research in the sociology of organizations

RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS SPECIAL ISSUE ON LABOR RELATIONS AND UNIONS Series Editor:

SAMUEL B. BACHARACH New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations Cornell University

Volume Editors:

SAMUEL B. BACHARACH New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations Cornell University

RONALD SEEBER New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations Cornell University

DAVID WALSH Department of Management Miami University

VOLUME 12 • 1993

JAI PRESS INC. Greenwich, Connecticut

^~"

London, England

ASSOCIATIONAL MOVEMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS: AN EMERGING PARADIGM?

Charles Heckscher and David Palmer

ABSTRACT The study of labor relations has remained focused on the question of whether unions, or the class movements underlying them, will revive. The most important recent changes in labor relations, however, have come not from these sources but from social-interest movements cutting across class lines and organized in loose coalitions The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, guaranteeing new job rights to a large sector of the work force, is one recent example of this pattern. Organized labor has largely failed to connect with these movements; but an AFL-CIO effort called "Jobs With Justice" is struggling to bring labor into alliance with social-interest groups, with great potential significance for employment relations.

Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Volume 12, pages 279-309. Copyright © 1993 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISBN: 1-55938-758-0

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CHARLES HECKSCHER and DAVID PALMER

INTRODUCTION Debate about employee rights has almost always focused on the role of labor unions. Currently advocates of greater rights lament the decline of organized labor and seek ways to bolster it, while managers criticize the continued "inflexibility" caused by unions. Journals, both academic and practical, are filled with investigations of one side or the other of this debate, orienting themselves fundamentally to the question of whether unions should be weaker or stronger. What has gone all but unnoticed is the fact that the social context affecting employment relations now involves far more than the traditional players: the strength of unions is only one piece of the dynamic. The image of two great behemoths squared off against each other is similar and clear, but long out of date. Those who continue to argue in those terms lose sight of the real process of change. In the past 25 years the most important battles around employment rights have been fought not on the terrain of collective bargaining, but in communities, legislatures, courts, board rooms and the press; rather than unions, the driving forces have often been service groups, community organizations, churches, and other non-workplace institutions. If we look at the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, at the battles over health and safety, or at the growth of claims to comparable worth, we find not a twoparty battle but a shifting series of multi-party alliances, often involving very temporary and loosely-formed associations. The main actors have included many groups with only weak ties to labor and each other —from blacks and women to veterans and the disabled. The current pattern of action tends most frequently to be one of multilateral coalitions. Labor unions clearly continue to be a major force shaping employment relations, but they are no longer the force. Thirty years ago they could rely very largely on their own strength to press their agenda, and other groups came as suitors seeking labor's support. In today's landscape, however, unions can rarely succeed on their own, and they need the help of others as much as others need them. This new dynamic has been little explored; neither management nor labor— nor, for that matter, the academic community—has yet come to grips with this shift.' Business has yet to develop a clear stance towards the enormous growth of legislated employee rights. On the union shop its position has been honed in a century of struggle, but on reproductive rights, plant closing legislation, child care, employee monitoring, use of polygraphs, or similar issues its position is uncertain. It has been enormously successful in its campaign to extend its prerogatives against labor unions, but it has not clearly noticed the ways in which nonlabor movements have cut into those prerogatives from other directions. It has forcefully and effectively advanced its positions in collective

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bargaining, but has been confused and clumsy in dealing with diffuse associational groups. Unions, meanwhile, have been similarly awkward: they have often acted as if they were still the dominant partner in coalitions, while the reality has shown that they are so no longer. In battles for legislated employee rights since the 1960s labor has usually been present, but has rarely been central. It has not set the terms of the debate, and has often been ambivalent about the outcomes: the tension, for example, between affirmative action and seniority continues to plague many unions. As for academics, there has been little effort to explore the dynamics of multilateral action in its consequences for the labor movement: studies remain largely focused on the functioning of unions as institutions. An increasing number of writers, it is true, are investigating innovative union tactics beyond collective bargaining, such as the use of community support or corporate campaigns.2 Others have focused on workers' relationships to their unions and communities, and the problem of how to characterize workers' consciousness.3 But these still pose the problem in terms of union tactics, implicitly assuming that the other groups are important only insofar as they support the goals of organized labor. In doing so they miss real developments which are critical to the workplace, but which involve unions only marginally. The exclusive focus on unions leaves important mysteries unexplained: why certain employment rights have continued to advance in an era of union weakness; why there has been no public reaction against management's growing dominance over unions: and why social movements that include employee rights in their agenda continue to grow in an era that politically is relatively conservative. None of these questions can be answered by assessing the traditional balance of power between labor and management. We have approached this field, therefore, from an unusual angle. Our question is not about unions, but about employment relations and rights; we seek to understand the underlying social forces which have produced a continued development of many employee rights during a period of union decline. This leads us to an investigation of the dynamics of movements outside the usual labor-management framework. We have explained two very different movements affecting employment relations. The first, the campaign on behalf of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), has had few links to unions: it has had a social-justice perspective that is pluralist rather than class oriented, and its effects on employment relations, though potentially enormous, are a byproduct of a drive for social rights. The second, the Jobs With Justice campaign, has been more closely connected with organized labor, but in an unorthodox way: though it is endorsed by the AFL-CIO, it has been driven almost entirely by local community-based organizers. These two contrasting movements illuminate different aspects of the new dynamics of employment rights activism.

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Our research is based primarily on extensive interviews with leaders and participants in these two movements. We also included activists from groups not directly associated with these movements, but affected by them, in order to get a wider sense of the structure of the coalitions. Finally, we drew extensively on the literature (newsletters, pamphlets, letters) published by both movements, press accounts, and government documents. Patterns of Engagement Over Rights The general phenomenon we are examining is the contest among social groups for rights and resources. In the labor tradition this is usually referred to as the "struggle," which connotes a particular type of contest: a two-party battle between sharply opposed groups. But this definition is precisely what is in question. Rather than a struggle, significant events might, for example, take the form of a "free-for-all" or of a "dialogue" or of "interest-group politics." We therefore use the word "engagement" as a less restrictive term including all these possibilities. Within labor-management relations, at least until the most recent phase, engagements could be sorted into two patterns. The most familiar one in the past 50 years has taken the form of a balance of power between formal organizations. Unions have offset corporations with government-authorised bargaining power and the strike. When a balance is achieved, the two parties can cooperate on the basis of mutual respect for each other's powei. This model fundamentally assumes the need for a bilateral contest -that is, it seeks to divide issues into two positions and to pull all forces onto one side or the other of the divide. From the point of view of the actors, the reasoning is that this maximizes the power they can bring to bear: unions regularly argue that any division on their "side" reduces the chances for victory. From the point of view of neutral policymakers, the bilateral structure is seen as the best way of stabilizing the contest and guaranteeing a lasting accommodation. These are the justifications for such elements of labor law as exclusive representation and the duty of fair representation.4 Unions which act on this model—and these remain in the majority today— focus on building their autonomous strength. They frame issues primarily in terms of the needs of their members, rather than of larger social groups or classes, and they rely on their ability to press demands through strikes and other weapons endorsed by the National Labor Relations Act. For some periods and some industries, this model has been successful in achieving stable resolutions and a sense of justice. The 1950s seem in retrospect to have been its high water mark: the bitter and costly strikes following World War II led to a truce in which labor and management essentially accepted a set of boundaries between them and a relationship which both sides could accept (if grudgingly) as a fair system.

