Reversible Relationship between Quantitative and Qualitative Data in ...

2 downloads 28150 Views 246KB Size Report
analysis focus on the differences between quantitative and qualitative anal- ... significant life events, and (c) analysis of data from the two types of self-.
Quality & Quantity (2005) 39: 199–215 DOI 10.1007/s11135-004-2968-7

Ó Springer 2005

Reversible Relationship between Quantitative and Qualitative Data in Self-Consciousness Research: A Normative Semiotic Model for the Phenomenological Dialogue between Data and Capta MARIANE L. DE SOUZA1, WILLIAM B. GOMES1 and SHERRI MCCARTHY 1

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul; 2Northern Arizona University.

Abstract. The aim of this study was to explore modes of integration of quantitative and qualitative data to verify existence of psychological constructs. Data obtained with a Likerttype rating scale and with narrative accounts of significant life-events were compared and integrated via logical analysis to examine the psychological construct of self-consciousness. Undergraduates between 17 and 32 years of age (78 females and 23 males) participated. Psychometric analysis of the scale classified the subjects’ focus of self-consciousness (public and private) into three levels: high, average or low. Independent judges evaluated self-consciousness profiles from the narrative accounts. Analysis verified the compatibility between self-consciousness scale measurements and self-consciousness profiles on narrative accounts. The results illustrate possibilities for and limitations of such comparisons, and also suggest criteria for comparing the same phenomenon in different contexts. Guidelines for choice of instrumentation in gathering data for research and practice are also presented. Key words: phenomenology, quantity, quality, self-consciousness, measurement issues.

1. Background The ongoing controversy in psychology over qualitative vs. quantitative research focuses on three main points. First, researchers with a historical tradition of quantitative analysis tend to rely on statistical formulas to analyze data. Second, researchers with a historical tradition of qualitative analysis focus on the differences between quantitative and qualitative analysis, arguing for the greater potential of qualitative methods (Burman, 1997). Third, a growing number of researchers avoid competition between quantitative and qualitative methods by developing strategies for a productive sharing of research experiences (Niaz, 1997). This new trend advances

200

MARIANE L. DE SOUZA ET AL.

analytical procedures for integrating the two types of data in a rich stream of combinations where the basic aspects and contributions of each method are stressed (Nelson et al.,1995; Kuhn and Lao, 1998; Tolman and Szalacha, 1999). We used the psychological construct of self-consciousness to explore the combined use of qualitative and quantitative data. The basic methodological assumption is that the combination is not only desirable but also necessary to improve research interpretation and discussion (Newman and Benz, 1998). The focus is the problematic relation between context and choice in research design (Lanigan, 1992; 1994). Context and choice serve as references to define the main differences between data gathered on qualitative and quantitative instruments. From the perspective of Communication Theory (Lanigan, 1992) a quantitative instrument such as a scale or a questionnaire establishes a choice in context. The respondent must make a forced choice from among a specified number of items or respond to specific questions about a particular state or event. A qualitative instrument such as an open interview offers a broader choice of context for responses. Constrained choice allows for more efficient analysis; broader context may offer a truer picture of the state or event, although interpretation and analysis of such data may be more problematic and time-consuming. Discussion of appropriate ways to combine both types of data in psychological research continues in the literature. 1.1.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AS A MEASURABLE CONSTRUCT

To advance this discussion, we took theoretical constructs in psychology, public and private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975), and asked the basic ontological question: What are public and private self-consciousness? Are they constructs derived from a Likert-type instrument or independent constructs derived from each individual’s perspective of self? Our hypotheses were that: (a) public and private self-consciousness are valid psychological constructs; (b) the constructs would be evident both on scales designed for quantitative analysis and through qualitative analysis based on self-report of significant life events, and (c) analysis of data from the two types of selfreport measures would provide consistent and compatible descriptions of individuals’ perceptions of their levels of public and private self-consciousness. 1.1.1. Quantitative Analysis of Self-consciousness In the mid-1970s, researchers (Fenigstein, 1987) began to test a group of items to examine Duval and Wicklund’s (l972) theory about objective selfawareness. The items were administered to several large samples of individuals and factorial analysis of the data showed three factors, which were

