'Responsibility to Protect' and the change in Sovereignty

Badtian Friborg

Word count: 3871

The ’Responsibility to Protect’ and the change in Sovereignty INTL 5000 Introduction to International Webster University Thailand, Bangkok Campus.

Bastian Friborg, ID Instructor: Dr. Kenneth Houston

4121119.

Relations

Bastian Friborg, ID 4121119

Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty

The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the change of Sovereignty

Index Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 2 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 2 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 2 Review of Literature .......................................................................................................................... 4 Sovereignty ................................................................................................................................... 4 Responsibility to Protect ............................................................................................................... 6 Narrative ........................................................................................................................................... 8 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 12 References.................................................................................... Fejl! Bogmærke er ikke defineret.

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Introduction Overview The nation-State is under pressure. Economics and the high level of mobility, brought about by globalization, has put into question the sovereignty of states. In 2005, the UN outlined the idea of the Responsibility to Protect, with three pillars: (1) the state carries the primary responsibility for its citizens. (2) The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist states in protecting its citizens, and (3) the international community has a responsibility to use appropriate means to protect populations against crimes if a state fails to do so itself (United Nations). This paper will look at how the responsibility to protect can be just another step towards a change in the concept of the sovereignty of state. The idea of the ‘responsibility to protect’ is relatively new, it was formulated in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report from 2001 as an alternative to the ‘right to protect’. This came after a decade of atrocities in the 1990’s when the protection of people against their own governments came to the front of international relations in cases such as Rwanda, Somalia and Kosovo (ICISS, 2001, pp. VII-X). The need for better tools to react and prevent such cases became clear. This paper claims that the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ is challenging the non-interference by foreign states in the internal affairs of a state as stated in the UN Charter and thereby supporting a gradual change of the concepts of state and sovereignty. The idea of the ‘responsibility to protect’ is that in extreme cases of crime against humanity, human rights should trump the sovereignty of a given state in order to let a coalition of international peacekeepers enter and stop the atrocities (ICISS, 2001). This, however, goes against the fundamental right of non-interference of sovereign states. According to this, other states are not allowed to interfere with how things are done within the territory of another state. This paper will look into whether or not the ‘responsibility to protect’ is supporting a change of the nationstate by challenging the non-interference agreement stated in the UN Charter.

Methodology The method used in this paper will be a liberal approach to the question, an approach also known as idealism or utopianism, since the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ is liberal – focusing on the ‘opportunities’ rather than the ‘constraints’ (Dunne, Cox, & Booth, 2002, p. 65).

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Another way to go is as Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2014) writes, that an aspect of liberalism, which has become stronger is the divide between: “those operating with an activist conception of liberalism” – advocating intervention and stronger international institutions – and “those who incline towards a pragmatic conception, which places a priority on toleration and nonintervention” (Baylis et al., 2014, p. 115). The paper will be using both primary sources, such as the report from the ICISS, the UN resolution on the matter and Tony Blair’s speech about the issue from Marts 18 2003, and secondary sources from academic journals and scholarly written books. Most sources will come from online sources, using different search engines and the online library made available by Webster University. Among the limitations for the writing of this paper is time, since this is a midterm paper for a short course, limited time to review relevant literature, resources such as money to buy books that develop on the theme and language, in that English is not the first language of the researcher.

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Review of Literature The review of literature will be ordered to start with ‘sovereignty’ and then move on to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. This will hopefully make it easier to follow the argument of this paper. First, before sovereignty, two definitions of a nation will be presented as background and something to have in mind when reading the rest of this paper. The concept of the nation has been conceptualized in many different ways, here will be presented two of the main theoretical approaches by Benedict Anderson and Miroslav Hroch. Anderson (2006, pp. 5-6) presents the nation as: “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign . . . It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion . . . The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them . . . has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations . . . It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinelyordained, hierarchical dynastic realm”. Hroch on the other hand sees a nation as shared “memory” of a common past, a density in linguistic and cultural ties, and a conception of equality for all members of the group (Hroch, 1996, p. 79 cited in Baylis et al., 2014, p. 388).

