconds, as read by a DVD player. For example “0:03:35 - 1:20:20” should be read: “the scene starts at 0 hour, 3 minutes, and 35 seconds, and ends at 1 hour, 20 minutes, and 20 seconds.” e ‘abstract’ nature of music has been frequently discussed as stemming from: 1) the 2 Th temporal and almost intangible nature of sound, which makes the perception of music an ephemeral phenomenon, and 2) the lack of specificity of representational and propositional content in music (see e.g., Kivy; Pratt; Walton). 3 S aslaw investigates various mental structures (or schemas) in the context of musical analysis, in particular when applying analytical methodologies put forth by Hugo Riemann. 4 J ohnson (The Body) uses the terms ‘schema,’ ‘embodied schema,’ and ‘image schema’ interchangeably. His notion of schema has been expanded to include ‘expectation schemas’ (Cox and Huron). 5 K övecses account for unidirectionality in metaphors stems from the concrete/abstract duality: “our experiences with the physical world serve as natural and logical foundations for the comprehension of more abstract domains. This explains why in most cases of everyday metaphors the source and target are not reversible” (A Practical Introduction 6). A few scholars, however, have challenged the notion of unidirectionality in the conceptual metaphor
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binary structure. Ortony, for instance, addresses the subject of unidirectionality based on the recognition of the features projected from source to target. He claims that, in general, these features are highly salient for the source domain but not for the target. In the metaphor “This man is a monkey,” the salient characteristics of “monkey” (noisy, physically flexible, or other) are projected onto “man.” Reversing the order of source and target (as “This monkey is a man”) would produce different and arguably less clearly delineated projections. 6 M ost scholars address one-dimensional abstract structures via the verticality or path schemas. Instead, I prefer the more abstract linearity schema, which does not imply physical orientation (as in verticality) or goal-directed motion (as in path). A possible argument for the widespread use of verticality is that “locating objects along vertical axis of the body is easiest because of the body’s perceived asymmetry with respect to the ground” (Barsalou “Grounded” 625). For a discussion about one-dimensional schemas please see Chattah (“Semiotics”). 7 Th e cyclic goal-directed motions mentioned here are broadly defined by their characteristic patterns of repetition. No taxonomy of movement involving complex motions of the whole body, however, seems to be available; naturally, any objective and formalized categorization of wholebody motion should consider (and possibly disregard) a range of variability in human motion. 8 S herrington’s notion of ‘proprioception’ as sensory information provided by internal organs is addressed only tangentially in this chapter. For further insights on proprioception and music please see Peñalba Acitores. 9 S imilarity correlations between conceptual domains are expressed in the form of a conceptual metaphor ‘A IS B’ as established by Lakoff and Johnson (Metaphors). 10 Juslin (“Perceived”) identified tempo as the most significant parameter in a modulating effect, triggering a wide range of emotional responses. For an in-depth exploration on the psychophysiological responses to musical tempo see Van der Zwaag, Westerink, and Broek. 11 In the Mandarin version of the film, the character performed by Ziyi Zhang is named Jen Yu. 12 Empirical studies by Husain, Thomson, and Schellenberg show that exposure to fast tempi result in increased arousal and tension. See also Van der Zwaag, Westerink, and Broek. 13 The reader might have encountered three words that seem equivalent: pitch, note, and tone. Although these words are often used interchangeably, pitch indicates the frequency of a sound, note is the conventionalized name for a particular pitch frequency (for instance, middle ‘C’ is 261.6 Hz), and tone addresses the timbre or ‘color’ of a sound. 14 Zbikowski observes that this conceptual metaphor varies among cultures. For instance, pitch relationships are relationships of physical size is used in Java and Bali, while pitch relationships are age relationships is used in Suya of the Amazon. This further emphasizes the notion that conceptual metaphors rely on abstract structures (in these cases the linearity schema). Direct world-wide-web link: http://www.tomandjerryonline.com/Videos/tjnc.mov. Also 15 available at: http://www.tomandjerryonline.com/videos.cfm. part from glissandi, the chromatic scale provides the most continuous rendition in the pitch do16 A main, as it includes all (twelve) pitch classes in the Western system of tuning; pitches repeat in different registers by way of multiples of their frequency. Alternative tuning systems (e.g., the Middle Eastern gadwall, or some traditional Indian systems) allow for microtonal pitch inflections. 17 Direct world-wide-web link: http://www.tomandjerryonline.com/Videos/tjpb1.mov. Also available at: http://www.tomandjerryonline.com/videos.cfm. 18 Johnson and Larson explore the notion of motion in music as reflected in the lyrics George Harrison’s song “Something in the Way She Moves.” From a psycho-perceptual focus, Gjerdingen gives an account of motion in music with an analogy to the ‘phi effect’ in vision:
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a succession of musical events (successive pitches for instance) when placed at appropriate distance of each other (both in terms of frequency and temporality) will trigger a sense of movement. 19 Employing the CAM model, Lipscomb found that perceived congruence is higher when accent structures between sounds and visual images synchronize. 20 Bolivar, Cohen, and Fentress attempt to apply the CAM model to observe semantic and formal (audiovisual) congruency. 21 Studies on Heart Rate Variability (HRV) shows that the heart-beat follows more constant patterns during tensed states, hence resulting in low HRV. Van der Zwaag, Westerink, and Brook explored the influence of music in HRV, finding that “HRV was higher during slow tempo music than during fast tempo music” (261). In a related study on brain stem reflex (which controls changes in pulse, respiration, heart rate, skin conductance, motor patterns, etc.) Juslin and Västfjäll explored the processes whereby emotions are induced by music. See also Levitin. By extending these results to film music, I speculate that music during a film may induce emotions through physiological mechanisms including heart-beat, respiration, skin conductance, blood pressure, motor patterns, and even brain waves or neurochemical levels. 22 Note that when establishing semantic correlations, the music appears as the concrete domain within the A IS B binary structure. This shift, from music acting as ‘target’ domain to music acting as ‘source’ domain, defines the boundary of the Mickey Mousing technique. 23 Attempts to quantify degrees of dissonance date back to Pythagoras, who observed frequency ratios in strings of various lengths. 24 Syntagmatic analysis attends to the temporal organization and placement of semiotic units within a structure; paradigmatic analysis, on the other hand, attends to relations of a semiotic unit to potential replacing units not present in the structure. 25 The major and minor scales have been the primary archetypes of Western music since the seventeenth century. Many film composers, however, avoid the ‘happy’ or ‘sad’ coloring typical of the major and minor scales by employing alternative pitch configurations, including the Greek modes. These configurations expand the composer’s tonal-color palette while providing new means for music-narrative interaction. 26 Qualifiers drawn from Cooke and Huron. 27 Qualia drawn from Huron (145). 28 Final cadences mark the ending point of musical phrases, and generally exhibit a descending melodic contour (Huron). In fact, the term ‘cadence’ derives etymologically from the Italian cadenza, which means ‘to fall’ or ‘declination.’ 29 Other pitches (the mediant, for instance) provide a relatively high degree of closure. 30 Thompson, Russo, and Sinclair conducted three experiments to examine the influence of musical underscoring on the judgment of closure in film. In order to provide a general understanding of the concept of closure in music he draws on general music theoretical concepts and on the theories of expectation by Leonard Meyer. 31 The music features a plagal cadence, commonly referred to as the ‘Amen’ cadence, outlining a harmonic movement from subdominant to tonic. It is not coincidental that the film’s opening musical gesture and its concluding cadence are in the same key. hile a linearity schema is defined by locations along a one-dimensional structure, a con32 W tainer schema is defined by content and boundaries. Lakoff and Johnson regards our body as the primary ‘container,’ as we are “bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skins (…) We project our own in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces” (Metaphors 29).
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33 Th e notion of homorhythmic denotes a single rhythm for all melodic lines. 34 Thomas Newman’s musical language brings to mind Aaron Copland’s open voicings featuring a profusion of fourths, fifths, and ninths. Although the ‘A Dorian’ scale is most prominent, Newman’s use of chromaticism results in tonal ambiguity in regards with the mode at a precise moment in the piece. 35 Hayward defines this tradition as “expressing futurist/alien themes through use of dissonance and/or electronic sounds” (24). Donizetti intended this aria to be accompanied with a glass harmonica; instead the 36 soundtrack features a flute. The eerie sound of a glass harmonica would have worked against the desire to ground his aria in human, rather than alien sonic environment. 37 As Huron notes, most melodies exhibit stereotypic patterns, the most common being the arch shape. Over time and with frequent exposure, listeners form expectations that reflect such patterns. 38 Sessions addresses musical phrases figuratively as performed “in a single breath” thus pointing to the vocal origin of musical phrasing. 39 The wordless vocals create associations with the sound of a Theremin. The use of a Theremin (and more broadly, of electronically generated timbres) has permeated in sci-fi films as a convention to represent alien beings since the 1950’s. In her survey of soundtracks to sci-fi films, Schmidt notes “there is some suggestion that our brains physically interpret electronic sounds as in some way profoundly artificial in relation to the sounds produced by other instruments (…) Thus, no matter how pleasing it may be to the ear, the electronic may always signify both itself and an anxiety about authenticity, and might have always been pre-destined to be alien” (36). 40 De Souza draws on Gibson’s notion of affordance to investigate the impact of instrumental interfaces in music production. 41 Research has shown that individuals with restricted mobility (paraplegics) experience difficulty in rhythm production in comparison with non-paraplegics (Huron). 42 Scholars have noted that sound is a direct result of objects moving; hence it can be argued that any sound (musical or otherwise) denotes a moving object. Cox maintains that most musical sounds are evidence of human behavior (“Metaphoric Logic”). 