A NORMATIVE SEMIOTIC MODEL

201

named Private Self-Consciousness (PRSC), Public Self-Consciousness (PUSC) and Social Anxiety (SAN). The Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al. l975) resulted from this research, and the private and public aspects measured by the scale were defined as personality traits. Private self-consciousness refers to the tendency one has to focus on personal inner experiences such as thoughts, memories and feelings. Public self-consciousness concerns characteristics that can be observed by others, such as appearance. The person demonstrating public self-consciousness is aware of the self as a social object. Social Anxiety, the third factor measured by the scale, is the discomfort someone feels in the presence of others. While the private and public aspects refer to types of self-consciousness, social anxiety refers to an individual’s reactions to self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975). The constructs measured by the scale, whether real in a phenomenological sense or not, were readily accepted for both psychological research and psychological practice. Recent studies have related self-consciousness to physical and mental health in the fields of clinical and health psychology (Hoyer and Klein, 2000) and psychopathology (Scandell, 2001). The construct has been refined and there is currently discussion in these fields about the distinction between self-reflectiveness, which relates to negative outcomes, and internal state awareness, which relates to positive outcomes as two facets of private self-consciousness (Creed and Funder, 1998; Silvia, 1999). The Self-Consciousness Scale has been translated into several languages and utilized for research in many countries including Mexico, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Holland, China and Brazil (see Heinemann, 1979; Vleeming and Engles, 1981; Nystedt and Smari, 1989; Banos et al. 1990; Comunian, 1994; Shek, 1994; Grob, 1995; Texiera and Gomes, 1995, 1996). Our study utilizes the Brazilian version of this scale (Texiera and Gomes, 1995) to examine the relationship between qualitative and quantitative data gathered on the psychological construct of self-consciousness.

1.1.2. Qualitative Analysis of Self-consciousness The qualitative analysis we utilized for comparison to quantitative data derived from the Brazilian Self-Consciousness Scale was based on a written narrative of an important life event. The research about life-events has been concerned with the impact of life changes in the development of life experience (Sarason et al., 1978), and the relation of desirability of life events to stress and mental disease (Vinokur and Selzer, 1975). Most recently, life events have been studied to assess subjective well-being (Suh et al., 1996) and to examine the relation between diseases (e.g., cancer and depression) to a patients’ life history and significant life events (Suedfeld and Bluck, 1993;

202

MARIANE L. DE SOUZA ET AL.

Grob, 1995). Accounts of life events have a narrative structure that varies according to the narrator’s level of involvement with the event. The narrative may be analyzed according to thematic choice, and through the correspondence between discourse style and speaker’s characteristics and environment (Bardin, 1977/1994). In summary, the two instruments we selected for this study were a scale designed to measure self-consciousness quantitatively and narrative accounts of life-events to measure self-consciousness qualitatively. Let us now further examine the literature regarding the relationship between qualitative and quantitative data analysis. 1.2.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Newman and Benz (1998) remind us the philosophical roots of qualitative and quantitative research are in the naturalistic and the positivistic approaches to science, respectively. As a consequence, they note, the debate among researchers is based upon philosophical differences about what constitutes reality and whether or not it is measurable. Despite this discussion, they conclude, students continue to be prepared for conducting research in an either–or dichotomous world. Students leave their universities either as welltrained statisticians, or as competent cultural anthropologists, methodologically weak in quantitative research. The authors argue that the two approaches coexist in the research world and are part of an interactive continuum. Contemporary scientific methodology should be inductive as well as deductive and objective as well as subjective. The use of this interactive continuum requires a definition of science that utilizes methods of traditional logicians, of empiricists and of naturalists. The fundamental assumption is that each research question dictates the scientific methodology to be utilized, what data to collect and what to do with that data once it is collected. The interactive continuum model defines qualitative methods and quantitative methods separately according to the form of logic inherent within each – inductive and deductive, respectively. Each approach (inductive-qualitative or deductive-quantitative) adds something to knowledge by building on the information derived from the other approach. Qualitative research, with an inductive perspective, is theory building and, therefore, the end is with theory. Quantitative research, with a deductive perspective, is theory testing and, therefore, begins with theory. Thus, in the interactive continuum model, the theory is neither the end nor the beginning of a scientific investigation, but rather part of a dynamic cycle that combines both quantitative and qualitative research procedures to gather information. A similar discussion appears in Lanigan (1994). Research is defined as a symbolic activity in which evidence is mediated by a shaping experience