Sovereignty Sovereignty is a broad concept, normally understood as the states right to control its own territory without interference from outside actors. Lauterpacht (1997), starts by emphasizing that sovereignty is not a new phenomenon it can be traced back to the works of Aristotle. Lauterpacht asks if sovereignty still means anything, or rather if it means the same now as then. Lauterpacht (1997, pp. 138-139) distinguishes between sovereignty within the national sphere – calling it “internal sovereignty” – and sovereignty in relation to the international system – called “international sovereignty”. On the national level there must be an institution that possesses ‘supreme’ power to do as it pleases within its own boundaries. On the international level, it means that the state is independent and other states are not allowed to interfere in its domestic affairs; this is also mentioned by Lake (2003, pp. 304-305),

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who talks about “internal sovereignty” and “external sovereignty”. Lauterpacht points to how sovereignty is largely a legal construction, and a relatively new one (going back to the Westphalian treaty in 1648), built on the acceptance of the people. Lauterpacht (1997) focuses mainly on sovereignty in relation to the United Kingdom and this makes the article somewhat biased towards other kinds of states, however Lauterpacht (1997, p. 149) concludes – in answer to the question whether sovereignty is myth or reality – that within the borders of a state (in this case the United Kingdom), sovereignty is very real. The state has a legal system and executive power that works, while when it comes to the international sovereignty it is more of a myth, since a country has international responsibility and is more or less bound by its commitment to international treaties. This final argument is strengthening the position of the argument of this paper – that the responsibility to protect is diminishing the sovereignty of states. Lapidus (1998), writes on the tragedy of Chechnya as a result of reforms in the Communist Party in the former Soviet Union (USSR), set in motion by Mikhail Gorbachev, secretary-general at that moment. It gave way for a growing feeling of national self-assertion in which the sovereignty of the centralized state came under pressure. When Chechnya, along with fourteen other territories got their independence in 1991, Russia still felt ownership and hence tried to use force – as it is a sovereigns right to do – to keep Chechnya in its fold. This turned out to severely damage the reliability of Russia in international affairs. The event of Russia’s intervention in the internal affairs of another sovereign state also pointed to the lack of effective and appropriate response from the international community – there was a lack of preventive diplomacy. The international community did not know how to tackle the situation, the responsibility for conflicts was largely seen as resting with the parties themselves (Lapidus, 1998, pp. 5-7; 14; 25). The article was written 18 years ago, and a lot has happened since then, with 9/11 and all that followed, including the formalization of the responsibility to protect in 2005 (General Assembly, 2005). Yet, still the international seems to be walking as on eggshells around Russia when failing to intervene in Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014. Lake (2003), talks about how the study of sovereignty is going through a ‘mini-renaissance’, with a new focus on hierarchy as an important factor in world politics. Lake points to how hierarchy in international relations has long been almost taboo, with everyone knowing it is there, while nobody talks about it. Lake believes that a better understanding of hierarchy could improve

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theories of international relations and maybe even help resolve some of the more complex problems of current policy. Lake (2003, pp. 304-305) talks about how sovereignty has two faces. There is the ‘internal sovereignty’, which requires effective control, and authority, over a given territory claimed by the state – in the absence of such control there is a lack of authority and therefor no sovereignty1. ‘External sovereignty’ requires recognition by the other states – the United Nations – and is thus a social concept or construction implying a sort of formal equality. In the real world, there is a hierarchy among states. United States is on the top, for now, imposing its authority onto other states in more or less direct way. The way in which countries get classified as more or less developed, as democratic or non-democratic are ways of constructing a hierarchy with European countries and United States on the top – China and Japan is getting in there too, but the rest is kind of second or even third rank countries. Being put in Tier 3 in the United States Transport in Persons Report (TIP) have big consequences for people living in that country, Germany’s feeling of being superior back in the 1930’s had a huge impact on the world, so ranking and hierarchy have huge effects and are thus important to study. After plenty examples Lake (2003, p. 319) repeats the benefits of building hierarchy into international relations theories, “[h]ierarchy and the question of who has authority are the key issues in today’s unipolar world”.

