Risk Management and Implementation Handbook - PARAmount

imProved Accessibility: Reliability and security of Alpine transport infrastructure related to mountainous hazards in a changing climate

Risk Management and Implementation Handbook Report on the communication and implementation of risk management tools, methods and procedures in the PARAmount test beds (Work Package 8)

PARAmount is supported by means of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)

Authors of the Risk Management and Implementation Handbook Editing and synthesis

Review

M.S. Adams & A. Zeidler

K. Kleemayr

Federal Research and Training Centre for Forests, Natural Hazards and Landscape (BFW)


Innsbruck, Austria

Innsbruck, Austria

Contributions by country Austria M.S. Adams, A. Zeidler, K. Hagen & R. Fromm

H. Siegel & G. Siegel


Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (BMLFUW)

Innsbruck/Vienna, Austria

Vienna, Austria

C. Stehlik & G. Schrömmer

C. Rachoy

PRISMA solutions EDV-Dienstleistungen GmbH

Austrian Federal Railways (ÖBB), Infrastruktur AG

Mödling, Austria

Vienna, Austria

France D. Laigle, J.-M. Tacnet, F. Berger & F. Liébault National Research Institute of Science and Technology for Environment and Agriculture (IRSTEA) Grenoble, France

Italy V. Larcher & C. Strada

S. Simoni

Office of Geology and Building Material Testing, Autonomous Province of Bolzano-South Tyrol

Mountain-eering srl – Spin off, Trento University Bolzano, Italy

Bolzano, Italy E. Casagranda & S. Meninno

G. Zampedri

DICAM – University of Trento

Servizio Geologico Provincia Autonoma

Trento, Italy

Trento, Italy

R. Pasquazzo

C. Gregoretti & M. Degetto

Geologia Geotecnica Ambiente

Department of Land, Environment, Agriculture and Agro-Forest Environments Forestry of the University of Padova

Pergine (TN), Italy

Legnaro, Italy M. da Canal, G.R. Scussel & A. Andrich

D. Tiranti, R. Cremonini & F. Motta

Regional Agency for the Protection of the Environment, Veneto

Regional Agency for the Environmental Protection of Piemonte, Piemonte

Belluno, Italy

Torino, Italy

H. Pechlaner, S. Pichler & L. Kofink European Academy (EURAC) Bozen – Bolzano, Italy

Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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Slovenia G. Rak, G. Zupančič, J. Sodnik, D. Kozelj,

J. Papež

M. Mikoš & F. Steinman

Hidrotehnik (formerly of the Torrent and Erosion Control Service Slovenia, PUH)

University of Ljubljana Slovenia, Ljubljana

Slovenia, Ljubljana

Switzerland M. Bründl WSL Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research SLF Davos, Switzerland


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Summary The Alpine Space is well served with high-level transport infrastructure. In case of temporary disruption of these traffic networks, local alternative routes are seldomly available and large-scale detours are necessary. Due to rising traffic frequency, damage potentials are increasing. In a globalised Alpine Space, prospering economy depends more and more on permanent connectivity and ‘just-in-time’ transport relations. However, for historic reasons transport lines do not comply with today’s security considerations and are exposed to a wide range of natural hazards. In addition to the immediate casualties following the impact of natural hazards (loss of life, damage to material assets), the disruption may cause indirect socio-economic costs for the local population and the industry, transport or service sector. The EU-funded project PARAmount (imProved Accessibility: Reliability and security of Alpine transport infrastructure related to mountainous hazards in a changing climate) therefore aimed at improving hazard and risk management strategies for infrastructure protection by the adaptation of existing tools and development of novel ones, as well as practices with a focus on infrastructurerelevant issues, especially with regard to the potential impact of climate change. The thorough initial state-of-the-art analysis of natural hazards management covered the accessibility constraints and potentials, considering risk perception and information requirements of decision-makers. Based on this cross-sectoral analysis, existing natural hazard management tools were adapted to the special requirements of transport infrastructure protection. Easy-to-use models were tested and implemented in the selected regional test beds, taking into account regional risk situations, existing management systems and the legal and institutional framework. The results were evaluated and used to improve and develop Decision Support Systems (DSS), serving as a basis for efficient decisionmaking in the pilot regions. The Risk Management and Implementation Handbook (RMIH) provides a concise summary of the implementation of these risk management tools, methods and procedures within the project PARAmount. It therefore offers the reader a condensed overview of the entire project and a comparable evaluation of the activities carried out on the local, regional, national and transnational scale. It addresses scientists and practitioners alike from the field of natural hazard management, who specialise in infrastructure-related issues. Since a strong focus of PARAmount was laid on actively involving institutions responsible for managing, operating and maintaining infrastructure, this handbook aims at facilitating to bridge the gap between science and practice. This handbook is structured in such a way that allows the reader to follow and understand the implementation process within PARAmount. It provides an initial overview of the institutional and legal framework in all five countries, represented by the 13 institutions in PARAmount, and outlines the context of the implementation process. The current state of risk management of infrastructure in particular and the respective legal framework in a more general sense, are also highlighted. This allows a direct comparison of the test beds in PARAmount with regard to accessibility and vulnerability to natural hazards (Chapter 1). The reader is furthermore provided with a very concise summary of the aims and results regarding the development and application of the tools/methods/procedures in PARAmount (Chapter 2), which are further evaluated in detail in the course of a SWOT analysis (Chapter 3). Hotspots were defined on several spatial levels (local, regional and national) as a result of the implementation process and were linked to the corresponding recommendations to suggest potential improvements of the status quo (Chapter 4). The document reaches its conclusion by issuing guidelines for regional risk governance processes (Chapter 5), as well as agreed regional action plans, which conclude the implementation process and form the final step in facilitating the transferability of these best practice examples (Chapter 6). Each chapter provides a transnational synthesis. This handbook is closely linked to other deliverables in PARAmount (e.g. Decision Support Guidelines and Guidelines for Operative Tools), providing the practical implementation and application of the technical results described in the guidelines. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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Table of Contents Authors of the Risk Management and Implementation Handbook ...................................................... i Summary ...............................................................................................................................................iii Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................. iv Foreword............................................................................................................................................. viii 1

Country and test bed survey ................................................................................................... 1

1.1

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1

1.2

Austria ...................................................................................................................................... 1

1.2.1

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management in Austria ....................... 2

1.2.2

Austrian test bed Stanzer Valley .............................................................................................. 5

1.3

France..................................................................................................................................... 15

1.3.1

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management in France ..................... 15

1.3.2

Location of test beds and overview of the objectives ........................................................... 17

1.3.3

Manival .................................................................................................................................. 18

1.3.4

St Antoine............................................................................................................................... 21

1.3.5

Southern French Alps ............................................................................................................. 23

1.4

Italy ........................................................................................................................................ 25

1.4.1

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management in Italy ......................... 25

1.4.2

Location of the Italian test beds in PARAmount .................................................................... 29

1.4.3

Brenner/ Brennero ................................................................................................................. 29

1.4.4

Rolle Pass ............................................................................................................................... 32

1.4.5

Cortina/Fiames....................................................................................................................... 34

1.4.6

Susa Valley ............................................................................................................................. 39

1.5

Slovenia .................................................................................................................................. 43

1.5.1

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management in Slovenia ................... 43

1.5.2

Posočje ................................................................................................................................... 44

1.5.3

Koroška Bela........................................................................................................................... 47

1.6

Switzerland............................................................................................................................. 49

1.6.1

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management in Switzerland ............. 49

1.6.2

Sedrun/Tujetsch ..................................................................................................................... 50

1.7

Transnational test bed summary ........................................................................................... 52

2

Implementation of the aims, tools/methods/procedures and results in the PARAmount test beds .......................................................................................................................................... 57

2.1

Stanzer Valley (Austria) .......................................................................................................... 57

2.1.1

Aims ....................................................................................................................................... 58


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2.1.2

Tools/methods/procedures ................................................................................................... 59

2.1.3

Main results ........................................................................................................................... 63

2.1.4

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 65

2.2

Manival, Southern French Alps & St. Antoine (France) ......................................................... 65

2.2.1

Aims in PARAmount ............................................................................................................... 65

2.2.2


2.2.3

Main results ........................................................................................................................... 68

2.2.4

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 69

2.3

Brennero/Brenner, Rolle Pass (Dolomites), Cortina/Fiames, Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) & Upper Susa Valley (Italy) ...................................................................................................................... 69

2.3.1


2.3.2


2.3.3

Main results ........................................................................................................................... 80

2.3.4

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 90

2.4

Posočje & Koroška Bela (Slovenia) ......................................................................................... 92

2.4.1


2.4.2


2.4.3

Main results ........................................................................................................................... 94

2.4.4

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 95

2.5

Sedrun/Tujetsch (Switzerland)............................................................................................... 96

2.5.1


2.5.2


2.5.3

Main results & discussion ...................................................................................................... 96

2.6

Transnational aims, tools/methods/procedures and results ................................................ 99

3

Transnational SWOT analyses of tools/methods/procedures developed and implemented in test beds ............................................................................................................................. 104

3.1

Damage-potential/vulnerability assessment tools/methods/procedures .......................... 105

3.2

Hazard potential tools/methods/procedures ...................................................................... 108

3.2.1

Debris flow ........................................................................................................................... 108

3.2.2

Rockfall ................................................................................................................................. 113

3.2.3

Avalanche ............................................................................................................................. 119

3.3

Risk assessment tools/methods/procedures....................................................................... 123

3.4

Hazard early warning tools/methods/procedures .............................................................. 125

3.5

Decision-support tools/methods/procedures ..................................................................... 128

4

Identification of hazard hotspots and recommendations ................................................. 135

4.1

Stanzer Valley (Austria) ........................................................................................................ 136


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4.1.1

Derivation of potential hazard hotspots .............................................................................. 136

4.1.2

Recommendations for potential hazard hotspots ............................................................... 140

4.2

Southern French Alps & St Antoine (France) ....................................................................... 141

4.2.1

Derivation of hazard hotspots ............................................................................................. 141

4.2.2

Recommendations for hazard hotspots .............................................................................. 144

4.3

Brennero/Brenner & Rolle Pass (Dolomites) (Italy) ............................................................. 145

4.3.1


4.3.2


4.4

Posočje & Koroška Bela (Slovenia) ....................................................................................... 154

4.4.1


4.4.2


5

Guidelines for regional risk governance processes (‘marketing strategy’) for higher acceptance of risk-minimising measures .............................................................................. 162

5.1

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 162

5.2

Institutions directly involved in regional and local decision-making ................................... 164

5.2.1

Prevention ............................................................................................................................ 164

5.2.2

Preparation .......................................................................................................................... 166

5.2.3

Intervention ......................................................................................................................... 168

5.3

Institutions dealing with natural hazards on a broader administrative or research-oriented level & infrastructure providers ............................................................................................. 168

5.3.1

BMLFUW/ÖBB/BFW............................................................................................................. 168

5.3.2

PUH/UL................................................................................................................................. 170

5.3.3

IRSTEA .................................................................................................................................. 173

5.4

Transnational summary of guidelines .................................................................................. 176

6

Proposal for regional action plans with high (political) acceptance ................................. 177

6.1

Which actions are proposed for improving monitoring/surveying? ................................... 178

6.1.1

BMLFUW/ÖBB/BFW............................................................................................................. 178

6.1.2

PAB ....................................................................................................................................... 178

6.1.3

PAT ....................................................................................................................................... 180

6.1.4

ARPAV .................................................................................................................................. 181

6.1.5

ARPAP................................................................................................................................... 181

6.1.6

PUH/UL................................................................................................................................. 181

6.1.7

IRSTEA .................................................................................................................................. 182

6.2

Which actions are proposed for improving the assessment of risks/hazards? ................... 182

6.2.1

BMLFUW/ÖBB/BFW............................................................................................................. 182

6.2.2

PAT ....................................................................................................................................... 182


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6.2.3

ARPAP................................................................................................................................... 182

6.2.4

PUH/UL................................................................................................................................. 183

6.2.5

IRSTEA .................................................................................................................................. 183

6.3

Which actions are proposed for improving the capitalisation of the tools/methods/procedures with regard to hazard & risk? .................................................... 183

6.3.1

BMLFUW/ÖBB/BFW............................................................................................................. 183

6.3.2

PAT ....................................................................................................................................... 184

6.3.3

ARPAP................................................................................................................................... 184

6.3.4

PUH/UL................................................................................................................................. 184

6.3.5

IRSTEA .................................................................................................................................. 185

6.4

What are the main future challenges in the test beds? ...................................................... 185

6.4.1

BMLFUW/ÖBB/BFW............................................................................................................. 185

6.4.2

PAT ....................................................................................................................................... 185

6.4.3

ARPAV .................................................................................................................................. 185

6.4.4

ARPAP................................................................................................................................... 185

6.4.5

PUH/UL................................................................................................................................. 185

6.4.6

IRSTEA .................................................................................................................................. 186

References ........................................................................................................................................ 187 List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................... 195 List of Tables ..................................................................................................................................... 198 List of Figures .................................................................................................................................... 199 Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... 204 Annex A ............................................................................................................................................. 206


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Foreword Chaired by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (BMLFUW), the project PARAmount was conducted from 2009 to 2012. It is part of the ‘European Territorial Cooperation’ in the context of the Alpine Space Programme (ASP), and is cofunded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). PARAmount brought together 13 project partners (PPs) from five different European countries, including authorities, public service providers, scientific experts and end-users, mainly from the field of natural hazard management. The expertise of transport infrastructure operation and maintenance institutions, as well as municipal, regional and national authorities was combined with the specialised knowledge of scientific experts on natural hazard management within all five partner countries (Austria, France, Italy, Slovenia and Switzerland).The project was started in September 2009 and finalised in November 2012.

The following institutions were involved in PARAmount as PPs: 

Federal Austrian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management – Forestry Department (BMLFUW)



Austrian Federal Railways, Railnet Austria Inc., Railway Service, Natural Hazards Management (ÖBB)



Federal Research and Training Centre for Forests, Natural Hazards and Landscape – Department of Natural Hazards (BFW)



Autonomous Province of Bolzano – South Tyrol, Geological Service (PAB)



Autonomous Province of Trento, Department of Civil Protection and Infrastructure (PAT)



University of Padua – Department Land and Agro-Forest Environments (TESAF)



Regional Agency for the Environmental Protection of Veneto (ARPAV)



Regional Agency for the Environmental Protection of Piemonte (ARPAP)



Torrent and Erosion Control Service Slovenia (PUH)



University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Civil and Geodetic Engineering (UL)



National Research Institute of Science and Technology for Environment and Agriculture (IRSTEA); Snow Avalanche Engineering and Torrent Control Research Unit (ETNA)



Federal Office for the Environment – Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (BAFU)



Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research SLF (WSL)

This partnership combined authorities, public service providers, scientific experts and end-users from across the Alpine Space. It ensured the practical relevance and applicability of the results. The broad experiences of the PPs in the sectors of transport and natural hazard provided good opportunities to introduce innovative methods, comprehensive solutions and integrative systems for accessibility improvement.


viii

PARAmount was divided into eight Work Packages (WP): one for project preparation (WP1), two for project administration (WP2 & 3) and five more to cover the thematic work. The main actions and operational goals of PARAmount within these WPs are in detail: 

WP4 ‘Regional Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats (SWOT) analysis and risk management state-of-the-art’: Creating an inventory of existing hazard management strategies and their implementation in the study area; analysis of current deficiencies and requirements in view of the state of affairs in natural hazard management with special regard to the requirements of transport infrastructure.



WP5 ‘Regional risk situation’: Assessing damage and hazard potentials in selected regional test beds, resulting in damage cadastres and hazard maps for the processes debris flow, avalanches & rockfall, with transport infrastructure relevance; risk assessments on a regional level, taking into account the findings of WP4 and an improved understanding of hazardspecific impacts on transport infrastructure (e.g. regarding vulnerability and indirect socioeconomic consequences); developing a regional economic model, which serves as the basis for the calculation of accessibility-related damages.



WP6 ‘Forecast systems for risk management on traffic routes’: Adapting and developing natural hazard management tools and hazard early warning systems (HEWS) to fit the specific requirements of the transport sector. As existing tools focus on populated areas and single hazard processes, tools applied to protect transport infrastructure need to have a broader spatial and thematic focus; increasing the reliability of risk forecasts in order to provide more accurate data, to be used in decision-making.



WP7 ‘Decision support for infrastructure protection’: Improving knowledge transfer and cross-sectoral risk communication & awareness, by establishing a risk dialogue with relevant stakeholders on the study sites, bringing together specialists from the transportation sector with authorities and experts from all administrative levels, dealing with natural hazard and risk management; developing and implementing easy-to-use Decision Support Systems (DSS) adapted and developed for the requirements of transport infrastructure protection in PARAmount, aimed at supporting decision-makers in the different phases of the decisionmaking process.



WP8 ‘Evaluation and Recommendation’: Presentation of the project results in a comprehensive and easy-to-use way for the implementation in other regions; establishing best-practice models and recommendations aiming to allow the transferability of results and therefore contributing to the improvement of existing risk management tools for infrastructure-specific measures in the whole ASP region; organising and conducting postgraduate courses, thus providing a tailored education, aiming at long-lasting knowledge transfer to experts & decision makers. This handbook is also part of the WP8.

This report is a response to the request of society for the protection of transport infrastructure against natural hazards and contains a compilation of all the efforts of the experts participating in the ASP project PARAmount. It is with great pleasure that I would like to acknowledge all the individuals and groups who dedicated their time, enthusiasm and commitment to PARAmount. I am deeply convinced that the local and regional application of the knowledge, solutions and recommendations generated by the partners of the PARAmount project will contribute to the sustainable development of the Alpine Space and benefit the people living in or transiting this mountainous area.

Vienna, 21 November 2012


Hubert Siegel, BMLFUW

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1

Country and test bed survey

1.1

Introduction

The first chapter of this handbook provides a summary of the institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management on a country level for each of the five member states that participated in PARAmount, answering the following questions: 

What are the most important laws that apply to natural hazard management and the processes studied in PARAmount?



Which levels of governance are involved?



Who are the main natural hazard-relevant governing bodies and how do they interact?



Which legal instruments are available (e.g. hazard maps)?



Are there additional laws and regulations, which apply on a provincial level only and are relevant to natural hazard management?

The second part of this chapter deals with the PARAmount test beds. It includes a summary report, focussing on the following key attributes: 

General description (geographic location, size/scale, altitude, etc.)



Relevance to PARAmount – description of infrastructure at risk and its regional/supraregional importance



Relevant natural hazard processes in the test bed/historical information on natural hazards with consequences on transport infrastructure in the test bed



Most important institutions that are responsible for natural hazard & risk management in the test bed; additional stakeholders that are affected or participate and how they interact



Role of PPs in the test bed and connection to stakeholders/institutions

For additional information, the reader is referred to the detailed test bed descriptions provided by each PP on the PARAmount website (PARAmount, 2012).

1.2

Austria

The situation with regard to the involvement in natural hazard management and the operation and maintenance of critical infrastructure in the test bed is quite diverse for the various Austrian PPs: 

The BFW supports infrastructure providers with expert knowledge and assistance in the frame of natural hazard and risk management on a provincial and regional level; however, the BFW does not have any direct responsibility regarding the operation or maintenance of transport infrastructure.



The Forestry Department of the BMLFUW deals with natural hazard and risk management issues on a federal administrative level, with no direct connection to infrastructure providers (notwithstanding the competences of other departments of the BMLFUW); therefore they also do not have any direct responsibility regarding the operation or maintenance of transport infrastructure.



The ÖBB as railway operator are directly responsible for the operation and management of the rail network and natural hazard and risk management for this type of infrastructure.


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However, as all Austrian PPs worked in a common test bed and the infrastructure lines partly run in close proximity through the valley, most sections of the handbook were drafted in a joint effort, with the aim of reflecting the specific roles of the respective PPs.

1.2.1

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management in Austria

Legislation Austria has a long tradition in dealing with natural hazards (Romang et al., 2009). The first efforts to prevent or reduce the impact of natural hazards can be traced back as far as the Middle Ages (Holub & Fuchs, 2009). A series of floods in the year 1882 initiated the need to establish a legal basis for hazard mitigation. In 1884 the first law regulating the interventions in mountain torrents was passed (Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie, 1884) and the corresponding federal office founded. This office is known today as the Austrian Federal Service for Torrent and Avalanche Control (Forsttechnischer Dienst für Wildbach- und Lawinenverbauung – WLV) (Thüring, 2003). Currently the Austrian legislation is very diverse with regard to hazard and risk management, and according to Holub & Fuchs (2009) no consistent text of law exists that uniformly governs the potential impact of natural hazards, especially with regard to transport infrastructure. However, generally there is a clear allocation of roles between sectoral hazard management authorities, with for example the WLV providing the technical competence in hazard assessment, as an input for spatial planning. As Zeidler (2011) points out: “Due to the strong fragmentation of competences in natural hazard management in Austria, there is, in principle, a strong need for interdisciplinary, interinstitutional, cross-level and cross-sector coordination and cooperation in natural hazard management.” In the specific context of PARAmount this should inter alia include representatives from national, provincial and municipal authorities, as well as infrastructure operators. Natural hazard management in Austria is based on the following laws (to name the most prominent): 

Forest Act (Republik Österreich, 1975) essentially regulates the forestal spatial planning, i.e. prescribing hazard zone mapping in catchments susceptible to natural hazards, which are endangering the settlement area (Forest Act §99).



Regulation on Hazard Mapping (Republik Österreich, 1976) regulates in detail the contents and design of hazard maps by the WLV, which serve as a basis for the project planning and realisation of mitigation measures.



Technical Guidelines for the Federal Service for Torrent and Avalanche Control (BMLFUW, 2006a) contains technical specifications for the Regulation on Hazard Mapping.



Hydrography Act (Republik Österreich, 1959) describes the aims and framework requirements of the Water Resource Management in connection with the respective technical guidelines (BMLFUW, 2006b).



Hydraulic Engineering Assistance Act (Republik Österreich, 1985) regulates the federal grants for the implementation of water management mitigation measures.



Technical Guidelines for the Federal Administration for Water Engineering (BMLFUW, 2006b) contains the technical specifications for the Hydraulic Engineering Assistance Act (RIWA-T).



Various regulations at the provincial, regional and local level, including Spatial Planning Act, Associated Decrees, Building Regulation, as well as the Provincial, Regional and Local Development Plan, Land Use Plan and Land Development Plan, govern the implementation of the afore mentioned laws in the respective Austrian Provinces.


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

EU-directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks requires mapping the flood extent and assessing the human and material assets at risk.

(after Holub & Fuchs, 2009; Thüring, 2003; ÖROK, 2005 and Rudolf-Miklau, 2009) These laws and the corresponding revisions are amended by additional articles with implications for natural hazard management, which are included in the federal traffic law and laws governing disaster management. As a result of the distinctive federal character of the Republic of Austria, a high diversity of competences and jurisdictions with respect to natural hazard management arises, while the level of detail and interpretation of the federal laws on a provincial level additionally differs between the nine provinces (Hattenberger, 2006; Kanonier, 2006; Romang et al., 2009). Figure 1 provides an overview of the legal basis of natural hazard management in Austria, split by competence scale – federal, provincial, regional & local (Holub & Fuchs, 2009). All federal and regional legislations currently valid in Austria in terms of natural hazard management are available online through the BKA (Federal Austrian Chancellery – Bundeskanzleramt Österreich) (www.ris.bka.gv.at).

Figure 1: The Austrian structure of legislation and executive competence for Alpine natural hazards (modified after: ÖROK (2005) and Holub & Fuchs (2009)).

Responsible institutions and stakeholders On the whole, the main responsibility of natural hazard legislation and executive competence in Austria is almost exclusively located on the federal level. The two main federal institutions, both governmental departments of the BMLFUW, dealing with natural hazards include (Thüring, 2003):


3



WLV: Represented in all provinces (Länder) with a total of seven units (Sektionen) and 29 regional offices (Gebietsbauleitungen); tasked inter alia with the protection of the settlement area (Raumrelevanter Bereich) from mountain torrents, avalanches and erosion; implements the legal prescription provided by the Austrian Forest Act (Republik Österreich, 1975), the associated Regulation on Hazard Mapping (Republik Österreich, 1976) and accompanying Technical Guidelines for Hazard Mapping; responsible for the upper catchments and mass movements; provides expert opinion and consultation regarding natural hazards, as well as planning and constructing technical, biological and forestry interventions; works mainly on a local level in the municipalities; the research activities, which were originally conducted within the WLV are now carried out by the BFW (Federal Research and Training Centre for Forests, Natural Hazards and Landscape) (Thüring, 2003).



BWV – Federal Administration for Water Engineering (Bundeswasserbauverwaltung): the BWV’s competence is delegated from the federal level to the Water Resource Management (Schutzwasserwirtschaft) offices within the respective provinces (Thüring, 2003); responsible for flood hazard mapping of the larger rivers and lower catchments; Danube, March and parts of the Thaya, which are classified as waterways, are however supervised by the Austrian Waterway Management and Development Company (‘via Donau’) (Rudolf-Miklau, 2009).

The appointment of competences between these two institutions is based on the size of the water body and its catchment area. A list is produced by the federal and provincial authorities, clearly specifying the respective responsibilities (Thüring, 2003). While several other institutions and ministries are also involved in natural hazard management on a federal level (e.g. the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology or the Federal Ministry of Finance), the bulk of the magisterial duties and responsibilities arising from the protection against natural hazards, especially with regard to the protection of transport infrastructure, is administered by either the respective provincial authorities (district administrative authorities and provincial governors) or the corresponding infrastructure providers (e.g. ÖBB or ASFiNAG – Austrian Motorway and Expressway Network Operator) (Rudolf-Miklau, 2009). These duties include, but are not limited to, regional planning and regional development, as well as related regional legal regulations, which implement the federal laws into construction and spatial planning laws on the one hand and, on the other, ensuring to build, maintain and operate the infrastructure lines and associated facilities in accordance with the respective laws (e.g. Austrian Railway Law, 1957). An extensive list of all natural hazard-related stakeholders in Austria is provided by RudolfMiklau (2009).

Hazard maps in Austria As stated in Figure 1, the main legal instruments of the WLV and BWV are hazard maps, which are designed according to the legal basis outlined above. The hazard maps are based on the area of an individual municipality and should be established in a reproducible manner. The draft is then reviewed by the respective mayor and the municipality’s public. Finally an expert jury, which is made up of representatives from the BMLFUW, the WLV, the province and the municipality, evaluates the drafted hazard map and examines its correctness. The final approval by the federal minister (BMLFUW) confirms its validity (Thüring, 2003). However, as Holub & Fuchs (2009) point out, the delimitation of hazard maps is not a statutory regulation, according to the Austrian Superior Administrative Court (VwGH 27.03.1995, 91/10/0090, Hattenberger, 2006; Kanonier, 2006). They are therefore not legally binding and are classified as expert testimony rather than normative acts. It is then up to the respective province to implement binding references to hazard maps in their spatial planning laws, as for example is the case in the Tyrolean Act on Spatial Planning (Amt der Tiroler Landesregierung, 2006 § 1 Abs. 2 lit. d). Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

4

However, several acts (BMLF, 1980; BMLF, 1991) have been developed on a federal level to be able to regulate the consequences in case the contents of the hazard maps are not respected (i.e. no federal co-financing of mitigation measures), also known as impediment reasons (Hinderungsgründe) (Thüring, 2003). With regard to transport infrastructure, these hazard maps are, however, only of limited informative value, as they are only applicable to the settlement area. It is therefore necessary for the respective transport infrastructure provider to assess and manage natural hazard along their network.

1.2.2

Austrian test bed Stanzer Valley

The Stanzer Valley is the designated test bed of the Austrian project partners, the BFW and ÖBB, as well as the project’s lead partner, the BMLFUW. It is located in western Austria in the Arlberg region (district of Landeck, Tyrol), and reaches from the municipality of Pians in the east, to the border of the Province of Tyrol in the west. The test bed covers an area of approximately 300 km², roughly 200 km² of which are directly relevant to the critical infrastructure, running the length of the valley (Adams & Huber, 2010; Adams et al., 2010). Figure 2 gives an overview of the Stanzer Valley and its four main municipalities (St. Anton am Arlberg, Pettneu am Arlberg, Flirsch and Strengen). Additionally, parts of the municipal areas of Grins, Pians and Tobadill are included in the test bed. The main river of the Stanzer Valley is the Rosanna, which is a tributary to the Sanna, which in turn flows into the Inn.

Figure 2: Overview of test bed Stanzer Valley (Tyrol, Austria) (source: BFW).

The topography of the Stanzer Valley, with maximum height differences of up to 2,300 m (approximately 900 m a.s.l. to 3,200 m a.s.l.) and a generally high relief energy as well as its climatic, geological and vegetational predisposition, result in a high susceptibility to a wide range of natural hazards (e.g. avalanches, rockfall, debris flow and torrential flooding), threatening the transport infrastructure (Perzl et al., 2012; BFW, 2010). Therefore, the infrastructure providers, the WLV and other institutions and authorities have invested heavily into temporary and permanent mitigation and defence constructions over the years (WLV, 2010). Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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The four main communities of the Stanzer Valley are home to a population of 6,285 inhabitants (as of 2009). In this region the settlements are concentrated on the partially very narrow valley bottom as well as the adjoining slopes and alluvial fans of the Rosanna tributaries. Of the total municipal area of these four communities, only 5.6% can be used for permanent settlement, thus also limiting the available space for transport infrastructure (Amt der Tiroler Landesregierung, 2010). Figure 3 (left) gives an impression of the central section of the test bed.

Figure 3: Central section of the Austrian test bed Stanzer Valley (left) (source: BFW); close-up view of the critical road and rail infrastructure in the test bed: Arlberg railway (far left in the picture) expressway (left in the picture) and A-road (right in the picture) near junction Flirsch Ost (right) (source: BFW).

Critical infrastructure The Arlberg separates the Stanzer Valley (Tyrol) in the east from the Kloster Valley (Vorarlberg) in the west and therefore forms a natural barrier for traffic travelling between eastern & central Austria and western Austria and Switzerland. It is crossed by an A-road, which was the main road link between Tyrol and Vorarlberg (Arlberg pass at 1,793 m a.s.l.), prior to the construction of the Arlberg tunnel and the S16 expressway. Transportation over the Arlberg pass has been documented from an early age. The importance of this route has increased throughout the years. The main construction and expansion of the first road infrastructure was triggered by an increase in salt and textile trade in the 18th century. Winter tourism became extremely important in the Arlberg region in the 20th century, leading to an increase in traffic and subsequently to a further expansion of the transport infrastructure (BFW, 2010). With the aim of providing a safe and reliable alternative to the afore-mentioned A-road, which was often closed in winter due to avalanche danger, the construction of the Arlberg expressway S16 started in 1973 with the building of the Arlberg road tunnel. Consequently, the construction of highlevel access roads to this tunnel followed, in order to accomodate for the increase in traffic towards the end of the 20th century (Vilanek, 1991). The S16 was finalised in 2005 with the completion of the last section, the Zintlkopftunnel. The S16 currently forms the most reliable and well-protected road infrastructure connection in the Stanzer Valley. Approximately 64% of the whole road length is permanently protected by either tunnels or galleries. However, in case the S16 is interrupted (e.g. due to a traffic accident or a natural hazard event), the A-road and some additional ancillary roads within the local municipalities can theoretically function as a bypass for the bulk of the transit and local traffic.


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The A-road consists of three adjoining sections within the test bed: the B171 runs from the eastern boarder of the test bed near the municipality of Grins to the junction Flirsch Ost; the L68 runs from junction Flirsch Ost to the junction St. Anton am Arlberg; the B197 follows the valley from junction St. Anton am Arlberg to the Arlberg pass at the western-most point of the test bed. This road is mostly used for direct access to the local municipalities, rather than for transit. Figure 3 (right) gives an impression of the infrastructure in the eastern part of the test bed – the A-road runs on the right side of the picture, the expressway on the left and the railway line can be seen in the background. The Arlberg railway line dates back as far as 1884. It was constructed within four years and connects Innsbruck in the east with Bludenz in the west. The core of this section is a 10.3 km-long tunnel through the Arlberg mountain (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Impressions from the construction of the Arlberg railway line in the late 19th century; railway portal in the Stanzer Valley (left); clearing avalanche snow (right) (source: ÖBB).

The Arlberg railway also features the first avalanche mitigation measures ever constructed in Austria, as well as an avalanche warning service, which was implemented from the opening of the Arlberg railway onwards (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Mitigation measures by the ÖBB in the Arlberg region (left); meteorological data collected by the avalanche warning service of the ÖBB (right) (source: ÖBB).


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To sum up, the critical road and rail infrastructure in the test bed Stanzer Valley therefore consists of: 

S16 from Gurnauer Tunnel (east) to the Arlberg Tunnel (west)



A-road (B171, L68, B197) from junction Paznaun (east) to the Arlberg pass (west)



Ancillary roads within the municipalities of Flirsch, Pettneu and St. Anton am Arlberg



Arlberg railway line from Landeck (east) to the Arlberg Tunnel (west)

Maintenance and management of all A-roads falls under the responsibility of the Office of the Provincial Government of Tyrol (OPGT). The expressway is in the custody of the federal institution ASFiNAG. The mainentance and management of the railway line falls under the responsibility of the ÖBB, where an in-company branch is responsible for natural hazard and disaster management (Romang et al., 2009). A detailed overview of the stakeholders’ activities in the test bed is provided in Chapter 2.1.

Volume of traffic in the test bed The main source of income in the Stanzer Valley stems from tourism in both summer and winter, with a strong focus on winter tourism (overnight stays 2009 – winter: 1,158,566; summer: 220,454). Winter tourism is centred around the municipality of St. Anton am Arlberg, featuring extensive ski areas and a well-developed hotel business, while some smaller ski areas are located in Flirsch and Pettneu. The inhabitants of the Stanzer Valley are strongly oriented towards the main city of the district, Landeck, to cover their basic living needs (employment, goods and services, etc.). According to the last census from 2001, 1,021 in-commuters and 1,458 out-commuters were registered (Amt der Tiroler Landesregierung, 2010). Unfortunately no data is available regarding the mode of transport used by these commuters (i.e. road or rail). These numbers highlight the importance of the accessibility, mobility and reliability of the transport infrastructure network in the test bed and are mirrored in the pattern of the volume of traffic. One of the most important factors to determine the volume of road traffic for a certain region is the MDT (Mean Daily Traffic). The MDT provides the average number of vehicles passing a certain point within 24 hours. The two institutions responsible for road maintenance and management in the Stanzer Valley (OPGT and ASFiNAG), gather information on the number and type of vehicles passing a total of six counting points along the A-road and the expressway. The names and locations of these counting points are displayed in Figure 6 (top). Figure 6 (bottom left) gives an overview of the development of the mean monthly traffic throughout the years 2008–2012 along the Arlberg expressway. The plots for all counting points along the S16 show a characteristic flux, which mirrors the role the road plays for tourism in the region. The peak values lie in the summer months (July to September) and the winter season (February to April). The typical mid-season lull in tourism and thus in traffic can be traced especially for the counting points Grins and Flirscher-Tunnel. For the A-road this development is shown in Figure 6 (bottom right). Here, the traffic pattern is characterised by the sharp decline of MDT values in August 2005, when the A-road was substantially damaged by a landslide in the Zintlwald area, causing a closure for several months. The Strenger Tunnel from the S16, which bypasses this area, had just been finalised and traffic could be rerouted (Volgger et al., 2006). Subsequently the MDT dropped from peak values of approximately 16,000 vehicles/day to below 2,000 vehicles/day on a monthly average.


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The seasonal variations identified for the S16 can also be found in the A-road data from the counting point in St. Anton Guhlbrücke. The bulk of the winter tourists mostly leave the S16 in St. Anton and head for the accommodation via the local road connections. The majority of the summer traffic is made up of transit, therefore bypassing this section en route to the Arlberg Pass. Due to this influx from the expressway, higher MDT values are recorded in St. Anton than at the other counting points along the A-road. A detailed analysis of the MDT values is available in Adams (2012a). However, besides its vital role for the local and regional economy, this road connection is also part of the E-road network (E-60) in Europe, designating its supra-regional and international importance within the Alpine Space (UNECE, 2012).

Figure 6: Overview of all counting points within the test bed for both expressway and A-road (top); development of mean monthly traffic on the expressway (2008 to 2012) (bottom left) (data source – ASFiNAG); development of mean monthly traffic on the A-road (2003 to 2012), (bottom right) (data source – OPGT) (all layouts – source: BFW).


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The operating data for the railway track, split by the type of train and the time of day, is pictured in Table 1. According to the schedule of 2008/2009, a total of 74 trains are run on the Arlberg railway line. This number is predicted to rise by 25% by the year 2025 to a total of 98 trains, including passenger, freight and service trains. Table 1: Operating data for the Arlberg railway (Landeck – St. Anton a. Arlberg – VzG 10105) according to the schedule for the years 2008/2009 and the operating programme for 2025 (source: ÖBB).

Past events cadastre of the Austrian test bed Over the years, the transport infrastructure lines in the Arlberg region have been heavily influenced by the occurrence of natural hazards. The following list gives an impression of some of the major events, demonstrating the hazard potential in this area, including both the Stanzer Valley and the neighbouring Kloster Valley, which lies on the western side of the Arlberg region (BFW, 2010): 

Winter 1952/53: an avalanche strikes a bus with winter tourists and kills 23 people in Langen am Arlberg



Winter 1953/54: an avalanche destroys the railway station and a train at Dalaas (10 people die)



Winter 1987/88: an avalanche destroys houses in St. Anton and interrupts railway traffic (7 people die)



Summer 1995: a thunderstorm causes a debris flow at the Masonbach near Dalaas. Several coaches of a passing train are derailed; 3 people die, several people get injured



August 2005: floods and debris flow destroy the roads and the railway in many places, interrupting the railway line from 29 August 2005 until 3 December 2005



Events 2012: both expressway and railway are interrupted for several days by snow-break of trees and snow slides along the rail track and road; additionally, rail and road are closed as a precautionary measure, due to high avalanche danger

In the scope of the PARAmount project, a past events cadastre was compiled, based on the previously existing structure of the BFW-database (Perzl et al., 2012). An existing source of comprehensive and consistent documentation of infrastructure-related hazard events could not be identified. In a first step, data was collected from the following sources and implemented into the cadastre: 

WLV past events cadastre for hazard mapping



Local municipality chronicles



Reports from local fire brigades


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Figure 7: Aerial view of the confluence of Rosanna and Trisanna during the floods in August 2005 (source: WLV, Gebietsbauleitung Oberes Inntal).

Table 2 provides a brief overview of the datasets recorded in this first draft of the database during the summer of 2010 with respect to the hazard processes considered in PARAmount: snow processes (e.g. avalanches, snow slides), channel processes (e.g. debris flow) and fall processes (e.g. rockfall). Despite including nearly 300 natural hazard events, the collected datasets do not represent an exhaustive list, but rather a collection of available information on historical natural hazard events from different data sources. The oldest records date back as far as 1616 (private chronicle Rudolf Kathrein, Flirsch), the latest record was entered 2 August 2010 (low magnitude debris flow, Lattenbach). While the majority of the entries cover the period between 1900 and 1999 (249 of 297 records), 24 events were recorded for the years 1616 to 1899 and 2000 to 2010 respectively. The majority of the datasets were derived from the WLV, with a focus on events prior to (ca.) 1990. Only few records (mainly data on events 1999 and 2005) are available on more current occurrences. Due to the fact that a large part of the records were derived from hazard zone map cadastres produced by the WLV, the documentation mainly focuses on events that pose a threat to settlement areas (= areas relevant to hazard zone mapping). A gradual decrease in the number of recorded avalanche events (snow processes) from west to east can be deduced from Table 2, coinciding with the predominant west-east snowfall gradient in the test bed, as described by Perzl et al. (2012). However, fall processes and hillslope processes (i.e. rotational, translational landslides and debris slides) are poorly documented and thus underrepresented here. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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Table 2: Past event cadastre records classified by community and hazard type; events that affected the transport infrastructure are included in brackets (data sources: WLV, municipalities & fire brigades in the Stanzer Valley). Community

Snow processes

Channel processes

Fall processes

Total

St. Anton a. Arlberg

50 (14)

13 (5)

0 (0)

63 (19)

Pettneu a. Arlberg

36 (23)

46 (23)

0 (0)

82 (46)

Flirsch

19 (2)

30 (16)

0 (0)

49 (18)

Strengen

8 (3)

25 (10)

1 (1)

34 (14)

Grins

13 (2)

38 (10)

0 (0)

51 (12)

Pians

0 (0)

6 (0)

0 (0)

6 (0)

Tobadill

10 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

10 (0)

Total

136 (44)

158 (64)

1 (1)

295 (109)

Table 2 also shows that only few events are documented in the municipalities of Pians and Tobadill – this may be explained as follows: On the whole, the municipal area of Tobadill does not seem to be highly exposed to the investigated natural hazard phenomena, despite some avalanche tracks within the area of the municipality. No records exist of a significant flood or debris flow event in Tobadill – an appraisal confirmed by the local authorities. The low number of recorded events in Pians can be explained by the fact that most of the records covering events in the Lattenbach, the most active torrent catchment in the municipal area of Pians, are linked to the upstream municipality of Grins in the database. In order to avoid double entries of a single event in the database, the events at the Lattenbach were either associated with the municipality of Grins or Pians, depending on the source of documentation. As also shown in Table 2, most of the events recorded in Grins are not relevant to the project, since a high number of the documented events either did not involve transport infrastructure or only affected infrastructure of minor importance (local roads, forest roads). This database was improved upon at a later stage of the project by Perzl et al. (2012), by including the following additional sources of avalanche events: 

Past events cadastre by Fliri (1998)



Events compiled in the scope of the MONITOR II project (Perzl et al., 2012)



Natural hazard chronicles of the railway maintenance Dalaas (unpubl.)

Most events could be spatially referenced by an info point, which represents the centre of the deposition. Many events lack detail, but on the whole the database shows that large powder snow avalanches dominate the hazard potential in the test bed (Table 3). Most of the documented events have caused damage, either to persons or material assets, confirming the suggestion that the actual number of avalanches (including the non-damage events) in the test bed is in fact much higher. This is particularly relevant when validating numerical simulations, as the documented events only represent a small fraction of the actual hazard potential. The documentation of natural hazard events is generally incomplete, both in past and present, probably again due to the high diversity of competences and jurisdictions with respect to natural hazard management in Austria. Additional information for the railway is provided in Figure 8, which shows an overview of the natural hazard events that have occurred along the Arlberg railway (Stanzer Valley section) between 1984 and 2009. The main event categories are snow and channel processes with 27 and 59 events respectively. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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The BFW past events cadastre served as an input for several PARAmount deliverables in the WPs (work packages) 5 and 6. It provided a starting point for the identification of local hazard hotspots with respect to critical transport infrastructure as defined above (Hagen et al., 2012b) and offered a valuable source of information for the evaluation of simulation results for the avalanche and debris flow hazard indicator maps (Perzl et al., 2012; Adams, 2012a; Scheikl et al., 2012). Table 3: Documented avalanche events of the extended past events cadastre in the Stanzer Valley (data sources: BFW, Fliri (1998), railway maintenance Dalaas (unpubl.), WLV, municipalities & fire brigades in the Stanzer Valley). Powder snow avalanche

Dense flow avalanche

Wet snow avalanche

Snow slide

Ice avalanche

Mixed avalanche

Avalanche (unspecified)

Total

St. Anton a. Arlberg

33

11

3

0

0

1

14

62

Pettneu a. Arlberg

14

9

5

3

1

0

18

50

Flirsch

5

2

4

5

1

0

22

39

Strengen

2

1

4

3

0

0

7

17

Grins

6

0

0

0

0

0

7

13

Pians

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Tobadill

2

0

7

0

0

0

1

10

Total

62

23

23

11

2

1

69

191

Process/ community

Figure 8: Compilation of natural hazard events from the ÖBB past events cadastre along the Arlberg railway (source: ÖBB).

Stakeholders in the Stanzer Valley Risk communication is an integral part of risk assessment and the process of risk management. In PARAmount, a wide range of project-external beneficiaries and observers active in this test bed were brought together, forming the key infrastructure-relevant stakeholders. These stakeholders form the basis of the Regional Risk Dialogue (RRD) group (Chapter 2.1.2). Figure 9 gives an overview of these natural hazard management stakeholders, which are relevant to PARAmount, and were thus invited to take part in the various interviews, workshops, meetings and courses organised by the Austrian PPs.


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Figure 9: Stakeholders in the Austrian test bed Stanzer Valley responsible for road (top) and rail (bottom) transport infrastructure listed by their level of governance, function and name (source: BFW).

Remark: The level of governance indicates on which administrative scale the respective institutions are coordinated. In the case of the federal (state) institutions, for example (ÖBB, WLV, ASFiNAG), the coordination is run on a federal level. However, these institutions operate through regional and local representatives, which are in contact with the provincial and municipal institutions.


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1.3

France

1.3.1

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management in France

Even though the first law relating to natural hazards prevention dates from 1860 and the first hazard mapping procedures (for floods) date from 1928, the current system of natural risk prevention is based upon the following, quite recent, laws: 

Law no. 82-600 of 13 July 1982 defines the organisation of the French system of natural disaster compensation (managed by both insurance companies and the French government)



Law no. 87-565 of 22 July 1987 defines the organisation of the civil protection and rescue. It was improved by Law 2004-811 of 13 August 2004



Law no. 95-101 of 2 February 1995, defines the PPR (Risk Prevention Plans), the current system of risk assessment and contingency planning, and allows, in specific situations, the government to expropriate people when they are exposed to natural risks. This solution is provided when the cost of protection works exceeds the economic value of the buildings and infrastructures at risk



Law no. 2003-699 of 30 July 2003, is related to the prevention of technological and natural risks and damage compensation. Its main objectives are, firstly, to mitigate risk by acting on the upper parts of the catchments; secondly, to develop risk awareness of the most exposed populations; and finally, to reduce the vulnerability of exposed populations located in urban zones.

Risk management activities for rescue and prevention are not unified in France, an unusual situation in Europe. Two ministries are in charge of the management of natural risks: 

The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of emergency measures and rescue plans.



The Ministry of the Environment is in charge of risk prevention.

To a lesser extent, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Economy are also involved in the process. In practice, the ministries are in charge of defining general orientations of the politics of risk prevention. Local departments (mainly at the county or regional level) of these ministries are in charge of the implementation of the risk management procedures. Given the large number of ministries and departments involved, all local actions are placed under the responsibility of the préfet (representative of the state at the county level). Consequently, the two main actors dealing with risk management are the mayor at municipality level and the préfet at county level. Providing information is a legal requirement in France. The law (art. L.125-2 of the Environment Code, Law no.87-565 of 23 July 1987, reinforced by the law of 31 July 2003) establishes the right for the population to be informed about foreseeable natural hazards and technological risks. The government has the responsibility to provide such information to the population. In practice, the responsibility of informing the public is shared by the national government and the local authorities. Insurance companies also play an important role. The insurance system combines private funding and public decisions. Since 1992, the insurance companies levy 9% of the contracts’ annual fees and keep them in a fund that can be mobilised in case of a catastrophic event. The warranty is effective when the national government (in practice, the préfet) officially recognises the situation of natural disaster. This decision is the result of a negotiation between the national government and local authorities. Since 2001, the levy on each contract has increased in the local communities where no risk prevention plans have been established, despite of a large number of natural disasters that have occurred in the area in the past.


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Figure 10: Managing risk chain actors in France: the town mayor and the préfet play major roles in the process (source: J.M. Tacnet, IRSTEA).

