Russian political elite and discourse on ...

University of Kent

Russian political elite and discourse on homosexuality: local ontology or counter-hegemonic strategy? By L. M. Skillen

A Dissertation Submitted to the Brussels School of International Studies of the Department of Politics and International Relations in the Faculty of Social Sciences In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of Master of Arts in European Union External Relations

Brussels, March 2016 (15250 words)

Table of Contents List of Tables ....................................................................................................... viii List of Figures ........................................................................................................ ix Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. x Note on Russian Transliteration and Translation................................................... xi Chapter 1:

Introduction ....................................................................................... 1

1.1

Research Focus and Motivation ............................................................... 3

1.2

Research Value ......................................................................................... 4

1.3

Aims and Objectives ................................................................................ 5

1.4

Road Map ................................................................................................. 7

Chapter 2: 2.1

Literature review ............................................................................... 9

Definitions ................................................................................................ 9

2.1.1

LGBT and Gender............................................................................. 9

2.1.2

‘The West’, ‘Europe’, and ‘the EU’................................................ 10

2.1.3

Norms and Values; Identity and Ideology ...................................... 11

2.1.4 2.2

Hegemony ....................................................................................... 11

Context: Normative Europe ................................................................... 12

2.2.1

A ‘Normative’ European Union...................................................... 12

2.2.2

The EU as a Normative Hegemon .................................................. 13

2.2.3

The EU and LGBT Rights Norms .................................................. 15

2.2.4

Opposing Europe? ........................................................................... 16

2.3

Context: Russia and Gender ................................................................... 18

2.3.1

Russia and Gender Discourse ......................................................... 18

2.3.2

The Role of ‘Blue’ Discourse in Russia ......................................... 21

2.4

Emerging Issues and the Need for Empirical Research ......................... 23

Chapter 3: 3.1

Research Methods ........................................................................... 25

Research Strategy ................................................................................... 25

3.1.1

Why a Case Study? ......................................................................... 26

3.1.2

Discourse Analysis.......................................................................... 29

3.2

Data Collection Techniques for Empirical Research ............................. 29

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3.2.1

Preliminary Results—Data Collected ............................................. 32

3.2.2

Supplementary Data—Time Period ................................................ 34

3.3

Limitations and Assumptions ................................................................. 36

3.3.1

‘Propaganda’ ................................................................................... 37

3.3.2

Europe or the EU? ........................................................................... 38

3.3.3

The ‘Status Quo’ and the Search for a Hegemon ........................... 39

3.3.4

Domestic Alternatives ..................................................................... 40

3.4

Frameworks for Data Analysis ............................................................... 40

3.4.1

Framework 1: Foucault and Pathologisation .................................. 41

3.4.2

Framework 2: Neo-Gramscianism and (Counter-)Hegemony ........ 47

3.4.3

A Note on Pathologisation .............................................................. 50

3.4.4

An Overlap? .................................................................................... 51

Chapter 4:

Framework 1—Foucault and Pathologisation ................................ 54

4.1

Ontology ................................................................................................. 54

4.2

Pathologisation ....................................................................................... 58

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4.2.1

Homosexuality ................................................................................ 60

4.2.2

Discourse around Homosexuality ................................................... 62

4.2.3

Third Parties .................................................................................... 65

4.3

The Emblematic Subject(s) of Pathologisation ...................................... 66

4.4

Truth-status and Practices ...................................................................... 67

4.5

Boundaries to the Discursive Formation ................................................ 68

4.6

Strategy? ................................................................................................. 69

4.6.1

Domestically ................................................................................... 69

4.6.2

Internationally ................................................................................. 70

4.7

Overall and Criticisms ............................................................................ 71

Chapter 5: 5.1

Framework 2—Neo-Gramscian Hegemony ................................... 75

Results .................................................................................................... 75

5.1.1

Ideological Alternatives .................................................................. 75

5.1.2

Opposition Parties ........................................................................... 77

5.2

Normalised Ideology .............................................................................. 78

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5.3

Domestic: Hegemony? ........................................................................... 79

5.4

International: Counter-Hegemony? ........................................................ 81

5.4.1

Group identity ................................................................................. 81

5.4.2

A Clear Ideological Alternative ...................................................... 82

5.4.3

Support from Civil Society ............................................................. 83

5.4.4

Popular Appeal................................................................................ 83

5.5

Overall .................................................................................................... 84

Chapter 6:

The Frameworks Compared ............................................................ 87

6.1

Pathologisation or Normalisation? ......................................................... 87

6.2

Subject, Subaltern, Counter-Hegemon? ................................................. 88

6.3

Boundaries to Discourse? ....................................................................... 88

6.4

Strategies Applied by Agents? ............................................................... 88

6.5

Structural Factors and Levels of Explanation ........................................ 89

6.6

Overall .................................................................................................... 90

Chapter 7:

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Conclusion ...................................................................................... 93

vi

7.1

Findings and Statement of Claim ........................................................... 93

7.2

Implications ............................................................................................ 93

7.3

Contribution, Limitations, and Areas for Future Research .................... 95

References ............................................................................................................. 97 Annex I: Key Identified Actors........................................................................... 107 Annex II: Results ................................................................................................ 110 References for Discourse Analysis ..................................................................... 165

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List of Tables Table 1: Pieces analysed, by actor ........................................................................ 32 Table 2: Categories of pathologisation and normalisation (Framework 1). ......... 58 Table 3: Items pathologised and normalised (Framework 1) ............................... 60 Table 4: 'Normal' ideology in the discourse (Framework 2) ................................ 76 Table 5: Parties in the discourse, normalised and 'other' (Framework 2) ............. 77

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List of Figures Figure 1: Timeline of discourse from Milonov..................................................... 34 Figure 2: Timeline of discourse from Putin .......................................................... 34 Figure 3: Timeline of discourse from Putin and United Russia, combined .......... 34 Figure 4: Timeline of discourse from United Russia and Putin, including that prior to 2012 .................................................................................................................. 35 Figure 5: What causes homosexuality? (% by number of instances in all cases) . 55 Figure 6: What causes homosexuality? (United Russia data only) .................... 56 Figure 7: Survey data - what causes homosexuality? ........................................... 57 Figure 8: Homosexuality pathologised, normalised, or ambiguous (Framework 1) ............................................................................................................................... 61 Figure 9: Ways in which homosexuality was normalised and pathologised (Framework 1). ..................................................................................................... 62 Figure 10: Third parties pathologised, by instances of pathologisation (%). ....... 66

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Acknowledgements Thank you to Dr Tom Casier for being a most excellent supervisor/shepherd; Dr Bojan Savić, for metaphorically hitting me over the head; will-be-a-Dr Reda Muhajer, for an absolutely insane amount of help and support; and Arthur Manookian, for meme-based assistance with Russian puns and connotation.

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Note on Russian Transliteration and Translation Transliteration from Cyrillic was completed using the Library of Congress Transliteration Tables for Cyrillic Alphabets (Russian)1 unless noted otherwise. Author Татьяна Рябова has published under both ‘Tatyana Ryabova’ and ‘Tatiana Riabova’, and her works have been consolidated under ‘T Riabova’. The same treatment has been applied to Oleg Riabov. Names such as Виталий have been transcribed in the text as ‘Vitaly’, rather than ‘Vitalii’, and Навальный as ‘Navalny’. Translations are into British English unless there exists a standard variant, so that Левада Центр is ‘Levada Center’ in accordance with their English-language publications, rather than ‘Levada Centre’. Translations from Russian were completed by the author unless noted otherwise.

1

(Indiana University Bloomberg 2016; The Library of Congress 2012)

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Russian political elite and discourse on homosexuality: local ontology or counter-hegemonic strategy?

Chapter 1:

Introduction

In 2012, a representative of the Russian ‘People’s Council’ demanded an investigation into ‘Vesëlii Molochnik’ milk,2 which had a rainbow on its carton. The representative, Anatoly Artukh, claimed this was a symbol of the ‘gay movement’, and therefore against St Petersburg’s propaganda laws. Furthermore, the milk company was owned by Pepsi Cola, which, according to Artukh, is “renowned for actively and aggressively financing and promoting homosexuality”. Later, in April 2013, President Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Valdai International Discussion Club in which he described a changing Russian national identity.

He spoke of how such an identity “cannot be established on an

ideological monopoly”, and went on to describe how Euro-Atlantic countries are losing their way and the values that underlie their civilisation. He then related this to same-sex partnerships and minority sexual rights.3 By this time, the famous ‘gay propaganda law’4 had been established at the national

2

(Bolcer 2012; Hermant 2012)

3

(Kremlin 2013c)

4

A 2013 Russian federal law that was the result of several earlier amended pieces of legislation,

and which focuses on the protection of children against “information harmful to their health and development” and “information that promotes the denial of traditional family values”. See (Decker

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level in Russia, and several months later, the term ‘Gayropa’ started to gain prominence. 56

This neologism suggested that ‘Europe’ was pro-gay, despite

internal divisions on same-sex marriage and tolerance of LGBT 7 communities within the European Union (‘EU’) and the ‘West’ more generally. Russia was not prepared to follow in Europe’s footsteps, instead searching to find its own way— politically in the form of a ‘sovereign democracy’, and socio-politically as a bastion of a different set of norms to those described in the West.8 Rather than give in to the ‘ideological monopoly’ referenced in Putin’s speech, Russia would have its own values, defined partly in opposition to those spread by ‘Gayropa’. These very different examples raise the question—is anti-homosexual discourse in

2013). 5

‘Gayropa’ (Гейропа) is a neologism of ‘Gay’ and ‘Europe’, as ‘Gayromaidan’ is a neologism of

‘Gay’ and ‘Euromaidan’. Goloboi, голобой, meaning ‘light blue’, is slang for gay in Russian. Therefore, European groups are known as the ‘blue lobby’, Europe is known as ‘blue Europe’, European democrats are as ‘gomokratii’ for ‘homo-’ and ‘democrats’, and the European ‘agenda’ is described as the ‘blue plague’, or ‘gay fascism’. The word ‘gay’ itself (гей, gey) entered the Russian language in the early 1990s, and related terms such as ‘homosexuality’, ‘sexual orientation’, and ‘LGBT’ have been adopted directly. See (Moss 2015). 6

See (Riabov and Riabova 2013), and note search trend data from Google Trends and Yandex

Wordstat. Google Trends first shows the term Gayropa (Гейропа) being searched in November 2013, with spikes in May 2014 and February 2015. (Google 2015; Yandex 2015a; Yandex 2015b) 7

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender

8

(Kremlin 2013c)

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Russia due to a particular ontological understanding of homosexuality, or is it part of an intentional strategy? That is, are political elites using this type of rhetoric because they believe in it, or because they can use it to serve a political agenda? Artukh’s reference to Pepsi Cola’s purported desire, convincing people to become gay, hints at an understanding that homosexuality is a choice—and a poor one at that. Meanwhile, Putin’s Valdai Discussion Club speech suggests an intentional strategy, whereby a particular type of discourse is used to support an alternative to an existing ‘monopoly’ or hegemony. This dissertation will consider each of these possibilities through application of Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian frameworks to the discourse of Russian political elites, as it relates to homosexuality. In the process, it addresses the question: ‘what discourse concerning homosexuality is used by Russian political elite, and does this represent local ontology about homosexuality and concomitant pathologisation, or an intentional strategy supporting a (counter-)hegemonic project?’

1.1

Research Focus and Motivation

Gender issues form part of the ‘traditional values’ espoused in conjunction with Russian nationalism and revisionism, and homosexuality is a key component of this gender-based discourse. As such, it presents an ideal focus for examining the role

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of political elite discourse in this area. The works of Tatiana Riabova and Oleg Riabov, published predominantly in Russian, are of particular value regarding masculinity and gender in Russia,910 and Riabova describes the use of devices such as ‘Gayropa’ in mobilising the Russian populace. However, where Riabova and Riabov’s research focuses predominantly on national mobilisation using discourse, this dissertation considers what the discourse suggests—local ontology or hegemonic strategy—and the implications both domestically and internationally.

1.2

Research Value

This area of study is important given the potential implications for the EU as a ‘normative power’,11 and particularly given ongoing tensions between the EU and Russia. Furthermore, the contribution of gender to Russian political discourse has been under-researched in English, both generally, and specifically as it applies to homosexuality. Research in Russian is also limited. This research extends the work of authors such as Riabova by examining the ontological assumptions and

9 10 11

In this dissertation, sexuality, and therefore homosexuality, is considered part of gender. Other authors on this issue include (Baer 2002; Baer 2009; Rutland 2013; Wilkinson 2014). (Manners 2002)

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normalisation underlying the discourse. It also considers the strategies associated with use of this discourse, particularly regarding Russia’s external relations. In doing so, it engages Diez’ conception of the EU as a ‘normative hegemon’, 12 through examining Russian discourse as part of a hegemonic project.

1.3

Aims and Objectives

This research considers how discourse concerning homosexuality has been used by political elites in Russia, and whether this reflects local ontology and concomitant pathologisation or (counter-)hegemonic strategy.13 It does this by addressing the following objectives: A. Identifying Russian political elite discourse which relates to homosexuality; B. Evaluating this discourse critically against Foucauldian theories of the contribution of pathologisation to power/knowledge structures, and neoGramscian theories of hegemony and counter-hegemony; C. Comparing the Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian frameworks; and

12 13

(Diez 2013); see also (Haukkala 2008). This is presented as ‘(counter-)hegemonic’ strategy, because as will become apparent, the

discourse reflects a hegemonic strategy domestically within Russia, and counter-hegemonic strategy internationally vis-a-vis the EU.

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D. Assessing whether the discourse reflects local ontology or intentional (counter-)hegemonic strategy. Objective A is necessary as it establishes what discourse is being used in Russia in relation to homosexuality, which forms the basis of this research. The context for the research is established in the literature review. Objective B evaluates the discourse from two different perspectives, giving insight into motivations or causes underlying it. Objective C compares these two perspectives in order to establish the strengths and weaknesses of each, and consider which provides the best explanation for the discourse. This research finds that adding a Foucauldian approach to pathologisation to neo-Gramscian conceptions of hegemony and counter-hegemony grants increased insight.

Lastly, Objective D uses the

information gained through the attainment of Objectives A through C in order to establish that the discourse reflects intentional strategy which is bounded by local social ontology. In addressing the above objectives, the dissertation conducts documentary research invoking secondary readings, survey data, and discourse analysis. Secondary readings provide context and inform the theoretical frameworks, while survey data from the Levada Center is used to evaluate Russian public opinion in relation to homosexuality. This acts as a control for elite discourse, evaluating whether it reflects broader public opinion rather than intentional strategy. The discourse

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analysed consists of a purposeful sample of official texts and speeches by Russian political elites. This dissertation argues that Russian political elites use discourse relating to homosexuality in a manner which supports a hegemonic project domestically and counter-hegemonic project internationally, the strategy for which is affected and bounded by local ontology.

1.4

Road Map

The remainder of this document is set out as follows. Chapter 2: Literature review defines key terms, before reviewing existing work on gendered discourse in Russia and on the EU as a normative hegemon. This chapter, in combination with Chapter 3, addresses dissertation Objective A, ‘identify Russian political elite discourse which relates to homosexuality’. Chapter 3: Research Methods describes the dissertation’s research strategy, methodological approach, and the two theoretical frameworks used. Chapters 4 and 5 analyse the results gained against the two frameworks. This addresses dissertation Objective B, ‘evaluate this discourse critically against Foucauldian theories of the contribution of pathologisation to power/knowledge structures, and neo-Gramscian theories of hegemony and counter-hegemony’.

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Chapter 6: The Frameworks Compared compares and contrasts the results of the two frameworks, meeting dissertation Objective C, ‘compare the Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian frameworks’. The implications of the results are then presented, addressing Objective D, ‘assess whether the discourse reflects local ontology or intentional (counter-)hegemonic strategy’. Chapter 7: Conclusion summarises and concludes the paper.

The practical

implications are discussed, and areas for further research highlighted.

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Chapter 2:

Literature review

This chapter defines key terms, then reviews existing work on gender discourse in Russia, in order to site the research in this dissertation. EU perspectives on LGBT rights are briefly discussed, and work on the EU as a ‘normative hegemon’ is reviewed, in order to support the neo-Gramscian framework set out in Chapter 3.

2.1

Definitions

2.1.1 LGBT and Gender ‘LGBT’, ‘gay’ and ‘homosexual’ are used interchangeably in this document. ‘LGBT’ is used as short-hand for other variations on the acronym. Distinction between male and female homosexuals is rarely made in the discourse analysed. Research by Riabova14 and Wilkinson15 suggests that ‘homosexual’ in Russian discourse typically refers to males, due to the deviation from local ‘hegemonic masculinity’, 16 but this is unclear in the discourse analysed. As a

14

(Riabova and Tsalko 2011; Riabov and Riabova 2011)

15

(Wilkinson 2014).

16

See also (Nixon 2003) and (Hall 2003a).

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result, terms such as ‘gay’ or ‘homosexual’ are taken to refer to any gender. 17 Sexuality is understood to constitute part of gender.

2.1.2 ‘The West’, ‘Europe’, and ‘the EU’ Marsh points to an ‘imagined’ or ‘invented’ West, a ‘Russian West’, which doesn’t exist except as a constructed device. 18 In this research, ‘the West’ is taken to include the EU, the USA, Canada, Australasia etc., but is to be understood as a contested, ill-defined, and heterogeneous region which is imagined as per Marsh, and shares a cultural and politically interstitial space with Russia.19 ‘Europe’ is similarly understood as a constructed entity. 20 While ‘Europe’ is referred to extensively in the discourse analysed, it is not clear what that includes. With this caveat, where ‘Europe’ is used in the text, it should be understood to approximate the countries of the European Union, and may also include states belonging to the European Free Trade Area (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and

17

Where distinction is made between ‘homosexuality’ and ‘lesbianism’, no substantive difference

was found in terms of how each group was referred to or pathologised. 18

(Marsh 2007)

19

See also (V. Morozov and Rumelili 2012). (Viatcheslav Morozov 2015) defines ‘the West’ in

relation to its hegemonic position. 20

See for example (Wolff 1994).

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Switzerland). See also 3.3.2 below.