Responsibility to Protect The ‘responsibility to protect’ has been under its way since NATO decided to intervene in Kosovo in 1999, and was finally put into a resolution in 2005 after the World Summit same year, and endorsed by General-Secretary Ban Ki-moon in 2009 and 2010 (General Assembly, 2005, 2009, 2010). In short it is about allowing states to intervene within another states territory in order to protect a group of people from genocide or crimes against humanity – in the cases where the hosting state is unable or unwilling to do so itself (ICISS, 2001; United Nations). Chandler (2004), starts by telling how there among European and North American powers is a growing consensus that international security as instituted in the UN Charter, is in need of a reform in order to be able to tackle the new kind of problems that the world face today. There is

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A current example of this could be Syria and Islamic State, in that case Syria, as a state, is failing to provide protection and have lost its authority, hence it could be claimed that it has lost its sovereignty.

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no longer wars being fought between states, rather it is more conflicts within states, between different ethnic or religious groups. The current framework for this, provided by the UN Charter (1945, pp. Cha. 1, Art. 2, para. 7), states that: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter”. Chandler (2004) continues that some military actions, like NATO in Kosovo, while lacking formal legal authority, claimed to have intervened to protect and had felt ‘morally’ obligated to do something about the situation. This new framework for international security is often promoted as ‘liberal peace’. The ‘liberal peace’ focuses on linking moral authority with legal (and political) legitimacy (Chandler, 2004, p. 60). Chandler points to the, Responsibility to Protect, report, which argues that the individuals human rights trump sovereignty (Chandler, 2004, p. 65; ICISS, 2001, p. 136). Chandler wraps up by repeating that, especially, European and North American powers now have easier with intervening in other countries without risk of reprisal from United Nations. It is becoming legitimate to intervene on moral background, and not only on legal grounds. Armstrong, Farrell, and Lambert (2012), are mostly giving some background information on the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’, listing events and resolutions that have been used to make the concept take form and gain international recognition. What is interesting in the article how the show that using constructivism “law gives states a common language and set of principles with which to engage in meaningful debate with one another about the legitimacy of using force” (Armstrong et al., 2012, pp. 158-159).

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Narrative In a world where the nature of conflicts have changed from textbook wars with professional soldiers shooting at each other, to bands of religious or ethnic groups fighting each other – sometimes across international borders other times not. The fighting is more and more hurting civilians – it seems like the morality of war has disappeared. It used to be professionals who killed professionals, with relatively few civilian casualties, now professionals and semi-professionals are seemingly targeting civilians – suicide bombs at cafés or markets, or bombs at a temple in large cities are just a few examples of this. The escalation of these events have made some states anxious and decide to intervene in cases where the hosting state did not or would not act to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. The intervention of one state into the domestic affairs of another state is in violation of the UN Charter, but NATO claimed that it acted on moral grounds, when it decided to intervene in Kosovo. The United Nations Security Council did not approve the move made by NATO, but it did not condemn of it either, since it was clear that something was not right and some action had to be taken. In 2005 all members of the United Nations signed up to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which states that: Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. . . . In this context we [the international community] are prepared to take collective action . . . through the Security Council . . . on a case-by-case basis. (General Assembly, 2005, para. 138-139) Before a state or a coalition of states use military to intervene they should justify their action, to help with this the ICISS (2001) report has set four criteria; firstly there should be evidence of serious atrocities, like genocide or crimes against humanity. Secondly, other means of assistance should have been tried, making a last resort action to intervene. Thirdly, the state or coalition should preferably get authorization from the UNSC or the United Nations General Assembly. Lastly, there should be a clear list of objectives and coordination with humanitarian agencies (Baylis et al., 2014; ICISS, 2001).