A NORMATIVE SEMIOTIC MODEL

203

(observation) into consciousness and measured via humanistic or naturalistic means. Lanigan (1994) asserts that the use of the term naturalistic to define qualitative research is unfortunate, since the positivistic view of science that is also based on ‘‘nature’’. The terms cultural studies and interpretative studies are becoming standard synonyms for qualitative research. In fact, Guba and Lincoln (1994, p. 105) changed the term naturalistic to constructivist, as they said: ‘‘We acknowledge at once our own commitment to constructivism which we earlier called ‘naturalistic inquiry... ’’ Lanigan (1994) specifies the relation between quantitative and qualitative criteria in the opposition between method and evidence, data (quod erat demonstradum; which was to be demonstrated), and capta (quod erat inveniendum; which was to be found out), and information (probability differentiation) and communication (possibility differentiation). In the humanistic, comprehensive or interpretative condition, capta is taken as evidence and characterizes the methodology of discovery. The benefit of this research is that the qualitative judgment makes possible exact and abstract descriptions (representations). On the other hand, in the empirical or positivist scientific models, Lanigan notes on p. 111 (1994): ‘‘the symbology of research can be ‘evidence’ that is mediated by converting consciousness (measurement) into experience (observation)’’. The result is data, that which is given as evidence and characterizes the methodology of invention. The benefit of research with this methodology is the fact that a quantitative judgment allows precision and generalization in attribution (prediction). The positivistic research method, a quantitative approach, requires an information theory formulated as a context of given choice (data). A humanistic approach to research requires a communication theory formulated as a choice of context (capta). This proposition moves away from reductionism, because the differences between these two approaches are considered. 1.3.

THE IMPORTANCE OF REASONING IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

Regardless of the approach, logical reasoning must still govern scientific inquiry. The present study advances the continuing discussion on qualitative and quantitative criteria through a conjunction of four principles of inferential reasoning based on Peirce’s (1931–1958) normative semiotic models. These principles are: (1) abduction (Rule + Result = Case [particular, a posteriori], (2) induction (Case + Result = Rule), (3) deduction (Rule + Case = Result) and (4) adduction (Result + Rule = Case [universal, a priori]). Induction and deduction are two well-known logical concepts. The first refers to a logic that affirms the consequent and indicates probability. The second refers to a logic that affirms the antecedent and guarantees the conclusion. Abduction is a concept that appears first in Aristotle and was used by Pierce to name a process of forming an original explanatory

204

MARIANE L. DE SOUZA ET AL.

hypothesis or, simply, to introduce a new idea. It is akin to creative thought. Adduction is a reasoning that moves by addition rather than deduction. Several results are combined, or added together and considered evidence for a universal ‘‘case’’. Studies in psychology employing many methods and relying on replication to confirm results are an example of scientific reasoning that relies primarily on adductive logic. 1.4.

RESEARCH, REASONING AND REALITY

Just as we assume both quantitative and qualitative data are necessary to confirm a particular psychological construct, we also assume that all four types of logical reasoning noted above should converge at the same conclusion if, indeed, that conclusion is a valid representation of ‘‘reality’’. This should be the true goal of all research touted as ‘‘multi-trait/multi-method’’. In the present study, our first step was to take self-consciousness as a context (rule) where an internal comparison (result) identified two phenomena (case): the expression of public and private self-consciousness. We accomplished this by asking participants to complete a scale designed to measure self-consciousness and to describe, in writing, a significant life event. Notice that in this first step, the context is an imagined experiential possibility. The second step used a self-report scale (inductive logic) to verify the expected occurrence of two phenomena – the expression of private and public consciousness (case), through an internal and independent comparison – i.e., statistical treatment and qualitative analysis (result), each one with its own criteria (rule). The third step was to utilize both quantitative and qualitative analysis (deductive logic), as a respective context (rule) to verify the selfconsciousness style in a given population (case), by internal comparison (result). Most research finishes at this point or suggests new studies and is based on only one type of analysis, qualitative or quantitative. In contrast, our final step utilized reasoning rules worked out in an external context to each other. So, in two different contexts – scale and narrative (rule) – an external comparison (quantitative and qualitative criteria) was performed (result) to establish the identity between two phenomena: findings from a standardized instrument and descriptions from self-reports about private and public consciousness. The convergence of several forms of reasoning and two types of data to establish the same psychological construct – hat of selfconsciousness – is presented as an illustration of the use of scientific methodology and reasoning as a ‘‘philosopher’s stone’’ to establish phenomenological reality. It is also presented, since the two types of analysis agreed, as support for using ‘‘Occum’s Razor’’ in selecting appropriate research methodology once a particular construct is established as valid, considering cost, benefit and context as guiding criteria for determining the type of data to be collected.