The PPR procedure applies at municipality level. The main objectives of PPR are to inform about the risk, to increase risk awareness and preparedness, and to reduce the vulnerability of the population, assets and activities threatened by natural hazards. PPR takes into account natural hazards through land-use planning, imposing restrictions on the edification of new buildings (prohibition or reinforcement of the structure depending on the hazard intensity). Administratively, the PPR is prescribed by and placed under the responsibility of the préfet. In practice, the procedure management is done by ministries departments (at the county level). The technical document, once established, is sent to the municipality for approval. Meetings with citizens are organised and remarks are taken into account. Finally, the PPR is officially approved by the préfet. The PPR implementation consists of taking into account the contingency plans of the PPR in PLU (Local Urbanisation Plans) as well as the prevention, protection, and safeguard measures of the PPR. The technical part of the PPR consists of: 

Data collecting (archives, field surveys, additional studies; using numerical models is not compulsory and additional studies limited to specific sites). Quite often the PPR considers several phenomena at the municipality level (e.g. floods, rockfall, debris flows, snow avalanches)



Mapping phenomena; includes an information map based on historical records and a hazard map defining zones of low, medium and high hazard level



Vulnerability assessment; includes a vulnerability map of urbanised zones and their nature (e.g. public buildings, schools, industries)


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

Contingency mapping; a contingency map is derived from the hazard and vulnerability maps and defines the rules that apply to each zone. Red zone: prohibition; blue zone: restriction; white zone: no restrictions. Other zones can be defined with other colours to reflect the necessity to keep some areas free (e.g. protection forest, area where future countermeasures should be installed)



Informing local authorities

For contingency planning, events with a statistical return period of 100 years are considered as the reference event. In case a more intense historical event was recorded, this is alternatively considered as the reference event. The PPR procedure is dedicated to the protection of urbanised areas and no specific procedure has been defined so far for roads and railways. Furthermore, transport networks are under the responsibility of several actors. Most of the roads are now under the responsibility of county councils. Most of the motorways belong to private companies. Only a few portions of roads and motorways are still under the responsibility of the state. Railway tracks are under the responsibility of the public company RFF (réseaux ferrés de France). All these administrative bodies are, in practice, in charge of the safety of the infrastructures under their responsibility, but in absence of a dedicated legal framework they have to cooperate with local authorities (the mayor at the municipality level and the ministries local departments at the county or regional level).

1.3.2

Location of test beds and overview of the objectives

In the test bed ‘Southern French Alps’, the National Research Institute of Science and Technology for Environment and Agriculture (IRSTEA) developed a purely regional approach with the objective to extensively identify hotspots at this scale. Debris flows were considered at the scale of the whole test bed, while snow avalanches and rockfall were considered at the scale of the Hautes-Alpes County. IRSTEA additionally focused on more limited areas to investigate at an intermediate scale: the Queyras area for rockfall and snow avalanches and Tinée and Var upper catchments for debris flows. In the Manival and St Antoine test bed, IRSTEA mainly developed methodologies at the catchment scale for debris flows. The catchment scale investigation takes place after the identification of hotspots at the regional level, when better accuracy is needed to precisely evaluate the hazard and damage potential to transport infrastructure. Manival and St Antoine have approximately the same size, but IRSTEA decided to keep both of them because a lot of information was available in Manival catchment, while only sparse information was available in St Antoine. The objective there was to propose methodologies adapted to the available knowledge in each catchment.


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Manival Debris-flows, catchment scale, detailed analysis of sediment yield

St Antoine Debris-flows, catchment scale, less detailed analysis of sediment yield

Southern French Alps Debris-flows, avalanches, rockfalls, regional scale, identification of « hot spots »

Figure 11: Location, scale and phenomena investigated in the test beds (source: IRSTEA).

1.3.3

Manival

The Manival Torrent is a small steepland mountain stream located near Grenoble in the eastern flank of the Chartreuse mountain range (Northern French Prealps, Isère County, and Rhône-Alpes Region) that drains a 7 km² catchment. The elevation of the catchment ranges from 250 m to 1,738 m a.s.l.. The catchment comprises a very active erosion amphitheatre (shallow landsliding, gullying, hillslope debris flow, rockfall) which supplies sediments to a steep main trunk, where debris flows occur once a year on average. Floods with bedload transport also occur several times per year. The apex of the urbanised alluvial fan is equipped with a sediment trap with a storage capacity of 25,000 m3 (drainage area upstream of the sediment trap: 3.4 km²) to protect the municipalities of SaintNazaire-les-Eymes and Saint-Ismier, as well as the N90 former national road. The sediment trap is managed by the Restauration des Terrains en Montagne (RTM) of the National Forest Office (Office National des Forêts – ONF). Several check-dams were also built upstream of the sediment trap to control the long profile of the torrent. This upper part of the catchment belongs to the state and is placed under the responsibility of ONF-RTM (Isère department). Debris flows generally occurs between May and October and are induced by high intensity rainstorms. The mean annual rainfall is estimated at 1,250 mm and the 10-year daily rainfall is estimated at 100 mm.


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Since 1891, the most degraded parts of the catchment have been purchased by the French Forest Administration for implementing torrent control works (e.g. reforestation, check-dams, and embankments). Hillslopes are now mainly occupied by natural and planted forests, but the steeper slopes and rockwall faces are still very active. The flooding history of the torrent was reconstructed recently by the RTM service (ONF-RTM, 2008). Fifty-six major damaging floods have been recorded since 1673. The maximum observed debris flow occurred in 1968 (estimated volume: 60,000 m³). Some of these floods impacted transport infrastructures. Historical data revealed that between 1790 and 1885, eight floods damaged the road from Chambéry to Grenoble, which, at that time, was a strategic road. Since the construction of the sediment trap in 1926, two events have affected the former national road (N90) in 1928 and 1952. A large amount of data was available in the Manival catchment prior to the PARAmount project: historical records of past floods provided by ONF-RTM (the main stakeholder IRSTEA was in contact with in the framework of PARAmount) and high-resolution airborne Light Detection And Ranging (LiDAR) derived Digital Elevation Model (DEM) of the entire catchment. For this reason, the decision was made to investigate the process of debris flow triggering. In Manival, debris flow events are mainly triggered when a sufficient amount of sediment, provided by floods with bedload transport, is stored in the channel. It was decided to investigate this process in detail in the framework of Joshua Theule’s PhD, with the objective to study the sediment response to rainfall force, with a special emphasis on the geomorphic controls of debris flow occurrence and intensity. Material and methods 

Intensive field monitoring of erosion and deposition in channel and hillslopes using cross section resurveys and terrestrial laser scanning



Measurement of debris flow volumes using sediment trap resurveys and a debris flow monitoring station. This monitoring station, installed in 2010, is equipped with rain gauges, geophones (front velocity), ultrasonic sensors (flow depth), a photo camera, a video camera, a computer to record data and solar panels for power supply



Morphometric analysis of the catchment using LiDAR-derived high-resolution DEM

Additionally, dendrochronology analysis was applied in the Manival fan to evaluate debris flow and rockfall activity in the past and the role played by protection forest (Lopez-Saez et al., 2011). Methodological improvements were proposed as a result of PARAmount.


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Figure 12: Upper part of the Manival catchment with the location of the sediment trap, monitoring station and transects where topographical surveys are carried out after each flood (source: J. Theule, IRSTEA).

Figure 13: Channel erosion induced by a debris flow event in August 2009 (source: J. Theule, IRSTEA).


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1.3.4

St Antoine

The St Antoine Torrent is a small steepland mountain stream located on the territory of the Modane municipality in the Maurienne Valley (Savoie County, Rhône-Alpes Region) that drains a 5.2 km² catchment. The elevation in the test bed ranges from 1,000 m a.s.l. to 3,000 m a.s.l. This catchment is prone to debris flows, as proved by the 1987 event (estimated volume: 60,000 m3), which destroyed part of the city of Modane, the railway track and the national road. The catchment basin can be split into three classical geomorphological parts: i) an upper sediment production zone ii) a medium transfer zone and iii) an alluvial fan. The two upper parts belong to the state and are placed under the responsibility of ONF-RTM (Savoie department). More than 100 check-dams were built in the upper catchment as early as the late 19th and early 20th century. The city of Modane, as well as the international railway track (connection to the Fréjus railway tunnel between France and Italy), and the former national road N6, are located on the alluvial fan. After the 1987 event, a big sediment trap (storage capacity: 25,000 m3) was built to protect the urbanised areas. In the event of a debris flow with a volume greater than the sediment trap capacity, the national road (N6) and the railway can be flooded by the torrent. This torrent catchment is not monitored in such a detailed manner as the Manival torrent catchment basin is. It is ranged as a medium available-knowledge catchment basin between the Manival Catchment basin (best and finest available knowledge) and a regional scale level (Southern French Alps). Numerous actions were carried out in the St Antoine test bed, most notably including: Geomorphological analysis and decision-support measures oriented towards the definition of debris flow event scenarios. 

Safety and reliability analysis of the effectiveness of existing protection, oriented towards the definition of debris flow event scenarios and carried out also to analyse the resilience in case of protection failure



Some Integrated scenario analyses (based on the previous measures) and a definition of a decision-support framework for risk management



Hybrid approach, which in practice consists of numerical simulations of debris flow spreading on the alluvial fan, using a numerical model and the scenarios defined previously as model inputs. Expert assessment of model parameters represented in the framework of the ‘possibilities theory’ was also carried out. Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis of the results versus the uncertainty of input parameters was carried out. This approach leads to real probabilistic hazard maps based on a threshold exceedance probability – a series of hazard maps was produced accordingly



An evaluation of the vulnerability and accessibility of the transport network was also carried out at the scale of the whole Maurienne valley


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Involvement of stakeholders IRSTEA had many connections with stakeholders in this area, including the St Antoine catchment itself, but also the whole Maurienne valley, which is prone to flash floods and many debris flows and where many infrastructures are situated (inter alia including an international railway track, an international motorway, as well as the future high velocity railway between Lyon and Turin, big factories, high voltage power lines and important hydro-power culverts). Among others, the observers were: Société Française du Tunnel Routier du Fréjus (SFTRF) (in charge of the Fréjus road tunnel and Maurienne valley motorway), the county council of Savoie (in charge of the whole road network), the ‘syndicat du pays de Maurienne’ (federation of all municipalities in the valley, which particularly deals with natural hazards management), the municipality of Modane, ONF-RTM of the Savoie County (department of the forest national administration, most notably in charge of coping with natural hazards), and to a lesser extent the RFF. Interviews and observers meetings were carried out.

Alt. 1000 m

Vulnerability assessment

Modane 5. 2 k m 2

hazard assessment

1000-1500 mm rain/year

Alt. 2800-3000 m Figure 14: Aerial photo of the St Antoine catchment with delineation of the area, where IRSTEA studied debris flow triggering processes and the urbanised area (including the international railway track and former international road) where IRSTEA assessed vulnerability (source: IRSTEA).


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Figure 15: Damage caused by the 1987 debris flow: the railway track is covered by mud and debris (source: ONF-RTM).

1.3.5

Southern French Alps

The Southern Alps test bed is located in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Region and covers three counties. It is a 16,775 km2-large area with elevation ranging from sea level to 4,102 m a.s.l.. This region is characterised by Mediterranean meteorological influences, known for producing extreme rainfall and flood events. These events generally occur during autumn (long-lasting rains) and summer (rainstorm-induced flash floods). Important parts of these catchments were reforested at the end of the 19th century for soil conservation (RTM actions). This test bed is characterised by active torrents, which produce debris flows, as well as by a large number of rockfall sites and snow avalanche paths. For instance, it was established by the ONF-RTM (subcontract) database that 4,236 impacts of torrent floods on road and railway networks have been recorded since 1850. The road network is mainly of regional importance, with, for instance, the access to ski resorts and local communities. Two main roads have a strategic importance at national level: the former national road N85 from Grenoble to Grasse (the historic and emblematic Napoleon Road) and the former national road N75 from Grenoble to Sisteron. Two further main roads have a strategic importance at international level: the former national road N91, connecting Grenoble to Turin via the Montgenèvre pass, and the former national road N94, connecting Marseille to Turin via the Montgenèvre pass. For the latter road, the freight traffic is especially important.


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Debris flow Two scales were investigated: i) a database compilation from the Alpine literature was carried out and made it possible to determine robust morphometric thresholds for the identification of debris flow prone catchments. These statistical models were implemented in a GIS-procedure (Geographic Information System) for mapping the most exposed transport infrastructure lines. Our maps revealed the density of the potential debris flow impact sites along 19,700 km of roads and railways in the region; ii) debris flow susceptibility maps were derived at the regional scale. IRSTEA also focused on the Var and Tinée upper catchments, where precise topographical data was acquired. This made it possible to analyse the influence of the precision of data on the maps produced. A comparison with maps derived from past events known by French torrent-control services (subcontract with ONFRTM) was also carried out.

Rockfall and snow avalanches Hazard maps were established at the scale of the Hautes-Alpes County with and without taking the effect of the protection forest into account. IRSTEA also focused on the Queyras Region, a valley located at the Eastern part of the Hautes-Alpes County, near the Italian border. In this region, a LiDAR survey was carried out and hazard maps established on this basis, once again with and without considering the effect of the protection forest. This again made it possible to analyse the influence of the precision of data on the maps produced.

Stakeholders County councils are now responsible for the management of a large part of the road network in France, including roads previously under the responsibility of the state (national roads). IRSTEA was able to gain the support of the county councils of Hautes-Alpes and Alpes Maritimes as observers in the project. People in charge of the safety of the road network were interviewed and IRSTEA is in regular contact with these people.

Focus on Queyras: Rockfalls, snow avalanches Focus on Var and Tinée Upper catchments: debris-flows

Figure 16: Regional map of the test bed with focus on the areas where precise topographical data were acquired (source: IRTSEA).


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1.4

Italy

1.4.1

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management in Italy

Introduction In general, hazard mapping in Italy is not really a new instrument for civil protection and regional development planning. Since the beginning of the 17th century and especially in the second half of the 18th century, many engineers have worked to secure settlements and infrastructures against natural hazards. Especially protection from inundations, torrents and debris flows were erected. The different concepts of hazard planning were always updated with respect to the technical requirements and the demands of the population. Furthermore, the changing relationship of the population versus nature played a decisive role: in earlier times, people were able to avoid the hazard zones due to the sparse settlement of the Alpine valleys. Later on, especially after 1900, people trusted much more in technology, and tried to secure these areas using protective structures. Nowadays hazard planning has top priority again. In Italy, natural hazard management competence is mainly in the hands of the regions and autonomous provinces. Therefore, the following description of the institutional and legal framework is divided by the Provinces and regions involved in PARAmount, as shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Overview of the Regions and Provinces in Italy – the provinces and regions the Italian PPs in PARAmount represent are coloured (source: outlines of Provinces and Regions – www.wikipedia.com; layout: BFW).


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Autonomous Province of Bozen – South Tyrol Based on the long-term experience and the high standard of hazard planning in Switzerland and Austria, as well as some pilot projects carried out by the CNR (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche) and the Geological Survey (geological mapping project CARG), some pilot studies were performed in order to draw up a concept for modern hazard planning. In doing so, the special situation of South Tyrol as a mountainous region on the one hand, and as a region with a well-working civil protection system with volunteers, municipalities and provincial offices on the other, has been taken into account. Over a period of several years the ‘Guidance for the issue of hazard planning and the classification of the specific risk’ was established, improved and tested; the corresponding rules for implementation were also developed. Since 3 December 2008 the standards for hazard planning provided by law have become operative. Four different laws have to be considered in South Tyrol: national and provincial laws, the guidelines for hazard mapping, and the implementation order. Hazard/risk-planning has been strictly required by national and provincial legislation for many years: DL 180 of 8 June 1998 converted into law Nr. 267 of 3 August 1998, DPCM 29 September 1998: atto di indirizzo e coordinamento per l’individuazione dei criteri relativi agli adempimenti di cui all‘ art. 1, commi 1 e 2, del decreto-legge 11 giugno 1998, n. 180, Durchführungsverordnung zum Landesraumordnungsgesetz – DLH vom 23.02.1998 Nr. 5. Particularly the provincial law from 11 August 1997 No. 13 contains article 22/bis for hazard zone planning. Article 7 provides the legal basis for the creation of hazard maps along transport infrastructures (Autonomous Province of South Tyrol, 2012).

Figure 18: Combination matrix for the hazard level (Gefahrenstufe), consisting of process intensity (Intensität) and probability (Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit), amended after Bundesamt für Umwelt (BUWAL, 1998) for mass movements and hydraulic/water hazards.


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Autonomous Province of Trento Regarding the Autonomous Province of Trento, laws exist for i) natural hazard and risk evaluation for planning purposes and ii) laws for natural hazard and risk management. Regarding i) these laws and guidelines aim at providing a legal basis for natural hazard and risk mapping for the whole territory of the province; guidelines were published in 2006 by the local government (Delibera della Giunta Provinciale (DGP) 2759/2006 and Annex 1) to provide instructions for natural hazard mapping; regarding ii) in 2005 a warning protocol and procedure was approved at the provincial level, whose aims consist in coordinating civil protection and governmental institutions responsible for specific hazards (e.g. floods and debris flow, rockfall, avalanches, fires, road accidents). This procedure provides instructions and priorities and is divided into three phases: forecasting, evaluation and warning. An additional series of regulations identifies responsibilities and availabilities (i.e. to be oncall) in case of an emergency. With the aim of investigating natural hazards within the Trentino Province, in 2003 a new tool was introduced to support hazard awareness. This tool, named Carte di Sintesi Geologica (CSG) has been periodically updated to incorporate new studies on intensities and extensions related to natural hazards, such as floods, avalanches and debris flows. Later on, in 2006, an additional tool was introduced as support for planning purposes; it is referred to as the Piano Generale di Utilizzazione delle Acque Pubbliche (PGUAP). It was approved by the DPR on the 15 February 2006, and it contains the regulations for development planning in the respect of soil protection and hydrogeological hazard. It contains hydrogeological hazard and risk maps built on the basis provided by the CSG. It also incorporates other regulations valid at State level, called Piani di Bacino (watershed regulations). The DGP 2759, dating from 22 December 2006, produced the ‘disposizioni tecniche e organizzative per la redazione e l’aggiornamento della carta della pericolosità’, which defines the criteria for a unified and coherent representation of the main natural hazards in the territory, including snow avalanches, landslides, floods, fluvial and torrential processes. According to this document, the different types of hazards will be tackled by the appropriate service; e.g. the Geological Survey is in charge of landslide, rockfall and seismic hazard, the Meteorological Service handles avalanche hazard, while flood and debris flow hazard are managed by the Mountain Torrent Service. Wild fires are the responsibility of to Forestry Service. A coordinator was designated to manage actions and output (mainly hazard maps) from each group.

Veneto Region In the Veneto Region, the Department for Soil Protection manages all the activities regarding the prevention of geological and hydraulic risk, based on the Inventory of Events and Cadastre of Landslides and the Hydro-geological Assessment Plan (PAI). The department collaborates with the basin authority for the assessment of hydraulic and geological hazard, and plans risk mitigation measures. Hazard classification in PAI is carried out by modified Bundesamt für Umwelt (BUWAL) methodology, which evaluates the hazard degree as the probability that an event of a given intensity occurs in a given time interval. The hazard degree is calculated as a combination of magnitude and probable recurrence of the event. Magnitude is the expression of the event’s energy as a result of combination of event’s speed and geometrical severity (volume). To estimate this last factor, a volume evaluation of the blocks involved is needed, which changes depending on landslide typology: in fall events the average diameter of falling blocks is considered, while for debris flow the thickness of the material in motion is relevant.


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The Veneto Region has acknowledged the operational guidelines of the Prime Minister’s Directive dated 27 February 2004. These guidelines establish the procedures and the warning methods of the system on various regional, provincial, and municipal levels, as called for by the legislative decree n. 112/1998. In the Veneto Region the planning, actuation and management of the monitoring network, as well as the responsibility of relative warning and pre-warning systems is under the Regional CFD ‘Centro Funzionale Decentrato’. The CFD of Veneto has been working since 2009 and is responsible for the surveillance of the regional territory and guarantees the presence of specialised experts during critical events. The experts belong to two regional departments: Civil Protection Unit and Department for Soil Protection. Alongside the hydraulic and geological experts working in CFD are employees of Regional Land Safety Department of ARPAV. They manage the regional early warning system for all the natural hazards induced by intense rainfall (floods, landslides, debris flows), by a trigger threshold system and daily define a warning advice with four levels of alert (absent, ordinary, moderate and high). Inside CFD, goals of ARPAV are: meteorological forecast, classification of risk levels and management of monitoring systems (concerning rain, snow and hydrometric level network). Civil Protection Unit aim is to activate, with regional warnings, the civil protection local offices of the respective areas in order to actuate emergency plans. The Department for Soil Protection regards expected scenarios that must be taken into account by stakeholders for decisions in natural hazard management.

Piemonte Region The Regional Agency for the Environmental Protection of Piemonte (ARPAP) manages the regional early warning system for all the natural hazards induced by intense rainfall (floods, landslides, debris flow), by a triggering threshold system. ARPAP contributes to risk mitigation by the characterisation of the causes. In this way, ARPAP can forecast and issue a warning concerning where and when natural hazards can impact on subjects of protection (e.g. roads or settlements). The regional law n. 28/2002 assigns the regional planning, actuation, and management of the monitoring network, as well as the responsibility of relative warning and pre-warning systems, under the regional Centro Funzionale, to ARPAP. The Centro Funzionale of Piemonte, operational since 1996, is responsible for the surveillance of the regional territory. The Centro Funzionale guarantees the presence of specialised experts assigned to functional groups that are capable of supporting the interpretation of the monitoring and forecast data and communicating these results to stakeholders on a permanent basis. The administration of the Piemonte region has acknowledged the operational guidelines of the Prime Minister’s Directive dated 27 February 2004. These guidelines establish the procedures and the warning methods of the system on various regional, provincial, and municipal levels, as called for by the legislative decree n. 112/1998 and regional law n. 7/2003. ARPAP is responsible for issuing regional early warnings via meteorological, hydrological, hydraulic and snow/avalanche bulletins. The aim of these regional warnings is to activate the Civil Protection bodies of the respective areas in order to actuate emergency plans. Information derived from ARPAP bulletins, regarding expected scenarios, is taken into account by stakeholders for decisions in natural hazard management.


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1.4.2

Location of the Italian test beds in PARAmount

The PARAmount test beds of the Italian PPs are distributed throughout the regions and provinces of Bolzano – South Tyrol, Trento, Veneto and Piemonte, as shown in Figure 19.

Figure 19: Overview of the Italian test beds in PARAmount (source: outlines of Provinces and Regions – www.wikipedia.com; BFW)

1.4.3

Brenner/ Brennero

The test bed of the Autonomous Province of Bozen (PAB), Brenner/Brennero, extends over a distance of 114 km and is delimited in the north by the Brenner/Brennero pass and to the south by the Province border with Trento. The Brenner axis provides the most important north-south connection between Italy and central Europe, not only in a social, but above all in an economic and touristic context. It covers an altitude difference of 1,160 m, reaching from 210 m a.s.l. in the south near Bolzano to 1,375 m a.s.l. at the border between Italy and Austria. Land use is variegated and comprises areas of settlement, manufacture, industry, agriculture, grassland, and forest. Figure 20 provides an overview of the test bed.

Figure 20: Brennero/Brenner test bed of the Autonomous Province of Bozen – South Tyrol (source: PAB).


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The topographic characteristic of the Alpine valleys the Brenner axis runs through (Etschtal, Eisacktal, Wipptal), are subject to the particular difficulties concerning the design and construction, as well as the adjacency of all PARAmount-relevant infrastructures (expressway, railway). The topographic and climatic exposure, combined with the immediate spatial proximity of all transport infrastructure lines, determines a high vulnerability towards natural hazards. Figure 21 shows all recorded mass movement events from the database Inventario Fenomeni Franosi d’Italia (IFFI).

Figure 21: Inventory of rockfall events since 1998 along the Brenner axis (source: PAB, landslide cadastre IFFI).

According to the landslide cadastre IFFI, more than 150 events have been registered along the Brenner axis during the last 14 years, which have directly affected the national road SS12 from Brenner/Brennero to Salurn/Salorno (Figure 21). Among these are about 110 rockfall events (Figure 22), which have been registered to have reached the road. Table 4 features a compilation of some events with a large damage potential, which have occurred in the past along the Brenner axis. Table 4: Registered rockfall events on the SS12 (source: internal database LPM). 17/08/1998

Debris flow reaches the expressway; 5 people die; enormous traffic jam near Mittewald/Mezzaselva

28/06/2000

Rockfall with 100 m³ near Atzwang/Campodazzo, SS 12 (km 454+200); blocksize up to 10 m³

26/06/2003

Rockfall near Atzwang/Campodazzo; SS.12 on km 455+100; 1 person dies (see below)

04/09/2009

Debris flow near Franzensfeste/Fortezza; 1 person dies


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Figure 22: Report in the Dolomiten newspaper on the rockfall event with one casualty on 26 June 2003, as listed in Table 1.

Six years ago the necessity of a systematic evaluation of hazard/risk levels led to the creation of the Viability Information System for Operators (VISO) database. On the one hand, it contains an evaluation of slopes prone to rockfall where transport infrastructure is endangered (based on geological parameters), and on the other hand it includes an evaluation of existing protective structures (as described in Chapter 2). The implementation of the probability of occurrence incorporates the frequency of an event into the calculation. These three factors provide the data for hazard maps for linear transport infrastructure (Figure 23; Figure 24).

Figure 23: Rockfall hazard map considering all existing mitigation measures (source: PAB).


Figure 24: Rockfall hazard map without considering existing mitigation measures (source: PAB).

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According to the method described above, three areas with the highest hazard level along the Brenner axis were defined and examined in detail. These include: 

Mittewald/Mezzaselva (north of Franzensfeste/Fortezza)



Atzwang/Campodazzo (north of Bozen/Bolzano)



Salurn/Salorno (near the province border in the south)

1.4.4

Rolle Pass

The SS50 road is a strategically important road for the region. It crosses the Dolomites, which is a well-known part of the Alps in north-eastern Italy. The Dolomites are mostly located in the province of Belluno, and partly in the provinces of Bolzano-Bozen and Trento. Their importance has increased since they have been declared a natural heritage of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in August 2009. Figure 25 displays the location of the SS50 between Predazzo, in Fiemme valley, and Fiera di Primiero, in Primiero valley. This road was originally managed by ANAS (State Agency for road management), then, in 1997, its management was given to the Autonomous Province of Trento (PAT).

Figure 25: Location of the test-bed in the north-eastern part of Trentino Province (source: PAT).

Figure 26: PAT test bed – SS50 – (left) Forte Buso rockfall (S. Simoni)/slide above the road and the lake; (right) SS50 at Rolle Pass, an avalanche-prone area (source: S. Simoni).


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The Rolle Pass road is a high mountain road in the province of Trento in Italy, with a total length of 54 km and a maximum elevation of 1,989 m a.s.l. (Figure 26). It crosses the Piattaforma Porfirica Atesina (Predazzo – Passo Rolle) and then the Prepermiano Crystalline basement. The central part is composed of rocks, forming the basal portion of the dolomite succession (unità clastico evaporitica Fmz Bellerophon, Fmz Werfen, Fmz Contrin, Fmz Dolomia dello Sciliar). The Rolle Pass road was built between 1863 and 1874, when the area still belonged to the AustroHungarian Empire, and several trenches, tunnels and barricades dating back to World War I are still scattered all over this area. The Rolle Pass road links the Fiemme and Primiero valleys within the Parco Naturale Paneveggio – Pale di San Martino, which is an important touristic area. The road serves as an access to many ski resorts of the Dolomites region in winter, since it is near to ski pistes and lifts, while in the summer season it is mostly used to reach the pastures and the tracks for mountain biking and climbing. Despite the efforts to protect the road, it is often closed in winter, due to the risk of snow avalanches, and sometimes in summer, due to rockfall. The main events that have occurred on this road include: 

‘Forte Buso’ landslide (at kms 104–106) and rockfall (max traffic interruption: three months)



Rockfall on Rolle Pass (on the Tonadico side)



Snow avalanches at Rolle Pass (in particular at Malga Fosse)

In case of landslides, landslips and snow avalanches, the most important institutions responsible for the risk management in the test bed are: 

The mayor of the municipality in which the event occurred, along with the mayors of the other municipalities served by the road



Carabinieri, road police and the road management institution, who are all in charge of the safety along the road



Helicopter units, Alpine rescue teams and canine units, which are contacted in case of a snow avalanche

In case of rockfall, a geologist is the first person called to manage the situation. He has to conduct an inspection in order to verify the nature and the status of the event (still active or not), then he is supposed to notify and alert (if necessary) the authorities mentioned above. The road management institution will decide to temporary close the road or divert the traffic on the basis of the nature and scale of the event. The activities carried out in the Rolle Pass test bed, within the project PARAmount, aimed at assessing the risk for snow avalanche and rockfall events along the Rolle Pass road. They have been carried out in collaboration with the department of civil protection and the University of Trento. Several interactions have been prompted with the road management service and the infrastructure service. All the evaluations have been done considering the legal framework, in which natural hazards are handled in the Province of Trento, as described above.


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1.4.5

Cortina/Fiames

The test bed Cortina/Fiames is close to Cortina d’Ampezzo, in the north-eastern part of the Belluno Province of the Veneto Region (Figure 17). This area is in the core of the Dolomites, and is characterised by widespread debris flow activity. Debris flow commonly occurs in channels draining small, steep rock basins, located in the upper part of slopes. Such watersheds respond dramatically to high intensity, short duration rainfalls, rapidly generating high runoff discharges, which are delivered downstream to the talus cones. Debris flow is commonly initiated at the transition between bedrock and talus and down-stream slope along the channels incised into the talus. The Fiames test bed area is located on the left bank of the flat and narrow valley north of Cortina d’Ampezzo between the road kilometres 106 (2 km north of Cortina) and 110 (bridge over Felizon river) of the National Road SS51 ‘Alemagna’. It is bordered on the right side by the Pomagagnon and Pezories peaks and on the left side by the eastern slopes of the Tofane group. The SS51 reaches an altitude of 1,300 m a.s.l. in the test bed area. Figure 27 shows an aerial view and the corresponding map of the region, with the test bed area encircled in yellow.

Figure 27: Map of Cortina (left), (source: Tobacco); aerial view of the test bed area (right), (source: National Flight, 2006).

At the bottom of the valley, Rio Boite flows towards Cortina d’Ampezzo. The climate belongs to the Alpine regime with low temperatures during winter, which decrease with altitude. About 80% of the total precipitation falls in the summer period. The national road SS51 crosses the entire test bed area in a longitudinal direction from Cortina towards Dobbiaco (Toblach). A cycling route (‘Lunga via delle Dolomiti’) which coincides with the old railway line constructed during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, runs parallel to the SS51 and is located just 100 m uphill on its orographic left side. Along the SS51 several manufacturing and trading businesses (carpentry & wood products; sport products), offices (Regole d’Ampezzo; ANAS – Italian Public Road Authority); leisure facilities (Fiames sport Centre; football and athletics grounds), as well as touristic infrastructure (campsite and hotel), are located further south. The valley on the entire right bank of Rio Boite and on left bank from km 109 belongs to the national park. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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debris flow Debris flow channels channels

National Road SS51 ‘Alemagna’

Figure 28: Fiames sport centre and two debris flow channels (27/09/2009), (source C. Gregoretti).

ANAS office

manufacturing and trading activities

National Road SS51

Figure 29: The manufacturing and trading businesses near km 108 (27/09/2009), (source C. Gregoretti).


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The natural hazards in the test bed mainly include debris flow that initiates at the base of the rock walls of the Pomagagnon and Pezories peaks and flows downstream, crossing the cycling route and the SS51. Debris flow initiation areas along the test bed are highlighted in Figure 30.

Figure 30: Aerial view of retention basins, initiation and routing areas (National Flight, 2006).

Figure 31: The new configuration of the debris flow path after the event on 5 July 2006 (source: TESAF).


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At km 106 and 109 two retention basins were built by the Genio Civile in 1998 and 2007 to prevent the routing of debris flow across the SS51. The debris flow, which occurred on 5 July 2006, changed its path with a deviation of about 500 m from the retention basin (Figure 31). An alarm light system controlled by sensors placed in the first retention basin, is located at km 106.II and 107.II. The private authority of Regole d’Ampezzo (ancient authority that has been managing the land surrounding Cortina since 1200) would, however, prefer a direct path to deviate the debris flow to the Boite River, coupled with further alarm devices. When debris flow interrupts the cycling route and the SS51, the traffic towards the province of Bolzano and Austria is diverted via the Tre Croci and Falzarego passes. In some cases debris flow may impact on manufacturing, trade, leisure and touristic businesses and infrastructure, with a high potential for loss of human lives. Table 5 gives an overview of the debris flow occurrences in the Fiames test bed and the respective source in the literature. Table 5: Debris flow in the Fiames test bed (source: Land Environment Agriculture and Forestry Department of Padova University - TESAF). Date

Source

1 August 1992

Marchi et al., 1994

4 September 1997 2 August 1998 19 July 2004

Gregoretti and Dalla Fontana, 2008

5 July 2006 4 July 2011 18 July 2011

Degetto (2012)

Morphological and sedimentological data relative to the triggering, routing and deposition areas of recorded occurred debris flows are given by Gregoretti and Dalla Fontana (2008), D'Agostino et al. (2010) and Degetto (2012).

2.4.6 Livinallongo del Col di Lana (Rio Chiesa) The Rio Chiesa test bed is located near the stream running through the Pieve di Livinallongo village – the main village of the municipality, in the vicinity of the ski area of Arabba. The Rio Chiesa catchment is 0.95 km² large, ranging from an altitude of 2,462 m a.s.l. at the peak of the Col di Lana mountain to the lowest point near the confluence with the Cordevole river at 1,175 m a.s.l.. The transport infrastructure impacted by the Rio Chiesa basin, includes: 

SR48 (regional road – Dolomites road Arabba–Cortina–Auronzo) that crosses the torrent at an altitude of 1,465 m a.s.l.



Three municipal roads that cross the torrent at three different altitudes (1,475 m, 1,320 m and 1,180 m a.s.l.)

The SR48 is currently the only connection between Livinallongo/Arabba and the lower part of the Belluno province and is therefore known as the ‘Dolomites route’. It links Arabba and Auronzo, via Falzarego and the Tre Croci pass. The three municipal roads provide access to the villages of PallaAgai, Retiz and Vallazza (Figure 19 and Figure 33 show the corresponding aerial and map view of the test bed area). In the past the mayor of Pieve di Livinallongo sanctioned a parking lot just above the Rio Chiesa and built an artificial waterway underneath it, just below the SR48 (Figure 32).


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Figure 32: Debris flow event on 28 July 2003 – the SR48 bridge, the new parking lot and corresponding artificial waterway can be seen in the centre of the picture (source: W. Testor, ARPAV).

Figure 33: Aerial (left) and map view (right) of the Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) test bed; the red arrows on the left image indicate the debris flow channels (source: Carta Tabacco 1:25.000, topographische Wanderkarte); the red arrow in the right image highlights the course of the SR48, while the red circle delineates, where the Rio Chiesa crosses the road and impacts the village of Livinallongo (source: Regione Veneto – Ufficio Cartografico – estratto).


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The climate of the test bed belongs to the endalpic region, similar to Cortina and the upper part of Piave river basin. The mean annual precipitation lies at about 1,000 mm with a continental trend and a rainfall maximum in July. Most debris flow events occur in July and August. Debris flow in the Rio Chiesa catchment is normally triggered by strong thunderstorms during the summer season. In the last 20 years the problem has become very frequent and has occurred almost annually, as the past events cadastre of the most important debris flow occurrences documents (Annex C). During a debris flow event, the first small bridge of the municipal road leading to PallaAgai, just 50 meters upstream from the SS48 (Figure 33), functions as a filter at the beginning and like an obstacle during the flood. Therefore, all the material (e.g. rocks, stones, mud and gravel) overflows the bed of the Rio Chiesa torrent, covering the road and the parking lot and causing damage to the houses and the cars, as well as interrupting all four above-mentioned roads. In this case, traffic heading towards Arabba is stopped and diverted to the Bolzano Province along the Falzarego pass and then the Val Parola pass, Corvara and the Campolongo pass. For the inhabitants of the three villages in the test bed area, it is then impossible to reach their homes. In 2007, the Regional Forest Service of Belluno constructed a permeable check dam about 500 m upstream from SR48. This structure represents a solution for small-scale events with a limited quantity of debris (< 500 m³). If this quantity is exceeded, the dam is not sufficient to stop the main part of the material that flows downstream and endangers material assets and human life.

Figure 34: The little bridge along the municipal road leading to Palla Agai after a debris flow event on 28 July 2003 (left), (source: Walter Testor, ARPAV); check-dam in the Rio Chiesa, 500 m upstream from the SR48 (right) (source: A. Andrich, ARPAV).

1.4.6

Susa Valley

At the beginning, the ARPAP test bed was the upper part of Susa Valley, which was subsequently extended to the entire Susa Valley. The Susa Valley (Figure 35) is a western Alpine valley close to Torino. The main river of the valley is the Dora Riparia with a length of about 100 km, draining an area of 1,337 km². The Susa Valley is one of the most important valley systems in the area, the location of the Torino 2006 Olympic Winter Games, and features high tourist activities. Very important road and rail connections to France run through the Susa Valley, including: 

Railway



Motorway A32 (heading towards the Frejus tunnel T4)



National roads SS24 and SR23



Melezet road


39

These corridors have a fundamental importance for freight and passenger traffic in this area. Conflict potentials and critical infrastructure stretches include about 40 km of roads and railway.

Figure 35: The Susa Valley (red); motorway (green); railway (dashed black); other roads (yellow) (source: ARPAP).

The lithological units outcropping in the upper Susa Valley belong to the Pennidic Structural Domain (Piemontese and Brianzonese Zones), and are characterised by continental margin, ophiolitic and oceanic units. The former are represented by a metamorphic pre-Triassic crystalline basement, covered by autochthonous Mesozoic metasediments and carbonate rocks with subordinates calcschists; the ophiolitic and oceanic units, consisting mostly of calc-schists, marble, quartzite and ‘green stones’ (Polino et al., 2002) (Figure 36). In the test bed area, rocks show a ductile deformation linked to four Alpine deformation events, and a brittle deformation represented by three main sub-vertical fault systems, mainly normal, with strikes N60, N100/N140 and NS. Morpho-tectonic evidence and slope deformations (e.g. trenches and fault scarps), variously oriented and involving bedrock and surficial deposits, are also greatly affecting this area. In the Quaternary, the studied area has been formed by glaciers and landslides. Traces of two main glacial phases are recognisable by the presence of well-preserved geomorphological forms and geological deposits throughout the valley.


40

Figure 36: Geological and structural sketch map of the western Alps (source: Polino et al., 2002, modified).

The post-glacial geomorphology is characterised by slope instability processes, related to the tensional rebound caused by the deglaciation and the structural framework of the area, or by the locally deep dissolution of evaporites (Alberto et al., 2008). The climate in the Piemonte Region is prevalently controlled by the orography, since the modest north-south extension in latitude (2°20') does not influence the climate. The annual rainfall distribution is bimodal, with two maxima (spring and autumn), and two minima (winter and summer). Piemonte shows four pluviometric regimes: three of them can be referred to as continental type characterised by minimum rainfall in winter; the fourth is Mediterranean type, with a rainfall minimum in summer. The Susa Valley is mainly characterised by the Mediterraneansubcoastal regime (main rainfall minimum in summer, main rainfall maximum in autumn and a secondary rainfall maximum in spring) with lower autumn precipitations and higher summer precipitations, than the average values of Alpine areas (Fratianni & Motta, 2002). The western Alps are barely influenced by oceanic and Mediterranean precipitation. Consequently, they are more xeric than the rest of the Piedmont Alps, particularly in the axial part of western Alpine valleys. In the upper Susa Valley the mean annual precipitation lies at about 800 mm. The cumulative daily rainfall is also moderate, usually at less than 20 mm/day (Figure 37)


41

Figure 37: Distribution of average daily rainfall (colour scale) and the average annual number of rainy days (isolines) in Piemonte Region. The Susa Valley is outlined in red (source: ARPAP).

For this valley, historical data (since 1728) relative to geohazards activity demonstrate a high occurrence of phenomena affecting transport infrastructures (more than 1,000 natural hazard events reported), especially by debris flow, rockfall and snow avalanches in the upper part of the valley system.


42

1.5

Slovenia

1.5.1

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management in Slovenia

Legislation and level of governance In the Republic of Slovenia, the following legislation concerning natural hazard management exists: 

Protection Against Natural and Other Disasters Act (Zakon o varstvu pred naravnimi in drugimi nesrečami)



Rules on the triggering of avalanches (Pravilnik o proženju snežnih plazov)



Water Act (Zakon o vodah)



Roads Act (Zakon o cestah)



Act on Forests (Zakon o gozdovih)



Railway Transport Act (Zakon o železniškem prometu)



Safety of Railway Transport Act (Zakon o varnosti v železniškem prometu)



Rules on the methodology to define flood risk areas and erosion areas connected to floods and the classification of plots into risk classes (Pravilnik o metodologiji za določanje območij, ogroženih zaradi poplav in z njimi povezane erozije celinskih voda in morja, ter o načinu razvrščanja zemljišč v razrede ogroženosti)



Decree on conditions and limitations for constructions and activities on flood risk areas (Uredba o pogojih in omejitvah za izvajanje dejavnosti in posegov v prostor na območjih, ogroženih zaradi poplav in z njimi povezane erozije celinskih voda in morja)

Unfortunately, the above mentioned acts do not satisfactorily tackle the problems of traffic infrastructure safety regarding rockfall, avalanches and debris flow. On the other hand, legislation regarding flood hazard is well defined in Slovenia. Because of this, the Slovenian partners employed some procedures defined in the flood risk management regulation as a basis for the avalanche and rockfall risk evaluation. Although regions, as an administrative form of governance, are not (yet) incorporated into the Slovenian government system, there are some state authorities, such as the Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (UZRSVN) and the Slovenian Environment Agency (ARSO), partitioned into several regional branches. According to state legislation, these regional branches coordinate and supervise disaster relief actions on a regional and municipal level. On a local level, municipalities can influence natural hazard management through spatial planning and municipal disaster relief forces training.

Available instruments 

Regarding avalanche hazard, an avalanche cadastre of the whole country exists as a tool for avalanche hazard assessment



Regarding rockfall hazard, the Slovenian Railways (Slovenske železnice d.o.o.), which is the manager of all public railroad infrastructure, has gathered information on rockfall events in the past. On the basis of the gathered information, a rockfall hazard assessment in the form of endangered railroad stretches was made and is used by the railway company


43



Regarding debris flows, there is no legislation or prescribed methodology for hazard mapping. In Slovenia debris flow is considered a phenomenon between flood and landslides; legislation exists concerning flood hazard mapping as well as a landslide cadastre and susceptibility map exist. In 2008, a debris flow susceptibility map was prepared, but proper legislation concerning local hazard mapping has yet to be completed.



For large railway accidents, a contingency plan was prepared on a state level and is currently in use

1.5.2

Posočje

Baška grapa (avalanches, rockfall) Baška grapa is a 30 km-long narrow valley dividing the Alpine region of Julijske Alpe and the subAlpine hills named Cerkljansko hribovje in north-west Slovenia (Figure 38). Its location (from 46°08’50’’N 13°46’00’’E to 46°12’40’’N 13°58’40’’), orientation (south-west to north-east) and connection to the Adriatic coast through the valleys of the Idrijca and Soča rivers, define its unique microclimate – a mixture of Alpine, continental and sub-Mediterranean influences (Sirk, 2010). The valley’s connection to the Adriatic coast is also the reason for its traffic importance. The railroad, which runs through the valley, is one of only two rail connections to the central European mainland with the nearest sea coast and ports of Koper and Trieste (Figure 41). The railroad has lost its importance since its construction in 1906, mostly because of changing international situations and borders after the First and the Second World War. Both wars also had a negative effect on the hazard situation, since heavy bombardment of the strategically important railroad negatively influenced the stability of slopes above the track (Papež et al., 2010). Old mitigation measures above the track, such as rigid wooden palisades, prove that the awareness for the hazard has been present for decades. Unfortunately, there has been little progress in last years – wooden palisades in combination with light catch mesh fences (Figure 40) are the predominant form of protection along the track and stretches of it are poorly maintained. Natural hazards (Figure 39 and Figure 42) have been and remain an important issue, to ensure the safety and continuity of railroad traffic in the test bed section. Steep slopes (30°–90°), with mostly sparse forest vegetation, rising above the track along most of the test bed section, are the source of avalanche and rockfall hazard. Available data on hazard processes consists of: 

Thirteen locations with different vegetation and altitude (400 to 600 m a.s.l.) where avalanches often occur, have been reported and described in the avalanche cadastre. Numerous rockfall events have been recorded by Slovenian Railways.



Rockfall and avalanche events often cause damage. Slovenian Railways have kept succinct reports of damage caused to the railroad equipment, locomotives and railroad vehicles throughout the past years. Events of different magnitudes have been recorded. Rockfall ordinarily causes more annual damage than avalanches.


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Figure 38: Baška grapa test bed (rockfall and avalanches); (source: UL).

Figure 39: Silent witness (source: J. Papež).

Figure 40: Existing protection structures (source: G. Rak).

Figure 41: Track and slope (source: G. Rak).

Figure 42: Typical malformed growth of protective forest trees due to pressures of the sliding snowpack (source: J. Papež).


45

Soteska Valley (debris flow) The northern part of the considered railway runs through the Soteska Valley between Bled and Bohinj. The study includes 1.9 km of railway and state road. The state road between Bled and Bohinj is the only connection (besides local and mountain roads) from Bohinj to other parts of Slovenia. The Soteska Valley is a part of the Alpine region of Slovenia. The test bed ranges from 46°18’06,50’’N, 14°02’37,00’’E in the south-west to 46°18’35,85’’N, 14°03’44,13’’E in the north-east. The altitude ranges from 470 m a.s.l. (Sava Bohinjka River) to 1,200 m a.s.l., which is the highest point along the bank of the valley. The valley slopes are very steep, from 15° up to 50° inclination. In Soteska valley there are numerous small, but active contributories of the Sava Bohinjka River, where debris flows occur frequently. For the Soteska valley test bed the following data sets are available: public DEM 5 and DEM 12,5, rainfall data, topographic maps, local debris flow susceptibility maps for Slovenia (scale 1:25,000), and geological maps (scale 1:5,000).

Institutions responsible for natural hazard & risk management In Slovenia almost all railway infrastructure is public and consists of 897.7 km of single track lines and 330.9 km of double track lines. According to the Railway Transport Act, rockfall and avalanche protection objects are also a part of the railway infrastructure. The Slovenian Railways are responsible for the management and maintenance of all railway infrastructure and thus play a major role in ensuring natural hazard protection, inter alia from rockfall and avalanches. The company’s involvement in natural hazard management includes maintaining protective structures, hazard warning, closing railway sections for traffic when the hazard is too high and also repairing damages caused by natural hazards. Owners of protective forests are obliged to respect certain rules regarding forest use and exploitation and thus contribute to lower hazard. In case of major railway accidents, the Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief is responsible for managing rescue and relief operations, in which local operational units (e.g. municipal civil protection, local fire brigades) play a major role. Disaster relief operations are coordinated according to an existing contingency plan.

Role of PP in the test bed and connection to stakeholders/institutions 

The University of Ljubljana is a centre of knowledge and is not directly connected to institutions responsible for hazard and risk management, although it can offer expert studies to the involved institutions regarding natural hazard mitigation



PUH – Torrent and Erosion Control Service – is a company providing expert services to the institutions involved in hazard and risk management, such as design and construction of protection structures

In the Baška grapa test bed, the following activities were carried out: 

Extensive four-day field survey (in the course of WP4), which included a precise inventory of the whole railroad section and all of the existing protection systems



Survey on risk perception and risk awareness in which regional and local stakeholders presented their experiences through a PARAmount questionnaire



Regional Risk Dialogue (RRD) workshop, in which regional and local stakeholders were presented with the project and were invited to cooperate



Meeting with representatives of the railway maintenance service responsible for the railway network in the test bed


46

Although the railway line has been marked for decades as a regional line and has been ‘only’ of regional importance and often neglected, nowadays some progress can be seen, since the ‘museum train’ has started running the line, offering the experience of riding the 100-year-old track with many bridges (including the longest stone arch railroad bridge in the world), tunnels and breath-taking scenery in a steam engine train. Future prospects within the European Union and its open borders are high, as are the expectations regarding safety. However, these high safety expectations call for an upgrade of the current mitigation measures and hazard management processes.