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This truce began decaying almost as soon as it was established, but it is only in the last decade that it has crumbled even at its core. The industries where the original battles were fought—autos and steel in particular—have been transformed by technology and competition: the balance of power has been disrupted. Unions have found that the strike is no longer an effective weapon in many situations, and they have been in retreat in bargaining. Nationally union membership has declined dramatically, while unions have generally failed to organize in new growth areas such as high technology and private sector offices.5 This decline of the balance-of-power model has inspired attempts to revive a second model of engagement, which can be called the labor solidarity model. The advocates of this approach look back past the 1950s to the 1930s and earlier—to an era in which unions could mobilize other labor organizations as well as communities in support of their issues. This form of mobilization, which has become increasingly attractive to younger organizers, has recently begun to shape strategy at the highest levels of labor. The 1989 strike at the Pittston coal company, which saw AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland dragged off by police for civil disobedience, was the nearest thing to a 1930s-style action in recent memory. This approach, like the first, involves a polar view of the world, structuring engagements into bilateral contests of labor and management. It differs from the balance-of-power type, however, in stretching beyond the boundaries of formal organizations. It puts its faith not in the discipline and consistency of hierarchy, but in the enthusiasm of solidarity. And it tends to take the form of what Michael Mann calls "explosions of consciousness"6—intense but relatively brief flareups of activity. Though the labor solidarity model builds coalitions, these are not open and multilateral coalitions. They are put together by unions for union goals: the coalitions are seen as a means to strengthen formal organization. Social movements are seen as valuable only insofar as they contribute to this consolidation. There tends, therefore, to be a very strong leadership role played by a few powerful organizations, with the other elements of the coalition following their lead. In the meantime, however—almost unnoticed by labor analysts—a third pattern of engagement has moved to the forefront, based on a socialassociational model. This, too, involves coalitions, but of a different sort from those of the labor-solidarity approach. 1.

There is a difference in base: they are grounded in social interest-groups, such as disabled people or blacks, rather than in economic classes. Indeed, their success is generally based on their ability to mobilize across classes.

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2.

3.

CHARLES HECKSCHER and DAVID PALMER There is a difference in issues: they are not centered on workplace concerns, but raise matters of workplace rights as an aspect of the social rights which they are pursuing. Finally, there is a difference of structure. Associational movements neither begin with nor end in dominant formal organizations: they take a much "looser," more shifting form. Often they are coordinated by very small associations with knowledge or prestige, but no formal power.

In one sense these movements can be seen as narrowly interest-based: there are far fewer blacks or disabled people than there are workers, for example. But they are broader than the organized labor on two key dimensions. The first is in their ability to cut across economic class lines. The second is in their social scope: the workplace is just one of many arenas which they seek to change. They aim at a transformation which includes public accommodations, education, and transportation as much as work relations. This pattern of engagement first came to the forefront, at least in relation to workplace issues, with the civil rights movement of the late 1950s: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forced a transformation in the personnel policies of large corporations as only one piece of the overall legislative thrust. In later years, this became the model for anti-discrimination employment laws passed to protect women, the disabled, and other groups. In each case, such legislation passed after social movements independent of unions developed to demand these rights. It is our contention that social change affecting the workplace now flows largely, if not primarily, from this associational type of movement. Formal collective bargaining has clearly been in retreat, and class-based solidarity has not re-emerged to take its place. Yet a steady stream of restrictions on employer power has flowed from social legislation focused on general rights: for women, minorities, the aged—and now the disabled. In these efforts labor's role has been important: our thesis and our evidence in no way suggest that it has become irrelevant to change. But it has no longer been the central player. Rather than the leader of a coalition, labor has been in these instances increasingly one actor among many in an associational pattern. We know surprisingly little about how this dynamic works. Tremendous attention, both practical and theoretical, has been paid to the dynamics of union-management relations, and recently to class movements as well; but the looser associations based on social rights have largely escaped notice, at least in connection with the labor sphere. Those who would understand the dynamics of employee rights now need to look beyond the formal institutions to the underlying movements.7

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The Labor Solidarity Model and the Institutionalization of Unions Labor-led coalitions were most fully developed during the 1930s, when industrial unionism became central to the trade union movement. Unions connected with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), drawing on American trade unionism's more militant traditions, promoted a dualistic class perspective, with workers pitted sharply against management. It was an outlook that had a real foundation in distinct, relatively independent workingclass communities.8 While these unions pushed for collective bargaining agreements and engaged in negotiations with management, they frequently appealed to the community for support. By the 1950s, however, unions shifted their focus from organizing to the consolidation of their formal organizational structures. This change created a tension. Since labor solidarity movements rely on mass mobilization and community support, they necessarily cross the boundaries of existing institutions. They thus can get "out of control" of institutional leaders, drawing on forces—popular activism and independent associations—which are not in their jurisdiction. Union leaders often perceive this as creating a threat to their organizations as well as to them personally. Thus as organized labor became established, labor solidarity movements declined. Unions became less inclined to look outside their boundaries for support, and the wider system settled into a relatively stable balance between formal organizations. In general, unions continue to focus on building strong organizations, confining their concerns to those that affect the workplace and the wages and benefits of their members. Labor issues tended to become a matter of private struggle between unions and employers, avoiding mobilization of the wider public. 9 This has been on the whole a period of union decline. There have, however, been notable successes both in collective bargaining and in the legislative arena. The Occupational Health and Safety Act was an extension of workplace rights clearly driven by organized labor, and a few more recent moves such as the plant closing legislation of 1988 suggest that the power of unions as institutions is far from being at an end. Organized Labor and the "New Movements" Much of the action in workplace rights during the last three decades, however, has flowed not from labor-led coalitions but from assertive new associations neither based on class identifications nor centered on the workplace, and not aiming at the consolidation of organizational power. Labor, now relying on its own collective bargaining strength and confining its focus to employees covered by contracts, has been largely isolated from

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these new movements and associations. Not surprisingly, these new groups and their constituents have frequently come to view unions as narrow and selfserving. These movements are the subject of a recent set of sociological studies which have stressed their innovative nature: the major themes are decentralization and "looseness" of structure.10 But there has been little attention to the role of the labor movement or their relation to the formal organization of unions. An exception is the work of the French sociologist Alain Touraine. His analysis brings out the tension between the two types of movement, noting that unions have been unable to work effectively with social-interest groups. In the end, Touraine minimizes the importance of the new social movements, arguing that such pluralist structures cannot muster the force needed for major change.'' The basic historical pattern in this country manifests the same tensions sketched by Touraine. The civil rights movement of the 1950s gave impetus to a new pattern: rather than being a part of a class-based struggle, it established itself on independent foundations. It was led not by trade unions but by black community leaders, particularly those (like Martin Luther King, Jr.) from Southern activist churches. But only a few unions gave whole-hearted support; and those unions that were staunch advocates of civil rights for minorities, such as the United Auto Workers (UAW), the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and the United States Farm Workers, were considered "outsiders" by the Federation until the 1980s. The AFL-CIO did establish departments to promote community ties with labor, but it failed to establish strong alliances. The difficulty resulted in part from the same institutional focus which created tension with labor solidarity efforts. But here there was an additional reason for resistance: the new movements had goals which were quite independent of, and sometimes directly in conflict with, those of labor. Frequently, for example, minorities' efforts to win affirmative action programs have conflicted with the "sacred" labor principle of seniority. At those times organized labor has often stood opposed to these new movements. In the 1960s, the black civil rights movement was followed by a variety of new social movements centered on other forms of identity. Among the most lasting was the modern women's movement. Here, too, the unions were slow to respond; what initiative there was came primarily from women activists in the unions, not labor officials.12 In the case of the movement to stop the Vietnam War, students and others found themselves at odds with the leadership of the AFL-CIO, which publicly endorsed the war. New social movements continued to develop during the 1970s, centered on issues including the environment, disarmament, and gay rights. Though organized labor was often supported their issues, there has been continual tension: the emergent groups have often seen unions as irrelevant or as