43 In outlining the associations triggered in instrumental music by Beethoven, for instance, Hatten asserts that styles “are themselves defined by certain structural oppositions” and with “clear associations with levels of society (…) A composer could exploit high, middle, or low styles the way a speaker exploits what sociolinguists call ‘social register’ in language” (77). 44 I n this case the 5/4 meter is arranged in ten subdivisions organized as 3+3+2+2. 45 Cox is hesitant about extending the finding of Mirror Neurons in Macaques to the human brain; he instead proposes the ‘Mimetic Hypothesis,’ grounded on metaphorical and embodied representation (“Embodying Music”). 46 Drawing on Gallese’s notion of Mirror Neuron System, Pulvermüller seeks to obtain empirical evidence of neuronal discharge triggered by hearing (rather than seeing): “hearing a word seems to be associated with activation of its articulatory motor program, and understanding an action word seems to lead to the immediate and automatic thought of the action to which it refers” (1). 47 Sachs speculates that particular contours derive from animal instinctive howls or wails; he identifies examples in Western classical music as well as Russian, Australian aboriginal, and Lakota (Sioux) music. 48 Kubrick is known for using pre-composed classical music in his films. See for instance his use of Penderecki and Bartok (in The Shining) or Strauss and Khachaturian (in 2001). 49 Van der Zwaag, Westerink, and Broek survey the effect of percussiveness in music percep-
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tion and further speculate “the amount of percussiveness in music indicates the power of the music’s impact” (253). Their empirical studies confirm this hypothesis by showing that skin conductance level (an indicator of emotion) “increases with higher percussiveness, as skin conductance is a direct reflection of the sympathetic nervous system, which is positively related to energetic as well as tensed arousal” (262). 50 A leitmotif is a short recurring musical idea associated with a character, place, or object, established by the concurrent and consistent appearance of a particular melodic idea and its counterpart in the film’s story-world. Film music archetypes exist outside of a single film; these develop via frequent exposure to music, becoming cultural units the listener identifies via the music’s stylistic characteristics. Arguably, accompaniment to silent film sought to trigger phenomenological responses; yet a close inspection of (at the time available) compilations for pianists, organists, and conductors (e.g., Ernö Rapée’s Encyclopedia of Music for Pictures of 1925) illustrate that pieces were arranged according to categories akin to archetypes, such as ‘Bridal Scenes,’ ‘Oriental,’ ‘Religious Music,’ etc. As a result, the purpose of performing these pieces during a silent film was to set locale, set time period, as genre identifiers, and as indicators of the ethnicity or socio-cultural background of characters. Leitmotifs and archetypes may rely on analogy or resemblance; but it is largely agreed that leitmotifs and archetypes draw on arbitrarily established relations, and thus become conventional within culturally defined repertoires. For an in-depth investigation on the relationships between the music’s connotations and a film’s narrative, please see Chattah (“Conceptual”). T H E F L O AT I N G W O R L D : F I L M N A R R AT I V E A N D V I E W E R D I A K R I S I S 1 See Plato, Republic III, and Aristotle, Poetics III, discussed below. Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film (16). 2 A lthough the term diakrisis is not a concept in classical poetics, I introduce the term in this chapter to name a set of phenomena that take place in the mind of the spectator, as well as the creators of a film (director, actors, editors, etc.). 3 I use the term ‘superstructure’ in a non-marxian sense here. 4 I n literary studies, the ‘fallacy’ of relying on the author’s stated or inferred intentions in order to determine what a works means was a credo for more than half a century, starting with T.S. Eliot’s 1921 essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and articulated most fully in Wimsatt and Beardsley’s article “The Intentional Fallacy,” and republished in expanded form in The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (3-18). This insistence on bracketing out authorial intent from the finished work seems not to have been a strong principle within film studies. 5 S eymour Chatman explains: “The difference between narration proper, the recounting of an event (…), and enactment, its unmediated presentation (…), corresponds to the classical distinction between diegesis and mimesis (in Plato’s sense of the word), or, in modern terms, between telling and showing. Dialogue, of course, is the preeminent enactment” (32). 6 I bid., 9-10. Gaut goes to some lengths to dismantle the notion that the viewer can share the position of this implied filmic narrator. The viewer doesn’t get to tell the story, and thus cannot be the narrator. We may pretend that we are having the same perceptual experiences that the implied narrator/observer does, but that illusion is not really sustainable (Gaut 203-206). 7 F or an excellent recap of these debates see Gaut (197-243). 8 B ordwell notes that diegetic theories of narrative came into their own during the era of French structuralism and poststructuralism (Narration 17-18). 9 P aradoxically, visual elements such as film edits are often considered through a diegetic framework, as well, because they become a vehicle of narration that is ‘language-like.’