1.5.3

Koroška Bela

The Koroška Bela torrential fan in north-western Slovenia (fan location: 46°25’43,72’’N, 14°6’7,47’’E) covers an area of 1.02 km² and has average inclination of 9%. The torrential watershed area is 6.4 km², with an average slope of 52% and a height difference of 570 m. The annual amount of precipitation lies between 1,800–2,000 mm. The test bed is located in an Alpine climate area of Slovenia. Average specific sediment production in the catchment area is estimated at about 5,000 m³. The specific sediment production (m³/km²/year) was estimated in the course of a hydrological study of the Sava Dolinka River (1995), where all torrential contributories were included.

Figure 43: Location of Koroška Bela test bed (debris flow) (source: UL).

The torrential fan is densely populated with numerous houses and 2,200 residents, resulting in a high damage potential. The regional road from Moste to Jesenice and the railway line from Ljubljana to Jesenice both cross the fan along the bottom part. There is also a heavy steel industry facility (ACRONI Jesenice) located between the fan and the Sava Dolinka River.


47

Figure 7: Aerial photo of Koroška Bela fan (featuring the regional road, houses and an industry facility) (source: UL).

No consistent and comprehensive historical data of the past debris flow events is available for the Koroška Bela test bed. The only recorded event occurred in the 1789, when 40 houses and several mills were destroyed. The main problem in Slovenia is the definition of debris flow and a separation between ‘classical torrent outburst’ and debris flow. In the national torrent and river archives, records of catastrophic events are available, but as mentioned before there is no distinction between different types of events. During previous research, excavations and geological analysis were carried out and historical evidence of debris flow activity found (larger boulders, types of sedimentation). Nowadays, there is an active landslide in the torrential watershed that threatens the torrential fan of the Koroška Bela. Under unfavourable conditions this landslide might turn into a debris flow, with an estimated volume of available material of over 100,000 m3.

Data availability For the Koroška Bela test bed, the following data sets are available: public DEM 5 and DEM 12.5, rainfall data, topographic map, geological map of the watershed, debris flow susceptibility map for Slovenia (1:250,000), laboratory results on fan sediment samples, geological vertical profile of the fan, sensitivity analysis of a 2-D model (FLO-2D) with regard to relief presentation and rheological properties of potential debris flows.

Institutions responsible for natural hazard & risk management In Slovenia the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning (since March 2012 Ministry of Agriculture and Environment) and the Slovenian Environmental Agency are responsible for the management of torrents and rivers, including maintenance works. For maintenance works, concession contracts with regional water management companies are signed. Flood mitigation measures are part of investments into water infrastructures and have to be included in the national spatial plans. In case of major natural disasters the same applies as in the Baška grapa test bed. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

48

1.6

Switzerland

1.6.1

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management in Switzerland

The dominant Alpine natural hazards in Switzerland are avalanches, landslides, rockfall, debris flow and inundations. Additionally, Switzerland is also endangered by hail, storms, heat waves and earthquakes. However, the latter processes are not attributed to the group of Alpine natural hazards, to which the following text is related. The legal framework for dealing with and mitigating the consequences of natural hazards is composed by the Federal Law on Land Use Planning, the Federal Law on Forests and the Federal Law on Flood Control. Due to several natural hazard events in the past decades, the general paradigm of dealing with natural hazards has changed. While the paradigm has been hazard-oriented for almost 100 years, the flood in 1987 caused a change; after the 1999 events (snow avalanches, floods and storms) the National Platform for Natural Hazards (PLANAT) started to develop the strategy ‘Dealing with Natural Hazards in Switzerland’, which was published in 2004. This strategy has meanwhile been put into practice. The basic principle behind this strategy is that risk management should aim for an equal level of protection for everyone in Switzerland (risk below protection goals). The risk reduction should follow economical criteria (cost-effective), be socially acceptable and environmentally sound. Mitigation follows the principle of the risk cycle, i.e. prevention, intervention and recovery, which are regarded as complementary components of risk management. The tasks related to the different phases of the risk cycle are shared between the three levels: the confederation (federal level), the 26 cantons and the 2,551 municipalities. The municipalities are the ones holding the major responsibility. Federal agencies are working on a conceptual and strategic level with the responsibility for basics and finances. A special feature is the PLANAT, a non-parliamentary commission, focusing on prevention and risk reduction at a strategic, national level. The federal authorities are in charge of formulating policy and financial guidelines, providing financial support as well as supporting research, education, alerts and warnings. The main authorities are the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN), the Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP) and the Federal Office for Spatial Development (FOSD). Additionally, the Federal Roads Office (FEDRO) as responsible authority for national roads, and the Swiss Railway Company, are the main responsible organisations for safety on traffic routes, along with other national and cantonal authorities. Recently, FOEN, the Federal Office for Climatology (Meteo Switzerland, national weather service) and the WSL Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research SLF, responsible for national avalanche forecasting, developed the Common Information Platform (GIN), which represents the information platform for warning and intervention. In the following years the National Earthquake Service will also join the platform. In Switzerland the cantons are responsible for enforcing national and cantonal laws. They are in charge of planning cantonal hazard mapping and emergency management for protecting people and material assets. On a technical level, the cantonal authorities mostly determine the operational implementation of risk management: they inter alia advise the municipalities on different tasks of risk management, consider applications for mitigation measures, and approve or reject municipal land-use planning, which has to include hazard maps and take a main responsibility for warning systems. All cantons in Switzerland have departments for natural hazards or similar sections.


49

Legally, the final responsibility for dealing with natural hazards is situated at the municipality level. This reflects the subsidiary principle of Swiss federalism, which states that matters ought to be handled by the lowest competent authority. Within their entire responsibilities, they mainly take influence on land-use planning by issuing building permissions and initialising hazard mapping. They are also the first level of emergency management, which is governed according to the civil protection system (made up of five partner organisations: fire, health care, technical services, protection and support services), operating at a municipal, but also a cantonal level. The private sector finally elaborates risk reduction projects on behalf of the municipalities, e.g. hazard maps and early warning systems. Generally, experts’ opinions play an important role in Swiss risk management. Therefore, Switzerland has a well-developed market of engineering and consulting companies. Insurance companies are further major players in risk management in Switzerland. In 19 cantons there is a mandatory building insurance, which means that all house owners are insured against fire and damages due to natural hazards, except earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. The 19 cantonal building insurances cover over 80% of the Swiss building structure. The cantonal building insurance of the canton Zurich is the only one also covering earthquake damages. The mandatory building insurances are obligated to provide insurance service to building owners in their canton. The reason why they can do this at remarkably low insurance rates is the existence of the intercantonal reinsurance (IRV) and the intercantonal risk community (IRG), representing a solidarity fund of the 19 cantonal insurances. Another key element is the guiding principle ‘secure and insure’ (Sichern und Versichern) meaning that cantonal building insurances are also engaged in prevention. In the seven cantons Geneva, Uri, Schwyz, Ticino, Appenzell Inner Rhoden, Valais and Obwalden (so-called GUSTAVO-cantons) buildings are insured by private insurances, although building insurance is not mandatory in the cantons of Ticino and Valais and in parts of the canton Appenzell Ausser Rhoden. However, most of the buildings are also insured in these cantons (Aller, 2003). The residual risk (not covered by mitigation measures financed by public money and insurances) has to be carried by the population. For example, house owners can be obliged to build object protection (e.g. reinforced walls) if their house is strongly endangered. The total sum being spent on the handling and the protection against natural hazards in Switzerland by all stakeholders amounts to almost 3 billion CHF (approximately 2.3 billion €, mean exchange rate May 2011) (Wegmann et al., 2007).

1.6.2

Sedrun/Tujetsch

The area of Sedrun/Tujetsch is situated in the canton of Grisons and encompasses an area of 13,393 ha. About 1,900 people live in this area with 87% of them speaking Romansh and 13% German (Sedrun-Tujetsch, 2012). The highest point is the Oberalpstock (3,327 m a.s.l.); the lowest point is Nislas (1,230 m a.s.l.). The economy is mainly based on agriculture, local industry and tourism. For winter tourism the ski resorts Disentis and Tujetsch are important. The area can be accessed by road and by train. During the winter months the area can only be reached by road from the south via the Lukmanierpass, which is sometimes closed due to avalanche danger, and from the east via the main road connecting the area with Ilanz and the capital of the canton of Grisons, Chur. The mountain pass road Oberalppass in the western part of the area is closed in winter (Figure 44). The area can be further accessed by the Rhaetian Railway, which is the only way to directly reach Andermatt, the village on the west side of the Oberalppass, in winter. Both the road and the railway in direction of the Oberalppass are endangered by avalanches in winter. For safety reasons, both traffic routes have to be closed intermittently during winter. Therefore, decision-making for road and railway closures during winter is of pivotal importance to this area.


50

The decision whether road and/or railway should be closed for safety reasons is taken by several organisations: the Highway Department (Tiefbauamt), the Rhaetian Railway, the communities and the cable car companies of Sedrun-Tujetsch. To improve the communication among these organisations, the communication system IFKIS-MIS was established in 2006 (Bründl et al., 2004; Bründl and Stoffel, 2012). The IFKIS-MIS (Interkantonales Frühwarn- und Kriseninformationssystem für Naturgefahren – Massnahmeninformationssystem für Sicherungsdienste) is part of the programme IFKIS, which was introduced after the avalanche winter of 1999. One goal within PARAmount in the test bed was to reflect experiences with IFKIS-MIS during the last years. Further activities included a survey and several interviews on risk perception with representatives of local authorities.

Figure 44: Region Sedrun-Tujetsch (source: © swisstopo).


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1.7

Transnational test bed summary

The transnational synthesis of this chapter reveals differences and conformities of risk and natural hazard management in the different countries and test beds. Table 6 summarises the most important characteristics from all PARAmount test beds. The main aim is to be able to see the scale of threat by the various natural hazards at a glance on a transnational level, in respective test beds. Table 6: Summary of PARAmount test beds, including the key data for natural hazard and risk management.

Manival (FR)

Stanzertal (AT)

Name

Size [km²]

300

7

Natural hazards events

1

Interruption and damage of 2 infrastructure

Endangered road/rail sections

3

Avalanche danger by road type (within test bed)

191 snow processes & 158 channel processes recorded between 1600 and 2010; mostly damage events (sources: BFW, Fliri (1998), railway maintenance Dalaas (unpubl.), WLV, municipalities & fire brigades in the Stanzer Valley)

44 snow processes and 64 channel processes affected road and rail between 1600 and 2010; damage: 2 persons killed, 48 cars and 2 trains affected, 12 cars destroyed (no data on further monetary damage)

Debris flow/torrent floods

Last impact on national road: 1952

On average, between one and three debris flow events or flood with huge sediment transport each year on average

A debris flow event impacted the bridge across the channel, cut the road and impacted the urbanised area

Only a limited portion of road (less than 100 m) is endangered, but with huge potential consequences on the local traffic

4,236 recorded impacts by debris flows and torrent floods since 1850

Not evaluated directly, but we established a map with the number of potential impacts per km of road/railway for the whole test bed (19,700 km of infrastructure)

Expressway: 3.5% (mostly low danger) – total length 45 km A-road:21% low, 15% high & 1% very high – total length 34 km Municipal road: 11% low & 13% high – total length 11.6 km Former national road N90

Southern French Alps (FR)

Rockfall/avalanches/debris flow/torrent floods

16,776

The number of events per year is unknown, but as the testbed covers half of the French Alps, one can estimate that tens of events occur every year, not necessarily impacting transport infrastructures or urbanised areas. Some events are probably never directly observed or recorded

1

Number and type of natural hazards events recorded in the test bed in a given time span (avalanche, debris flow, rockfall & other) – not only infrastructure-relevant events

2

Frequency of interruption of infrastructure per event type and damage by infrastructure-related natural hazard events to persons and material assets

3

Sum of approximate length of threatened road/rail sections and other subjects of protection within the test bed


52

St Antoine (FR)

26 June 2003 rockfall event near Campodazzo/Atzwang km 455+100, 1 person died

Highest hazard level along this road stretch; partly the hazard level could be reduced by building a gallery

Avalanches: 17 days in 2008, 11 days in 2009; 0 in 2010 and 2011 – not continuously/First recorded events 10/09/98, then 24/02/2004; a series of events occurred this year in May: 7/05/2012, 10/05/2012, 24/05/2012, 25/05/2012

About 2 km of road involved km 104 – km 106. Pavement, guard rail had to be replaced, together with barriers.

Rolle Pass (Dolomites) (IT)

About 500 m of national road and railway tracks, but with high potential economical loss (international railway)

50

Cortina/ Fiames (IT)

Rockfall

Last impact on national road and railway: 1987; damage approximately 1mio €

5

Debris flow: 6 events in 10 years (1992-2012)

3 times (September 1997; July 2004 and July 2006)

Kms 106–109 of National Road SS51

Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) (IT)

~1500

Limited floods occur each year in the watershed where a large number of check-dams and other protection structures were installed about one century ago. Some of these protection structures are now partly destroyed and a strategic decision has to be made on whether it is necessary or not to maintain them all. Thus, scenarios of future evolution of the watershed had to be studied.

0.95

15 debris flow events in the last 20 years

No data

No data

U. Susa Valley (IT)

5.2

Brennero/ Brenner (IT)

Debris flow

1,337

800 torrential processes and 200 landslides from 1729 to 2012

470 by torrential processes; 123 by landslides; damage: 3 roads interruptions per year (average value)

About 40 kms railway, motorway A32, national roads SS24 and SR23

Avalanches: data available since 2008 – nine events recorded Rockfall scattered data available since 1998 - five events recorded


53

Posočje (SI)

30

Koroška Bela (SI)

1.02

No precise historical data on past events. In 1789 debris flow destroyed 40 houses

No data

1 km of regional road, 1 km of railway, 251 houses + 19 apartment blocks (22 apartments per block) (2,200 inhabitants), industry facility

Sedrun/ Tujetsch (CH)

134

Avalanches, debris flow, flood, rockfall, landslides

No data

No data

Avalanche – little data on exact number of events Rockfall – 96 recorded events from 1990 to 2010, 5 train-rock collisions from 1997 to 2002


No data on interruptions, two very brief nonmonetary rockfall damage descriptions

20 km-long single track railroad section of regional importance with some 12,000 train passages annually

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The main aspects to be discussed on a transnational level with regard to their importance in PARAmount are on a national level: 

The legal system (e.g. laws, regulations, instruments)



Multi-level governance coordination/cooperation

and on a test bed level: 

PPs involvement in risk management in the test bed



Selected scale of test bed



Focus of work with respect to the integral risk management cycle



Intersectoral coordination/cooperation



Communication, including participation

These aspects will be discussed with respect to the key questions, as formulated in the introduction of this chapter.

Institutional and legal framework for natural hazard management In general, the legislative roles and responsibilities are clear in natural hazard management in each country. As can be concluded from the contribution of each PP, to a greater or lesser degree, the laws and regulations are divided among the federal, provincial and the municipal levels, as well as between different policy and planning sectors in most countries. While in Italy the competencies are mainly in the hands of the regions and autonomous provinces, in Slovenia the administration is purely on the national level, as regions do not yet form a part of the governance system. In the PP countries, the coordination and cooperation between sectors is mostly regarded as insufficient. In Austria, for example, there is a strong separation between the main federal institutions dealing with natural hazard (i.e. the WLV and BVW), but a cross-sectoral coordination and harmonization is not regulated by law. Therefore, the competence for floods lies in the water sector, whereas torrents, debris flow and avalanches are regulated in the forest sector. In addition, these laws apply to settlement areas, outside of which the responsibilities for natural hazard risk management are with the operators of roads, for example. The instruments of road and railway operators include company-internal hazard and risk assessment tools and procedures, as well as monitoring systems (Rachoy, 2012; Zach, 2012; Siegel, 2012). However, the cooperation between sectors works differently in the countries involved in PARAmount. The fact that risk prevention and emergency response are governed by different ministries (e.g. France) can be pin-pointed as a greater shortcoming. In most countries the implementation of risk management procedures are in the hands of local or regional authorities, but the responsibilities are somewhat unclear. Participation is gaining in importance, especially in those countries where participation is explicitly mentioned in laws and regulations. In France, for example, it is a legal requirement to inform the public about natural hazards and technological risks. The implementation is most often shared by higher government and local authorities, but does not always work as anticipated. Major players in natural hazard and risk management are the insurance companies, which were mentioned in those countries that not only focus on hazard assessment.


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PPs involvement in natural hazard management and operation of critical infrastructure As the formulation of the specific aims in the test bed were up to the PPs, the respective outputs strongly depended on their institutional role in risk management of critical infrastructure (e.g. administration, operation and maintenance, research). This inter alia includes the federal administrative level, railway operators, natural hazard experts and research institutions. Consequently, the focus of work in each test bed differed, depending on the day-to-day work of the participating PPs. In any case, additional infrastructure-relevant stakeholders were integrated in the project in all test beds.

Test bed-specific information As mentioned above, the work in the test bed was directed by the responsible PPs in the region, who selected the topic within the risk management cycle they were able to tackle in the frame of PARAmount. In general, this included hazard assessment, vulnerability assessment and risk assessment. Depending on the test beds size, the most relevant processes and degree of exposure the data required differed. However, in all cases the data quality was believed to be acceptable, but improvable. Especially the scale of the selected test bed and the associated aims are important for the selection of methods and tools applied to PARAmount. The following scales are delineated to be important in PARAmount: 

Catchment scale  detailed analysis of one process



Local scale  locally restricted area, e.g. municipality with more than one hazard of the same or different type



Regional  larger area with several hazards, the analysis focuses on the identification of hotspots based on hazard indicator maps or more general approaches. The governance of multiple administration levels and more than one operator was a main challenge.

In most test beds, there was no single scale analysis, but the regional approach was first applied to identify hotspots, followed by a more local scale methodology to more precisely evaluate hazard and damage potential with regard to the transportation infrastructure. On the catchment scale, the debris flow analyses were performed in Manival (FR), Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) (IT), Cortina/Fiames (IT) and Koroska Bela (Sl). All other test beds considered both local and regional scale methods.

Involvement of stakeholders In the past years, participation processes have gained in importance in natural hazard risk management, in order to guarantee the principles of good governance (e.g. transparency, fairness, etc.), as outlined in Chapter 5, and therefore fostering the acceptance of necessary mitigation and adaptation strategies. In PARAmount, stakeholder dialogs were organised and held in order to learn from locals, provide a discussion platform for relevant stakeholders and bring together decisionmakers from different sectors. The stakeholder involvement ranged from informing and gathering information to actively inviting relevant stakeholders to the PARAmount project as observers. The degree of involvement again depended strongly on the chosen scale.


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2

Implementation of the aims, tools/methods/procedures and results in the PARAmount test beds

At the start of project PARAmount, the overall aims were defined, as highlighted in the foreword of this document. In the course of the project, these general aims were broken down to each country, test bed and PP. After describing the current state of natural hazard management in these test beds in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 focuses on giving a short summary of which aims each PP defined for the respective test beds, and how these aims were achieved by developing and applying tools/methods/procedures within the WPs 5, 6 and 7, describing in brief what results were gained. Finally a discussion of these results is provided. A detailed test bed-specific analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of these tools/methods/procedures is provided in the SWOT analysis below (Chapter 3).

2.1

Stanzer Valley (Austria)

As the Austrian PPs worked in close cooperation in a common test bed, all aims, tools/methods/procedures and results are described and discussed here in a joint chapter. Within PARAmount, the workload was divided between the BMLFUW, ÖBB and BFW as follows: BMLFUW: Main focus on project preparation, administration and coordination, as well as providing funding for external experts, meetings, courses, workshops and conferences. ÖBB: Main focus on rail-related issues, including hazard and damage potential assessment, study on the impact and extent of indirect costs and economic losses; development of a decision-support tool for the railway avalanche commissions; coordination of WP4. BFW: Main focus on road-related issues; providing funding for the transnational project management of PARAmount, technical support of external experts, organisation and realisation of national meetings, workshops and the ‘national info meeting’, scientific publications and participation at international conferences, media communication; major contribution to climate change-related issues in PARAmount and presentation of these results at meetings and workshops; supporting and conducting interviews to establish the risk management state of affairs in the Austrian test bed; hazard and damage potential assessment, compilation of a past events cadastre, extensive field surveys, lab analyses of samples; development of hazard early warning system (AWarnTool), extensive testing of debris flow PTA-model (AdB module) and implementation in the Austrian test bed; organisation and realisation of two regional risk dialogue workshops, extensive contact with local and regional key stakeholders (infrastructure providers and natural hazard experts from state, provincial, regional and municipal level), development of a matrix-based climate change Communication and Strategic Decision-support Tool for Natural Hazards (CDT), including a Europewide online survey; coordination of WP8, organisation and realisation of the Austrian post-graduate course and editing of and main contribution to the RMIH.


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2.1.1

Aims

An investigation into the current state of affairs in natural hazard management in Austria prior to PARAmount by the BFW, ÖBB and the BMLFUW brought to light the following key issues: 

In general, natural hazard management in Austria can be described as being a fragmented, cross-sectoral affair. Therefore, a broad range of institutional and legal competences is divided between a large group of stakeholders with different fields of jurisdiction and responsibility, inter alia with respect to managing and maintaining infrastructure, bringing to mind the image of a ‘competence avalanche’ (Rudolf-Miklau, 2009). While communication and cooperation between road authorities, municipalities, district institutions and relief units is well established in the Austrian test bed, few cross-sector approaches between these stakeholders and railway representatives are currently in place.



Natural hazard management in Austria is mainly focused on local scale hazard assessment by municipality for settlement areas, which are defined by the WLV, as outlined in Chapter 1.2.1. However, for management and maintenance, infrastructure providers break their network down into track sections, which are not necessarily connected to administrative borders. A regional or track section-based scale of natural hazard management is required to delineate critical infrastructure and communicate and coordinate an integrated concept. Although detailed hazard management plans by separate infrastructure providers, responsible for expressway, A-road and railway do exist, few coordinated, regional scale approaches, methods and procedures, providing an infrastructure-focused overview and definition of hotspots are currently in use.



Hazard assessment in Austria mainly focuses on direct damages to defined subjects of protection (e.g. settlements, buildings). Indirect consequences of natural hazard events are only dealt with marginally and are still subject to scientific research, rather than application in the practice of natural hazard management. Therefore, there is a general lack of explicit calculation and analysis of indirect damages in natural hazard management in Austria.



So far, the concept of integral risk management has not been implemented on a large scale in Austrian natural hazard management and is currently still subject to discussion and research in the form of single projects or initiatives. Therefore, damage potential assessment and risk maps, especially with a focus on transport infrastructure, are still somewhat lacking in Austria. However, pilot studies are underway on integral risk management and guidelines, for instance for the WLV, to put a stronger focus on this topic.

Building on these issues, the Austrian PPs set the goals of PARAmount, in an effort to improve on this state-of-the-art. The aims of the Austrian PPs in PARAmount in the test bed Stanzer Valley were therefore manifold. They included: 

Making a detailed inventory of the current state of the hazard management strategies and their implementation in the study site; detailed investigation of risk awareness in the test bed; providing an analysis of the current deficiencies and requirements in view of the current state of natural hazard management.



Extending hazard and damage potential assessment, as well as risk analysis, to critical road and rail infrastructure lines (especially outside of populated areas) for debris flow and avalanches; investigating indirect costs of natural hazards and creating a database on economic losses.



Extensive testing of the debris flow PTA-model (AdB module) and implementation in the Austrian test bed combined with a Master’s thesis, which aimed at comparing different debris flow simulation models.


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

Developing both a hazard early warning system and a decision support system for infrastructure providers: i) low-cost system, which integrates both historic and current meteorological data from the test bed; ii) developing a Communication and Strategic Decision Support Tool for Natural Hazards; iii) Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA)-based DSS providing decision support for the ÖBB avalanche commissions in cooperation with IRSTEA.



Studying the impact of climate change on the test bed with regard to projected alterations of meteorological factors (e.g. precipitation, temperature or wind) and their potential impact on natural hazard processes, relevant to the Stanzer Valley; presentation and discussion of results via a suitable platform, which integrates a literature review as well as a broad-based investigation into expert knowledge on this subject (interviews); building on the results of related projects, both finalised and running (e.g. AdaptAlp – Adaptation of Climate Change in the Alpine Space or CLISP – Climate Change Adaptation by Spatial Planning).



Fostering cross-sectoral cooperation of the relevant infrastructure stakeholders in the study area and strengthening risk communication on a regional level, aiming at creating a network of infrastructure stakeholders for road and rail, as well as other key stakeholders.



Publishing and disseminating project results by various means to a wide (scientific) audience (e.g. national info meeting, post-graduate course, publications, etc.).

2.1.2

Tools/methods/procedures

State-of-the-art analysis natural hazard management A detailed state-of-affairs analysis of natural hazard management strategies and a survey on risk awareness and perception on a regional/local level was conducted by the external expert from the European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano (EURAC) (commissioned by the BMLFUW), with the support of the BFW. Besides a detailed literature review and a summary report, two sets of interviews were conducted in the Stanzer Valley (and similarly in all PARAmount test beds, also by the European Academy - EURAC): 

Qualitative survey: In order to gain a first insight into the relevant topics and opinions among local stakeholders, five semi‐structured interviews were conducted in the Stanzer Valley with representatives from the municipality (mayor and tourism director), road authorities (expressway and A-road) and the chamber of commerce. In comparison to closed‐ended questions, this approach followed the exploratory character of the interviews. The interviews were held in the mother tongue of the interviewee to guarantee that there are no misunderstandings. They were tape‐recorded, transcribed and analysed with the MaxQDA qualitative software tool.



Quantitative survey: In order to validate the results of the qualitative interviews in quantitative terms and to gather responses in a standardised way for all test beds, an online questionnaire was developed. It consisted of 31 closed‐ended questions, answerable by checking one of the predetermined answers or scales and six open‐ended questions, requiring participants to answer in their own words (see appendix). For the evaluation a five‐point Likert scale was used. It was sent out to 43 persons and answered by 17.

For details on the EURAC survey see PARAmount deliverable 4.1 (Pechlaner et al., 2011).


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Damage and hazard potential, risk analysis, indirect costs The following methods were implemented for the regional scale hazard and damage potential assessment in the Stanzer Valley: 

A damage potential assessment for road and rail was performed, taking into account the replacement costs of material assets in the test bed (e.g. road/rail track, attendant facilities, mitigation structures and removal clearance cost of snow of debris after a natural hazard event) and the number of exposed persons, derived from the mean daily traffic counts for road and train schedule for rail (e.g. Adams, 2012a).



As described in Chapter 1.2.2, a past events cadastre was compiled (mainly avalanche and debris flow events), based on a wide range of available data sources from infrastructure providers, municipalities, WLV, related projects and the available literature. This cadastre formed a valuable basis for the hazard potential assessment with computer-based simulation models and expert knowledge (e.g. Perzl et al., 2012).



Various concepts to establish the hazard potential for road and rail, including i) avalanche hazard indicator maps – a matrix-based combination of expert assessment, a simple statistical simulation model, existing hazard maps, the above-mentioned past events cadastre, remote sensing data (e.g. DEM, orthophotos), forest and snow cover, mitigation structures and extensive field surveys (Perzl et al., 2012); ii) results from the IRSTEA avalanche hazard indicator maps, calculated using AvalforLIN (Chapter 2.2.2); iii) regional assessment of debris flow-prone catchments, using morphometric parameters (e.g. Melton ruggedness index), past events cadastres, expert knowledge and detailed field surveys in selected hotspot locations, followed up by lab analysis of the collected debris flow material samples, taking the protective function of mitigation measures into account (Hagen et al., 2012b); iv) including regional debris flow assessment by an external expert (engineering consultants alpinfra – commissioned by the BMLFUW & ÖBB) using the model aiDebrisFlow3D for both rail and road (Scheikl et al., 2012).

Finally, a risk assessment was conducted for road and rail by an external expert (engineering consultants alpinfra – commissioned by the ÖBB), implementing all results from damage and hazard potential assessment in the previous steps (Scheikl et al., 2012). A study was commissioned by the ÖBB (engineering consultants NATUR.ING) in cooperation with the SLF to investigate existing approaches on the quantification of indirect costs in general, and economic costs for infrastructure provides in particular, arising from natural hazard events. The study, based mainly on a literature review, was combined with a workshop in Innsbruck (16 December 2010), in which representatives from several PPs took part (Chapter 0 and Winkler, 2011).

Testing PARAmount PTA-model – Master’s thesis Huber (in review) In the scope of PARAmount, several PTA-models (Partner Transnational Activities) were developed, including a debris flow module in the open source software AdB by TESAF and AvalforLIN by IRSTEA. In close cooperation with TESAF, the BFW tested and implemented the AdB module in four debris flow catchments within in the Stanzer Valley, providing detailed feedback to the developers (Hagen et al., 2012b). The implementation of the AdB debris flow module further utilised the data collected in the frame of the field work in the Stanzer Valley, as described in detail by Hagen et al. (2012b). Furthermore, Huber (in review) wrote a Master’s thesis in the scope of PARAmount, dealing with the comparison of different computer-based debris flow simulation models. Unfortunately the original aim of including the AdB module in this comparison could not be reached, due to the fact that the finalisation of the module was considerably delayed in PARAmount and was therefore not finished in time for use in the Master’s thesis.


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Hazard early warning system In an attempt to supply the road infrastructure providers in the Stanzer Valley with a low-cost, easyto-use hazard early warning system, the BFW introduced ‘AWarnTool’. Prior to developing the tool, a detailed literature review was conducted, in order to establish the current state of hazard early warning, as well as gathering information on the available meteorological data in the Stanzer Valley and the potential target audience for the tool. AWarnTool combines meteorological data (air temperature, wind speed and precipitation), the avalanche danger level (as published by the Tyrolean Avalanche Warning Service), with recorded avalanche events from the PARAmount past events cadastre. The tool and its implementation in the Stanzer Valley are described in detail by Fromm & Adams (2012).

Climate change and decision support In the context of PARAmount, the Austrian PPs developed two communication and decision-support tools: 

Communication and Strategic Decision Support Tool for Natural Hazards (CDT): The CDT offers a suitable platform for the presentation and discussion of the potential impact of climate change on natural hazard processes. CDT includes both the respective current findings in the literature on climate change and a broad-based investigation into expert knowledge by conducting an online survey, in which 333 natural hazard experts from all over Europe took part. The methodological approach of the CDT is based on the determination of the relevance of single factors and sub-factors (parameters) for specific natural hazard processes (flooding in small catchments/torrents, debris flow, spontaneous landslides in loose material, rockfall and avalanches). The evaluation of the parameters (e.g. intensity of precipitation) was implemented in the above-mentioned online survey. A detailed description of CDT is provided in several publications (Hagen et al., 2012a; Hagen et al., 2012c; WP7 Decision Support Guidelines). The CDT tool furthermore builds on the results of previous projects, namely CLISP (Zeidler, 2011; Hagen & Andrecs, 2012) and AdaptAlp (Andrecs et al., 2010).

Furthermore, the BFW and the respective PTA-leaders drafted a report on the relevance of climate change in the Alps to PARAmount (Dobesberger et al., 2011). On the part of the BFW, this report included a detailed literature review regarding the available data and expected climate change impact according to various models and projects (i.e. HISTALP, PRUDENCE and reclip:more) on a global, Alpine and regional (test bed) level.

Cooperation and communication in the test bed In an attempt to build a transport-focused natural hazard network in the Stanzer Valley and allow for a high level of direct participation from the early stages of PARAmount, direct contact with key stakeholders was established and fostered throughout the project. Some of these stakeholders could also be formally included as observers in PARAmount. A detailed list of stakeholders /observers is included in Chapter 1.2.2. These stakeholders actively participated in the following PARAmount actions: 

Qualitative and quantitative interviews (summer 2010) – total of 22 persons questioned



National info meeting (held on 20 September 2010 in Innsbruck) – 12 participants



RRD workshops (held on 26 January 2011 in Landeck and 16 February 2012 in Landeck; third workshop planned for Feb 2013) – 26 and 14 participants respectively



PARAmount mid-term conference and final conference


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

Two workshops on the results of WP5 (held in Innsbruck on 26 July 2012 and 26 September 2012) – 7 and 8 participants respectively



Austrian Post-graduate Course (held in Innsbruck from 23 to 25 October 2012). The course brought together a wide range of infrastructure decision-makers, planners, road and rail engineers, as well as natural hazard experts from research and practice arriving from 7 different European countries (Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Slovenia and Switzerland) – in total, 70 participants were registered. A total of 30 presentations were held by the PARAmount project team (LP, PP1, PP2, PP3, PP5, PP8/9, PP10, NON-EU PP1, NON-EU PP2) and project-external experts, some of which were involved in PARAmount as observers (OPGT, ASFiNAG, ASTRA – Bundesamt für Strassen, alpInfra, ÖAW – Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, University of Stuttgart, ZAMG – Zentralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geodynamik). Presentations were given in both English and German, while simultaneous translation into both languages was provided for all participants. Twelve posters providing further leading information on the presented topics were displayed in the foyer outside the conference hall.



Many informal meetings, correspondence and interviews throughout the project



Additionally valuable inputs for the PARAmount project (wide range of spatial, traffic, natural hazard event and remote sensing data) were provided by WLV, OPGT, ASFiNAG, ZAMG and various municipalities

(details on these actions can be found in the corresponding reports of WPs 3 through 8) The most important of these is the RRD: It is intended as a means of building a cross-sector work group in the region, which will encourage and foster risk communication and awareness, ideally beyond the duration of the project. PARAmount may therefore provide a long-term benefit to not only the decision-makers, but also the broader public in the test bed Stanzer Valley, providing an improved and extended knowledge-base for the decision-makers involved in natural hazard management. The RRD therefore serves as a starting point for a more sustainable, long-lasting, interdisciplinary communication and cooperation platform in regional natural hazard management and risk communication.

Dissemination and publishing Throughout the project, the Austrian PPs utilised several different means of communicating and publishing the project results, inter alia including scientific publications, media communication, international conferences, national workshops, national info meetings, as well as the post-graduate course, and this Risk Management and Implementation Handbook at the end of the project, featuring the final results. For full list of these deliverables see the outputs in WP3.


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2.1.3

Main results

In general, the results generated by the Austrian PPs are in accordance with the aims defined in the Application Form. The wide range of results generated in all of the PARAmount WPs entail that only short excerpts from these results can be included below. A detailed compilation of the results can be found in the respective publications listed in Chapter 2.1.2. The results generated by the Austrian PPs therefore include: 

The extensive report on the state-of-affairs analysis of natural hazard management for the Austrian test bed, providing a basis for the further actions. The results for instance show, that a high percentage (94.1%) of the interviewed persons have witnessed natural hazards in the past five years (mostly avalanches, floods, rockfall and landslides/debris flow), hence most of the participants are most concerned about these processes; of the 17 interviewees, 78% indicate, that awareness of natural hazards has increased over the last 10 years and 62% say the number of natural hazard events has increased on the whole. These numbers show a very direct involvement of the interviewed infrastructure-related stakeholders in natural hazard management. Natural hazards are seen as a major problem for the region, as both road and rail connections are typically interrupted several times a year due to natural hazard events. This has wide-ranging effects on the local population, as accessibility plays a crucial role in the Stanzer Valley, with respect to the population being able to access their basic living needs and generating income and jobs from tourism. This highlights the importance of further development and improvement of natural hazard management in the test bed.



The damage potential analysis revealed that the number of persons travelling via road and rail in the test bed has steadily increased over the last years (e.g. by approx. 7% from 2008– 2011 via road – counting point: Grins) and shows a very inhomogeneous temporal distribution: i) seasonal variation, e.g. with changes between 17,500 and 12,000 vehicles mean monthly traffic due to influx from tourists (Grins); ii) weekly variation, e.g. with maximum values of 27,000 to 16,000 vehicles mean daily traffic/24h (Grins); a total of three infrastructure-focused hazard maps were finalised with the methods developed in PARAmount. The results were validated with the infrastructure providers and natural hazard experts in the test bed. The results gained with AvalforLIN and the regional assessment of debris-flow prone catchments were used in the initial stages of the project to delineate hotspots and focus the consecutive hazard mapping; the risk maps cover the entire test bed, integrating damage and hazard potential evaluations into an integrated overview.



An extensive methodology was successfully developed for testing and implementing the PARAmount PTA-model in the Austrian test bed. By applying the tool to differently-sized catchments (0.1 – 23 km²), its applicability for local scale debris flow analysis in the eastern Alps could be studied and compared with the results from the debris flow comparison by Huber (in review). For all catchments, a complete land use and hydrological group mapping, as well as CN-value determination, was performed, and the model was tested using eHYD (Hydrografisches Messstellennetz Österreichs) precipitation data, resulting in detailed feedback to the developers at TESAF.



A low-cost hazard early warning system was successfully developed and implemented in the test bed, based on a comprehensive literature review. This tool was presented to the infrastructure providers. Unfortunately, the terms and conditions for the use of the meteorological data only allowed for a preliminary version of the tool to be distributed. Current efforts by the BFW are towards setting up cooperation with the infrastructure providers to acquire both full rights to the data and the full version of the software to be applied in every-day use.


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

With the CDT method, it was possible to display existing knowledge on complex natural hazard processes in a simple and traceable way within the project. This is a prototype to evaluate and communicate natural hazards and their potential on a general level, as well as in view of climate change. Advancements of CDT are reasonable on the base of further applications and the user’s feedback. CDT can therefore support: i) spatial planning on a regional level (strategic decision-support) including the estimation of effects of changing frame-conditions (like changed climatic conditions); ii) spatial planning on a local level by compiling a base for communication, a starting point and guidance for structured discussions (communication); iii) decision-makers, stakeholders and experts of other disciplines which are involved in planning processes in endangered areas (e. g. architects) by helping them to get a basic understanding of effects and impacts regarding natural hazards (education). By providing an extensive literature review and analysis of climate change data, the BFW was able to provide an important climate change-related input for PARAmount and present these results both to local stakeholders and PPs.



Regarding cooperation and communication in the test bed, the RRD was one of the key outputs in Austria, as the final summary of all results regarding this action show: o

The RRD has proven to be an effective communication platform for natural hazard management and risk communication within the test bed

o

The RRD reflects and strengthens the importance of a participatory approach (bridging the gap between science and practice)

o

The RRD workshops were rated as one of key benefits from the project PARAmount, by the project-external stakeholders and project partners

The RRD further enabled the stakeholders and involved PPs to improve the cooperation between road and rail providers, especially with respect to:



o

Endorsement of the importance of cooperation on a regional level between road and rail decision-makers (change of perspective for rail company encouraged)

o

Enhancement of communication between avalanche commissions (road – rail) in order to improve effectiveness of hazard early warning and temporal measures

o

Advances in disaster and natural hazard management with regard to establishing more direct lines of communication

o

Envisaged data exchange via a common weather station network, bilateral meeting road and rail stakeholders, including district and municipal decision-makers

The dissemination and publication of project results led to several reviewed publications by the BFW at international conferences (e.g. Mountain Risks Conference, INTERPRAEVENT & EGU); newspaper articles on PARAmount in the Austrian print media (e.g. Bezirksblatt, Rundschau & Tiroler Tageszeitung) and television (Landeck TV) and a very well received and well-attended post-graduate course.


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2.1.4

Conclusion

In conclusion the main lessons learned for the Austrian PPs from the PARAmount project are: 

An improved communication was achieved between road and rail, generating major benefits for cross-sector natural hazard disaster management of transport infrastructure, especially with respect to the following insights: o

Endorsement of the importance of cooperation on a regional level

o

Enhancement of communication of avalanche commissions (road – rail)

o

Advances in disaster and natural hazard management (communication)

o

Direct feedback from regional stakeholders is vital



Regional hazard, damage, risk assessment with major benefits for assessment per track sections; testing and implementing new methodologies with a regional view on hazard and damage potential assessment for rail & road section-wise evaluation on different scales.



A more holistic view on natural hazard management of critical infrastructure could be fostered within PARAmount by integrating stakeholders from a wide field of expertise and different levels of competence and responsibility. According to these findings, future efforts should go towards further widening the concept of ‘critical infrastructure‘, by considering not only transport infrastructure, but also energy, water and waste infrastructure, forming an integrated approach.



The importance of a participatory approach was identified in order to bridge the gap between science and practice



Risk communication with local stakeholders is essential to improve acceptance of temporal mitigation measures (e.g. road or rail closures) and improve the effectiveness decisionmaking on a local level



Contribution to natural hazard management on a strategic level is possible

2.2

Manival, Southern French Alps & St. Antoine (France)

2.2.1

Aims in PARAmount

Preliminary ideas on which the IRSTEA activities were based in the domain of debris flow, rockfall and snow avalanche impact on infrastructures are described below: 

Impact of natural hazards on urbanised areas has been widely studied and prevention is organised by a legal framework. The situation is not as clear for transport infrastructures outside of urbanised areas.



Transport infrastructures develop over large regions, while natural hazards are often studied and assessed at a local scale (typically at municipality level). Some assessment of the impact of natural hazards on transport infrastructures is required, even if it remains relatively rough, at least for questions of priority of intervention. In other words, hotspots have to be identified at the regional level.



Once hotspots have been identified, some precise evaluation of the risk at the local scale is often required in order to define accurately appropriate mitigation measures


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

The fact that not all sites prone to natural hazard occurrence are known with the same level of accuracy and uncertainty (even if it is small), is always present in any risk assessment. IRSTEA assumes that knowing the level of uncertainty of the risk assessment can impact the decision regarding the appropriate countermeasures to be installed. Furthermore, the risk assessment is often based upon heterogeneous sources of information that must be combined.



The protection role of the forest is an important factor for safety for transport infrastructures. This role should be assessed more accurately at the regional level and recommendations proposed about the future management of forested areas.

The main objectives of IRSTEA consisted in developing methodologies that could be applied to any Alpine region or catchment. The test beds were chosen on account of the possibilities they offered for testing and validating the tools and methodologies produced. The ideas presented above were translated into project aims as follows: 

Identify the specific needs of departments in the transport sector facing natural hazards.



Propose a methodology of hazard and risk assessment and mapping for debris flow events, rockfall and snow avalanches, with the objective of identifying hotspots with priority intervention. Identify areas or catchments most likely to produce damage in case of the occurrence of specific weather conditions (pre-warning). Focus on the protection function of forest with identification of areas of particular interest and recommendations for future management.



Propose a complete methodology of debris flow hazard and risk assessment at the catchment scale (to be applied to hotspots once they have been identified), which consists of improving knowledge about debris flow triggering and propagation, taking into account heterogeneous sources of information, including expert assessment, and explicitly taking into account uncertainties by working on the basis of scenarios



Analyse specific features of the vulnerability of transport networks at the local and regional scale, taking into account the consequences of disruption.



Propose decision-support tools based on a rigorous framework, to help decision makers express their priorities, the criteria they consider as important, and formalise the steps of their decision process



Communicate our actions, transfer tools and methodologies

2.2.2


The state-of-affairs analysis and communication with stakeholders consisted mainly of identifying the stakeholders’ needs. The methodology included observer meetings, interviews with stakeholders, questioning them about the context of the decision and the decision itself. IRSTEA also was in contact with authorities in charge of crisis management (civil protection), infrastructure management (e.g. RFF and county councils) and political authorities (e.g. ANEM – national association of political representatives of mountain municipalities). IRSTEA also analysed the sensitivity of transport infrastructures to debris flow risk at the regional scale in the framework of a Master’s thesis. IRSTEA particularly emphasized decision-making support tools, for example the multi-criteria and hierarchical analysis, providing a rigorous theoretical framework for the expression of preferences on the basis of a series of criteria, formulated by the end-users themselves. A sensitivity analysis of the method was also carried out (again, in the frame of a Master’s thesis). An application of this method was carried out in cooperation with PARAmount’s PPs ÖBB and PAT.


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Debris flow at regional scale Our aim was to develop simple tools of evaluation able to deal with a limited quantity and easy-toobtain information on hazard and vulnerability at a regional scale. The methodology consisted of the following contributions: Mélanie Bertrand PhD, Southern French Alps: A statistical model for discriminating debris flow prone catchments from those that produce only bedload transport was developed from the compilation of data from the Alpine literature (more than 600 catchments). The model is based on two morphometric parameters (Melton index and channel slope) and was successfully tested with validation databases obtained from a Leave-One-Out statistical procedure (Bertrand et al., 2012; Bertrand et al., in review). This statistical model was encapsulated in a GIS procedure that was developed for the automatic mapping of potential debris flow impact points on transportation infrastructures at regional scale. Part of the work was dedicated to the validation and improvement of the procedure. With that aim, historical data of debris-flow impact on transportation infrastructures in the Southern French Alps were acquired (subcontract) and supported the vulnerability analysis at regional scale. A comparison between model results and data was carried out. A methodology for the evaluation of the vulnerability and accessibility of transport networks exposed to natural hazard in mountain areas was also developed (Master’s thesis) and applied to the Maurienne Valley (St Antoine test bed)

Debris flows at catchment scale Joshua Theule PhD, Manival test bed: Intensive field measurements of geomorphic responses in the Manival catchment allowed for the collection of high-quality data to document catchment-scale sediment transfer in a very active debris flow torrent. Two debris flow events have been characterised in terms of sediment budget, revealing the importance of channel scouring for the prediction of debris flow volumes (Theule et al., 2012). A statistical model was developed for the prediction of the scour depth in steep-slope channels (Theule, 2012). Oldrich Navratil post-doc, Manival test bed: A monitoring station dedicated to debris flow was deployed in autumn 2010. The station is composed of one ultrasonic sensor for stage recording, three geophones for the recording of soil vibrations induced by debris flow fronts, and one videocamera for the qualitative interpretation of the flow (Navratil et al., 2012). Several flash floods with bedload transport were successfully measured by the station during summer 2011.

Methods applied to the St Antoine test bed The aim was to analyse the debris flow hazard and risk at the catchment scale, accounting for the vulnerability of transport infrastructure and explicitly considering the sources of uncertainty of hazard assessment. This led us to combine several sources of information and to work on the basis of scenarios, using the following steps: 

The specific characteristics of the vulnerability of transport infrastructure were studied in the framework of two Master’s theses, with particular attention to the St Antoine test bed: o

A geomorphological analysis was carried out, leading to a precise knowledge of potential erosion processes at catchment scale

o

Some safety and reliability analyses of the protection structures present in the catchment were carried out, to analyse the efficiency of protection works, the resilience in case of protection failure and contribution to build-up in debris flow scenarios


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

Some spatial application of the information fusion was then carried out, mixing knowledge acquired from the previous steps, historical records and pure expert assessment. This led to integrated scenarios of debris flow events.



Application of the hybrid approach, which in practice consisted of simulating the debris flow spreading on the St Antoine alluvial fan, with inputs from the scenarios defined after the previous steps. In practice, model parameter values and their range of possible variation are represented in the framework of the ‘possibility theory’. Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis of results, versus uncertainty of input parameters. This approach leads to real probabilistic hazard maps based on a threshold exceedance probability.

Rockfall and snow avalanches at the regional scale; effect of protection forest Our main aim was to develop a methodology at regional scale in order to evaluate the potential impacts of rockfall and snow avalanches on transport infrastructure, with and without taking into account the protection function of the forest. With this in mind, IRSTEA adapted the Norwegian statistical energy line model and generated one model for rockfall (RockforLIN) and one model for snow avalanche propagation (AvalforLIN) dedicated to some preliminary hazard mapping at regional scale. These tools make it possible to simulate phenomena with or without taking into account the forest vegetation. IRSTEA particularly emphasized the added value generated by using LiDAR data, rather than more classical topographical data. For snow avalanches, IRSTEA took advantage of an existing model for the location of triggering zones. IRSTEA emphasized the calibration and validation phase for both models, notably in cooperation with Austrian, Slovenian and Italian PPs (most of the rockfall and snow avalanche hazard maps in the project were established using our models). Models were also used on the French test beds Hautes-Alpes (Southern French Alps) at the regional scale, most notably in the Queyras Region (part of the Hautes-Alpes county), where LiDAR data was acquired and used. This made it possible to assess the added value resulting from the LiDAR survey. A series of hazard maps was produced. The study of the frequency of phenomena was carried out using historical data, amended by an important dendromorphological analysis (development of a methodology) and provided important results on the frequency, intensity and extent of the phenomena under consideration (Corona et al., 2010a, 2010b). The comparison of simulations carried out with and without taking into account the presence of forest made it possible to identify, at regional scale, areas where forest plays an important role regarding protection from natural hazards. Given that the forest is likely to evolve in the future (populations getting older or adaptations due to climate change), criteria to assess the present state of the forest and recommendations about future management of forested areas were established.

