Section I: Introduction

Section I: Introduction

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Chapter 1 Nigeria’s Geopolitical and Culture Landscape ―Until the lions have their own historians, the history of the hunt will always glorify the hunter‖? -

Chinua Achebe (1930 – 2013)

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he entity Nigeria spans an enclave of 923, 768 square kilometres. Its land mass stretches from the banks of the bights of Bonny and Benin in the South East and South West respectively, to the littoral zones of Lake Chad in

the North East. And from the prairies of the lower Sahara desert in the North West, the hinterland connects to the creeks of the lower Niger, up to the northern ends of the Bakassi Peninsula in the South East. The farthest length from north to south covers a stretch of 1, 040 kilometres while its coastline is over 700 kilometres. Nigeria with a population of about 170 million is the most populous country in Africa and the seventh such country in the world. It has the highest collection of black men and women in the world and has been seen doubly as the potential giant of Africa and the hope of the black race. The history of Nigeria is wide and varied. Archaeological accounts give evidence of human life since 9000 BCE. Her peoples are equally wide and varied, with three major ethnic groups, thousands of tribes in about 371 ethnic groups. And even though the peoples may have lived in diverse cultures from the earliest of times, the account of Gannon & Pillai (2013 p.318) suggests that there was a common culture of collectivism associated with tribes and ethnic groups in Nigeria. Essentially, the main thrust of the philosophy of collectivism was in the supremacy of the collective interest over that of the individual. Though such culture may not have existed between tribes and ethnic groups, there are many accounts of evidence that it highly existed among individual groups, albeit in different patterns. For instance some scholars such as Lauer & Anyidoho (2012 p.1033) have associated collectivism in 7

traditional Africa with totalitarian nationalism, where the leviathan is accepted by the people thus giving the regime full legitimacy. The collectivism model among the traditional Hausa-Fulani of the North yields a good example. Here Nnoli (1978) argues that there was a strong culture of reverence for established authority, while such structure strengthened centripetal cohesion among the people with an age-long trust that the Head was expected to, and actually was, a ―good man‖ (Blench, Longtou, Hassan, & Walsh, 2006). Besides, Nnoli (1978) also notes that the Hausa-Fulani culture found dignity in servility for which the led where usually not let down by the leader. This unique culture which revered leviathan kings, gave the people of Northern Nigeria an uncommon sense of direction, with the inspirational governance which characterised the leadership pedigree of traditional Hausa-Fulani political entities. And in spite of the gross abuse by opportunistic interlopers over time – an issue within the scope of this work – traces of this great attribute are still found among the Hausa-Fulani to this day. An important capital from above political culture was the emergence of large and strong empires where all the paraphernalia of the modern state thrived. These included trade, commerce, agriculture, and rudimentary technology in addition to political governance. Also present were standing armies, police, fiscal structures and even banking (Rodney, 1972). These empires were led by monarchs who were both political and, sometimes, religious leaders as with the Sokoto Caliphate especially. At other instances they were more of political Heads as with Kanem-Bornu Empire for example. Interestingly, smaller jurisdictions under these empires where led by Emirs who had the blessing of the monarch, usually more of regents who were related by blood to the monarch. For these empires leadership succession was mostly by primogeniture where the first born inherited the thrown, or a quasi-primogeniture where a brother, cousin, or nephew took succession. There were also instances of well-established and organised dynasties domiciled in ruling houses that usually traced themselves to the same ancestry. Such were not uncommon among the numerous ethnic groups of the upper Niger and Benue

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rivers1. For instance Yahaya (2003) gives a good account of the structured leadership of the Nupe in the middle and upper Middle Belt. According to the author, the chronology of anyone who ascended the throne of Etsu Nupe as the monarch of the Nupe Kingdom was called, would be traced to the original Fulani conquerors who established the Etsu dynasty which stands to this day. And similar to the HausaFulani leadership structure, the Etsu would appoint district Heads to superintend communities within his jurisdiction, as well as a cabinet of unalloyed loyalists who advised him (Yahaya, 2003). It was the beauty of the organised Hausa-Fulani and other northern Emirates system of governance that the colonialist as supervised by Lugard, tried to copy by superimposing it – with modifications – on other parts of the country. But rather than promote legitimate governance, the Lugard venture created contradictions that formed part of the fabric of today‘s decay in these parts of the country. This is not to say that there is no explanation for the rot in the north, suffice it to say that there were other contradictions that corrupted the excellent political climate in the north. These issues are dealt with in the later parts of this account. Although democracy has traditionally been associated with individualism (Hellsten, 1998), scholars such as Datta (2013) have associated collectivism with a corresponding government of democracy, tracing the foundations of totalitarianism to what they call collectivist democracy. The traditional political patterns of the Igbo in Eastern Nigeria aptly demonstrate this form of collectivist democracy. The Igbo were known to have practiced Athenian democracy where the people governed themselves direct through informal councils constituted by title holders, elders and even youth age-groups of plebs. Though the traditional Igbo society was known to be the most individualistic relative to the other ethnic groups in Nigeria, it was more of economic than of social relations (Ijeaku, 2009 p.82). For instance, among the traditional Igbo, architects were not known to be entrepreneurs but foremen who led gangs of workers constituted by collective age groups to build houses for each