2.1.3 Norms and Values; Identity and Ideology ‘Identity’ is understood as “feelings of ‘we-ness’”, 21 and non-essentialist and pluralist in nature. 22

Values represent ‘should’ statements—standards which

decide what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’—and norms are the practices (rules, guides, expectations) that implement them. Norms and values help to constitute identity, ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’. 23

They are constructed and maintained through

discourse. An ‘ideology’ is understood as a ‘system of ideas and ideals’.24

2.1.4 Hegemony In this research, a ‘hegemon’ is understood as a “leading or paramount power; a dominant state or person”. 25

A hegemon conditions a political or economic

structure in a way that enables it to remain dominant to other groups. A group

21

Definition from (Casier 1998).

22

(Katzenstein 2009)

23

‘Cultural’ and ‘ideological’ hegemony are used interchangeably in this document, though it is

important to note that ‘culture’ a stronger connotation of being attached to a group, forming part of its identity. 24

(Oxford 2016)

25

(Speake and LaFlaur 2002)

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subject to hegemony and unable to affect the hegemonic structure is a ‘subaltern’. A counter-hegemon is a group or body that seeks to displace a hegemony, and may be understood to be actively working against a hegemon, or forming part of a neutrally ‘competing’ hegemonic project. According to Gramsci, hegemony has an ideological component as well as a political or economic one, and this ‘cultural hegemony’26 is required before the other components can be established. Such hegemony relies on consent as well as coercion,27 and is involved in changing conceptions of the normal.2829

2.2

Context: Normative Europe

2.2.1 A ‘Normative’ European Union The EU has been described in several ways, including as ‘normative power

26

‘Ideological hegemony’ and ‘cultural hegemony’ are used interchangeably in the following text.

27

(Hobsbawm 2000)

28

According to Worth, hegemons are also capable of co-option: a strategy whereby “dominant

forces at the centre give certain allowances and certain concession but maintain the hegemonic character of the order in place.” Hegemons are able to incorporate elements of culture and ideologies from potential counter-hegemons, in order to defuse those efforts and ensure their ongoing hegemony (Worth 2015, 162). 29

See also 2.2.2.

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Europe’ 30 (‘NPE’). Manners posits that what the EU lacks in ‘hard’ power, it makes up for with ‘soft power’, including economic and ‘normative’ power. The latter involves spreading the EU’s norms externally, through methods such as conditionality in the EU accession process, and instruments such as Association Agreements with third parties.31 The EU is also posited to have drawing power, whereby other states see its success and attempt to copy it. This is reflected in the plethora of economic unions which have followed an EU model, such as ASEAN and the Eurasian (Economic) Union. Furthermore, states can be forced to comply with EU norms and regulations due to its market size.32

2.2.2 The EU as a Normative Hegemon In contrast to Manners, Diez proposes that the EU is a normative hegemon, using the Gramscian understanding of a hegemon as a body with the power to change “what is considered normal” beyond its borders. 33 This reformulation of NPE removes the artificial division between norms and interests; takes away the idea

30

This concept was introduced by Ian Manners, following Duchene’s earlier work on the EU as a

‘civilian power’ (Manners 2002; Manners 2013; Orbie 2006; R. G. Whitman 2013). 31

(Haukkala 2008)

32

See (Damro 2012) on the EU as a ‘market power’.

33

(Diez 2013)

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that the EU subscribes to international norms irrespective of consequences, instead suggesting ‘hegemonic struggles’ whereby the EU’s norms are contested both internally and externally34; avoids the pitfall of NPE as a purely academic exercise; and stops the confusion of ‘normative’ power Europe as explanatory, descriptive, and a normative principle. It incorporates the Gramscian conception of hegemony through ‘consent’.35 Williams agrees with the idea of hegemonic struggles, arguing that “hegemony is not singular…its own internal structures are highly complex, and have continually to be renewed, recreated and defended; and by the same token…they can be continually challenged and in certain respects modified.” 36

According to him,

hegemony is not unitary and is subject to contestation. Presenting the EU as a regional normative hegemon, rather than as ‘NPE’, may also assist in investigating Eurocentrism. Manners suggests that the EU should spread its norms as a normative power37. Meanwhile, Rahman claims that EU politicians

34

With the notion of ‘hegemonic struggle’ in mind, Diez suggests that a focus on hegemony “put[s]

the politics of normative power at centre stage”, and further suggests that normative discourses can affect the identity of actors “within a normative power’s sphere of influence”. (Diez 2013, 196) 35

I.e. a hegemon implements Lukes’ ‘third face’ of power. See (Lukes 2004).

36

(Williams 1980, 38). See also 2.2.3.

37

Other suggestions revolve around the EU’s norms being spread for strategic security reasons, as

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see the EU as superior to other states in terms of its norms and values, and therefore it is natural that other states should implement the EU’s solutions in their local environments.38 This is despite the heterogeneity within the EU’s Member States themselves—for example, in relation to tolerance of same-sex marriage or LGBT communities.39

2.2.3 The EU and LGBT Rights Norms Rahman utilises notions of the EU as a (post)colonial power in combination with ideas reminiscent of those of Diez’ neo-Gramscianism in arguing that the EU undertakes ‘homocolonial’ activities. He argues that the EU’s export of LGBT rights and norms through measures such as Association Agreements constitutes a civilising mission by the EU.

He also claims that by presenting EU

in the case of the European Security Strategy, Neighbourhood Policy, and desire for a ‘ring of friends’. (European Commission 2004; R. Whitman and Wolff 2010) 38

(Rahman 2014). See also (Bjorkdahl 2005; Headley 2012; Headley 2015; Fisher-Onar and

Nicolaidis 2013) 39

(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2012) indicates wide differences.

For

example, in response to the question “In your opinion, how widespread are expressions of hatred and aversion towards lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or transgender in public in the country where you live?”, 47% of Bulgarian respondents responded that it was “Very Widespread”, compared to 3% of Danes. Note that respondents self-identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender.

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‘exceptionalism’ 40 in relation to LGBT rights as a matter of an ‘advanced’ EU identity, the EU and its Member States are more likely to further LGBT rights internally. This helps to overcome the internal ‘hegemonic struggles’ of which Diez speaks, while at the same time entrenching identities as oppositional, and perhaps risks alienating third states. This in turn can lead to external hegemonic struggles.

2.2.4 Opposing Europe? Rosalind Marsh illustrates that by the late 90s, Western “cultural forms and lifestyles were coming to be increasingly perceived as an alien imposition”. The focus had shifted from perestroika-era discourse about ‘how to save Russia’, to suspicion as to the West’s agenda, and finally to emergence of a messianic Russia with its own destiny. By the early twenty-first century, Russian “national-patriots” were attacking Western values on several bases, including its “[p]erverted sexual practices”. However, Marsh stresses that these accusations targeted an imagined opponent, as in reality, “Russian and Western culture have been drawn closer together by their shared condition of postmodernity”, due to the “collapse of all

40

He notes that the EU is the only intergovernmental organisation to include LGBT issues in its

regulations.

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‘grand narratives’”.41 Authors such as Morozov 42 and Huntington 43 disagree with Marsh, with the former arguing that Russia is subaltern to a hegemonic West, while Huntington essentialises cultural differences between ‘civilisations’.

Morozov, amongst

others, argues that ‘European’ norms are being mistaken for ‘universal’ norms, and that international society is characterised by Eurocentrism. According to him, Russia has been ‘colonised’ by the normative language of the West, Europe, and international society.44 Head of Russia’s Council on Security and Foreign Policy, Sergey Karagonov, suggests that the “competition is not over”, and that

“[s]tates that are liberal-democratic yet economically weak must automatically orient themselves to the West and follow in the

41

Here she references Lyotard’s ‘postmodern condition’, (Lyotard, Bennington, and Massumi

1984). 42

(Viatcheslav Morozov 2015)

43

(Huntington 1993)

44

This is despite the fact that the Soviet Union and Russia as its successor state participated in

forming international laws and norms. See also (Merlingen 2007), who claims that the EU’s ‘normative mission’ is characterised by Eurocentric epistemic violence.

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wake of its policy. However, if another model proves successful, some states will have an opportunity to reorient themselves...”45 Whether the EU is or is not a normative hegemon may not be as important as the perception that it is. 46 The second framework associated with this dissertation therefore questions whether Russian political elite discourse represents a counterhegemonic effort vis-à-vis the EU.

2.3

Context: Russia and Gender

2.3.1 Russia and Gender Discourse The ‘gendering’ of Russian politics has been considered by Tatiana Riabova, who claims that gender norms are intentionally used by Russian political elites in two ways.

These are ensuring legitimisation of the regime and the retention of

domestic political power, and the construction of a Russian identity which features ‘traditional values’ in opposition to those being spread by the EU.47 Rutland suggests that gender as a frame of analysis and mobilisation arose in Russia at the time of the ‘Pussy Riot affair’.

45

(Karaganov 2007, 29–30)

46

See 3.4.2.2 and footnote 118.

47

(Riabov and Riabova 2014a)

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This concerned the now infamous

18


performance by the band Pussy Riot at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, where they sang about needing the Virgin Mary to save them by chasing away Putin. Three of the women faced trial on charges of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred. During the trial, the three were depicted as failing in some ‘womanly’ way. Two were ‘bad mothers’ for putting the politics of the band ahead of their children, while a third was criticised for not having children.48 This took place during a period in which mass dometic protests against Putin’s regime were underway. Sharafutdinova and Riabova argue that Putin’s regime needed a new way to legitimise itself, as the previous justification—restoration of state power—was no longer appropriate. 49 According to Sharafutdinova, “the Russian public no longer saw that as reason to tolerate another six years of Putin as president”, and the ‘sluggish’ recovery after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis meant that the improvement to living standards which had previously buoyed Putin’s popularity could no longer be relied upon to provide legitimacy. A change in discourse resulted: state-restoration and improved living standards would now be replaced by discourse incorporating gender norms under the flag of ‘traditional

48

(Rutland 2013)

49

(Riabova and Tsalko 2011; Riabov and Riabova 2011; Riabov and Riabova 2014b; Riabova 2014;

Sharafutdinova 2014)

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values’.50 Following the Pussy Riot court decision, Putin said that “[o]ne must not erode our moral foundation and undermine the country”. 51

A link was thereby made

between the gender failures of the women in Pussy Riot, the values of which the Orthodox Church was guardian, and the survival of the country. The state was to be understood as having a moral base, rather than just a political one, and its identity was linked to norms. Johnson52 and Riabova suggest that the gendering of Russian politics and national identity goes back further than Pussy Riot. Johnson claims that Putin’s legitimacy relied on a heavily masculinised image from the start. Riabova points to the identification of 1990s Russia with a prostitute or weak woman, as opposed to the stronger, more ‘masculine’ Western powers. 53

However, while gender-based

discourse may have been used at that time, Riabova argues that today “the gender dimension has become one of the most important aspects of allegations levelled

50

(Wilkinson 2014; Moss 2015)

51

(Rutland 2013), citing (Elder 2012).

52

(Johnson 2013)

53

(Riabova and Tsalko 2011)

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against the West”, 54 and that concepts such as ‘Gayropa’ help to support the collective identity of Russians.

Wilkinson points at Russia’s ‘sovereign

democracy’ as now supplemented by ‘sovereign morality’.55 In the former case, Russia would implement international norms relating to ‘democracy’, but interpret them in its own way. Wilkinson argues that with the advent of sovereign morality, Russia aims to lever international human rights norms in a way that will allow for local, rather than a universal, interpretation.56 Is localisation necessary in order to support different ontological understandings,

57

or do proposals for such

localisation actually represent contested hegemony in the normative sphere?

2.3.2 The Role of ‘Blue’ Discourse in Russia As well as writing about the general ‘gendering’ of Russian politics, Riabova has researched the role of ‘Gayropa’ in mobilising the Russian populace.58 She argues

54

(Riabov and Riabova 2014a). Emphasis added.

55

(Okara 2007, 12), writing years prior to the discourse examined in this dissertation, said that “The

basic

difference

between

‘sovereign

democracy’

and

‘official

narodnost’’

spirit/nationality] is the absence of a spiritual benchmark of some kind.”

[national

Such a ‘spiritual

benchmark’ could be represented by discourse around ‘traditional values’, with the support of the Orthodox Church. 56

(Wilkinson 2014); see also (European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice

Commission) 2013; Rahman 2014) 57

Noting that ontological understandings are subject to change, as per Foucault.

58

(Riabov and Riabova 2013)

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that this concept paints Europe as a normative ‘other’ against which Russia can be depicted as stronger and (morally) superior.

The main effects of this are to

legitimise Putin’s regime and to consolidate power domestically. Alexei Navalny, in his campaign for Moscow mayor, was depicted as being the Europe-friendly champion of LGBT people and other ‘abnormal’ groups. Opposition in Russia was therefore marked by both national betrayal and gender deviance. Riabov and Riabova note one questionnaire participant, who asked, “Does this mean that if you support Navalny, you’re gay?”—sexual preferences are identified with political ones and vice versa. This weaponises LGBT discourse and opens the possibility of use in discrediting opposition and mobilising citizens.59 Riabova suggests that these are ideas are mobilised through “indirect methods” such as the manipulation of values and symbols. She claims that while the concept of the ‘decadent West’ during the 90s and 2000s did incorporate the superiority of the Russian family and gender norms, Europe started to be portrayed as “in charge” of “gender abnormalities” from 2013, during the French debate on the legalisation of same-sex marriage.60 The alleged destruction of ‘normal’ gender order through legalisation of same-sex

59


60

See (Neumann 1998; Malinova 2014) on the Slavophile/Westerniser divide and the different

positions of ‘Russia’ to the ‘West’ and to ‘Europe’.

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marriage, the growth of feminism, and derogation of the family as a social institution, are in turn portrayed as leading to the decline of European civilisation. Europe is ‘condemning itself’ to geopolitical defeat by Islamic civilisation, and should the ‘gender abnormalities’ of European society permeate Russia, it would lead to the downfall of the Russian democratic state at the hand of ‘gay fascists’, as well as to the moral decline of Russia.61

2.4

Emerging Issues and the Need for Empirical Research

While Riabova in particular considers the use of LGBT discourse in mobilisation and in contributing to a Russian nationalist discourse, as well as the proposed threat of ‘European’ gender norms to the integrity of Russian state and society, she does not investigate how this discourse arises, is selected, or used. Likewise, little attention is given to the ontology underlying it, or how the discourse informs Russia’s international strategy. At the same time, the EU has been presented as a normative regional hegemon, and a source of Western or Eurocentric ‘universal’ norms.

Little research has

addressed ‘countering’ such a normative hegemon, specifically in relation to

61


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sexuality and gender norms, and this research attempts to redress these gaps.

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Chapter 3:

Research Methods

This chapter outlines the dissertation’s research strategy, methodology and data collection techniques; evaluates the limitations and assumptions associated with the research; and presents the two frameworks used for analysis.

3.1

Research Strategy

This dissertation applies a combined documentary research strategy which consists of secondary readings, use of survey data, and case studies with a cross-sectional element.62 Major secondary readings are presented in the literature review above. They assisted in siting the current research, identifying gaps in knowledge, and locating data sources for analysis, supporting Objective A. Survey data from the Levada Center was included to provide ontological background for political discourse. Data included or was tagged ‘LGBT’, ‘gay’,

62

Bryman points out that a research strategy based on a case study typically includes just one ‘case’,

whereas a cross-sectional research strategy looks at multiple cases in order to look at variation. This dissertation uses three actors as ‘cases’, though is concerned with the content of those cases rather than variation between them. Furthermore, these cases are from a single community (the Russian political elite). (Bryman 2004, 59, 66)

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‘same-sex’ or ‘homosexual’ (in Russian) on the Russian-language version of the centre’s website.63 Lastly, several case studies were used in addressing Objectives B and C. The case studies’ setting was the Russian political elite, and three parties—Vladimir Putin, Vitaly Milonov and United Russia—were selected as representatives of this body (see 3.2).

3.1.1 Why a Case Study? Bryman defines a case study as “the intensive study by ethnography or qualitative interviewing of a single case, which may be an organisation, life, family, or community.” The intention is to “probe deeply and to analyse intensely the multifarious phenomena” associated with the case. 64 Alternately, Yin defines a case study as “an empirical enquiry that (a) Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when (b) The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”65 Under this definition, the nature of a case study as ‘in-depth’ is not as apparent.

63 64 65

See also ‘thesaurus’ in footnote 76. (Cohen and Manion 2000) cited in (Biggam 2011, 118) (NB 1995 printing cited). (Yin 2003, 13) cited in (Biggam 2011); bullet points replaced.

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However, with its second clause it addresses the research question underlying this dissertation, as it relates to pathologisation and ontology. As will become apparent in the discussion below, it is unclear in the first instance whether the discourse of Russian political elites reflects the power/knowledge structures of society, or arises as a strategy separate to this knowledge—the boundaries between the phenomenon of discourse and the ontological context in which it takes place are not defined. Furthermore, given that the empirical research in this study is concerned with the in-depth evaluation (Objective B: “evaluating this discourse critically…”) of cases from a single community in a single period of time, a case study research strategy is appropriate irrespective of whether Cohen and Manion or Yin’s definitions and associated purposes are applied. Bryman highlights the criteria against which any social science research must be measured: reliability, replicability, and validity.66 These are ensured (insofar as possible) in this research in the following manner: Reliability

The concepts used—for example, hegemony—are defined and related to existing theoretical work.

Analysis was

completed by one researcher over three consecutive days,

66

(Bryman 2004, 47)

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and pieces compared and checked for coding consistency. Static data was used. Replicability

The data collection methods used are detailed and justified, and all sources listed.67

Validity68

Internal validity: The issue of causality is addressed directly using two different frameworks. External validity: Gerring69 suggests that the results of a case study may be used to understand “a larger class of (similar) units”.

The cases selected are understood to

belong to the same community in terms of political structures within Russia, and as such, generalisability is enhanced. An effort has been made to further enhance this through the use of ‘exemplifying cases’.70 See also 3.2.

67 68

See Annex II for full results and sources. Measurement and ecological validity were evaluated as having little relevance for this research.

69

Cited in (Bryman 2004, 342).