2.2.3

Main results

The main objective of IRSTEA was to establish new methodologies for hazard and risk assessment, both at regional and local scale, and to build decision-support tools. In that framework, all the methodologies presented in the section above can be considered as results of our action within the project. These methodologies have been transferred to the scientific and technical communities. This transfer has consisted in a large number of papers published in scientific and technical journals, in a large number of contributions to conferences or workshops, and in an important effort to transfer validated tools to technical and management departments in charge of protection against natural hazards or in charge of transport infrastructures. The most prominent factual products include: 

State of current practices dealing with management of natural hazards on transport infrastructures and reinforced cooperation with departments in the transport sector


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

Methodology of hazard assessment and mapping for debris flows at regional scale and maps of potential impact at the scale of the Southern French Alps test bed. Method for the derivation of hotspots.

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Methodology of hazard assessment and mapping for rockfall and snow avalanches at the regional scale and maps of potential impact for the Hautes-Alpes County (Southern French Alps test bed) with focus on Queyras.

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Identification of the protection role of forest at that scale and recommendations about future forest management.



Method for the derivation of hotspots. Transfer of operational tools to PPs by generating numerous hazard maps in Austria, Italy and Slovenia.



Complete methodology of debris flow and risk assessment at catchment scale, explicitly taking uncertainties into account, including expert assessment and heterogeneous sources of information in a formalised framework to generate flood scenarios. Treatment of these scenarios with a hybrid approach (using a numerical model) to generate debris flow hazard maps based on the new concept of threshold exceedance probability.



Complete characterisation of the sediment yield in a debris flow prone catchment and installation of a monitoring station

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Analysis of the vulnerability of transport networks at the regional scale, taking into account consequences of disruption, applied to the Maurienne valley (extension of St Antoine test bed)

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Decision-support framework based on multi-criteria analysis, application in cooperation with PPs in PARAmount



Communication actions (inter alia organisation of project final conference, interviews on national TV channels, communication with stakeholders and decision-makers, numerous articles in journals and communications at international conferences)

2.2.4

Conclusion

The results IRSTEA have produced in the framework of the project are coherent with the workprogramme presented at the beginning of the project. The project gave us the opportunity to learn more about the specific requirements of the transport sector and to mainly propose innovative methodologies, but also a series of hazard and risk maps for the considered areas. New tools have already been transferred or will be in the future. A coherent framework for hazard and risk assessment has been proposed: at the regional scale for the identification of hotspots and the definition of intervention priorities, at the local scale (namely the identified hotspots) for precise assessment and mapping.

2.3

Brennero/Brenner, Rolle Pass (Dolomites), Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) & Upper Susa Valley (Italy)

2.3.1

Aims in PARAmount

Cortina/Fiames,

The aims of the Italian PPs in PARAmount, listed by institution are: 

PAB: Improvement of risk assessment and management for transport infrastructure within the province. A progressive development of the methodology in relation to other countries or institutions could bring a sustainable improvement of the own system. In the end our results can convince other countries or institutions to perfect their way of working with this very special topic.


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

PAT: Point out areas that might be affected by snow avalanche and rockfall hazards giving information of relative level of danger, in order to obtain a reliable risk map of the test bed which can support road service in managing risk due to natural hazard. The goal is to provide a prototype for a usable system for risk management, based on a mitigation measure database and modelling tools, which can provide support for decision-making processes.



TESAF & ARPAV: The test bed area is subjected to an intense debris flow activity and allows both a monitoring activity and test of debris flow triggering, delineation of inundated area and routing simulation models according to WP 5. The main analysis in the test area include: o

Design of hazard maps, field surveys, inquiries in local public offices, in-house postprocessing

o

Implementation of an early warning system, related to the rainfall monitoring and activated by the effective flow of debris

o

Testing the early-warning system for debris flow occurrence and evaluating the performance of the system in the field, according to the prerequisites of the institutions concerned and the involved observers

The implementation and testing of an early warning system enables a risk alert for the Institutions, the traffic routes and the people that pass or live by the torrent. The test also allows an evaluation of the impact of debris flow on the infrastructure network and therefore achieves the main objectives of the project with regard to risk assessment and management. 

2.3.2

ARPAP: Development of methodologies and tools for hazard evaluation and forecasting/warning of debris flow phenomena (or more generally, the torrential processes) for civil protection purposes. The developed methods and tools are mainly focused on prevention and forecasting services in mountain environments, in particular in the Susa Valley. These project actions are aimed at improving the regional warning system and the knowledge about these particular phenomena. Moreover, the sharing of methodologies/tools with the other PPs is also a priority in the goals of the project.


Brennero/Brenner (PAB) Method 1: VISO The need to protect the road infrastructure in the Province of Bolzano against rockfall prompted the road service, the Geological Service and the Department of Informatics, to develop a system in order to investigate and catalogue rockfall mitigation measures and to evaluate the hazard on a stretch of road, which was the start of the VISO project (internet download to be announced). R = H x V x E (R…risk, H…hazard, V…vulnerability, E…exposure)


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The VISO database includes the following procedures: 

Identification of the hazard level at a regional scale (Piacentini & Soldati, 2008) Different numerical models aiming at reproducing the process of rockfall can be used to analyse how blocks move along a slope and, consequently, to estimate the run-out distance The models with a high definition output usually require very detailed input datasets such as dimension (in x, y and z axis of the block), volume, weight, geology, characteristics of fissures, exact position of starting points, vegetation and distribution of trees and their diameter in the run-out area, the energy dissipation by cushioning of blocks on ground and much more. Models with a minor requirement of input data useable on the Alpine scale are based on empirical relationships between topographic characteristics and run-out distances. These models allow an easy and robust use on wide areas, but do not allow calculating the velocity of blocks or the impact forces on endangered settlements (Figure 45).



Quick analysis of the hazard level on an intermediate scale without considering existing mitigation measures The VISO tool offers the surveyor a way to quickly detect the hazard due to rockfall phenomena that characterises a slope adjacent to stretch of road. It also allows the creation of a priority list of mitigation measures (new investments) and maintenance based on fundamental parameters, such as the hazard level of the slope and, in the future, the risk level. The intensity of the event (GEI – geological event intensity) is given by the sum of the following parameters: single block volume, greatest volume to be mobilised, state of decompression of the slope and structural situation of the rock face (orientation and spacing of discontinuities). The damping factors (slope coefficient) are assigned by the definition of the slope angle, the morphology and the rebound of the slope, as well as the type and density of vegetation. The assessment of the hazard level on a slope segment, without mitigation measures, is fundamentally based on the intensity of the phenomenon (SEI – slope event intensity), given by the sum of the GEI and slope coefficient parameters, and their probability of occurrence. The calculation of the probability of occurrence for the VISO method is based on counting every rockfall event (records of surveys, and/or technical reports, archived at the Office for Geology and Building Material Testing of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen) within the maximum monitoring time span available (from 1998 onwards). The measure of error clearly depends on the quality of event detection and the period of monitoring.

Figure 45: Outline of run-out zones obtained through the three-dimensional empirical model (source: A. Zischg, Abenis AG).


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

Quick analysis of the efficiency of the existing mitigation measures an on intermediate scale Survey of the functional characteristics of the mitigation measure; this includes its conservation state, its efficacy and its proper positioning related to the intensity and the geometry of the phenomena that may occur on the slope as defined in the previous step. In the frame of PARAmount, a procedure was developed to evaluate the absorption capacity of existing mitigation measures (Gottardi et al., 2011). The assessment of the hazard level to a slope segment with mitigation measure is given by comparing the hazard value for the slope without mitigation measure and the evaluation of the examined mitigation measure.



Quick analysis of the hazard level on an intermediate scale considering existing mitigation measures Survey of the position (Global Positioning System (GPS) or classical topographical methods) and of the characteristics of the mitigation measure(s); this implies the identification of the type of mitigation measure and the determination of its geometrical features.

Method 2: Calculation of vulnerability to attribute a risk level to single road stretches The calculation of vulnerability and exposure of single road stretches allows the transition from the priority list based exclusively on the hazard level, to the priority list based on the risk level, which takes the damage potential into account. Nevertheless, a real risk management concept is very complex and cannot be considered concluded after the PARAmount project. After defining the most critical road sections on an intermediate scale (VISO), a detailed study to investigate these critical points was initiated. Three main critical points along the Brenner axes were investigated: Mittewald/Mezzaselva, Atzwang/Campodazzo, and Salurn/Salorno. After a field survey, different commercial 2D and 3D software products were evaluated and the real intensity of the phenomenon and the functionality of the mitigation measures tested. These software products included: 

RockyFor3D



Rotomap 3D



Rockfall (Dr. Spang) 2D



Geostru 2D



Rocfall 2D

Method 3: Monitoring systems In a place where no mitigation measures can be installed because of the large block volume, for example in Salurn/Salorno, other monitoring systems such as crackmeters may be an adequate way to manage the risk (Figure 46).


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Figure 46: Hazard hotspot Salurn/Salorno in the south of the province; the numbers indicate the main installed extensometers (source: G. Cotza).

Fissurometer: Log 4 20

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Figure 47: Installed mechanical extenometer on the rock tower of Salurn with the movement measured since 2009 – x-axis shows time [days] and the y-axis the movement [mm] and the temperature [°C] (source: PAB).


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Rolle Pass (Dolomites) (PAT) Avalanches The assessment of snow avalanche hazard has been carried out by intersecting the probability of occurrence of natural hazard events in the test bed with their intensity. The return period of snow avalanches has not been defined through a statistical analysis of past events, due to a lacking systematic past events cadastre. This is due to the fact that the CLPV contains only a small amount of registered events, whose number is not sufficient to make statistical considerations. Furthermore, information on the probability of occurrence is available at those points where snow avalanches have not been registered in the Carta di Localizzazione Probabile delle Valanghe (CLPV). However, their probability of occurrence has been linked to the return period of the precipitation that generates the accumulation of snow responsible for the avalanches. The intensity, on the other hand, has been evaluated on the basis of physical parameters, which have been determined by simulating different snow avalanches with different return periods. Preliminary analyses have been carried out to obtain information about the test bed, in order to identify the potential locations of avalanche release areas, tracks and run-out zones. Therefore the initial focus of activities of PAT in the PARAmount project was placed on the collection of historical, cartographic and meteorological data, which has been used to generate a forecast of the new snow depth and the direction of predominant winds, among other factors, that play a role in the snow avalanche release and dynamics. Hazard mapping has been carried using the AVAL-1D computer-based simulation model. AVAL-1D is able to provide information on the run-out velocities, impact pressures, flow levels and distribution of the deposition depth, by solving a set of equations that give a reliable description of the phenomenon from the starting zones to the deposition area. However, the model has some limits, especially concerning the run-out zone of the snow avalanche, which is provided as input datum at the beginning of the simulation. Therefore, hazard maps generated using AVAL-1D are very similar to the CLPV in the test bed, which has been used to calibrate the simulation. Detailed analyses have been produced by applying RAMMS-2D to selected large snow avalanches. Rockfall The assessment of rockfall hazard has been carried following two different approaches. Firstly, a new systematic procedure was implemented to produce a cadastre for mitigation structures. The main types of structures were identified for rockfall and avalanches; for each of them a specific formsheet was designed to be used during field survey; a database was then created with the same structure to be filled in with the information collected during the field surveys. An up-to-date cadastre is primarily important for planning mitigation structures. In fact, the location and the status of existing structures have to be known to achieve efficiency in maintenance and replacement. Secondly, a new physical-based methodology for rockfall hazard modelling over large areas was developed and applied to the entire test-bed SS50 – Passo Rolle; it consists of two subsequent scales of investigation. Rockfall was investigated at both the regional and local scale, using the same modelling tool Rockyfor3D (Bourrier et al, 2009) and two different data sources. The goal of the regional scale analysis is to provide an overview on the entire test bed and pin-point the most hazardous areas within the test bed. A more accurate analysis is then applied at these hotspots. The main difference between the methodologies applied at two different scales consists of the input data preparation. At a regional scale, input data are derived from thematic maps (vegetation, geology, land use) and DEM, whereas, at a local scale, input data are collected in the field. The latter allows for more detailed results and focuses on smaller details (such as presence of small couloirs, buildings, etc), it is however also more time-consuming, whereas the former provides a good overview at a lower expense (Figure 48).


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Figure 48: Rockfall hazard map, section along the SS50. Red identifies high hazard, blue, medium and green, no hazard (source: PAT).

Cortina/Fiames (TESAF) Historical data, surveys, aerial image analysis and field surveys TESAF collected all past events data of the debris flows, which occurred in test bed area. These events were also inserted into a database (built together with ARPAV), called ‘Inventory of Critical road Sections’ in the frame of WP4. The analysis of the technical maps and aerial images covering the timespan from 1882 until now, identifies several flow path-changes of recurrent debris flows and different flooded areas (Figure 49). Extended field surveys were carried out in the summers 20102012. These surveys consisted of GPS and TLS measurements as well as the identification of eroded and deposited areas of debris flows, which occurred between 2006 and 2011. Most notably, more than 30000 GPS points were recorded (Figure 50). The GPS points with a vertical error larger than 0.3 m were discarded. The aim of these field surveys, was the understanding debris flow behaviour, and collecting data for model testing as well as building empirical relationships on erodible and deposition sediment volumes of debris flows. Figure 51 shows the deposits from the debris flow event, which occurred in July 2011.


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Figure 49: Debris flow paths in the years 1882 – 2011 (source: National Flight, 2006).

Figure 50: GPS-points recorded in selected channels in the test-bed area of Fiames along km 108 – 109 of SS51 (source: National Flight, 2006).


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Figure 51: Sediment deposits in a channel within the test-bed area of Fiames, after a debris flow occurred in July 2011 (source: National Flight, 2006).

Monitoring Station TESAF installed a monitoring station (Figure 52) just beneath the Dimai peak at about 1707 m a.s.l.. The station was equipped with video cameras, pressure transducers, a rain gauge and a sharp crested weir to allow runoff measurements. Two additional rain gauges were installed within a radius of 500 m from the monitoring station (Figure 53).

Sharp-crested weir

Figure 52: The monitoring station just beneath the Dimai peak (source: Massimo Degetto).


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Figure 53: The monitoring station and the rain gauges installed in the test.bed area of Fiames (source: National Flight, 2006).

Hazard maps Hazard maps were drafted using the models and tools described by Gregoretti et al. (2011), where erosion was simulated. Model input parameters and coefficients were obtained through the comparison of simulations with field data from eroded and deposited sediment volumes. These were provided by the field surveys and rainfalls/runoff measurements from the monitoring station described above. A new approach was followed when designing the hazard maps: the runoff volume contributing to the debris flow was defined as originating in the triggering section, with a possible deviation with of 35° from the usual debris flow path.


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Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) (ARPAV) Design of hazard maps, field surveys, inquiries at local public offices & in-house post-processing ARPAV collected historical data on debris flow events, which occurred in the Rio Chiesa catchment, present in the archive of the Livinallongo del Col di Lana municipality and in the IFFI database. The collected data was used to create a database, together with TESAF, called Inventory of Critical Road section (WP4). A field survey was conducted for the four debris flow events, which occurred during the project period (13 July 2011 and 17 September 2011; 9 July 2012 and 22 August 2012). The focus of this survey was put on the collection of data, regarding the type of meteorological event, triggering the debris flow in terms of ground effects (e.g. detection trigger, propagation and deposition zone, volume and granulometry of the deposit, etc.). By using the specific tool developed by TESAF (AdB debris flow modelling tool), a simulation of a debris flow event in the Rio Chiesa catchment was performed. Once the data needed for modelling had been collected, ARPAV, with the help of TESAF, proceeded with the calibration of the model, taking into account the event having a return period of 100 years and a volume of 16,000 m³. Finally, a hazard map was produced according to WP5 goals. ARPAV have implemented a hazard early warning system in the Rio Chiesa catchment. The mains goal of the system was to test new kinds of sensors for detecting debris flow events, during the event itself. In addition, the instrumented catchment will provide high-quality information for deriving regional thresholds of rainfall intensity and/or cumulated values for debris flow triggering, which can be utilised for warning systems. The system is composed of two main stations: The first station, a rain gauge station integrated with temperature and wind sensors and a webcam, is located in the upper catchment of the Rio Chiesa. The principal function of this station is to monitor the triggering factors for debris flow (intense precipitation) using three rain gauges and activating the warning system. The second station, a data processing station, is located along the debris flow channel near an opencheck dam. The principal function of this station is to monitor and to detect the passage of the debris flow through the channel. To achieve these goals, the latter station is equipped with a series of sensors, including a thermal camera, four ultrasonic sensors and two wire sensors. The power will be supplied by photovoltaic panels. Transmission of data and alerts of the early warning system will be conducted via the radio Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) signal.

Upper Susa Valley (ARPAP) ARPAP started with the analysis of the test bed (e.g. geology, climate) to find 12 specific basins for a precise investigation, with the aim of characterising the debris flows in the Susa Valley. Furthermore, ARPAP collected data from the regional weather radar systems, the regional rain gauge network and a mobile rain gauge, to define a triggering threshold for debris flow events. As a conclusion of the workflow, ARPAP developed an innovative approach for the debris flows hazard assessment, based on the classification of Alpine basins and related processes (geological model). Moreover, an integration of a geological model, a Cellular Automata (CA) model and a numerical model for the simulation of debris flow routing and deposition scenarios, was successfully applied to three basins selected from the upper Susa Valley. As result, a very good simulation of debris flows routing and deposition was completed. The CA model was calibrated through the geological model (catchment process type, observed depositional style and rheology of debris flows for each basin group). Using this methodology, hazard/risk scenarios impacting on critical infrastructure (railways, highways and roads) were tested and verified. Following this, an early warning system, based on the geological model and the radar storm-tracking technique, called DEFENSE (DEbris Flows triggEred by storms – Nowcasting SystEm) was developed. Subsequently DEFENSE was refined by introducing the expected torrential process type for a specific basin (flash flood, debris flood or debris flow) obtained by the new considerations on the basins’ geomorphology and morphometry. In addition, a new algorithm for the improvement of DEFENSE was implemented. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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2.3.3

Main results

Brennero/Brenner (PAB) One of the main goals reached during the project PARAmount, was the creation of a priority list of intervention and maintenance, based on the risk level. A second very important result was the collection of knowledge of already existing and installed mitigation measures; it is absolutely vital to know their efficiency in case of an event. The detailed testing of different commercial 2D and 3D software products led to a better understanding of the theoretical bases and the different approaches of each programme. The comparison of the results, especially of kinetic energies and bounce heights, enabled estimation of the error bars of the single products and in a next step, of the methodology. In addition, it was possible to define the required and most critical input parameters to map in the field, to be able to guarantee the correct calculation by the different programmes. The evaluation of the input parameters and the critical point, as well as the handling of these programmes, will be listed in guidelines (WP6).

Rolle Pass (Dolomites) (PAT) Avalanches The main results include hazard maps, which have been created on the basis of the results generated by the AVAL-1D model, by referring to the indications prescribed by the of law the Autonomous Province of Trento. According to this law, hazard levels are defined by considering the BUWAL (Bundesamt für Umwelt) matrix, in which probability and intensity are divided into three different classes (low, medium and high) on the basis of their values (Table 7 and Figure 54). Table 7: Classification of impact pressure and return period for BUWAL matrix (source. Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, 1998). Intensity

Impact pressure

Probability

Return period

High

P > 15 kPa

High

30 years

Medium

3 kPa < P < 15 kPa

Medium

100 years

Low

P < 3 kPa

Low

300 years

Figure 54: BUWAL matrix used by the PAT for the snow avalanche hazard assessment (source. Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, 1998).


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For example, intensity is considered as being ‘low’, if the energy of the snow avalanches falls below 3 kPa, ‘medium’, if it lies between 3 – 15 kPa and ‘high’ if it is greater than 15 kPa. The IRSTEA avalanche model has not been applied to produce the hazard maps in the test bed, because it gives information about the likely path of snow avalanches without specifying the velocity and pressure values. Rockfall The methodology has been successfully applied, providing reasonable results, which have been verified with ad hoc field surveys. A hazard map for the test bed has been produced (Figure 48); the hazard level has been classified according to three main variables, falling height, number of passages per cell and falling velocity. At the moment, this choice represents a test whose results are still under discussion, since the thresholds differ from those proposed in the Annex to the DGP 2759. In this respect, the PARAmount project has been a good opportunity to investigate methodologies and threshold values for rockfall hazard mapping. A synthesis of the results is the quantification of road (percentage) falling within each level of hazard and risk (Figure 55). This information is useful for hazard management purposes and when planning mitigation measures.

Figure 55: Portion of the table which summarises the outputs of the rockfall analysis (source: PAT).

Cortina/Fiames (TESAF) All data from monitoring station and surveys were used to test models of operative tools. Data and models were used to build hazard maps.

Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) (ARPAV) After the participation in the AdB modelling course held in Legnaro on 12 to 14 September 2011, ARPAV started testing the AdB model in the Rio Chiesa catchment. The data produced by the application of the model has been used for the definition of the debris flow hazard map of the Rio Chiesa catchment. ARPAV developed an early warning system. In the design phase of the monitoring system, ARPAV gave priority to the use of innovative sensors for motion detection of debris flow (thermal camera).


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The system was installed at the beginning of summer 2012 and tested by two debris flow events in July and August. The precipitation data recorded provided good information for deriving regional thresholds of rainfall intensity for debris flow triggering, which could be utilised for other warning systems, too. The rainfall activated the warning system and the transmission of data and alerts via GSM signal worked very well. Also, the wire sensors were broken by the debris flow passage and sent an alert message. The recorded images of the thermo camera were analysed in order to set the motion detecting software. So at the end of the first monitoring summer, some goals has been achieved: indicative thresholds of rain fall intensity for debris flow triggering, good data transmission, interesting images recorded for motion detecting, low energy consumption of the monitoring system, good sizing of photovoltaic panels and rechargeable batteries.

Upper Susa Valley (ARPAP) Basins and related processes classification method: results According to a study conducted on several alluvial fans in the Alpine region (Moscariello et al., 2002), several upper Susa Valley basins have been classified by Tiranti et al. (2008) into three main typologies of catchment lithology: (1) massive and/or crudely stratified/foliated carbonate rocks (e.g., dolostones, limestones, marbles); (2) fine-grained, sheared, finely-foliated metamorphic rocks (e.g., calc-schists, shales, phyllades); (3) massive or coarse-grained crystalline rocks or massive quartzite rocks (e.g., granitoids, gneiss, ultrabasites, meta quartz-conglomerates). On the basis of these lithological characteristics, the dominant alluvial fan aggradational processes are related to a cohesive debris flow (CDF) and to a non-cohesive debris flow (N-CDF). The occurrence of the two debris flow types depends on the amount of clay or clay-like phyllosilicates and clay silt, produced by the different bedrocks. A matrix clay content greater than 5% characterises the CDF; a matrix clay amount lower than 5% characterises N-CDF. In Table 8 the main features of the three basin types are summarised. Table 8: Characteristics of the three catchment lithology groups in the western Alps (modified after Tiranti et al., 2008). Basin group

Fan/basin area [%]

Dominant processes

Main depositional style

1

20

CDF

Rudavoi

2

5

CDF

Grand Vallon

3

5

N-CDF

Inferno – Grotto

Triggering recurrence [years]

Minimum triggering rainfall type

Main triggering season

4

Storms of high intensity

Basin group

1

Late spring

(≥30 mm/h)

2

1

Storms of moderate intensity

Summer

(≥20 mm/h) 3

>10

Storms of very high intensity (≥50 mm/h)


Autumn and spring

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The considerations regarding the triggering frequency and the triggering seasonality displayed in Table 8 are derived from analyses of the historical data from 1728 until today. The considered average values of critical rainfall intensity (Table 8) are only indicative of a high probability of debris flow triggering. The characterisation of basins is instead based on direct observations of the catchment’s geology, sedimentary features of debris flow deposits and the characteristics of alluvial fans (morphology, sedimentology and architecture). Finally, the basins’ classification (including processes and alluvial fans), was successfully applied to the entire Susa Valley, as shown in Figure 56.

Figure 56: The classified basins of Susa Valley: G1 basins in light blue; G2 basins in green; G3 basins in dark red (source: ARPAP).

Moreover, the nature of the processes that occur in a basin, also depends on morphometric characteristics of that basin. In fact, through a new index based on the Melton index (the average gradient and length of the main channel), it is possible to identify the most likely type of process that can occur in a basin: flash flood, debris flood or debris flow (based on Wilford et al. 2004). The basins of Susa Valley were also classified by the main expected phenomenon, as shown in Figure 57.


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Figure 57: Main expected phenomena in the Susa Valley’s basins: Flash flood in light blue; debris flood in orange; debris flow in red (source: ARPAP).

A hazard scenario maker using the integration of the basin classification method and a CA model: results The propagation and deposition of debris flows in upper Susa Valley are simulated by a 3D numerical code, based on a CA method (Segre & Deangeli, 1995; Deangeli, 2008). In the frame of the present study, this code has been improved and modified by the implementation of a visco-plastic rheology regime, according to the Bingham constitutive law. The behaviour of debris flow depends on many factors and the coexistence of different regimes during the run-out phase of a given event has been observed (Deangeli, 2008). According to the geological classification, we have suggested different rheologies: if CDF are predominant, we adopt a visco-plastic rheology, where we consider the mixture to behave as a Bingham fluid; if N-CDF is the main process, we assume the granular material to behave as a dilatant fluid in the grain inertia regime of Bagnold (1954). The initial volumes of loose material do not refer to a particular occurred event, but have been estimated for each catchment on the basis of several past events. The values are hence representative of the investigated area and are free from subjective interpretations of an occurred phenomenon. The model parameters are then calibrated on the depositional style and fan architecture. The CA model has been used to simulate debris flow events in three different basins belonging to the three different groups: Rio Fosse (Bardonecchia) – group 1, Rio Frejus (Bardonecchia) – group 2 and Rio Secco (Salbertrand) – group 3.


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a) Rio Fosse The Rio Fosse is a small basin extending over an area of about 1.40 km² and is characterised by a catchment lithology mainly formed by dolostones, limestones and subordinate calc-schists. The simulations have been performed considering a saturated material and a mixture of mud and water as embedding fluid. Exclusively for this basin, both the previously introduced rheologies have been adopted in the CA model. As a matter of fact, debris flows along Rio Fosse could be characterised by a coexistence of different flow regimes, the basin being intermediate between group 2 and group 3 (CDF and N-CDF respectively) (Deangeli et al., 2011). The results of the two types of simulations seem to indicate that the most appropriate constitutive law is the visco-plastic one, as reported in Figure 58. In fact, the modelling output shows a good agreement with the depositional style and the geometrical characteristics of the alluvial fan, typical for group 1 basins (wide and regular fan with a gradual decrease of the slope from apex to toe).

Figure 58: Results of the numerical analysis of debris flows in the Rio Fosse basin. The blue line represents the contour of the watershed; the red line represents the contour of the alluvial fan (the values of x- and yaxis are the ED50-UTM/32N coordinates) (source: ARPAP).


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b) Rio Frejus The Rio Frejus has a basin of about 22 km² and the town of Bardonecchia is situated on its alluvial fan. The Frejus basin is mostly composed of calc-schistes and characterised by a high density of active landslides, sometimes involving whole slopes (deep-seated gravitational slope deformations). The high frequency of debris flow phenomena is due to the debris abundance deposited in the stream channels. The basin of the Rio Frejus is very large and involves several tributaries on both the right and left bank. The numerical modelling has considered only the contribution of Rio Gautier, because, historically, the highest number of debris flows has originated along this secondary basin. The numerical simulations have considered a saturated material. The basins of group 2 are characterised by an excellent production of clay or clay-like minerals, which should give rise to a more ‘viscous’ debris flow than group 1 basins. As for the previous case, the modelling results (Figure 59) seem to fulfil the deposition style observed in the geological classification, especially with respect to the alluvial fan geometry and the accumulated debris thickness. A very good agreement between numerical results and in-situ observations has been obtained for the abundant deposition of debris along the channel.

Figure 59: Results of the numerical analysis of debris flow events in the Rio Frejus basin. The blue line represents the contour of the watershed; the red line represents the contour of the alluvial fan (the values of x- and y-axis are the ED50-UTM/32N coordinates) (source: ARPAP).


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c) Rio Secco The Rio Secco is located in the Salbertrand municipality and extends over an area of about 4.85 km². It is characterised by a catchment lithology mainly formed by gneiss and massive micaschists, as well as very subordinate dolostones and calc-schists. The source areas were identified with the abundant talus deposits distributed at the basin head. These main source areas are characterised by a high presence of very coarse debris deposits, with open work structure, resting on very steep slopes. The mobilisation of coarse sediments is only possible when very extreme rainfalls occur. The basins of group 3 produce less fine fractions, compared to groups 1 and 2. The embedding fluid in this case is clear water. The material is assumed to be fully saturated. A value of the friction angle between 30° and 40° has been adopted, due to the fact, that the group 3 basins are characterised by very coarse particles. The results of the CA modelling (Figure 60) have again emphasized the similarities among the estimates of the geological model, the in-situ observations regarding the depositional style along the channel and the alluvial fan geometry (high slope, particularly in the apex zone).

Figure 60: Results of the numerical analysis of debris flow events in the Rio Secco basin. The blue line represents the contour of the watershed; the red line represents the contour of the alluvial fan (the values of x- and y-axis are the ED50-UTM/32N coordinates) (source: ARPAP).


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The early warning system DEFENSE: results Traditional warning systems are usually based on rainfall rate thresholds derived from rain gauges. However, rain gauge networks are often too inadequate to properly identify localised storms (Duncan et al., 1993). Polarimetric C-band radar can provide reliable, real-time rainfall estimation with high spatial and temporal resolution. An algorithm for storm identification and tracking using the TREC technique (Tracking Radar Echoes by Correlation – Rinehart, 1979) has been implemented. Storm cells are hence localised, characterised (i.e. maxima echo, storm area, VIL – Vertical Integrated Liquid) and tracked. Using this pattern recognition process, radar-derived storm cells are stored in arrays and are compared by cross-correlation with storm cells detected on previous steps, in order to determine the storm path. Considering the overall path of the storm, it is then possible to now-cast the next position of the storms and their interaction with the debris flow basins. By integrating the new classification of Alpine basins and the radar storm tracking method, ARPAP has developed an innovative early warning system, called DEFENSE. The system is able to predict a dangerous torrential process that will affect roads and railways or other subjects of protection near the alluvial fan area and/or the main incised channel. Recently, ARPAP moved to a new approach, oriented to real-time analysis and now-casting derived products with full Geographic Information System (GIS) functionality, based on the open source platform and GFOSS (Geographic Free and Open Source Software) tools. PostGIS allows the native storage of geometries in the database and for various GIS queries, including unions, area calculations and ‘features within’. Geometry objects can then be displayed by various GIS-server and client applications, allowing the database to act as a backend GeoSpatial database for GIS servers. The application of DEFENSE in the Susa Valley On 3 September 2011 a storm event hit the Susa Valley causing mud debris floods/mud debris flow in three basins (Torrent Claretto, Torrent Gioglio and Torrent Mardarello – Val Cenischia, Torino) between 13:30 and 14:00 UTC. Damage was reported in several areas, including severe damage to the only access route to the valley (Figure 61).

Figure 61: Only access route to the Cenischia valley, damaged by mud debris flow (Torrent Gioglio), (source: ARPAP).


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The basins of Torrent Gioglio, Torrent Claretto and Torrent Marderello can be ascribed to the basins of class 2 (Figure 62). The high production of clay-like minerals in loose material determines a viscoplastic rheology of debris flow/debris flood phenomena.

Figure 62: Lithological settings of (from north to south) Torrent Gioglio, Torrent Claretto and Torrent Marderello catchments: calc-schists and phyllades in ochre; limestones and dolostones in light-blue; amphibolites and prasinites in red; talus deposits in light-grey; glacial deposits in dark-grey (source: ARPAP).

On the basis of the main morphometric characteristics, the most likely expected process for these three basins is a debris flood, rich in fine fraction.

Figure 63: Storm cells paths. The numbers on cells centroids are the reflectivity values (dBZ). Involved basins are bordered in black (source: ARPAP).


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By weather radar observations, storms responsible for debris flood/debris flow triggering were identified as individual cells, following their evolution with satisfactory accuracy (Figure 63). As shown in Figure 63, some storm cells followed a south-to-north path coincident with the axis of the Cenischia Valley (Susa Valley) getting close to the basins affected by mud-debris floods/ mud debris flows. In conclusion, the mud debris floods/mud debris flow were triggered only in those basins affected by the strongest storm shower, responsible for the excess of class 2 basins triggering-thresholds (≥ 20 mm/h).

2.3.4

Conclusion

Brennero/Brenner (PAB) The experience with the project PARAmount was very positive. The knowledge collection, absorption and transfer to the stakeholders, transport operators and everyone else involved in PARAmount, helped develop the risk and damage potential concept implemented during the project PARAmount. This goes for technicians and, above all, for transport infrastructure administration departments, who are thus able to allocate money for new investments in an objective way and not based on personal decisions. The calculation of the vulnerability and the exposure of single road stretches allowed the transition from a priority list based on hazard level to a list based on risk level, which considers the damage potential. Nevertheless, the step of a real concluded risk management concept is a very complex one, which cannot be considered concluded after the PARAmount project.

Rolle Pass (Dolomites) (PAT) The activities carried out within the PARAmount project proved to be useful to develop an awareness for tools and methodologies necessary for an appropriate hazard analysis and risk management. A dialog with local authorities and technicians helped when focussing on weaknesses and strengths within the road management in mountainous areas where natural hazard cannot be ignored. In particular, avalanches and rockfall hazard were investigated along the SS50 road. Avalanches The mathematical models used to assess hazard have some limits, but results were checked in the field so that a hazard map for the Rolle Pass could be drawn. Despite its limitation this tool can support in decision-making and road risk management. Rockfall The methodology developed in PARAmount can be applied on both a local and regional scale, providing a database for mitigation measures and data necessary to build the model. This tool allows a classification of rockfall hazards and risk along a road. The scale of investigation has to be chosen depending on the purpose of the analysis and on resources available for field surveys. The methodology applied on a large scale allows for hazardous sections along the road to be identified, whereas at local scale, the analysis reveals the main details of the dynamics, leading trajectories and arresting zones.


90

Cortina/Fiames (TESAF) The work carried out within the PARAmount project was very useful, because it provided a GIS-based tool for the complete simulation of all physical processes of the debris flow phenomenon from runoff to deposition and data for running models. In fact, two monitoring stations were set up in the two test-bed areas of Fiames (station for monitoring runoff triggering debris flow, TESAF) and Rio Chiesa (station for debris flow early warning, ARPA Veneto). Moreover, in the test bed area of Fiames detailed topographic surveys were carried out by using Airborne and Terrestrial laser scanners, and GPS with real-time correction. Both models and data are necessary for appropriate hazard analysis and risk management. A dialog with ANAS technicians helped for the purpose of data acquisition and technical information about road protection systems. ANAS appreciated the resulting database developed within WP 4.

Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) (ARPAV) The experiences in PARAmount project have been interesting for the development of ARPAV activities and role in collaboration with regional departments, concerning hydraulic and hydro geological risk management. In particular, it was an opportunity to increase our knowledge transfer to the stakeholders, public and private bodies and operators involved in PARAmount goals. The early warning system installation on Rio Chiesa catchment represents the first step for ARPAV towards an operative managing experience in the field of debris-flow monitoring. It has been and will be an occasion to test innovative sensors and calibrate the alert system from an energetic point of view, but also to test an efficient communication system based on a real-time feedback between the field stations recording and the operators/stakeholders. For this reason the realisation is a mile stone and the work cannot be concluded with the end of the PARAmount project.

Upper Susa Valley (ARPAP) The outputs of the ARPAP WP6 actions include i) a complete and integrated tool capable of classifying the basins and the torrential processes from a hazard evaluation point of view, ii) generating hazard and risk scenarios and forecasting the triggering of torrential phenomena. As a synthesis of the workflow results, the DEFENSE system was presented above. The system is based both on sound basin classification and on storm identification and tracking algorithm, using operational polarimetric C-band radar operated by ARPAP. Storm cell centroids and parameters are stored in a PostGres/PostGIS database and geographical operations are performed to derive critical conditions. Data, indicating critical basins threatened by severe storms, are produced every five minutes and published on a WebGIS server. The whole system (basin classification, radar monitoring and now-casting) can be easily applied to the Alps and more generally to mountainous areas. This innovative system can be operationally implemented in WebGIS-based early warning issues to road, railway and infrastructure stakeholders (civil protection, road managers, etc). Moreover, a ‘risk scenario maker’, generated by the integration of the basin classification and CA model, can be adopted for better understanding of where a torrential phenomenon can involve the target infrastructures in the alluvial fan area and the proximity of a main basin channel. Three methods/tools for hazard evaluation and forecasting of debris flows were obtained as project action (WP6) results. These methods/tools are easily adoptable and adaptable by other PPs in their test beds.


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2.4

Posočje & Koroška Bela (Slovenia)

2.4.1

Aims in PARAmount

The aim of the Slovenian partners was the improvement of existing risk mitigation strategies for transport infrastructure in two test beds (Posočje and Koroška Bela). The current state of risk management in Slovenia is lacking the modern approaches that were developed within the PARAmount project. The natural hazards of rockfall, avalanche and debris flow present a real threat to transport and other infrastructure. Although the effects of climate change cannot be predicted with sufficient accuracy, most of the studies show a trend towards increasing occurrence of extreme weather conditions in the Alpine Space. Such a trend will, as a consequence, bring higher hazards, which we have to be aware of and prepared for. In Slovenia, hazard and risk assessment studies for these natural hazards are rare and not uniform. Therefore, one of the main aims for the Slovenian project partners is to present good examples of hazard and risk mitigation strategies in the test beds, which could form a guideline, or at least a bestpractice example for the whole of Slovenia.

Posočje 

Baška grapa (rockfall, avalanches) The aim of the Slovenian partners was the improvement of the reliability and security of railroad transport infrastructure threatened by the natural hazards of avalanches and rockfall, especially regarding the Bohinj railway through Baška grapa. In accordance with this main aim, the following new goals were set:



o

Expert survey evaluation of the existing rockfall and avalanche protection system

o

Rockfall and avalanche hazard evaluation

o

Vulnerability evaluation

o

Risk evaluation, including a risk dialogue with Slovenian Railways

o

Risk evaluation ‘good-practice example’ for wider use in the Slovenian transport system

o

Test of decision-support systems developed in the test bed within PARAmount, with the goal of improving current risk management processes

Soteska (debris flow) In Soteska Valley test bed the main aim was to research possibilities of preliminary debris flow hazard assessment and preliminary debris flow hazard mapping using semi-empirical models. These models require fewer input data parameters and are easier to use for preliminary hazard mapping. In accordance with this main aim, the following new goal was set: o

Debris flow hazard assessment (semi empirical numerical modelling)

Koroška Bela In Koroška Bela test bed the main aim was to research possibilities of detailed debris flow hazard assessment and debris flow hazard mapping. We took into consideration the railway, regional road and settlements.


92

In accordance with this main aim, the following new goals were set: 

Damage potential analysis (road, railway and settlement)



Debris flow hazard assessment (numerical modelling)



Debris flow model sensitivity analysis (influence of different DEMs)



Test of developed operative tool (debris flow hydrological, triggering and routing model developed by TESAF)

2.4.2


The basis for any hazard and risk evaluation is data of good quality of the state in the field. Therefore, a thorough field survey of the Posočje test bed was carried out. During the survey, the data gathered from different sources (avalanche cadastre, data from Slovenian Railways ltd) was checked and an elaborate database of the existing protection structures of the railroad section Podbrdo – Most na Soči was made. The database includes the following protection structure data: 

Location (GPS coordinates)



Distance from track and approximate railroad chainage



Altitude



Slope inclination



Year of construction (mostly unknown)



Type of structure



Structure dimensions (length, height)



State of structure (bad, sufficient, good, very good, perfect)



Suitability of structure for expected hazards (bad, sufficient, good, very good, perfect)

The created database is an important tool, since it gives the responsible authorities a good overview of the existing protection structures, including their state. This can be used to set priorities of the renewal or existing protection structures, or the locations of new structure, in order to replace the existing ones. The database can be easily maintained by including data on rebuilt or new structures and can be a long-lasting tool in risk management. The database was also a good data source for the hazard and risk evaluation analyses carried out in the test bed. The risk evaluation approach to assure accessibility along critical transport infrastructure lines is a fairly new concept in the Slovenian Alpine Space. Therefore, no best-practice examples and legal or expert guidelines for reaching the above-mentioned aims were available at the start of PARAmount (Rak et al., 2012b). Precisely for that reason, the following methods had to be developed: 

Method for avalanche hazard evaluation (Posočje-Baška grapa test bed)



Method for rockfall hazard evaluation (Posočje-Baška grapa test bed)



Method for debris flow hazard assessment (Koroška Bela test bed)



Method for preliminary debris flow hazard assessment (Posočje-Soteska test bed)



Method for damage potential and vulnerability evaluation (Posočje-Baška grapa test bed)



Methods for avalanche and rockfall risk evaluation (Posočje-Baška grapa test bed)


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In the course of the development of methods, the main goal was to devise tools that are, on the one hand, thorough and complex, so that they enable good hazard, vulnerability and risk evaluation according to local particularities. On the other hand, a significant amount of effort was made to make the methods simple and undemanding, in order to make them widely usable and applicable (e.g. to the whole Slovenian railway network). Only a succinct and well-defined method can be used widely, while such a method cannot envelop all local specialities that can influence natural hazard and/or risk. The compromise between the two opposing aims was difficult to reach. In debris flow hazard assessment (Koroška Bela testbed), a commercially available numerical modelling tool FLO-2D was used. FLO-2D model is a user-friendly certified model for mass movement modelling. The interface of the model is schematic, and input data required for modelling is welldefined. The user can set all control parameters of the model. The most important input data when modelling debris flow movement is topographic data (DEM) and magnitude of the event. With LiDAR technology we were able to solve the problem of data accuracy, but defining magnitude of the event remains a problem. Additional methods for magnitude (event scenario) assessment must be applied. The hydrological model in Flo-2D cannot be used for debris flow magnitude assessment. FLO-2D is suitable for modelling of the moving phase of the event and for hazard mapping. Surprisingly, FLO-2D has shown a small sensitivity for rheological parameters of debris flow. Regarding defined magnitude, FLO-2D is a useful tool with schematic interface and tools for hazard mapping. The user can define borders of hazard classes and modelling results – thereby defining the hazard map. Past research and model applications have shown that FLO-2D is an appropriate model for hazard assessment, but requires specific knowledge and experience with modelling. The developed methods showed good functionality when applied to the Slovenian test beds and proved worthy of further use and development. Although the methods functioned well, the results could use verification. Ideally a comparison of results of several different risk evaluation methods used in the same test bed would give a good overview of the method’s validity. Although verification of this sort would be most welcome, such a comparison has not been carried out, nor has it been planned. Unfortunately, the evaluated risk has not been checked by Slovenian Railway officials, who could provide feedback from their users and would bring an improvement to the developed method. Whether Slovenian Railways will improve their willingness to cooperate in the PARAmount project remains uncertain (Rak et al., 2012a). For more information on the creation of the WP5 tools and method development, please refer to the respective WP5 deliverables.

2.4.3

Main results

The Slovenian partners have, according to the goals set in the beginning of the project and regarding the agreed deliverables defined in the application form, developed the following tools as a result of the PARAmount project: 

Database of the existing protection structures on the Podbrdo – Most na Soči railroad section



Avalanche hazard map for the Posočje test bed (Baška grapa)



Rockfall hazard map for Posočje the test bed (Baška grapa)



Debris flow hazard map for the Koroška Bela test bed



Damage potential cadastre with a vulnerability map for the Posočje test bed (Baška grapa)



Damage potential assessment for the Koroška Bela test bed



Avalanche risk map for the Posočje test bed (Baška grapa)



Rockfall risk map for the Posočje test bed (Baška grapa)


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2.4.4

Conclusion

All new methods developed during the PARAmount project give an option of further development. Since in Slovenia we do not have legislation covering natural hazards, research projects are necessary for development of methodology. The aim in Slovenia is to adopt legislation and prescribe methodology for hazard assessment and mapping. Developed methodology should be evaluated and tested in other test beds. With a larger number of field tests we could evaluate the methods and consider using them in the decision support system which will have to be developed sooner or later. It is very important to apply developed methods in the process of spatial planning. In future, all important transportation lines should be considered and the responsible authorities must be included. Slovenian Civil Protection, who are responsible for first interventions in the case of a natural disaster, should be included and aware of the state-of-the-art methods. Their measures must be synchronised with the conclusions and results of the newly-developed methods. Main lessons learned by the Slovenian PPs during the PARAmount project are: An improved communication was achieved between rail maintenance staff and hazard experts, generating major benefits for natural hazard disaster management of railway infrastructure, especially with respect to the following insights: 

Familiarisation with the possible consequences and application of the latest Slovenian water and natural disaster legislations (based on EU Water flood directive) in the field of management of railway infrastructure; introduction to possible interpretation/adaptation of the accepted flood and erosion hazard/risk concept in the field of rockfall, avalanches and debris flow hazards on railway



Expert groundwork and good-practice examples for expert tools and methodologies in the field of rockfall, avalanches and debris flow hazard/risk assessment of the railway infrastructure



Hazard and risk maps for rockfall, avalanches and debris flow hazards adapted to railway infrastructure, and preliminary recommendation of adequate protective measures in the most critical sections in test bed



Expert groundwork and good-practice example (recommendation) for improving and introducing an adequate GIS event data base as well as the operative documentation of hazardous events



Expert groundwork and good-practice example (test bed example) for improving and introducing an adequate data base on existing protection objects and improving operative control and supervision of protective structures



Recommendation for decision-making processes regarding hazard assessment, planning and design of protection measures and maintenance on the rail network

PARAmount results are providing a good basis for the acceleration of the development process in the field of natural hazard/risk management affecting Slovenian Railways, which is already visible in some of the latest approaches taken by railway maintenance staff in last two years (enhanced cooperation with natural hazard experts and companies, more focused decision-taking process, more ambitious, goal-oriented and content-based planning, execution of some intervention high-tech solutions – installation of first flexible rockfall protective barriers, …).


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2.5

Sedrun/Tujetsch (Switzerland)

2.5.1

Aims in PARAmount

The Swiss PPs had three aims within PARAmount: Task 1: Conducting a national workshop aimed at analysing the current state of instruments and tools used in decision-making for protection against natural hazards along traffic routes. Task 2: Survey on risk perception of natural hazards in the pilot area Sedrun-Tujetsch and exchange of experiences regarding the information system IFKIS-MIS. Task 3: Study on existing methods for assessing the indirect costs caused by interruption of traffic routes due to natural hazards.

2.5.2


Regarding task 1, an international workshop with 30 participants was conducted from 16th to 17th July 2010 at the ETH in Zurich. The results of this workshop are summarised in a separate report (Willi & Locher, 2010). Addressing task 2, a working group from the EURAC and the SLF conducted personal interviews with representatives of local authorities in the Sedrun-Tujetsch region. Additionally, an internet survey was organised. The results of this survey were presented and discussed with affected people from the test bed. In this workshop, experiences with the information system IFKIS-MIS, established in the region in 2006, were exchanged. With regard to task 3, a literature review and a workshop on assessing the cost of interruptions of traffic routes was conducted. The literature review consisted of searching available studies. The results of this undertaking were presented and discussed at a workshop in Innsbruck with representatives of the ÖBB, BFW, the Autonomous Province of Bozen – South Tyrol and various engineering consultants.

2.5.3

Main results & discussion

The discussions among participants in the workshop within task 1 indicated several open questions, which have to be addressed in future. The authors of the summarising report provided the following recommendations (Willy and Locher, 2010): 

Use of a unified terminology: in the involved countries, several approaches for hazard and risk management are used. The basis for an exchange of ideas is that involved parties use terms in the same manner. Existing glossaries should be considered and exchanged among partners.