A NORMATIVE SEMIOTIC MODEL

205

2. Method 2.1.

PARTICIPANTS, INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURE

One hundred one undergraduates completed the Brazilian version of the SelfConsciousness Scale (Teixeira and Gomes, 1995) and wrote a significant lifeevent during two of their regular classes at a federal university in southern Brazil. The sample was comprised of students from three courses of study (majors): Psychology (34.6%); Education (25.8%) and Health Sciences (39.6%). Participants included 78 women and 23 men between 17 and 32 years of age (mean age: 22.3 years; SD = 5.6). The Self-consciousness Scale comprises three subscales: Private Self-consciousness, Public Self-consciousness and Social Anxiety. Only the first two subscales were used. The Private Self-consciousness subscale has nine items focusing on personal inner experiences, as exemplified by the items ‘‘I am generally attentive to my inner feelings’’, and ‘‘I am constantly examining my motives’’. In contrast, the Public Self-consciousness subscale has seven items focusing on characteristics which can be observed by other people, as exemplified by the items ‘‘I usually worry about making a good impression’’, and ‘‘I am usually aware of my appearance’’. The rating scale ranges from 0 (‘‘I totally disagree’’) to 4 (‘‘I totally agree’’). The Brazilian version has an acceptable reliability: 0.73 (coefficient alpha) and 0.89 (test–retest). Data was collected during two separate class periods. During the first class, 41 students answered the scale and 61 students wrote a significant lifeevent account. During the second class, one week later, the 61 students who had previously written a life-event narrative completed the scale while the other 41 students wrote significant life-event accounts. 2.2.

DATA ANALYSIS

Mean, standard deviation, frequency and reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) were computed for scores from the Self-Consciousness Scale. In order to assess differences in response based on gender, male and female scores were also compared via t-tests. Narratives were assessed via content analysis, evaluation by independent judges and correspondence analysis. Content analysis. Qualitative content analysis, based on criteria suggested by Patton (1980), was used to identify both thematic amplitude and possible meanings of a significant life event. Frequency and intensity of words related to particular, self-identified themes within each narrative account were noted. Evaluation by independent judges. The narrative accounts were then submitted to four independent judges for evaluation of self-consciousness profiles based on a protocol formulated from the scale items. The protocol for evaluation of self-consciousness profiles defined private self-consciousness descriptors as descriptions of: (1) affective states; (2) cognitive states; (3)

206

MARIANE L. DE SOUZA ET AL.

daydreams, and (4) bodily states (e.g., pain, hunger, stomachache, etc.). Public self-consciousness descriptors were defined as descriptions of: (1) personal appearance (body attributes, clothes); (2) personal style (posture, coordination of movement, voice tone, manners), and (3) ‘‘what people think about me’’. Statistical correspondence analysis. Statistical correspondence analysis, a method for representing data in a Euclidian space so that the results can be visually examined for structure (examples can be found in Weller and Romney, 1990), was used to verify the compatibility between data and capta. 3. Results 3.1.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SCALE

The reliability coefficient for the Self-Consciousness Scale (Cronbach’s Alpha) was 0.71. Table I presents mean and standard deviation of scores for private and public subscales. t-tests were performed to examine possible significant sex differences on the scores for each subscale. No significant differences were found between women and men for either private self-consciousness (t ¼ 0.48; p ¼ 0.62) or public self-consciousness (t ¼ 1.22; p ¼ 0.22). 3.2.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: SIGNIFICANT LIFE-EVENT NARRATIVES

Few constraints were given to subjects regarding the significant event they described, in order to allow for as broad a context as possible. The significant event could be an episode either recently occurring (last week, month or year) or remotely occurring (early years of narrator’s life). The significant event could be positive (accomplishment, joy or transcendence) or negative (frustration, lost or sadness). The importance of the event was related to the emotional intensity experienced by the narrator. Many resulting narratives related to ordinary events such as problems and accomplishments in career, Table I. Means and standard deviations for each subscale of the translated self-consciousness scale for men, women and total sample Mena Subscale Private Self-Consciousness Public Self-Consciousnesse a

d

n = 23. n = 78. c N = 101. d The range was from 15 to 36. e The range was from 8 to 28. b