70

(Bryman 2004)

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3.1.2 Discourse Analysis Discourse analysis was used for the case studies, in accordance with Objective B. This analysis was inter-textual, and utilised content analysis of individual texts as well as considering the trends between them. The data collection technique used is presented in the following section.

3.2

Data Collection Techniques for Empirical Research

For the case studies, it was elected to limit data to the period 2012-2015, which incorporated several events involving gay rights in Russia and in the EU-Russia geographical area more generally: the Magnitsky Act and Yakovlev Acts 71 and associated reactions; the ‘anti-propaganda law’ in St Petersburg and then in the Russian Federation;72 the reaction to same-sex marriage decisions in France; the Sochi Winter Olympics; Navalny’s campaign for Moscow mayor; and geopolitical events between the EU and Russia in relation to Crimea and Ukraine. Discourse analysed consisted of purposively selected pieces which related to

71

Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act

of 2012 and On Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation Act 2012 respectively. (Russian Federation 2012; United States Congress 2012) 72

See (Decker 2013).

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homosexuality. All pieces selected were of Russian origin, from official sources, or published in Russian media. Key actors in this area of discourse were established in the secondary readings, and a ‘snowball’-inspired approach 73 was used to locate relevant Russian political elites.

74

Each of these actors was investigated for their input and

representativeness, and Vladimir Putin and Vitaly Milonov were chosen for case studies. Putin was selected as Russia’s President, and Milonov due to his role in initiating the St Petersburg ‘gay propaganda’ law. He was also awarded a medal “For Service to the Fatherland” by Putin, for reasons including his “active lawmaking efforts”.75 United Russia as the dominant political party was identified as a noteworthy collective actor for study. Discourse from each of these three actors consisted of the following: Putin’s speeches and interviews concerning homosexuality76 from the Kremlin’s official

73

“With this approach to sampling, the researcher makes initial contact with a small group…and

then uses these to establish contacts with others” (Bryman 2004, 202) 74

See Annex I; note that actors from the political establishment were privileged over those from

the Russian Orthodox Church. 75 76

(Luhn 2015) A bank of search terms was created and used for both the Kremlin and United Russia’s websites.

These terms were gay (гей), LGBT (ЛГБТ), homosexual (гомосексуалист), homosexuality (гомосексуализм), same-sex (однополый and other-gendered forms), light blue (голобой).

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website, reflecting the President’s official stance (N=11), located by searching the Kremlin’s document collection; news articles about United Russia hosted on its website at er.ru, located by searching (N=45, including duplications of three of Putin’s speeches); and quotes by Vitaly Milonov. Milonov does not have an official webpage, but is frequently quoted in media. Articles (N=20) were located using Google News Aggregator77 by searching ‘Vitaly Milonov gay Europe’78 in Russian within the ranges 1 January–31 January for the years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. The first five top-level aggregated items for each year were selected, reflecting the article’s popularity and the reputability of the news source.79 These

77

There are three major aggregators, Google News, Yandex News, and Yahoo! News. Yahoo!’s

search return was minimal, and Yandex’s archive was not well aggregated and appeared to include articles of all quality and popularity. It was also difficult to search by date. Google News’ Aggregator on the other hand has technical and quality guidelines which articles must fulfil in order to be included, such as ‘journalistic standards’, ‘authority’, and ‘accountability’ (Google News Help 2016). Similar stories are grouped together, and articles are ranked based on “how often and on what sites a story appears online”. Further, “stories are sorted without regard to political viewpoint or ideology” (Google News 2013). 78

‘Виталий милогов гей европа’. ‘Europe’ was included in the search terms following review

of the first five of each of Putin’s and United Russia’s pieces. Europe appeared as the preponderant third party, and given the assumptions underlying this dissertation—I.e. that ‘Europe’ is a plausible normative hegemon—this search phrase was used in order to gain further data regarding the ideological interaction between the two parties in political discourse. 79

‘Incognito Mode’ on Google’s Chrome browser was utilised for searches, so that results would

not be skewed by user-tailored customisation.

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They may have been marginally altered via

31


Russian-language articles are presumed to be those with the highest distribution and popularity on the topic for those years, and as such were understood to have the highest validity as sources. They were examined for quotes by Mr Milonov, and this discourse analysed.

3.2.1 Preliminary Results—Data Collected This section shows which data were collected. Table 1 shows the pieces analysed for each actor, including information about the language, presumed intended audience, and source. Table 1: Pieces analysed, by actor

PIECES (∑=76)

PUTIN

UNITED RUSSIA

MILONOV

11

45

20

Russian

Russian

Domestic

Domestic

English, officially LANGUAGE

translated from Russian

AUDIENCE80

International;

regionalisation, but the region-free version of Google News (secure.google.com) did not provide adequate aggregation. 80

The intended audiences for each piece of discourse are understood to be the Russian public in the

first instance. Putin’s speeches were presented to international audiences and translated into

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domestic SOURCE

Kremlin.ru

ER.ru

news.google.com

Three of Putin’s speeches were cross-posted to the United Russia website, and these are included in the figures for ‘United Russia’ above, but were not coded twice. Unless indicated otherwise, the duplicate entries have not been included in the remainder of the tables and figures in this document. The following figures plot the discourse analysed along a timeline. Figure 1 shows Milonov’s discourse. Figure 2 plots Putin’s discourse against several major events domestically and internationally. Lastly, Figure 3 is a timeline of all analysed discourse from Putin and United Russia against major domestic and international events.81

English to increase their audience internationally, so it is assumed that the audience included these groups as well as Russian constituents. Vitaly Milonov is a regional actor, though is referred to at national level.

Nevertheless, due to his stature, his audience is presumed to be narrower

domestically. 81

Because samples for Milonov were purposively selected on the basis of five items per year rather

than including the entirety of his discourse for the period 2012-2015, this data is not included on the timeline, as it would give potentially misleading results.

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Figure 1: Timeline of discourse from Milonov

Figure 2: Timeline of discourse from Putin

Figure 3: Timeline of discourse from Putin and United Russia, combined

3.2.2 Supplementary Data—Time Period As per 3.2, data collected for discourse analysis was limited to the period 2012 – 2015. However, Figure 3 suggests a possible correlation between the appearance of discourse about homosexuality and internal unrest within Russia. To assist in

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verifying the correlation, further data was collected as follows:82 a) United Russia: The same search parameters were used as for initial data collection, but with no limit on the publish dates for returned data. An additional six articles were located, dated between 19 August 2011 and 5 December 2011. The earliest news article on the United Russia website is dated 9 June 2010, and the archive includes a total of 71776 articles between that date and the end of 31 December 2015. b) Vladimir Putin: One further piece was found using the techniques listed above, and was dated 1 February 2007. The additional data relating to United Russia was added to that in Figure 3, to give an updated timeline (Figure 4):83

Figure 4: Timeline of discourse from United Russia and Putin, including that prior to 2012

82

The content associated with these additional data points was not analysed.

83

The additional piece for Putin was not plotted, as it was several years beforehand.

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As seen in the timeline in Figure 4, instances of discourse relating to homosexuality or homosexual propaganda appear to correlate with domestic protests against Putin and United Russia.84 Over the roughly 20-month period of protests, there were 56 instances of discourse, while in the following approximately 29-month period, there were just 21.85 Had the discourse been present at the same frequency during the latter period, 81 pieces would have been expected.

3.3

Limitations and Assumptions86

The methodology above has several weaknesses. Firstly, case studies are not inherently externally valid, and measures have been taken to address this (3.1.1). Secondly, issues of author normativity and social ontology could have affected the outcome of analysis. As per Saussure, 87 language is not a closed system, but includes an element of interpretation. As such, the discourse analysed would be interpreted by its audience, and was also interpreted for meaning in the process of

84

Instances were not analysed to establish which, if any, third parties were pathologised in

connection with homosexuality over this time span. 85

The three duplications are not included in these figures, but fell within the 20-month period of

protests. Dates used are 4 December 2011 to 18 July 2013. (Wikipedia 2016) 86

Incompatibilities between the underpinnings of the two theoretical frameworks are considered in

3.4.4 and Chapter 5. 87

(Hall 2003c, 45)

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research. The interpretation of the researcher is assumed to be similar to that of pieces’ intended audience. To help ensure this, particular attention was paid to ontological statements in the text, and to appropriately coding all statements associated with homosexuality (so that, for example, instances of both pathologisation and normalisation of homosexuality in the discourse were included and analysed against the theoretical frameworks). Thirdly, all source texts, barring Putin’s officially translated speeches, were in Russian. Care was taken in translation, particularly with regard to connotation. Any ambiguities were noted (see 3.3.1). Limitations and assumptions associated with the word ‘propaganda’, references in the discourse to ‘Europe’, the normative ‘status quo’, and presence or otherwise of ‘domestic alternatives’ are explored below.

3.3.1 ‘Propaganda’ While in English, ‘propaganda’ has a negative connotation, that is not necessarily the case in Russian, where the meaning is closer to ‘strong information’. In ‘good health propaganda’, ‘propaganda’ has a positive connotation because it is referring to something positive, while if it is referring to something negative, then ‘propaganda’ also becomes a negative term. As such, ‘homosexual propaganda’ only has a negative connotation in Russian if homosexuality itself is considered

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negative. For this reason, appearances of ‘propaganda’ in the discourse were coded separately to value judgement-related instances of ‘homosexuality’, whether positive or negative in nature.

As seen in 4.2, homosexuality is typically

pathologised in the discourse. Furthermore, ‘homosexual propaganda’ appears frequently in conjunction with ‘paedophile propaganda’, as both the St Petersburg and Federal laws were repeatedly colloquially referred to as ‘laws against the “propaganda

of

homosexuality

and

(propaganda

of)

paedophilia”’.

Homosexuality is therefore assumed to be a generally negative concept in the discourse, and ‘homosexual propaganda’ considered to have a negative connotation.

3.3.2 Europe or the EU? The European Union was referred to by name on just two occasions in the discourse analysed. EU Member States appeared 22 times, in 14 pieces of the discourse, and ‘Europe’ was used on 27 occasions, in 16 pieces. No regions outside of the European Union but on the European continent 88 were referred to. This may

88

See (Wolff 1994, chap. Introduction) regarding the different ways in which ‘Europe’ can be

construed. See also (Favell 2006; Katzenstein 2009)

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suggest several things—the idea of ‘Europe’ as ‘imagined’; 89 or that the term ‘Europe’ is synonymous with the EU or parts thereof. Using context clues in the discourse, it is assumed that ‘Europe’ is used to refer to the EU, even if the ‘EU’ spoken of constitutes an imagined other.90

3.3.3 The ‘Status Quo’ and the Search for a Hegemon A (neo-)Gramscian framework assumes that the hegemon is spreading and/or normalising its own ideology, and that this ideology is reflected in the ‘status quo’. Domestically within Russia, the hegemon is assumed to be the ruling classes or regime, and so the ideology spread by that group—as reflected in the discourse— is that of the domestic hegemon.

Internationally, given the prevalence of

references to ‘Europe’ in the discourse, existing literature on the EU as hegemonic (2.2), and Russia presenting itself normatively in opposition to Europe (2.3), the

89

(Marsh 2007). Morozov and Rumelili suggest that ‘Europe’ is partially constituted by Russia

as its ‘liminal other’ (V. Morozov and Rumelili 2012), while Said’s research suggests that ‘Europe’ could be produced as an object of study and reference within the analysed discourse (Said 2003; Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 2008). In the same way that ‘Europe’ produced the ‘Orient’, the discourse in Russia could be producing ‘Europe’. Said relates such an idea to Gramscian hegemony ‘of ideas’. 90

Note also that ‘Gayropa’ suggests a unified ‘Europe’ on LGBT issues, which is not the case.

This gives credence to the notion of the Europe as at least partially imagined.

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EU is assumed to be a regional hegemon in the normative sphere. See also 5.1.2.

3.3.4 Domestic Alternatives The discourse of Russians outside the ruling party is not analysed. This means that the positions and understandings of other political elites, possible opposition parties, or subaltern groups is not evaluated. As such, secondary readings were used to gain insight into their discourse. Riabova and Sperling claim that these groups use similar gendered forms of discourse to that used by the actors analysed. Sperling investigated the lyrics of Pussy Riot and found homophobia and the same gender norms as those used by the political elite. Riabova and Riabov argue that “the political opposition used gender rhetoric to delegitimate power during the protest movement of 2011-2013”.91 As such, it is assumed in this research that discursive alternates are not apparent domestically within Russia.

3.4

Frameworks for Data Analysis

The data collected was interpreted using two different frameworks. The first of these is Foucault-inspired, and used in order to consider the relationship between power, language, and knowledge. The second is based on neo-Gramscian notions

91

(Riabov and Riabova 2014b; Sperling 2014)

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of counter-hegemony, and relates to Diez’ conception of the European Union as a ‘normative hegemon’. The two are used in conjunction to provide depth to the analysis, enabling the consideration of both ontology and counter-hegemonic strategy. Each understands meaning as “constructed in and through language”,92 and as neither fixed nor absolute.

3.4.1 Framework 1: Foucault and Pathologisation According to Foucault, discourse is “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about - a way of representing the knowledge about - a particular topic at a particular historical moment”. 93 It includes language and practice, and both “defines and produces the objects of our knowledge”. 94 It governs how conduct is regulated, and what is and is not acceptable. A ‘discursive formation’ means the rules that govern discourse, and also refers to a set of discourse sharing the “same patterns of concerns, perspectives, concepts, or themes”. 95

92 93

This dissertation considers the discursive formation surrounding

(Hall 2003c, 15) (Hall 2003c, 44) citing “Hall, 1992, p. 291”. He does not appear to include the source in his

references. 94

Emphasis added.

95

(Chandler and Munday 2014). See also (Wallace 2013).

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homosexuality as seen in the discourse of Russian political elite. This includes the rules surrounding what may and may not be said, as well as the totality of the speech acts themselves. The sum of all discursive formations associated with a given period is known as the ‘episteme’.96 An episteme is unique to a particular place at a particular period of time.

3.4.1.1 Pathology Foucault’s ‘Madness and Civilization’ highlights the link between discourse, power and knowledge. 97

He points at different conceptions of ‘insanity’ between

historical epochs, arguing that time, the discourse—the language and practice— around insanity changed. Instead of being understood as a quasi-animal state, the only solution to which was confinement, insanity became a medical condition, a ‘pathology’ which could be treated through expert body of knowledge known as psychiatric medicine. 98

This body of knowledge is associated with power

structures—some people, such as trained psychiatrists, are privileged over others, such as laymen.

96

This with more power are privileged to speak, such that

The “accepted mode of acquiring and arranging knowledge” (Baldick 2015).

97

(Foucault 1971)

98

Insanity is thereby “the result of a signifying practice”, which produces meaning.

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psychiatrists are able to decide who joins their ranks at the top of the power structure, through practices such as peer review and examination. A related power structure is that of ‘justice’, as laws govern institutions and patient rights. A person who is ‘insane’ according to the relevant body of knowledge and associated power structure is ‘subject’ in terms of their diagnosis, treatment and institution, and also a subject of the overall discourse and associated body of knowledge. That is, any given citizen can understand what it means to be ‘insane’ or ‘sane’, demonstrating they are subject to their culture’s structures of ‘power/knowledge’, 99 and may also be subject to treatment under this regime should they be declared insane. Foucault’s notion of a literal ‘pathology’—that of insanity—is key to the first framework used in analysing the selected Russian political elite discourse. The discourse is analysed according to what is pathologised and what is normalised, and ontological statements are marked. The intention is to understand the structure of knowledge associated with the discourse, and the distribution of power that results.

99

For Foucault, power and knowledge are so inextricably entwined that they are typically captured

in the combined term ‘power/knowledge’. According to him (Foucault and Sheridan 1977, 27), “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations”.

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3.4.1.2 Epistemes and Discontinuity of Discourse Foucault examined boundaries between epistemes using a historicist approach which considered change over time, by focusing on radical breaks or discontinuities. Such breaks are associated with an alteration in one or more discursive formations.100 According to Hall, “culture is concerned with the production and the exchange of meanings…between the members of a society or group.” Meaning, meanwhile, “gives us a sense of our own identity”, 101 and helps to regulate and organise conduct and practices.

Each of these concepts is tied up in Foucault’s

power/knowledge structures and nature of the subject. Under Hall’s definitions, different epistemes, featuring different discursive formations, may exist not just between historical periods, but also between different cultures at the same time. As such, the ‘discontinuity of discourse’ associated with a break in epistemes as considered by Foucault may also be applied to alternate cultures as constructed through the discourse itself.

100

See (Foucault 1970; Foucault 1991, 56–59).

101

(Hall 2003c, 2–3)

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3.4.1.3 A Role for the Elite? Foucault focused on a productive power ‘between’ rather than ‘power over’: all are subject to power/knowledge structures. However, he does not deny that those at the ‘top’ of power structures have a certain capability to shape associated structures, through the medium of discourse—they may be able to mobilise existing societal knowledge in a way that benefits them. Nevertheless, as subjects of the episteme, elites must operate within its limits or ‘regime of truth’. They can never be outside of power/knowledge as its “source and author”.102

3.4.1.4 Approach Taken Foucault did not outline a specific method for discourse analysis, and as such this approach draws from Foucault,103 Hall, and Thomson.104 Hall recommends that the following are identified:(Hall 2003c, 45–46) 1. Statements which provide knowledge about the topic;

102

(Hall 2003c, 55). See also (Heller 1996, 79), who claimed that at least some resistance—and

therefore agency—is possible under a Foucauldian framework (“...resistance to power...is structurally guaranteed for Foucault by the reversibility of power-mechanisms and the heterogeneous process(es) of subjectification”). 103

Particularly (Foucault 1970; Foucault 1971; Foucault 1976; Foucault and Sheridan 1977).

104

(Thomson 2011). See also (McLaren 2009).

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2. What is and what is not acceptable—I.e. what is ‘normalised’ and what is ‘pathologised’; 3. The ‘subjects’ who personify the discourse and associated attributes, given knowledge constructed on the topic; 4. How this knowledge acquires authority or truth; 5. Practices for regulating the conduct of subjects; 6. The possible boundaries to the episteme or discursive foundation. This scheme is applied in this research by firstly identifying statements which relate to homosexuality in the discourse (1). Trends in what is being pathologised and normalised are identified.