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10 Still more confusingly, diegesis is applied by some to non-fictional storyworlds, as, for example, in documentary films. However, it is more typically applied to fiction. 11 Jason Mittell explains the distinction between diegetic and non-diegetic elements of narrative with examples from The Wizard of Oz: “The diegesis refers to the storyworld which the characters experience, whether we witness it or not–even though we do not see Dorothy’s house land on the Witch of the East, it is a diegetic element of the film’s narrative, later recounted by the Witch of the North. (…) By contrast, non-diegetic elements are used to tell the story, but do not actually appear within the film’s internal storyworld. Typically, films employ non-diegetic techniques such as camera movements, edits, and soundtrack music to represent aspects of the storyworld and guide our reactions to onscreen events” (“Film” 160). There is some slippage in the term “diegetic,” defined earlier in this chapter as the “telling” of a narrative. In Mittell’s description, diegesis occurs within the storyworld, while the non-diegetic elements of narrative remain outside of it, yet still help tell the story. 12 Carroll’s concept of the erotetic assumes that films actually have a narrator, which, as we have seen, is a complicated assumption, especially in the case of implied narrators. 13 Bordwell calls these templates schemata. Schemata are broad categories of information we carry inside our head that we use to make rapid judgments about specific information presented in a film (Narration 31-39 et passim). 14 Dehaene and his colleagues theorize consciousness as a ‘global neuronal workspace.’ “We propose that consciousness is global information broadcasting within the cortex: it arises from a neuronal network whose raison d’être is the massive sharing of pertinent information throughout the brain” (13). 15 On the phenomenon of embodied simulation, our innate capacity to understand the actions, basic motor intentions, feelings, and emotions of others, and thereby to ground our identification with and connectedness to narrated characters, see Wojciehowski and Gallese. 16 Viewer X is loosely based on my own recent screening of Titanic as I was writing this article. It is a highly approximate reconstruction of my thoughts as I was watching, which I wrote down a day later. Viewer Y is loosely based on the thoughts of my partner Eric Chapelle, a composer and connoisseur of film scores, who generously contributed his own reconstructed internal narrative in response to my invitation. 17 Imaginary stream-of-consciousness narrative was pioneered by James Joyce and Virginia Woolf, and many others in the meantime. 18 Dehaene notes that subjective responses were looked down on by scientists, particularly in the wake of mid-twentieth century behaviorism. “The correct perspective,” Dehaene argues, “is to think of subjective reports as raw data” (12). If subjective reports are one half of the equation, experimental data is the other, he asserts. 19 See also the previous note, which discussed Wimsatt and Beardsley’s companion essay “The Intentional Fallacy.” 20 For a summary of some of these experiments, see Chapters 1 and 2 of Dehaene’s book Consciousness and the Brain (17-88). Scientists can track the progress of visual information in the brain, determining how far it must progress in order to register consciously. Interestingly, such information may be processed and even acted upon, whether or not it reaches an individual’s conscious awareness. 21 Interestingly, Donald’s example of intermediate-term memory in action is a conversation between eight people about a film that they have recently viewed (Donald 46-91). 22 The ‘movie’ they used in their experiment was a 27-minute episode of Curb Your Enthusiasm (Season 1, Chapter 7).
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M O D E S O F A C T I O N AT T H E M O V I E S , O R R E-T H I N K I N G 1 ‘Measurement Theory.’ Cinemetrics. Cinemetrics, n.d. Web. 08 March 2014. 2 See at least Cutting, Brunick, and Candan; Smith T.; Smith, Levin, and Cutting. 3 I borrow the term from David Bordwell (Poetics 46). 4 See, e.g., Ihde (iii). 5 On the relationship between the cinematic illusion and the viewer’s body see Voss. 6 I think of two American books like The Photoplay (1916) by Hugo Münsterberg and The Art of Photoplay Making (1918) by Victor Oscar Freeburg. 7 See, e.g., Grodal (Embodied). 8 See at least Chateau; Barker; Stadler. 9 Among others, Bochet et al.; Furman et al.; Iwase et al.; Nishimoto et al.; Rothstein et al. 10 For a recent publication, which allows one better to grasp Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on cinema, see the 2011 edition of Merleau-Ponty’s 1953 Cours au Collège de France Le Monde sensible et le Monde de l’expression. 11 Beyond the already mentioned Sobchack and Barker, see also Marks and Rutherford. 12 See, e.g., Smith, Murray. 13 This is the approach of some analysis by the already mentioned Barker, and by D’Aloia (La Vertigine). 14 Bordwell put forward the idea that low-level, modular processes play a key role in eliciting suspense – the so-called ‘firewall hypothesis’ – and this would be one of the reasons why we experience the same feeling when we see a movie for the second or third time. He attributes such an effect to a kind of resonance in which mirror neurons would also play a role (Bordwell and Thompson Minding Movies 100). 15 Gallese et al.; Gallese, Keysers and Rizzolatti. 16 See Michotte van den Berck (“La Participation”); Wallon. See also the parts on cinema in Merleau-Ponty (Le Monde). 17 Canonical neurons – in the premotor and posterior parietal cortex – selectively activate both when the agent grasps an object and when he merely perceives it. For evidence on canonical neurons in monkeys see Murata et al. For evidence in humans see Grèzes et al. 18 On film metaphors and camera movements see also Coëgnarts and Kravanja (“The Visual”). 19 See also Heimann et al.; Gallese and Guerra (“The Feeling”). 20 For more details see references in previous note. 21 This is the proposal by MacDougall. 22 Daves’ “Observations on the Camera Acting as a Person” are mentioned and commented by Vivian Sobchack (“The Man” 72-74). 23 See at least Magliano and Zacks. ART IN NOISE 1 L awrence Shapiro describes embodied cognition as less a theory than a research programme unified by its commitment to “elevate the importance of the body in the explanation of various cognitive abilities” (“The Embodied” 340). 2 E mbodied simulation theory has been recently applied to cinema by Gallese and Guerra, but their focus has been unimodally limited to visual imagery. Fahlenbrach, however, has written