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defenders of the status quo rather than as a force for change. The disability rights movement is only the latest to hold such a view (though it welcomes any backing offered by the AFL-CIO and its affiliates). Union support for these movements has often been uncertain, coming from individual unions and local activists rather than uniting the movement as a whole. Even in the area of health and safety, national units rarely have pushed for government actions that extend beyond the workplace, and so have failed to build strong alliances with groups whose focus extends to other institutions.13 The 1981 Solidarity Day march in Washington, D.C. remains emblematic of the divide between labor and new movements. Led by the AFL-CIO, the event drew together a quarter of a million people, both from trade unions and from the whole range of "social-justice" associations. This event was trumpeted as a breakthrough for labor—the first time that the AFL-CIO invited speakers from women's and civil rights groups to share the podium with them at a national labor rally, a symbol of a new openness. Yet the march presented no program and failed to cement these relationships: in the aftermath the different parts of the coalition went their own way as before.

THE ASSOCIATIONAL STRATEGY AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT The clearest recent example of a true social-associational movement culminated in the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in May 1990. The potential impact of the legislation on employee rights and employment relations is vast; yet trade unions were minimally involved in the effort, and management's position was divided. The movement which achieved it has unequivocally taken the form of a pluralistic association built around social issues, with the workplace element being only one aspect of their focus. The ADA promises to do for the country's 43 million disabled what the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did for blacks and other minorities. It prohibits job discrimination by private sector employers with 25 or more employees, as well as state and local government. It further assures accessible public transportation for the disabled and mandates full access to public accommodations. Enforcement allows the same provisions as those in the 1964 Act. The initial puzzle to be explained is this: how, in an era of growing business influence and declining union power, did this significant extension of employee rights come about? How could it develop sufficient strength without the active involvement of labor unions—or, indeed, of any single large institutional force for reform?

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CHARLES HECKSCHER and DAVID PALMER The Development of the Movement

The ADA's passage resulted from two decades of continuous organizing by the disabled and their allies, sometimes in very public ways, but even more often behind the scenes. The first major step was the formation, especially during the 1970s, of independent organizations directly representing the disabled. For years, charitable groups like Easter Seals and the American Federation for the Blind had spoken for disabled people, even though the disabled had virtually no say in these organizations: the disabled were seen as victims who needed the help of well-meaning volunteers. But by the 1970s, activists in the disabled community sought to create independent groups that were run by their own people and spoke to their own needs and culture. At first this "independent" phase of this movement was rather narrowly based in both membership and tactics: it brought together established organizations in a political lobbying network at the Federal level. In 1973 liberal staffers for Democratic Congressmen helped engineer Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibited discrimination in any federally funded projects. The next year activists from a variety of disability organizations began to develop a national network that eventually led to the formation of the American Coalition for Citizens with Disabilities (ACCD). 'I he ACCD activists remained in contact in the times between meetings; they continued the focus on legislative pressure, helping to organize demonstrations against the presidential vetoes of the Rehabilitation Act in 1972 and 1973. A number of organizations within the disability rights movement tried to shape federal policy while drawing much of their financial support from the federal government. 4 As a result, strong ties were forged between disability groups tied to ACCD and a number of Congressional staffers and federal officials. Broadening the Movement Though relations with the government were sometimes friendly, resistance was also significant, even during the Ford and Carter administrations. The Reagan years brought open government hostility to the goals of the disability rights movement. The tactics of relying solely on alliances with political officials was therefore insufficient; indeed, ACCD collapsed after its federal support was eliminated, and many other groups tied to the government were pushed to the brink. Yet in the end this period saw a broadening of the movement as new institutions filled in the void. There was a decline in nationally oriented groups that promoted a wide range of disability rights issues and were geared to a mass base. However, a diverse range of more focused groups flourished in their place. These included both national membership organizations concerned with specific disabilities—


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especially when they promoted locally-oriented chapters and activities—and non-membership staff organizations providing educational or legal services. For the most part, both types of groups were financially self-supporting and widely accepted by people from all political persuasions. Political advocacy groups shifted from a national to a local focus. Local groups like the Massachusetts Coalition for Citizens with Disabilities (MCCD) barely survived the Federal cut-backs, but at least could fall back on a local volunteer base (almost all of whom were disabled), limited state funding, and private grants. These organizations, generally operating on shoestring budgets, won substantial new disability rights legislation at the state level. Numerous states, including Massachusetts, California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Texas, passed statutes that protected the disabled and improved delivery services. According to Lex Frieden, the original author of the ADA, "The states were the key to the national level. Many legislators at the federal level were surprised that state statutes were stricter than federal ones." In addition to this state legislative activity, the tactical focus broadened to include more direct action. There had arisen during the 1970s, side by side with ACCD and other lobbying groups, a number of grass roots organizations geared to directly assisting the disabled rather than toward advocacy in the political arena. These organizations divided roughly into "activist" and "service" types. Activists went outside the "legitimate" bounds of lobbying, creating pressure through direct action. In 1978 disability activists in Berkeley, California physically blocked the entrance to federal buildings to protest Secretary of HEW Joseph Califano's continued refusal to move swiftly on enforcement of Section 504. Demonstrations and sit-ins then gave national prominence to the disabled activists and their organizations, and led to the adoption of a new strategy that combined legal tactics with mass mobilization of the disabled through a wide variety of decentralized organizations. "Service" groups, providing specific help for the disabled, also developed rapidly. The Centers for Independent Living (CIL), where those with major disabilities could live in a community instead of being confined to institutions, had been an important innovation of the 1970s. Now, in the 1980s, service organizations made further strides. They gained substantial support from professionals in the health care field. A number of major corporations responded positively to this new opportunity by providing specific facilities and training for disabled employees: these included DuPont, IBM, and Sears.15 And companies such as Levi Strauss and McDonald's, perceiving a whole new market, began to show disabled people using their products in advertisements. These varied activities helped change public attitudes and popular culture. Movies and television shows featured physically and mentally disabled persons