Womenb

Totalc

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

24.6 19.7

3.9 4.2

25.5 20.8

4.1 3.6

25.0 20.5

4.0 3.7

A NORMATIVE SEMIOTIC MODEL

207

education or family life. Other narratives related to affective or cognitive events such as changes in spiritual orientation or religious life. The changes cited by participants included changing professions, economic status, spouses and schedules. Psychological changes such as growing up, changing selfimage, or adopting new perspectives about specific issues or people were also described. In fact, the narratives obtained in this study were close in content to the original findings of Sarason et al. (1978) in their research on significant life-event narratives. Narratives were read and rated for intensity and for indications of public and private self-consciousness. Comparing self-consciousness with life-event accounts. The comparison between quantitative and qualitative data required some adjustments. It was necessary to establish cut-off points on scale scores to create three groups – low, average and high – for both private and public self-consciousness. For private self-consciousness, low scores ranged from 15 to 22; average, scores from 23 to 29; high, scores from 30 to 36. For public self-consciousness, low was from 8 to 16; average, from 17 to 22; high, from 23 to 28. Next, participants were classified into nine groups to match the combined results of private and public self-consciousness, ranging from low to high on both subscales. The nine possible groups into which subjects could be placed according to their scores included: (1) Low Private Self-Consciousness (PRS) and low Public Self-Consciousness (PUS); (2) Low PRS and average PUS; (3) Low PRS and high PUS; (4) Average PRS and low PUS; 5) Average PRS and average PUS; 6) Average PRS and high PUS; (7) High PRS and low PUS; (8) High PRS and average PUS; and (9) High PRS and high PUS. No subjects fell in group number 7 (High PRS and Low PUS). See Figure 1. Four independent judges, trained graduate psychology students, read and rated self-consciousness profiles from the narrative accounts, placing them subjectively into the possible categories depicted above. All four judges’ evaluations agreed on 87% of the narrative accounts from the total sample. Narrative accounts with unequal judges’ evaluations point out the difficulty of subjective evaluation inherent in qualitative interpretation of data. For purposes of our subsequent analysis, we resolved the problem by withdrawing these cases but, by doing so, a bias was introduced and potentially valuable data was lost. Similar types of loss occur in quantitative analysis when problems of dealing with outlying scores or cases are dealt with. Similarly, in order to compare data from the scale and capta from the accounts, the participants who scored Average+Average, Low+Average and Average+Low in both private and public self-consciousness were excluded. These self-consciousness profiles were not ‘‘pure cases’’, from a theoretical point of view. In order to establish constructs of public and private self-consciousness, it seemed more useful to compare the extreme cases and exclude the average, or middle scores. Therefore, 40 cases remained for

208

MARIANE L. DE SOUZA ET AL.

Figure 1. Classification of combined profiles of private and public self-consciousness.

this final comparison: (1) Low PRS with Low PUS (n ¼ 5); (2) Low PRS with High PUS (n ¼ 1); (3) AveragePRS with High PUS (n ¼ 22) (4) High PRS with Average PUS (n ¼ 5) and (4) High PRS with High PUS (n ¼ 7). Table II compares the self-consciousness profile indicated on Self-Consciousness Scale and self-consciousness profile identified by independent judges in the significant life-event account for these cases. Correspondence analysis (see Figure 2) confirms a tendency of association between data (from scale) and capta (from life-event account). There is a moderate association tendency between the profile High PRS + High PUS (from scale) and SPR descriptor identified on the life event account, as well as an association between the profile Low PRS + Low PUS with the PRS descriptor. There is also a strong association between the profile Low PRS with High PUS (from scale) and the PRS and PUS descriptors (from life event account). However, this must be interpreted cautiously since there is just one Low PRS + High PUS (from scale) in the sample. 4. Discussion The correspondence between scale scores and qualitative ratings can be interpreted to mean that public and private self-consciousness are valid constructs rather than an artifact of a scale designed to display these states by the manner in which choices are constrained within context. The consistency may also be interpreted to show that both qualitative and quantitative methods result in similar conclusions about the constructs within individuals. Thus, in future studies of the construct, employing

209

A NORMATIVE SEMIOTIC MODEL

Table II. Self-consciousness profiles from scale and self-consciousness descriptors from lifeevents accounts in the reduced sample (27 cases) Case

Profile (scale) PRS + PUS

Account descriptors

010 013 016 018 022 026 027 034 046 048 052 062 067 069 072 074 075 079 080 081 082 084 088 089 091 099 100

A+H A+H A+H L+L A+H H+H A+H L+L H+H A+H A+H H+A A+H H+A L+L H+H H+H A+H H+A L+H A+H A+H L+L A+H H+H A+H A+H

PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS PRS

Total

H+H = 05 L+H = 01 L+L = 04 A+H = 14 H+A = 03

PRS and PUS = 09 PRS = 18

and PUS and PUS

and PUS and PUS and PUS and PUS

and PUS and PUS and PUS

both methods simultaneously would be redundant and the decision as to which type of data to collect should be based on criteria such as availability, efficiency and purpose. In counseling practice, narrative accounts may be sufficient for therapists to use in forming judgments about the levels of these constructs within clients. In studies with large samples, which employ self-consciousness as a variable, scale scores, which can be more readily obtained and more efficiently analyzed, are sufficient.

210

MARIANE L. DE SOUZA ET AL.