Areas of ontological understanding—I.e. what is

homosexuality105—are noted, and compared to survey data which indicate the state of knowledge (2). The nature of the subject is then elucidated (3), and (4)–(6) are

105

In his ‘archaeological’ theoretical framework, Foucault argued that a distinction can be made

between objective reality and the meanings constructed by discourse (Foucault 1970). This means that items such as gender and sexuality may have a basis in external fact as well as social construction. (Howarth 2000, 61) claims Foucault’s distinction is unconvincing, but it does imply that a researcher can be detached from the discourse they are analysing (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 102–3). This, and the reflexibility of the researcher, is assumed to be the case for this piece of research.

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discussed based on these observations. Analysis against Framework 1 is presented in Chapter 4.

3.4.2 Framework 2: Neo-Gramscianism and (Counter-)Hegemony The second framework used to analyse data is based on neo-Gramscian ideas of hegemony. 106

Robert Cox applied Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ to the

international sphere, and suggested that the original impetus behind an ideology arises from a leading or dominant state.107 He argued that even though “a state might have the power to lead and structure an international system,108 it still needs to build forms of consent and an ideological framework to enable it to succeed”.109 Ideology remains key to establishing dominance in other areas.

3.4.2.1 Discourse and the Elite Gramsci described two types of elite—traditional and organic ‘intellectuals’. The former category includes traditional elites such as politicians, while the latter

106

Gramsci was generally statist in outlook, and focused on economic classes due to his Marxist

heritage. His ideas have since been developed by other authors. 107

(Cox 1987)

108

I.e. has traditional forms of ‘hard’ power.

109

Worth citing Cox. (Cox 1981; Cox 1983; Worth 2015, 13)

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includes civil society actors such as churches, academics, and non-governmental organisations. Each of these groups has a role to play in ensuring consensus and therefore domination by the hegemonic ideology, including via their discourse practices.110 Religion and popular culture are often engaged in order to build a successful hegemonic—or counter-hegemonic—project.111

3.4.2.2 Countering and Competing with Hegemony According to Worth, a counter-hegemonic movement is one which “seek[s] to challenge the form and content of the existing order, and to replace it with an alternative model”.112 However, there are different types of ‘counter-’ hegemonic movements: ‘counter-’ may suggest that such a movement is acting against something, or it could be that a hegemonic project is competing with an existing hegemonic project,113 without the judgement-laden quality suggested by the word ‘against’. This latter type of counter-hegemonic movement will not necessarily seek to replace the ‘existing order’, as international order in particular is able to

110

‘Discourse’ in a Foucauldian sense, I.e. words and practices.

111

(Worth 2015)

112

For this paragraph, see (Worth 2015, 150–151, 168).

113

Gramsci used the idea of competing rather than counter hegemonic projects. See (Gramsci,

Hoare, and Smith 1971; Hobsbawm 2000; Worth 2015)

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support multiple simultaneous hegemonies.114115

3.4.2.3 Approach Taken Worth claims that a counter-hegemonic movement must have three things: “(a) a clear ideological alternative to the current status quo; 116 (b) support from civil society that can be mobilised at different levels; and (c) a popular appeal which can challenge the overriding common sense of a specific order”.117 This research will add one further category: group identification. A counterhegemonic movement presupposes the existence of an identity, which has been

114

Establishing which type of counter-hegemonic movement is associated with the discourse

analysed herein is outside the scope of this research. 115

Gramsci used the Machiavellian ‘War of Movement’ and ‘War of Position’ to outline counter-

hegemonic strategies. The former is utilises revolution, and Worth gives the example of the Occupy movement in 2011–2012 as such a ‘war’. The latter is a longer process, in which ideas are “discussed, contested, challenged, replaced and defended”, which is reminiscent of Williams’ theory of the constant contestation of hegemonic order (see 2.2.2). A key strategy used by hegemons in defusing counter-hegemonic movements is the co-option of ideas from that movement—ideological hegemony is subject to change. Worth claims that predominant ideas contested in such a struggle are those associated with the media, popular culture, and religion. He points at the political mobilisation of popular nationalism in supporting a counter-hegemonic effort. 116

Even if a hegemonic project is more ‘competing’ than ‘counter’ (see 3.4.2.2), an ideological

alternative to other hegemonic projects is necessary. ‘Changing the status quo’ may not be required in such an instance, as international order can allow for multiple simultaneous hegemonies. 117

(Worth 2015, 150)

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shaped at least in part by extant hegemonic structures.118 Hence, the selected discourse will be analysed for four properties—Worth’s three plus group identification—with the support of secondary readings and survey data. The initial phase of this analysis will be 1. Identifying opposition parties within the discourse, including potential hegemonic, counter-hegemonic and subaltern groups; and 2. Identifying ideological alternatives present in the text. Analysis against Framework 2 is presented in Chapter 5.

3.4.3 A Note on Pathologisation Each of the frameworks above refers to either ‘pathologisation’ or ‘normalisation’.

118

Laclau and Mouffe suggest that hegemony does not have one centre of origin, and may be

understood via separate discourses. It could be that “entirely different hegemonic realities are constructed”. This lends itself towards constructivist writings on identity and othering, whereby the perception of hegemony may be as relevant to the construction of counter-hegemonic movements as the presence of a hegemon in reality. Such construction of a hegemonic ‘other’ could help to form a counter-hegemonic group identity. (Laclau and Mouffe 2001) cited in (Worth 2015, 108–14). NB: p. 108-14 of 1985 edition cited. See (Wendt 1994; Jepperson and Wendt 1996; Hall 2003b; Manners and Whitman 2003; Diez 2005; V. Morozov and Rumelili 2012) regarding the use of an ‘other’ in construction of the ‘self’ in international politics.

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This dissertation considers two forms of normalisation/pathologisation. The first form, associated with the Foucauldian framework, is where one thing is selected to be ‘pathologised’, and another is selected to be ‘normalised’. A binary is created. ‘Black’ is selected as the opposite to ‘white’, rather than ‘grey’ or ‘coloured’. Mary Douglas argues that cultural order may be disturbed when something does not fit binary categories, or appears in the ‘wrong’ category.119 The second form, associated with the neo-Gramscian framework, is where one item is selected to be ‘normalised’, and everything which is not ‘normal’ is pathologised. The binary is based on exclusion, rather than on the definition of set categories. Thus, where democracy is normalised, everything that is ‘not democracy’ (Communism, fascism, etc) is pathologised. This latter reflects Derrida’s position whereby binary oppositions are rarely neutral—one is dominant, and another is aberrant.120

3.4.4 An Overlap? As will be seen below, the above frameworks have a degree of overlap. They are both concerned with power relations, though Foucault focuses on ‘power between’

119 120

(Hall 2003b, 236) Derrida 1972, cited in (Hall 2003b, 235).

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while the neo-Gramscians are concerned with ‘power over’; each suggests a ‘voiceless’ subject or group, in the ‘subject’ or ‘subaltern’; and each suggests a boundary to understanding, via a ‘discontinuity of discourse’ or episteme, or potentially through alternate hegemonic projects. Both are concerned with the social construction of ‘reality’, and both incorporate consent as well as coercion into their understandings of power. However, there are also differences between the frameworks which render them fragile in combination.121 Firstly, Foucault was concerned with removing the individual as the focus of analysis, and was instead interested with how power circulated through a group. Gramsci was instead primarily concerned with high-level structures of domination, and particularly as these related to economic domination. Foucault was opposed to class reductionism, and while Gramsci’s concept of ‘ideology’ brought him closer to Foucault’s position,122 economic class remained a preoccupation. Secondly, as per 3.4.3, the Foucauldian framework begins by looking at ‘pathologisation’ and ‘normalisation’, whereas the neo-Gramscian framework is primarily concerned with ‘normalisation’. This can have different connotations

121

Several authors have attempted to combine the two approaches, with limited success. See

(Pringle 2005; Stoddart 2005; Ekers and Loftus 2008). 122

(Hall 2003c, 48)

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for how processes of pathologisation and normalisation are understood, and what is included in associated categories. Thirdly, the role of agency is understood differently. Foucault allows for some very limited agency in moulding power/knowledge structures, while Gramsci permits the wielding of intentional strategies by ‘intellectuals’ in order to shape reality and relations of domination. Particular attention is drawn to these areas of divergence when comparing the frameworks in Chapter 6.

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Chapter 4:

Framework

1—Foucault

and

Pathologisation In accordance with 3.4.1, this chapter considers the pathologisation and ontology associated with the discourse. It examines the practices for regulating conduct and how associated knowledge acquires truth status. It then considers the implications vis-à-vis third parties.

4.1

Ontology

The discourse points to an understanding of homosexuality as characterised by choice. Homosexuality as a fact of nature appears in 13% of instances apparent, and as a choice in 46%. Homosexuality as a social contagion or learned behaviour appears in a further 25%, and as a fashion choice, in 4%. In a 8% of instances it is portrayed as due to poor moral character. These latter three categories also reflect the idea of choice. Overall, homosexuality is seen as relating to choice or subject to change. Figure 5 shows these results:

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8% 4% Choice

4%

Contagion/Learned

13%

46%

Fact of Nature Fashion Insanity / Psychological Handicap Poor Moral Character

25%

Figure 5: What causes homosexuality? (% by number of instances in all cases)

Figure 6 shows the data for United Russia as a collective actor only123, avoiding a possible in case the data in Figure 5 is skewed by the singular opinions of either Putin or Milonov.

123

Note that the ‘causes’ of homosexuality were apparent 15 times in this discourse.

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7% 7%

Choice

7%

33%

Contagion/Learned Fact of Nature Fashion

13%

Insanity / Psychological Handicap Poor Moral Character 33%

Figure 6: What causes homosexuality? (United Russia data only)

This ontology in the discourse is reflected by survey data of the Russian population. In July 2012, 32% of survey respondents said that homosexuality is the result of illness or psychological trauma, and 43% that it is essentially due to promiscuity or bad habits. 17% of people said that it is a fact of nature, 1% as a ‘sign of a special endowment or talent’, and 9% that it was difficult to answer. These figures have remained relatively consistent over time,124 as seen in Figure 7.

124

(Levada Center 2012; Levada Center 2015a)

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50% Disease / result of trauma

45% 40%

Promiscuity or bad habits

35% 30%

Sexual orientation / fact of nature

25% 20%

Sign of special endowment or talent

15% 10%

Difficult to answer

5%

Apr-14

Dec-12

Aug-11

Apr-10

Dec-08

Aug-07

Apr-06

Dec-04

Aug-03

Apr-02

Dec-00

Aug-99

Apr-98

0%

Result of abuse

Figure 7: Survey data - what causes homosexuality?

Note in Figure 7 that there was a change in the questions asked from February 2013. After July 2012 there appears to be a downward trend in the number of people responding that homosexuality is a fact of nature, and increase in those understanding it as a disease or result of trauma. There is a possible link between the political mobilisation of discourse pathologising homosexuality and local understandings of what it is, suggesting that elites are affecting local understandings. The proportion of people understanding homosexuality as a fact of nature is broadly similar to the frequency seen in the discourse analysed, though the questions asked in the survey otherwise deviate significantly from understandings reflected in the

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discourse. The understandings held by United Russia as a collective actor are particularly close to the beliefs held by the public at large.

4.2

Pathologisation

All

instances

of

pathologisation

and

normalisation

in

the

discourse were identified,125 and then clustered into the categories shown in Table 2. Items relating to homosexuality have been shaded. Table 2: Categories of pathologisation and normalisation (Framework 1).

PATHOLOGISED – +Propaganda HOMOSEXUALITY Against Tradition(al Values) +Paedophilia Dangerous for Civilisation Dangerous for Vulnerable People Inherently bad Undemocratic / Against Human Rights PATHOLOGISED - "Europe" THIRD PARTIES "West" Domestic Opposition EU EU Country Foreign Country

125

See also section 3.4.3.

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LGBT Lobby Liberal Values NGO Pussy Riot USA NORMALISED Banning propaganda Democracy / Public Opinion EU third parties protesting LGBT rights Heterosexuality / Traditional Family Homosexuality+126 LGBT not wanting rights Private +-127 Russia Russian Orthodox Values Russian Values Traditional Values United Russia UR Politician The description, count, and prevalence of each of these items can be seen in Annex II. Items pathologised versus normalised fell into binary categories, as shown in Table

126

Homosexuality normalised.

127

Ambiguity—homosexuality potentially acceptable as long as it is kept private.

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3: Table 3: Items pathologised and normalised (Framework 1)

Pathologised

Normalised

Homosexuality

Heterosexuality

(Too many) rights given to minority Democracy and championing the rights groups

of the majority128

‘Non-traditional values’. Values held Traditional, within Europe.

Russian,

Orthodox values.

or

Russian

‘True European’

values. Domestic opposition parties

United

Russia,

United

Russia’s

politicians. International third parties (the ‘West’, Russia Europe etc)

4.2.1 Homosexuality Homosexuality itself is treated somewhat ambivalently in the discourse.

128

On

Permitting ‘gay propaganda’ was portrayed as against democracy, as ‘most Russians’ were in

favour of the law and were against propaganda. Hence, passing the laws was a democratic measure which reflected public opinion.

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multiple occasions, homosexuality as a voluntary behaviour between consenting adults is treated as acceptable, as long as this is a private activity. 129 The role of equality, and of equal treatment of all minorities within Russia, is raised in conjunction with this idea. A characterisation of LGBT groups as positive—when campaigning against gay rights legislation in European countries—also appears in the discourse.

Figure 8 shows the proportions in which homosexuality was

pathologised, normalised, or treated ambiguously in the discourse:

9% 2%

Normalised Ambiguous Pathologised

89%

Figure 8: Homosexuality pathologised, normalised, or ambiguous (Framework 1)

However, homosexuality is elsewhere characterised as inherently bad, as dangerous

129

“[I]t’s okay if you do what you like privately” (Kremlin 2012).

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for vulnerable groups, as associated with paedophilia, as dangerous for civilisation, and as ‘non-traditional’ or unnatural. Figure 9 shows the break-down between the instances of different types of pathologisation.

Note that homosexuality is

associated with paedophilia in 10% of instances, as dangerous for vulnerable people in 11%, and as against tradition or traditional values in 31%.

6%

1%

Homosexuality+

9% 2%

Private +10% +Paedophilia +Propaganda

31%

Against Tradition(al Values) Dangerous for Civilisation 25% Dangerous for vulnerable people 6%

Inherently bad 11%

Figure 9: Ways in which homosexuality was normalised and pathologised (Framework 1).

4.2.2 Discourse around Homosexuality Pathologisation of discourse around homosexuality is less ambivalent.

Here,

‘discourse’ means social discussions or information, as propagated by Russians or

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within Russia. For this reason and to avoid confusion it will be addressed as part of ‘homosexual propaganda’. As per 3.3.1 and despite the noted ambivalence, ‘homosexual propaganda’ is understood to be bad, because homosexuality is bad.130 Moreover, ‘homosexual propaganda’ is strongly correlated in the discourse with ‘paedophiliac propaganda’, and with danger for vulnerable groups.131 It is understood that if a child is exposed to homosexual propaganda, they may choose to be gay, and as this would not produce children, it could be dangerous for Russia demographically as well as morally. 132133 The link between ‘homosexual’ and ‘paedophiliac’ propaganda reflects the title of anti-propaganda laws, and suggests that homosexuality is a

130

“There is nothing more disgusting than the propaganda of such things.” (MR7.ru 2012)

131

Giving a child to homosexuals for upbringing means deliberately crippling their lives. This is

unacceptable.” (United Russia 2013a) "If a child is brought up by homosexual couples, they will be caused serious trauma and gain a distorted view of reality." (United Russia 2013d) 132

A 2013 survey conducted by the Levada Center asked the Russian public why they thought the

State Duma had adopted the federal gay propaganda law. With multiple answers permitted, 15% of respondents said that it was due to the country’s poor demographic situation. 56% pointed at adolescent’s ‘low level of morality’, 46% at resisting the corrupting influence of the West, 7% the creation of a tool for suppressing dissidents, and 12% that it was a tool to distract the public from socio-economic problems. (Levada Center 2013). 133

“…we cannot afford to raise children with gay families. Such attempts are, in my view, aimed

at the destruction of our country and undermining the foundations of its spirituality.” (United Russia 2013a)

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sexual deviation of equivalence with, or the same as, paedophilia. It is elsewhere similarly associated with sexual relations with furniture and zoophilia.134 The issue is muddled by the lack of definition regarding what ‘homosexual propaganda’ entails, both in the discourse and in related legislation.135 In some instances, it consists of talking to prohibited groups—namely children—about homosexuality. In others it is taking part in a pride parade, same-sex marriage, or attending gay bars or clubs.136 Milonov’s discourse reflects particular vigilance regarding what constitutes homosexual propaganda—he requested that Russia Post137 return items to Finland rather than delivering them if they included stamps depicting famous Finnish homosexuals, because they were against propaganda laws.138 A sports clothing range with rainbow colours was also banned as gay propaganda.139 Hence, while ‘homosexual propaganda’ is exclusively pathologised, there is a lack of clarity around what practices this ‘propaganda’ includes. Furthermore, the fact

134

(Riabov and Riabova 2014a; Vice News 2014d, 5)

135

(Wilkinson 2014)

136

(NTV.ru 2014; Radio Svoboda 2014; Wilkinson 2014)

137

Почта Россий

138

(Miasnikova and Fontanka 2014)

139

(Dubrovskaia and MK.ru 2015)

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that it may include attending gay clubs or parades heightens the tension between pathologisation and normalisation of homosexuality itself: if ‘practising’ homosexuality is acceptable only in private, but discussing or expressing one’s (non-hetero) sexuality in other venues is inappropriate, then this suggests that homosexuality itself is pathologised, and the ambivalence around it in the discourse is caused by other factors such as a desire to ascribe to international norms.

4.2.3 Third Parties Third parties are pathologised in connection with homosexuality in the discourse analysed. These include both domestic and international third parties (see Figure 10).