Methods for risk assessment are very different regarding their level of detail. At the beginning of a risk assessment, the respective goals have to be clearly defined before a method is chosen.



Local knowledge should be included in hazard and risk assessment.



Protection goals for traffic routes should be formulated. The desired level of safety and the remaining risk strongly influence the choice of mitigation measures. Besides risk to human life, the availability of a traffic route is crucial for planning mitigation measures. A high level of availability requires a high safety level. The determination of interruption costs is an open issue and requires a clear definition of system boundaries.



Dealing with uncertainties remains a key issue in risk assessment.



Accepted methods for risk evaluation are necessary.


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

Decision-makers have to be sensitised to risk-based decision making.



Climate change effects should be taken into account in risk assessments.

In the first part of task 2, local stakeholders and natural hazard experts were interviewed. The interviewed persons proved to have a high awareness of natural hazards, because they deal with them on a daily business, especially in winter (closure of traffic routes). Natural hazards have a large influence on the local economy. As the region of Sedrun-Tujetsch can only be permanently reached via the road from one side during the year (with few exceptions; access from the south can be closed, access from the east is permanently closed in winter), accessibility is identified as a key factor for economy (Figure 64). Stakeholders stated that accessibility and safety have the largest influence on the quality of life. The most important mitigation measures are technical measures (e.g. avalanche supporting structures) and warning systems.

Figure 64: Answers of local stakeholders in the Sedrun-Tujetsch region regarding influencing factors on regional economy (Pechlaner et al., 2011).

In the second part of task 2, an internet survey was conducted. In total 15 questionnaires were sent out, 10 were returned, which is a return rate of 67%. The results can be summarised as follows: 

80% of the respondents indicate that their institution or enterprise experienced a natural hazard event in the past five years. Nearly 67% experienced landslides or debris flow events. 50% indicate that they were affected by avalanches and 33.3% by torrential floods. 16.7% experienced rockfall. The interviewed persons are mainly concerned about avalanches, landslides, debris flow and torrential floods, while avalanches are considered as the process with the highest hazard potential.



All natural hazards noticed during the last five years caused damage. 25% of the damage was primary or direct damage. 25% of the damage was secondary or indirect damage. 50% of the damage caused both primary and secondary damage.



The awareness of natural hazards increased during the last years.



The respondents do agree with the statement “natural hazards are seen as a major problem in the area”. They are indifferent on the statements “the potential of natural hazards is a disadvantage for the location” and “natural hazards impair the general attractiveness of the location”. The main impact on the regional economy is caused by a reduced accessibility.


97



The answers also indicated that the interviewees are well informed about potential natural hazards, early warning and early alert. They mentioned, that they do not need further information from other institutions. These answers show that people in the region SedrunTujetsch have a high awareness of natural hazards. This is due to the fact that they are frequently affected by natural hazards.

In the third part of task 2, local safety services were interviewed regarding their experiences with the information system IFKIS-MIS. IFKIS-MIS was introduced within the IFKIS-project as a consequence of the avalanche winter 1999, which caused damage worth over 500 mio € and 17 fatalities (Bründl et al., 2004; SLF, 2000). IFKIS-MIS is an online information platform for natural hazard safety services, which enables them to easily exchange information of safety measures. When a safety decision is stored in the database, all registered users are automatically informed either by email, SMS or pager. IFKIS-MIS was introduced in 2006 to the Sedrun-Tujetsch region. The discussion showed that IFKISMIS provided valuable support during critical situations when there is an increased danger of avalanches (Figure 65).

Figure 65: Comparison of avalanche danger level and number of messages in IFKIS-MIS. The red columns show that during phases with rising and decreasing avalanche danger, the number of messages increases or decreases due to closure or opening of traffic routes (indicated with blue arrows) (source: SLF).

The representatives of the avalanche safety services confirmed that the system would also provide valuable support for managing other natural hazards, e.g. debris flow in summer. They also expressed their wish to make the system better available on mobile devices, e.g. smartphones. The literature review in task 3 pointed out that there is little experience in determining indirect consequences of natural hazards (Winkler, 2011). However, new approaches are available, based on network models. The most advanced study for calculating additional cost due to traffic route interruption was elaborated on by Erath and colleagues from ETH-Zurich. In their model, they consider additional cost of travel time, additional cost of distance, advantage due to time gained, accident costs, noise-related costs, air pollution costs, climate costs, and the density of infrastructure networks (Erath et al., 2009). The workshop in Innsbruck has shown that it is crucial to know from which perspective indirect consequences are evaluated. It is recommended to define this point of view and to communicate it adequately to all involved partners. It was a consensus that the railway’s point of view should correspond to the one of the department of infrastructure. It was recommended to develop a simple method to estimate indirect costs. This instrument should highlight the dimension of the indirect consequences and be valid as a convention until more accurate data is available. The model proposed by Erath and colleagues could provide a sound basis. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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2.6

Transnational aims, tools/methods/procedures and results

A summary of the aims, tools/methods/procedures and results in PARAmount, as set by the PPs, is provided on a transnational level in Table 9. Table 9: Summary table of all aims, tools/methods/procedures and results in the PARAmount test beds (WP 5 – 7).

Test bed

Aims in PARAmount

Stanzertal (AT) – regional

Current state of risk management: Detailed inventory of hazard management strategies; implementation in test bed; risk awareness Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Debris flow & avalanche assessment for critical road and rail infrastructure; risk analysis; indirect costs; database on economic losses Simulation models: Testing & implementing AdB in test bed

Tools/methods/procedures Current state of risk management: Survey on risk awareness and perception on a regional/local level; literature review; interviews Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Assessment of material assets and human lives at risk; past events cadastre; hazard potential (avalanche & debris flow) – matrix-based approach, AvalforLIN, regional assessment using morphometric parameters, aiDebrisFlow3D; risk map; literature review & workshop on indirect damages Simulation models: Implementation of AdB in four debris flow catchments & feedback to developers

HEWS: Low-cost system, integrating historic & current meteorological data

HEWS: Development of HEWS AWarnTool; literature review

DSS & risk dialogue: Create network of key stakeholders – foster cross-sector cooperation & communication; develop communication and (strategic) decision-support tools

DSS & risk dialogue: Communication and cooperation with stakeholders in test bed via workshops, meetings, regional risk dialogue groups; online interviews; cooperation with IRSTEA

Evaluation & recommendation: Publish & disseminate project results by various means to a wide (scientific) audience Climate Change: Study regional impact of climate change


Evaluation & recommendation: Scientific publications, media communication, national info meeting & postgraduate course; RMIH

Main results

Current state of risk management: Extensive report on current state of natural hazard management in test bed Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Damage potential cadastre; three infrastructure-focused hazard maps & one risk map; validation with infrastructure providers Simulation models: Extensive implementation report; Master’s thesis on debris flow simulation model comparison – Huber (in review) HEWS: Low-cost software tool developed & implemented; extensive report DSS & risk dialogue: Transport-focused natural hazard network established, direct contact with key stakeholders – key output: RRDs; development of CDT & ÖBB DSS Evaluation & recommendation Climate change: Report on climate change in cooperation with other PPs

Climate Change: Literature review and analysis of climate change data

99

Manival (FR) – local St Antoine (FR) – local / regional (Maurienne Valley)

Current state of risk management: Identify specific needs of departments in the transport sector regarding natural hazards Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Propose complete methodology of debris flow hazard and risk assessment; improving debris flow triggering and propagation knowledge, considering heterogeneous sources of information including expert assessment; explicitly taking into account uncertainties DSS & risk dialogue: Propose DSS to support decisionmakers in expressing and formalising the steps of their decision process; establish specific features of the vulnerability of transport networks considering consequences of disruption Evaluation & recommendation: Communicate actions, transfer tools and methodologies

Southern French Alps (FR) – regional

Current state of risk management: Identify specific needs of departments in the transport sector regarding natural hazards Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Propose methodology for hazard and risk assessment and mapping for debris flow, rockfall and snow avalanches at regional scale; focus on role of protection forest HEWS: Identify areas or catchments most likely to produce damage in case of occurrence of specific weather conditions (pre-warning) DSS & risk dialogue: Propose decision-support tools based on a rigorous framework to help decision-makers express their priorities, the criteria they consider as important, and formalise the steps of their decision process Evaluation & recommendation: Communicate actions, transfer tools and methodologies


Current state of risk management: Observer meetings, interviews of stakeholders, civil protection, infrastructure management and political authorities

Current state of risk management: Report on current natural hazard management of transport infrastructure, reinforced cooperation with transport sector

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Intensive field measurements of geomorphic responses; collecting high quality data on catchment-scale sediment transfer; complete monitoring station installed

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Complete methodology of debris flow and risk assessment, explicitly considering uncertainties, including characterisation of the sediment yield; installation of a monitoring station

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Geomorphologic analysis carried out leading to precise knowledge of potential erosion processes; safety and reliability analysis of the protection structures; application of information fusion; integrated scenarios of debris flow events; hybrid approach, using a numerical model; sensitivity and uncertainty analysis of results

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Analysis of expert assessment and heterogeneous sources of information in a formalised framework for flood scenarios; hybrid approach (using a numerical model) to generate debris flow hazard maps, based on new concept of probability of exceeding threshold; methodology to analyse the vulnerability of transport networks

Current state of risk management: Observer meetings, interviews of stakeholders, civil protection, infrastructure management and political authorities

Current state of risk management: Report on current natural hazard management of transport infrastructure, reinforced cooperation with transport sector

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Statistical model for identifying debris-flow prone catchments; compilation of data from literature; GIS procedure for mapping potential debris flow impact points; past event cadastre for debris flow; model validation; generation of LIN LIN rockfall (Rockfor ) and snow avalanche models (Avalfor ) – simulation of impact of forest protection; emphasising the added value generated by using LiDAR data, calibration and validation of both models; dendromorphological analyses (added information on frequency, intensity and extent of phenomena); sensitivity of transport infrastructures to debris flow

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Methodology of hazard assessment and mapping for debris flows, rockfall and snow avalanches and maps of potential impact; identification of the protection role of forests and recommendations regarding future forest management; method for the derivation of hotspots

DSS & risk dialogue: Decision-support tools (e.g. multicriteria and hierarchical analysis), sensitivity analysis of these methods

DSS & risk dialogue: Decision-support framework based on multi-criteria analysis with application in cooperation with partners ÖBB and PAT. Evaluation & recommendation: Transfer of operational tools to other PPs (Austria, Italy & Slovenia); communication actions (inter alia organisation of final conference, interviews on national TV, communication with stakeholders and decision makers, numerous articles in journals and at international conferences)

100

Brennero/Brenner (IT) – regional; Atzwang/ Campodazzo and Mittewald/Mezzaselva – local Rolle Pass (Dolomites) (IT) – regional; Forte Buso – local Cortina/ Fiames (IT) – local

Current state of risk management: Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Knowledge collection on installed rockfall protection measures and evaluation of their efficiency

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Data collection in the field and finite element modelling by the subcontractor University of Bologna

Simulation models: Testing various commercial 2D and 3D rockfall simulation software

Simulation models: Rocfall, Rockfall (Dr. Spang), Georock2D, RockyFor3D, Rotomap

HEWS: Prevention against rockfall on roads in province of Bolzano induced cooperation of Road Service, Geological Service & Department of Informatics to develop a system to investigate and catalogue rockfall protection measures and evaluate the hazard on a stretch of road.

HEWS: VISO (Viability Information System) developed, offers a way to quickly detect the hazard due to landslide or toppling phenomena which characterises a slope adjacent to the stretch of a road.

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Identifying hazardous sections in test bed and elaborating methodology to support the road service in managing natural hazard risk HEWS: Develop mitigation measure database that includes their location and status in order to support maintenance

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Calculation of vulnerability and the exposure of single road stretches – from priority list based on the hazard level to the priority list based on the risk level (regarding the damage potential) Simulation models: Evaluation of the applicability of different simulation software. Integration of freelancers and experts. HEWS: Evaluation of absorption capacity of different types of protection measures, above all for older measures. Evaluation & recommendation: Knowledge collection, absorption and spreading to the stakeholders, street workers and other key stakeholders led to efficient concept of risk management for technicians and especially transport infrastructure administration in charge of funding

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Development of methodologies for rockfall and snow avalanche hazard evaluation; risk maps of the test bed

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Hazard maps for snow avalanches and rockfall in the test bed; vulnerability analysis for test bed, in cooperation with Road Service of the Province of Trento; risk map for the test bed

Simulation models: Applying dynamic models to snow avalanches and rockfall (inter alia AVAL-1D, RAMMS 2D)

Simulation models: Methodology for rockfall analysis to be applied to the entire Province of Trento

HEWS: Cadastre of protection structures in the test bed (barriers, snow rack, etc.)

HEWS: Cadastre of protection structures in the test bed and a model to be applied to the entire Province of Trento

Simulation models: GIS-based operative tool for debris flow modelling

Simulation models: Testing operative tool by monitoring activities

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Survey of debris flow channels routed by debris flows Simulation models: Methods for modelling debris flow triggering and routing HEWS: Monitoring rainfall and runoff triggering debris flows


101

Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) (IT) – local Upper Susa Valley (IT) Posočje (SI) Koroška Bela (SI) Sedrun/ Tujetsch (CH)

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Design hazard maps HEWS: Implementation and test of a debris flow early warning system

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Developing methodologies and tools for hazard evaluation HEWS: Forecasting of debris flow in a western Alpine test bed (Susa Valley)

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Expert survey of the existing rockfall and avalanche protection systems; rockfall and avalanche hazard evaluation; vulnerability evaluation DSS & risk dialogue: Risk evaluation including a risk dialogue with Slovenian Railways; developing decisionsupport systems in test bed, thereby improving current risk management processes Evaluation & recommendation: Risk evaluation “good practice example” for wider use in SI transport system Current state of risk management: International workshop on the current state of instruments and tools for decision-making for protection against natural hazards along traffic routes Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Study on existing methods for assessing the indirect costs caused by interruption of traffic routes due to natural hazards. DSS & risk dialogue: Survey on risk perception of natural hazards, exchange of experiences with IFKIS-MIS.


Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Collecting historical and bibliographic data; post-event analysis of a debris flow that occurred during summer 2011; application of a debris flow model in the test bed area

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Test bed debris flow hazard map; post-event analysis HEWS: Test bed debris flow early warning system

HEWS: Collecting of precipitation data in test bed area Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Developing and testing of a new classification method for a better hazard evaluation for the torrential processes

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: The basins and processes classification method was successfully developed and applied in the entire Susa Valley

HEWS: Application of a CA model to some basins in the test bed in order to develop a hazard/risk scenario maker; developing an early warning system based on radar stormtracking for the prediction of torrential processes

HEWS: Hazard/Risk Scenario Maker, based on the integration of the new classification method and CA routing model developed and successfully applied on three basins in test bed; the new early warning system DEFENSE was developed and tested in the Susa Valley with very positive responses

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Method for damage potential and vulnerability evaluation; avalanche, rockfall and preliminary debris flow hazard evaluation

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Damage potential cadastre with a vulnerability map; avalanche, rockfall and preliminary debris flow hazard map; avalanche and rockfall risk map

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Method for debris flow hazard assessment; method for avalanche and rockfall risk evaluation

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Damage potential assessment; debris flow hazard map

Current state of risk management: Several methods and tools are available for risk assessment along traffic routes Current state of risk management: Workshop and report Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: Internet survey, literature review, workshop DSS & risk dialogue: Interviews, workshop

Damage & hazard potential/risk assessment: There is a lack in methods for assessing the indirect consequences of natural hazards. However, there are promising models available, which could be adapted DSS & risk dialogue: High awareness of natural hazards in the region; accessibility is a key factor for local economy.

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As can be deduced from Table 9, the aims as set by the PPs in PARAmount strongly depended on the chosen scale of the test bed. Most of the PPs conducted a detailed risk management survey in the selected test beds, in order to learn about the hazard management strategies in the test bed and the specific transport infrastructure. Some PPs also initiated a communication platform in the context of PARAmount, thereby contributing to increased risk awareness. The specific needs of stakeholders from the transport sector regarding natural hazards were analysed, especially on a local level, where a wrong decision may lead to direct damage. Depending on the aims and depth of information needed, the applied methods included a survey (questionnaire), literature reviews, interviews with the relevant stakeholders, observer meetings and workshops. The results include not only a report, but also the start of building a better cooperation in the test beds. The transnational meetings were used to gain an overview on a broader level regarding existing tools and methods of decision-support along traffic routes. The national meetings and workshop were not concerned as much with risk management as a governance problem, but rather working on damage, hazard potential and risk assessment. The damage potential assessment or vulnerability analysis, mostly only considered direct damage. Only Austria and Switzerland tried to assess indirect costs. However, this aspect was dealt with in the context of a descriptive analysis of the current state of affairs in the course of a detailed literature review and a corresponding workshop – an application of the respective tools did not take place in the context of PARAmount. The vulnerability was assessed for single road stretches or for the entire length on a regional scale. However, the latter method still lacks reliable verification. In Slovenia and Austria a specific damage potential cadastre was established. Work on the hazard potential assessment tasks were performed in all test beds and took up the main part of the effort by the PPs. In its easiest form, this was done by evaluating the results of a simulation model (Cortina/Fiames (IT)). The main focus was put on hazard assessment in all test beds, where for the different scales (catchment, local, regional), different methods for effectively performing risk management were delineated. The methods thereby had to be adapted to the level of information detail. For example, on the catchment scale, a monitoring system was installed, which can be used for operational forecasting or studying the respective natural hazard, whereas on the regional level, more strategic tools were necessary; the latter inter alia included improved hazard maps. The PARAmount project focussed on the natural hazard processes of debris flow, avalanches and rockfall. Depending on the existing knowledge, these methods differed in sophistication (expert hazard assessment to hybrid approach). The hazard maps are tailored to the specific needs of the infrastructure sector. For instance in Austria, hazard zone maps were drafted in close conjunction with the responsible transport infrastructure operators, in order to foster their acceptance. The only test bed where the protective function of forests was considered was the Southern French Alps. In some test beds an intersection of hazard and vulnerability assessments resulted in risk maps for the test bed area, indicating hotspots. However, they are not comparable to each other, as the depth of analysis and classification of results vary significantly. Process-oriented simulation models were applied to the processes rockfall and debris flow in selected catchments. The main focus was on the evaluation of different models, although one model was developed within PARAmount (AdB). GIS-models based on topographical parameters were applied at a local and regional scale, for example for avalanches in the Stanzer Valley (AT). An effective tool used in PARAmount was the RRD, which was performed to create a network of key stakeholders and foster cross-sector cooperation and communication. The RRD were considered to be an important tool to enable effective and efficient risk management that goes beyond the current habits. The decisions are believed to be more transparent in the future and such a network may help during disaster response. Some PPs developed and tested forecasting or communication tools. However, these tools need further development before they can be applied operationally.


103

3

Transnational SWOT analyses of tools/methods/procedures developed and implemented in test beds

The concept of a systematic comparison of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) originates in the 1960s, but has remained a popular strategic planning tool ever since. Its aim is to relate external factors (threats and opportunities) to internal factors (strengths and weaknesses), thereby seeking a compromise between these two perspectives. The SWOT analysis was originally developed for the deployment in companies to review corporate strategies (Hill & Westbrook, 1997). However, Romang et al. (2009) state that, given a clear aim, SWOT analysis may be used in any decision-making situation, especially in its preliminary stages. Therefore, this type of analysis can also be applied in the natural hazard context. It is additionally credited as being a very straightforward, intuitive method by several authors (e.g. Genelitti et al., 2007; Houben et al., 1999). In this particular context, the SWOT analysis serves as a means of evaluating the tools, methods and procedures developed within and applied to PARAmount, as well as being implemented in the test beds. Instead of summing them up by country, they are featured as different categories in risk management: 

Damage potential/vulnerability assessment, hazard potential (debris flow, avalanche, rockfall) and risk tools/methods/procedures (corresponding to the output from WP5)



Hazard early warning tools/methods/procedures (corresponding to the output from WP6)



Decision-support tools/methods/procedures (corresponding to the output from WP7)

(MCDA,

Regional

Risk

Dialogues,...)

The description of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, filled in by each PP who implemented a tool/method/procedure in their respective test bed, follows the criteria given below: 

Indication in which test beds the tools/methods/procedures were implemented and on which administrative level (local, regional, provincial, state) they operate



A comparable evaluation is provided, with the main focus on transport infrastructure regarding natural hazards



Data requirements (in general and for the models in particular)



Results and their implications/viability – practicability



Precision and accuracy of the tools/methods/procedures indicating their corresponding imperfections



Effect of the potential impacts of climate change on the tools/methods/procedures with respect to their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats



Indication how severe the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats are


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3.1

Damage-potential/vulnerability assessment tools/methods/procedures

Table 10: SWOT analysis of damage-potential tools, methods and procedures developed and applied in the test beds within PARAmount.

Strengths

Weaknesses

Data on replacement costs and traffic counts from infrastructure providers (up-to-date, reliable, high acceptance of results)

Regional scale approach:

Data compilation in GIS-database facilitates straightforward implementation by PPs, road authorities and follow-up projects

BFW Vulnerability assessment of road infrastructure

Data collected and analysed for entire road section, not administrative entity (transport infrastructure focus) Delineation of critical infrastructure of test bed in cooperation with stakeholders (high acceptance, relevance of results in test bed) Position and type of mitigation measures (structures) available from infrastructure providers – essential input for hazard analysis

PAB Vulnerability estimation (OD matrix)



Monetary value of structures and road surface approximated with across-the-board approach (local under- and overestimation possible) 

Data on MDT limited to six counting positions along A-road and expressway (interpolation to rest of road stretch necessary)

Full replacement cost calculated – usually road sections can be repaired – complete destruction of infrastructure seldom (partially accounted for in risk analysis – damage sensitivity)

Detailed collection of relevant data from the whole road network (traffic net) was carried out

The application is not possible without an appropriate digital road net (traffic net)

All the relevant parameters/criteria for the different road segments were indexed

No reliable information on the average daily traffic for municipal and forest roads available – excluded from analysis


Opportunities

Offers a good basis for further, more detailed analyses or projects Straightforward methodology can be easily comprehended by stakeholders Direct comparison and combination with data from other critical infrastructure possible

Application can be repeated with different input data if they are available in a more detailed or current state

Threats

Test bed

As scale of study is regional, local scale analyses have to be accompanied by a more in-depth investigation (i.e. concerning the replacement costs) – threat of misinterpretation or false application of data

Stanzer Valley – regional

The calculation is made with specific software, so that it is not possible to make an ad-hoc calculation Risk of wrong estimations or information regarding multi-lane or direction roadways

A vulnerability and exposure map finalised for national and provincial roads in Province of Bozen – regional

105

PAT

Data collected from the road service on the road closure and replacement cost (which represent the smallest proportion of damage, the largest being indirect costs)

Very little data available on indirect cost (road closures, diversion, loss of earning due to ski area not accessible, etc.) Little data on average daily traffic for minor roads, such as mountain roads

A need for traffic and damage potential data has arisen; this can potentially improve the amount of data available in the future Application can be extended to the whole road network within the Province of Trento

If data on events occurred and damages are not systematically collected, planning an efficient risk management on roads will be difficult. The alternative to planning in advance is taking action during an emergency.

Rolle Pass – regional

Possibility of vulnerability misevaluation due to unforeseen influences

Posočje (Baška grapa) – local

Possibility of damage potential misevaluation due to unforeseen influences

Koroška Bela – local

Most of the data used is commonly accessible

PUH, UL Vulnerability (damage potential) evaluation I

High precision (10-metre stretches) Based on transport infrastructure value Incorporates possible environmental impacts

Vulnerability classes’ thresholds could use verification with other methods or by representatives of the railway safety services.

Offers railroad management and users an extensive overview of vulnerability of the track and environment for the test. Can easily be applied to the whole rail network.

Effects of rail curvature and visibility considered

PUH, UL Damage potential evaluation I

Usage of publicly available data Traffic count, construction cost, importance of railway connection considered

No regulations for damage assessment in case of interruption of connection in Slovenia (costs of traffic diversion, additional costs – toll) – indirect damages

An evaluation of the connection interruption could be prepared and all indirect costs evaluated

Traffic count data outdated


106

IRSTEA Inventory of past debris flow events (database) with impact on infrastructures and GIS-mapping

Made it possible to identify 4,236 impacts of mountain stream floods since 1850, which is enough for a statistical approach and the generation of pertinent maps

Requires an existing database with sufficient quality of records The area where the impact was located is known, but generally not the precise point nor the exact damage

Has already been applied to the whole French Alps

Extension to other regions will probably be limited (main bottleneck: the availability of data)

Southern French Alps – regional

Currently not a practical tool

Maurienne valley (extended St Antoine test bed) – regional

IRSTEA Vulnerability of road network considering the connectivity disruption

This original methodology analyses the consequences of a disruption in terms of a reduction of connectivity at regional scale


Has only recently been applied in connection with transport in mountainous areas Currently used as a research tool

Promising perspectives of application

107

3.2

Hazard potential tools/methods/procedures

3.2.1

Debris flow

Table 11: SWOT analysis of hazard potential tools/methods/procedures (debris flow) developed and applied in the test beds within PARAmount.

Strengths

BFW Past events cadastre debris flow

BFW Regional expert analysis of debris flow potential

Detailed overview of hazard situation in test bed possible Compilation of various sources possible in a common format Prerequisite for simulation model result validation

Valuable preliminary study of test site to pin-point further action hotspots and get first impression of debris flow-related hazard potential Comparison of results of morphological classification with current literature possible (general characterisation of test bed)

Weaknesses

Opportunities

Highly inhomogeneous data sources account for wide range of data quality Very time-consuming, as most data had to be retrieved from analogue sources (chronicles, written statements, etc.) Cadastre incomplete with regard to events impacting on infrastructure, as not all events were documented

Expert-based and therefore to a certain degree subjective and possibly biased Regional approach entails low to medium level of detail

Additional sources can be easily implemented afterwards Can be integrated into a large-scale past events database (i.e. on a national level)

Methodology can be easily applied to other regions

Threats

Test bed

Format of database possibly not compatible with other databases (different standards) Cadastre only covers occurred events – impact of climate change may cause events that have so far not been recorded (back-analysis, limited forecast)

None



Comparably minimal time- and cost-intensity


108

BFW Detailed field survey of critical debris flow channels

TESAF AdB tool

ARPAV Past events cadastre debris flow

ARPAV Hazard estimation

Well-established procedure, based on international standard (ETALP-project) Important input for debris flow models, estimating available bed load and debris flow characteristics Monitoring both runoff and erosion/deposition area of debris flow provide a reliable data set for testing model A clear procedure was established for field surveys to have homogenised data Compilation of various sources possible in a common format Prerequisite for simulation model result validation Necessary to define rainfall thresholds Approach for the calculation of the intensity of a phenomenon through field investigations. The probability of occurrence is calculated from emergency interventions/past events cadastre.


Time- and cost-intensive procedure – only feasible in a limited number of catchments – preceding hotspot definition required Exact estimation of available bed load subject to a wide range of uncertainties (log or drift wood jams, lateral material influx from landslides and unconfined debris flow) Time- and cost-intensive procedure – only feasible with adequately trained and motivated personnel (at least three persons for six weeks: three for surveys and three for check and digital restitution)

Easily applicable to other catchments

Possibility of over- or undershooting required model inputs

Stanzer Valley – local

Applicable to other catchments

None

Fiames – local

Additional sources can be easily implemented afterwards

Too many public bodies involved. A continuous change of regional department organisation.

Rio Chiesa catchment – local

Hazard map is the first level for good land planning and efficient management of the whole road network

Hard to define all the input parameters. Magnitude is defined on a regional and not local scale


Highly inhomogeneous data sources account for wide range of data quality Very time-consuming; most data are qualitative and not quantitative Cadastre incomplete with regard to events impacting infrastructure, events were not documented

Lack of continuity in data updates. Not enough data to calculate the probability of occurrence more precisely.

109

ARPAP Basins and related process classification

ARPAP Hazard/Risk Scenario Maker

Very simple to apply and very reliable (extensively tested and documented in the scientific literature); applicable to all scales; direct correspondence to hazard degree

Tested only in Alpine environments

Test the method in other mountain environments

None

Susa Valley – regional

Very good response in simulated cases; simple parameterisations and application; historical data on debris flow events is not required to calibrate the model

The model application on a regional scale is difficult; tested only in Alpine environments

Test the model in other mountain environments

None


Commercially available  approved model & user-friendly

UL FLO-2D

Widely used method, a lot of experience worldwide Most input data available for other locations

Simple usage

UL TopRunDF

Open source software, small quantity of input parameters required Small quantity of input data required

Long computational times, low sensitivity to rheological parameters Danger of ’black box‘ modelling

New models can be developed

Expensive LiDAR data, which is necessary for input, is not publicly available

Necessary to develop methodology for debris flow hazard assessment and mapping

A lot of input data, very hard to assess proper values of parameters Hard to define all the input parameters

Koroška Bela – local

Debris flow magnitude (event scenario) assessment is not accurate Computing algorithm (different results with exact same input parameters)

Regular upgrade of the model by open source community

Results not useful for detailed debris flow hazard mapping

New models and upgrades can be developed

Expensive LiDAR data, which is necessary for input, is not publicly available

Necessary to develop methodology for debris flow hazard assessment and mapping

Hard to validate the model (problems with computing algorithms)

Posočje (Soteska) – local

Assessment is not accurate


110

Simple tool easily implemented in a GIS

IRSTEA Debris flow susceptibility – geomorphic model at regional scale

Gives interesting overview on the regional scale Oriented towards the identification of priorities

It remains difficult to properly identify some of the parameter values

Possibility of application in other regions and refinement

Further validation required


Still partly a research tool

Partly validated by referring to historical records

IRSTEA Field investigation of geomorphic response to meteorological events & monitoring station

IRSTEA Geomorphological analysis of erosion processes at the catchment scale

IRSTEA Safety and reliability analysis of mitigation structures at catchment scale

IRSTEA Spatial application of information fusion to generate debris flow scenarios

Requires some financial support over a long period of time

Accurate way of defining a catchment behaviour, which is an important element when defining debris flow scenarios

Mainly a research tool, which can be installed for practical purpose in active catchments with strong vulnerability

Similar methodology is being applied to a debris flow prone catchment in the Southern French Alps. Further developments are possible.

Can be easily learned within a few days by people sufficiently familiar with erosion processes in torrent catchments

Does not directly give the magnitude of debris flow events

Methodology can be applied to many other catchments

Return period of a given magnitude can hardly be inferred

St Antoine – local

This methodology is still under development concerning natural hazards (processes known less accurately than in the industrial domain)

Lots of future studies could take advantage of this methodology

The challenge is to carry out a cost/benefit analysis in complex conditions


Still under development for the application in natural hazard context

Promising perspectives of application

More validation required, only a few applications in natural hazard context


Uses methods well known in the industry Makes it possible to precisely analyse the effectiveness of mitigation measures Methodology to generate scenarios on the basis of heterogeneous sources of information, including expert assessment


There is no warranty regarding the number of events that will be recorded.

Manival – local

111

IRSTEA Lave2D: model for the computation of debris flow spreading on an alluvial fan

Relatively simple model: few parameters to assess Has been widely validated and used for consulting

Requires good quality DEM (LiDAR), but cannot cover a large area (high computation time) Does not have a user-friendly interface

Lots of future studies could take advantage of this tool

Requires ArcGIS software

The probability of user error is high We do not have the possibility to establish a ’hotline‘ to help potential users


It takes a few days to complete a case study on the basis of scenarios

IRSTEA Hybrid approach using a numerical model based on the possibilities theory

Promising methodology in terms of alternative to the more classical Monte-Carlo technique Produces probabilistic maps


Still a research tool that requires a lot of computation time and cannot be used by non-specialists

None

Complexity and cost in terms of time


112

3.2.2

Rockfall

Table 12: SWOT analysis of hazard potential tools/methods/procedures (rockfall) developed and applied in the test beds within PARAmount.

Strengths

PAB Estimation of the susceptibility (hazard potential) on a regional scale

PAB Hazard estimation

PAB Mitigation measures

Possibility to simply and very quickly get an idea of the areas potentially affected by rockfall on regional scale.

Approach for the calculation of the intensity of a phenomenon through field investigations. The probability of occurrence is calculated from emergency interventions.

It is possible to create a priority list for road maintenance. It is possible to collect all data for an inventory of mitigation measures on provincial level.


Weaknesses

Opportunities

None

Testing different models has resulted in a good accordance/plausibility ratio. The model gives a general overview of areas potentially affected by rockfall and has to be compared with detailed analysis in a second step.

The probability of occurrence is calculated for every 500 m of road. This could be a problem for very frequent events on the same small road stretch  overestimation very probable. Not enough data to calculate the probability of occurrence more precisely. Only the last 12 years are registered.

Time-consuming, because it is necessary to investigate the whole slope. It is difficult to investigate the state of mitigation measures  foundations, anchorages, coil nails and rust status.

The result is a hazard map for the whole road network of the provincial area (national, provincial, and municipal roads).

The long experience in emergency work, and therefore in taking a decision, improves the ability to classify the state of a mitigation measure. It is possible to create an inventory of all mitigation measures installed in the past, and also record their state, efficiency and utility.

Threats Without checking the entire road network, small potential hazard sources can be overlooked. Confusion with more detailed methods possible.

Due to the subjective evaluation of some criteria, the results could vary according to the experience of the investigator.

Because of the subjective evaluation of some criteria, the results could vary in accordance with the experience of the investigator. Continuous communication and collaboration between technicians and decisionmakers is absolutely necessary for the application of the results.

Test bed

Brennero/ Brenner – regional



113

PAB Calculation of the absorption capacity of ’old‘ rockfall barriers

Extensive experience of testing mitigation measures allows an appropriate evaluation of the basic elements of the measures.

PAB

The real hazard level can be calculated by considering the state, utility and efficacy of the mitigation measure.

Hazard level assessment by considering the role of the mitigation measure

The result is an effective decision support for the road administration. The real utility of a mitigation measure can be evaluated.

Not every single measure can be tested, but a statistical variety of the different types and their defects could be calculated. Lack of experimental data Despite a working long-term mitigation measure, appropriate maintenance is absolutely necessary. All mitigation measures are only able to reduce the hazard/risk, so as not to eliminate it  residual risk. Existing mitigation measures in the test bed were investigated. Hazard calculation is made automatically from the database VISO.

Integrating field expertise could adjust the calculated results. The absorption capacity of some old mitigation measures could be defined.

An evaluation of the maximum force a mitigation measure can absorb is getting much easier. The force of the maximum force a mitigation measure can absorb can already be considered at hazard level and not only at risk level.

Inappropriate use of the results.


Data exchange to complete the database often doesn’t work as well as it should.


None

Atzwang/ Campodazzo and Mittewald/ Mezzaselva – local

The software provides real information about the rockfall hazard. A statistical calculation of energies, jump heights, translational speed, volume deposit and number of deposited rocks is possible.

PAB RockyFor3D

Possibility of taking the actions of trees and forest stands into account. The different trajectories can be identified.

The software does not allow a backanalysis. The field investigations are very complex and sophisticated (at least if the precision should be high).

The function of protection forest can be calculated in a more appropriate way (not only through the variation of specific soil values). The results can be imported into a GIS.

Mitigation measures can be inserted (energy capacity, height). Allows calculating a large area, if detailed field data is available.


114

No mitigation measures can be accounted of.

PAB Rotomap

PAB Geostru

PAB Rockfall

Software provides realistic information about the rockfall hazard.

Possibility to perform backanalysis. A statistical and deterministic calculation of energies and jump heights is possible. Possibility to perform backanalysis. A statistical calculation of energies and jump heights is possible.

It is not possible to perform a backanalysis. The insertion of data is difficult. Large areas such as Atzwang/Campodazzo and Mittewald/Mezzaselva cannot be simulated. They have to be divided into two sub-areas. The default parameters are not always able to simulate the process in a realistic way. The preparation of input data is difficult. Often the default parameter has to be modified. The output cannot be printed on paper, only screen shots are possible. Often the default parameter has to be modified. At least 100 blocks have to be simulated to get realistic results.

PAB Rockfall (Dr. Spang)

A statistical calculation of energies and jump heights is possible.


The preparation of input data is quite complex. A lot of experience is needed to define the specific soil values. The software only offers a range.

The main trajectories can be defined. The results can be imported into a GIS.

It is possible to consider every single trajectory. The results can be printed on paper.

It is very simple to insert basic data.

The usability of the software is not very intuitive and could be improved. Repeated simulation runs can improve the fidelity of the results.

If the precision of the input data is not appropriate, no error message is implemented in the software to give you further details.


None


With the wrong soil parameters the result could be overestimated.


Difficult to zoom into a small slope segment, therefore very difficult to evaluate the single trajectories.


115

PAT Past events cadastre – rockfall

PAT Application of rockfall past events cadastre to road sections

PAT Cadastre for mitigation structures

PAT Rockyfor3D (software for 3D rockfall modelling)

PAT A methodology for using Rockyfor3D at regional scale

Possibility of comparing the data of the hotspots defined by regional models with current situation in the catchment

Only few cases of rockfall collapse events are documented in this region Several types of mitigation measures (rock nets, walls, buttresses) are scattered along the test bed. Not all locations are known.

Calibration of the data on the regional scale using the same software (Rockyfor3D), for regional and local scale elaboration.

None

The data can be used in GIS analysis, which permits a fast evaluation of risk.

The cadastre must be populated with all newly built structures by the province. This is not trivial, because often money for the new structures is contributed by different administrative institutions.

This cadastre permits the estimation of the cost to maintain the mitigation system efficiency over time.

The cadastre is functional if it is homogeneous and updated; it must be organised from a central point (e.g. one institution per region).

Opportunity to study a methodology to build and keep a cadastre up-to-date in detail, even for small events.

Subjectivity in data entry, cost, need for continuous updates. It could be time-consuming if applied at regional scale.


Opportunity to compare other methods used in the past on this road section to estimate sections susceptible

None


The application on a regional scale can provide a lot of information about the most critical points along the road- or railway network.

It could be very timeconsuming to apply to a regional scale.


Physical-based, 3D model allows a realistic and reliable description of the rockfall process if sound input data is provided.

Detailed data over large areas is difficult to obtain.

Physical rockfall modelling can be used not only for hazard mapping, but also for other engineering tasks.

If data is not checked, results can be unreliable.


The methodology allows the analysis of a large area at once, in order to identify hotspots and prioritise actions.

Automating the input procedure (i.e. building a database) is timeconsuming.

Building a database with input data can be helpful for different purposes.

If data is not checked, results can be unreliable.



116

PAT Rockfall analysis

The outlined procedure (i.e. automatic input on a regional scale analysis; regional scale analysis; local scale analysis) allows for coverage of many aspects of rockfall hazard and risk management. Based on DEM and past events data. The latter exists for the whole Slovenian rail network.

PUH, UL

High precision (10-meter stretches)

Rockfall hazard map and method

Enhanced with 1D and 2D numerical modelling. Danger zones set by the Slovenian Railways are considered.

PUH, UL RockyFor3D

PUH, UL Rockfall (Dr. Spang)

The entire procedure can be timeconsuming.

Analysing an area at different scales can provide helpful information for different levels of decision-making.

If input data is not checked, results can be unreliable.


Gives a good overview of hazard zones for the test bed, to be used by the railway management.

Possibility of hazard misevaluation due to unforeseen influences.

Baška grapa – local

Some of the employed vital data and studies are not available for all endangered railway sections in Slovenia. Difficult to apply to the whole Slovenian rail network. Hazard classes’ thresholds should be verified with other methods or by representatives from the railway safety services.

The software provides good overview on spatial extension of rockfall hazard (good possibilities of different methods of visualisation). Possibility of taking the influence of trees and forest stands into account. Allows the calculation of a large area, if detailed field data is available.

Back-analysis with 2D rockfall models only gives an estimation of what happened. The quality of input data from field investigations heavily depends on expert experiences – large differences are possible between different users (subjectivity).

The function of protection forest can be calculated as a reference for forest management teams regarding silviculture. The results can be imported into a GIS.

Results have to be properly checked in the field, due to frequent defects of DEM input data; this applies to all 3D programmes.


A statistical calculation of energies and jump heights is possible. Positive response from expert designer/practitioner regarding dimensioning.

A lot of experience is needed to define the specific soil values. Only a range is given by the software.

Software could be even more userfriendly, especially regarding preparation of input data and possibility of saving different repeat experiments in the same location.

Results should be checked for speed of falling rocks – this is very sensitive and highly dependent on the characteristics of the soil.



117

PUH, UL Past events cadastre – rockfall, snow avalanches

PUH, UL Cadastre for mitigation structures

A good GIS data base offers a high-quality overview over ‘hotspots/sections’. Consistent and comprehensive event documentation is a great help when assessing hazards and designing protection measures.

Inconsistency in continuous documentation (proper records and descriptions of all cases) can lead to limited usability and to misleading conclusions.

Modern technological equipment (tablet computers, GPS devices, cameras equipped with GPS tracks, special binoculars...) can facilitate by capturing data and the formation of a user-friendly and useful GIS data base.

Overvaluation of the database of past events and lack of attention to other potential dangerous sections.


Possibility of comparing the data of hotspots, past events, and behaviour of different protection measures. Essential data basis for planning of maintenance work.

In this area there are no Slovenian technical guidelines for the railways. It is not completely clear how to use this information in hazard and risk assessment. What is the weight of protective objects without known characteristics, plans, certificates …

Common European standards (e.g. EOTA guidelines) and experiences in neighbouring countries could present already implemented solutions, which may be easily transferable to Slovenia

Subjectivity in data entry regarding state of protection facilities/structures could lead to wrong conclusions.


Possibility of hazard misevaluation due to unforeseen influences.


Simple and very quick for establishing pre-zoning of the areas potentially affected by rockfall on a regional, watershed and local scale. The criteria are automatically determined by the resolution of the DEM.

IRSTEA RockforLIN

Robust criteria from past analysis studies made for the last 50 years. Easy to calibrate using local past events cadastre. Can directly provide a hazard matrix.

RockforLIN only provides pre-zoning, which requires validation through a field survey. There is no trajectory calculation and identification. Forest cover mapping is needed for the protection forest pre-zoning.

The slope criteria can be easily modified using a past event cadastre. This tool allows for the definition of the geographical area for which a trajectory analysis is needed. This tool can be used for the validation of the extreme runout points calculated using trajectory models.

Due to the DEM resolution, possibility of misevaluation or overvaluation.

Manival – local Southern French Alps – regional

The results are provided in a GIS format. This tool proposes a pre-zoning of protection forest located only in the runout zones.


118

3.2.3

Avalanche

Table 13: SWOT analysis of hazard potential tools/methods/procedures (avalanche) developed and applied in the test beds within PARAmount.

Strengths Encompasses a wide range of existing basis data (e.g. local scale hazard maps, past events cadastre, avalanche cadastre) Incorporates protection function of forests and (to a limited extent) mitigation measures

BFW Regional model to generate avalanche hazard indicator maps for roads

Relatively low-cost and time effective, considering the covered area (high benefit-cost ratio) Not limited to settlement areas (as local scale hazard maps are) – transport infrastructure focus Mixture of expert-based and model-based approach (check and balance) Supported by field work – in-situ verification of simulation results

Weaknesses

Mitigation measures were included from aerial photograph mapping, not field work, due to limited time frame available – complete protection function could not be fully established and implemented in final results Must focus on a single subject of protection (i.e. transport infrastructure), therefore delineation of hazard potential for other assets not admissible or advisable Partially expert-based and therefore to a certain degree subjective and possibly biased Gives information on qualitative hazard potential (no information on pressure or flow heights possible)

Opportunities

Focuses on areas of potential concern (with regard to avalanche hazard), i.e. gives indication of potential (currently unknown) hotspots Basis for downstream detailed studies and risk analysis Detailed methodology established, which can be transferred to other regions Offers a good opportunity for infrastructure providers to localise (hitherto) unknown hazard potentials

Threats

Can be mistaken for detailed, local scale hazard map, in case limitations are not regarded by the reader – no detailed planning tool Depicts worst-case-scenario, as inter alia temporary mitigation measures (e.g. avalanche dynamiting) are not taken into account (conservative approach)

Test bed


Matrix-based approach insures consistent work procedure

BFW Past events cadastre avalanche

Detailed overview of hazard situation in test bed possible Compilation of various sources possible in a common format Very valuable source for simulation model result validation

Highly inhomogeneous data sources account for wide range of data quality

Additional sources can be easily implemented afterwards

Very time-consuming, as most data had to be retrieved from analogue sources (chronicles, written statements, etc.)

Can be integrated into a large-scale past events database (i.e. on a national level)


Format of database possibly not compatible with other databases (different standards)


119

PAT Past events cadastre – avalanche

The CLPV (map of the likely locations of snow-avalanches) offers a synthesis of the historical events that have occurred in the region until the date of publication It also contains a description of the snow-avalanches used to realize it

The CLPV does not contain information about the return period of snow avalanches. Therefore it cannot be used as a prevision tool for planning.

The cadastre is digitalized and available via a GIS platform. Therefore it is easy to use with commercial software

The CLPV should be updated continually in order to take into consideration the changes in the vegetation cover and morphology, which are the most influential factors on the occurrence of snow-avalanches.


Since the CLPV does not include statistical considerations, there is the chance to over- or underestimate the return period of some events, leading to a wrong simulation of the real phenomenon.


The CLPV gives the opportunity to verify the simulations by comparing the snow-avalanche path computed through mathematical models, with the regions that have actually been affected by the events in the past.

PAT Application of avalanche past events cadastre to road sections

The CLPV has been used to calibrate the model for the simulations of the events in the test bed.

The events shown in the CLPV are considered with the highest possible return period since no information on them is available.

Since it highlights the most likely areas of snow avalanches, it allows the simulation to be performed in a narrower domain. The application of the CLPV to the test bed has revealed some interesting aspects regarding the runout path of snow-avalanches. Possibility of comparing the data of the hotspots developed from regional models with the reality on the ground


120

PAT AVAL 1D

AVAL 1D requires a minimum of input data that can be easily obtained. The geometric data can be derived from a GIS analysis and consists of coordinates of the points defining the avalanche path. Snow data are derived from climatic analysis. Frictional data are tabled values, which depend on the snow-avalanche type and topography. The output data (velocities, pressure, and depth of snow deposit) are easily interpreted.

PAT RAMMS 1.3.0 2D

The following input data are required: DEM with the outline of the release areas; snow data, equal to those computed for AVAL 1-D; frictional data, which depend on the physical features of the snow, initial volumes, type of snow cover and the topography. Unlike the above mentioned input data, the length and width of the avalanche run-out depends on the topography. Rated by the values of the snow measurements, AVAL 1D it does not need the run-out path and its width, but only the extension of the domain.

The run-out path of the avalanche is predetermined, as is the input datum, stopping region and flow depth. AVAL 1D is very sensitive to slope variations in the flow region of the avalanche.

The application to a regional or local scale affects only the accuracy of the preliminary analysis.

The snow avalanche mass is constant, since the mass variation processes are not modelled. Displaced volumes only depend on the height of the snow in the release area (evaluated thanks to the snow measurements available in the study area) and on the surface of the transition zone.

Climate change can be taken into account by modifying the input parameters determined by historical and meteo-climatic analysis.

The hazard maps produced in PARAmount are very similar to the CPLV. The results from the AVAL 1D model might be worse, if the CPLV was not available.

Rolle Pass – regional.

The reliability of the results depends on the precision of the CPLV.

RAMMS is less dependent on the topography of the study area. Mass variation processes are not modelled yet. Interaction between the snow cover and the avalanche body (entrainment), are not taken into account.


RAMMS can provide information on the likely paths of the avalanche by considering the kinetic energy of the mass. RAMMS has only been applied to a small number of snow avalanches, in comparison with AVAL 1D.

It could be very time-consuming, if applied to the regional scale. Higher cost, than for the AVAL 1D model.


121

Based on the avalanche cadastre – data is available for the whole of Slovenia.

UL

High precision (10 m stretches)

Avalanche hazard map and method

Enhanced with 1D numerical modelling.