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in a positive light. Finally, the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s created a huge movement that linked up with those fighting for disability rights and contributed to public recognition of the need to help and respect the disabled. In the later 1980s divisions emerged in the White House. Vice-president George Bush, who was authorized to cut aid to disabled children, reversed course when affected families flooded the White House with protesting calls and letters. By 1988 Bush, now a Presidential candidate, had publicly parted company with his predecessor: he decided to support the new Americans with Disabilities Act (in its broad form) a few weeks after Michael Dukakis did. Bipartisan support for disability rights was now assured. The movement had survived the Reagan years. How the ADA Passed Congress: The Associational Strategy in Practice The structure of this new movement, now centered around passage of the ADA, was extraordinary: it was a loose and decentralized association of highly diverse groups. In contrast to the trade union movement, no major organization assumed overall leadership. Instead, the effort consisted, first, of numerous organizations and individuals with widely varying political values, tactics, and long-term objectives; and second, of a temporary core group of individuals from some of the most active organizations who coordinated information to this national network and waged an incessant informational campaign in the halls of Congress. The variety of organizations, in terms of orientation, structure and focus, participation levels, and scope, was significantly greater than the relatively uniform approach of the trade union movement. Some had a narrow range of interests, while others had a broad vision of the future. Some believed in varying forms of advocacy, from legislative initiatives to sit-ins, while others concentrated on improving services, creating support groups, and spreading education, Some had well-endowed organizations, others survived on almost nothing. Political views ranged from conservative Republicans to those on the left, and everything in between. But all united in support of civil rights for the disabled, symbolized in the ADA, and all tolerated the diversity of the coalition built to secure the ADA's enactment. Those affected by disabilities, like those involved in other civil rights issues, are not restricted to any particular class or social group, thus making it difficult to create polarities of "them and us." Almost every family is touched by disability in some way at some time. Though the disabled are disproportionately poor, in part because of the effects of discrimination, they are distributed nearly randomly in terms of education and ethnic/ racial background. Indeed, many prominent political officials from both major parties supported the ADA because of personal or family experiences with disabilities. For example, Senator Bob Dole lost the use of his right arm from a World War II injury;


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Senator Edward Kennedy has a mentally ill sister and a son who lost a leg to cancer; and Senator Tom Harkin has a hearing impaired brother. The problem of coordinating this diverse coalition became critical as federal legislation became a plausible objective. By 1989 some 54 organizations joined together in the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) to support the ADA. Most groups represented either the disabled themselves or professionals (such as psychologists and special needs teachers) who served the disabled. Legal rights and informational organizations also belonged to the Coalition. Most of the key leaders in the CCD came from three organizations: two with a strong participatory membership base (Paralyzed Veterans of America and Epilepsy Foundation of America) and one non-membership educational/ legal defense group (Disability Rights Education and Defense Foundation) with roots in the 1970s activist period. These leaders and others maintained regular personal contact with Congressmen in Washington to inform them of the disabled community's perspective and conducted extensive mailings to inform and mobilize people around the country. In this way Congressmen saw the disabled themselves speaking on their own behalf. The make-up of the CCD was highly respectable, with some 50 percent of the organizations consisting of organizations focused on Congressional informational activity or representing professionals. Single-disability service organizations also were well represented and included such traditional groups as the National Multiple Sclerosis Society and the American Federation for the Blind. The radicals of the movement, such as ADAPT and Disability Rag (the movement's most widely used national journal), were not formal members, but supported this activity in their own way through the informal national network. Although some liberals in Congress were apprehensive about the activists who advocated direct action, the CCD maintained a tolerant perspective that reflected the sentiment of the disabled community. ADA author Lex Frieden notes: We're living in America, where there are many ways to express yourself. So some demonstrate. Some conservatives are frightened by these activists, but these activists are also frightened of conservatives. We have achieved a confluence, an informal aggregation of groups, with membership groups as the key. The [unsuccessful] effort to pass the Civil Rights Restoration Act was driven by old institutional groups, with the result that progress was slow But the ADA is different because there's social involvement based on many different voluntary associations.

Support also spread beyond the Coalition: many individuals participated directly as part of a local and national network, instead of through national organizations that represented their particular disability. In addition, almost


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150 national organizations—many not with the Coalition—publicly supported the ADA. Religious, civil rights, and women's organizations were well represented in this second tier of support. Union support, however, was minimal. The CCD counted only one union among its members—the National Education Association (NBA), not AFLCIO affiliated. The AFL—CIO was an endorser within the larger group, but only one of its own unions was listed as a supporter. In numerous interviews conducted for this study, union officials and staff indicated there was virtually no awareness of the ADA and its issues. A number of businesses, especially large ones in transportation, telecommunications, and hotels, raised objections. The ADA's defenders responded by emphasizing the economic benefits which would result from the bill. Republican Justin Dart, acting on behalf of the CCD, toured the nation to address business organizations on the bill's merits for business. By this strategy, much opposition from the business community was effectively neutralized, while some new allies emerged. This appeal to business became important when a major battle erupted in the final stages over an amendment backed by Marriott Hotels: this would have outlawed the use of employees with AIDS and ARC in food handling operations. The CCD asked for support from its business allies who sold equipment to Marriott. These companies threatened to pull out all their equipment if the chain did not change its position. The tactic worked: the chain backed down, the amendment was defeated, and the bill in its earlier form passed the House and was signed by the President. A number of factors explain why the disability rights coalition succeeded in the ADA campaign: 1.

The diversity of the coalition. It cut across many social, political, economic groups. There were many surprising players. Although Congressional Democrats provided the greatest initial support, they welcomed prominent Republicans in leadership roles; this became a genuinely bipartisan movement. Progressive businesses were another important player: supporters of the bill framed arguments in terms of economics and efficiency. Civil rights and women's organizations were active, as seen for example in the Congressional Black Caucus's actions on behalf of ADA. Finally, there were broad public approval of disability rights, based on years of exposure to the positive side of the movement, growing acceptance of the disabled as an integral part of American life, and realization that disabilities affect virtually every family at some point. While many people oppose certain minority and women's rights, few opposed the ADA. Most elected officials understood this political reality.


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2.

The decentralized structure, coordinated not by a powerful central body but by smaller mediating groups. No organization or group of organizations dominated the coalition; it evolved in part from separate campaigns by groups acting independently, in part from efforts loosely coordinated through negotiations among equals. The CCD did not interfere in the internal affairs of individual organizations. In fact, it could not have existed without this decentralized approach that utilized informal networks coordinated by active staffers in Washington. The leadership of the movement was not motivated by organization building, nor did they seek to build political careers. Some of the most important came from small organizations with little or no power. A major coordinating role was played by DREDF, a tiny group of researchers based in Washington with no direct power base. Their effectiveness came initially from their ability to provide credible information; this in turn put them gradually at the center of the communications network, and they at times mediated among organizations with varying interests.16 3. A plurality of tactics. Moderation (traditional contacting of officials by well-placed organizational representatives) was combined with grassroots mobilization (hearings, presence in Washington, letter-writing, and so on) and direct actions (sit-ins, marches). Precisely because the movement was so loosely coordinated, these diverse approaches coexisted without creating splits; in fact they reinforced each other. 4. A clear aim: passage of the ADA. Building the CCD was always subordinate to this goal, with the CCD seen as only a temporary structure. This enabled the many movements to focus on the shared goal and reduced "turf tensions.

The new battleground for the movement now appears to be enforcement of the ADA, given the existing broad support for legal rights. Government bureaucracy, tight budgets, and business resistance have led many disability rights organizations to wage campaigns around funding and policy implementation. However, the successful fight for the ADA seems to have assured that the associational character of the movement will continue.