Domestic parties pathologised through association with homosexuality

included governmental opposition140, the band Pussy Riot, NGOs operating within Russia, and the LGBT lobby (domestically and internationally). International parties included the ‘West’, USA, and Europe.141 ‘Liberal values’ as a facet of

140

“Showing a blatant ignorance of law and humanity, representatives of the faction 'Fair Russia'

refused to vote in favour [of a proposal for St Petersburg's anti-propaganda law]”. “[Fair Russia] not ready to protect children from paedophiles.” “[Fair Russia are] lobbying for the interests of paedophiles...” “[With their vote against the bill] aimed against the propaganda of paedophilia and homosexuality...[the opposition] have expressed enthusiastic support for the phenomena of premature knowledge from which we seek to protect minors.” (United Russia 2012) 141

“Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that

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international society were likewise pathologised.

West, 7% USA, 12%

Domestic Opposition, 13% EU, 2%

Pussy Riot, 3% EU Country, 18%

NGO, 4%

Liberal values, 8% LGBT Lobby, 1% Foreign Country, 11%

Europe, 21%

Figure 10: Third parties pathologised, by instances of pathologisation (%).

4.3

The Emblematic Subject(s) of Pathologisation

Pathologisation requires a subject. In ‘Madness and Civilisation’, Foucault uses the example of leprosy as pathologised, whereby the ‘subject’ of pathologisation

constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious and even sexual. They are implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with the belief in Satan.” (Kremlin 2013c)

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was the leper. In the discourse analysed, where homosexuality is pathologised, the subject is the homosexual, and especially the homosexual who does not abide by the state’s laws (see 4.4). Just as the leper in Foucault’s example is associated with leper colonies, themselves places of exclusion which should be avoided, in the discourse analysed, homosexuals are associated with third party actors, both domestically and internationally.

This ‘smearing’ effect is discussed further

below.142

4.4

Truth-status and Practices

In Foucault’s analyses, there is a strong link between the acquisition of knowledge as truth, and the practices which implement discourse. The pathologisation of homosexuality is reflected in formal practices such as limiting expression in the form of the anti-propaganda laws, or banning gay pride parades.143 This helps to normalise the pathologisation and associated knowledge structures. Furthermore, those in certain positions within knowledge/power structures may

142

“Once leprosy had gone, and the figure of the leper was no more than a distant memory, these

structures still remained. The game of exclusion would be played again, often in these same places, in an oddly similar fashion two or three centuries later. The role of the leper was to be played by the poor and by the vagrant, by prisoners and by the 'alienated', and the sort of salvation at stake for both parties in this game of exclusion is the matter of this study.” (Foucault 1971) 143

(Wilkinson 2014)

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have some capacity to influence those structures, as described in 3.4.1.3 above. The Russian political elite have greater access to law-making capabilities and to media, and are therefore in an advantageous position when pathologising some things, such as homosexuality, and normalising others, such as heterosexuality. As above (see 4.1), Russian public opinion regarding homosexuality has remained relatively consistent over time. This suggests that the pathologisation used by the Russian political elite in the discourse analysed reflects the regime of truth to which they are subject: they are working within extant power/knowledge structures. However, it does not explain why homosexuality as an object of discourse arose relatively suddenly as per the timelines in 3.2.2—if the regime of truth has remained stable, then why would related discourse arise and then fall in such a short space of time? There appears to be no organic explanation for this under the Foucauldian framework.

4.5

Boundaries to the Discursive Formation

The boundary to the indicated discursive formation surrounding homosexuality would be represented by alternate discourses. Such an alternate discourse is that of the EU, which includes rights for minorities in its Treaties, and furthermore

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promotes LGBT rights in the course of external action. 144

This discursive

formation seems to reflect an alternate understanding of homosexuality, and what rights should be associated with it. There does not to be a significant alternative set of discourse in relation to homosexuality within mainstream Russia,145 and further research would have to be conducted to establish the presence or otherwise of alternate understandings of homosexuality and associated knowledge.

4.6

Strategy?

In the pieces analysed, homosexuality and the pathologisation thereof was linked with third parties, both domestically and internationally. See Annex II for the number of instances and in what number of articles such pathologisation occurred.

4.6.1 Domestically The pathologisation of opposition parties, NGOs and Pussy Riot, and normalisation of United Russia and its politicians (see 3.4.3) seems to reflect an intentional

144

(Rahman 2014)

145

For the omnipresence of ‘Orthodox’ and homophobic discourse in Russia, see (Vice News

2014a; Vice News 2014c; Vice News 2014d; Vice News 2014b; Vice News 2015).

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strategy on behalf of the regime’s elites to bolster their rule and discredit their opponents. This is understandable, both in terms of being political ‘business as usual’, 146 and due to the need for re-legitimation associated with the domestic protests. While Foucault grants actors limited capability to affect knowledge within an episteme, the knowledge associated with homosexuality appears to have been utilised as a political strategy to affect power dynamics within the governmental/political structure.

4.6.2 Internationally As seen in Figure 10 above, internationally, the most commonly pathologised party was ‘Europe’, even if the related categories of the EU and ‘EU countries’ are excluded. Together, they are pathologised in 41% of instances of pathologisation of third parties. This is perhaps due to the fact that the EU’s discursive formation regarding homosexuality appears to form a boundary with that of Russia. However, unless an episteme is shared, there is no basis for comparison or understanding. As such, how could referring to the alternate set of understandings and associated rights held by Europe bolster the internal credibility of Russia’s

146

I.e. pathologising Europe/the West as a long-term trend in domestic mobilization and national

identity building.

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regime, or the discursive regime that underlies it? It is not clearly apparent why international third parties appear in the discourse at all. (See following section.)

4.7

Overall and Criticisms

Overall, the Foucauldian analysis outlined above provides several insights into the discourse used by Russian political elites. It helps to understand the ontology of homosexuality underlying the discourse, this understanding is backed up by survey data, and there is clear pathologisation of some items and thereby normalisation of others. The enhanced understanding of the underlying ontology combined with other discursive knowledge—such as the ‘demographic decline’ of Russia 147 — helps to understand why pathologisation of homosexuality could be an outcome, and why it could be presented as dangerous for Russian civilisation. 148 This pathology has logical consequences in terms of the regulation of conduct, as seen in the form of the anti-propaganda laws. However, there are several items which this framework has difficulty explaining. Firstly, Foucault accords limited capabilities to actors in terms of forming

147

E.g. (Kremlin 2013b; Kremlin 2013c; Kremlin 2013a)

148

“What else but the loss of the ability to self-reproduce could act as the greatest testimony of the

moral crisis facing a human society?” (Kremlin 2013c)

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power/knowledge structures. They can make some choices as ‘half-individuals’, and further, someone subject to the power/knowledge structures associated with internal Russian politics would understand that pathologisation of third parties works as a delegitimising or discrediting strategy.

This could explain why

pathologisation is so common in the discourse, and why similar strategies would be used by domestic opposition parties. It does not however sufficiently explain how pathologisation as a strategy was implemented, or who could implement it, given the limited capacity of individuals to identify sections of discourse and implement them. It likewise does not explain why discourse pathologising homosexuality arose ‘suddenly’—given the stability in Russian opinions and understandings, appearances of related discourse should have been similarly regular. This framework also does not explain why there would be an attempt to discredit international bodies, or address them at all within the discourse. In Foucault’s historicist approach, it is possible to reflect upon alternate epistemes: a person who understands insanity as a pathology subject to psychiatric treatment can also know that previously, insanity was treated as godly or beastly, and required confinement. Discourse can address these alternate epistemes, and it will not have an effect upon them—talking about a different understanding of insanity will not effect changes in how insanity was treated in previous historical eras. However, the discourse analysed explicitly refers to other actors with other epistemes and other discursive

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formations and practices surrounding homosexuality. Unlike discussions crossing historical boundaries, this discourse addresses geographic or cultural boundaries, and contains elements of both othering and self-reflexion which can have an effect both internally (I.e. domestically within Russia, by altering the discourse) and externally (I.e. on relations between Russia and those third parties). Given that this is the case, the question of why these references to international third parties are made arises: is it an intentional strategy, and if so, to what end? Does it reflect a greater, ‘meta-level’ episteme, in which Russia and the EU are different power/knowledge structures? 149 If so, how are differences within and between these bodies to be explained, and if actor agency is as limited as Foucault suggests, then how have different ‘cultures’ around homosexuality arisen? Either culture is essentialist, or it is not.

If it is, then discussions around

homosexuality between actors such as the EU and Russia must be reduced to those of cultural relativism.

Cultures are made up of discursive formations and

power/knowledge structures, that is, are associated with epistemes. If they are essential and ‘real’, then how then can breaks between epistemes (between

149

Such a ‘meta-episteme’ could in any case start to reflect a structure with which both Gramsci

and Putin would agree. “…a unipolar, standardised world does not require sovereign states; it requires vassals.” (Kremlin 2013c). It would also suggest that both Europe and Russia share a similar pedigree of thinking in relation to homosexuality as an object of study and discourse.

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historical periods or otherwise) be explained? Foucault argued that such breaks do happen, and were key to his studies, so clearly he did not understand culture as essential. If, then, culture is subject to change, then what is the purpose of addressing other bodies across ontological borders? Why are Russian values presented as being in opposition to ‘European’ values, and how can this not relate to a strategy or choice? Given addressing international parties is an intentional strategy, then from what and in what manner does such strategy arise—and if it is not intentional, then how can it be explained? The domestic use of pathologisation in bolstering the legitimacy of United Russia seems apparent, but its use with reference to international third parties is less clear. Overall, Framework 1 sheds light on social ontology and on the pathologisation of homosexuality and related discourse, but it does not sufficiently explain how strategies may be formed and implemented, or what the purpose of pathologising international third parties might be.

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Chapter 5:

Framework

2—Neo-Gramscian

Hegemony This chapter discusses the discourse analysed against the dissertation’s second framework, concerning neo-Gramscian conceptions of hegemony and counterhegemony. It firstly considers domestic Russian hegemony, and then international hegemony and counter-hegemony.

5.1

Results

5.1.1 Ideological Alternatives Homosexuality was described on 40 occasions (11% of the time) as being a ‘non-traditional’ sexual orientation, and against ‘traditional’ values. Note that ‘traditional’ values, ‘Russian’ values, and ‘Russian Orthodox values’ were used seemingly interchangeably in the discourse150. Traditional values were associated with heteronormativity and a ‘traditional family’ including a male and female parent (“[We] worry that [gay] parades will convince children that ‘papa

150

See (Honestus 2012) regarding the link between identification as ‘Russian’ and as, thereby,

‘Orthodox’.

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plus papa is fine’—no, papa plus mama, this is a family” ;151 “[Where kids of six or seven are told that] ‘one Santa Claus can live with another Santa Claus’,…[it’s a] situation of hatred… It's a situation that in essence...is Nazi.”152). Homosexuality was treated as a subset of ‘nontraditional’ values, I.e. against ‘traditional’ values.153 Values which were normalised were identified, and then their opposites located in the text. Ideological or normative divisions fell into the following categories (Table 4): Table 4: 'Normal' ideology in the discourse (Framework 2)

Normal

Pathologised (abnormal)

Traditional values

Not-traditional values

Democracy (and human

Not-democratic (and against

rights)154

human rights)

151

(Dozhd’ 2013)

152

(Vice News 2014d, 5)

153

This appears to presume that homosexuality is a choice.

154

Regarding the linked popularity and legality of anti-propaganda laws: “the legislative process in

Russia is carried out with democratic standards” (United Russia 2013f). France is meanwhile undemocratic, because “Hundreds of [French citizens] have been arrested for what they have on their t-shirts—the logo of a traditional family, ‘mum, dad, me’.”. Regarding the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe treating same-sex marriages as equal, “Who of us is ready? I think none of us”—I.e. it would be undemocratic to inflict this upon members. “These people

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In 74 instances (representing 9.5% of all codes), ‘Russian’ values as were presented as ‘alternate’ to other values.155

5.1.2 Opposition Parties Parties in the discourse were identified and divided according to which were associated with normalised concepts, and those which were not, as shown in Table 5: Table 5: Parties in the discourse, normalised and 'other' (Framework 2)

Associated with normalising Other discourse Domestic

United Russia, Putin, regime

Domestic opposition groups

aren’t disabled, they aren’t children who have been sexually abused. And they should not be subject to special protection.” (United Russia 2013g) 155

“[there is a] serious fault line between the values of Europe and Russia”; “If a same-sex family

wants to adopt a child from Russia, the corresponding national authorities [in Europe] will take their side, not the side of Russia” (United Russia 2013c). “Putin is one of the few secular leaders who openly declares that homosexual propaganda is bad, and traditional values are good. It is for that reason that he, like all Russian society, is a beacon”; “...we have become a compass for [France/the West]” (United Russia 2013e). “Aggressive postmodernism…the ideology is not acceptable to most countries in the world. It has received a rebuff from Russia. And now our country is looked upon with hope all over the world, as a country that defends traditional values.” (United Russia 2013h)

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International

Russia

West, EU, liberal values

Domestically, the regime was identified as hegemonic, while internationally the body most frequently treated as referent object was Europe (see Figure 10). As such, Europe was presumed hegemonic, and ‘Russia’ counter-hegemonic.

In this set of discourse, LGBT

persons represent a subaltern group, who lack a voice in the discussion while being controlled by it.156

5.2

Normalised Ideology

Results indicated that certain items are normalised—traditional/Russian values; democracy—whereas others are pathologised by exclusion—non-traditional values; lack of democracy. Democracy and human rights are linked in their positive aspect to traditional values, whereas a lack of democracy and lack of human rights are associated with homosexuality and hence a deviation from such traditional values. 157 Normalisation was the primary concern, with a particular

156

See the discussion of (Spivak 2010) on the subaltern’s ‘ability to speak’.

157

Even together, these values do not constitute the entirety of the ideology associated with United

Russia—this dissertation considers the ideology through a limited lens. However it can be seen that different ideological components associated with governance are used to positively reinforce

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discourse and ideology promoted, and other options rendered inferior through exclusion (see 3.4.3).158 United Russia and Russia were normalised in association with democracy and traditional values, whereas domestic opposition and Europe were associated with a lack of democracy and non-traditional values.

5.3

Domestic: Hegemony?

United Russia is a hegemonic party within Russia’s highly defined and classdivided political system, and it and its politicians were normalised in the discourse. Domestically, it appears that the discourse around traditional values, which precludes homosexuality as an acceptable alternative, is an ideology being spread by this hegemonic political group and serving its legitimation.159 This also explains the apparent correlation between instances of discourse around homosexuality and the domestic protests against United Russia and Putin: presenting Putin as the defender of traditional values against the incursions of

one another. 158

Note that in this context, homosexuality formed part of ‘non-traditional values’, and did not pose

an object in and of itself. 159

See (Riabov and Riabova 2013; Wilkinson 2014; Sharafutdinova 2014).

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excluded and pathologised groups helped to shore up the regime’s legitimacy. As noted in 3.3.4, opposition groups are understood to use similar discursive content to Putin and his regime. Under the proposed neo-Gramscian scheme, groups in opposition to a hegemon would be expected to provide an ideological alternative. This could include alternatives found within Russia itself—perhaps alternate interpretations of traditional values or democracy—or from externally, as for example in the model of the EU. Such a counter-hegemonic movement was not apparent in secondary readings.

While group identities seem apparent,

opposition within Russia appears to fail against all three components of Worth’s counter-hegemonic movement typology: an ideological alternative, support from civil society, or popular appeal against the regime. This suggests that domestic opposition are not counter-hegemonic, and would in either case would likely be considered part of the same hegemonic structures of domination as the regime. As such, the regime’s hegemonic efforts within Russia seem successful at this point, and this relates at least in part to their success in normalising and mobilising a particular ideology.160

160

Worth points to religious organisations as a possible source of counter-hegemony, but the

Orthodox Church’s support of the traditional values discourse renders this an unlikely source. See (Richters 2012; Vice News 2014a, 3; Worth 2015).

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5.4

International: Counter-Hegemony?

At an international level, Russia is normalised—including through association with traditional ‘European’ values 161 —at a cost to third parties, particularly Europe, which is associated with a lack of democracy and non-traditional values. It is notable that the international norms of human rights and democracy have been used in normalising the traditional, heteronormative values found in the discourse, as they are applied differently to the way in which they are applied in the EU. For instance, rather than ‘democracy’ enshrining individual rights, it instead protects the right of the majority to not be exposed to norm-deviant behaviour.162

5.4.1 Group identity163 The discourse points to a national group identity at the level of ‘Russia’. The main other group referred to at the international level is ‘Europe’, reflecting Diez’ proposed regional normative hegemon. The ideology associated with ‘Russia’ is variously presented as a neutral ‘alternate’ to and in ‘opposition’ to that associated

161


162

See also (Wilkinson 2014)

163

See (Huddy 2001; Malinova 2014) on Social Identity Theory, especially regarding strategies of

social mobility, social competition, and social creativity—each of which is compatible with a neoGramscian framework and the construction of counter-hegemonic projects.

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with Europe.

5.4.2 A Clear Ideological Alternative164 The divide between a hegemonic Europe with its LGBT rights (see 2.2.3) and ‘nontraditional’ values, and Russia, with an ideology based on heteronormativity and traditional values, is clear in the discourse analysed, particularly in that of Vitaly Milonov, 165 but also in samples from Vladimir Putin 166 . A clear ideological alternative is presented in the dimension of value systems and associated rights.

164

(Neumann 1998) cites (Pozdnyakov 1991, 46), in saying that “Russia cannot join [Europe]

because it is part of another type of civilisation, another cultural and religious type… The term [’Common Civilisation’]… denotes the pretension of Western European civilisation to the exclusive rights of universal significance.” Notions of Eurocentric norm-spreading and incompatibilities within Russia preceded the recent use of gender-based discourse. 165

“[W]e do not care about their opinion, let us raise our own children.” “Apparently, when a man

sleeps with a man, it’s beautiful, civilisation…

[W]e do not tolerate gays” (Bryzgalin and

Komsomol’skaia Pravda 2013). “[Europe is] a different civilization, I mostly listened.” (Grani.ru 2013) 166

“ideological monopoly…has no future in the modern world. We need…an understanding of

our cultural, spiritual and political traditions from different points of view.” “[The European model] opens a direct path to degradation and primitivism, resulting in a profound demographic and moral crisis… Russia believes that international law, not the right of the strong, must apply.” (Kremlin 2013c)

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5.4.3 Support from Civil Society Putin has collaborated with the Orthodox Church167 in mobilising civil society for the ‘traditional values’ ideology.