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extensively upon cinematic sound and affect from the perspective of embodied metaphor (“Feeling Sounds”, “The Emotional Design”, “Aesthetics”) and, latterly, embodied simulation (“Embodied Spaces”, “Emotions”). In this chapter, my contribution to the research approach rests in locating a basis for embodied meaning in the sonic induction of affect described by the BRECVEMA framework. 3 B ut see the individual work of Brian Boyd, Joseph Carroll, and Jonathan Gottschall, for an overview of the recently emerged cognitive and evolutionary approaches to literary theory (see also their edited volume Evolution, Literature, and Film: A Reader). y reference to theories of affect should not be confused with ‘affect theory’ currently in 4 M use within humanities discourse. My use of the term affect is not identical to its use by affect theorists such as Brian Massumi, Nigel Thrift, or William Connolly. us far my professional career encompasses 30 years in sound design with the last decade 5 Th also encompassing media education. 6 David Bordwell, in referring to “Grand Theory” as SLAB theory, an acronym formed from “Saussurean semiotics, Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althusserian Marxism, and Barthian textual theory” (“Historical” 385), underscores its doctrine-based nature and limitations. 7 However, Gianluca Sergi (“In Defense”), Barbara Flueckiger, and Birger Langkjær are notable exceptions to this trend. isted here are some of In the Cut’s sound design personnel: 8 L Supervising sound editor: Andrew Plain Dialogue editor: Linda Murdoch Sound designer / SFX and atmospheres editor: Peter Miller SFX and atmospheres editor: Mark Ward Foley supervisor: Blair Slater Foley artist: Mario Vaccaro Sound re-recording mixer: Martin Oswin A more complete listing of the movie’s creative personnel may be found at the International Movie Database. See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0199626/. 9 Walter Murch and Randy Thom, of course, have consistently presented their ideas about cinematic sound to a wider audience, yet they remain decidedly designers of sound rather than writers of theory. Rare examples of practitioner-theorists might include Michel Chion and Daniel Levitin. Chion is a composer as well as a noted author of film-sound theory, while Levitin is a music producer who turned to a systematic programme of research in the neuropsychology of music cognition. 10 As illustration, consider the role of audition in controlling visual attention in Timecode (Mike Figgis, 2000) where synchronous sound activates the screen sector to which the audience will (mostly) attend. Sound design is also strikingly used to steer visual attention through highly complex or rapidly changing visual displays such as in the genres of action-adventure or thriller. A good example of this is the T-Rex battle in King Kong (Peter Jackson, 2005) where sound guides visual attention through a highly dynamic series of threats and opportunities. However, this steering function also occurs in tranquil movies, such as in the harsh scraping of a boy’s shoes on a doormat in Mon Oncle (Jacques Tati, 1958, at approximately 00:18:30 (hh:mm:ss)), attracting our visual attention even though the boy is in deep background and a highly animated conversation is underway in foreground. See Noesselt et al. for a description of how “sound increases the saliency of visual events.” 11 Many examples of this aesthetic effect may be found in the works of David Lynch, particularly Mulholland Drive (2001), Lost Highway (1997) and Eraserhead (1977).
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12 For reviews of the empirical literature on auditory imagery see Timothy Hubbard and the edited work Auditory Imagery (Reisberg). 13 For example, the spatial illusion of the ventriloquism effect (Bertelson; Bertelson and Aschersleben; Thurlow and Jack) whereby visual spatial location captures auditory location, and the speech illusion of the McGurk effect (McGurk and MacDonald) whereby vision modifies speech perception. 14 Mechanisms for multimodal interaction are many and varied, and limitations of this chapter do not permit a full cataloguing of their relevance for cinematic media. However, for a comprehensive review see the edited volumes The Handbook of Multisensory Processes (Calvert, Spence and Stein), and The Neural Bases of Multisensory Processes (Murray and Wallace). 15 In this regard, it is interesting to note Joseph Anderson’s prescient assessment of crossmodal confirmation as a fundamental mechanism for the creation of cinematic events (“Sound and Image”). 16 For a discussion of contemporary sound design and the interaction of the soundtrack’s three major components of dialogue, music and sound effects, see Altman, and Altman, Jones and Tatroe. For a comprehensive review of the sound of silent cinema see The Sounds of Early Cinema (Abel and Altman). 17 Van Wassenhove, Grant and Poeppel identify this temporal window as holding for audiovisual speech, but it may be assumed to extend to other ecologically valid audiovisual stimuli. See also Slutsky and Recanzone. 