LABOR AND MILITANT COALITION-BUILDING: "JOBS WITH JUSTICE" In contrast to the disabilities movement, "Jobs with Justice" grew directly out of organized labor. It is coalitional in that it seeks to build alliances beyond the boundaries of individual unions and to rekindle a broad sense of social

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mission and solidarity. But it is strongly rooted in a set of powerful organizations—labor unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO—and its primary intention is to further strengthen those organizations by enhancing community support. In these respects it appears to differ from the more diverse association behind the ADA. But many of Jobs With Justice's successes have failed to follow the intended pattern. They have not come in situations where unions have been the main players and workplace issues the key rallying point; nor have they noticeably strengthened unions as institutions. The campaign's greatest impact has come as a supporting actor in civil rights struggles, rather than as a leader of a revival on labor-focused actions. The history of the campaign therefore supports some of the general lessons of the disabilities movement, despite its stated intentions. Change, in the Jobs With Justice campaigns as with the ADA, has come most often from coalitions focused around social issues, with no single organizational focus; the "labor" issues have been components of these battles, but not their center.


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Communications Workers of America (CWA) and one of the founders of the effort, claimed at least 200,000 of these cards have been signed by mid-1990. The national leadership encourages the formation of local steering committees, which allow "somebody from each of the organizations that's prepared to take this down to the grassroots level inside their organizations." Active participation by rank-and-file workers, especially union members, is seen as crucial. "It's different from a normal coalition," notes Cohen, "in that it has to be done almost one-to-one, getting that individual commitment from members." The tactics tend toward direct action: "If we have a rally, one of the things that we really stress with people is that it should be short on speeches and instead emphasize action—people marching, blocking, doing things." The campaign, in short, seeks to go beyond the very limited forms of coalition-building familiar to AFL—CIO organizations. It actively seeks support from non-labor groups such as the National Organization of Women and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Cohen says it is trying "by and large to recreate the community split that existed in the 1930s, and that carried into the 1940s."

Jobs With Justice: Formal Structure and Goals Labor's sharp decline during the 1970s and 1980s gave rise to a group of young union leaders, some at the local level and others in prominent staff positions, who looked back to the militancy of the 1930s as a cure for the current malaise. The Jobs With Justice campaign, though officially endorsed by the AFL-CIO, has been driven by these type of leader from outside the mainstream. Initiated in 1987, the campaign's formal goals are of the classic laborsolidarity type. It aims to create "a national coalition to fight for workers' rights" based on three demands: "employment security; a decent standard of living; [andjthe right to organize on the job." It seeks to implement this pi ogram by building "powerful labor/community coalitions which can force major corporations and government to act responsibly in their communities; demonstrate to unorganized workers that there is a viable collective fightback response to the workplace problems they face; [and] change the political climate in the United States to permit social and legislative changes favorable to workers."17 By 1989 Jobs With Justice claimed to have active operations in some 60 cities and towns throughout the country. 18 Although the campaign is officially endorsed by the AFL-CIO, it has no formal organizational seat or paid staff. A network of relatively young union activists has developed the basic strategy and published documents to guide local efforts. Some are based in Washington, in unions such as the CWA and the UMW, and therefore tend to play a national coordinating role. The cornerstone of Jobs With Justice is the pledge card: activists sign cards promising to "be there" five times during the coming year for other people's struggles as well as their own. Larry Cohen, Director of Organizing for the

Jobs with Justice in the North and East: The Limitations of Labor Solidarity In the North and East, Jobs With Justice has generally pursued the model of labor solidarity as sketched by the national leadership, focusing on labor issues and building links primarily among unions. The national policy at the start, in 1988, was to hold large Labor Day rallies in as many locations as possible, uniting union activists. In most places, this activity has not built much momentum. The number of cities and towns that reported activities dropped substantially between 1988 and 1989. One feature of the campaign that may have contributed to lack of development in these regions has been the focus on breaking collective bargaining deadlocks at the expense of building community-issue oriented associations. These areas seem to have followed the outlook of national literature connected with Jobs with Justice, in contrast to the more civil-rights oriented approach of the South and Southwest. There have been many social issues linked to Jobs With Justice campaigns that do not come within the parameters of collective bargaining. In the North, Jobs With Justice has failed to fully integrate these concerns, though in principle it is open to doing so. And in these areas it has had difficulty expanding its coalition efforts. For example, in the Plains region of the Midwest, foreclosure of family farms was a major concern in 1987. Jobs With Justice initially participated in the movement to prevent foreclosures and gain assistance for these farmers, many of whom, along with family members, worked in area union plants. No follow-

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workers who were fighting for their first union contract. These workers were mostly black women; the active involvement of the black community was crucial to the success of the effort.

up seems to have been done on this issue, and Jobs with Justice activity subsequently disappeared from Iowa. The greatest obstacle to incorporating local community issues in these regions seems to have come from the outlook of the national unions themselves. Their focus has been on contract bargaining; many of these community issues have been seen as secondary. Thus they have failed to cement lasting alliances.19 Jobs With Justice in the South and Southwest: The Role of Civil Rights The successes of Jobs with Justice, especially in terms of long-term organizing, have been overwhelmingly in the South and Southwest: these regions have had the greatest number of activities and the widest community involvement. This is especially significant in view of the weakness of the traditional labor movement in these areas. For the most part, these activities have been concentrated in a few major urban areas where trade union issues have coalesced with civil rights movements. Although Jobs With Justice mobilized on behalf of the Machinists in their battle with Eastern Airlines, the most effective activities have been in service jobs, among predominantly black or Hispanic workers, and quite often women. In the South (and East Texas), black workers' rights have been at issue, while those of Hispanics, particularly Chicanos and Mexicans, have been most important in the Southwest (except in Denver). The urban areas where Jobs with Justice has been active in these two regions do not have powerful unions or central labor councils. Although Jobs with Justice has sometimes function as a "labor support" coalition, it seems to have had the most impact where it has addressed both civil rights and labor interests, doing more than just supporting collective bargaining demands. A number of Hispanic union organizers and staff in the Southwest commented on the importance of the link between the union movement and the Chicano movement in their local efforts to build Jobs with Justice. The black civil rights movement, with its strong community base, has also proved to be a critical ally for those in Jobs With Justice in the South. For example: • Nashville took initiatives to establish ongoing gatherings that brought trade unionists and church activists together, laying the groundwork for a real community-union association. • In spring of 1988, Jobs With Justice co-sponsored the Martin Luther King march from Memphis to Atlanta with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The march stopped in cities and small towns along the route, holding rallies in support of local employee rights causes. • In Nacogdoches (east Texas), Jobs With Justice successfully mobilized dozens of unions and organizations in support of university cafeteria

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Sources of Resistance One can learn a great deal about a change process from the forces arrayed against it: these in a sense mark its boundaries. In the case of Jobs With Justice there have been three key sources of resistance: 1.