Some vital data and studies used here are not available for all endangered Slovenian railway sections. Hazard classes’ thresholds should be verified with other methods or by representatives of the railway safety services.

Danger zones provided by the Slovenian Railways were considered. Simple and very quick for delineating pre-zoning of the areas potentially affected by snow avalanches on a regional and local scale. Easy to calibrate using local past events cadastre

IRSTEA AvalforLIN

The results are provided in GIS format Proposes a regional set of parameters

Gives a good overview of hazard zones for the test bed to be used by the railroad management.

Possibility of hazard misevaluation due to unforeseen influences


AvalforLIN only provides a pre-zoning, which requires a validation through a field survey The calculations are only made for the steepest slope direction, no lateral deviation along the path is taken into account The spread of at the maximum run-out point is calculated using a buffer zone, which needs to be calibrated using local data on past events

This tool proposes a pre-zoning of protection forest only located in the release areas


A good past event data cadastre is required for parameter calibration

The slope criteria can be easily modified using a past events cadastre AvalforLIN allows to define the geographical area, for which the analysis is needed, using a processbased model This tool can be used for the validation of the extreme run-out points calculated with more sophisticated models

Possibility of hazard misevaluation due to unforeseen influences Due to the DEM resolution, possibility of misevaluation or overvaluation.

AvalforLIN has been applied to all the test beds affected by snow avalanches – regional

Forest cover mapping is required for the protection forest pre-zoning

122

3.3

Risk assessment tools/methods/procedures

Table 14: SWOT analysis of risk tools/methods/procedures developed and applied in the test beds within PARAmount.

Strengths

Weaknesses

Opportunities

Threats

Despite all mitigation measures working, in the long term, appropriate maintenance is absolutely necessary. All mitigation measures are only able to reduce the hazard/risk, not eliminate it  residual risk.

The quick field investigation allows a short evaluation of the situation, even if it cannot substitute a detailed analysis.

There is a risk that the finalisation of work could be interrupted (e.g. due to money or staff shortage) and that data will not be updated regularly.

VISO requires comprehensive knowledge of the digital road characteristics.

The calculation with new input data is quite simple and it is possible to update the results.

The continuous data check is very sophisticated and may cause problems.

Test bed

Very time-consuming!

PAB VISO (risk)

Within a geographic database it is possible to visualise the hazard level, as well as the vulnerability and risk level for the whole road network, administered by the Province of Bolzano. The method takes into account all relevant characteristics of the provincial road network (e.g. traffic flow) and calculates the consequence of an interrupted road segment for the whole traffic network.

Detailed instructions are necessary for the investigation and insertion into the database.

Brennero /Brenner – regional

The method is quite complex.

The result represents a specific condition; if the characteristics of the road network change (input data), the calculation has to be rerun. Special software is needed to run the calculation.

PAT Cost analysis

Helpful in evaluating alternative choices and setting priorities.

Difficult access to traffic and damage data. Very little traffic and damage data for rockfall, more available for avalanches.


A good cost analysis leads to costeffective decision-making, avoiding giving wrong priority.

Wrong or missing data, unreliable results and inappropriate decision-making.


123

PAT Cost analysis applied to SS50

Difficult access traffic and damage data; little data was available for avalanches.

Helpful in evaluating alternative choices and giving priority.

High precision (10 m-stretches).

PUH Rockfall risk map

Risk classes’ thresholds should be verified with other methods or by representatives of the railway safety services.

A simple procedure when hazard and vulnerability are known. Applicable to the whole rail network.

Avalanche and rockfall risk map

IRSTEA Combination of hazard and vulnerability maps at regional scale

Risk classes’ thresholds should be verified with other methods or by representatives of the railway safety services.

A simple procedure when hazard and vulnerability are known. Applicable to the whole rail network.

Can be helpful when evaluating alternative choices and giving priority. Easy to establish, once hazard and vulnerability maps are available.

Very little traffic data, very few alternatives if a link is cut.


Gives a good overview of risk for the test bed, to be used by the railroad management. Sets priorities for risk management and reduction.

Possibility of risk misevaluation due to unforeseen influences.


Possibility of risk misevaluation due to unforeseen influences.


None

Not applied to test bed

Can easily be applied to the whole rail network.

High precision (10 m-stretches).

UL

A good cost analysis leads to costeffective decision-making, avoiding giving wrong priority.

Wrong or missing data, unreliable results and inappropriate decision-making.

Gives a good overview of risk for the test bed, to be used by the railroad management. Sets priorities for risk management and reduction. Can easily be applied to the whole rail network.

Requires hazard and vulnerability maps to already be available.


Possible extension to a large number of areas.

124

3.4

Hazard early warning tools/methods/procedures

Table 15: SWOT analysis of hazard early warning tools, methods and procedures developed and applied within PARAmount.

Strengths

Weaknesses

Opportunities

Threats

Test bed

Easy to use. Includes local and current meteorological and event data.

At present, AWarnTool only uses data from one weather station.

Provides infrastructure institutions with low-cost, time-effective tool.

Data rights are limited by providers.

Distinguishes between different processes.

BFW AWarnTool HEWS

Provides information on frequency of avalanche danger levels. The algorithm only needs few data sets to be able to arrive at a first conclusion. Can be used as past events cadastre at the same time, due to structure of tool (full documentation of event, including pictures, etc.).

PAB Monitoring system by mechanical extensometer

Currently a research tool and still under development. Quality of results strongly depends on fidelity and completeness of past events cadastre (ideally should also include non-damage events to infrastructure – very difficult). Photo upload is limited (nine photos). No document upload (except photos).

Simple tool that can be applied to any region, providing available meteorological and event data. Additional data sources (more weather stations or extended past events cadastre) or algorithms can easily be included and would most probably provide more reliable results. Can be coupled with outputs from weather forecast models.

Competition of several private weather services contracted with weather forecasts for infrastructure providers in test bed – area of conflict?


Calculation for large data sets is slow (improvements are possible).

Maintenance work is needed. Offers the possibility to observe large rock volumes, which cannot be protected by classical mitigation measures (e.g. barriers, nets).

Need of support and initiative from infrastructure providers – might run dry if nobody provides upkeep.

Usually the control device is quite sensitive to atmospheric variations. The monitoring system is too expensive and sophisticated to install in many hazard zones.


Real time alert is possible.

Rockfall is a very quick process, so that the alert signal may come too late to take preventive and civil defence action.

Salurn/Salorno – local

If not installed correctly, the monitoring system may cause a false alarm.

(rock tower has been monitored since 2009)

Last winter the control device was broken.

125

PAB HEWS

PAT Extensometers and traffic lights (monitoring system)

PAT Procedure in case of an emergency

TESAF Debris flow monitoring

ARPAV HEWS

The cables were connected to traffic lights on barrier 2.

A lot of false signals.

The opportunity to try remote control systems.

The barriers are not automatic.


This system has some problems with deformation due to high temperature.

Comparison and testing of different instruments.

The system has unfortunately proved unreliable, considering the short time until the rocks reach the road.

Forte Buso – local

High hazard potential is still prevalent before and after the wall (located along the Paneveggio lake, at the toe of Forte Buso rockslide).

Forte Buso – local

Fiames – local

There were two thresholds for alarm and pre-alarm. The first instruments installed in September–October 1998 were strain gauges and inclinometers without data transmission functions; the data was collected manually. Later, optical tracking based on optical targets was installed on the rocks.

A wall was built along the road, covering almost the whole extent of the rockslide to improve road and traffic safety.

A procedure is well-defined at provincial level. This procedure identifies technicians and people responsible for risk management and decision-making.

Short time span until the rocks reach the road.

Monitoring station installed provides the experience required for testing instruments and procedures.

Monitoring duration is too short for reliability analysis of results.

Testing the instruments with real debris flow.

Small number of events occurred in the test bed area.

Very good response during the two debris flow events in summer 2012. Innovative sensors; a good communication system via GSM signal.

Electricity only from photovoltaic panels.

Test the early warning system, test efficiency of thermo camera, test a real remote control system.

Possible use as an everyday warning system has to be evaluated.


False warnings were issued.

The wall proved to be not enough to protect the road; this led politicians to agree on the construction of a new tunnel.


126

ARPAP DEFENSE HEWS

IRSTEA Pre-warning procedure based on potential debris flow impact maps at regional scale

Very good response during simulated events; innovative approach; developed in an open source environment; the userfriendly WebGIS interface is consultable from everywhere via computers/ tablets/smartphones.

Weather Radar is required; tested only in Alpine environments.

Test the early warning system in other mountain environments.

Pertinent only in case of regional meteorological event.

Possible extension to other regions.

Identification of the catchments most likely to produce debris flow with impact on transport infrastructure in case of a meteorological event at regional scale.


Not validated yet.

Coupling with meteorological nowcasting could be planned.

None


Pertinence for practical purpose still has to be evaluated.


127

3.5

Decision-support tools/methods/procedures

Table 16: SWOT analysis of decision-support tools, methods and procedures developed and applied within PARAmount.

Strengths Reaches a wide range of natural hazard experts.

BFW Online survey (basis for CDT)

No limit to amount of responses that can be contributed and subsequently analysed. Relatively low effort compared to other methods. Direct statistical analysis of results possible.

Weaknesses Dependant on good-will of participants for high return rate of interviews. No figures for the explanation of processes available. Data basis inhomogeneous with regard to the origin of the interviewees (many participants from Austria, fewer from other countries). High number of participants necessary for significant result.

Brings together key stakeholders from a wide range of institutional and professional backgrounds (cross-sector network).

BFW Regional Risk Dialogue Group Stanzer Valley

Opportunities

Threats

Test bed

Interviewees may misunderstand the questions or context of the questions.

Interview Alpine Space-wide – application to Stanzer Valley – regional

Must be organised and enforced by somebody (interested person or institution).


Results can easily be further extended by enlarging the interviewed target group. Repetitions of survey may trace a change or development in knowledge base. Different viewpoints of participating groups (scientists, practitioners,...).

Can serve as a basis for long-lasting a dialogue group in the region (benefit beyond duration of project).

Fosters direct communication and cooperation in the test bed.

High organisational effort.

Enables analysis of current deficiencies and requirements with regard to natural hazard management of infrastructure in the Stanzer Valley.

Overlaps with daily business of stakeholders – benefit of attending the RRD has to be clearly recognisable (results possibly intangible or not easily measurable).

Provides a good platform for the presentation, discussion and dissemination of project results (bridging the gap between science and practice).


Can be the basis of new projects in hazard and risk management and communication. Introduction of additional participants possible at any time. Possible educational effect for nonexperts in natural hazard management.

128

Incorporated in several EUprojects (AdaptAlp, CLISP) to allow a broader and more long-term design, testing and implementation phase and enable a thematic link (as proposed in the PARAmount AF). Contribution to research into the potential impact of climate change on natural hazard processes with respect to a strategic/regional assessment.

BFW Communication and Strategic Decision Support Tool for Natural Hazards (CDT)

Draws on wide knowledge-basis from natural hazard experts from all over the Alpine Space. Contributes to shedding light on complex climate change issues by fostering direct, transparent communication and cooperation (e.g. in municipalities).

Reflects the opinion of a selected group of experts (see above). Evaluation limited to natural hazard experts (for non-experts, describing complex natural hazards by relevant factors and parameters is not feasible). Currently still a research tool (currently not clear who should apply the tool; public needs support from expert in the beginning to be able to use tool).

Includes results from extensive literature reviews, comparing the results from the CDT study with the current state of affairs.

Further development and application to other regions possible. Application of tool in test bed can have an educational effect and improve communication.


Providing the necessary interest and feedback – adaptation to different user groups possible.

An interaction of parameters is not considered in the structure.

Relatively simple and traceable method – focus on process parameters and step-by-step approximation towards the determination of the impact on the process itself


129

PAB VISO: Priority list for new interventions

PAB VISO: Priority list for maintenance work

VISO allows the creation of a priority list, based on the hazard/risk level, to correctly plan new investments.

The method (database) is currently only valid for rockfall.

The system offers an ’objective‘ decision-support for the administration. VISO allows the creation of a priority list based on the hazard/risk level to correctly plan the maintenance work.

The method (database) is currently only valid for rockfall.

The system offers an ’objective‘ decision support for the administration.

The collaboration (data input, data use) between different stakeholders (e.g. road service, geological survey, engineering consultants) is strengthened.

The road operators know when they have to check mitigation measures and carry out maintenance.

There is a risk that the finalisation of work could be interrupted (e.g. due to money or staff shortage) and that the data will not be updated regularly. The continuous data check is very sophisticated and may cause problems. If the database VISO is not updated after the maintenance work has been completed, there a lot of barriers remain at the top of the priority list, even though they have already been maintained.

Brings a new perspective of research. Connecting research groups with transport authorities.

PUH/UL

Potential for further development.

New methods and knowledge with upgrade potential for wide usage.

Applied only on limited locations.

Debris flow hazard maps are pioneer project in Slovenia.

IRSTEA Decision-support tools: multicriteria analysis, hierarchical analysis

Series of methods that can be used quite easily. Each user defines their own aims and criteria. Can be applied to many different contexts.

Defining the initial architecture can be time-consuming. Use in the domain of natural hazards has not been widely validated.


Potential to get national interest and financing of further research and hazard assessment.

Large variety of domains of application and the warranty that each user can get a suitably tailored system.

Brennero/Brenner – regional


Koroška Bela New methods must be officially sanctioned in order to be applied more widely.

Posočje – Baška grapa Posočje – Soteska

None

Used in cooperation with PPs ÖBB and PAB

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Although, in the PARAmount test beds, the applied methods and tools differed, similarities in the SWOT analysis allow a transnational summary of the results. One of the main outcomes from this comparison is that the PARAmount project largely facilitated the spread of hazard assessment tools throughout the majority of the participating countries (e.g. regarding the application of rockfall tools), thereby highlighting the importance and justification of the transnational character of PARAmount and the cooperation and communication between PPs. In the following, the main outcomes of the SWOT analyses are summarised according to the main steps in a risk management cycle (hazard, vulnerability and risk assessment) and associated decision-tools (early warning systems and decision support tools).

Damage potential/vulnerability assessment In most of the test beds a vulnerability assessment was performed in a more or less detailed analysis. A main difference arises from the analysis. Considering regional assessments, the strength was seen in the ability of the regional methods to be able to consider an entire stretch of an endangered infrastructure line, instead of limiting the analysis to within administrative borders. In practice, e.g. in Austria, the administrative responsibilities of road sections in close vicinity are in the hands of multiple municipalities and/or different multigovernmental operators. A regional approach allows the analysis not to focus on the specific need of single stakeholders, but on the development and use of commonly agreed vulnerability indicators. This enables an objective comparison of the damage potential across administrative levels, e.g. on a regional or even transnational scale. In addition, when working with a group of stakeholders, more basic data becomes available, which may be used for quantitative assessment. This may lead to the harmonisation of, for example, replacement costs and cost for indirect damages. In PARAmount, a participatory approach was chosen in order to involve relevant stakeholders from different interest groups to discuss the vulnerability assessment with a regional focus, which lead to a common problem understanding and high acceptance of the results. With regard to the tools applied and developed in PARAmount, a strength is seen in the use of GIS analysis, because the visualisation of results allows focusing on specific interests and is easy to implement; the decision become more comprehensible. The strengths on a local level are seen in the use of high-precision data, including transport infrastructure values and the possibility to include environmental and social vulnerabilities, for example. Although the strengths are in many ways conclusive, there are several weaknesses that have to be pointed out and should be considered when interpreting the results. The most severe shortcoming is seen in the lack of reliable data on monetary values that can be used for assessing the potential damage. In most test beds, the values considered were rough approximations based on available literature or cost-benefit calculation guidelines. Especially in the case of indirect damages there is a lack of reliable methods to determine the costs considering the entire network of economical, ecological and social dependencies. On test bed level one important indicator was the daily traffic, which is only collected in selected spots, but does not reflect local specifics. Even though digital road maps are available by now in many countries, the quality of underlying data may not be sufficient for detailed analysis, and this subsequently limits the trust in the results. A weakness is also seen in the lack of verification possibilities. The opportunities are most notably seen in the appliance of well-developed GIS, as the use and interpretation of the results are straightforward, easy to follow and understood by stakeholders. By involving decision-makers of different interest groups in the conceptualisation of a GIS model, the acceptance of the results will be guaranteed. As more and more digital data becomes available, most of the methods can be easily applied to larger areas to gain an overview of vulnerability. This also allows for an objective comparison of different regions. Where more detailed and high-quality data is or becomes available, these tools can be easily adapted to meet more specific problems. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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The greatest threat is seen in the limited availability of data and here especially in the insufficient quality of data. Often it is unclear to the end-user how to use the results in a sustainable way. The methods are easy to apply, but the results may be associated with great uncertainties. Many stakeholders may not be aware of these uncertainties, because the communication between analyst and decision-makers is often not supported in a structured risk management procedure. One must be aware that a regional approach may deliver an area-wide overview, but cannot substitute more detailed analysis on local/catchment scale. The methods have to be adapted to the specific problems and one should acknowledge that unforeseen influences cannot be accounted for.

Hazard potential assessment The two main approaches to determine the hazard potential were a disposition analysis for the processes: rockfall, debris flow and avalanche on a regional as well as local scale, and the use of simulation models on catchment scale. A prerequisite for both approaches is a past event cadastre, in order to analyse the event occurrences (frequency, magnitude), to calibrate modes or to verify the results of simulation tools. In some test beds of PARAmount these cadastres have been available prior to the project, in others one aim of the work in the project was to establish an event cadastre. Independently from process specific aspects, the results of the SWOT can be summarised as follows: Past events cadastre (establish and analyse) The strength of the establishment and analysis of a past events cadastre is seen in the overview that such an instrument can give of the hazard situation in a region. In PARAmount, the focus was on setting up a regional cadastre by combining and harmonising datasets from different stakeholders. A good data pool allows for quantitative analysis of the data in order to statistically determine the hazard potential. In addition, important input for simulation models and GIS-based disposition analysis is provided. An important aspect is also that reliable information of past events is needed for the verification of model results. A weakness that can hinder detailed analysis of past events is inhomogeneous data sources. Often different stakeholders only record information they consider important for their specific need and decision territory. Consequently, the data is biased and selectively collected. Also, incomplete data recordings are apparent in most datasets. This is often observed when responsibilities change or are not clearly defined. A past event cadastre allows for this information database to easily be supplemented and managed, especially with regard to today’s computing facilities. PARAmount was the start of maintaining a structured database in some test beds, however time will show the sustainability. The demonstration of the usefulness of a cadastre increased the need for better documentation. The greatest threat is seen in the danger of misinterpretation of the dataset, because of the lack of high-quality data and the time-limited availability of data. In addition, the use of data from different documentation standards may lead to questionable results. One aspect that is seen as an opportunity and threat is the involvement of relevant stakeholders, because it may be difficult to find a common agreement on data collection and management, which could result in time-intensive work. Indicator maps/disposition analysis/regional assessments The strength of indicator maps, disposition analysis and regional assessments is that these are simple and easy tools to apply. The direct link of tools and methods to GIS allows the visualisation of results that are easy to comprehend. Most of these tools do not require large computing times and can be used to assess the hazard for larger areas. This does allow a direct comparison of results across administrations and on transnational level. In addition, most of these tools are flexible and easy to adapt to specific needs.


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While the strength is seen in the ability to work on a larger area, the weakness lies in the scaling problem. Often smaller, but more frequent processes, may not be represented and local effects are evened due to interpolation and smoothing of data. The data availability is a limiting factor in the analysis. The opportunities are mainly seen in the application in various regions, which will give a good overview of the hazard potential and help to govern risk on a regional scale. The threats mainly result from the fact that the results of the tools may be used without further validation in regions. The trust might be too high and misleading, as regional results may be used for local decisions. In addition, unforeseen influences cannot be included. Simulation The strength in the simulation models is seen in the way they were developed and calibrated. Most were developed by researchers and natural hazard experts, directly responsible for practical decisions. Consequently, the validation of output is directly linked to the needs of the end-users. In addition, the simulation tools are user-friendly. Although natural hazards depend on many parameters and their interaction, the required input data is limited to a manageable amount in PARAmount, so that the tools can be applied in many regions, even without detailed data availability. Simulation software often delivers important values for use in constructions, such as pressure data and velocity. Some tools have are able to account for protection measures (forest, structural) and that they can often be used for back-analysis. Weaknesses are seen in long computational times, even though most of the implemented algorithms have been simplified. Simulation models can only represent the natural conditions with great uncertainties, which result from a lack of knowledge of process, a lack of measured data, a lack of high-quality data and a lack of time, money and computational facilities. This may lead to the use of incorrectly calculated and verified data on the magnitude, runout and velocity of natural hazard events. With regard to the use of the simulation models, it has to be pointed out that the algorithms behind the results are often not transparent, the calibration maybe biased, the application is restricted to small areas, some models are very sensitive and the subscription maybe expensive. The opportunity is seen in the link to further use in hazard and risk mapping. Especially open source models are regarded as a great asset to existing models. In addition, upgrades may include important aspects, such as forests and structural mitigation measures. Further studies can build on existing models and a focus can be placed on the verification of the model output. The implementation in a GIS should help to better visualise results and subsequently foster higher acceptance of decisions. Improved computing possibilities open new opportunities for user-friendly solutions. The incorporation of climate change will be of great interest in future. The threat is that high costs and time requirements for the development and use of the models may restrict the quality of the model output. In addition, high trust in results (over and underestimations) may lead to wrong decisions, especially in cases where uncertainties are neglected. Other methods and tools used include expert approaches and field surveys, both of which cannot and should not be neglected in any analysis.

Risk assessment The strengths of the risk assessment tools lie in them allowing an objective priority ranking of mitigation measures and evaluation of alternatives, as well as being applicable to wide areas. Furthermore, they permit an inclusion of local data and present a reasonably simple procedure when hazard and vulnerability are known.


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In general, the weaknesses are seen in the availability and quality of input data (i.e. hazard and vulnerability maps), as well as the choice of the classification of risk (thresholds) and the comparability of the results between different PPs and countries. The main opportunities of risk assessment, according to the SWOT analysis, lie in being able to (objectively) set priorities for mitigation measures and risk reduction in general, thus supporting costeffective decision-making. Furthermore, several risk assessment tools/methods/procedures are credited for the possibility to extend them to a larger area (i.e. the whole transport network in a given area). The threats facing risk assessment mostly refer to the reliability of input data and the corresponding results. The authors pin-point this as a potential source of inappropriate decision-making or misevaluation.

Hazard early warning A wide range of hazard early warning systems was implemented in the test beds. These include systems based on in-situ data (e.g. extensometer measurements, monitoring stations in debris flow catchments) or remote sensing measurements (e.g. Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR) stormtracking system connected to client-server infrastructure); systems combining past event cadastres and current (meteorological) data (software approach), as well as systems based on procedures for pre-warning and emergency. Due to the high variability of the tools/methods/procedures developed in the frame of this action, a direct comparison regarding the SWOT analysis on a transnational level is not feasible.

Decision-support tools The decision-support tools developed in PARAmount also feature a high variability: They range from relatively simple and easily traceable methods, which were generated with a focus on a pragmatic approach, to a cross-sector cadastre of mitigation measures and multi-criteria, and hierarchical analysis. Due to the high variability of the tools/methods/procedures developed in the frame of this action, a direct comparison regarding the SWOT analysis on a transnational level is not feasible here, either.


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4

Identification of hazard hotspots and recommendations

Using the tools/methods/procedures described and evaluated above, the PPs in PARAmount have identified a series of hazard hotspots in their respective test beds, with particular focus on the natural hazard-vulnerability of transport infrastructure. Subsequently, recommendations for the improvement of infrastructure protection strategies and measures for different stakeholders connected to these highly vulnerable infrastructures were drafted and are presented below. The choice of indicators for the definition of the hotspots depends strongly on the employed methodology, which highly differ in detail (catchment scale to regional), which is why no direct transnational comparison of the results from this chapter is conducted.

Identification of hazard hotspots In general, two kinds of hotspots were identified: 

Geographical hotspots: Section of road or rail infrastructure with a high risk level, as evaluated in the course of WP5 (direct damage). Additionally, hotspots were identified in areas were the topographical situation causes bottlenecks, where alternative routes are not available or where large-scale detours are necessary when the primary network is interrupted (indirect damage).



Thematic hazard hotspots: organisational or structural deficits in the test bed, as inter alia identified in the course of WP4. These deficits may be caused due to a lack of direct communication, cooperation or a missing or insufficient platform for information exchange between infrastructure providers.

Where applicable, several hotspots were identified for each test bed, with particular reference to their importance on a regional, national or transnational level. They include a reference to the role of the stakeholders in the test bed and were identified inter alia by consulting the local and regional decision-makers. Additionally, the following key questions and requirements were taken into account when locating these hotspots: 

Hotspots to be classified according to hazard priority, vulnerability and risk priority



Evaluation of implemented hazard mitigation measures or optimisation of existing decision and hazard management structures (e.g. organisational, technical improvements) against the background of protection potentials of highly vulnerable infrastructure sections (based on results from Act. 4.3) – best-practice examples from measures with highest potential in the frame of PARAmount.



How does climate change affect the pin-pointed (geographical) hotspots? Will there be additional hotspots due to the potential impact of climate change? Will there be a geographic shift to other locations, or will the selected locations be more severely impacted?

Recommendations for hazard hotspots For each identified hotspot, one or more recommendations were established. In this context, recommendations encompass improvements of infrastructure protection or mitigation measures for different beneficiary groups, as suggested by the project partners, inter alia in conjunction with local experts. These recommendations can be divided into two main groups:


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



Structural and technical countermeasures to reduce the hazard potential (generally applies to geographical hotspots). They include: o

Snow drift regulation (e.g. snow fences, jet roofs, wind baffles)

o

Stabilising constructions (e.g. permanent and temporary supporting structures and afforestation in release areas of avalanches)

o

Breaking constructions (mounds built specifically in the runout zone)

o

Deflection and catching constructions (e.g. dams, galleries or tunnels)

o

Reinforcements (structural alterations of buildings)

Non-structural, administrative or organisational countermeasures to generally reduce the damage potential and therefore mitigate hazard effects on transport infrastructure (generally applies to geographical & thematic hotspots). These include: o

Optimisation of existing decision-support and communication structures by initiating and conducting risk dialogues, info meetings, workshops or post-graduate courses to improve and foster communication and cooperation between key infrastructurerelevant stakeholders in the test beds

o

Land-use management strategies and land-use planning to improve the security of transport infrastructure (e.g. hazard maps, emergency plans, development plans)

o

Long- to short-term management of upcoming events, including monitoring, forecasting, hazard early warning, warning and alarm)

(after Bründl et al., 2008; Lied, 2006)

4.1

Stanzer Valley (Austria)

As described above, the Austrian PPs jointly worked in the Stanzer Valley, covering both the critical road and rail infrastructure. Due to the close proximity of the infrastructure in some parts of the test bed, direct communication and close cooperation in defining potential hazard hotspots and drafting recommendations was essential.

4.1.1

Derivation of potential hazard hotspots

In order to assess the level of debris flow and avalanche hazard in the Austrian test bed, which covers an area of 200 km² of potential natural hazard terrain, relevant to the critical infrastructure, regional models were employed. One of our main aims was to be able to provide the respective infrastructure stakeholders with transport-focused hazard indicator maps, providing information on (possibly todate unknown) potential hotspots. These maps should be further combined with the damagepotential data supplied by the infrastructure stakeholders and compiled by the BFW & ÖBB in order to be able to additionally supply risk maps.

Potential geographical hazard hotspots Potential hotspots on a regional level were derived using the tools, methods and procedures, inter alia developed in the frame of PARAmount. These hotspots are based on past events cadastres, remote sensing data and other available sources of information on the natural hazard potential, relevant to the infrastructure lines. The data is used as an input for regional-scale simulation models (e.g. aiDebrisFlow3D). This first step is a rough estimation of the location of potential hotspots, not taking into account the local scale specifications, e.g. temporary mitigation measures, dimensions of culverts and bridges crossing the torrent.


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Debris flow (road) Several methodologies were employed by the Austrian PPs to derive potential hazard hotpots at a regional level. For debris flow, these included i) a strictly model-based approach (aiDebrisFlow3D) and an expert-based approach, building on the results of a morphometric analysis and an extensive past events cadastre. These models are further described in Chapter 2.1.2. Figure 66 gives an overview of the potential debris flow hotspots along the critical road infrastructure in the Stanzer Valley as identified by these regional models in PARAmount. Locations where both approaches agree are marked as ‘common hotspots’, whereas all other potential hotspots are highlighted accordingly. The criteria for the definition of a potential hotspot with aiDebrisFlow3D are: 

The road section is classified as being potentially affected by debris flow in the scenario ‘large event’, which corresponds to a height of the fluid layer of 0.12 m.



No permanent mitigation measures (tunnels, galleries) are installed along this particular stretch of road (temporary measures are not accounted for in the regional scale analysis)

(for a detailed description see Scheikl et al. (2012)) The criteria for the definition of potential hotspots with the regional scale expert approach are: 

Catchment is classified as being debris flow prone by the morphometric analysis (Melton ruggedness index), morphology of alluvial fan (distinctive torrent channels crossing the major road network) and some (rough) additional geomorphologic frame conditions



Analysis of past events cadastre shows high activity in debris flow events



No permanent mitigation measures (tunnels, galleries) are installed along this particular stretch of road (temporary measures are not accounted for in the regional scale analysis)



Additional data (e.g. hazard maps) points to a debris flow hazard

(for a detailed description see Hagen et al., 2012b)

Figure 66: Overview of potential debris flow hotspots along the road, as identified by the regional models employed in PARAmount (source: BFW).


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Figure 67: Common potential hazard hotpot Schnannerbach in the central part of the test bed, shown here after a debris flow event in summer 2005 (source: WLV, Gebietsbauleitung Oberes Inntal).

Figure 68: Common potential hazard hotpot Dawinbach in the eastern part of the test bed, shown here after an event in summer 2010 (source: WLV, Gebietsbauleitung Oberes Inntal).


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Avalanches (road) Potential hotspots of avalanche hazard along the critical road infrastructure in the Stanzer Valley were derived using a regional matrix-based assessment, as described in Chapter 2.1.2. In an attempt to provide the decision-makers with a user-friendly output, which allows straightforward interpretation for practitioners, the hazard levels were coupled with the European avalanche danger scale. The map provided below (Figure 69) gives a compilation of all potential hazard hotspots for the road infrastructure. The criteria for the definition of a road section as a potential hotspot with this approach are: 

According to the avalanche hazard indicator map, a section of ≥100 m is potentially endangered by an avalanche danger level ≤ 4. Sections of road below that length are assumed to be small-scale snow slides, where the snow can be cleared within a short timespan.



No permanent mitigation measures (e.g. tunnels, galleries) are installed in the runout zone along this particular stretch of road (as defined in the scope of the study). Temporary measures are not accounted for in the regional scale analysis (worst-case scenario).

(for detailed description see Perzl et al., 2012)

Figure 69: Overview of potential avalanche hotspots along the critical road infrastructure, as identified by the regional model employed in PARAmount (source: BFW).


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Thematic hotspots In the course of the state-of-the-art survey in the Stanzer Valley in the initial phase of the project and the first RRD held in January 2011, several key issues were raised with respect to the potential improvements PARAmount could bring. The main issue the key stakeholders highlighted, was the need for an improved cooperation and communication between the network of road maintenance and management institutions, municipal and district authorities on the one hand and the ÖBB on the other. As the ÖBB are a federal institution mainly operating on the state level, the stakeholders criticised the lacking regional focus of the rail maintenance and management company. This lack of communication and cooperation resulted in a certain degree of uncertainties and disaccord between the two groups. In the following project work and meetings held involving the key infrastructure stakeholders (as listed in Chapter 0), this issues was specifically targeted.

4.1.2

Recommendations for potential hazard hotspots

A range of possible recommendations were drafted and partially already implemented in the Stanzer Valley in the frame of PARAmount in close cooperation with the key infrastructure stakeholders.

Potential geographical hazard hotspots As described above, these model results and therefore potential hotspots derived on a regional scale serve as a basis for a more detailed analysis and associated recommendations. An assessment of the criticality of the defined potential hazard hotspots was conducted by: 

Providing feedback and general recommendations to the key infrastructure stakeholders in the test bed; presentation and discussion of project results, especially in the frame of two stakeholder meetings regarding the geographical hotspots in particular, held on 26 July and 26 September 2012; all road sections identified as potential hotspots were discussed with the infrastructure and natural hazard experts from the test bed; for each identified hotspot, feedback was documented, analysed and included in a protocol during the meeting; the main recommendations connected to the identified potential hotspots were compiled in the respective reports (Scheikl et al., 2012 and Perzl et al, 2012).



Exploring possible, more detailed methods for hazard analysis on a local level inter alia by field investigations, detailed local numerical simulations for example with AdB, (local) expert opinion from natural hazard specialists.

Thematic hotspots The main recommendations regarding the communication and cooperation issues in the Stanzer Valley were already implemented, including most importantly the RRD. At the final project meetings (e.g. die final conference), the key infrastructure stakeholders have already reported the positive effects of the increase in communication and cooperation as a direct result of PARAmount. As part of the effort to extend the positive effects and build on the basis established in PARAmount, a third RRD was planned for February 2013. By continuing the RRD as a platform for risk communication, these efforts are planned to be further strengthened.


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4.2

Southern French Alps & St Antoine (France)

As mentioned previously, the aim of IRSTEA was to produce tools and methodologies to be applied not only in the test beds, but in a wide range of Alpine areas. With this goal in mind, the test beds were chosen according to their specific applicability to testing the tools and methodologies.

4.2.1

Derivation of hazard hotspots

The tools and methods developed and applied in the Southern French Alps test bed all follow the objective of deriving hotspots, keeping in mind that transport network managers have to prioritise their actions and that some regional knowledge of the most hazardous areas is an important element of their decision to install mitigation measures. Derivation of debris flow hazard hotspots Our aim was to develop simple evaluation tools, able to deal with a limited quantity of data and easyto-obtain information. The methodology consisted of automatic mapping of potential debris flow impact points on transport infrastructure at regional scale. It is based on a statistical model using two morphometric parameters (Melton index and channel slope) encapsulated in a GIS procedure (developed in the software ArcGIS). This procedure was validated with the past events cadastre of debris flow impact on transportation infrastructures in the Southern French Alps. To some extent, providing a large number of records are available, mapping the impact points of historical events on transport infrastructure can also be considered an interesting method for the derivation of hotspots. In practice, a large number of maps can be derived from such procedures. Examples of maps of potential impact points are given in Figure 70 and Figure 71b (derived from the morphometric approach) and Figure 71a (derived from records of historical events). Derivation of rockfall and snow avalanche hotspots, effect of the protection forest Our main aim was to develop a methodology of the evaluation of potential impacts of rockfall and snow avalanches on transport infrastructure with and without taking into account the protection function of the forest. The methodology consists of using the models RockforLIN and AvalforLIN respectively for rockfall and snow avalanches, which make it possible to establish preliminary hazard mapping at the regional scale. These tools make it possible to simulate phenomena with or without considering the presence of the forest vegetation. The interest in these tools was demonstrated by the widespread use by a large number of PPs in PARAmount. Example maps of the potential runout of rockfall and snow avalanches at a regional scale are given in Figure 72 (Hautes-Alpes county), Figure 73a (potential impact of rockfall on the transport network, Queyras area, without considering protection forest) and Figure 73b (potential impact of rockfall on the transport network, Queyras area, considering protection forest). Simulations carried out in the Queyras area took advantage of the LiDAR data acquired for that purpose and yield precise results. Derivation of risk hotspots Derivation of hazard hotspots is an important step, but does not reflect the importance of the potentially impacted transport infrastructure notably in terms of loss of connectivity, and economical impact in case of disruption. Consequently, we also developed a methodology of evaluation of the vulnerability and accessibility of transport networks exposed to natural hazards in mountain areas. Last but not least, natural hazards are not the only factor to be considered by authorities in charge of transport infrastructure management. We considered a more appropriate formulation of priorities and criteria by these authorities. Thus, our action in PARAmount consisted in developing and adapting sound decision-support methods, sufficiently simple to be used by non-specialists. In practice, such a decision-support framework, based on multi-criteria analysis and a hierarchical method, was applied in cooperation with other PPs in PARAmount.


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Figure 70: Potential debris-flow impact points on the transport network of the Southern French Alps with associated probability of debris-flow occurrence (source: M. Bertrand, IRSTEA).

a)

b)

Figure 71: Number of impact points per km of transport network for the Southern French Alps a) recorded since 1850 (extracted from the ONF-RTM database) b) potential debris-flow impacts as determined by the geomorphic approach developed in the framework of the PARAmount project (source: M. Bertrand, IRSTEA).


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Figure 72: Rockfall hazard map for the Hautes-Alpes county (Southern French Alps) considering (in red) and without considering (in orange) the protection role of the forest (source: IRSTEA).

a)

b)

Figure 73: Rockfall potential impact for the Queyras region (eastern part of the Hautes-Alpes county, Southern French Alps) a) without taking into account the protection role of the forest b) taking into account the protection role of the forest (source: IRSTEA).


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4.2.2

Recommendations for hazard hotspots

Derivation of hotspots at regional scale is an important tool of management, but is generally insufficient for the definition and design of mitigation measures. One has to keep in mind that phenomena trigger at the scale of the torrent catchment (debris flows, avalanche path or rockfallprone cliff). Catastrophic events at a regional scale may result from exceptional meteorological conditions, but most frequent events remain limited to small areas. Thus, a local study of phenomena is not compulsory, but often of large interest once priorities between intervention points have to be defined, especially when the installation of technical prevention measures is planned. For such approaches several tools and methodologies do exist or have been developed in the framework of PARAmount. For a relatively exhaustive list of methods dedicated to debris flow hazard assessment at catchment scale, one can refer to Chapter 2.2.2 of the present document. Such approaches often use numerical models. This step is not compulsory, but can be of great interest. We would, for instance, recommend using the model Rockyfor3D for rockfall (includes possible consideration of protection forest) and Lave2D for debris flow events (applied to derive the hazard map presented in Figure 74), to mention only our own tools. However, one has to keep in mind that these models require high-quality input data. Most notably, the use of LiDAR data is highly advisable. Part of the methods briefly presented in Chapter 2.2.2 aim at producing higher-quality input data. However, one has to keep in mind that both data and model are still imperfect and natural phenomena show high variability. Consequently, it is strongly advised to work on a series of scenarios. It is also important to consider that models can help the expert assessment but that they cannot completely substitute it. To some given extent, these models make it possible to consider the effect of some existing or planned protection structures, which can be of particular interest. An example of a debris flow hazard map at catchment scale is provided in Figure 74. This map corresponds to one scenario occurrence (several scenarios were considered) and related simulations can provide detailed information about the features of the impact on transport infrastructure (international railway track and national road in the example). Once again, as mentioned in the last section, derivation of hazard hotspots is an important step, but does not reflect the vulnerability of transport infrastructure. This point should be explicitly considered. Furthermore, hazards are not the only factor to be considered by authorities in charge of transport infrastructure management. The hotspots and appropriate remediation measures have to be considered, including all local constraints and decisions taken by local authorities, preferably on the basis of clear criteria in the framework of a well-defined decision-support system.


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Figure 74: Debris flow hazard map and identification of impact points on transport infrastructure deduced from an application of the hybrid approach to the St Antoine torrent catchment (Modane, Savoie) with a 3 debris flow volume of 120,000 m (source: IRSTEA).

4.3

Brennero/Brenner & Rolle Pass (Dolomites) (Italy)

4.3.1


Brennero/Brenner (Mittewald, Atzwang & Salurn) Referring to the VISO method, three hotspots of rockfall hazard were identified along the Brenner axis and studied in detail within PARAmount (Figure 75): 

Mittewald/Mezzaselva



Atzwang/Campodazzo



Salurn/Salorno

All hotspots are located directly along the Brenner axis, on the national road SS12, and are quite divers from a geological point of view on the one hand, but similar regarding their hazard character on the other.


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Figure 75: Hazard hotspots along the Brenner axes (source: PAB).

Mittewald/Mezzaselva Travelling along the Brenner axis in a southerly direction, the first hazard hotspot is located a few kilometres north of Franzensfeste/Fortezza (Figure 76) – Mittewald/Mezzaselva. Within the Province border this area, where the highway and the national road are partly parallel, is remembered well by the local population, because of a debris flow event 1998, which cost the lives of five people lost. The numerous installed mitigation measures, as well as the drafted contingency plan represent a significant prevention measure. Furthermore, rockfall hazard is an important issue in this area, as steep slopes reach more or less directly down to the road. Strongly dissected and partly weathered granite rocks loom over the 400 m of steeply inclined slope with sparse coniferous forest. Just as for debris flow, many mitigation measures have been planned and installed. Due to the steep, rugged slope, the installation of mitigation measures was difficult. Even the periodic maintenance work is always very sophisticated.


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Figure 76: Overview of the slope near Mittewald/Mezzaselva (source: G. Cotza).

Figure 77: Simulation with RockyFor3D without (left) and with forest (right) (source: PAB).


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To get an overview of the dimension of the rockfall hazard, various simulation software products were applied. Due to the thorough installation of rockfall mitigation measures, it seems that the danger is momentarily reduced; nevertheless, the functionality of mitigation measures has to be ensured for the future. Figure 77 gives an overview of the results gained with the simulation model RockyFor3D. Atzwang/Campodazzo Probably the largest rockfall hotspot along the Brenner axis, at least considering the number of events, is located north of Bozen/Bolzano. Since 1998, no less than 18 events occurred, which partly caused the temporary closure of the road. Apart from large amounts of damage to material assets (e.g. asphalt, street signs), some events also claimed human lives, e.g. in August 2004. Therefore, the most dangerous road stretch was protected by building a rockfall gallery. From the geological point of view, we are situated in the Etschtaler volcanic group. The steeply inclined slope is superposed by strongly dissected and weathered volcanic rock formations. Some smaller cliffs are located directly next to the road. The unfavourably running joints/gaps and the strong weathering repeatedly cause large and small rockfall events.

Figure 78: Measured GPS points from May 2011 (source: PAB).


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In the course of PARAmount, we tried to test the various existing rockfall simulation software, based on a rockfall event that occurred in May 2011. In this case it was possible to reconstruct the trajectory by following the block impacts. The impacts have been measured using a differential GPS (Figure 78). Afterwards this work was very helpful when defining the soil parameters needed in the software. It is not yet clear if the impacts were caused by one single or numerous blocks. Due to the small distances between the observed impacts along the channel, it seems more probable that one block split into several pieces. The experiment showed quite different results. Partially calibration worked well with the default parameters, but in other cases the simulation had to be run repeatedly with manually entered soil parameters in order to get satisfying results. Salurn/Salorno Salurn/Salorno is situated on the southern provincial border, between the province of Bolzano and the province of Trento. In this case a totally different situation had to be solved: large block volume towers above and directly next to the national road SS12. In other words, there is no slope (trajectory). All mitigation measures would be useless regarding the huge rock volume. A monitoring station with mechanical extensometers, which observes all critical joints/gaps, presented itself as the only solution. Therefore, seven extensometers were installed, which measure the displacement every four hours (Figure 47). The numbers in the image on the right show the position of each extensometer. The measurement takes place every day, 365 days a year. Until now, no large and alarming displacement has been registered. The variations of the displacement more or less follow the annual temperature variations. The pertinence of these measurements was shown recently when on 15 December 2011 a large rockfall event occurred just a few kms north of the monitored rock tower: several thousand m³ of calcareous rock was mobilised (Figure 79 and Figure 80). After this event the idea of shifting the road to a less dangerous zone was discussed more intensively, but without arriving at a final decision until now.


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Figure 79: Rockfall event near Salurn/Salorno on 15 December 2011 (source: PAB).

Figure 80: Extract of the inspection report of 16 December 2011 (source: D. Tonidandel; internal data schedule Office of Geology and Building Material Testing).


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Rolle Pass (Dolomites) Potential hotspots within the test bed were derived using both the tools and methodologies developed in the context of PARAmount and past experience (studies and monitoring) in the area. The use of a numerical rockfall model (Rockyfor3D), developed on a regional scale, along with the introduction of threshold values set by decision-makers and directly related to the type of phenomenon, allowed us to identify the critical sections for a homogeneous initial screening. Since rockfall and avalanche events have occurred in the past within the test bed area, many of the hotspots pin-pointed by the model were already known. The calibration on the ground of the results of computational models, coupled with detailed studies, made the point that the development on a regional scale has led to an improvement of current techniques of risk assessment, allowing us to define those sections along the roads exposed to homogeneous risk values and then placing them into a GIS to make the degree of penalisation of the various sections accessible to decision makers. Degrees of penalisation were thus mapped along the SS50 road using three levels of intensity for the hazard identified respectively with the typical colours (yellow, blue and red). Above all, the most hazardous and also risky section was identified as Forte Buso. The model was able to capture a rockslide which had been active in the past and still is. Forte Buso The Forte Buso rockslide is located along the SS50 where it borders the Paneveggio lake, within the Paneveggio National Park. It lies in the north-eastern part of the province of Trento. Geologically, this region is composed of two different stratigraphic sequences, the Piattaforma Porfirica Atesina (Predazzo – Passo Rolle) and the Prepermiano crystalline basement. The basement rock is penetrated by composite plutons at different depths, as well as basic acids. The basement rock is locally overlain by Palaeozoic-Tertiary age sediments (Permo-Cenozoic), partially folded in various phases of the Cretaceous by a thick Plio-Quaternary Sup clastic sequence, forming the depositional wedge-top. In the past this area was used as porphyry rock quarry. Porphyry is a type of volcanic rock belonging to the Atesina porphyry platform, an enormous complex of volcanic rocks in Trentino Alto Adige region. Description of the area In 1930, the road was moved from the valley floor to the north side of the valley, where it lies now, to allow the construction of the artificial basin. Forte Buso Landslide consists of an accumulation of large blocks of porphyric rock, fractured from the joint and fault that has generated these blocks. The landslide area is located close to the top of the slope and has a size of 80x30x15 m (Figure 81). Falls occur periodically in the steepest peripheral portions, with volumes ranging from individual blocks to a few hundred cubic meters of boulder with mixed debris blocks. The movements of these boulders are relatively slow and the velocity vectors have a radial trajectory with a movement of about 1 cm/year. The sliding mass is not morphologically uniform – the bottom is nearly flat, while the central area is rather steep. The volumes involved in the landslide range from minimum values of 150–200 m³ to a maximum of 30–40,000 m³. Expected collapsing events have volumes ranging between 150 m³ and 1,000 m³. Different sets of joint display sizes range from 40 to 50 cm up to 3 to 5 m.


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Figure 81: Overview of the Forte Buso rockfall location with mitigation measures in colours (source: PAT).

Instrumentation and monitoring The first early warning system was made by installing instruments between September and October 1998. It consisted of strain gauges and inclinometers without GPRS transmission, and the data was collected manually. Then, optical tracking, based on 30 optical targets installed on the rocks, was enabled. Records show that all the blocks moved on average about 1 cm/year, while two boulders of 4–5 m width moved 20–25 cm/7–8 years. As a third step, a metal wire gauge was anchored to the landslide body and fixed to the wall on the back. When the stretched cables exceeded a given threshold, a pre-alarm and then an alarm were raised with the relevant people. This system showed limitations due to deformation induced by high temperature (36˚C the summer), which led to false alarms. In winter the weight of snow on the wires generated similar problems. Later on, the cables were connected to traffic lights with two barriers. In addition two distometers were added – one in a state of expansion and one in a state of compression; more accurate results were attained because the thermal expansion proved to be low. Wall inclinometers and three lasers were installed on the landslide crown, linked to specific targets. Continuous measurements were taken every 15 minutes. The system has unfortunately proved to be unreliable due to the short time necessary for rockfall to reach the road (approx. 15 sec).


