Rethinking the Obvious

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two archetypal stances of both sides –and playing the devil's advocate while ...... [31] Dawkins 2004, “A Devil's Chaplain: Reflections on Hope,. Lies, Science ...
Rethinking the Obvious Introducing the Lingua Democratica at the Boundaries between Philosophy and Engineering Kees P. Pieters University for Humanistics Utrecht, the Netherlands

[email protected] Keywords Lingua Democratica, Philosophy, Engineering, Boundaries, Friction, Patterns, Complex Systems Theory

1.INTRODUCTION “Philosophy is the art of reflecting on that what we think we already know” This quote from my supervisor Harry Kunneman, starkly addresses the problem of any interdisciplinary enterprise, such as is the case when philosophy meets engineering and vice versa. It is hard to reconsider the obvious, or at least those issues that our training and experience have made us believe that are obvious [1], such as reliance on formal, preferably mathematical, truths in the case of engineering, or the continuum of critical stances based on established scholastic traditions in philosophy; or the focus on tackling actual problems in a clearly defined context, versus reflection on potential risks that may or may not become a real (future) threat. There are also many rules of practice that are taken for granted; the truth of progress at lightning speed that many fields of engineering face, and of course also by the philosophers who reflect on the consequences of such progress. One group is desperately trying to keep up to date with the steady stream of publications on specific issues on their field of interest, while others just as desperately try to understand the long term social or ethical consequences of the rapidly expanding products of these areas –complex systems theory, neural science, genetic engineering and many, many more. These matters are the current focus of an interdisciplinary team of researchers at the University for Humanistics (UH) in Utrecht, the Netherlands. In this team, sponsored by the NWO, the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research through their program “The Societal Component of Genomics Research” [2], the problem of communications between various stakeholders in the genomics debate is being tackled by a motley crew of scientists, with contributions from philosophy to engineering (one researcher, with a background in computer science and electronics, engaged in a research for a PhD in Humanistics). This project, “Towards a Lingua Democratica for the Public Debate on Genomics” [3] both addresses, as experiences the problems of interdisciplinary research –miscommunication, established, often ‘coagulated’, mindsets and expectations on what ‘the other’

should know or should consider scientifically viable. The notion behind the central theme in this project, the Lingua Democratica, is that the problem between any inter- or cross disciplinary communication is not specifically a problem of distinct scientific languages –such that a lingua franca could capture-, but is already manifest at more fundamental levels. These levels range from various dialects that can be more or less closed to others, occur at intermediate levels where presuppositions, expectations, beliefs and intentions are formulated, and eventually end at the level of abstract relationships and interactions. These contributions may help to enhance awareness of the strengths and limitations of the individual stakeholders and hopefully provide means of a more inclusive –democratic- approach to face the challenges of genomics. The individual contributions of this project focus, amongst others, on issues as the use of metaphors in science [4], various modes of scientific practices [5]. The specific project that spawns this paper –the contribution from engineering- is looking into various patterns that can be identified in the interactions between stakeholders with different backgrounds and stakes in an interdisciplinary micro-society. This paper aims to introduce the current state of the engineering contribution –evidently work in progress- that aims to ‘reverseengineer’ problems at the boundaries of two distinctly different societies, for instance between engineering and philosophy, with the tools that are available within engineering itself. It aims explore the issues that one faces and argues that these problems are similar to those which the maturing field of complex systems theory faces.