18 A dominant aesthetic within the virtual world of TRON is a form of digital ‘chunkiness’ in which its crystalline nature stands in contrast to the smoothness of the real world. This aesthetic grounds concepts of threat where characters literally risk disintegrating into blocks of digital debris. Such a digital aesthetic also underpins notions of racial and social identity. From an aesthetic perspective, it is worthwhile noting a parallel use of digital granularity within The Matrix where Neo’s voice similarly disintegrates at the point of his first passing from the Matrix into the Real World. In this instance, the disintegration of Neo’s voice is synonymous with the disintegration of his virtual self. 19 Parallel with the increasing significance of timbre in cinematic sound is Rebecca Leydon’s observation that contemporary music is “increasingly focused on timbre as a crucial semantic feature” (1), and argues an urgent need to explain its function. 20 To date, the most sophisticated soundfield technology is Dolby Laboratories’ Atmos, a format which supports the processing of 128 discrete audio channels distributed to up to 64 speaker feeds. 21 Tan goes on to say the “distal cause of entertainment activity is an unconscious need for training useful capabilities, whereas the proximal cause is enjoyment of the activity for its own sake” (“Entertainment” 28). 22 Gallese has written further upon Feeling of Body and ‘liberated’ embodied simulation in relation to narrative and psychoanalysis, noting “the bodily affective self is at the roots of the narrative self ” (“Embodied Simulation Theory” 196). 23 The term narrative design is commonly encountered in the computer game industry where it stands in the stead of screenwriter or author. My use of the term here signals a desire to make commensurate the design processes of narrative and perceptual imagery. Narrative immersion is sometimes also referred to as transportation (Green and Donahue; Holland; Mar and Oatley; Sestir and Green; Tal-Or and Cohen). 24 Cinematic proto-narrative acts as a workspace where bottom-up and top-down processes interact. Hence, my notion that proto-narrative is an interface. However, there are limitations
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to the capacity of top-down processes to act upon the primitive. For example, it is doubtful top-down processes have any influence over the primordial feelings or life-regulation processes controlled at the level of the brainstem. As to what is produced as a consequence of this interface, which grounds cognition in perception, I suggest Barsalou’s concept of perceptual symbols (“Perceptual” 577). 25 For a discussion of the return of the cinema of attractions in post-classical cinema see the edited volume The Cinema of Attractions Reloaded (Strauven) and Ndalianis. 26 Parallel to Wojciehowski and Gallese is Patrick Colm Hogan’s proposal for an affective narratology (Affective Narratology). Hogan considers the structure and purpose of stories as inseparable from our emotion systems (“A Passion” 65). 27 For a survey of emotion concepts and the trends these concepts indicate see Kleinginna and Kleinginna, and Russell and Lemay. For an overview of the abiding problems in defining the field of emotion study and producing satisfactory definitions of emotion concepts see Frijda (“Point of View”). For a history of the development of the scientific study of emotion see Gendron and Barrett. 28 For a current account of the working definitions of ‘emotion’ see Izard, and Gendron. 29 There is a dearth of research which specifically examines the relationship between environmental sound and affect. The current research programme of emoacoustics, a portmanteau of emotional acoustics and represented by the work of Asutay et al., Tajadura-Jiménez, Tajadura-Jiménez et al., Väljamäe and Tajadura-Jiménez, responds in part to this lack. 30 See Russell’s virtual reality hypothesis (“Core Affect” 155-156) for further discussion of the role of core affect in art and entertainment. 31 In this regard, Bartsch and Hübner’s observations echo Mark Johnson’s theory of embodied meaning (“Embodied Meaning”, The Meaning) which argues that even the highest levels of complexity found in human abstract thinking have their basis in the lowest levels of the biological. 32 For a discussion of the design strategy for voice see Macallan and Plain (253-255). Plain is the supervising sound editor of In the Cut. 33 The sound design process for the creation of sound effects (SFX) and atmospheres of In the Cut is somewhat unconventional. Ordinarily, a single individual (or small group) is responsible for either the SFX or atmospheres across the duration of a movie. In the case of In the Cut, Miller and I divided the movie according to scene location so that we were each individually responsible for both the SFX and atmospheres of specific environments. This allowed for an intimate evolution of each locale’s environmental soundscape through which we shaped an emotional landscape. 34 Edward Hall (Hall “Proxemic Behavior”, Hidden) termed the study of a segmentation of human space as proxemics. These spatial zones exist pan-culturally, but are modulated by cultural rules. In this way, proxemics can be understood as both a biological-ecological understanding of inhabited space as well as providing basis for a study of social semiotics. The proxemics of In the Cut arises from the cinematic manipulation of peripersonal space. 35 For example, consider the sequences at approximately 00:11:10-00:14:05 (hh:mm:ss), 01:15:53-01:17:50, and 01:19:25-01:23:02, respectively. 36 Although opportunity does not permit examination of the impact of affect upon subjective temporality, several significant studies should be mentioned in passing, in particular (Bar-Haim et al.; Droit-Volet and Meck; Droit-Volet and Gil; Droit-Volet, Fayolle and Gil; Droit-Volet, et al; Noulhiane et al.; Schirmer; van Wassenhove et al.; Yamada and Kawabe). 37 Hovering in the background of this chapter, of course, is the irony in attempting to explain the embodied meaning of sound through the written word.