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As put out by Lauterpacht (1997) certain obligations must be met to be a sovereign state; among these obligations is the responsibility to protect the people within the states border (not only citizens) against atrocities of different kinds. A failure to do this means that the state failed its responsibility and the international community can go in and secure peace and security with whatever means necessary. The Security Council (UNSC) has always been able to override state sovereignty if a given state broke international peace and security, only on more than one occasion has UNSC failed to address major violations of international peace and security. It failed to intervene in Kosovo, which meant that NATO in the end felt morally compelled to take action, and intervene without permission from the UNSC, in what Chandler (2004) would call protection of the ‘liberal peace’. The action taken by NATO falls into what is called the third approach to humanitarian intervention. The first holds that sovereignty should be protected to ensure that weaker states are not bullied by stronger states. The second approach is a little softer and recognizes that intervention can be necessary in extreme cases when (veto members) paralyze the UNSC. In such cases, the intervention would still be illegal, but tolerable as a lone standing case – an exception. The third approach allow intervention in extreme cases on claims of moral humanitarian imperatives – as was the case with NATO in Kosovo (Baylis et al., 2014, pp. 116; 486491). Blair (2003, March 18) held a famous speech, in which he talked about the “development of the UN” and that it is important that “the world confront the central security threat of the 21 st century”. He claimed that how the world reacted to the threat of Iraq and its weapon of mass destruction, would determine international politics for a generation. He talked about how the 1441 resolution on Iraq, should have been followed up by persuading measures and eventually military means by the UN, but all such attempts was vetoed. Blair went on to talk about how much patience the international community should have with leaders like Saddam Hussein. A threat of war and a show of strength could have been enough to sway Hussein into opening Iraq for UN inspectors and led them move around more freely than was the case. Blair (2003, March 18) even grab back in history, drawing on the appeasement between Nazi-Germany and Britain, France and the Soviet Union (allowing Hitler to annex parts of Czechoslovakia) – also known as the Münich agreement. Blair is using the resolution number 1441 to justify the use of force by allied (United

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States, Britain, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Portugal) in Iraq – while not using the exact words, Blair is arguing for the international ‘responsibility to protect’ (Blair, 2003, March 18). In the case of Syria, where evidence of the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population surfaced in summer 2014, the UNSC failed to react do to vetoes from Russia and China. The two countries claimed that it would violate state sovereignty – there was no evidence proving that it was the Syrian government who was behind the attacks (Security Council, 2014, 22 May). This paper is claiming that because there was being committed crimes against humanity and mass killings, and the Syrian government did not do anything to prevent it, there was ground for intervention on moral grounds and since the Syrian government had failed to protect its people and thereby forfeited its sovereignty (Lauterpacht, 1997). In short, there were morally legitimate ground to intervene without authorization from the UNSC. According to Borshchevskaya (2015, September 16) Russia has now for a long time had soldiers on the ground in Syria. While this is not an intervention as such, since the Assad regime has approved it, it is a move by Russia to move focus from its annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014, which is broadly considered a breach of international law, since Russia violated the sovereignty of Ukraine,—and not because Ukraine was committing crimes against humanity, but rather because Russia wanted its strategic position at the Black Sea, where one of the largest Russian naval bases is located2. Russia has for long time being supporting Assad’s regime by sending gas and weapons from Kerch (a port in the Crimean peninsula). However, the Kremlin has not been willing to comment on whether Russia had soldiers fighting in Syria, but they have been clear on the fact that they support Syria with weapons. Vladimir Putin has been advancing the idea of a “broad coalition” to fight Islamic State. Borshchevskaya (2015, September 16) argues that should Russia succeed in convincing the international community that Russia is essential in fighting Islamic State, and then Putin could gain legitimacy as a leader in the fight against terror. Should this happen, a breach of sovereignty would have been – after long debate and controversy – silently accepted. Russia would then be able to promote itself as a counter weight to United States dominance in world politics, as mentioned by Lake (2003). States and sovereignty is being put under pressure by the new concept of responsibility for its own population and it is loosening in its edges. The responsibility to protect is not the only thing

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As it happens the Crimean peninsula is historically the origin of what came to be Russia (Tsygankov, 2009).