2.DEFINING THE PROBLEM OF A LINGUA DEMOCRATICA Research is progressing at lightning speed in all kinds of disciplines. This poses a problem, the problem of selection. Within scientific disciplines this problem is usually resolved internally, as the specific cultures sufficiently prepare students and practitioners for the important mainstreams, historical references and the current state of affairs within the discipline. Even those who decide to leave ‘the beaten track’ usually do this knowingly and fully prepared of the consequences. Such references are usually not so readily available for scientists from other disciplines, and so a cross disciplinary or interdisciplinary research often requires major readjustments by the individual contributors. One not only needs to be acquainted with the cultures of the others, usually the dominant areas that

opened up the interdisciplinary field, but one is also confronted with the fact that the interpenetration [6] between disciplines requires the necessary adjustments and often forces one to reconsider one’s own background and training. Take, for instance, the 'unlikely bedfellows' of philosophy and engineering [7], the focal point of WPE 2007, in thinking about complex systems [8], which is the central theme of the research that spawned this paper. Both areas address the same problems, namely those related to understanding complex systems, but both the language as presuppositions require the necessary adjustments to truly penetrate the boundaries of the existing cultures. Taking two archetypal stances of both sides –and playing the devil’s advocate while doing so- a philosopher may resolve to critique on a certain issue based on a compilation of ideas and theories of the Grand Names of a certain scholastic tradition or of certain established themes (e.g. post modernism [9]), while the engineer in true anarchistic fashion may take such names for granted and just wonder whether the provided claims can be tested or verified in experiments [10]. Conversely, the engineer may be in for a surprise when a beautiful train of formal logic reasoning is rejected as ‘naive’ because the context of this reasoning was not sufficiently bounded. Out of personal experience I can convey that it can be quite a shock when a discussion on behavior in the sense that is used in general systems theory –an observed response to a system’s input- escalates in a discussion with ethicists because they immediately associate it with the excesses of Taylorism [11]. In order to cope with these issues, the various contributors often revert to certain strategies which are often implicit in nature and therefore poorly understood by the parties involved. A condition at the boundaries of philosophy and engineering I often see is that what I call the ‘Amsterdam Syndrome’, as it closely resembles a similar phenomenon that a self-confident person who grew up in a rural area experiences in the attitude of – equally, if not more, self-confident- inhabitants of a major city, ‘the place where it happens’. It will not come as a big surprise that many inhabitants of such cities tend to consider rural areas with certain wariness, if not contempt, and this will usually be reflected in the nomenclature they use to describe the ‘provincials’ [12]. This does not necessarily have to be a problem –a sense of superiority based on exclusive knowledge of the own turf seems to be a trait of some individuals in cities and local communities alike, as any stranded or lost tourist may have experienced-, were it not that a certain category of those provincials actually fully agree with the superiority of the city, while others basically do not care what those ‘city-folk’ think anyway. This asymmetry leads to a state of flow where people from rural areas move to the city who have all reason to confirm the importance of that city, while this is hardly compensated by a balancing force –the ones who could advocate this notion don’t care and have better things to do! When it comes to the philosophy-engineering boundary, for instance on a topic such as the ethical consequences of technological progress in say, genetic engineering, the Amsterdam Syndrome deserves serious attention. In this case the asymmetry revolves around the backgrounds of philosophers on one side, who take a professional interest in the consequences of technology in society and usually are experts on these topics, completed by engineers who share this interest, and are willing to