The first has been from existing labor bodies, especially central labor councils and state federations. This resistance confirms the importance of the challenge to the dominant labor strategy and repeats a frequent lesson of the 1930s and 1940s: the logic of formal organization is in tension with the tactics of mobilization represented by Jobs With Justice. Resistance among existing labor leaders was manifest from the very beginning. The original plan of the campaign's organizers was to kick - — it off with a major rally in Detroit. That never got off the ground: some powerful unions, most notably the UAW, were unwilling to risk a new strategy based on a community-union coalition. Invariably, these unions confined themselves to collective bargaining concerns at the expense of larger social issues that encompassed employee rights, and relegated community issues to a separate sphere from those considered relevant to labor. In a number of cities, powerful central labor councils have obstructed the new initiative, and the tension has only increased when they encounter young activists by bypassing them by appealing to the authority of the AFL-CIO-authorized campaign. Those against it, according to several local organizers, had reservations about "activists" asserting an independent policy. Some resistance to building Jobs With Justice has also been evident in the higher levels of the AFL-CIO, despite official endorsement and Industrial Union Department (IUD) sponsorship. For example, in 1988 and 1989 AFL-CIO News, the federation's house organ, gave almost no coverage to the campaign, even though it publicized the Eastern strike and other engagements where Jobs With Justice actively participated. 2. A second source of resistance has come from local unions and workers themselves, who want unions to represent only their own immediate interests—job preservation and wage and benefit hikes—regardless of the impact on those outside the workplace. Community interests are sometimes pitted against those of union members in the workplace, thereby weakening both the union and the community.

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One of the sharpest outbreaks of this tension between labor and community issues occurred in Denver. In 1989, Jobs With Justice attempted to form a coalition to deal with the environmental problems at the Rocky Flats nuclear bomb plant. The campaign broke down when workers at the plant decided to support management-led efforts to keep the plant open, while environmentalists and community residents continued to call for its closing. At hearings held in June 1990, plant workers with "Solidarity" t-shirts sat on one side, while environmentalists and residents sat on the other. 3. The third source of resistance is perhaps the least expected: Jobs With Justice has been viewed with suspicion by many "progressives," younger union activists who first came into the labor movement during the scattered union insurgency of the 1960s and 1970s. What is surprising is that similar young activists have also been the key leaders of Jobs With Justice in local engagements. The nature of this tension is especially instructive. In places like Boston, San Francisco, and New York City there are strong groups of local officials who came from such movements as the Farmworkers' organizing drives among Chicanos, Philipinos, and others; black caucuses and women's caucuses in a number of unions; and efforts to democratize unions like the Steelworkers and the Teamsters. These trade unionists see a natural connection between the trade unions, community activism, and civil rights, and they have been seeking for decades to build such coalitions. This would seem like a natural locus for the galvanizing efforts of Jobs With Justice; yet the campaign has consistently failed to take root in these areas. The main source of this resistance is a deep suspicion of central "bureaucrats." Despite the deliberately low-key role played by leaders in Washington, local activists remain skeptical of rhetoric from national union officials; they see Jobs With Justice as an outside operation. The mass rallies used as kickoffs to Jobs With Justice activists are often seen as flashy but lacking longer-term commitment to organizing. The success of these local organizers in their own coalition building has come through painstaking creation of local networks. They understand the structure of social coalitions, and they see an attempt at domination by a central organization as not only "redundant" to their own efforts, but potentially destructive. It appears, in short, that traditional labor leaders are afraid that Jobs With Justice will undermine organizational control, and local "progressives" are afraid that it won't. Jobs With Justice stands at the intersection of socialassociational and labor-solidarity activity, and manifests the tension between


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them. Where traditional labor organizations are strong, the dilemmas seem unresolvable. In the South and Southwest, by contrast, there has been less tension, and also more success. On the one hand, labor's formal organization is less strong than in the North; on the other, "new movements" with roots in civil rights activity are often better developed. Thus there is less fear of central domination, and a more natural tendency to join in associations of equals. In these areas younger "1970s" trade union activists have participated actively in Jobs With Justice, and central labor councils have supported the campaign. In Tennessee and Alabama, central labor councils have called on Jobs With Justice to support local strikes, although follow-through after initial efforts has been limited. In San Antonio and San Diego, local organizers and central labor council officers have worked closely to sponsor labor rallies and events, especially those that have focused on the Latino community. In Florida, the central labor council in Tampa has supported efforts to build unioncommunity coalitions; in Miami, the few officials who resisted the campaign no longer sit on the council. A Case: The Miami Campaign The two strands of Jobs With Justice are well illustrated by the experience in Miami, where the national campaign was officially opened. It began with a clear labor solidarity orientation, building support for both national and local labor disputes. But it also moved toward the social-associational model when it became involved with a struggle by area unions, black community organizations, and numerous other non-labor advocacy groups to retain transit system jobs and public transportation for low income people. Collective bargaining concerns dominated the first type of engagements, while social issues, in which those of labor were only one part, predominated in the second. The engagements utilizing the associational model proved more successful. Miami became the first region of activism for Jobs With Justice in part because the city was the home of Eastern Airlines, where the International Association of Machinists (JAM) was protesting that company's contract demands. The campaign chose Miami as the location for its first national rally in 1987. Follow-up work included implementing a grass roots media strategy based on local "worker abuse" cases, and pulling together a coalition-building effort that encompassed some 80 unions and 24 organizations, including the Florida Consumers Federation, Florida NOW, ACORN, and the Florida State Council of Senior Citizens, and the NAACP. The labor support network built by Jobs With Justice brought activists to various picket lines. The most visible actions developed around direct-action support for the Eastern Airlines strike; but this campaign failed, for two basic reasons. First, there was resistance from institutionalized labor bodies.

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According to a number of Jobs With Justice activists, the leadership of the IAM and the AFL-CIO apparently feared this direct-action approach would backfire. The IAM instead sought to buy out Eastern, which shifted the fight into the courts and away from mass mobilization. As a result, Jobs With Justice could only play a limited strike support role. In effect, the national IAM and the AFL—CIO reverted to the "balance-of-power" model, checking the development of a labor solidarity orientation. Second, the labor focus of the struggle narrowed the coalition. Though there was formal support from a wide swath of organizations, the workplace issues did not energize forces beyond the labor movement. In this it recalled the Solidarity Day march: much formal unity, but little real working together. At the same time, however, another campaign within Miami succeeded— precisely by effectively pulling together these social groups. The issue was only partially a labor one: it involved a new transportation system, and the working conditions of its employees was just one piece of the problem. Nor were the unions the central forces. Because of recent economic and urban development, Miami has a strong network of community organizations, including ones in the black community. These are linked to economic growth: like San Diego, California and San Antonio, where Jobs For Justice is also active, Miami has many new immigrants, an infusion of high tech industry, and considerable expansion in building construction. It is less conservative -politically and socially than other parts of the state. The events which sparked the associational movement began in 1976, when Dade County voters narrowly passed a referendum financing the building of a new rail system. As plans for the new system developed, it became apparent that the new line would only serve suburban commuters while draining revenues away from bus lines used by the city's overwhelmingly minority population. Furthermore, bus drivers, most of whom are black, were expected to take pay cuts, while the majority of county workers, mainly white, received raises. TWU Local 219 claimed that this new policy of discrimination against black bus drivers and the black community amounted to "transit apartheid" and turned to its labor and community allies for help. In early 1988 it asked Jobs With Justice to help build a community-wide campaign around the transit issue. ' In September 1988, Local 219 decided to oppose the reelection of three county commissioners who had instigated the transit cutbacks. A very loose coalition as organized, which drew on widely divergent types of people and organizations affected by the transportation issue. Leadership was not centralized; each constituency operated autonomously, while maintaining information links to Local 219 and the campaign.