3,0 Low+High 2,5

Scale Event

2,0 1,5 1,0 PRS&PUS ,5 Aver+High High+Aver Low+Low

0,0

Dimension 1 -,5

PRS

High+High -1,0

PRS+PUS

Figure 2. Correspondence analysis between data (self-consciousness scale) and capta (life-events accounts).

The results also suggest additional questions: (1) How is the predominant occurrence of private self-consciousness descriptors and the non-isolated occurrence of public self-consciousness descriptors in the accounts best explained? Does this indicate a tendency of those who select careers in psychology, education and health sciences to demonstrate particular levels of these constructs? (2) Why, if both qualitative and quantitative means are equally effect means of measuring the constructs, was the correlation between data sets as depicted in Figure 2 not perfectly linear? and (3) How can the relation between these two indicators best be captured as an evidence of reversibility of quantitative and qualitative data in capturing an established psychological phenomenon? According to Buss (1980, p. 17) ‘‘Private self-awareness can be induced in several different ways’’. Small mirrors, which reflect just our own faces, direct attention related to private self-awareness to aspects such as bodily processes, emotions, fantasies and self-evaluation. In the same way, writing a diary can direct the attention to private aspects of oneself. In this case, however, if the individual writes a recital of the events of the day – the meals eaten, the people met, the classes attended – the attention is obviously directed toward his or her public self. Writing a significant life-event

A NORMATIVE SEMIOTIC MODEL

211

in one’s life history as well as writing a diary can be private self-awareness inducers. Predominance of private self-consciousness descriptors and the absence of exclusively public self-consciousness descriptors in the accounts may be an artifact of this direction of attention inward. Buss (1980) suggests, however, that individuals with high private self-consciousness are so self-reflective that inducers would not elevate their private self-awareness. On the other hand, individuals with high or low scores in public selfconsciousness show differences just in the presence of public self-awareness inducers. That different susceptibility to inducers may explain both the presence of private self-consciousness descriptors and the exclusive presence of public self-consciousness descriptors even in accounts of individuals who scored high in public self-consciousness. Also, this explains the presence of public self-consciousness descriptors even in accounts of those low in public selfconsciousness. These differential responses to a task which focuses attention on public and private arenas, rather than traits peculiar to those who select particular occupations, could explain the findings referred to in the first question above and also explain why the correlation referred to in the second question is not perfect. A study comparing individuals from several different majors or careers on levels of public and private self-consciousness, utilizing scale scores, would help to answer the first question. Addressing the second is somewhat more problematic. As far as the third question is concerned, the connection among dynamic style, and the private and public self-consciousness descriptors utilized by the only individual in the study with a Low + High score on the scale confirms, in a qualitative, case study format, the relation between self-consciousness profiles from narrative accounts and self-consciousness profiles from scale score. The other narratives also tended, generally, to match scores, even in cases of lows in both private and public self-consciousness. The connection among descriptive style, private self-consciousness descriptor, High + High profiles and Low + Low profiles confirmed the tendency of the inducers noted by Buss (1980). Thus, the moderate association tendency between High private self-consciousness + High public and private self-consciousness profile descriptors identified in the account, as well as the association between Low private + Low public and private descriptors in accounts indicated in the correspondence analysis supports the reversibility of quantitative and qualitative data. 5. Conclusion In this study, the first step of the comparison met an apparent limitation of instrumental order: while the scale we used evaluated level of self-consciousness, the significant life-event account provided a self-awareness

212

MARIANE L. DE SOUZA ET AL.