adopt the necessary requirements in order to engage in these discussions. These engineers will usually consider the philosophical contributions as a valuable extension of their own practice, and maybe even take some pride expanding their cultural capital in their understanding of Great Thinkers and certain philosophical traditions. The majority of engineers however, are only mildly interested in such issues. At best they keep themselves globally informed by reading a quality daily newspaper but furthermore, well, they have better things to do! The true challenge to enhance awareness in the engineering community on societal aspects of technological progress is therefore not to create a closed environment where papers and articles circulate amongst an in-crowd of like-minded spirits1, but where they actually manage to successfully penetrate the majority of engineers who are open to these issues, but expect that this information is presented to them in the concise, analytical manner that they are used to. They will usually be oblivious for perceived ‘crises’ in their field, a condition that is often used by philosophers to draw attention to actual themes. Least of all they are interested in hearing what they ‘should’ do –such as in ‘should pay more attention to the ethical aspects of technology’- by those who find themselves in the luxurious position of being paid to think about such issues without being burdened with the complexity of producing technology, and questions of the kind: ‘can a statement be tested or verified in experiments?’. This is the bulk of work of most engineering activities -formulating ideas and theories is usually the easy part. This attitude is enforced especially when critique amongst philosophers suggests to the outside world that apparently there is no agreement on these topics anyway. It will become clear that criticizing technology and technological practices, which is a normal way to advance knowledge within philosophy, can become quite a volatile activity if the dynamics between the disciplines are insufficiently considered. Critique between disciplines can result in defensive attitudes, often because the criticism is unexpected, which may lead to reactions that are emotional rather than scientific. This works both ways, for philosophers are usually also poorly equipped to deal with the methodological requirements that an engineer would expect. This may even result in certain haughtiness, as if the 'Art of Thinking' should not be contaminated with mundane issues such as methodology [1]. Certain closure of domains appears to be a natural tendency [13], not only as a defensive action but also because of the intrinsic requirements within and between disciplines. As an example from my own experiences, my technical papers are increasingly criticized as being ‘too philosophical’ (which is certainly not a recommendation), for the likings of peer reviewers ever since I started at the UH three years ago, while I am still learning to adjust to the requirements of less technical conferences. The problem is, of course, that the issues of the lingua democratica are not easily described in mathematical formulas while, on the other hand, I am still primarily an engineer and have no ambitions to become a half-turf philosopher. I guess this is another consistent truth of getting caught in the middle of interdisciplinary research; there is a good chance to get slaughtered from all sides!

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Note that ‘like-minded’ refers to the accepted cultural premises of the discipline, not to agreement of the topics that are debated.

3.OPENING DOMAINS The tendency of closure between domains has been identified and theorized from various angles and is explained, amongst others, as a means to cope with the internal complexity within a social system, such as a scientific discipline [13]. The lingua democratica aims to provide means to counter this ‘natural’ tendency by advocating certain awareness of the dynamics that take place at the boundaries between disciplines. This stance obviously assumes that such openings are indeed possible. The lingua democratica therefore focuses on the friction - to use a very technical, and quite neutral, term- that affects the interpenetration between disciplines. Such friction can either stall the interpenetration, but can also enrich the involved disciplines, i.e. it can be creative. We are primarily interested in this ‘creative friction’ that opens domains rather than closing them. In the particular case of the friction between philosophy and engineering –and probably most other disciplines as well- there are certainly possibilities. First, engineering is usually described as a pragmatic derivative of the hard sciences [14], which means that there is ample experience within engineering in the friction between formal purism and more ‘relaxed’ approaches to engineering science. The art of solving problems under constrained circumstances, the essence of engineering, often requires such an attitude [10]. On the other hand, there are many philosophers who effectively reflect on domains other than technology in ways that blend well with engineering. Daniel Dennet’s ‘Darwin’s Dangerous Idea’ is an excellent example (especially the first ten chapters) where neoDarwinian evolution theory is described in terms of philosophical ‘problems’ that were addressed by philosophers and other thinkers alike [15]. But there is another approach that is advocated by the UH, which I personally consider one of the most powerful means of opening domains, and which is closely related to the goals and aims of the university, dedicated to “… the academic study of meaning-related or existential issues, i.e., personal questions concerning meaning, and of processes of humanisation of society. Humanist traditions are an important source of inspiration, as are insights from philosophy and ethics; the social and cultural sciences; religious studies; and the theory of science. Humanistics is a multi-disciplinary academic and vocational training. A humanistician is trained as a professional counsellor of individuals, groups and organizations.” [16] This background in ‘applied philosophy’, as I tend to call it, invites an attitude that acknowledges the strength of experience in a professional background and offers additional means to reflect on one’s practices from various established perspectives – in other words, to rethink the obvious!