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Black members of the local union mobilized organizational support from their own community. While well established organizations such as the NAACP lent their aid, many local groups and churches got their members involved. Many of these groups operated relatively autonomously from the larger coalition, though they attended campaign meetings. Senior citizens were among the most active in the election. They had their own system of autonomous organization through local condominium associations and consumer advocacy groups. Among local activists they were known as the "condo commandos." Finally, a sector of business—particularly real-estate interests seeking to improve suburban transportation—participated in the coalition. Their concerns were for a change to "responsible government" and a more carefully planned transportation policy. As a result, many white middle income residents of Dade County who wanted improved highways supported the opposition candidates.

The working relationship among business, the unions, and the black community was tenuous, but drew together around an anti-incumbency stance. As a result of the coalition's grass roots mobilization and wide support from diverse groups and strata, voters elected labor-endorsed candidates who pledged that they would be responsive to the community at large, including the black community. Voters soundly defeated the three commissioners who had promoted the discriminatory transit policy, although the reasons voters cast their ballots differed depending on the particular community. Jobs With Justice played a significant role in the election, but it was not the central or driving force. The transportation issue itself and the subsequent coalition building began prior to the unions' participation in the election campaign. Many black activists whom we interviewed had never heard of Jobs With Justice, though they had often been involved in activities sponsored by it. What Jobs With Justice did was to provide a critical communication network through its computerized pledge card system and to become a means, through its committees and activities, for training leaders in how to organize and build coalitions. It clearly broadened the coalition and highlighted the particular concerns of the black community among those in other neighborhoods. This approach helped to break some of the isolation that led to the Liberty City riots, though government has yet to address many of the black community's needs. Despite the success of the transit campaign, there appears to be a lull in the effort to build a working community-labor coalition in Miami. Jobs With Justice activity has also subsided, though this followed the campaign's national trend during 1989 and 1990.

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CHARLES HECKSCHER and DAVID PALMER Jobs With Justice as an Associational Movement

We can summarize the conditions of success for most Jobs With Justice activity as follows: 1. Relatively weak unions and other formal labor bodies. In the South and Southwest, of course, organized labor has always been weak; in the North, where it has been stronger, the formal bodies have often resisted the coalitional approach. 2. Relatively strong and effective non-labor associations, especially civil rights and community groups. Again, the South fits this profile than the North: the level of civil-rights organization is high. 3. An element of "social" engagement—frequently around minority or women's issues, occasionally around environmental or other community concerns. Labor issues fit within this context. Under these conditions, Jobs With Justice effectively becomes an associational movement similar to the disabilities effort. Rather than trying to show that labor issues "should" be central to other groups, it accepts their place as an element of a contest over social rights. 22 The role of labor in these events is not one of control or even leadership: it has not defined the issues, not has it dominated the decision-making processes. It has accepted a position as a member of a coalition rather than its director. This is more similar to the coordinating role played by DREDF in the ADA engagement: labor builds credibility largely through its ability to gather and disseminate information. It is, paradoxically, relative lack of true organizational power in the South which has increased labor's effectiveness in this coordinating role. Prospects for the Labor-Solidarity Approach The picture is not, of course, entirely simple: the social-associational type has not swept the field clean. There are issues which create a picture more complicated than a simple shift from one type to another. First of all, the developments we have sketched, centered on legislative redefinitions of rights, have left open the problem of enforcement. Unions play a key role both in the definition and in the enforcement of rights in the workplace. The new movements have demonstrated clear ability in the first function but not the second. Thus, it should be stressed, our analysis stops well short of an assessment of the future of organized labor in general. Second, the labor-solidarity model, while unsuccessful overall, has scored a number of victories within Jobs With Justice, keeping alive visions of a more dramatic and explosive mass movement. The most visible instance was the


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Pittston coal strike of 1989, which was partly organized by Jobs With Justice and fit much more closely with the national leadership's image of a labor-led coalition. Unlike the social-associational successes in Miami and other places, the Pittston struggle was an old-fashioned worker-management faceoff which also rallied wider forces—both other labor unions and the surrounding communities. At one point, even Lane Kirkland, the staid AFL-CIO president, was arrested for participating in a sitdown on a highway with Pittston strikers. Many saw these engagements as a return to the militant tactics of the CIO during the 1930s, and a harbinger of a re-emergence of traditional militancy.23 But Pittston had some unusual characteristics. The Mineworkers are nearly unique in that they have continued to use militant confrontational action long after most other unions have lost that desire of capacity. The 1974 strike in Harlan County, documented in a well-known film of the same name,24 could have occurred in nearly the same form in the 1930s. The Pittston strike appears not as a recreation of labor militancy, but merely a new eruption of it in a narrow sphere were it never died. There is little sign in the year since those events that it is sparking a new movement beyond the boundaries of the coal mines. In general, signs of a revival of a true labor-led mass movement are faint. The significance of Jobs With Justice appears to be a somewhat unintended one: not in reviving an old approach, but in beginning to develop a new labor strategy which ties into the broad social movements which are currently the major sources of change.

CONCLUSION: LABOR AND ASSOCIATIONAL MOVEMENTS The first conclusion to be drawn is that there is a need to reframe the study of employment rights. To restate our thesis as carefully as possible: we would not claim on the basis of this evidence that social-associational movements have replaced organized labor. We would claim that they have grown increasingly important in affecting workplace rights, and that they exhibit laws of structuring and development which are distinct from those of traditional labor-led movements. The two sets of events we have examined defy widely-accepted, if implicit, laws of labor relations: in this arena, at least, the world often changes not with a bang but with a flurry. Many of the greatest recent changes have been accomplished with the least polar conflict. They resulted neither from organizational strength nor from mass outpourings of class solidarity: they emerged instead from sets of groups, mostly small, acting in association but with no dominant leader. Indeed, the greatest impact was achieved in the places

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with the weakest unions: traditional organizational strength seemed at times to be a negative, creating more resistance than potency. This backward dynamic shows how far the context has changed from the period in which the labor relations framework was first developed, and calls for an understanding of how the new pattern of engagement works. We cannot fully specify that from these examples, but there are a number of points worth further investigation: 1. These movements have been pluralistic, not only in the sense of having many elements, but in the range of their strategies: they have spanned the spectrum from "radical" to "established. In particular, they are highly intertwined with established political and social forces. The business community, in particular, has played a significant part within successful coalitions. This pattern runs counter in particular to the observations of Touraine and his colleagues: they see the "new movements" as highly conflictual and in general anti-modern in their thrust. They do not note, in the French context at least, the possibility of an intertwined structure such as is visible in the disabilities movement or the Miami transportation engagement. This may be why they discount the effectiveness of such engagements, while our evidence points the other way. 2. We have noted, in line with some theorists of "new movements," the importance of a coordinating role based on mediation and informationgathering. Labor organizations have at times been able to gain influence through such a role.25 3. Outside resources do not appear the main determinant of success in these cases, though they may be crucial at certain points. From the perspective of these cases, the "resources" issue which is so central to recent movements literature seems something of a red herring: the pivotal point, as discussed above, is the multiple and intertwined nature of the movements. The disabilities engagement, for example, benefited greatly at certain points by outside fundraising from long-established groups; but it also survived some of its worst periods through maintaining very small volunteer groupings of the disabled themselves. In the Miami transportation case, Jobs With Justice provided some valuable "outside" resources, as did the business community; but the activism of local black churches was equally central. 4. A political goal seems necessary to focus the coalition: the Miami transportation case shows this as much as the ADA. Legislative engagements, in contrast to collective bargaining, appear to encourage the formation of multiparty alliances. One might speculate that the political arena—legal rights and legislativelyoriented interest-group politics—constitutes the permanent "residue" of the associational movements, in the same way that organized labor is the