profile. This difficulty was overcome by using the scale score as a fixed parameter and the account of self-awareness as an induced profile. The private and public self-consciousness profiles on the Self-Consciousness Scale are defined as personality traits instead of personality states. In that sense, the scale ascribes a context to a participant that may not be the same context in which the participant chooses to answer the questions. However, we argue that such contrast is not only desirable, but also necessary. The theoretical assumption behind any scale is rooted in information theory, which reduces uncertainty by exclusion – that is, probability differentiation. Simply formulated, a scale is a context of constrained choice; strictly formulated, a scale is ‘‘the context of a choice by correlation which entails a context by relation’’ (Lanigan, 1992, p. 211). The life-event account, on the other hand, ascribes to the participant the possibility to choose the context in which he or she describes an experience. The theoretical assumption behind the life-event account is rooted in communication theory, which asserts certainty by combination – that is, possibility differentiation. Simply formulated, the account functions as a choice of context; strictly formulated, the account is ‘‘the choice of a context by relation which entails a choice by correlation’’. (Lanigan, 1992, p. 210). Note that the terms relation, correlation and function are used in Hjelmslev’s (1943/1961) conception of the underlying logic of language. Thus, relation means ‘‘Both/And function’’; correlation means ‘‘Either/Or function’’; and ‘‘function is the dependence that fulfills the conditions for an analysis’’ (Lanigan, 1992, p. 229). In turn, analysis ‘‘is description of an object by uniform dependencies of other objects on it and on each other’’ (Lanigan, 1992, p. 229). Quantitative or qualitative data alone are incomplete to verify a concept or to establish reversible relations between each other. The need to establish a complementary relationship and to verify a construct is a necessary first step in psychological research. Establishing this relationship is a function of the adductive analysis of semiotics, which in different contexts (scale and accounts; Rule), through an external comparison (quantitative or qualitative; Result) establishes the identity of two phenomena (self-consciousness classifying and profile; Case). Even so, difficulties in design and interpretation remain. For example, the manner in which comparison between quantitative and qualitative data occurred in our study illustrates an interesting point. The quantitative instrument was taken as a context for the qualitative instrument. The qualitative interpretations utilized were constrained by the definitions operationalized by the quantitative instrument. Thus, the scale provided the parameters for the analysis of the accounts. The research procedure’s central focus was qualifying the profiles through the quantitative operationalization. That procedure mirrored a common situation in present-day psychological research: A mixed research design combines quantitative and

A NORMATIVE SEMIOTIC MODEL

213

qualitative methods in order to either use data to ensure the validity of capta or use capta to ensure the validity of data. In either case, the latter is defined and constrained by the former, potentially damaging one of the instruments. The quantitative instrument in such a combination may lose its predictive validity and, consequently, its major contribution to psychological research is lost. The qualitative instrument, if used as a pilot procedure in a quantitative research design, does not ensure an accurate understanding and description in a quantitative sense of the object under investigation. In our present study, we assumed (abductive logic) that quantitative and qualitative methods could serve as contexts for each other, and there is no infallible way to assess the validity of this assumption. Such logic, by its very nature, is circular. It may not be possible to overcome this basic flaw of logic, save through Neitzschian metaphysics. Regardless, the starting point of sound psychological research should be to clarify the epistemological assumptions inherent in the design. In utilizing the Self-Consciousness Scale, our major assumption was the observable similarity between a number obtained through a scale measuring level of a particular trait and the actual existence of a specific amount of that trait in ‘‘reality’’. In utilizing written narratives, our major assumption was the comprehensive similarity between the narrative description and the actual ‘‘reality’’ of each subject. We sought to maintain the integrity of each research method by emphasizing essential differences and logically deriving a suitable means of comparing the two different types of data. We assert the presence of self-consciousness descriptors in the narrative accounts compatible with scale scores, considering the caveats noted above, is evidence of the reversibility between qualitative and quantitative data measuring the constructs of private and public self-consciousness, and also that these constructs are indeed ‘‘real’’. Comparing instruments of different orders (qualitative and quantitative) may be interpreted as a weakness of research design if a correspondence between results from the two has already been empirically demonstrated. On the other hand, if a hypothetical psychological construct has not yet been confirmed and a correspondence between qualitative and quantitative measures has not been demonstrated, comparing instruments of a different order is warranted. When making such comparisons, however, well-reasoned procedures, derived from an ongoing phenomenological dialogue between data and capta should be defined. We may, in the final critique of pure reason, always be required as mortals to simply take ‘‘our best guess’’ but we hope the semiotic model we described here will assist students of research methods – and even researcher-practitioners in psychology – to avoid thoughtless use of methodologies and to refine their guesses and make them better in the future.

214

MARIANE L. DE SOUZA ET AL.