Bodies such as youth groups, 168 the ‘All-

Mothers’ group169 and public demonstrations and initiatives170 reflect the fact that support can be mobilised at different levels. The movement has also had support from groups outside of Russia.171

5.4.4 Popular Appeal The traditional values discourse and associated ideology has clear popular appeal within Russia.172 In March 2015, 77% of the population was in favour of the law banning homosexual propaganda.173 In a later survey relating to the role of men

167

See footnote 55.

168

United Russia’s ‘Young Guard’ (Kremlin 2012)

169

(United Russia 2013b)

170

A recent play was picketed and interrupted by a bomb scare (Bezmenova and Poslianova 2016);

‘civic’ groups such as ‘Occupy Paedophilia’ find gay men and boys via social media and attempt violent conversion (Vice News 2014b, 2). 171

(Vzglad 2013)

172

It may also gain support from within other countries.

See for example (Rahman 2014;

Wilkinson 2014) regarding Uganda. 173

(Levada Center 2015a). See also (Borusiak and Levinson 2015) and the feedback forum

regarding the now-approved ‘State Cultural Policy’ draft (Kremlin 2014; Obsudi Proekt [Discussion Project] 2014).

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and women, 44% of respondents said that a woman who deliberately refuses to have children should be ‘condemned’, 61% of those saying that having children is the main purpose of women. A ‘proper’ man should, by age 30, get an education (65%), get married (56%), complete army service (55%) and have a career (52%), while women should get married (77%), have children (75%), get an education (60%) and learn to cook (52%). 174 These reflect the gender-based traditional values discourse used by elites.175

Given the above, the discourse analysed displays all of the features of a counterhegemonic movement at the international level, where the hegemon is ‘Europe’.

5.5

Overall

The second framework used for this dissertation helps to understand Russian political elite discourse as reflecting an alternate ideology, counter to the EU’s normative hegemony.

It is of particular assistance in understanding the

international component of the discourse analysed.

Neo-Gramscian authors

174

(Levada Center 2015b). These are the top four results for each gender.

175

See also (Riabov and Riabova 2014b; Riabov and Riabova 2011; Riabova and Tsalko 2011).

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consider ideological hegemony as a step towards political or economic hegemony, and while heteronormativity and associated traditional values are not linked to economic arguments in the discourse, 176 they do appear to link to strategies of political expedience.177 Gramsci’s work was concerned with the subaltern as well as the hegemon, and in this instance the subaltern group of homosexuals does not inform a counterhegemonic movement. 178

Even domestic opposition parties use the same

discursive strategies as the regime.179 This neo-Gramscian framework does not, however, explain the underlying ontology—the understanding of what homosexuality is, or how this contributes to traditional values.

It also provides limited assistance in understanding why

particular things are normalised rather than others, or why this could gain popular

176

With the exception of one article, (United Russia 2013e). In this, the Director of the Centre for

Political Analysis in Russia links Russia’s economy and the strengthening of traditional values. He speaks of Russia’s ‘increasing affluence’, saying that “in virtually all indicators of life, we have not only exceeded the Soviet Union in its heyday, but are in many ways even ahead of the rest of the world… [T]traditional values…are gradually returning to our lives, whereas in the West,…they suffer crisis. " 177

I.e. domestic legitimation, and resistance or power at the international level.

178

(Viatcheslav Morozov 2015) argues that Russia itself is subaltern to Europe.

179

(Sperling 2014) argues that Pussy Riot use the same misogynistic and homophobic language as

the groups they oppose.

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support.

The following chapter compares the two frameworks in order to establish which provides the most adequate explanation for Russian political elite discourse relating to homosexuality.

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Chapter 6:

The Frameworks Compared

As per 3.4.4, there are significant differences underlying the Foucauldian and neoGramscian frameworks. Chapters 4 and 5 however demonstrate that the analysis arising from each agrees on several points, and points of congruence and divergence are considered below.

6.1

Pathologisation or Normalisation?

The Foucauldian framework considers both normalisation and pathologisation as selected categories, whereas the neo-Gramscian framework focuses on normalisation. This leads to differences in what is normalised or pathologised under each framework. The neo-Gramscian explanation has difficulty framing what precisely is pathologised, and hence, struggles to explain social ontology. It is therefore not equipped to analyse pre-existing ontology against strategies which are eventually selected by the elite. The approach associated with the Foucauldian framework on the other hand is able to explain the ontological setting within which elites exist and operate. A strategy will have more success if it mobilises popular sentiments, and considering both pathologisation and normalisation is able to explain why discourse around homosexuality would be mobilised.

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6.2

Subject, Subaltern, Counter-Hegemon?

Under the first framework, the ‘subject’ of the discourse is the homosexual, who under the neo-Gramscian framework becomes subaltern. In both situations, the subject/subaltern of the homosexual lacks a voice in the structures, social and political, to which they are subject.

6.3

Boundaries to Discourse?

The discursive formation’s boundary under Framework 1 is primarily an international

boundary—the

ontology of

homosexuality and

associated

pathologisation appears shared within Russia, but not with the EU’s institutions. This is similar to the boundary identified in the neo-Gramscian framework—here, the domestic hegemon is Putin’s regime, with no alternate apparent. Internationally, Russia is presented as counter-hegemonic with regard to the EU.180

6.4

Strategies Applied by Agents?

Foucault gave limited attention to the role of agency in forming power/knowledge structures. The above argues that a strategy could be mobilised by ‘smearing’ the pathologisation associated with homosexuality to third parties, in order to

180

This is despite internal differences, within the EU, and within Russia.

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delegitimise them, as part of the regulatory behaviour associated with ‘political’ power/knowledge structures within Russia.

However, elites are limited to

activating an existing idea in the power/knowledge structure, and this does not explain why gender as a frame of reference arose ‘suddenly’, when the underlying social knowledge remained static. The role of agency is unclear. Gramsci points to the role of intellectuals in ensuring the ongoing dominance of the ruling classes. Their strategies include cultural manipulation, and the analysed discourse could form such manipulation.

6.5

Structural Factors and Levels of Explanation

The Foucauldian framework explains the domestic situation within Russia regarding homosexuality well, in terms of attitudes, understandings, and regulating behaviours and laws. However, it is of limited use at the international level, which is itself an artificial distinction.

There is no apparent explanation for why

international third parties are mentioned in association with the pathologisation of homosexuality (see 4.6.2). While the Foucauldian framework disregards material, economic and structural factors, the neo-Gramscian framework is preoccupied with them. Under this second framework, structural forces help shape Russian group identity(/ies) and condition behaviour.

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international level, and permits modifying strategies. The building of a cultural hegemony as a strategy can be understood as a first step in a political and economic hegemonic project—a project of structural change. The consistent use of the ‘Russian’ model as alternate to that of ‘Europe’ suggests that the discourse is informing such a counter-hegemonic project at the international level. The neo-Gramscian framework is thereby able to explain references to international third parties and structure in the discourse, while the Foucauldian framework is not.

6.6

Overall

The Foucauldian framework provides insights into social ontology and an understanding of why some things—homosexuality—are pathologised rather than others.

It helps comprehending United Russia’s domestic legitimation, and

moreover, laws and regulations controlling homosexuality. It also explains why domestic opposition use similar pathologising discourse to the regime, as they have comparable ontological understandings. The neo-Gramscian framework on the other hand explains how homosexuality is linked to strategies domestically and internationally through its subsumption into a cultural ideology of ‘traditional values’, as well as linking to Russian nationalism and group identity construction. Overall it is more convincing as an explanation

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for the role of homosexuality (against ‘traditional values’) in discourse, supporting the Russian regime’s hegemony nationally and counter-hegemonic project internationally, as specifically defined against the normative hegemony of the EU. However, adding the Foucauldian strategy of considering both pathologisation and normalisation as selected categories is not inconsistent with the assumptions underlying this framework.

It provides information about the ontological

background against which elites operate, and by which they are constrained in terms of strategy selection. Looking at homosexuality in particular as pathologised— rather than simply subsuming it into 'not-traditional values’—also helps to understand Russia as counter-hegemonic: a value associated with the EU as normative hegemon was selected to be pathologised, and Russian values provided to counter it. Considering pathologisation as well as normalisation is therefore helpful in understanding the mechanics of Russia's normative counter-hegemony. Overall, an analysis based on the ontology surrounding homosexuality alone (Framework 1) was unable to explain the discourse used by Russian political elite, whereas a viewpoint which considers hegemonic strategy, domestically and internationally (Framework 2), is able to do so, especially when pathologisation as well as normalisation is taken into account. This latter allows the researcher to understand why sexuality appears in the discourse as an object, and how this issue can be mobilised in support of a (counter-)hegemonic project.

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Hence, the discourse should be understood as contributing to normative hegemony domestically, and counter-hegemony internationally—but the strategies which political elites may use to further these efforts are bound by ontological understandings of what homosexuality is.

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Chapter 7: 7.1

Conclusion

Findings and Statement of Claim

This research identified Russian political elite discourse relating to homosexuality (Objective A), then evaluated it against Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian frameworks (Objective B). Comparing the results of these evaluations (Objective C) showed that this discourse reflects a hegemonic strategy domestically, and counter-hegemonic strategy internationally.

A Foucauldian input, considering

pathologisation as well as normalisation, assists in understanding how the discourse is used and mobilised, by activating existing understandings in the population. Overall, it was found that the discourse of Russian political elites in relation to homosexuality represents an intentional strategy, affected and bounded by local ontology, supporting a hegemonic project nationally and counter-hegemonic project internationally (Objective D).

7.2

Implications

Given the Russian understanding of homosexuality as a choice, and therefore subject to strategic manipulation by political elites, it seems unlikely that the current pathologised status of homosexuality will change in the short term. A shift to understanding homosexuality as a ‘fact of nature’ might suggest minority

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protections, and moreover could detract from the specific pathologisation of homosexuality as dangerous for civilisation on the basis of demographic crisis. Domestically, opposition parties appear to form part of the same ‘ruling class’ propounding traditional values-based discourse as the regime, and no counterhegemonic movement is apparent.

If neo-Gramscian theorists are correct in

saying that cultural hegemony consolidates political or economic hegemony, and that this hegemony can only be countered via a counter-hegemonic movement, then current Russian domestic power structures may continue to gain stability— particularly given the co-optation of the Orthodox Church into the hegemonic ideology. Internationally, Russia as normatively revisionist could lead to complications. The rendering of alternate understandings of rights and ontology under international normative frameworks could lead to a shift from ‘international’ rules and norms around human rights to localised versions, reinforcing and essentialising cultural differences, and enhancing the possibility of discrimination or conflict. Russia’s precedent may also support other states who mobilise the pathologisation of homosexuality, and thereby systematically disadvantage their LGBT populations. There may also be implications for the EU as a regional ‘normative hegemon’, particularly in its shared neighbourhood with Russia. It may need to reflect on whether its norms are universal or ultimately Eurocentric, the importance

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or otherwise of its ontological security, and whether norm dispersion is or can be one-way.

7.3

Contribution, Limitations, and Areas for Future Research

This research extends existing efforts in relation to gender discourses within Russia, by considering the ontological foundations of discourse surrounding homosexuality and the ways in which this is mobilised by political elites to inform political strategy.

It does however rest upon a limited number of case studies, using

qualitative methods which may have been affected by researcher subjectivity despite efforts to the contrary, and does not include the input of non-hegemonic parties within Russia.

For this reason, the nature of the Russian regime as

hegemonic within Russia should be considered in future research, particularly in relation to the presence or otherwise of counter-hegemonic groups. Further research could also consider strategies aimed at ensuring the protection of subaltern LGBT groups within Russia, particularly given an alleged rise in violence against them following the implementation of gender-based discourse.

The

ontology of homosexuality as a choice within Russia should be further examined, as this could have implications for EU-Russia relations in the realm of LGBT rights, both directly and through interactions in their common neighbourhood.

The

application of the anti-propaganda laws should be considered, including examining

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whether what is understood as ‘propaganda’ differs in context, or has political or strategic implications. The style of Russia’s counter-hegemony—as ‘against’ or as a ‘competing’ hegemon—should likewise be investigated.

Lastly, the

possibilities of Russia’s alternative ideological model, particularly as they relate to the localisation of international norms, should be considered, particularly in connection with the EU as a normative hegemon.

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Annex I: Key Identified Actors Person

Role

Referring Article

Vladimir

President of the Russian Federation

(Riabov and Riabova

Vladimirovich

2013; Riabov and

Putin

Riabova 2014a; Wilkinson 2014)

Sergey Viktorovich

Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs


Lavrov Vladimir Ivanovich

Former president of Russian

(Riabov and Riabova

Yakunin

Railways; founder of international

2014a)

forum ‘Dialogue of Civilisations’. Nataliya

Politician (formerly a representative

(Riabov and Riabova

Alekseevna

of the Rodina party). Former

2014a)

Narotchnitskaya

member of the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests; associated with Orthodox Church; Part of Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Public Council.

Konstantin Dolgov

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Representative of Russia’s Foreign

(Riabov and Riabova

Ministry

2014a)

107


Person

Role

Nikolai Platonovich Secretary of the Security Council of

Referring Article (Riabov and Riabova

Patrushev

Russia; former Director of the FSB

2014a)

Alexei

Head of the Foreign Affairs Council

(Riabov and Riabova

Konstantinovich

in the State Duma; Professor of

2014a)

Pushkov

Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMOUniversity)

Ramzan

Head of the Chechen Republic


Akhmadovich Kadyrov Vladimir

Chairman of the Synodal

(Riabov and Riabova

Romanovich

Informational Department, Russian

2013)

Legoyda

Orthodox Church

Sergei

Director of the Institute of Policy

(Riabov and Riabova

Alexandrovich

Studies at MGIMO-University;

2013)

Markov

former member of the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests. Member of several political forums and

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Person

Role

Referring Article

councils, including the Presidential Council for Facilitating the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights of the Russian Federation. Yelena Borisovna

Politician (A Just Russia); backer of

Mizulina

federal ‘gay propaganda’ law; Chair

(Wilkinson 2014)

of Duma Committee on Family, Women and Children’s affairs City Council

(Wilkinson 2014)

Vitaly

Member of the Legislative

(Wilkinson 2014)

Valentinovich

Assembly of St Petersburg (United

Milonov

Russia); initiator and principal

Moscow City Council

sponsor of St Petersburg ‘gay propaganda’ law

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Annex II: Results Coverage—Code Descriptions, Counts, and Cases

Pathologised - Homosexuality

Category

Code

Description

Count

% Codes

Cases

% Cases

+Propaganda

Reference to homosexual (or synonym) propaganda.

104

13.40%

39

51.30%

Against Tradition(al

Homosexuality portrayed as against tradition, against 'traditional

40

5.10%

17

22.40%

Values)

values', or 'unnatural' under traditional values.

+Paedophilia

Homosexuality associated with paedophilia (e.g. linked in the

28

3.60%

8

10.50%

24

3.10%

17

22.40%

116

14.90%

39

51.30%

same phrase or sentence). Dangerous for Civilisation

Homosexuality as dangerous for civilisation, Russian or otherwise. Includes the 'moral foundations' of civilisation, 'being overrun', and failure due to corruption or demographic crisis.

Dangerous for vulnerable

Homosexuality (or associated propaganda) as dangerous for vulnerable groups. Includes 'moral' and other forms of danger.

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Category

Code

Description

people

Vulnerable groups understood to predominantly consist of

Count

% Codes

Cases

% Cases

23

3.00%

21

27.60%

3

0.40%

3

3.90%

children and teens. Inherently bad

Homosexuality as 'bad' by nature, or for some other intangible

Pathologised - Third Parties

reason not already listed.

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Undemocratic / Against

Homosexuality as against the will of the majority (including

Human Rights

public opinion) or against human rights.

"Europe"

'Europe' pathologised in connection with homosexuality.

27

3.50%

16

21.10%

"West"

The 'West' pathologised in connection with homosexuality.

8

1.00%

6

7.90%

Domestic Opposition

Domestic opposition parties pathologised in connection with

16

2.10%

6

7.90%

2

0.30%

2

2.60%

homosexuality. EU

The European Union pathologised in connection with homosexuality.

111

Category

Code

Description

Count

% Codes

Cases

% Cases

EU Country

An EU country pathologised in connection with homosexuality.

22

2.80%

14

18.40%

Foreign Country

A non-specified third party country pathologised in connection

13

1.70%

8

10.50%

1

0.10%

1

1.30%

10

1.30%

9

11.80%

5

0.60%

2

2.60%

4

0.50%

4

5.30%

15

1.90%

9

11.80%

with homosexuality. LGBT Lobby

An LGBT lobby pathologised in connection with homosexuality. Includes domestic and international lobbies.

Liberal values

'Liberal values' pathologised in connection with homosexuality, and linked to an idea of world order or unspecified third parties.

NGO

A non-governmental organisation is pathologised in connection with homosexuality.

Pussy Riot

The band 'Pussy Riot' is pathologised in connection with homosexuality.

USA

The United States of America (or a state thereof) is pathologised in connection with homosexuality.

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Category

Code

Description

Count

% Codes

Cases

% Cases

Banning propaganda

The banning of propaganda (as natural etc) is normalised. The

3

0.40%

1

1.30%

38

4.90%

17

22.40%

Normalised

propaganda relates to homosexuality. Democracy / Public

Democracy or majority public opinion is normalised. These

Opinion

concepts are linked.

EU third parties protesting

EU third parties protesting LGBT rights are normalised.

4

0.50%

4

5.30%

Heterosexuality /

Heterosexuality or the 'traditional family' are normalised. The

28

3.60%

17

22.40%

Traditional Family

latter is understood to include a male and female parent.

Homosexuality+

Homosexuality is normalised.

33

4.20%

18

23.70%

LGBT not wanting rights

LGBT persons who do not want special rights or recognition as

1

0.10%

1

1.30%

7

0.90%

7

9.20%

LGBT rights

LGBT group members are normalised. Private +-

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Ambiguity relating to homosexuality as a private activity.