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38 For recent examples of this kind of cross-fertilisation of artistic and scientific practice see Heimann et al.. See also Guerra (this volume) for a discussion of how cinematic visual movement may be explored for its ecological validity in the activation of the MNS and social cognition, and T.J. Smith, and Smith, Levin and Cutting for an exploration of audience reception of filmmakers’ intentions through the eye-tracking of actual movies. However, as with much theory in Film Studies, these examples reveal a focus upon the visual at the exclusion of the auditory, illustrating the need for yet more innovative experiments to capture the role of multimodality in cinematic experience. T H E C H A R A C T E R ’ S B O D Y A N D T H E V I E W E R : C I N E M AT I C E M PAT H Y A N D E M B O D I E D S I M U L AT I O N IN THE FILM EXPERIENCE 1 M ental simulation developed within Philosophy of mind in the context of the Simulation-theories debate (Currie and Ravenscroft; Gallagher and Zahavi; Goldman; Gordon). F I L M S A N D E M B O D I E D M E TA P H O R S O F E M O T I O N onceptual metaphors are conventionally printed in small capitals, and metaphorical ex1 C pressions in italics. 2 Gibbs (Embodiment 244) reminds us that the word emotion itself stems from the Latin movere. 3 The degree of redundancy may vary from one film to another and within the same film. 4 Th e following are some of the comments on the film included in http://www.imdb.com/ title/tt0180093/reviews: “One of the most devastating and beautiful experiences I’ve had watching,” “Aronofsky knows how to tell a story in a way that is dazzling in its use of sound, editing, and cinematography,” “It is the essence of independent filmmaking, a daring, engrossing, artful film that stays with you long after you leave the theater,” “(..) this film went straight for the heart, ripped it out and kicked it around the floor for 90 minutes,” “A masterpiece of all the elements of what filmmaking is about, mixed together in some sick soufflé and thrown into your face, burning hot and scalding,” “It had a profound impact on me and I haven’t been able to stop thinking about it since I watched it on opening night.” 5 Available at http://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/. 6 See the director’s comments on the DVD. M B O D I E D C I N E M AT I C S U B J E C T I V I T Y: M E TA P H O R I C A L A N D E METONYMICAL MODES OF CHARACTER PERCEPTION IN FILM 1 S ee also Sweetser and her claim that physical touching and manipulation are common semantic sources for English perception verbs (i.e. visually picking out a stimulus) (32). 2 S ee in this regard, also the notion of the modularity of mind, i.e., the question regarding the functional and compositional architecture of the mind (e.g., Fodor Modularity 10-11). ote that it is not always necessary for the viewer to actually see the perceptual organ in 3 N order to identify the metonymical relationship. Top-down knowledge can help to aid in this identification. For instance, we know enough about the structure of human bodies to know that the eyes are attached to the head, so even if we only see, for example, the backside of a character’s head in the foreground of the frame with the object of his gaze in the background, we are able to infer the perceptual organ, and by extension the metonymy eyes stand for seeing.
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4 F or a discussion of the term ‘homospatiality’ in relation to visual metaphor see also Carroll (“A Note”), Forceville (“The Identification”) and Coëgnarts and Kravanja (“From Thought”). 5 A similar categorization of the perception is reception metaphor in film can be construed by reversing source and goal in Table 4. or a detailed discussion of this scene, albeit without yet explicitly referring to the conceptu6 F al metaphor perceiving is touching, see also Coëgnarts and Kravanja (“Towards” 9-11). similar metaphorical application of this type can be discerned in the scene from Barry 7 A Lyndon when Lady Lyndon catches her husband cheating on her (for a discussion of this scene see also Coëgnarts and Kravanja “Towards” 8-9). N THE EMBODIMENT OF TEMPORAL MEANING IN CINEMA: O PERCEIVING TIME THROUGH THE CHARACTER’S EYES 1 I n ‘sequential scanning’ the different configurations are viewed successively (as in watching a motion picture) (Langacker 145). It differs from what Langacker in his theory of Cognitive Grammar refers to as the process of ‘summary scanning’ where aspects of a scene are scanned simultaneously (as in looking at a photograph) (144-146). Where the former is connected to events that represent time as something dynamic, the latter is linked to static scenes that conceptualize time as a unified whole (see also Evans and Green 535). ne might counterargue that the absoluteness of this interpretation is somewhat tempered by 2 O the fact that the shot of the past (i.e., the object of her memory) does not represent a subjective shot of Deborah’s POV, but an objective shot of Deborah’s face and body. In other words, the viewer is not literally looking through her eyes as she remembers herself as an external entity. This, however, does not stand in contradiction with human evaluation of past experiences. As the cognitive neuroscientist Shimamura writes: “Our recollections are sometimes viewed as if we are seeing a different person. For example, sometimes we might recollect an episodic memory not from a first-person perspective in which we visualize the event in the same manner as we viewed it originally, but as seen from a third-person point of view, as if we are observing the scene from a distance” (Experiencing Art 137). Nevertheless, as our chapter will show, there exist other examples in cinema where the shot of the past coincides with the POV of the character that remembers. or a similar discussion of Lone Star from the perspective of CMT see Ortiz (“Visual Manifesta3 F tions” 12-13). is analysis differs from our previous study (Coëgnarts and Kravanja “The Visual”) in which 4 Th the flashback scene from The Passenger (Michelangelo Antonioni, 1975) was studied as an example of the time-moving metaphor on the grounds that the character is stationary. However, this account did not take into consideration the concept of perception, and the possibility that the perceiver’s sight can be expressed metaphorically by camera movement in which the camera brings the perceiver’s point of view in direct contact with the perceived object (i.e., the time). alsetto’s comprehensive analysis of the sequence was very useful for describing and structuring 5 F the different shot transitions (112-115). e latter can be considered an example of what Edward Branigan, following Noël Burch, calls 6 Th ‘proximate spatial articulations;’ that is, “the space revealed by shot A is near that of shot B – perhaps within the same room – but at no point does it overlap or coincide with the space of shot B” (“Formal” 54). or a more elaborated discussion of the role of the containment schema in the conceptualiza7 F tion of binary oppositions in film see Coëgnarts and Kravanja (“On the Embodiment”). 8 For this reason one might argue that the third case is closely related to Grady’s notion of resem-