1

See for example “Politics and Society in Nigeria's Middlebelt: Borgu and the Emergence of a Political Identity” by Adekunle, J. (2004)

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family, especially the newlyweds. Even on the economic front, collectivism was seen in age groups organising themselves to work in one another‘s family farms in turns. The profit embedded in the Igbo system of direct democracy was that decisions were taken on the people by the people who tilled the soil and who moved the economy. For instance, community cabinets known as Ndi Ichie, were composed of the same persons who created and owned farms, owned and manned fishing boats, or engaged in different types of trade. As such it was not possible for these cabinets to take decisions that were far from equity and not in the best interest of the rest of the society. These were gerontocrats who were custodians of the innate wisdom the people needed for leadership. In like manner, the youth met in age-groups; deliberated on matters concerning them and took decisions. Where there was a conflict between a decision taken by the youth age-group and that of the ‗upper house‘ Ndi Ichie in council, Nwizu (2009) notes that it was amicably resolved, sometimes through the spiritual leader of the community the Ezemmuo who coffered with the gods. In rare cases where there was a conflict between the elders‘ group and that of the youth that the gods‘ verdicts were not sought, the youth would yield. Such convention was subsumed in perhaps the most popular adage among the Igbo which says that what an elder sees sitting, a youth would not see standing high up an iroko tree. The point here is that yielding ultimate authority to the council of elders was informed by a long history of faithfulness and un-betrayed trust by these elders who took decisions in the interest of all. On the economic front, decisions taken on building community infrastructure such as markets, roads, village squares or environmental maintenance did not go with any monetary allocation. Rather it was the same approach of organising agegroup work gangs who built the infrastructure and got ‗paid‘ with bowls of pounded yam collectively prepared by the women folk. Adeyeri & Sanni (2013) found a similar pattern among the womenfolk of the Amori of Ogun State, Western Nigeria. The authors observe that among the traditional Amori, women made extensive selfless contributions to the commonwealth by way of collectively cleaning the market places, the streets and generally maintaining other objects or artefacts of public infrastructure. This was done as a collective 10

responsibility and far beyond the traditional domestic roles of women. In effect, public service among the womenfolk of Amori was seen not as a venture for profits or self-aggrandizement, but as a measure of social responsibility. This particular order of things was rather consistent with practically all communities in pre-colonial Nigeria. Further, for the Igbo the symbols of the collective good were found in the designated monuments of each community which were kept sacred. Chuku (2005) aptly points out that the marketplace, for instance, had a wide measure of sanctity; dos and don‘ts that were religiously followed. In some communities certain market days especially Eke were kept holy and no one went to farm. Equally other collective monuments such as village squares, designated streams and rivers and to a larger extent shrines, were held in awe and no one needed to be told not to desecrate them. The sacrilege of desecrating public property was met with severe punishment that was sometimes extended to the immediate families of the offenders (Igbo & Uguoke, 2013). These could include banishment of entire families, ostracism and essentially, stigmatisation. Dorward (1969) finds a similar fragmented form of leadership among the smaller ethnic groups of the Middle Belt, in this case based on kinship lineages. Importantly, kinship was made of God, the author further observes. In a similar token Mbachaga & Ukuma (2012) aptly observe the deep cultural significance of art in the social system of the Tiv in Benue State of the Middle Belt. Significantly, the authors identify the deep significance of theatre as a mechanism of deep acculturation among the Tiv. For instance, they note that the Kwagh-hir institution which is a puppet theatre that involves the use of otherwise simple vignettes to dramatise contemporary living, demonstrates the values, ethos, mores and the sanctity of respect for truth, morality, justice and equity among the Tiv. These values, note the authors, are the real metaphor of the puppetry. Further, the pattern of governance among the traditional Yoruba of the west coast provides an interesting hybrid of the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo patterns. Salami & Aremu (2007) give a succinct account of this model. According to the authors the highest rung of government was the position of a monarch known as the Oba who usually presided over big towns, sometimes empires with other smaller towns under 11