4.AN ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE ON THE LINGUA DEMOCRATICA The pragmatism of engineering with respect to formal purism offers openings to face the ‘problem’ of the lingua democratica at the boundary between engineering and philosophy. The acknowledgment of the necessity of friction to enable creativity, also acknowledges the creative strength of pragmatism with respect to purism on one side and the relative freedom of philosophy on the other, without disputing the strength of these

poles for the issues they normally focus on. Pragmatism apparently is an effective, maybe even necessary, approach to deal with issues related to engineering. In many types of complex systems, formal purism may become too restricted a means to describe certain phenomena, while a collection of philosophical contributions on a certain topic –not individual contributions- is often too imprecise for engineers to enable enactment. It is a bit like trying to play a game of pool on a chess board on one extreme and on a soccer field on the other. Somehow the dimensions of a pool table are just right to make the interactions between the balls, the cues, the players and the rules of the game worth watching. In that respect, engineering has, although definitely closely related to formalism, more ‘degrees of freedom’. This interplay between constraint and freedom is what makes the game of engineering, well, beautiful! If one had therefore got the impression that this paper aims to criticize philosophy from the perspective of engineering –small town boy goes to the city, looks around, shrugs his shoulders, wonders what the fuss is all about, and decides to go back home [17], in terms of the Amsterdam Syndrome-, then I can safely say that this is not the focal point of my research. Such criticism would be rather futile, as it would be like an evaluation of a game of soccer with the rules of pool billiards. The main issue is rather how to address topics that are normally the focus of fields other than engineering in a way that are still faithful to engineering practices. This means making these practices, especially methodology, explicit. Such an exercise may increase understanding on why engineers do the things they do in the way they do, and provide means to share their knowledge with other disciplines. These issues are closely related to the constraints of engineering practice. When does an approach become too relaxed? If so, which adjustments are acceptable to methodology and practices to deal with these issues without betraying the rules of the game? The next sections explore a number of these issues that are currently being looked into.

5.PATTERNS Up to now the terms like ‘pattern’ and 'strategy' were introduced loosely, but they are used in the way these words are currently used in software engineering. Patterns were first identified in building architecture, where they were used to describe recurrent structures and approaches to make certain constructions. A classical brick archway is a good example of a pattern. In the early Nineties this notion was adopted in software by the ‘Gang of Four’ [18] and currently many of such patterns –constellations of software objects or sequences of interactions- have been described and have become common means of structuring complex software architectures. Many standard layouts of electronic components such as amplifiers, filters and the likes could be considered patterns, although to my knowledge they are not called as such in electronics. In general, a pattern is an abstract description (both textual as graphical) that could apply for a large class of comparable phenomena. An often used concept such as ‘competition’, for instance, can be considered as a pattern of interaction between two entities [19]. Competition could be considered an ‘instantiation’ of a class of patterns called strategies. Used this

way, patterns become means of classifying and defining concepts, and (thus) bounding their meaning. From a methodological stance, patterns are of interest because they are the transition point from pure formal descriptions -the essence of software- to a higher order, and less precise, means of describing aspects of software. In disciplines with a strong instrumental component, such methodological shifts are usually adopted without too much ado. Pragmatism often advocates a 'toolbox' approach to methodology; you use what is best suited for the job. This hints at a relationship between methodology and the nature of the issues that are researched, which means that certain methodologies are bounded by a range in which they can work effectively.