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tearing at the concepts of state and sovereignty, also globalization with its interconnectedness and interdependence are factors. A state does no longer stand alone in decisions affecting its population, economic up and down turns in one country effects the economy in that of another, even on the other side of the globe. Mass migration from Syria, Afghanistan and Africa is effecting both receiving and sending countries, changing the inner workings of the state and the receiving countries identity (Baylis et al., 2014; Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2013). Because of this, everybody has a shared responsibility for life on this planet. As events one place effects other places, atrocities committed to a people in Iraq or Syria, effects not only those people but also the surrounding countries and those that end up taking them in as refugees.

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Conclusion The nature of states and sovereignty have changed since the founding of the United Nations. It has come to include more morally inspired aspects such as the responsibility to protect, with a greater focus on human rights and the states responsibility in this regard. The international community is starting to give greater authority to the protection of individuals on the behalf of states sovereignty. As of yet, it is more like the exception than the rule, largely due to the lack of unity in the UNSC. Yet, there continue to be cases were intervention takes place with or without the authorization of the UNSC. The international community, led by the European and North American countries, is beginning to dictate interventions on moral imperatives rather than on international law. As long as the responsibility to protect is not binding for all member states, there is likely to be issues with justifying interventions. This paper argues that because of the interconnectedness of events in the world, sovereignty and the concept of the state is coming on second place, when it comes to securing a safe livelihood for people. This paper hence has shown that there has indeed been a change in the concept of state and sovereignty – the sovereignty of the state is beginning to be dependent on its ability to protect its population. The responsibility to protect is not yet binding, thou consensus seems to move in that direction it is unlikely to become binding in the near future, simply because there still are strong veto wielding powers, like Russia and China, on the UNSC, which do not want sovereignty to be weakened. Nevertheless, a new sovereignty is emerging. As supported by Lauterpacht (1997) where the people are constituting power.

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References3

Primary Sources Blair, T. (2003, March 18). Full text: Tony Blair's speech. September 18, 2015. Retrieved from The Guardian website: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/18/foreignpolicy.iraq1. General Assembly, U. N. (2005). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: 2005 World Summit Outcome. (A/RES/60/1). New York: United Nations. General Assembly, U. N. (2009). Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General. (A/63/677). New York: United Nations. General Assembly, U. N. (2010). Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General. (A/64/864). New York: United Nations. ICISS. (2001). The Responsibility to Protect. Retrieved from Ottawa, ON, Canada: Security Council, U. N. (2014, 22 May). The situation in the Middle East. (S/PV.7180). New York: United Nations. United Nations. The Responsibility to Protect. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility Charter of the United Nations, (1945). Secondary Sources Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities : reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London; New York: Verso.

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Please note that according to APA 6th style guides the date of retrieval is not needed for content that is likely not to change, see https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/10/.

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Armstrong, D., Farrell, T., & Lambert, H. (2012). International Law and International Relations (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (Eds.). (2014). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (6th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Borshchevskaya, A. (2015, September 16). Does Putin Have a Plan for Syria? September 18, 2015. Retrieved from Foreign Policy website: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/16/does-putinrussia-plan-for-syria-military-escalation/. Castles, S., de Haas, H., & Miller, M. J. (2013). The Age of Migration - International Movements in the Modern World (S. Castles Ed. Fifth Edition ed.). Chandler, D. (2004). The responsibility to protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’. International Peacekeeping, 11(1), 59-81. doi:10.1080/1353331042000228454 Dunne, T., Cox, M., & Booth, K. (Eds.). (2002). The Eighty Years' Crisis: International Relations 1919-1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lake, D. A. (2003). The New Sovereignty in International Relations. International Studies Review, 5(3), 303-323. doi:10.2307/3186572 Lapidus, G. W. (1998). Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya. International Security, 23(1), 5-49. doi:10.2307/2539261 Lauterpacht, E. (1997). Sovereignty - Myth or Reality? International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 73(1), 137-150. doi:10.2307/2623554 Tsygankov, A. P. (2009). From Beograd to Kiev: Hard-line nationalism and Russia's foreign policy. In M. Laurelle (Ed.), Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia. London: Routledge.

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