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Organization of accors Formal Organization

Balance-ofWorking class

CoaLitional

Labor solidarity

power uniontern

(labor-led coalitions)

Social Base

| historical | movement Social

Interest-group

Social-

Interests

politics

Asaoclational

(multi-class)

(legislated

movements

social rights)

synchronous tansion and oscillation

Note

\ he chart sumrnanzs the main types discussed in the body of the essay The relation of social-associational groups to intcicst gioup politics is not developed in our argument, but it is essential to the problem of enforcement and institutionahzation

Figure L

Types of Social Engagement

permanent remnant of class-based movements. The "explosions of consciousness" of the thirties created union organizations, which consolidated their demands and gave them a continuing structure. Yet there has always been a tension between the movement and the organization, a tension which Jobs With Justice is reliving in the present phase. Labor history can be seen as a creative oscillation between the two poles. In the same way legislated rights and permanent lobbying groups both institutionalize and denature the thrust of social-associational movements. (See Figure 1) 5. Dominant organizational strength tends to weed out the diversity and reduce the effectiveness of these engagements. The disabilities movement grew after escaping the shadow of the old national organizations; the Jobs With Justice efforts, as we have stressed, took off most where labor was weakest.

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Many labor scholars, puzzled by this form, see the associational approach as merely a temporary stage on the way to true labor solidarity Banks (1990) for instance, argues Jobs With Justice is trying to say this is really the same fight—that unions have to act in the public interest But in the past they didn't have an explicit community-union goal Jobs With Justice needed to take this approach in the beginning because people m the communities don I trust unions u

The campaign, in this view, is essentially a way to bring people towards the "real" labor movement The evidence we have examined, however, indicates that social-associational engagements are at least as important to employment relations as is traditional labor action, and independently so' they represent not a weak form of labor solidarity, but a form of collective action m its own right Their success or failure in transforming relations of employment cannot be accounted for by the usual labor-management analysis To understand the forces affecting employee relations, then, it is not sufficient to ask whether unions will revive, or whether there will be a resuigence of working-class militancy We need to understand better the conditions for the development of associational movements and the role of labor within them For its clear that they have already produced major transformation in employment relations, and their limits have not yet been reached

NOTES 1 For significant exceptions see Brecher and Costello (1990), especially the introductory and concluding essays Also see Piven and Cloward (1979) 2 See, for example, Craft (1990, pp 145 160), Perry (1987), Jarley and Maranto (1990, pp 505-524), Brecher (1986, pp 1-17), Stout (1986, pp 19 33), and Mann (1986, pp 3544) 3 See, for example Fantasia (1988), Clark (1989), and Katznelson (1981) 4 For a more extended treatment of this issue, see Hecksther (1988, C hs 3, 9) 5 For further discussion of the decline of the balance of-power model, see Hecksther (1989 Ch 4) 6 See Mann (1973) 7 See Figure 1 for a tabular representation of the relations among these types of social engagement 8 See, for example, Mackenzie (1973), and Thompson (1963) 9 See Banks (1990, p 33) 10 Though the "new movements" have drawn little attention from the labor side, they have spawned a substantial academic literature of their own, especially in Europe The primary representatives, including Tourame and Melucci, have emphasized two key themes relevant to this study the distinctive character of social rights movements (as opposed to "old" class based movements), and their relatively decentralized and associational structure They have generally characterized these movements as anti-modern, anti-political, and highly conflictual


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In the U S there has been much less attention to the changing character of movements, research has been centered on the general conditions for collective action, especially the importance of outside resources and professional organizers (in the "resource mobilization" approach of Zald (1988) and colleagues) When they do raise questions about the nature of modern movements, they tend first to stress their "professional" character they emphasize the importance of expertise and of "outside" support in generating social-rights movements Some U S researchers, however, have converged with the Europeans m specifying the "looselystructured" qualities of new movements Aldon Moms' study of civil rights, for example, brings out the importance of varied local networks and "non-bureaucratic formal organizations " The mam questions for this paper are how the "new movements" have affected employment rights and how they have related to organized labor We may, however, be able to add some data to the question of how these associational movements work in achieving their goals On these issues, see Oberschall (1980, pp 45-68), Zald (1988, pp 1941), Perrow (1979, pp 192211), Moms (1984), Tourame, Weivorka, and Dubet (1987), Klandermans and Tarrow (1988, pp 1 -38) and Melucci (198) "Social M ovements and the democratization of everyday life " in John Keane, ed, Civil society and ihe State new European perspectives London, New York Verso, 1988 11 See Tourame, Weivorka, and Dubet (1987, p 292) 12 See, for example, Milkman (1985, pp 300-322) 11 A notable exception is the current involvement of the Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers (Ot AW) in the National Toxics Campaign 14 See Scotch (1984 pp 82, 86) 15 See lor example, New York Times June 22, 1989 16 I Ins is similar to what Mandell calls a "multilateral brokerage role' see Mandell (1984) A similar and more sophisticated, theoretical argument is built by Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl (1988, pp 502534) 17 "Jobs with Justice Information Kit Questions and Answers," undated brochure Washington, DC circa 1989 18 "lobs with lustice A Nationwide Campaign for Workers' Rights," undated brochure, Washington, DC circa 1989 19 Detailed tables of the number and types of Jobs With Justice events in various parts of the country, as well as a list of those we interviewed for this article, are available from the authors 20 On AH CIO opposition in practice to Jobs with Justice, see, for example, Abas (1989, pp 12-21) Iasmi(1989) For the federation lack of coverage of Jobs With Justice, compare the 1988 89 issues of A PL (IO News with the official journals for the same period of the C WA, SEIU, and UMW 21 See Banks (1990) 22 Though these conditions occur most often in the South, there have been some successes in the North which in effect prove the rule In Lewiston, Maine, for example, Jobs With Justice helped lead a successful organizing drive by the Maine Nurses' Association But on the crucial dimensions, this area more resembles parts of the South than the Northeast it lacks strong unions but has numerous citi/en action and service associations that support social change The Maine People's Alliance gave critical support, and the Campaign for Human Development (connected with the Catholic Church) paid for an organizer Furthermore, the predominance of women—in the coalition leadership and among the nurses being organized—gave this campaign a social dimension similar to that of the Southern civil-rights coalitions, and going well beyond workplace issues 23 Wall Street Journal, Sept, 17, 1990 Tasini (1990, p 15) For a view which predicts a resurgence of union-centered class conflict—but which disagrees with current AFL-CIO policy— see Moody (1988), and the periodical Labor Notes 24 See "Harlan County, U S A , " (1974) 25 See, for example, Mandell (1984) 26 Personal interview The italics are ours

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