5.1COMPLEXITYAND METHODOLOGY The maturing field of complex systems theory offers an explanation of this 'toolbox approach'. Traditionally science has progressed with the implicit distinction between system and observer, the latter being able to capture aspects of the system into bodies of knowledge [20]. Complex systems theory inherently acknowledges the fact that the meta-system of observer-system is in itself also a complex system. This domain has traditionally been covered by the very philosophical area of metaphysics. It stands to reason that this distinction in the scale of complexity has certain ramifications. If the observed systems are relatively simple -in the sense that they allow themselves to be described with relatively few rules-, the meta-system can become more 'saturated' with complexity. The complexity of physics or mathematics, for instance is largely manifest in the constraints of formal strictness that is agreed upon within the discipline. Engineering is closely related to these formal sciences, but the additional constrains imposed on the observed system, which are mainly related to time and planning [21], requires 'shortcuts' in formalism, which are usually covered by heuristics, intuition and so on. This does not imply that the formal sciences do not acknowledge such approaches, but they are less accepted as means of conveying knowledge amongst peers than in engineering. Formal scientists will need to formalize their hunches before sharing them. The notion of patterns that was described previously demonstrates the bifurcation point in computer science, where pure formalism (which is the essence of programming) no longer can effectively address certain classes of problems in software engineering. It is not surprising that such bifurcation points happen at the levels where software has to interact with human beings, such as in human computer interaction or, in the case of patterns, the level where software is designed (architecture). In this respect, one can say that research adapts itself to the research subjects, and which evolves in certain accepted approaches. Scientific disciplines with a strong operational component usually are less resistant to such adaptations than more or less theoretical disciplines, as the requirements 'to get the job done' imposes this on the discipline. This is also the reason why the Amsterdam syndrome is less likely to occur in engineering, as adaptability also demonstrates the relativity of knowledge, expertise, and professional hierarchy. In software engineering, the last decades has seen many examples where whiz-kids ruthlessly overtook established names and only in the last five years or so,

the maturity of current software libraries and methodology has begun to re-establish experience as a favorable nomenclature. In engineering it also quite accepted that 'others' do not have much knowledge of the 'details' of the discipline; you do not need to know electronics to use a radio or a mobile telephone. In fact, this 'information hiding' is an essential aspect of most engineering endeavors. Silence is usually a sign of success, especially with respect to the deliverables! On the other end of the spectrum, more or less pluralist approaches reflect the complexity of the systems that are researched. Morality, ethics and human behavior are difficult to capture in methodology. Certain aspects may be addressed successfully by certain methods, such as qualitative or quantitative approaches, but it is unlikely that a supreme methodology will be developed that covers the entire area. However, complex systems theory does constrain research on complex systems, and therefore any researcher who is looking into complexity will have to address the metaphysical aspects of the research itself. This paper explores the methodological consequences of a complex system -the lingua democratica- along a number of themes of complexity: adaptability, self-description, scaling, evolution and premises. As an example of the the methodological problems one faces when moving into increasingly complex problem domains, I will give an example of a 'theory'' that describes the interactions between a scientific discipline and the kind of research that is conducted. Then I will reflect on the methodological issues that arise when one aims to verify it with the complex system it aims to describe.

5.2ABSOLUTISM AND LETHARGY The poles in which engineering takes an intermediate position are that of formal purism on one side and –from the relative stance of engineering- the almost infinite academic freedom of thought in philosophy on the other. Such poles appear to be recurrent patterns in many discussions within and between disciplines [22]. Currently two members of our group are looking into the mechanisms behind these patterns, which we assume are two stable attractors of processes that occur when autonomous agents have to operate in a complex, dynamic environment. This notion is based on the fact that knowledge costs energy. We presume that the states both use energy optimally, but that their effect on the agent's ability to act depends on the conditions of the environment. A very stable (state of the) environment will reward a limited amount of highly effective means of enactment (comparable to a strategy of specialization in, for instance, nature). The other extreme occurs in very volatile and unpredictable environments where a large range of enactment is required, but with is less effective than that specialization. If, for instance, the degrees of freedom revolve around a set of strategies that an agent can put to use as means of enactment, then a stable environment would lead to a state of absolutism, where a few strategies will dominate and out-compete the others (i.e. there is an absolute dominance of these strategies). The Amsterdam Syndrome described earlier could be considered such an absolute condition as it is insufficiently challenged and therefore presides in a stable environment that allows this condition to maintain itself.