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Recently, optical monitoring with a GPS station was installed in addition to the laser monitoring. A new protection wall was built along the road, at the toe of the rockslide. It covers almost the whole extent of the rockslide. Along the road, the wall is reinforced by land armies (inclination 32°) and cliffs (slope 65°); the inside of the wall is covered with blocks on a 70° slope. The wall height ranges from 6 to 7 m and its width ranges between a minimum of 7–8 m and a maximum of 14 m. The excavation upstream has an inclination of 40°. During the wall construction, workers were protected by rockfall barriers. Currently, the road is protected by rockfall barriers and the wall. During spring 2012, a large event occurred along the road, which was then closed for several days to remove the material and to stabilise the slide (Figure 82). It partially destroyed the protection wall. This event interrupted a backbone fibre optic line that was under the road and linked Predazzo to S. Martino, causing a lot of problems. Luckily no casualties occurred. After the event, the local government decided to fund the design of a new artificial tunnel that passes under the landslide, in order to permanently solve the problems of rock collapse along the Paneveggio lake.

Figure 82: Rockfall occurred in May 2012. The road was closed for several days (source: PAT).

Province of Belluno Potential hotspots within the test-bed were obtained by field analysis and past events recording. The length of retaining walls built for protecting National Road SS 51 at km 106 and 109, respectively is not enough. Debris flow can deviate from usual path, as for debris flows occurred the 5 July 2006 and the 4 August 2011, and reach the national road SS. 51 after crossing forest roads (walked by tourists) and the cycle route (former Austrian railway) between Calalzo (province of Belluno) and Dobbiaco/Toblach (province of Bolzano/Bozen). Moreover, debris flows at km 108 and 110 can reach the road (5 July 2006).

4.3.2


Brennero/Brenner Because of the complexity of the three hazard hotspots along the Brenner axis, different recommendations are requested. As already mentioned for Salurn/Salorno, the shift of the road to a less dangerous zone will be realised in the near future. On the other hand, because of the narrow valley, for Atzwang/Campodazzo the building of a rockfall protection gallery may be the only efficient solution. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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Rolle Pass (Dolomites) The lesson learned from Forte Buso rockslide is that hotspot analysis and early warning systems can be reasonably applied only in certain contexts when the size of the slide and the proximity to the road are fairly small and can be kept under control. There are cases when building appropriate mitigation measures will save money overall and, sometimes, human lives. Recommendations mainly involve building mitigation measures along those parts of the road were a warning system was too difficult to set up and to maintain. Despite mitigation measures being expensive and unsightly, they can sometimes represent a means of effectively solving the problem. In other cases (limited size of the slide, relatively far from the road), warning systems can be applicable. That is also the case for the Rolle Pass area and the section of the road leading to S. Martino di Castrozza, where avalanches often occur, enforcing the closure of the road. An alternative means for reaching the pass (where a ski resort is located) has been evaluated. It consists of a cable car line connecting S. Martino to Rolle Pass, mainly running inside tunnels to avoid avalanches and rockfall.

Province of Belluno The length of the retaining walls at kms 106 and 109 of SS51 should be enlarged to cover the possible flow path deviation of debris flow during routing. Moreover, an early warning system should be installed for protecting traffic along the stretches of road at kms 108 and 110 against the threat of a debris flow event.

4.4

Posočje & Koroška Bela (Slovenia)

4.4.1


In the Slovenian test beds the following hazard hotspots were defined: 



Two avalanche hazard hotspot (Baška grapa: location Hudajužna): between track stations 38 km + 0 m and 39 km + 500 m (near 41°11’30’’N, 13°55’50’’E) and also between 41 km + 700 m and 42 km + 200 m (near 46°10’10’’N, 13°54’20’’E), avalanche hazard reached the highest values in the whole test bed. Along these two kilometre-long stretches, avalanches are known as a serious threat. A number of avalanches have been reported in the past: o

In the avalanche cadastre, the area is marked as an area of rare events (10–25-year return period) that endangers the railroad

o

The hotspot railroad section is marked as ‘endangered’ in the operational plan for winter traffic safety, used by Slovenian Railways

o

On the avalanche hazard map, the hazard of a substantial part of the hotspot area has been classified as high (Figure 83)

o

On the vulnerability map,, the vulnerability of several parts of the hotspot area has been classified as high

o

On the avalanche risk map, the risk of a substantial part of the hotspot area has been classified as high (Figure 84)

One rockfall hotspot (Baška grapa: location Bača): Between track stations 54 km + 0 m and 54 km + 800 m (near 46°9’0’’N, 13°46’20’’E) rockfall poses a serious threat to the safety of the railroad: o

Rockfall events causing considerable damage have been reported along this track section


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



o

On the rockfall hazard map, the hazard of the whole hotspot area has been classified as high hazard potential (Figure 85):

o

On the rockfall risk map, the risk in the hotspot area has been classified as medium to high (Figure 86)

Two debris flow hotspots: o

Koroška Bela: a majority of the Koroška Bela torrential fan is a debris flow hotspot. Potential debris flow inundates about 125,000 m² of fan area (Figure 87). Debris flow crosses a regional road and the railway in at least one section (crossing of torrent and infrastructure). Since the population is dense (251 houses, 19 apartment blocks, value over 155,000,000 €), the whole fan should be considered a hotspot.

o

Posočje – Soteska valley: position 46°18’35,85’’N, 14°03’44,13’’E is a hotspot, because debris flow reaches the railway as well as the state road (Bled – Bohinj). The hotspot is marked on the preliminary debris flow hazard map (Figure 88).

Two thematic hotspots: o

Koroška Bela, Soteska: No legislation-based methodology for debris flow hazard mapping. There is no regulation as to which scenario to consider in hazard mapping (return period of event unclear) and there is no definition of hazard classes (flow height, flow velocity).

o

Posočje – Baška grapa: poor cooperation on behalf of Slovenian Railways regarding risk management and risk mitigation. Rockfall and avalanche risk management of public railways is mostly run by the state-owned Slovenian Railways, where important decisions are being made. Decision-making is not transparent and there is a lack of cooperation with other institutions. Of course the railroad section within the Slovenian test bed is not the only endangered railroad in Slovenia. Thus the cooperation problem extends throughout the whole Slovenian railway network. Although there have not been any heavy railroad accidences with serious financial damages and/or fatalities as a consequence of natural hazards in past years, improvements in the sense of transparency of hazard and risk management would bring even higher safety to railroad traffic.

The first two hotspots are of local and regional importance. Natural hazards at these hotspots can cause damage to the railway infrastructure, thus interrupting railroad traffic. High dependence of local residents and the local economy on the railway traffic would be the cause of economic as well as social loss (hampered mobility) if interruptions occurred. In addition to local consequences, the closure of the line would affect companies that use this regional line as a reliable transport route throughout the Severno-primorska and Gorenjska regions. If an interruption occurred during the tourist season, it would harm the tourist industry, which is a significant business in the area, with two important tourist sites at Bled and Bohinj, both located along the railroad. The railroad line is also an important transport line for local commuters, since local roads are dangerous, and do not allow highspeed automotive transport due to the mountainous terrain. The line is of substantial importance, since it is used as a second access route to the strategically important Adriatic ports of Koper and Trieste. The last hotspot is of national and even transnational importance, since Slovenian Railways is responsible for hazard management of all national railways, including international lines and the trans-European corridors V and X.


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On the site of the two avalanche hotspots, the following hazard and risk maps were drafted:

Figure 83: Avalanche hazard map of the two avalanche hotspots in the Baška grapa test bed (source: UL).

Figure 84: Avalanche risk map of the two avalanche hotspots in the Baška grapa test bed (source: UL).

Since the evaluated hazard and risk in the area reaches the highest class (marked with a red line), the definition of avalanche hotspots selection was not difficult.


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From the risk map, the priority of the railroad sections can be set, regarding risk management within the hotspot. In high-risk areas mitigation measures are suggested. Construction of state-of-the-art protection structures for some 400 m of the line at high-risk is proposed.

On the site of the rockfall hotspot, the following hazard and risk maps were drafted:

Figure 85: Rockfall hazard map of the rockfall hotspot in the Baška grapa test bed (source UL).

Figure 86: Rockfall risk map of the rockfall hotspot in the Baška grapa test bed (source UL).

In the whole hotspot area, hazard has been evaluated as being high and was also evaluated as being high in most of the risk area. Thus, the area shown in the presented figures (Figure 85 and Figure 86) is an obvious hotspot. From the risk map, the priority of the railroad sections regarding risk management within the hotspot can be set. Construction of state-of-the-art protection structures is proposed for the whole hotspot section, or at least for the length of the railroad line classified as being high-risk (some 550 m).


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Figure 87: Preliminary debris flow hazard map for Soteska valley (hotspot circled) (source: Mikoš et al, 2012).

The preliminary debris flow hazard map for the test bed Soteska valley shows a probability of the occurrence of debris flow. The hotspot consists of a 350 m railway section and state road, where potential debris flow crosses transport infrastructure. This hotspot has local and regional importance. Consequences of railway interruption are described in the upper paragraph. State road interruption means an isolation of Bohinj from other parts of Slovenia when not considering the roads over the mountain passes, which are only suitable for cars, not for buses or heavy traffic. This interruption would have a high impact, especially during the tourist season. Construction of state-of-the-art protection structures is proposed for the whole hotspot section (some 350 m).


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Figure 88: Debris flow hazard map for the Koroška Bela torrential fan (transport infrastructure hotspot circled); the debris flow hazard map was prepared using potential scenarios of debris flow events. High 2 2 hazard (h>1m or v*h>1m /s) is pictured in red, medium hazard (h>0.5m or v*h>0.5m /s) is pictured in 2 orange, and low hazard (h>0.2m or v*h>0.2m /s) in yellow (source: UL).

Since the debris flow inundates 125.000 m² of the fan area (Figure 88), the whole fan can be identified as being a hotspot. Concerning transport infrastructure, we can locate one hotspot where debris flow crosses the railway line and state road. The railway Jesenice – Ljubljana is a part of X. European railway corridor. Over 60 trains pass this hotspot every 24 hours. Interruption of this connection therefore has an international impact. The only available bypass is over Maribor. The local road is heavily frequented. According to traffic count data, over 16,000 vehicles cross this part of the road every day. Interruption of this road would only have a local impact, since all transnational traffic runs along the highway A2 Hrušica – Obrežje. In the hotspot area, construction of state-of-theart protection structures would not sufficiently reduce debris flow hazard. Complete research and measurements are proposed for the whole hotspot (torrential watershed and channel).

4.4.2


Rockfall and avalanche hotspot recommendations (Posočje – Baška grapa test bed) In order to minimise the hazard and risk at all geographical hotspots, several mitigation measures have been examined: 

Administrative changes in form of land-use would not bring desired effects, since the area above the railroad track already acts as a protective shield, which does not satisfactorily tackle the problem. In all hotspot areas, the slopes above the track are forested, but tree density is low due to the rocky surface and high slope angle, which, together with frequent summer storms and substantial game population, cause high erosion of the thin soil layer. All of this contributes to difficult tree and shrub growth conditions. Because of these eventualities, better rockfall and avalanche protection due to land-use is not to be expected.


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

Since higher safety cannot be reached with land-use modifications, protection structure improvement is proposed. The existing protection structures – rigid fences with light meshes – offer some protection against rockfall and avalanche danger, but not enough. In fact, some of the existing structures are in such a bad condition that they do not offer any protection, some even pose an additional threat in case of their collapse (Figure 89). With that in mind, the following is proposed: o

upgrade of existing functioning protection structures

o

replacement of currently non-functioning structures with state-of-the-art protection fences

o

and, most importantly, establishment of an efficient maintenance system of all protection structures

Figure 89: Some of the protection structures have, due to age and neglect, lost their function (source: G. Rak).

Besides structural improvements, better monitoring of the highly endangered rail stretches, especially where rockfall is the main concern, is proposed. Current rail monitoring is executed by the experienced employees of Slovenian Railway, who walk along the track, looking for possible and actual hazardous events. In the short run, higher frequency of such observations of the highly endangered stretches is proposed. In the long run, construction of a rockfall and avalanche detection and warning system would probably bring a higher benefit.

Debris flow hotspot recommendations (Posočje – Soteska valley, Koroška Bela test bed) The main suggestions include: administrative changes in the form of debris flow hazard assessmentrelated legislation in which the methodology is prescribed. Debris flow hazard maps should be prepared and these maps should be considered in the process of spatial planning. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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

Posočje – Soteska valley: Protection structure improvement is proposed. The existing protection structures were neglected in the past and majority of structures are in very poor condition. They only offer protection from events with a short return period. Events with a long return period would not be mitigated by these structures. The following measures are proposed: o

Check-dams

o

Sediment budgets

o

Torrential channel regulation (erosion limitation measures)

Figure 90: Some of the protection structures have, due to age and neglect, lost their function; (source: J. Sodnik).



Koroška Bela

Structural and administrative measures are proposed for the Koroška Bela hotspot. In the Koroška Bela watershed there is an active landslide where an online monitoring system is needed. A landslide might turn into debris flow under unfortunate conditions (heavy rain for longer periods of time). There are no existing protection structures in the Koroška Bela torrent. Complete research and protection measures are proposed: o

Monitoring system with alarm for landslide

o

Sediment budget on the fan apex

o

Torrential channel regulation

o

Local protection measures against debris flow impact on buildings


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5

Guidelines for regional risk governance processes (‘marketing strategy’) for higher acceptance of risk-minimising measures

5.1

Introduction

In recent years, the concept of risk governance has been discussed with regard to natural hazards and climate change, and several projects, for example Social Capacity Building for Natural Hazards (CapHazNet, 2011), have dealt with this topic extensively. In the aforementioned project, it is stated that the concept of risk governance covers the entire process of risk assessment, management and communication by integrating a multitude of stakeholders and views. With regard to PARAmount, risk governance can be seen as the umbrella under which the various actions can be summarised. The guidelines, as proposed in this chapter, are derived from the experiences of the PPs in the respective test beds/countries. In the following, the concept of governance and its significance when dealing with natural hazard risk management will be introduced based on a literature review. Specific actions that correspond to risk governance in PARAmount will be highlighted. This is followed by the PPs who worked in the test beds describing the lessons learnt and delineating a number of guidelines.

Concept of governance, good governance & (regional) risk governance Governance is defined as “[...] the process by which stakeholders articulate their interests, their input is absorbed, decisions are taken and implemented, and decision-makers are held accountable” (Furlong and Bakker, 2008). Governance is the overarching concept of the three terms listed in the heading of this paragraph, summarises the actions, processes, traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised and decisions are taken and implemented. The concept of government, however, encompasses the institutional design and structure that puts governance principles into practice (Plumptre and Graham, 1999; Zeidler, et al., 2011). Good governance is both a method and objective that can build a basis for sustainable outcomes (Furlong and Bakker, 2008). It is defined by the UNPD (1997) as being “*...+ among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law” (UNDP, 1997). The current literature gives an extensive compilation of the major principles of good governance (e.g. Ohl et al., 2007; Furlong and Bakker, 2008; Kaufmann et al., 1999; UNDP, 1997; European Commission, 2001; Edgar et al., 2006; Liou, 2007). The main relevant principles include: 

Participation: The principle of ‘hearing the other side’ emerged into the principle of participation, therefore promoting a two-way communication, which allows all stakeholders to have a say in the decision-making process (OECD, 2002; UNDP, 1997).



Transparency: Sums up the principle of the processes, institutions and information directly accessible to those concerned with them, thus providing enough information for all stakeholders to understand and monitor these processes (OECD, 2002; UNDP, 1997).



Fairness: The principle of fairness implies that the centre of interest lies in the process and the social unity prior to the decision-making process, rather than after it, therefore fairness is also known as “non-outcome fairness” (e.g. Anand 2001).



Rule of Law: The principle of the rule of law states that legal frameworks should be fair and enforced in an impartial way, especially with regard to the laws on human rights (OECD, 2002; UNDP, 1997).


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

Equity: All men and women have equal opportunities to improve or maintain their status of well-being. The Canadian Institute on Governance summarised, the principles of equity and the “rule of law” within “fairness” (OECD, 2002; Edgar et al., 2006).



Accountability: Decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society are accountable to the public and institutional stakeholders (OECD, 2002; UNDP, 1997).



Inclusiveness: Providing for all views to be represented, thus increasing the legitimacy and credibility of a participatory process (Hemmati, 2002).

(Zeidler, et al., 2011)

(Regional) risk governance Risk governance is defined by the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) as: “the application of the principles of good governance to the identification, assessment, management and communication of risk” (IRGC, 2009). Risk governance includes, but also goes beyond, the conventionally recognised concept of integral risk management, which is generally displayed as a cycle of concerted phases (Figure 91).

Figure 91: Cycle of integral risk management and the position of the PARAmount PPs therein (modified after PLANAT, 2012).


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According to Renn (2008), risk governance requires a consideration of the legal, institutional, social and economical contexts in which an evaluation of risk takes place, including the relevant stakeholders who act in this context. This results in different perceptions of risk, which have to be dealt with. Encompassing the combined risk-relevant decisions and actions of both governmental and private actors, risk governance is of particular importance for (but not restricted to) situations where there is no single authority to take a binding risk management decision, but where, instead, the nature of the risk requires cooperation and coordination between a range of different stakeholders. Risk governance, however, not only includes a multifaceted, multi-actor risk process, but also calls for the consideration of contextual factors, such as institutional arrangements (e.g. the regulatory and legal framework that determines the relationship, roles and responsibilities of the actors, and coordination mechanisms such as markets, incentives and self-imposed norms) and political culture, including different perceptions of risk (Zeidler, et al., 2011).

Structure of the contributions to the guidelines in PARAmount The regional risk governance process guidelines for higher acceptance of risk-minimising measures are derived from the work within the test beds in PARAmount. The involved PARAmount PPs can generally be split in two groups: i) institutions directly involved in regional and local decision-making (e.g. civil protection and regional environmental agencies, as well as provincial authorities); ii) institutions either not directly connected to the regional level decision processes, but dealing with natural hazard management on an broader administrative or research-oriented level (e.g. federal authorities, research institutions), or institutions directly involved in natural hazard management and decision-making, but coordinated on a national level and involved in all stages of the cycle (e.g. infrastructure providers). Being the basis of risk governance, the presented guidelines are categorised here in accordance with the above-mentioned groups, as well as the involvement of the PPs with respect to the stages in the risk management cycle (Figure 91).

5.2

Institutions directly involved in regional and local decision-making

5.2.1

Prevention

PAB Several departments are involved in risk management in the province of Bolzano. The procedure is shown here from the view-point of the geological service, who mainly deal with rockfall hazard. However, the procedure applied to other phenomena (avalanches, debris flow…) is quite similar. The province of Bolzano mainly has to resolve problems of protecting the common good, which means (with respect to project PARAmount), to secure linear infrastructure (in our case mainly roads) against rockfall. Obviously this should be conducted with a minimum monetary effort. Therefore, the Road Service has established two main working groups: the first one mainly deals with urgent work for maintenance, so they re-build existing mitigation measures. Moreover, they are allowed to request and establish new projects for mitigation measures if they are needed. The total of the investment may not exceed a certain limit. The second working group, known as Department of Infrastructure, deals with all new and larger-scale investments, such as tunnels and galleries. A lot of experience has been gathered during years of emergency service. Both working groups have to respect the priority list of intervention, and the first group also has to adhere to the priority list of maintenance. The intervention list is based on a detailed procedure to classify rockfall hazard: first, road sections with recorded rockfall events are individually checked. Then we apply the Swiss BUWAL method, which works with a certain slope inclination. In a nutshell, BUWAL automatically calculates areas steeper than a certain limit (33°) where rockfall can occur. The intersection of the BUWAL areas with the road network are investigated in a quick analysis and fed into the VISO database. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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The VISO tool offers the surveyor a way to quickly detect the hazard (H, H*) that characterises a slope adjacent to the stretch of a road under consideration. At the same time, it allows the implementation of a computerised land register for protection systems. In the quick analysis, the intensity of the phenomenon SEI (Slope Event Intensity) is evaluated on the basis of several easily assessable parameters (e.g. slope inclination, vegetation). Numerical coefficients are attributed to each of the above-mentioned measures, and added up to detect the intensity of the SEI. This defined intensity is then combined with the frequency of events, known as return period, which includes all rockfall events on roads during the last 12 years on a road section of 500 m. Then the characteristics of the protection systems are implemented in the hazard calculation. The survey implies the definition of its state of maintenance, its usefulness, and its positioning when compared to the intensity and the geometry of the phenomenon that can develop on its slope. It is carried out quite quickly and cannot discount the values previously defined for the intensity of the phenomenon. Finally, the hazard of a road section is defined as a link between all these parameters.

Figure 92: Risk matrix (source: hazard mapping guidelines – Autonomous Province of Bolzano).

After defining the hazard level, another parameter becomes increasingly important to create the priority list of intervention: risk (risk = hazard x vulnerability x exposition). In order to estimate the vulnerability of road sections, the traffic flow (number of vehicles per hour) and the importance of the hubs, which the road is connecting, are considered. This means the damage that will arise if a road has to be closed will be estimated. Obviously the vulnerability of roads connecting huge economic centres will be higher than a provincial road connecting two small villages. Another important item is the number and state of deviations. The term ‘cut-link’ relates to roads without any possible deviations – therefore this road is more vulnerable. At the same time, the exposition more or less includes the possible costs that can arise. Here we have to distinguish between direct and indirect costs/damage. While the direct material costs (e.g. damage to the road, asphalt) are relatively small, the loss of life creates much higher costs. Also, the indirect costs are usually much higher, with the added difficulty of their monetary assessment. After the definition of risk, the priority list of intervention can be carried out. It is renewed every year and can be used by experts as well as politicians. This list features the road section risk in descending order. The Road Service and Department of Infrastructure use the available funds in order to mitigate the highest risk level. Usually the list has a high political acceptance, because it allows justification of investments. Obviously a decision can always be changed in order to account for a new situation, i. e. if the Tour de France is going to pass a road, the risk level will be temporarily higher. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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As mentioned above, a priority list of maintenance can be established. The ordinary work is done by the local Road Service, while extraordinary maintenance has to be carried out by a special company. Maintenance work is becoming more and more important, because the existing mitigation measures have to be in working order. On the prevention side, a law was published in 2006 (DGP 2759 + annex) which regulates how hazard has to be analysed and mapped. The aim is to prevent hazardous situations where people, infrastructure and economy could be endangered. Different types of processes are studied and analysed by the designated structure of the province; then all these studies are merged to produce a single hazard map for the province. These studies are currently under development. Vulnerability criteria have been defined in the PGUAP (Piano Generale Utilizzo Acque Pubbliche = General Plan for Use of Public Water); this could be used to translate hazard maps into risk maps. However, this is still a matter of discussion.

PAT The above mentioned law published in 2006 (DGP 2759 + annex), is also valid for the province of Trento and has similar implications here.

5.2.2

Preparation

ARPAV ARPAV is part of the CFD (Departmental Functional Centre), the regional organisation aiming to assess and manage hydraulic and hydrogeological risk. The main goals of CFD are the meteorological, hydrogeological and hydraulic forecasting and monitoring of an event, as well as supporting the emergency management. The regional department of civil protection and the regional direction on soil defence are also involved in the CFD. The alerts, as required by Italian law, are managed in two steps. The first step is related to the forecasting the expected meteorological, hydrological, hydraulic and snowpack conditions and the evaluation of possible effects on the integrity of life, property and environment. The second step is related to the real-time monitoring of events and the observation of effects in terms of rising hydrometric levels, landslides and avalanches. ARPAV aims to improve the knowledge of forecasting and monitoring steps, in particular through the study and definition of trigger thresholds of rainfall intensity for debris flow and development of HEWS, within the activities of PARAmount. The definition of thresholds of rainfall intensity as a trigger for debris flow could be used by CFD to improve the procedures for setting levels of expected risk and for the design of HEWS. The experience of HEWS and in particular the testing of new kinds of sensors for real-time detection of debris flow, will be important for the improvement of existing systems and for the development of new systems. All the results produced in PARAmount will be submitted to interested observers, in particular the municipality of Livinallongo del Col di Lana and Veneto Strade (Regional Road Authority). This decision is important, because many of the used thresholds have not been tested on a regional scale, but were obtained from literature reviews. We have started the analysis of rainfall data obtained by a rain gauge installed in the Rio Chiesa test bed and have finished the design of HEWS. At the end of the tender, we will proceed with the implementation of HEWS. For the design of HEWS, we started from the analysis of the existing system in regional and transnational context. In particular, a thorough literature review was performed with the aim to analyse the critical points of existing systems and to identify the innovative sensors and methodologies that can be applied to the Rio Chiesa test bed. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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The study of rainfall that triggers debris flow will lead to the definition of rainfall thresholds, which are more suitable for the local context. Experience related to the design and management of HEWS will bring useful knowledge to improve the safety of roads, property and peoples. The development of more accurate and reliable monitoring systems, as well as increasing the security, will lead to a reduction in false alarms by helping to improve living conditions in mountainous areas.

ARPAP ARPAP manages the regional HEWS for all the natural hazards induced by intense rainfall (floods, landslides, debris flow), by a trigger threshold system. ARPAP contributes to the risk mitigation by characterising the causes. We can forecast and issue a warning about where and when dangerous phenomena can hit sensitive targets. The Regional Law n. 28/2002 assigns the regional planning, actuation, and management of the monitoring network, as well as the responsibility of relative warning and pre-warning systems, to the regional Centro Funzionale to ARPAP. The Centro Funzionale of Piemonte, operational since 1996, has been responsible for the surveillance of the regional territory. The Centro Funzionale guarantees the 24/7-presence of specialised experts, assigned to functional groups that are capable of supporting the interpretation of the monitoring and forecast data and communicating it to stakeholders. The administration of the Piemonte Region has acknowledged the operational guidelines of the Prime Minister’s Directive, dated 27 February 2004, with its own guidelines that establish the procedures and the warning methods of the system on various regional, provincial, and municipal levels, as called for by Legislative Decree n. 112/1998 and Regional Law n. 7/2003. ARPAP is responsible for issuing regional early warnings by meteorological, hydrological, hydraulic and snow/avalanches bulletins. The effect of regional warnings is to activate all the civil protection agencies of affected area in order to actuate emergency plans. Information derived from ARPAP bulletins concerning expected scenarios are taken into account by stakeholders for decisions in natural hazards management. There is not a fully shared methodology between institutions at a national and international level, due to different approaches based on local/national experiences or accounted for by different scientific backgrounds. ARPAP’s early warning bulletins are derived from state-of-art modelling and now-casting, integrating information derived from weather forecasts, conceptual and empirical models and monitoring data. Forecasted scenarios are evaluated by an expert. ARPAP developed an innovative approach of hazard assessment for debris flow in order to validate and classify the Alpine basins and related processes (geological model) based on main catchment lithology, including the expected torrential process type for a specific basin (flash flood, debris flood or debris flow), based on geomorphological and morphometric considerations. Each basin class is characterised by a specific triggering threshold value, linked to the hourly intensity of rainstorms. On the basis of this new geological model, HEWS based on the radar stormtracking technique was developed. Moreover, the geological model was used for a CA routing model calibration applied in test bed area. As a result, very accurate simulations of debris flow routing and deposition were completed. The final outputs of this integrated methodology consist in producing digital maps showing the 3D evolution (from the propagation to the deposition along the main channel and the alluvial fan) of the sediments mobilised by a debris flow in a specific basin class. Therefore, hazard/risk scenarios calibrated on the basin type (basin class), interacting with subjects of protection (railways and roads), were tested and verified. Using these new tools, it is possible to forecast and pre-announce the occurrence of a torrential phenomenon for a given basin and it is possible to forecast the affected area of the alluvial fan.


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5.2.3

Intervention

PAB If a real and immediate threat occurs, the adherence to the priority list of interventions is not obligatory any more. The emergency service is provided by the geology department and civil protection agency, which works 24 hours a day all year round. In emergencies, the decision for an action has to be made immediately, following a local inspection of the endangered road section by the technicians/experts. In this case the decision will be taken according to the hazard, not the risk.

PAT The emergency context is regulated by a structured procedure published in May 2005. In essence, this procedure coordinates and organises activities between the Civil Protection Agency, decisionmakers and technicians. The main aims are: 1) to continuously check the hazard level connected to several natural hazards, 2) to guarantee the flux of information among interested actors, 3) to time action well, 4) to safeguard autonomy with respect to the national Civil Protection Agency. The system is based on three phases: forecasting, evaluation and warning. The meteorological service is directly responsible for the forecasting phase; its duty consists of weather forecasting and notifying a list of persons and province institutions (such as the fire brigades), whenever an intense event is forecasted. In case of an event, an expert is sent to the site with the aim of evaluating the event and notifying the designated persons. Then a warning is issued with a level of intensity (low, medium, high).

5.3

Institutions dealing with natural hazards on a broader administrative or research-oriented level & infrastructure providers

5.3.1

BMLFUW/ÖBB/BFW

Guideline framework The core of the guidelines for regional risk governance in the test bed Stanzer Valley is the activities of the Austrian PPs in the context of the RRD. The RRD was preceded by research into the current state of natural hazard management in the test bed (Pechlaner at al., 2011). Based on the results from this assessment, the RRD was set up according to the concept of good governance as outlined in the introduction. The RRD brought the Austrian PPs and a wide range of project-external beneficiaries together; amongst these were key decision-makers, road and rail engineers and natural hazard experts from institutions dealing with the operation and maintenance of the critical infrastructure in the Stanzer Valley, as well as relief units. Furthermore, stakeholders representing institutions heavily relying on the availability of critical infrastructure (e.g. tourism board, chamber of commerce) were also represented. All levels of government (national, provincial, district and municipal) were represented in the RRD, setting the stage for an improvement of inter- and cross-sector risk communication. In the risk management context, the RRD is situated in the prevention/preparation stage of the risk cycle. As described by Höppner et al. (2012), risk communication and thus the RRD forms an intricate part of this stage of integral risk management by raising awareness, building trust and involving stakeholders in decision making.


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RRD Stanzer Valley – results and conclusions The interviews conducted in the Stanzer Valley previous to the RRD (WP4) show a considerable diversity of requirements and perceptions of natural hazards in general and in particular regarding their management (Pechlaner et al. 2011). The results highlight the conflicts, challenges and ambiguities the stakeholders face on this study site (see deliverable Act 4.1). During the RRD, the participants stated that the cooperation between the district and municipal authorities, as well as the road management and operation, was well developed. A high level of cooperation was testified, at the centre of which stands a general meeting before the start of every winter (winter service review), which involves all road transport operators and authorities. One of the key issues raised by the participants of the RRD I in the Stanzer Valley and therefore a major aspect in these guidelines, was the need of increased cooperation on a regional level between the district authority, fire brigades/municipal avalanche commissions and road operators on the one hand, and the ÖBB as rail operators on the other. The main issues raised by the participants included: 

Timing and justification of road/rail closures



Contact persons at the ÖBB in crisis situations (due to company-internal restructuring, former lists of contacts were partly out-of-date)



Exchange of meteorological data from weather stations in the area, thus improving the reliability of avalanche forecasts

As representatives from all involved parties were present in the RRD II, first steps to resolve these issues could be undertaken. In general, the RRD brought to light the large interest of the involved stakeholders in a long-term fostering and intensification of risk communication and cooperation. The main strategic results and benefits from the RRD workshops held in the test bed Stanzer Valley include: 

The RRD has proven to be an effective communication platform for natural hazard management and risk communication within the test bed



The RRD reflects and strengthens the importance of a participatory approach (bridging the gap between science and practice)



The RRD workshops were rated by the project-external stakeholders and project partners as one of key benefits from project PARAmount

Specific results on an operational level include: 

Clear definition of the responsible contact persons at the ÖBB



The head of district authority (Bezirkshauptmann) has invited the ÖBB to join the winter service review in the coming year in order to set concrete steps to improve risk communication in the region



Some of the mayors in the test bed stated at the RRD II that since the first RRD workshop, communication and cooperation between the municipal and ÖBB avalanche commissions has been significantly improved. This was particularly important, as a high degree of avalanche danger and a closure of both critical road and rail connections for several days occurred in the winter of 2011/2012 in the test bed



Cooperation was planned between the ASFiNAG (expressway operation and maintenance) and the ÖBB regarding the exchange of meteorological data


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Guidelines and lessons learned The RRD is intended as a means of building a cross-sector work group in the region, which will encourage and foster risk communication and awareness, as well as promoting the concept of risk governance, ideally beyond the duration of the project. PARAmount may therefore provide a longterm benefit to not only the decision-makers, but also the broader public in the test bed Stanzer Valley, providing an improved and extended knowledge base for the decision-makers involved in natural hazard and risk management. The RRD therefore serves as a starting point for a more sustainable, long-lasting interdisciplinary communication, cooperation and coordination platform in regional natural hazard management and risk communication. The main lessons learned within project PARAmount and thus the core of the presented guidelines, include: 

Endorsement of the importance of cooperation on a regional level between road and rail decision-makers (encouraging regional focus of rail company)



Enhancement of communication between avalanche commissions (road – rail) in order to improve effectiveness of hazard early warning and temporal measures



Advances in disaster and natural hazard management with regard to establishing more direct lines of communication



Envisaged data exchange via a common weather station network and bilateral road – rail meetings including district and municipal decision-makers



Direct feedback from regional stakeholders and their participation is vital



Importance of participatory approach, to bridge the gap between science and practice



Risk communication with local stakeholders important to improve acceptance of mitigation measures (permanent or temporary)



Contribution to natural hazard management on a strategic level within PARAmount

The results of the RRD have additionally been presented in Adams (2012b, 2012c, and 2012d and Adams et al. (2010) as well as the Decision Support Guidelines of WP7.

5.3.2

PUH/UL

Slovenian partners PUH and UL cooperated with Slovenian Railways (with status of an observer in the project) with the intention of preparing expert and practically oriented recommendations that will contribute to higher safety and efficiency in the Slovenian rail transport, especially in the areas of development, modernisation and infrastructure management regarding protection against natural hazards. Bohinj Railroad (Jesenice – Gorica – Kreplje – Trst) was chosen for analysis on regional level. More detailed surveys were executed in the most problematic 20 km-section between Podbrdo and Most na Soči in a very narrow valley with extremely steep slopes above and below the railway. Although the Bohinj railroad is classified only as a regional track, it is still an important transport route with some 350,000 passengers per year (mostly daily commuters to job or school) and around 400,000 t cargo per year. Therefore, decisions regarding the level of safety are regionally important issues. Natural disasters, which are a consequence of geological, geographical, societal and other phenomena, represent a constant threat to the safety of the Slovenian railway infrastructure. Due to climate change, extreme weather conditions are becoming increasingly frequent and more intense. Since climate conditions trigger many hazardous events (rockfall, avalanches, debris flow…), the hazard levels of vulnerable infrastructure increase.


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Protection against natural and other disasters is a uniform and comprehensive sub-system of the state’s national security. The system is based on: 

The responsibility of state authorities and municipalities for the prevention and elimination of danger and timely response when disasters occur



The obligation of companies (e.g. Slovenian Railway), institutions and other organisations to implement emergency measures for protection, rescue and relief



The responsibility of inhabitants for their own safety and the safety of their property

The principal effort for the protection against natural and other disasters is the implementation of preventive measures. Preventive measures are all measures through which the occurrence of disasters is reduced, or measures through which the adverse impacts of disasters are reduced. Preventive measures are essential for reducing the possibility of disaster occurrence and for the reduction of damage potential. Prevention and operational notification and warning of risks posed by natural and other disasters are prepared by National Notification Centre in cooperation with the Environmental Agency of the Republic of Slovenia. In particular, it handles warnings with regard to extensive rain and floods, extensive snow fall, snow avalanches, strong winds, sleet, high tides, thunderstorms with hail and announcement of risk of fire in the natural environment. These warnings are also accessible on the web addresses: www.sos112.si and www.arso.gov.si/vode/opozorila. Influence of such warnings on railway transport is very limited. Trains are usually stopped only when something (a hazardous event) has already happened. An important improvement in the field of the reduction of flood risks in Slovenia was contributed by means of the ‘European Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks’ which, instead of ensuring a certain degree of flood safety, introduces a principle of risk management. The provisions of the directive were transposed to national law by adoption of amendments to The Water Act and new implementing regulations: ‘The Decree on establishment of flood-risk management plans (Official Gazette RS, No. 7/2010)’ and ‘The Decree on conditions and limitations for construction and activities in flood-risk areas (OG RS, No. 89/2008)’, which together with the ‘Rules on methodology to define flood-risk areas and erosion areas connected to floods and connections of classification of plots into risk classes (Official Gazette RS, No. 60/2007)’, forms a legal framework to prevent the introduction of new damage potential in an area of flood risk. The principle prevalent in these official documents was used when deciding how to establishing a specific methodology for hazard and risk assessment of railway infrastructure regarding rockfall, avalanche and debris flow hazard within the PARAmount project. Regarding general protection concepts against rockfall and snow avalanches investigated in the project, a considerable difference between road and railway infrastructure exists. In protection of roads against, for example. rockfall in last 15–20 years, modern flexible and certificated rockfall protection barriers dominate, while throughout whole Slovenian railway network, such barriers are present only on one location. Along the railway lines, rigid catching wooden fences and simple light rigid mesh-fences are predominant (Figure 93). Many of these measures partially or completely lose their efficiency and functionality after an occurred impact or due to lack of maintenance work.


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Figure 93: Very old typical wooden rigid structure (source: J. Papež).

On the most endangered 14 section, an early warning system called EAN which is 11,654 m long is installed (Figure 2). Plans for construction of additional 10,540 m of EAN exist.

Figure 94: System for early warning and alerting called EAN or NOJP (source: J. Papež).

The main challenges of the project were: evaluation of the efficiency of existing protection structures and early warning systems and proposal of a decision for updating the risk management concepts. Preparedness against disaster is also reflected in the emergency response plans (State's Contingency Plan for Railroad Accidents). An emergency response plan is a detailed plan for protection, rescue and relief in the event of natural and other disaster. On railroads such a plan mainly covers residual risk. In order to mitigate this risk, the right decisions have to be made about the dimension of ‘design rock’ (Energy Absorbing Capacity), about the design and installation of protection systems (systems have to be anchored and installed according to the product manual and instructions of the producer of the protection system), about the safety of Dynamic Rockfall Barriers (quality, reliability, durability …), which is in turn also depended on adequate execution of controlling and maintenance. Several complementary methods and tools were checked to help decision-making (decision management) in the context of natural risk assessment. The GIS information system gives a good overview (spatial data bases include past events, protection works and hazard/risk maps) and could considerably help by answering some questions: which section of the infrastructure should we protect first and where/when should we first work on maintenance of the existing protection systems. This follows the economic approach (cost/benefit), which is very important because of constant lack of funds for prevention measures. Decisions in the field of protection against natural hazards are definitely based on a multi-criteria approach – even if it does not seem transparent. There is a set of possible solutions/alternatives and a set of criteria, which have to be taken into consideration. So, after sorting and ranking a decision has to be made. Besides economical and safety aspects, PARAmount proposes that durability and maintenance are to be considered.


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A complete protection against natural disasters does not exist. There is always some residual risk which has to be accepted by the society and the individual. This is why notifying, awareness raising and educating the public regarding the existing danger and the possibilities for self-protection are so very important. The specific conditions of railway transport demand special handling with residual risk. This goes for the endangered sections without installed protection as for those railroad sections where protective objects and protective regulations already exist. In the Koroška Bela test bed there are three vulnerable sections: regional road, international railway and settlements. On the bottom of the fan, 1 km of both road and railway are exposed. Road sections have regional importance because of great amounts of daily traffic. An alternative is the motorway with vignette system. The railway has national importance, because it is the connection between Ljubljana and Villach (and also Germany). In this section, some debris-flow related research was carried out in the past, but a final hazard map was not prepared. With our research we have defined hotspots where potential debris flow would cross the transport infrastructure. The transport authorities must prepare scenarios for the case of closed roads and railway lines. There are options of measures for bridge reconstruction, but they are not very likely to be accepted. Debris flow hazard assessment has no legislation background in Slovenia. Most of the research carried out in the past (before the PARAmount project) was ‘case study’-type research. It all started in 2000 with debris flow in the village Log pod Mangartom. From that moment debris flow events started to find their place in the ‘dictionary’ of natural hazards. That disaster was the trigger for a number of case study research projects. The main idea is to develop approaches for hazard assessment combining existing methods and tools. We have to collect the existing data, provide all the input parameters for the model, check and possibly improve the data and use it. We developed algorithms for DEM improvement which resulted in decreased computational times of the model and more precise hazard maps. The results should be compared to other methods and validated. A new hazard map is important for two reasons. Firstly, because authorities can prepare scenarios in case of a natural disaster (road, railway, settlement, industry); secondly, because this debris flow hazard map is the first, and there is a lot of potential to use the same methodology in other test beds and critical areas. With PARAmount, we have developed new approaches for debris flow hazard assessment. We improved existing methods with more precise input data and developed methods for more accurate hazard mapping. All the methods have an upgrade potential and are options for use on a national level. Results of the research will help the authorities when deciding on protective measures and preparing decision support systems.

5.3.3

IRSTEA

IRSTEA has not directly contributed to effective decision-making in relation to infrastructure managers and community mayors, but has proposed a series of tools and methods in order to improve existing methodologies for decision-support system design and implementation. The sections below also express what we understood to be the context and nature of decisions transport infrastructures managers have to make.


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Public or private bodies in charge of transport infrastructure management have to face several kinds of problems related to risks (either risk for people, risk of disruption or risk of damage to the infrastructure itself). Traffic jams can be considered as belonging to that type, but also car crashes, not to mention well-known catastrophic events, e.g. the fire in the Mont-Blanc tunnel in 1999 (strategic axis between France and Italy; remained closed for a period of three years) and the fire in the Fréjus tunnel in 2005 (strategic axis between France and Italy; remained closed for a period of two months). Natural hazards can only be considered as one component of the risk to transport infrastructure and decision is always taken within a global context, where not only the risk is taken into account, but also financial aspects (limiting the possibilities of intervention). As explained in Chapter 1.3.1, transport infrastructure managers do not have a well-identified position in the risk management organisation. Of course, they care about the safety of the infrastructure under their management, but in absence of a dedicated legal framework, they have to cooperate with local authorities: the mayor at the municipal level and the préfet (in practice, ministries local departments placed under the responsibility of the préfet) at the county level. The national/regional/local dimension of transport infrastructure management can be described as follows: 

The railway network falls under the responsibility of RFF, which operates at the national level



Apart from a few exceptions, motorways are under the responsibility of private companies, which operate at regional level (regional here does not necessarily indicate coherence with administrative regions)



Most of the road network is now under the responsibility of county councils, which operate strictly within their own county territory



Minor local roads are under the responsibility of municipalities



A few sections of roads and motorways are still under the responsibility of the national state. In these cases they are operated by the local departments of the national ministries at county level

The main decisions to be taken regarding transport infrastructure concern prevention on the one hand and crisis management on the other. Concerning prevention, the first point concerns the identification of locations, where an impact is likely to occur, and to define priorities of intervention. However, it appears that, in practice, it is almost exclusively the locations where previous events occurred that are clearly identified by transport infrastructures managers. The second point regarding prevention, concerns protection structures (either existing or planned). Knowledge of the reliability of existing protection structures is required and the decision concerns the work for maintaining or installing new structures. One should also notice that protection structures are mostly present or have to be installed in areas that are not part of the remit of the transport infrastructure manager. These areas might belong to private bodies, municipalities or to the state (sometimes to two or even three of them). Regarding crisis management, the main decisions concerning the closure of the road or railway, when critical (e.g. meteorological) conditions are identified, include removing the snow or mud after a structure has been impacted (conditions of safety of the intervention), and re-opening the structure once the conditions are considered as safe enough (this point is particularly sensitive, especially due to responsibility issues).


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The decision is important a) because of the safety of the people who use the transport infrastructure – in case of casualties, the responsibility of the transport infrastructure manager can be sought by the justice department and legal prosecution can ensue; b) because of the potential damage to the structure itself or simply because the structure has to be cleaned up and the disruption has a direct cost implication for the infrastructure manager. Both of these points have a direct financial impact. Transport infrastructure managers are very sensitive to both of these points, but seem less aware of the economical impact of the disruption at regional level. The PPR procedure is dedicated to the protection of urbanised areas and no specific procedure has been defined so far for roads and railways. Transport infrastructure is under the responsibility of a large number of public bodies, which all have their own internal organisation and procedures. For instance, some of them have databases on past events or existing protection structures (for example regarding efficiency and reliability), while others do not. Some of them have developed simple decision-support systems, others have not and not much information is shared from one organisation to another. When decisions related to natural hazards have to be made, the infrastructure managers quite often interact with external experts, but this seems to greatly vary from one department to another. A few bodies have their own risk expert. This initial state can be summarised by mentioning that no unified methodology exists and that people are rarely aware of the methods and tools developed and used by other people who have to deal with the same problems in other Alpine counties or areas. The methodology we have proposed is described in the respective sections of this handbook. It consists of the following: 

Description of decision-making processes in the context of natural hazards and requirements for decision-aiding method design and implementation



Mainly tools and methods for identifying hazards on a regional scale, in order to obtain an exhaustive knowledge and to establish priorities



Methods to assess the vulnerability of transport networks on a regional scale



Methods to evaluate the effectiveness of protection works and strategies based on scenarios – description and dependability (including reliability) analysis



A series of innovative tools and methods to assess the risk on transport infrastructure on a local scale, taking imperfection of the available information into account. A complete and versatile framework has been proposed. It is based on the use of advanced multi-criteria decision making methods, numerical modelling uncertainty analysis, network structural properties analysis and dependability (reliability) analysis. Details on these developments can be found in the specific brochure of the project related to Decision Support Systems development.



Methods with a strong scientific basis are to be used to design decision support systems in relation to the infrastructure managers in order to define criteria of decision and information quality levels, depending on the kind of decision to be made and its context

The main result is a complete set of methodologies and tools to assess risks on roads, which can be compared to existing PPR methodologies, applicable to transport networks and not only to urbanised areas (contrarily to PPR). This set of methods and tools can be applied to any Alpine region. It has notably generated hazard and risk maps for the French test beds. Some transfer has been carried out to other partners of the project and transfer to transport infrastructure operators is now planned. The objective will be to homogenise the procedures and methods so that the highest-standard tools are used in practice.


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5.4

Transnational summary of guidelines

The test bed PPs selected specific actions dealing with topics most important in the region and in their field of expertise. Consequently, a quantitative evaluation of the outcomes on a transnational level was not feasible. Thus, in the following, the main aspects of the work in the test beds are only summarised on a transnational level, and not evaluated. The results in PARAmount with regard to the prevention phase in the risk management cycle showed that one important request was to clearly define indicators in order to determine the vulnerability, enabling the translation of hazard into risk maps. Nowadays, risk maps are considered a valuable addition to traditional risk management tools. This will contribute to a higher transparency in decision processes as the decisions will become more comprehensible to relevant stakeholders. In addition, clear responsibilities contribute to the good-governance principle of accountability. In the preparation phase, the main aim is to provide more accurate tools for forecasting and monitoring events. The request is to further develop more reliable instruments based on more thorough scientific process analysis. The definition of clear threshold values and improved real-time detection should enable local decision-makers to deliver an improved response to dangerous situations. The instruments will reduce false alarms and subsequently trust in the decisions will widely increase. In addition, emergency management should be supported more efficiently. Above all, well-coordinated cooperation of stakeholders on different levels of governance and from all relevant sectors is key in future risk management procedures. This requires a harmonisation of knowledge and communication, because local experiences may not tally with decisions made on a higher level of government. The most important aspects for a successful handling of risk in the intervention phase are clear responsibilities and a structured emergency plan. The activities of different stakeholders should be coordinated and organised and a well-developed communication platform should be in place. The good governance principles to be followed are transparency, accountability and good communication. In PARAmount, some of the work in the test beds cannot be attributed to one specific phase in the risk management cycle, but the results have to be evaluated on an all-encompassing level. This reflects the idea of risk governance, where risk communication is seen as a central part, leading to the various steps to be taken. This is especially important on a higher than local level. The acceptance of mitigation measures can be fostered in all phases of the risk management cycle and by improving the single steps, the acceptance will increase. As in PARAmount the majority of PPs are natural hazard experts, the development of tools was a main focus. The regional level of risk governance has particular relevance to PARAmount, as the RRD are defined as central to a transport-focused cross-sector network, which was established throughout the entire Alpine Space. The communication and cooperation between the various infrastructure-relevant stakeholders was set up and coordinated by the respective PARAmount PPs on a regional level with the aim of creating a cross-sector network of infrastructure stakeholders. Therefore, the concept of risk governance is an inherently central topic in project PARAmount and in particular in the RRD. Good governance therefore builds on a selected set of principles. There were taken into particular account in PARAmount with regard to the RRD as a framework for stakeholder involvement in the project, as well as a means for disseminating and evaluating the project results. The RRD is applicable to every phase, except the intervention phase. However, in the case of an event, communication will be more effective, as in the RRD the responsibilities are clearly defined. The main good governance principle is participation, which contributes to transparency, fairness, accountability and inclusiveness. One major challenge is to assign the responsibility for the organisation to one stakeholder or organisation.