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blance metaphor (“A Typology”). In contrast to the group of correlation-based metaphors, which involves a set of correspondences between a concrete source domain and an abstract target domain (e.g., time is space, knowing is seeing), resemblance metaphors are grounded in a single resemblance between target and source. In the expression “Achilles is a lion,” for example, one feature, namely the inner characteristic quality of courage, is mapped from the lion onto Achilles. One kind of resemblance metaphor that has received much scholarly attention is the image metaphor (Deignan; Gibbs and Bogdonovich; Lakoff “Image Metaphors”, “The Contemporary Theory”; Gleason; Lakoff and Turner). Here, the mapping of a single resemblance is based on a shared image structure rather than on a shared inner quality. For instance, in the often cited André Breton example of “My wife…whose waist is an hourglass,” one aspect of an hourglass, namely its shape and more specifically its narrow centre, is mapped onto the form of a woman. According to Lakoff and Turner image structure is characterized by both part-whole structure (e.g., the relation between a roof and a house) and attribute structure (e.g., colour, physical shape, intensity of light, etc.) (90). 9 E xemplary in this regard would be the pub scene from David Lean’s film Ryan’s Daughter (1970) in which Major Randolph Doryan’s (Christopher Jones) aural perception of Michael’s (John Mills) repetitious banging of his leg on the pub bench causes him to recall the dreadful memories of his time in the trenches during World War I. M B O D I E D E T H I C S A N D C I N E M A : M O R A L AT T I T U D E S E FA C I L I TAT E D B Y C H A R A C T E R P E R C E P T I O N or the sake of introducing and situating embodied ethics we are simplifying deontology 1 F somewhat here (see also Slingerland 306). 2 A s we will point out ourselves in the analysis of our own examples later, assessing what is wrong or not often crucially entails that we contextualize what we are witnessing. This is especially the case when we are evaluating other people (whether real life or fictional) on the basis of a description of their perceptual acts. That is, in order to provide a proper account of the moral weight of the perception of a person or character, one often has to bring in additional a priori information, the kind of knowledge which is often fuelled by a priori cases of perception itself. is broadening and non-dualistic conception of perception also recalls Rudolf Arnheim’s 3 Th writings on visual thinking. As we have already seen earlier in this volume, perception, according to Arnheim, offers more than just the passive processing of the stimuli arriving at the sensory receptors. For Arnheim, the separate treatment of seeing and thinking is “absurd” because “in order to see we have to think, and we have nothing to think about if we are not seeing” (“A Plea” 492; see also Visual Thinking). 4 F or a discussion of the importance of emotions in ethical matters see also Oakley. 5 Carl Plantinga claims something similar when he states: “The ability of narrative films to elicit sympathies, antipathies, allegiances, and other responses to fictional characters is a key element in their aesthetic success, and in their moral and ideological impact” (“I Followed” 34). or a typology of various affective responses to fictional characters see Plantinga (“I Fol6 F lowed” 43). 7 For more on the evaluative nature of emotional responses in film see also Dadlez (“Seeing”) and Carroll (“Movies”). 8 N ote the link with the moral perception view according to which perception (i.e., the lower level) always precedes moral judgement (the higher level) (see also Vetlesen 4).
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9 Th e term ‘dramatic’ is used here in the literary sense of relating to drama or the study of drama. 10 It would be an interesting empirical problem to examine how much additional narrative information the viewer needs in order to make this kind of mapping from the perceptual level of the character onto the intentional/mental level of the character. 11 F or a good summary of these studies, see Winter (152-153). 12 For a good discussion of both concepts see also Plantinga (“I Followed” 36). 13 The idea that thought is mirrored in the face goes back to Ancient Greece, and up to modern facial expression research. For a good historical overview of some of this literature see Scherer (141-144). COGNITIVE SEMIOTICS REVISITED: REFRAMING THE FRAME e need to be aware that cognitive science is itself undergoing theoretical reduction via 1 W neuroscience. See, for example, Bickle. 2 I wish to thank Edward Branigan for his feedback on an earlier version of this chapter. urthermore, it is important to note that image schemata are not literal images (for images 3 F are always of something specific). Instead, this term refers to mental structures, which are more abstract than an actual image. We begin with images, but abstract structures from them to form schemata. or a more detailed analysis of Inland Empire from a formalist perspective, see Buckland 4 F (“The Acousmatic Voice”). 5 Werner Wolf defines metalepsis as “a fictional representation consisting of several distinct worlds and levels, among which unorthodox transgressions occur” (95).
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