113

Category

Code

Description

Count

% Codes

Cases

% Cases

Russia

Russia is normalised. Strategies may include language relating

36

4.60%

22

28.90%

1

0.10%

1

1.30%

to Russian superiority, positive language etc. Russian Orthodox Values

Russian values normalised in connection with idea of 'Orthodox' values.

Russian Values

Russian values normalised on prima facie basis.

8

1.00%

8

10.50%

Traditional Values

'Traditional' values normalised.

21

2.70%

15

19.70%

United Russia

United Russia as a party is normalised.

10

1.30%

7

9.20%

UR Politician

United Russia politicians and those in agreement with the policy

28

3.60%

11

14.50%

Social Ontology

of UR are normalised. Includes Vladimir Putin.

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Choice

Homosexuality is understood as a choice.

11

1.40%

9

11.80%

Contagion/Learned

Homosexuality is understood as the result of a social contagion or

6

0.80%

6

7.90%

socially learned behaviour.

114

Category

Code

Description

Count

% Codes

Cases

% Cases

Fact of Nature

Homosexuality is understood as a fact of nature.

3

0.40%

3

3.90%

Fashion

Homosexuality is understood as the result of fashion (choice).

1

0.10%

1

1.30%

Insanity / Psychological

Homosexuality is understood as the result of insanity or a

1

0.10%

1

1.30%

Handicap

psychological handicap.

Poor Moral Character

Homosexuality is understood as the result of 'poor moral

2

0.30%

2

2.60%

74

9.50%

30

39.50%

character', including promiscuity (choice). Models

L. M. Skillen

Alternatives

Alternative ideologies explicitly referred to.

115

Code Count, by Case (and thereby date) Case 2012.02.29 1181

181

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised

Heterosexuality / Traditional Family

1

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

United Russia

Normalised

United Russia

4

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

3

United Russia


+Paedophilia

8

United Russia


+Propaganda

2

United Russia


Dangerous for vulnerable people

7

United Russia


Domestic Opposition

8

(United Russia 2012a)

L. M. Skillen

116

Case 2012.02.29 1 AA182

2012.03.01183

182

(MR7.ru 2012)

183

(Inosmi.ru 2012)

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised

Private +-

1

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

11

United Russia


+Paedophilia

7

United Russia


+Propaganda

11

United Russia



5

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

2

Milonov


"Europe"

1

Milonov


"West"

1

Milonov


Liberal values

1

117

Case 2012.03.11

2012.03.11184

184

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

3

Milonov

Normalised

Russia

2

Milonov


+Propaganda

1

Milonov


Dangerous for Civilisation

1

Milonov


"Europe"

2

Milonov


Liberal values

1

United Russia


+Paedophilia

3

United Russia


+Propaganda

4

United Russia



4


L. M. Skillen

118

Case 2012.03.13185

2012.03.22186

2012.03.24187

185

(United Russia 2012c)

186

(United Russia 2012d)

187

(United Russia 2012e)

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

United Russia


Pussy Riot

1

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

3

United Russia


+Paedophilia

3

United Russia


+Propaganda

5

United Russia



3

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

1

United Russia


Domestic Opposition

3

119

Case 2012.03.29188

188

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised


2

United Russia

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

United Russia

Normalised

Private +-

1

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

1

United Russia

Normalised

Russian Orthodox Values

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

11

United Russia



1

United Russia



9

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

United Russia


"Europe"

1

(United Russia 2012f)

L. M. Skillen

120

Case

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia


USA

1

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

3

Milonov


+Paedophilia

1

Milonov



1

Milonov


"Europe"

1

Milonov


EU

1

2012.04.08190

United Russia

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

2012.04.20191

United Russia

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

2012.04.02189

189

This article in Russian (InoPressa 2012) summarises an article originally in English (Walker 2012). The latter was analysed in this case.

190

(United Russia 2012g)

191

(United Russia 2012h)

L. M. Skillen

121

Case

2012.05.06192

2012.06.21193

192

(United Russia 2012i)

193

(United Russia 2012j)

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised

Private +-

1

United Russia


EU Country

1

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

1

United Russia


Domestic Opposition

1

United Russia


+Paedophilia

1

United Russia



1

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

United Russia


Liberal values

1

122

Case

Actor

Category

Code

Count

2012.07.11194

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

2012.08.10195

Milonov


+Propaganda

1

Milonov



1

Putin

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

Putin

Normalised

Private +-

1

Putin


Pussy Riot

1

United Russia

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

United Russia

Normalised

United Russia

1

2012.09.06 Interview to Russia 196

Today TV Channel

2012.09.15197

194

(United Russia 2012k)

195

(L!feNews 2012)

196

(Kremlin 2012). Duplicated on ER.ru at (United Russia 2012l)

197

(United Russia 2012m)

L. M. Skillen

123

Case

2012.09.25198

2012.12.14199

198

(United Russia 2012n)

199

(NTV.ru 2012)

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia


Domestic Opposition

2

United Russia


Liberal values

1

United Russia


Pussy Riot

1

United Russia

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

United Russia


Pussy Riot

1

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

1

Milonov


+Propaganda

1

Milonov



1

124

Case

Actor

Category

Code

Count

2013.02.27200

United Russia


Domestic Opposition

1

2013.03.12201

United Russia



2

United Russia

Social Ontology

Contagion/Learned

1

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

2

Milonov

Normalised

Russian Values

1

Milonov



1

Milonov


Inherently bad

1

Milonov


"Europe"

1

2013.03.14 1202

200

(United Russia 2013a)

201


202

(Bryzgalin and Komsomol’skaia Pravda 2013)

L. M. Skillen

125

Case

Actor

Category

Code

Count

2013.03.14 2203

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

2

2013.04.07204

United Russia

Normalised

Russian Values

1

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

1

United Russia



1

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

Normalised

Democracy / Public Opinion

3

Putin

Normalised

Homosexuality+

4

Putin

Normalised

Russia

1

2013.04.08 statement answers

Press Putin and to

203

(Grani.ru 2013)

204

(United Russia 2013x)

L. M. Skillen

126

Case

Actor

Category

Code

Count


+Paedophilia

2

Putin


+Propaganda

2

Putin



3

Putin



1

Putin


Inherently bad

1

Putin


EU Country

1

Models

Alternatives

4


EU Country

1

journalists' questions Putin following

Russian205

Dutch talks

2013.04.25

Direct Putin

Line with Vladimir

Putin

Putin206

205

(Kremlin 2013a)

206

(Kremlin 2013b)

L. M. Skillen

127

Case 2013.05.13207

207

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised

Banning propaganda

3

United Russia

Normalised


6

United Russia

Normalised


2

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

2

United Russia

Normalised

Russian Values

1

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

3

United Russia


+Propaganda

8

United Russia


Against Tradition(al Values)

3

United Russia



1

(United Russia 2013m)

L. M. Skillen

128

Case

2013.05.17208

2013.05.21209

2013.05.29 1210

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia



9

Milonov

Normalised


2

Milonov



1

Milonov


Inherently bad

1

United Russia



3

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

United Russia


EU Country

2

United Russia

Normalised


2

208

(Dozhd’ 2013). This article included a video, which was also analysed.

209


210

(United Russia 2013d)

L. M. Skillen

129

Case

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

1

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

2

United Russia

Normalised

United Russia

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

4

United Russia



1

United Russia



4

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

United Russia


Undemocratic / Against Human Rights

1

United Russia


"West"

1

United Russia


EU Country

2

United Russia

Normalised

EU third parties protesting LGBT rights

1

130

Case 2013.05.29 2211

2013.05.30212

2013.06.04

Category

Code

Count

United Russia



2

United Russia


EU Country

1

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

1

United Russia



1

United Russia



4

United Russia


EU Country

3

Models

Alternatives

1

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

News Putin

conference following

211

(United Russia 2013e)

212

(United Russia 2013f)

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Putin

131

Case the

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

5

United Russia



2

United Russia



4

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

United Russia


"Europe"

2

Russia-EU

Summit213 2013.06.06214

213

(Kremlin 2013c)

214

(United Russia 2013g)

L. M. Skillen

132

Case

2013.06.10 1215

215

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia


"West"

2

United Russia


EU

1

United Russia


EU Country

2

United Russia


Liberal values

1

United Russia

Social Ontology

Fact of Nature

1

United Russia

Social Ontology

Fashion

1

United Russia

Social Ontology

Insanity / Psychological Handicap

1

United Russia

Social Ontology


1

United Russia

Normalised


2

United Russia

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

(United Russia 2013h)

L. M. Skillen

133

Case

2013.06.10 2216

216

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

1

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

5

United Russia



7

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

United Russia

Social Ontology

Choice

2

United Russia

Social Ontology

Contagion/Learned

1

United Russia

Social Ontology

Fact of Nature

1

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised

United Russia

1

(United Russia 2013i)

L. M. Skillen

134

Case

2013.06.11 1217

217

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

1

United Russia



1

United Russia


EU Country

1

United Russia

Normalised


7

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

1

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

2

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

3

United Russia


+Propaganda

7

United Russia



4

(United Russia 2013j)

L. M. Skillen

135

Case

2013.06.11 2218

218

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia



1

United Russia



5

United Russia


"West"

1

United Russia


Domestic Opposition

1

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised


3

United Russia

Normalised

Russian Values

1

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

2

United Russia


+Propaganda

2

United Russia



2

(United Russia 2013k)

L. M. Skillen

136

Case

2013.06.13 1219

219

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Social Ontology

Choice

1

United Russia

Social Ontology

Contagion/Learned

1

United Russia

Normalised


2

United Russia

Normalised


3

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

2

United Russia



2

United Russia



1

United Russia



6

(United Russia 2013l)

L. M. Skillen

137

Case

2013.06.13 2220

220

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia


Foreign Country

2

United Russia

Models

Alternatives

2

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

2

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

1

United Russia



1

United Russia



5

United Russia


Inherently bad

2

United Russia



1

(United Russia 2013n)

L. M. Skillen

138

Case

2013.06.13 3221

221

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia


"Europe"

5

United Russia


EU Country

3

United Russia


Foreign Country

1

United Russia

Models

Alternatives

1

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

2

United Russia


+Propaganda

1

United Russia



2

United Russia


"Europe"

1

United Russia


EU Country

2

(United Russia 2013o)

L. M. Skillen

139

Case 2013.06.18 1222

2013.06.18 2223

222

(United Russia 2013p)

223

(United Russia 2013q)

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised


2

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

1

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

1

United Russia



2

United Russia



1

United Russia



3

United Russia

Normalised


1

140

Case

2013.06.21224

224

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia



2

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

1

United Russia

Normalised

Russian Values

1

United Russia

Normalised

United Russia

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

2

United Russia



1

United Russia



1

United Russia



3

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

(United Russia 2013r)

L. M. Skillen

141

Case

2013.06.25

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia


EU Country

1

Models

Alternatives

1

Putin

Normalised

Homosexuality+

2

Putin


+Propaganda

1

Putin



1

Putin


"Europe"

1

Putin


EU Country

1

Putin

Social Ontology

Choice

1

United Russia

Normalised


3

News Putin

conference

with

President of Finland Sauli Niinisto225

2013.07.01226

225

(Kremlin 2013d)

226

(United Russia 2013s)

L. M. Skillen

142

Case

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

United Russia

Normalised

Private +-

1

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

1

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

4

United Russia



1

United Russia



6

United Russia

Social Ontology

Choice

1

United Russia

Social Ontology

Contagion/Learned

1

United Russia

Models

Alternatives

3

143

Case 2013.07.02227

227

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

4

United Russia

Normalised

Russian Values

1

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

2

United Russia

Normalised

UR Politician

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

1

United Russia



1

United Russia


Inherently bad

1

United Russia


"West"

2

United Russia


EU Country

1

(United Russia 2013t)

L. M. Skillen

144

Case

2013.07.03 1228

2013.07.03 2229

228

(United Russia 2013u)

229

(United Russia 2013v)

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia


Liberal values

1

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia


+Propaganda

1

United Russia



1

United Russia

Normalised


3

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

United Russia

Normalised

United Russia

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

1

United Russia

Social Ontology

Contagion/Learned

1

145

Case 2013.07.03 3230

2013.09.04

230

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Models

Alternatives

2

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised


2

United Russia



6

United Russia


"Europe"

1

United Russia


Foreign Country

2

United Russia


Liberal values

2

United Russia


NGO

4

United Russia

Social Ontology

Choice

1

Putin

Models

Alternatives

3

(United Russia 2013w)

L. M. Skillen

146

Case

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Normalised


1

Putin

Normalised

Homosexuality+

4

Putin

Normalised

Russia

4

Putin


+Propaganda

1

Putin



7

Putin



2

Putin



1

Putin


Foreign Country

1

Putin


USA

5

Putin

Social Ontology

Choice

2

Interview to Channel Putin One and Associated 231

Press news agency

231

(Kremlin 2013e) Duplicated on ER.ru at (United Russia 2013y)

L. M. Skillen

147

Case

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Models

Alternatives

10

Putin

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

Putin

Normalised

Russia

1

Putin


+Propaganda

1

Putin



1

Putin



2

Putin



1

Putin


"Europe"

3

Putin


Foreign Country

1

Putin


Liberal values

1

2013.09.19 Meeting Putin of

the

Valdai

International Discussion Club232

232

(Kremlin 2013f)

L. M. Skillen

148

Case

2013.09.20233

2013.10.10234

233

(812 Online 2013)

234

(NTV.ru 2013)

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Putin


USA

2

Putin

Social Ontology

Choice

1

Milonov

Normalised

Private +-

1

Milonov


+Propaganda

1

Milonov



1

Milonov


Inherently bad

1

Milonov


+Propaganda

1

Milonov



1

Milonov



2

149

Case

2013.12.25235

2013.12.27236

235

(United Russia 2013z)

236

(United Russia 2013aa)

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Milonov


Inherently bad

1

Milonov


LGBT Lobby

1

United Russia

Models

Alternatives

1

United Russia

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

United Russia

Normalised

Private +-

1

United Russia

Normalised

United Russia

1

United Russia


+Propaganda

1

United Russia



1

United Russia

Models

Alternatives

4

150

Case

2014.01.19 Interview to Russian

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Normalised


1

United Russia

Normalised

Russia

4

United Russia

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

United Russia



1

United Russia


"Europe"

1

United Russia


USA

1

Putin

Models

Alternatives

8

Putin

Normalised


2

Putin

Normalised

Homosexuality+

6

Putin

Normalised

Russia

2

and foreign media237

237

(Kremlin 2014a) Duplicated on ER.ru at (United Russia 2014a)

L. M. Skillen

151

Case

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Putin

Normalised

Russian Values

1

Putin


+Paedophilia

3

Putin


+Propaganda

3

Putin



5

Putin



3

Putin



2

Putin


"Europe"

1

Putin


"West"

1

Putin


Foreign Country

2

Putin


USA

2

Putin

Social Ontology

Choice

1

152

Case

2014.04.25238

238

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Putin

Social Ontology

Contagion/Learned

1

Putin

Social Ontology

Fact of Nature

1

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

4

Milonov

Normalised


1

Milonov

Normalised

Russia

1

Milonov


+Propaganda

1

Milonov


Inherently bad

2

Milonov


"Europe"

4

Milonov

Social Ontology


1

(dp.ru 2014)

L. M. Skillen

153

Case 2014.05.20239

2014.06.04 Vladimir

Putin’s

Actor

Category

Code

Count

United Russia

Models

Alternatives

1

United Russia


Liberal values

1

Putin

Models

Alternatives

1

Putin


+Propaganda

2

Putin



2

Putin


USA

1

Putin

Models

Alternatives

1

Putin

Normalised


1

interview with Radio Europe 1 and TF1 TV channel240 2014.06.24241

239


240

(Kremlin 2014b)

241

(Kremlin 2014c)

L. M. Skillen

154

Case

2014.09.24242

2014.10.20243

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Putin

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

Putin

Normalised

Russia

1

Putin


Foreign Country

2

United Russia

Normalised

Homosexuality+

1

United Russia


NGO

1

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

1

Milonov

Normalised

Russia

1

Milonov


+Propaganda

4

Milonov



1

242


243

(Miasnikova and Fontanka 2014)

L. M. Skillen

155

Case

Actor

Category

Code

Count

2014.11.10244

Milonov


Inherently bad

1

2014.11.25245

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

1

Milonov


+Propaganda

1

Milonov



1

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

2

Milonov

Normalised

Russian Values

1

Milonov


+Propaganda

1

Milonov



1

2015.07.30246

244

(NTV.ru 2014)

245

(Dni.ru 2014)

246

(Dubrovskaia and MK.ru 2015)

L. M. Skillen

156

Case

2015.09.02247

2015.09.09248

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Milonov



1

Milonov


Inherently bad

1

Milonov


USA

1

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

1

Milonov

Normalised


1

Milonov


+Propaganda

1

Milonov


Inherently bad

1

Milonov



1

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

2

247

(RusNovosti.ru 2015)

248

(Mavliev and Komsomol’skaia Pravda 2015)

L. M. Skillen

157

Case

2015.09.29249

2015.09.29 Interview

to

American

TV

channel

CBS

PBS250

249

(Dni.ru 2015)

250

(Kremlin 2015)

L. M. Skillen

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Milonov


"Europe"

1

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

4

Milonov

Normalised


1

Putin

Models

Alternatives

1

Putin

Normalised


3

Putin

Normalised


1

Putin

Normalised

Homosexuality+

4

Putin

Normalised

Russia

2

Putin


+Propaganda

1

and

158

Case

2015.10.12251

251

Actor

Category

Code

Count

Putin



1

Putin


Foreign Country

2

Putin


USA

1

Putin

Social Ontology

Choice

1

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

2

Milonov

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

Milonov


USA

1

(Rbc.ru 2015)