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6

Proposal for regional action plans with high (political) acceptance

Introduction Within the frame of project PARAmount, proposals for regional action plans were drafted, based on the results of the development and implementation of the tools/methods/procedures (as outlined in Chapter 2), as well as the analysis of their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, as detailed in Chapter 3. These tools were also the basis of the delineation of hotspots and the corresponding recommendations, as summed up in Chapter 4. The drafted proposals for action plans can therefore be thematically split into the following key questions: 

Which actions are proposed for improving monitoring/surveying? A substantial part of PARAmount was dedicated to the development of monitoring and forecasting tools, including systems based on in-situ data (e.g. extensometer measurements, monitoring stations in debris flow catchments) or remote sensing measurements (e.g. RADAR storm-tracking system); systems combining past event cadastres and current (meteorological) data (software tools), as well as systems based on procedures for prewarning and emergency. This key question therefore summarises the proposed action plans derived from the experiences of the PPs with respect to the topic of hazard early warning.



Which actions are proposed for improving the assessment of risks/hazards? In PARAmount, a wide range of tools, methods and procedures was developed in and applied to the test beds. These proposed action plans give concrete feedback and proposals on how these approaches can be further improved or implemented in other regions.



Which actions are proposed for improving tools/methods/procedures with regard to hazard & risk?

the

capitalisation

of

the

Project PARAmount put a focus on the methodological development of risk and hazard tools. Due to the extensive collaboration between the PPs at European level within the project, the capitalisation and implementation was begun on several levels and will be continued on a national level in collaboration with the project’s stakeholders This key question and the corresponding action plans therefore focus on how this set of tools can be capitalised, i.e. displaying the added value and long-term effect of PARAmount beyond the duration of the project. 

What are the main future challenges in the test beds? The main future challenges facing the test beds on a more general level and the associated proposed action plans are detailed in this key question. They include regional cross-sector communication and cooperation between the infrastructure relevant stakeholders; issues regarding the potential impact of climate change and communication; and acceptance criteria for residual risk.


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6.1

Which actions are proposed for improving monitoring/surveying?

6.1.1

BMLFUW/ÖBB/BFW

The crux for better monitoring and surveying of natural hazards and the subsequent improvement of decision and forecasting tools is seen in the improved collaboration of a multitude of stakeholders on all levels of governance, and especially in the sharing of data within a predefined region. The knowledge of the occurrence of natural hazard processes (frequency and magnitude) is most important for risk management, but until now only few datasets have been available which allow a thorough analysis. In addition, datasets are owned by the specific person in charge at the respective stakeholder offices (e.g. railway operators, road operators, ski areas, municipalities), which have a different focus. Therefore, the structure and content of the datasets do not match up. Consequently, one of the main actions proposed is to develop a harmonised shared dataset that can be used for regional forecasting. In addition, new monitoring sites (e.g. debris flow detection, weather stations) should be shared by all stakeholders. Instead of only monitoring hotspots, it would be of advantage to cover the entire potentially endangered area along the critical infrastructure lines.

6.1.2

PAB

The decision-support methodology used by the province of Bolzano seems to work quiet well. The collaboration of various institutions, and above all between technical experts and decision-makers, is obviously a big step in the right direction. In future it will be increasingly important to strengthen the relations between all involved parties, so that everyone can give the highest input. The effort to connect these two groups – experts and decision-makers – was not always as strong as today. In fact, the long experience of technicians working in the emergency service of natural hazards resulted in the need of a methodical procedure to ensure the correct distribution of available funds. Obviously the first idea came from the experts’ side, but without the acceptance of the decisionmakers, every effort would have been be to no avail! For all these reasons, the VISO project as a cadastre of rockfall mitigation measures was developed. During the course of PARAmount we took the opportunity to update the system, which had so far worked on the hazard level. We found a regional system to calculate risk, even though the procedure is not yet finalised. Nevertheless, the result of PARAmount should also include the risk calculation for the whole provincial road network. In this regard it was absolutely necessary to look into all the literature established in other countries.

Civil protection Data use

Civil engineering Data use

VISO

Road service Data use

Data input

Geological service Figure 95: Schematic working procedure of the VISO database (source: PAB).


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Unfortunately, the VISO database only started to collect data in 2006, so that the database is not complete yet. All newly installed mitigation measures were recorded, as well as the already existing measures of the national and partly of the provincial roads, but there is still a lot to investigate. This means that at the moment we can not exactly say how many and which types of measures are installed across the whole provincial area. However, work is on-going and we are quite confident that it will not take too long to get the complete inventory. While collecting all data on the mitigation measures, we had to face a new problem: many installed mitigation measures are quite old, have no certification, and have been partly damaged over the years. Their protective function can no longer be guaranteed, but they should be able to stop smaller events at least. For this reason our subcontractor – the University of Bologna DICAM department of transport engineering – investigated the behaviour of rockfall protection barriers installed in the province of Bolzano, based on the VISO database, in which the available technical documentation and in-situ surveys are integrated. Additionally, a set of FEM (Finite Element Method) models were developed to predict the behaviour of these structures on impact of blocks of known kinetic energy. These models were designed to evaluate the effectiveness of existing barrier types with respect to possible rockfall events. The results allow behaviour-forecasting of existing barriers on rockfall impact, in terms of structure deformation and forces imposed on the foundations and anchoring points.

omega-net

rhomboidal-net

ring-net

Figure 96: Structural analysis of rockfall nets (source: final report subcontractor University of Bologna).

Figure 97: Frequency of the defined models in the province of Bolzano (source: final report subcontractor University of Bologna).


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This leads to another delicate point, which is the maintenance of installed mitigation measures. Somebody has to take the responsibility for installed, possibly old, mitigation measures that do not work anymore. In case of an event, the public institution has to take the responsibility. This is likely to be more difficult than expected, as in the mountainous regions not every mitigation measure is simple to reach. A strong collaboration with the Road Service is therefore essential. After completion, the maintenance work has to be integrated into the database in some way; only by this procedure is it possible to keep an overview of the work carried out and the money invested for maintenance.

Last but not least: residual risk Residual risk has been discussed extensively. From a general point of view it seems logical that, despite all the protection work, a residual risk will always remain. This holds especially true for rockfall mitigation measures along the road network: these measures partially or completely lose their efficiency and functionality after an impact or because of lacking maintenance work, meaning: 

A periodic check/control becomes absolutely necessary



To bring to attention that all mitigation measures are only able to mitigate the risk, not to eliminate it!

Based on this consideration and the fact that in some cases the appropriate technical systems for hazard mitigation do not exist, it is necessary to define a concept of residual – in many cases of acceptable – risk with a defined threshold. It will never be possible to protect every single road, from the biggest to the smallest. Also, the available money will never be sufficient for all necessary investments. Therefore, we should come to an acceptable residual risk, explain it and sensitise the public to it. Everyone has to take the responsibility for his own actions to some extent. It is a matter of education and attitude to take personal responsibility, even if the trend goes in another direction.

6.1.3

PAT

The collaboration among different services of the province in the decision-support methodology used by the PAT proved to be well-implemented. Dialog between technical experts and decision-makers are the heart of the decision-support system for monitoring and event management of disasters involving road and rail. The experience gained from the various provincial technical services involved in risk management is leading to the implementation of common procedures and methodologies applied to regional and local scales. These methods are based on the expertise and data available, so that an appropriate definition of the intensity and extension of the phenomena are possible. Still, the evaluation of the efficiency of mitigation structures installed in the past years along transportation infrastructure in Trentino remains difficult and uncertain due to lack of data. This makes the maintenance of those structures even more difficult. A first step has been taken in this regard within the framework of PARAmount, consisting of work on a template of a database and field sheets. These sheets will be used in the field to collect information on the position and status of mitigation structures, which will then be added to the database. If this tool were appealing to responsible persons of the departments and decision-makers, it could be extended to the whole province of Trento. This information could then contribute to the process of planning defence measurements and risk management.


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6.1.4

ARPAV

The presence of various authorities involved in the management and protection of roads and residential areas leads to not having a regional plan for monitoring the road network. At present, each institution, according to their capacity and resources, shall monitor the road sections under its jurisdiction. Unitary planning of monitoring activities could lead to improved performance and reduced costs. The survey of the most dangerous sites for debris flow activities requires highly skilled technicians, who are often not present in small local authorities.

6.1.5

ARPAP

Traditional warning systems are usually based on rainfall rate thresholds derived from rain gauge measurements, but rain gauge networks are often inadequate when properly identifying the localised storms. Rain gauge networks also often lack localised and intensified precipitation. On the contrary, weather radar data can provide reliable real-time rainfall estimation with high spatial and temporal resolution. Weather radars provide a unique way to monitor rainfall over wide areas, with a high spatial detail and temporal resolution, provided that the signal is above the minimum detectable threshold. Since 2000, ARPAP has developed a web GIS-based system to disseminate real-time weather radar data and ground station data both for stakeholders and citizens. This application is primarily focused on visualising meteorological and hydrological data for decision-support and situational awareness. Recently ARPAP moved to a new approach, oriented towards real-time analysis and now-casting-derived products, using full GIS functionality on a Linux platform and GFOSS tools. The PostGIS extension allows for the native storage of geometries in the database and allows various GIS queries to be made from the data, including unions, area calculations, and features within. Geometry features can then be displayed by various GIS server and client applications, allowing the database to act as a backend GeoSpatial database for GIS servers. All storm parameters and paths are then stored in the same PostgreSQL/PostGIS database, where basin polygons are also stored. Storm cells with a severity index above a fixed threshold (SSI > 3), whose centroids or precipitation affect the basin, or will affect it within the next 30–60 minutes, are then localised and corresponding warnings are produced.

6.1.6

PUH/UL

The principles of rockfall protection are determined by the extent and location of the hazard. The recommended basis for decisions about protection measures on Slovene railroads consists of: Hazard and risk assessment (including rockfall/avalanche/debris flow simulation analysis) and preliminary design proposals for protection & slope stabilisation, were developed within the PARAmount project. These proposals have to already include demands and conditions regarding standards, technical possibilities, up-to-date types of solutions, reliability, durability, rationality and environmental acceptance of control measures. Mentioned works have to be prepared by competent natural hazards experts (certificated engineers). It is important to note that rockfall, avalanches and debris flow events are natural events and therefore cannot be calculated in an exact manner. Simulations performed within PARAmount are, despite state-of-the-art analysis, still only an approximation of real events. Thus, field investigations and incorporating the messages of ‘silent witnesses’ are obligatory in expert decision making, since they lead to higher-quality results.


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6.1.7

IRSTEA

From a scientific point of view, phenomena should be more closely monitored to acquire more detailed knowledge. From a practical point of view, all that contributes to input data of models, tools and methods should be surveyed (e.g. sediment yield, rockfall and snow avalanche triggering areas). Particular emphasis should be placed on the assessment of the reliability of protection systems (expert assessment and database), as well as on a past events cadastre and events that can be observed directly. Concerning this last point, DOMODIS (Documentation of Mountain Disaster), proposed by Interpraevent constitutes a good basis for data recording. However, this kind of database has to be improved in order to represent more explicitly the information quality: qualitative indices can be replaced by other quantitative measures, using ad-hoc uncertainty representation theories such as fuzzy sets, and possibility theories. Thus, information quality is represented and information quality traceability can be improved.

6.2

Which actions are proposed for improving the assessment of risks/hazards?

6.2.1

BMLFUW/ÖBB/BFW

Close collaboration between the stakeholders within the test bed is seen as an improvement for assessing risk/hazard. In addition, the development of new tools is considered as being equally important, mainly to assess the danger on a regional basis. This will help to identify potential hotspots that are not known today, for example due to a changing forest cover. The risk should be calculated on commonly agreed indicators, so that the results are comparable and transparent for the impacted stakeholders. The specific actions include: the definition of vulnerability indicators, the regional assessment of hazards, the inclusion of a multitude of stakeholders, and the establishment of a regional risk dialogue group.

6.2.2

PAT

The use of calculation models tailored to different phenomena and calibrated on a regional scale for a first screening, combined with detailed studies carried out in those points that the modelling at regional scale has mapped as the most critical, can lead to an improvement of current techniques of risk assessment and hazard. Studies on the 2D-avalanche model, currently taking place at Trento University, will improve snowavalanche hazard mapping; this requires not only theoretical studies, but also field experiments. Some of them have been carried on within the framework of PARAmount.

6.2.3

ARPAP

A recent ARPAP classification proposal groups the Alpine basins into three main catchment lithology classes: 

Massive and/or crudely stratified/foliated carbonate rocks (e.g. dolomite, limestone, marble)



Finegrained, sheared, finely-foliated metamorphic rocks (e.g. calc-schists, shales, phyllades)



Massive or coarse-grained crystalline rocks (e.g. granitoids, gneiss, serpentinites)


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The nature of the basin bedrock influences the rheology, the sedimentary processes, the depositional styles and the alluvial fan architecture, the triggering frequency and the triggering seasonality of debris flow/debris floods. In particular, this classification includes triggering causes as classifying parameter and distinguishes the rainfall type causing a torrential phenomenon in each basin class. Moreover, the nature of the processes that occur in a basin also depend on the morphometric characteristics of the basin. In fact, through an index based on the Melton index, the average gradient and length of the main channel, it is possible to identify the most likely type of process that can occur in a basin: flash flood, debris flood or debris flow. The torrential processes, of whatever type, are mainly triggered by heavy rain characterised by hourly peaks of very high intensity, depending on considered basin class. This methodology allows easy classification of a basin, providing an immediate assessment of its potential hazard.

6.2.4

PUH/UL

The basis of all methods is good historical data (event documentation) and up-to date, real-time information, expert assessments (hazard/risk maps) and proposals for admissible/preferable mitigation measures. The higher the quality of this input data, the more reliable the decisions that are made are. Decision-makers have to face various types of information imperfection (inconsistency, imprecision, incompleteness and uncertainty) in real-time situations, but imperfections cannot justify not making a decision. Responsible persons have to take all available time and possibilities to improve the set of the most important information for decision-making. When they face the deadline for taking the decision, they have to assess whether taking the decision based on imperfect information is better than not taking any decisions. But the system has to be established in such a way that decision making processes will constantly improve – this means that all support systems have to be maintained constantly and regularly upgraded for the purpose of optimal decision-making and planning.

6.2.5

IRSTEA

The methodology we have proposed provides the most important tools and methods to carry out this kind of assessment. Of course new scientific results will help improve these tools in the future, but this is probably a good starting point for practical purposes. Applying these tools requires time and financial support. One should also keep in mind that the models will give more precise results when precise input data is available and properly recorded events make it possible to calibrate them. The vulnerability assessment remains limited and should probably be improved.

6.3

Which actions are proposed for improving the capitalisation of the tools/methods/procedures with regard to hazard & risk?

6.3.1

BMLFUW/ÖBB/BFW

The most relevant actions with regard to improving the capitalisation of the tools/methods/procedures, is to foster trust in these tools. This can only be done by a continuous development and improvement of these tools and by clear communication of uncertainties inherent in the results. The stakeholders using these tools should be aware of the benefits and limitations of decision instruments. Consequently ,a comprehensive description, as well as expert support, should be available. An exchange of knowledge and experiences should be fostered not only on a local level, but also internationally.


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6.3.2

PAT

Experience carried out within the framework of PARAmount can be extended from the test bed to the whole province of Trento. Currently, the Geological Survey is working on the rockfall analysis at regional scale using the model Rockfor3D. This was made possible thanks to a joint effort between Geological Survey technicians, expert consultants and some of the PPs in PARAmount. In addition, collaboration with the local Road Service allowed the implementation of a methodology to evaluate road vulnerability. This can be investigated thoroughly and extended to encompass the entire provincial road network to derive its risk. GIS-based maps containing information about protection measurements were also implemented, so that decision-makers could be supported in evaluating the presence and effectiveness of those measurements.

6.3.3

ARPAP

The capitalisation of the products by each partner can be obtained through the exchange of the different methods in order to then be applied in other contexts than those for which they have been developed. Therefore, the various approaches can be compared and validated in a peer-to-peer fashion. To refine and integrate the different models, tools and procedures, it would be important to establish a permanent communication network to exchange data, tools, research results, reports and the different strategies adopted by individual Institutions. This communication portal should be easy to use in real-time mode, such as a social-network oriented web portal, dedicated to the PPs.

6.3.4

PUH/UL

The use of modern calculation/simulation analyses, combined with detailed studies carried out in those points that the modelling at regional scale has mapped as most critical, can lead to an improvement of current techniques of hazard and risk assessment. Good praxis examples of technology and protection solutions from other countries significantly contribute to acceptance of development and to investment-increase in the field of natural hazard protection. Railroad management teams have to take short-term (urgency interventions) and medium-term decisions (priority list of intervention/protection works). They need expert support (defining the hazard level) and suggestions (up-to-date advice regarding mitigation measures) from competent institutions/companies, in order to provide the technical background for making decisions. Experts have to help decide between primary or secondary protection measures, and active or passive measures. Primary protection is carried out in the areas where hazardous phenomena (rockfall, avalanche, debris flow…) occur. Secondary protection is used when mass (rocks, snow…) has already been released. Where possible, it is better to stabilise slopes in the source area (primary protection) to eliminate the danger at its source. But according to the preliminary studies of slope conditions (in the test bed and also on most Slovenian railroads), secondary measures will have to be the dominant form of protection. Today’s up-to-date rockfall barriers can retain falling rocks and boulders from 75 kJ up to over 8000 kJ of dynamic pressure. The rockfall barriers can be combined with avalanche protection measures. By the application of sound engineering principles to a predictable range of parameters and by the implementation of correctly designed protection measures in identified risk areas, the exposure of injury and loss of property can be reduced substantially. These structures (rockfall barriers) can serve their purpose only when they are regularly inspected/checked, cleaned and maintained. Only through this approach the desired protection level can be assured. Additional provision must be taken to mitigate the residual risk through preparedness and intervention.


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6.3.5

IRSTEA

The best way to capitalise would be to have as many detailed risks maps as possible and a precise database on past events and existing protection structures. All these factors contribute to more accurate knowledge of risk. However, the main challenge will be to convince and to teach infrastructure managers and local authorities to use the tools and methods we have produced and to share their experience.

6.4

What are the main future challenges in the test beds?

6.4.1

BMLFUW/ÖBB/BFW

The main future challenges are manifold. The important first step is to continue the RRDs and to find someone to take on the responsibility of organising them. Furthermore, an important task will be to harmonise the datasets and further foster cross-sector communication.

6.4.2

PAT

Another important topic which would need further discussion is the acceptance of residual risk. Despite mitigation structures being set up and maintained, sometimes it is not possible reduce the risk to zero.

6.4.3

ARPAV

The use of simulation models can lead to an improvement of current techniques of risk and hazard assessment. The development and maintenance of geodatabases of past events can be another tool to use in selecting the areas to be used for urban expansions.

6.4.4

ARPAP

Due to the local nature of natural hazards, dense, reliable and effective monitoring systems have to be developed and maintained. Municipal and regional planning has to take the current hazards and their changes as a consequence of climate change into account. Hence a strong link must be developed by experts and public stakeholders.

6.4.5

PUH/UL

Slovenian Railways ltd. has to continue to pursue and strengthen the development of integral systems for protection against natural hazards. This has to be visible in securing much more founds for this field of activities. The decision to repair existing structures and install new ‘light semi-rigid net fences’ without a defined baring capacity and certificate has to be solved transparently by explaining what the purpose of such measures is. It is obvious that with such an approach the railway maintenance team can, with very limited funds, cover larger endangered sections of the railway. But this offers minimum protection with limited functionality. It is in some ways acceptable and reasonable that the railroad is thus protected against the hazard of small falling rocks, which are also very dangerous for railway traffic. But this action has to be accompanied by hazard assessments (which will show the remaining/residual risk), which have to be compared with set goals and plans. In addition, other future actions have to be defined, so that the most critical sections of the track will be adequately protected. We must not allow ourselves to be satisfied with minimum protection – we have to plan optimum protection and in the meantime raise awareness of residual risk and implement all measures to minimise the damage effects, if this hazard should become a reality. The available funds will never be sufficient for all necessary investments. Therefore, Slovenian Railways should have a transparent overview of hazard and risk situations, set priorities and be aware of the remaining residual risk, so that suitable preparations can be made. PARAmount results are a good basis for further actions. Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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Proposed methods for hazard assessment should be implemented in the decision support system. Some of the methods are also suitable for preliminary hazard assessment and could be applied on a national level. All proposed methods have to be evaluated and tested in various test beds. The influence of different terrain conditions should be evaluated before applying methods to regional or national scale. Mathematical modelling should be a common approach when assessing hazards. Preliminary hazard mapping must be carried out and ‘hotspot areas’ for detailed hazard mapping should be defined. Results of hazard mapping must be included in the spatial planning process. In Slovenia, a general system of hazard assessment must be established. At the moment there are few institutions preparing hazard maps, and methodology is not prescribed. These maps are preliminary hazard maps, susceptibility maps etc. They maps consider landslides, rockfall, sediment transport, debris flow and avalanches. Since there is no methodology, these maps are often not comparable to each other and end-users of these maps are often confused.

6.4.6

IRSTEA

Solving the problem means defining the structural and non-structural measures to be applied locally. This could include installing protection structures, moving the road or railway track to a less dangerous area, installing alert systems and procedures and informing the public and local authorities. In fact, the whole risk circle has to be covered.


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List of Abbreviations AdB – River Authority software (software dell' Autorità di Bacino) ANAS – Italian Public Road Authority (Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade) ANEM – National Association of Political Representatives of Mountain Municipalities ARPAP – Regional Agency for the Environmental Protection of Piemonte (Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione Ambientale del Piemonte) ARPAV – Regional Agency for the Environmental Protection of Veneto (Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione Ambientale del Veneto) ARSO – Slovenian Environment Agency ASFiNAG – Austrian Motorway and Expressway Network Operator (Autobahnen- und SchnellstraßenFinanzierungs-Aktiengesellschaft) ASP – Alpine Space Programme ASTRA – Bundesamt für Strassen BAFU – Federal Office for the Environment – Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications BFW – Federal Research and Training Centre for Forests, Natural Hazards and Landscape (Bundesforschungs- und Ausbildungszentrum für Wald, Naturgefahren und Landschaft) BGBl – Federal Law Gazette for the Republic of Austria (Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich) BKA – Federal Austrian Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt Österreich) BMLF – Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft) – predecessor of the BMLFUW before the year 2000 BMLFUW – Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft) BUWAL – Bundesamt für Umwelt (now BAFU) BWV – Federal Administration for Water Engineering (Bundeswasserbauverwaltung) CA – Cellular Automata CDF – Cohesive Debris Flow CDT – Communication and Strategic Decision-support Tool for Natural Hazards CEMAGREF – (has become IRSTEA, National Research Institute of Science and Technology for Environment and Agriculture, France) CFD – Departmental Functional Centre (Centro Funzionale Decentrato) CLISP – Climate Change Adaptation by Spatial Planning CLPV – Carta di Localizzazione probabile delle Valanghe (map of likely locations of avalanches based on past events) CNR – Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche CSG – Carte di Sintesi Geologica DEFENSE – DEbris Flows triggEred by storms – Nowcasting SystEm Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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DEM – Digital Elevation Model DGP – Delibera della Giunta Provinciale DOMODIS – Documentation of Mountain Disaster DPCM – Decreto del presidente del consiglio dei ministri DPR – Decreto Presidente Repubblica DSS – Decision Support System eHYD – Hydrografisches Messstellennetz Österreichs ERDF – European Regional Development Fund EURAC – European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano FEDRO – Federal Roads Office FEM – Finite Element Method FOCP – Federal Office for Civil Protection FOEN – Federal Office for the Environment FOSD – Federal Office for Spatial Development GEI – Geological Event Intensity GFOSS – Geographic Free and Open Source Software GIN – Common Information Platform for Natural Hazards (Gemeinsame Informationsplattform Naturgefahren) GIS – Geographic Information System GPS – Global Positioning System GSM – Global System for Mobile Communications HEWS – Hazard Early Warning System IFFI – National Inventory Event and Cadastre of Landslides IFKIS – Interkantonales Frühwarn- und Kriseninformationssystem für Naturgefahren IFKIS-MIS – Interkantonales Frühwarn- und Kriseninformationssystem für Naturgefahren – Massnahmeninformationssystem für Sicherungsdienste IRGC – International Risk Governance Council IRV – Intercantonal Reinsurance LiDAR – Light Detection And Ranging MCDA – Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis MDT – Mean Daily Traffic N-CDF – Non-Cohesive Debris Flow ÖAW – Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften ÖBB – Austrian Federal Railways (Österreichische Bundesbahnen) OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ONF – Office National des Forêts Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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OPGT – Office of the Provincial Government of Tyrol (Amt der Tiroler Landesregierung) PAB – Autonomous Province of Bolzano – South Tyrol (Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano) PAI – Hydro-geological Assessment Plan PARAmount – imProved Accessibility: Reliability and security of Alpine transport infrastructure related to mountainous hazards in a changing climate PAT – Autonomous Province of Trento (Provincia Autonoma di Trento) PGUAP – General Plan for Use of Public Water (Piano Generale Utilizzo Acque Pubbliche) PLANAT – National Platform for Natural Hazards PP – Project Partner PPR – Risk Prevention Plans PTA – Partner Transnational Activities PUH – Torrent and Erosion Control Service Slovenia (Podjetje za urejanje hudournikov d.d) RADAR – Radio Detection and Ranging RFF – Réseaux Ferrés de France RGBl – Federal Law Gazette of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Reichgesetzblatt) RIWA-T – Technical Guidelines for the Federal Administration for Water Engineering (Technische Richtlinien für die Bundeswasserbauverwaltung RIWA-T gemäß § 3 Abs. 2 WBFG) RMIH – Risk Management and Implementation Handbook RRD – Regional Risk Dialogue RTM – Restauration des Terrains en Montagne SEI – Slope Event Intensity SFTRF – Société Française du Tunnel Routier du Fréjus SWOT – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats TESAF – Land Environment Agriculture and Forestry Department of Padova University TREC – Tracking Radar Echoes by Correlation UL – University of Ljubljana (Univerza v Ljubljani) UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNPD – United Nations Procurement Division UZRSVN – Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief VIL – Vertical Integrated Liquid VISO – Viability Information System for Operators WLV – Austrian Federal Service for Torrent and Avalanche Control (Forsttechnischer Dienst für Wildbach- und Lawinenverbauung) WP – Work Package WSL – Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research SLF ZAMG – Zentralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geodynamik


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List of Tables Table 1: Operating data for the Arlberg railway (Landeck – St. Anton a. Arlberg – VzG 10105) according to the schedule for the years 2008/2009 and the operating programme for 2025 (source: ÖBB). ...................................................................................................................................................... 10 Table 2: Past event cadastre records classified by community and hazard type; events that affected the transport infrastructure are included in brackets (data sources: WLV, municipalities & fire brigades in the Stanzer Valley). ............................................................................................................. 12 Table 3: Documented avalanche events of the extended past events cadastre in the Stanzer Valley (data sources: BFW, Fliri (1998), railway maintenance Dalaas (unpubl.), WLV, municipalities & fire brigades in the Stanzer Valley). ............................................................................................................. 13 Table 4: Registered rockfall events on the SS12 (source: internal database LPM). .............................. 30 Table 5: Debris flow in the Fiames test bed (source: Land Environment Agriculture and Forestry Department of Padova University - TESAF). .......................................................................................... 37 Table 6: Summary of PARAmount test beds, including the key data for natural hazard and risk management. ........................................................................................................................................ 52 Table 7: Classification of impact pressure and return period for BUWAL matrix (source. Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, 1998). ................................................................................................................ 80 Table 8: Characteristics of the three catchment lithology groups in the western Alps (modified after Tiranti et al., 2008). ............................................................................................................................... 82 Table 9: Summary table of all aims, tools/methods/procedures and results in the PARAmount test beds (WP 5 – 7). .................................................................................................................................... 99 Table 10: SWOT analysis of damage-potential tools, methods and procedures developed and applied in the test beds within PARAmount. ................................................................................................... 105 Table 11: SWOT analysis of hazard potential tools/methods/procedures (debris flow) developed and applied in the test beds within PARAmount. ...................................................................................... 108 Table 12: SWOT analysis of hazard potential tools/methods/procedures (rockfall) developed and applied in the test beds within PARAmount. ...................................................................................... 113 Table 13: SWOT analysis of hazard potential tools/methods/procedures (avalanche) developed and applied in the test beds within PARAmount. ...................................................................................... 119 Table 14: SWOT analysis of risk tools/methods/procedures developed and applied in the test beds within PARAmount. ............................................................................................................................. 123 Table 15: SWOT analysis of hazard early warning tools, methods and procedures developed and applied within PARAmount. ................................................................................................................ 125 Table 16: SWOT analysis of decision-support tools, methods and procedures developed and applied within PARAmount. ............................................................................................................................. 128


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List of Figures Figure 1: The Austrian structure of legislation and executive competence for Alpine natural hazards (modified after: ÖROK (2005) and Holub & Fuchs (2009))...................................................................... 3 Figure 2: Overview of test bed Stanzer Valley (Tyrol, Austria) (source: BFW). ....................................... 5 Figure 3: Central section of the Austrian test bed Stanzer Valley (left) (source: BFW); close-up view of the critical road and rail infrastructure in the test bed: Arlberg railway (far left in the picture) expressway (left in the picture) and A-road (right in the picture) near junction Flirsch Ost (right) (source: BFW). ......................................................................................................................................... 6 Figure 4: Impressions from the construction of the Arlberg railway line in the late 19th century; railway portal in the Stanzer Valley (left); clearing avalanche snow (right) (source: ÖBB). ................... 7 Figure 5: Mitigation measures by the ÖBB in the Arlberg region (left); meteorological data collected by the avalanche warning service of the ÖBB (right) (source: ÖBB). ...................................................... 7 Figure 6: Overview of all counting points within the test bed for both expressway and A-road (top); development of mean monthly traffic on the expressway (2008 to 2012) (bottom left) (data source – ASFiNAG); development of mean monthly traffic on the A-road (2003 to 2012), (bottom right) (data source – OPGT) (all layouts – source: BFW). ........................................................................................... 9 Figure 7: Aerial view of the confluence of Rosanna and Trisanna during the floods in August 2005 (source: WLV, Gebietsbauleitung Oberes Inntal). ................................................................................. 11 Figure 8: Compilation of natural hazard events from the ÖBB past events cadastre along the Arlberg railway (source: ÖBB). ........................................................................................................................... 13 Figure 9: Stakeholders in the Austrian test bed Stanzer Valley responsible for road (top) and rail (bottom) transport infrastructure listed by their level of governance, function and name (source: BFW). ..................................................................................................................................................... 14 Figure 10: Managing risk chain actors in France: the town mayor and the préfet play major roles in the process (source: J.M. Tacnet, IRSTEA). ........................................................................................... 16 Figure 11: Location, scale and phenomena investigated in the test beds (source: IRSTEA). ................ 18 Figure 12: Upper part of the Manival catchment with the location of the sediment trap, monitoring station and transects where topographical surveys are carried out after each flood (source: J. Theule, IRSTEA). ................................................................................................................................................. 20 Figure 13: Channel erosion induced by a debris flow event in August 2009 (source: J. Theule, IRSTEA). ............................................................................................................................................................... 20 Figure 14: Aerial photo of the St Antoine catchment with delineation of the area, where IRSTEA studied debris flow triggering processes and the urbanised area (including the international railway track and former international road) where IRSTEA assessed vulnerability (source: IRSTEA). ............ 22 Figure 15: Damage caused by the 1987 debris flow: the railway track is covered by mud and debris (source: ONF-RTM). ............................................................................................................................... 23 Figure 16: Regional map of the test bed with focus on the areas where precise topographical data were acquired (source: IRTSEA). ........................................................................................................... 24 Figure 17: Overview of the Regions and Provinces in Italy – the provinces and regions the Italian PPs in PARAmount represent are coloured (source: outlines of Provinces and Regions – www.wikipedia.com; layout: BFW). ...................................................................................................... 25


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Figure 18: Combination matrix for the hazard level (Gefahrenstufe), consisting of process intensity (Intensität) and probability (Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit), amended after Bundesamt für Umwelt (BUWAL, 1998) for mass movements and hydraulic/water hazards. ................................................... 26 Figure 19: Overview of the Italian test beds in PARAmount (source: outlines of Provinces and Regions – www.wikipedia.com; BFW) ................................................................................................................ 29 Figure 20: Brennero/Brenner test bed of the Autonomous Province of Bozen – South Tyrol (source: PAB). ...................................................................................................................................................... 29 Figure 21: Inventory of rockfall events since 1998 along the Brenner axis (source: PAB, landslide cadastre IFFI). ........................................................................................................................................ 30 Figure 22: Report in the Dolomiten newspaper on the rockfall event with one casualty on 26 June 2003, as listed in Table 1. ...................................................................................................................... 31 Figure 23: Rockfall hazard map considering all existing mitigation measures (source: PAB). .............. 31 Figure 24: Rockfall hazard map without considering existing mitigation measures (source: PAB). ..... 31 Figure 25: Location of the test-bed in the north-eastern part of Trentino Province (source: PAT)...... 32 Figure 26: PAT test bed – SS50 – (left) Forte Buso rockfall (S. Simoni)/slide above the road and the lake; (right) SS50 at Rolle Pass, an avalanche-prone area (source: S. Simoni)...................................... 32 Figure 27: Map of Cortina (left), (source: Tobacco); aerial view of the test bed area (right), (source: National Flight, 2006). ........................................................................................................................... 34 Figure 28: Fiames sport centre and two debris flow channels (27/09/2009), (source C. Gregoretti). . 35 Figure 29: The manufacturing and trading businesses near km 108 (27/09/2009), (source C. Gregoretti). ............................................................................................................................................ 35 Figure 30: Aerial view of retention basins, initiation and routing areas (National Flight, 2006). ......... 36 Figure 31: The new configuration of the debris flow path after the event on 5 July 2006 (source: TESAF). ................................................................................................................................................... 36 Figure 32: Debris flow event on 28 July 2003 – the SR48 bridge, the new parking lot and corresponding artificial waterway can be seen in the centre of the picture (source: W. Testor, ARPAV)................................................................................................................................................... 38 Figure 33: Aerial (left) and map view (right) of the Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) test bed; the red arrows on the left image indicate the debris flow channels (source: Carta Tabacco 1:25.000, topographische Wanderkarte); the red arrow in the right image highlights the course of the SR48, while the red circle delineates, where the Rio Chiesa crosses the road and impacts the village of Livinallongo (source: Regione Veneto – Ufficio Cartografico – estratto). ............................................................................... 38 Figure 34: The little bridge along the municipal road leading to Palla Agai after a debris flow event on 28 July 2003 (left), (source: Walter Testor, ARPAV); check-dam in the Rio Chiesa, 500 m upstream from the SR48 (right) (source: A. Andrich, ARPAV). .............................................................................. 39 Figure 35: The Susa Valley (red); motorway (green); railway (dashed black); other roads (yellow) (source: ARPAP). .................................................................................................................................... 40 Figure 36: Geological and structural sketch map of the western Alps (source: Polino et al., 2002, modified). .............................................................................................................................................. 41 Figure 37: Distribution of average daily rainfall (colour scale) and the average annual number of rainy days (isolines) in Piemonte Region. The Susa Valley is outlined in red (source: ARPAP). ..................... 42 Figure 38: Baška grapa test bed (rockfall and avalanches); (source: UL). ............................................. 45 Risk Management and Implementation Handbook

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Figure 39: Silent witness (source: J. Papež). .......................................................................................... 45 Figure 40: Existing protection structures (source: G. Rak). ................................................................... 45 Figure 41: Track and slope (source: G. Rak). ......................................................................................... 45 Figure 42: Typical malformed growth of protective forest trees due to pressures of the sliding snowpack (source: J. Papež). ................................................................................................................. 45 Figure 43: Location of Koroška Bela test bed (debris flow) (source: UL). ............................................. 47 Figure 44: Region Sedrun-Tujetsch (source: © swisstopo). .................................................................. 51 Figure 45: Outline of run-out zones obtained through the three-dimensional empirical model (source: A. Zischg, Abenis AG). ............................................................................................................................ 71 Figure 46: Hazard hotspot Salurn/Salorno in the south of the province; the numbers indicate the main installed extensometers (source: G. Cotza). ................................................................................ 73 Figure 47: Installed mechanical extenometer on the rock tower of Salurn with the movement measured since 2009 – x-axis shows time [days] and the y-axis the movement [mm] and the temperature [°C] (source: PAB). ............................................................................................................ 73 Figure 48: Rockfall hazard map, section along the SS50. Red identifies high hazard, blue, medium and green, no hazard (source: PAT). ............................................................................................................ 75 Figure 49: Debris flow paths in the years 1882 – 2011 (source: National Flight, 2006). ...................... 76 Figure 50: GPS-points recorded in selected channels in the test-bed area of Fiames along km 108 – 109 of SS51 (source: National Flight, 2006). ......................................................................................... 76 Figure 51: Sediment deposits in a channel within the test-bed area of Fiames, after a debris flow occurred in July 2011 (source: National Flight, 2006). .......................................................................... 77 Figure 52: The monitoring station just beneath the Dimai peak (source: Massimo Degetto).............. 77 Figure 53: The monitoring station and the rain gauges installed in the test.bed area of Fiames (source: National Flight, 2006). ............................................................................................................. 78 Figure 54: BUWAL matrix used by the PAT for the snow avalanche hazard assessment (source. Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano, 1998). ................................................................................................ 80 Figure 55: Portion of the table which summarises the outputs of the rockfall analysis (source: PAT). 81 Figure 56: The classified basins of Susa Valley: G1 basins in light blue; G2 basins in green; G3 basins in dark red (source: ARPAP). ..................................................................................................................... 83 Figure 57: Main expected phenomena in the Susa Valley’s basins: Flash flood in light blue; debris flood in orange; debris flow in red (source: ARPAP). ............................................................................ 84 Figure 58: Results of the numerical analysis of debris flows in the Rio Fosse basin. The blue line represents the contour of the watershed; the red line represents the contour of the alluvial fan (the values of x- and y-axis are the ED50-UTM/32N coordinates) (source: ARPAP). ................................... 85 Figure 59: Results of the numerical analysis of debris flow events in the Rio Frejus basin. The blue line represents the contour of the watershed; the red line represents the contour of the alluvial fan (the values of x- and y-axis are the ED50-UTM/32N coordinates) (source: ARPAP). ................................... 86 Figure 60: Results of the numerical analysis of debris flow events in the Rio Secco basin. The blue line represents the contour of the watershed; the red line represents the contour of the alluvial fan (the values of x- and y-axis are the ED50-UTM/32N coordinates) (source: ARPAP). ................................... 87


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Figure 61: Only access route to the Cenischia valley, damaged by mud debris flow (Torrent Gioglio), (source: ARPAP). .................................................................................................................................... 88 Figure 62: Lithological settings of (from north to south) Torrent Gioglio, Torrent Claretto and Torrent Marderello catchments: calc-schists and phyllades in ochre; limestones and dolostones in light-blue; amphibolites and prasinites in red; talus deposits in light-grey; glacial deposits in dark-grey (source: ARPAP). .................................................................................................................................................. 89 Figure 63: Storm cells paths. The numbers on cells centroids are the reflectivity values (dBZ). Involved basins are bordered in black (source: ARPAP). ..................................................................................... 89 Figure 64: Answers of local stakeholders in the Sedrun-Tujetsch region regarding influencing factors on regional economy (Pechlaner et al., 2011). ..................................................................................... 97 Figure 65: Comparison of avalanche danger level and number of messages in IFKIS-MIS. The red columns show that during phases with rising and decreasing avalanche danger, the number of messages increases or decreases due to closure or opening of traffic routes (indicated with blue arrows) (source: SLF). ............................................................................................................................ 98 Figure 66: Overview of potential debris flow hotspots along the road, as identified by the regional models employed in PARAmount (source: BFW). ............................................................................... 137 Figure 67: Common potential hazard hotpot Schnannerbach in the central part of the test bed, shown here after a debris flow event in summer 2005 (source: WLV, Gebietsbauleitung Oberes Inntal). ................................................................................................................................................. 138 Figure 68: Common potential hazard hotpot Dawinbach in the eastern part of the test bed, shown here after an event in summer 2010 (source: WLV, Gebietsbauleitung Oberes Inntal)..................... 138 Figure 69: Overview of potential avalanche hotspots along the critical road infrastructure, as identified by the regional model employed in PARAmount (source: BFW). ....................................... 139 Figure 70: Potential debris-flow impact points on the transport network of the Southern French Alps with associated probability of debris-flow occurrence (source: M. Bertrand, IRSTEA). ..................... 142 Figure 71: Number of impact points per km of transport network for the Southern French Alps a) recorded since 1850 (extracted from the ONF-RTM database) b) potential debris-flow impacts as determined by the geomorphic approach developed in the framework of the PARAmount project (source: M. Bertrand, IRSTEA). ............................................................................................................ 142 Figure 72: Rockfall hazard map for the Hautes-Alpes county (Southern French Alps) considering (in red) and without considering (in orange) the protection role of the forest (source: IRSTEA)............ 143 Figure 73: Rockfall potential impact for the Queyras region (eastern part of the Hautes-Alpes county, Southern French Alps) a) without taking into account the protection role of the forest b) taking into account the protection role of the forest (source: IRSTEA). ............................................................... 143 Figure 74: Debris flow hazard map and identification of impact points on transport infrastructure deduced from an application of the hybrid approach to the St Antoine torrent catchment (Modane, Savoie) with a debris flow volume of 120,000 m3 (source: IRSTEA). .................................................. 145 Figure 75: Hazard hotspots along the Brenner axes (source: PAB)..................................................... 146 Figure 76: Overview of the slope near Mittewald/Mezzaselva (source: G. Cotza). ............................ 147 Figure 77: Simulation with RockyFor3D without (left) and with forest (right) (source: PAB). ............ 147 Figure 78: Measured GPS points from May 2011 (source: PAB). ........................................................ 148 Figure 79: Rockfall event near Salurn/Salorno on 15 December 2011 (source: PAB). ....................... 150


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Figure 80: Extract of the inspection report of 16 December 2011 (source: D. Tonidandel; internal data schedule Office of Geology and Building Material Testing). ............................................................... 150 Figure 81: Overview of the Forte Buso rockfall location with mitigation measures in colours (source: PAT). .................................................................................................................................................... 152 Figure 82: Rockfall occurred in May 2012. The road was closed for several days (source: PAT). ...... 153 Figure 83: Avalanche hazard map of the two avalanche hotspots in the Baška grapa test bed (source: UL). ...................................................................................................................................................... 156 Figure 84: Avalanche risk map of the two avalanche hotspots in the Baška grapa test bed (source: UL). ...................................................................................................................................................... 156 Figure 85: Rockfall hazard map of the rockfall hotspot in the Baška grapa test bed (source UL). ..... 157 Figure 86: Rockfall risk map of the rockfall hotspot in the Baška grapa test bed (source UL)............ 157 Figure 87: Preliminary debris flow hazard map for Soteska valley (hotspot circled) (source: Mikoš et al, 2012). .............................................................................................................................................. 158 Figure 88: Debris flow hazard map for the Koroška Bela torrential fan (transport infrastructure hotspot circled); the debris flow hazard map was prepared using potential scenarios of debris flow events. High hazard (h>1m or v*h>1m2/s) is pictured in red, medium hazard (h>0.5m or v*h>0.5m2/s) is pictured in orange, and low hazard (h>0.2m or v*h>0.2m2/s) in yellow (source: UL). ................... 159 Figure 89: Some of the protection structures have, due to age and neglect, lost their function (source: G. Rak). ................................................................................................................................................ 160 Figure 90: Some of the protection structures have, due to age and neglect, lost their function; (source: J. Sodnik)................................................................................................................................ 161 Figure 91: Cycle of integral risk management and the position of the PARAmount PPs therein (modified after PLANAT, 2012). .......................................................................................................... 163 Figure 92: Risk matrix (source: hazard mapping guidelines – Autonomous Province of Bolzano). .... 165 Figure 93: Very old typical wooden rigid structure (source: J. Papež). ............................................... 172 Figure 94: System for early warning and alerting called EAN or NOJP (source: J. Papež). ................. 172 Figure 95: Schematic working procedure of the VISO database (source: PAB). ................................. 178 Figure 96: Structural analysis of rockfall nets (source: final report subcontractor University of Bologna). ............................................................................................................................................. 179 Figure 97: Frequency of the defined models in the province of Bolzano (source: final report subcontractor University of Bologna). ................................................................................................ 179


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Acknowledgements The PARAmount project partners would like to express their sincere gratitude to all stakeholders and observers who actively participated in PARAmount and provided very valuable input data, information and feedback throughout the whole project! These include, but are not limited to: Austria:  Forsttechnischer Dienst für Wildbach- und Lawinenverbauung (Gebietsbauleitung Oberes Inntal, Stabstelle für Geoinformation, Sektion Tirol) 

Amt der Tiroler Landesregierung (Abteilung Verkehr und Straße, Baubezirksamt Imst, Straßenmeisterei Landeck/Zams, TIRIS, Landesgeologie)



ASFiNAG Alpenstraßen



Vertreter der Gemeinden St. Anton am Arlberg, Pettneu am Arlberg, Flirsch, Strengen, Tobadill, Grins, Pians, Kaunertal (insbesondere: Bürgermeister, Tourismusdirektor St. Anton, Lawinenkommissionen & Freiwillige Feuerwehr)



Bezirkshauptmannschaft Landeck



Regionalentwicklungsverein für den Bezirk Landeck: regioL



Wirtschaftskammer Landeck



Zentralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geodynamik

France:  Société Française du Tunnel Routier du Fréjus 

Syndicat du Pays de Maurienne



Commune de Modane



Conseil Général de la Savoie



Conseil Général des Hautes-Alpes



Conseil Général des Alpes maritimes



Mr. Jean-Pierre Cleirec

Italy: 

Autostrada Del Brennero Instandhaltungsabteilung

S.P.A.

Servizio

Manutenzione/Brennerautobahn

AG:



RFI S.P.A Servizio Manutenzione (Rete Ferroviaria Italiana)/RFI AG Instandhaltungsdienst (italienische Staatsbahnen)



Ripartizione 10 Infrastrutture (Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano)/Abteilung 10 Infrastrukturen (Autonome Provinz Bozen)



Ripartizione 26 Protezione Civile (Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano)/Abteilung 26: Zivilschutz (Autonome Provinz Bozen)



Provincia di Bologna – Dirigente Servizio Manutenzione Strade/Provinz Bologna – Abteilungsdirektor Straßeninstandhaltungsarbeiten



ANAS (Compartimento del Veneto)


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

Provincia di Belluno – Servizio Difesa del Suolo e Protezione Civile



Regole d'Ampezzo



Comune di Cortina



32.3 Ufficio Pianificazione forestale/ 32.3 Amt für Forstplanung

Furthermore the editors would like to sincerely thank Ms. Julia Adams (Hachette UK) for proofreading the document in hand.


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Annex A Debris flow events in the Livinallongo (Rio Chiesa) test bed (source: ARPAV) 12 July 1925 9 August 1945 Autumn 1948 17 September 1960 4 November 1966 16 June 1970 10-12 June 1972 August 1985 July 1987 August 1989 10 August 1992 6 August 1994 29 August 1994 27 June 1997 9 July 1997 17 July 1997 20 July 1998 21 September 2000 28 July 2003 (Figure 32) 26 July 2006 6 July 2008 (night between 6 and 7 July) 13 July 2011 17 September 2011 9 July 2012 22 August 2012


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