References Ban˜os, R. M., Belloch, A. & Perpina, C. (1990). Self-consciousness Scale: A study of Spanish housewives. Psychyological Reports 66: 771–774. Bardin, L. (1977). L’analyse of contenu [Content Analysis]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Burman, E. (1997). Minding the gap: Positivism, psychology, and the politics of qualitative methods. Journal of Social Issues 53: 785–801. Buss, A. H. (1980). Self-consciousness and Social Anxiety. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company. Comunian, A. L. (1994). Self-consciousness scale dimensions: An Italian adaptation. Psychological Reports 74: 483–489. Creed, A. T. & Funder, D. C. (1999). Shining the light on private self-consciousness: A response to Silvia (1999). European Journal of Personality 13: 539–542. Duval, S. & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A Theory of Objective Self-awareness. New York: Academic Press. Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. & Buss, A. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 43: 522–527. Fenigstein, A. (1987). On the nature of public and private self-consciousness. Journal of Personality 55: 543–554. Grob, A. (1995). Subjective well-being and significant life-events across the life span. Swiss Journal of Psychology 54: 3–18. Guba, E. G. & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research, California: Sage, pp. 105–117. Heinemann, W. (1979). The assessment of private and public self-consciousness: A German replication. European Journal of Social Psychology 9: 331–337. Hjelmslev, L. (1961). Prolegomena to a theory of language (F. J. Whitfield, Trans.). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press (original work published in Danish 1943). Hoyer, J. & Klein, A. (2000) Self reflection and well-being: Is there a healthy amount of introspection? Psychological Reports, 86: 135–141. Kuhn, D. & Lao, J. (1998). Contemplation and conceptual change: Integrating perspectives from social and cognitive psychology. Developmental Review 18: 125–154. Lanigan, R. (1992). The Human Science of Communicology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Lanigan, R. (1994). Capta versus data: Method and evidence in communicology. Human Studies 17: 109–130. Lincoln, V. S. & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Nelson, G., Wiltshire, C., Hall, G. B., Peirson, L. & Walsh-Bowers, R. (1995). Psychiatric consumer/survivors’ quality of life: Quantitative and qualitative perspectives. Journal of Community Psychology 23: 216–233. Newman, I. & Benz, C. R. (1998). Qualitative–Quantitative Research Methodology: Exploring the Interactive Continuum. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Niaz, M. (1997). Can we integrate qualitative and quantitative research in science education? Science and Education 6: 291–300. Nystedt, L. & Smari, J. (1989). Assessment of the Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss Self-consciousness Scale: A Swedish translation. Journal of Personality Assessment 53: 342–352. Patton, M. Q. (1980). Qualitative Evaluation Methods. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Peirce, C. S. (1931-1958). The collected papers of Charles Sanders Pierce, 8 vols. In C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (eds.), Vols. 1–6, and A. W. Burks (ed.), Vols. 7–8 (See Vol. 5 paragraphs 127; 145; 171; 188). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

A NORMATIVE SEMIOTIC MODEL

215

Rime´, B. & Le Bon, C. (1984). Le concept de conscience de soi et ses ope´rationnalisations. L’anne´e Psychologique 84: 535–553. Sarason, I. G., Johnson, J. H. & Siegel, J. M. (1978). Assessing the impact of life changes: Development of the life experiences survey. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 46: 932–946. Scandell, D. J. (2001). Is self-reflectiveness an unhealthy aspect of private self-consciousness? Journal of Psychology, 135: 451–461. Scheier, M. F. & Carver, C. S. (1985). The self-consciousness scale: A revised version for use with general populations. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 15: 687–699. Shek, D. T. L. (1994). Assessment of private and public self-consciousness: A Chinese replication. Journal of Clinical Psychology 50: 341–348. Silvia, P. J. (1999). Explaining personality or explaining variance? A comment on Creed and Funder (1998). European Journal of Personality 13: 533–538. Suedfeld, P. & Bluck, S. (1993). Changes in integrative complexity accompanying significant life events: Historical evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64: 124–130. Suh, E., Diener, E. & Fujita, F. (1996). Events and subjective well-being: Only recent events matter. Journal of personality and social psychology 70: 1091–1102. Teixeira, M. A. P. & Gomes, W. B. (1995). Self-consciousness Scale: A Brazilian version. Psychological Reports 77: 423–427. Teixeira, M. A. P. & Gomes, W. B. (1996). Escala de autoconscieˆncia revisada (EAC-R): Caracterı´ sticas psicome´tricas numa amostra de adolescentes brasileiros. [Revised selfconsciousness to Brazilian adolescents]. Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia 48: 78–92. Tolman, D. L. & Szalacha, L. A. (1999). Dimensions of desire: Bridging qualitative and quantitative methods in a study of female adolescent sexuality. Psychology of Women Quarterly 23: 7–39. Vinokur, A. & Selzer, M. L. (1975). Desirable versus undesirable life events: Their relationship to stress and mental distress. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32: 329–337. Vleeming, R. G. & Engelse, J. A. (1981). Assessment of private and public self-consciousness: A Dutch replication. Journal of Personality Assessment 45: 385–389. Weller, S.C. & Romney, A.K. (1990) Metric Scaling: Correspondence Analysis, Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences 07-075. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Mariane Lima de Souza is a doctoral student in Developmental Psychology at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. William Barbosa Gomes is a professor of history of psychology in the graduate psychology program at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Sherri McCarthy is an associate professor of educational psychology in the graduate counseling and human relations program at Northern Arizona University-Yuma. Their research interests include, theory, practice and history of psychology.

Suggest Documents