The other extreme will not favor any strategy. A volatile environment would reward extreme adaptability, such as opportunism. However, if the environment is truly random, in the sense that there are no strategies that have any effect on the agent’s ability to function in that environment, any choice of strategy becomes random as well, resulting in a lethargic mode of operation, an inability to act effectively. Most environments will reward an approach somewhere in-between these extremes, which requires a delicate balancing act between ‘too much’ and ‘too little’. When we extend these ideas to the discussion of the 'poles of science' mentioned earlier, we can infer that the art of engineering –and any other discipline for that matter- apparently is optimized for its specific challenges, which are obviously related to the constraints mentioned earlier. Some disciplines can evolve (in the sense of increasing their own internal complexity) with fewer rules than others. Such absolute approaches can thrive until the complexity of the research itself forces the discipline to reconsider the rules of their own ‘game’. This usually reveals another friction, that between conservative and progressive attitudes, in which conservative attitudes will dominate the early phases of such a transition –for good reason, as conservatism is needed to ensure stability within the system-, but eventually has to give way to novel approaches once the progressive attitudes manage to effectively address the new challenges of the research. As science has an innate tendency to increase its internal complexity, which is related to the accumulation of knowledge within science, these transitions will happen at regular (although certainly not linear) intervals, as Kuhn had already analyzed [23]. Some may observe a paradox in my reasoning, due to the fact that I have identified an absolutist approach (the Amsterdam Syndrome) in the very dynamic environment of philosophy -it is dynamic because philosophy revolves around a large variety of issues of which many are extremely fleeting and usually very complex. This paradox, we think, is due to the fact that humans are experts in reshaping their immediate environment ('surroundings' in terms of Luhmann) to their advantage. The process of becoming an expert in a certain area is a means of stabilizing one's surroundings which, in turn, drives further specialization. Such paradoxes are often the related the scales of observation. As an example, the same paradox often returns in discussions of the growth of human population at global scale and at the scale of individual nations [24] or regions. Note in this respect also the effects of scale on a topic such as war. Taking a very naive perspective on war for the sake of clarity, those who wage wars usually observe a very stable environment with 'good guys' and 'bad guys', while those who are subject to it experience a thoroughly volatile environment that is close to being totally random.

5.3Reflection on a Model The previous concise description of a ‘theory’, using concepts from evolution theory, game theory and complex systems theory provides a sufficient base to evolve into an acceptable theory in a philosophical arena. There is certain logic behind the theory to make it plausible and sufficient scientific literature to support the theory from various perspectives. However, the theory is extremely ‘thin’ if it were to pass as a valid contribution for engineering science. In fact, it is a description of a model [21] rather than a theory, and the claim that this model

can actually say something about modes of operation of different scientific disciplines is close to being a methodological nightmare. First there is the matter of testability and verifiability. It would be no problem to create an experiment where this model could be tested, for instance a software program that codes an agent with a predefined set of strategies, and various modes of adaptability, in an environment that can be stable or random, according to some specific criteria2. If the agent would consistently learn to select a small subset of coded strategies in a stable environment and this would not occur in the random situation, we could indeed conclude that the experiment confirms the claims of the model. The second issue, however, is a far greater challenge. How can we be sure that the model is a faithful representation of the complex interactions between scientific disciplines? Within the mathematical domain one could look for signs of scale-invariance [25] between model and its complex correlate, for instance the existence of a power law. But how can we be assured that the results of an experiment with agents coded in software can indeed be extended to address modes of operation between distinct scientific disciplines? And even if the observed attractors are identified in scientific societies, how can we confirm that they are the result of the processes that were described in the model, and are not the result of alternative theories (for instance theories on power structures or social interactions)? This methodological requirement posed here is of course an extreme one, but it is an essential issue when considering any complex system. On one hand complex systems theory offers openings in these dilemmas, for instance through the concept of scale invariance, but on the other hand it eludes us when we try to grasp recurrent patterns at various levels of complexity [26]. Why can we safely use a concept as ‘competition’ in agent systems, biology and in sociology? Is competition a scale invariant strategy? If not, does it have various dialectical meanings in different disciplines? If so, can we safely ‘borrow’ conclusions from the various disciplines and use it in others? And why would a claim that a software model in fact is a faithful representation of a pattern of interaction between scientific disciplines be discharged as ‘naive’, while the infinitely more static models captured in bodies of text or schematics are accepted at face value? Are bodies of text or schematics (graphs, charts, etc.) actually models, or are they analogies, supportive tools or metaphors [27]? If so, are these relationships made explicit and are the boundary conditions in the relationship between them and the complex reality they aim to describe, sufficiently clear?