L. M. Skillen

159

L. M. Skillen

160

Code Count, by Actor ACTOR

Category

Code

Count

Milonov

Models

Alternatives

30

Milonov

Normalised


2

Milonov

Normalised


3

Milonov

Normalised

Private +-

1

Milonov

Normalised

Russia

4

Milonov

Normalised

Russian Values

2

Milonov

Normalised

Traditional Values

1

Milonov


+Paedophilia

1

Milonov


+Propaganda

13

Milonov



3

Milonov



3

Milonov



8

Milonov


Inherently bad

8

Milonov



1

Milonov


"Europe"

10

Milonov


"West"

1

Milonov


EU

1

Milonov


LGBT Lobby

1

Milonov


Liberal values

2

Milonov


USA

2

Milonov

Social Ontology


1

L. M. Skillen

161

ACTOR

Category

Code

Count

Putin

Models

Alternatives

30

Putin

Normalised


9

Putin

Normalised


1

Putin

Normalised


1

Putin

Normalised

Homosexuality+

24

Putin

Normalised

Private +-

1

Putin

Normalised

Russia

11

Putin

Normalised

Russian Values

1

Putin


+Paedophilia

16

Putin



13

Putin



10

Putin



9

Putin


Inherently bad

1

Putin


"Europe"

5

Putin


"West"

1

Putin


EU Country

3

Putin


Foreign Country

8

Putin


Liberal values

1

Putin


Pussy Riot

1

Putin


USA

11

Putin

Social Ontology

Choice

6

Putin

Social Ontology

Contagion/Learned

1

Putin

Social Ontology

Fact of Nature

1

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ACTOR

Category

Code

Count

UR252

Models

Alternatives

14

UR

Normalised

Banning propaganda

3

UR

Normalised


27

UR

Normalised


3

UR

Normalised


24

UR

Normalised

Homosexuality+

9

UR

Normalised


1

UR

Normalised

Private +-

5

UR

Normalised

Russia

21

UR

Normalised

Russian Orthodox Values

1

UR

Normalised

Russian Values

5

UR

Normalised

Traditional Values

20

UR

Normalised

United Russia

10

UR

Normalised

UR Politician

28

UR


+Paedophilia

22

UR


+Propaganda

80

UR



24

UR



11

UR



99

UR


Inherently bad

13

252

United Russia

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ACTOR

Category

Code

Count

UR



2

UR


"Europe"

11

UR


"West"

6

UR


Domestic Opposition

16

UR


EU

1

UR


EU Country

19

UR


Foreign Country

5

UR


Liberal values

7

UR


NGO

5

UR


Pussy Riot

3

UR


USA

2

UR

Social Ontology

Choice

5

UR

Social Ontology

Contagion/Learned

5

UR

Social Ontology

Fact of Nature

2

UR

Social Ontology

Fashion

1

UR

Social Ontology

Insanity / Psychological Handicap

1

UR

Social Ontology


1

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References for Discourse Analysis 812 Online. 2013. ‘Милонов против лишения геев родительских прав [Milonov against the Deprivation of Gay Parental Rights]’. September 20. http://www.online812.ru/2013/09/20/007/. Bryzgalin, Kirill, and Komsomol’skaia Pravda. 2013. ‘Виталий Милонов: “Стивен Фрай считает Россию варварской страной” [Vitalii Milonov: “Stephen Fry Counts Russia as a Barbarian State”]’. March 14. http://www.spb.kp.ru/online/news/1389725/. Dni.ru. 2014. ‘Милонов: Самое время геям уезжать из России [Milonov: It’s Time for the Gays to Leave Russia]’. November 25. http://www.dni.ru/society/2014/11/25/287413.html. ———. 2015. ‘Милонов возьмется за геев Европы [Milonov Will Take on the Gays of Europe]’. September 29. http://www.dni.ru/society/2015/9/29/316248.html. Dozhd’. 2013. ‘Милонов пришел на митинг ЛГБТ в Петербурге с дочкой и женой [Milonov Came to an LGBT Meeting in St Petersburg with His Daughter and Wife]’. May 17. https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/here_and_now/milonov_prishel_na_miting_lgbt _v_peterburge_s_dochkoj_i_zhenoj_-343562/. dp.ru. 2014. ‘Виталий Милонов назвал Евровидение “всеевропейским гейпарадом” [Vitalii Milonov Named Eurovision an “All-Europe Gay Parade”]’. April 25. http://www.dp.ru/a/2014/04/25/Vitalij_Milonov_nazval_Ev/?articlepage= 1. Dubrovskaia, Liza, and MK.ru. 2015. ‘Милонов ищет гей-пропаганду в спортивных магазинах [Milonov Is Looking for Gay Propaganda in Sports Stores]’. July 30. http://www.mk.ru/social/2015/07/30/milonov-trebuetproverit-sportivnye-magaziny-na-geypropagandu.html. Grani.ru. 2013. ‘Милонов: Фрай хотел меня оскорбить [Milonov: Fry Wanted to Offend Me]’. March 14. http://grani.ru/Politics/World/Europe/m.212581.html. InoPressa. 2012. ‘Санкт-Петербург: Гей-сообщества живут в страхе [St Petersburg: The Gay Community Is Living in Fear]’. April 2. http://inopressa.ru/article/02apr2012/independent/spb2.html. Inosmi.ru. 2012. ‘Санкт-Петербург запрещает пропаганду гомосексуализма среди несовершеннолетних [St Petersburg Prohibits Propaganda of Homosexuality among Minors]’. Общество. March 1. http://inosmi.ru/social/20120301/187267098.html. Kremlin. 2012. ‘Interview to Russia Today TV Channel’. September 6.

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http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16393. ———. 2013a. ‘Press Statement and Answers to Journalists’ Questions Following Russian-Dutch Talks’. April 8. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17850. ———. 2013b. ‘Direct Line with Vladimir Putin’. April 25. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17976. ———. 2013c. ‘News Conference Following the Russia-EU Summit’. June 4. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18253. ———. 2013d. ‘News Conference with President of Finland Sauli Niinistö’. June 25. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18407. ———. 2013e. ‘Interview to Channel One and Associated Press News Agency’. September 4. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19143. ———. 2013f. ‘Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club’. September 19. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243. ———. 2014a. ‘Interview to Russian and Foreign Media’. January 19. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20080. ———. 2014b. ‘Vladimir Putin’s Interview with Radio Europe 1 and TF1 TV Channel’. June 4. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45832. ———. 2014c. ‘Press Statements and Answers to Journalists’ Questions Following Russian-Austrian Talks’. June 24. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46060. ———. 2015. ‘Interview to American TV Channel CBS and PBS’. September 29. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50380. L!feNews. 2012. ‘На концерте Мадонны детей просили поддержать геев [At Madonna’s Concert, Children Were Asked to Support Gays]’. August 20. http://lifenews.ru/news/99218. Mavliev, Aleksei, and Komsomol’skaia Pravda. 2015. ‘Виталий Милонов: Гонять геев меня научили в Европе [Vitalii Milonov: Europe Taught Me How to Drive Away the Gays]’. September 9. http://www.spb.kp.ru/daily/26431.4/3302725/. Miasnikova, Ol ’ga, and Fontanka. 2014. ‘Милонов не выдержал гей-марки [Milonov Can’t Avoid the Gay-Brand]’. October 20. http://www.fontanka.ru/2014/10/20/105/. MR7.ru. 2012. ‘Матвиенко и Милонов не оставят геев в покое и за пределами Петербурга [Matvienko and Milonov Will Not Stand for the Gays, Even Outside St Petersburg]’. Матвиенко и Милонов не оставят геев в покое и за пределами Петербурга. March 11. http://mr7.ru/articles/51060/. NTV.ru. 2012. ‘Клевета и гей-пропаганда: Милонов пожаловался на Леди Гагу прокурорам [Slander and Gay Propaganda: Milonov Complained to Prosecutors about Lady Gaga]’. December 14. http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/387476/.

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———. 2013. ‘Милонов хочет запретить российским геям пользоваться суррогатным материнством [Milonov Wants to Ban Russian Gays from the Use of Surrogate Mothers]’. October 10. http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/673096/. ———. 2014. ‘«О нас вытерли ноги»: Депутат Милонов через прокуратуру добивается аннулирования гей-брака [’They’ve Wiped Their Feet on Us’: Deputy Milonov Is Seeking Annulment of Gay Marriage]’. November 10. http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1261395/. Rbc.ru. 2015. ‘Депутат Милонов предложил МИДу не пускать в страну гейактивистов из США [MP Milonov Proposed That the Foreign Ministry Not Allow Gay Activists from the USA into the Country]’. October 12. http://www.rbc.ru/society/12/10/2015/561b11019a794717a922948b. RusNovosti.ru. 2015. ‘Геи Петербурга раздавлены, уверен Виталий Милонов [The Gay of St Petersburg Has Been Crushed, Confirms Vitalii Milonov]’. September 2. http://rusnovosti.ru/posts/385361. United Russia. 2012a. ‘Эсеры не готовы защищать детей от педофилов [’Fair Russia’ Not Ready to Protect Children from Paedophiles]’. February 29. https://er.ru/news/76537/. ———. 2012b. ‘Полтавченко подписал закон, запрещающий пропаганду гомосексуализма и педофилии [Poltavchenko Has Signed a Law Preventing the Propaganda of Homosexuality and Paedophilia]’. March 11. https://er.ru/news/77986/. ———. 2012c. ‘Бурматов: Оппозиция поддерживает Pussy Riot только из-за антипутинских акций [Burmatov: The Opposition Support Pussy Riot Just because of Their Anti-Putin Action]’. March 13. https://er.ru/news/78250/. ———. 2012d. ‘Депутаты рассмотрят законопроект по штрафам за пропаганду гомосексуализма, если он поступит в парламент – Нарышкин [Deputies Will Consider a Bill on Fines for the Propaganda of Homosexuality, If It Goes to Parliament - Naryshkin]’. March 22. https://er.ru/news/79146/. ———. 2012e. ‘Бурматов: Для полной картины авторы “белой недели” забыли внести в свой список гей-парад [Burmotov: To Complete the Dance Card for “White Week”, They Have Forgotten to Include a GayParade on Their List]’. March 24. https://er.ru/news/79319/. ———. 2012f. ‘Лысаков: Дети должны быть защищены от пропаганды однополых отношений [Lysakov: Children Should Be Protected from the Propaganda of Same-Sex Relationships]’. March 29. https://er.ru/news/79754/. ———. 2012g. ‘Гюнтер Грасс объявлен персоной нон грата в Израиле за критичное стихотворение [Gunter Grass Declared a Person Non Grata in Israel for Critical Poem]’. April 8. https://er.ru/news/80568/.

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———. 2012h. ‘Политолог: Саркози имеет шансы победить Олланда на выборах президента Франции [Political Scientist: Sarkozy Has a Chance to Beat Hollande in the French Presidential Election]’. April 20. https://er.ru/news/81622/. ———. 2012i. ‘Бурматов: Виновные в беспорядках на Болотной должны понести наказание [Burmatov: Those Responsible for the Riots on Bolotnaia Should Be Punished]’. May 6. https://er.ru/news/82931/. ———. 2012j. ‘Депутаты Краснодарского краевого парламента проголосовали за ряд важнейших законопроектов [Deputies of the Krasnodar Regional Parliament Voted in Favour of a Number of Important Bills]’. June 21. https://er.ru/news/86610/. ———. 2012k. ‘Госдума предлагает вернуть статью о клевете в Уголовный кодекс [The State Duma Recommend Returning Defammation Article to the Criminal Code]’. July 11. https://er.ru/news/87902/. ———. 2012l. ‘Путин: Экономика станет ключевой проблемой саммита АТЭС [Putin: The Economy Will Be the Key Issue at the APEC Summit]’. September 6. https://er.ru/news/90189/. ———. 2012m. ‘Бурматов: “Марш миллионов” превратился в “марш пяти тысяч” на отмыв миллионов [Burmatov: The “March of Millions” Has Become the “March of Five Thousand”, Millions Have Washed Away]’. September 15. https://er.ru/news/90559/. ———. 2012n. ‘Бурматов: Номинация Pussy Riot на премию Сахарова оскорбление его имени [Burmatov: Pussy Riot’s Nomination for the Sakharov Prize Is an Insult to His Name]’. September 25. https://er.ru/news/91044/. ———. 2013a. ‘В Госдуме готовы обсуждать поправки в Гражданский кодекс [The State Duma Is Ready to Discuss Changes to the Civil Code]’. February 27. https://er.ru/news/97548/. ———. 2013b. ‘Кризис института семьи продолжается – Крыштановская [A Crisis of the Family Institution Is Underway - Kryshtanovskaia]’. March 12. https://er.ru/news/97967/. ———. 2013c. ‘Россия может запретить усыновление детей гражданами Франции [Russia May Ban the Adoption of Children by French Citizens]’. May 21. https://er.ru/news/101333/. ———. 2013d. ‘Дума поддержит запрет пропаганды гомосексуализма [The Duma Will Support the Ban on Homosexual Propaganda]’. May 29. https://er.ru/news/101751/. ———. 2013e. ‘Дума рассмотрит меры по запрету на усыновление однополыми парами [The Duma Will Consider Measures to Ban Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples]’. May 29. https://er.ru/news/101741/. ———. 2013f. ‘Россия должна приостановить усыновление во Францию -

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Астахов [Russia Must Suspend Adoptions to France - Astakhov]’. May 30. https://er.ru/news/101800/. ———. 2013g. ‘Баталина и Железняк примут участие в программе «Политика» [Batalina and Zhelezniak Will Participate in the Program “Politika”]’. June 6. https://er.ru/news/102070/. ———. 2013h. ‘Закон оградит детей от пропаганды гомосексуализма – Железняк [The Law Saves Children from Homosexual Propaganda Zhelezniak]’. June 10. https://er.ru/news/102216/. ———. 2013i. ‘Запрет на усыновление однополыми семьями обсудят в Госдуме [Ban on Adoption by Same-Sex Families Will Be Discussed in the State Duma]’. June 10. https://er.ru/news/102189/. ———. 2013j. ‘Баталина: Депутаты поддержали позицию россиян о запрете пропаганды гомосексуализма [Batalina: Deputies Support the Russian Position on the Prohibition against Homosexual Propaganda]’. June 11. https://er.ru/news/102277/. ———. 2013k. ‘Соцплатформа обсудила проблемы воспитания молодежи [Social-Platform Discussed the Problems of Youth Education]’. June 11. https://er.ru/news/102281/. ———. 2013l. ‘Дума запретит усыновление однополыми семьями до конца сессии [The State Duma to Ban Adoption by Same-Sex Families by the End of the Session]’. June 13. https://er.ru/news/102346/. ———. 2013m. ‘“Матери России” поддерживают запрет пропаганды гомосексуализма [’Mothers of Russia’ Support the Ban on Propaganda of Homosexuality]’. June 13. https://er.ru/news/102322/. ———. 2013n. ‘Пушков предлагает уточнить соглашение с Францией по усыновлению [Pushkov Recommends a Clarification of Agreement with France on Adoption]’. June 13. https://er.ru/news/102334/. ———. 2013o. ‘Российско-французский договор об усыновлении будет пересмотрен [The Russian-French Agreement about Adoptions Will Be Re-Evaluated]’. June 13. https://er.ru/news/102343/. ———. 2013p. ‘Госдума увеличит пособие при усыновлении [The State Duma Will Increase the Benefits for Adoption]’. June 18. https://er.ru/news/102492/. ———. 2013q. ‘Стрельба на улицах создает огромную социальную угрозу – Железняк [Gunfire in the Streets Constitutes a Huge Social Threat Zhelezniak]’. June 18. https://er.ru/news/102501/. ———. 2013r. ‘Чижов поддерживает запрет на усыновление однополыми парами [Chizhov Supports a Ban on Adoption by Same-Sex Couples]’. June 21. https://er.ru/news/102718/. ———. 2013s. ‘Железняк отметил солидарность общества в важных вопросах [Zhelezniak Marked the Solidarity of Society Concerning Important

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Questions]’. July 1. https://er.ru/news/103071/. ———. 2013t. ‘Данилин: Путин и Россия на Западе становятся «маяком» [Danilin: Putin and Russia Have Become a “Beacon” for the West]’. July 2. https://er.ru/news/103160/. ———. 2013u. ‘МИД РФ предостерег ОБСЕ от вмешательства в законотворчество [Russia’s Foreign Ministry Warned the OSCE from Intervening in Law-Making]’. July 3. https://er.ru/news/103215/. ———. 2013v. ‘Молодежь Ставрополья выступила за традиционную семью [The Youth of Stavropol Act for the Traditional Family]’. July 3. https://er.ru/news/103190/. ———. 2013w. ‘Мы не позволим НКО-грантоедам диктовать нам повестку – Сидякин [We Will Not Allow NGO Grants to Dictate the Agenda Sidiakin]’. July 3. https://er.ru/news/103194/. ———. 2013x. ‘Сенатор Пичугов рассказал о перспективах развития Югры [Senator Pichugov Spoke about the Development Prospects of Ugra]’. July 4. https://er.ru/news/103297/. ———. 2013y. ‘Успех России зависит от эффективной работы в муниципалитетах [The Success of Russia Depends on Effective Work in the Municipalities]’. September 4. https://er.ru/news/105296/. ———. 2013z. ‘Орлов перечислил главные итоги 2013 года [Orlov Listed the Main Results of 2013]’. December 25. https://er.ru/news/110282/. ———. 2013aa. ‘В 2013-м на Россию с надеждой посмотрел весь мир – эксперт [In 2013, the Whole World Looked upon Russia with Hope Expert]’. December 27. https://er.ru/news/110179/. ———. 2014a. ‘Путин: Олимпиада - это шанс показать миру новую Россию [Putin: The Olympics: The Chance to Show the World the New Russia]’. January 19. https://er.ru/news/110902/. ———. 2014b. ‘Медведев дал интервью телеканалу Bloomberg [Medvedev Gave an Interview to Bloomberg Television]’. May 20. https://er.ru/news/117044/. ———. 2014c. ‘Никонов требует расследования военных преступлений в Донбассе [Nikonov Requires the Investigation of War Crimes in the Donbas]’. September 24. https://er.ru/news/122779/. Walker, Shaun. 2012. ‘St Petersburg: Gay Communities Living in Fear’. The Independent Europe, March 30. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/st-petersburg-gaycommunities-living-in-fear-7604065.html?

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