6.Complex Systems and Models Suppose we accept that a model can indeed reveal one or more patterns of a more complex correlate. In other words these patterns are scale invariant within the range of complexity that spans both model as the modeled system. This would indeed provide an answer why a strategy such as ‘competition’ could be present or observed at the level of software agents, genes, memes, animals and human society. It would also mean that behavioral – in the sense of systems theory, I hasten to add- or structural patterns in software agents could be present in bonobo apes and, 2

In fact, the results of such a software experiment would be close to trivial, as a correct projection of strategies and adaptability to equivalents in software would make the predicted outcome almost a logical inevitability.

in turn, in human beings [28]. In other words, societies of apes would be faithful models of some aspects of human societies, in the sense that if the pattern is identified both in a society of apes as in that of humans, then this pattern would be scale invariant within the established ranges of complexity. This would imply that any description about that pattern that uses concepts typical for human beings, would be less plausible than descriptions that use concepts which cover both levels of complexity. In other words, a statement such as ’a human can use tools because of the specific shape of the human hand’ would be less plausible, because chimpanzees use tools too. The statement is, in this case, too imprecise. On the other hand, a similar statement such as ‘The human ability for understanding abstract concepts is unique, due to the specific size and structure of the human brain’ is plausible as there is no comparable model in known to date that could match human intelligence. Note that an implicit methodological choice was made in this description to replace the classic 'Holy Grail' of 'truth', with the more pragmatic stance of plausibility. From this stance, science could be considered as a structured means of increasing the plausibility of knowledge about ourselves and the world we live in. This choice is also related to scaling issues. It may be 'true' to consider a planetary orbit as a circle around the sun, but it will not hold if the requirements of observation deem it to be elliptical. This distinction could be considered a falsification of the first, but I think that the fact that a circular orbit is often sufficient for certain descriptions would rather advocate the limitations of choosing such dichotomies. The pragmatic stance of plausibility would respect both notions, but acknowledge the fact that the latter is a more complete model of a solar system (it allows more levels of detail, but with a more general description). This stance, of course, is also implicitly accepted in physics in the distinctions between Newtonian mechanics and Einstein's special relativity [29]. Note also that the above example was chosen consciously, as this means of identifying and extending patterns at different levels of complexity is quite accepted in biology. Even though this approach is often criticized on the same grounds as mentioned earlier3, it is persistent within the discipline and apparently an accepted means to advance knowledge. This probably is due to the fact that biologists try to understand extremely complex phenomenon –in some ways more complex than those addressed by engineering- within the constraints of, amongst others, chemistry, physics and evolution theory. Apparently such implicit methodological choices are obvious and easily adapted within one domain, but they can cause quite some headaches if they need to be made explicit. They also may have unexpected outcomes. For instance, the acceptance of scale invariance in models and patterns could, in some circumstances, imply that a certain pattern identified in a model could be used as a methodological construct. If the model is a faithful representation of a scientific methodology, an identified pattern in the model could be applied for the methodology as well. In other words, in an extreme situation, scientific research could create its own methodology and become self-describing!

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Although most problems seem to occur when the human traits are projected on animals, which basically is a projection of a pattern at a higher level of complexity to a lower one.

As a less extreme example, the previous argumentation on the limitations of criticism as means to advance knowledge between scientific disciplines, already constrains the research on the lingua democratica, which aims to address openings between stakeholders, both within as outside the scientific community. A conclusion from the research –limitations of criticism as means to advance knowledge between disciplines- therefore affects the research itself. The moment that this conclusion is drawn, is also them moment the approach of the research has to be reconsidered. There is also the issue of evolution theory. If a complex system has an evolutionary component, or evolution theory is used to describe aspects of the system, then this has methodological consequences as well, as Dennet already pointed out [15]. Identified patterns in the system must be described in system properties that exist at a given level of evolution. More complex, novel parts arise from less complex existing parts. Complex systems theory provides one escape route called emergence [30], but even this property of complex systems relies on constellations of existing elements. Evolution theory also affects research on the lingua democratica. It will be clear if the lingua democratica also aims to open up to pro-creationist views –within and outside science-, that a stance on religion such as proclaimed by Dawkins [31] cannot be incorporated into the research without considerable thought. Yet again, the research subject affects and constrains the research! As a last issue that will briefly discussed here, revolves around the consequences of initial conditions, or premises, of a complex system. One extremely difficult aspect of complex systems is, that small variations in initial conditions can cause enormous variations in the dynamics of the system. Research on complex systems therefore needs to consider their premises with great care. Science can be considered a production system, where knowledge is produced based on existing knowledge. This self-referential aspect of science (knowledge creates knowledge) makes this issue very important, and I think has enormous consequences for especially metaphysical contributions to complexity. Take for instance the template contribution for WPE 2007 [7]. In this paper, which reveres the power of logical reasoning in, and therefore the self-referential nature of science, opens its argumentation from the importance of the second world war for current engineering practices and teaching. From a Continental European position, and especially one from a country with long-standing engineering traditions in, amongst others, sea-defense and ship building, the impact of World War II will be very different than that of, for instance, the United States. In this particular case, the line of reasoning developed in the paper, does not diverge too much from alternative stories that would take other premises than the second world war -the Netherlands also intensified engineering at an academic level in after 1945- and so various stories on modern engineering will probably converge to similar essences. This, however, does not conceal the fact that logical reasoning can not exist without the premises from which they start. Engineering in this respect, has the enormous advantage of its ability to fall back on formalism, which is usually the effect of testing and verification. But logical reasoning in philosophy usually are compilations of the ideas of many thinkers and which covers many eras of thought. Without established 'securing anchors' in shared premises, the lessons of complexity teach us that reasoning can take us anywhere if we are

not careful. Besides this, lack of shared premises is just that what closes domains very rapidly and can result in the archetypal stances as was described in the introduction. Methodological issues such as these are being addressed and pioneered in various disciplines that concern themselves with the study of complex systems [32], but they are as yet far from conclusive. Yet, we can already see that they are going to constrain the progress of science on complex systems in the (near) future. Scientific contributions on complex systems will eventually need to conform to the accepted constraints that are agreed upon. These constraints are far from static, but adjust themselves to topics that are looked into. Researchers, from engineering to philosophy, who take an interest in complex systems will have to (learn to) enjoy this game between freedom and constraint, while adjusting to the right ‘fit’ needed to understand complex systems.

7.CONCLUSION Halfway through the project, “Towards a Lingua Democratica for the Public Debate on Genomics”, we are seeing some means of readjusting our vocabularies and mindsets so that effective communications between disciplines become not only viable, but create opportunities to enhance the individual contributions. Complex systems theory both frustrates such attempts, as it provides openings to create shared premises. Awareness of the possibilities and limitations of the individual disciplines advocates certain modesty. That, despite aims and pretences, science is a very human activity, which is both its strength as its weakness.

8.REFERENCES [1] Riegler 2003, “Inclusive Worldviews: Interdisciplinary Research From a radical Constructivist Perspective”, World Scientific [2] NWO 2001, “The Societal Component of Genomics Research”, http://www.nwo.nl/subsidiewijzer.nsf/pages/NWOP_547JJZ _Eng [3] NWO 2003, “Towards a Lingua Democratica for the Public Debate on Genomics”, http://www.nwo.nl/nwohome.nsf/pages/NWOP_65GALN [4] Van der Weele & Beekman 2004, “Naar een Gereedschapkist voor een Constructieve Ethiek”, LEI den Haag

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