the Oba‘s jurisdiction. Then there was devolution of power down to the villages where the Head or the Baale as they were known, held the forth. Afe & Adubuola (2009) find a rung of High Chiefs between the Oba and the Baale who led different towns within the Oba‘s jurisdiction. The authors identify Oyomesi in Oyo, Iwarefa in Ondo and Larefa in Ekiti, to mention a few. Further down were the family Heads called Oloori Ile. The headship of the family was mostly determined by age and Salami (2006) notes that among these villages rested ruling houses from where the Oba was chosen through some form of Electoral College. One very relevant exposé of the Afe & Odubuola (2009) account was on how the ruling houses emerged. This is important for understanding the basis under which the people accorded legitimacy to these leaderships. Emmanuel (2009) observes that the traditional Yoruba believe that Kings were chosen by God and therefore were direct ambassadors of God. This probably stems from the belief, as propagated by some accounts that the ancestral patriarch of the Yoruba race Oduduwa descended from heaven. Some of these ruling houses traced there family origins direct from Oduduwa while others at some point in history were chosen by the gods through the local priest. Very importantly Afe & Odubuola (2009) note that the Obas enjoyed total allegiance and legitimacy from the people due to the fact that before an Oba was enthroned he went through tutelage direct from the gods as handed down through the Ifa priests. But the Oba‘s power was not absolute. Johnson‘s (2010) classic account of Yoruba history demonstrates the checks and balances inherent in the Yoruba system of government. In the Oyo Empire for example which was very highly organised and arguably the largest of Yoruba traditional governments, the Bashorun who was both the political and spiritual Prime Minister (Johnson, 2010) and the gerontocratic house of nobles known as Oyomesi provided these checks and balances. In addition, socially, the Yoruba convivial culture distinguished them in any event that called for celebration. Be it birth, marriage, title-taking or death, it usually would be the burden of a chain of relatives and friends far beyond the directly affected. Besides making such celebration grandiose, such culture built in the people the spirit of togetherness and love for one another.

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It therefore strengthened the forces that bound the people together for the betterment of all. The Bini model of the traditional modern state, complete with unreserved legitimacy from the governed, provides yet another interesting account. The origin of the Benin Empire (1440-1897) could be traced to the eleventh century beginning from the foundations laid by the Ogiso dynasty (Oghi, 2014). The modern Benin Empire as recorded in history however, began with the Ewuare dynasty in 1440 with the emergence of Oba Ewuare I in that year; the dynasty that has remained till this day even after the Empire was annexed by the British in 1897. The administration of government under the Benin Empire model had the Oba at the helm of affairs. He was assisted by a cabinet of council of chiefs that included the Iyase who was prime minister. There was a council of chiefs known as the Eghaevbo n‘ore; the Oba‘s cabinet headed by the Iyase (Hellermann, 2013 pp.24-25). The Eghaevbo n‘ore are essentially the vehicle for a well organised system of devolution of power as they are also town and district chiefs who supervise another tier of governance closer to the people. This refers to the administration headed by village Heads called Enigie or Enogie for singular. One thing outstanding about the Benin model was that under the empire, before 1897, when the government was an absolute monarchy, it enjoyed unreserved legitimacy from the people. This was even though that most of the tiers of government were by paternal primogeniture including especially, that of the Oba the monarch. This legitimacy was perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that many climes, far and near adopted the Benin model rather seamlessly. These included territories acquired by conquest and others founded by Benin princes even without military conquest, and yet others by association. A classic illustration of this is adequately captured by Aguleri (2014). Explaining the prominence of the Benin system of government in most of Western Igbo in modern day Delta up to Onitsha and environs in Anambra State, the author takes a bearing from the reign of a certain monarch in Agbor a Western Igbo kingdom: ―During the reign of Mmodu, Agbor had collapsed under Benin (cultural) domination and many Benin cultural

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traits diffused into Western Igbo areas through Agbor or Ishan ... It is not surprising therefore to find Benin traits here and there in the area (Aguleri, 2014)‖2. Although Bini traditional societies could not be said to be as communal or collectivistic as most others in modern Nigeria and in fact, highly regimented under the command of the king, there were adequate social institutions that closed, or at least narrowed the social distance among the people. Oghi (2014) identifies these institutions as those that bordered around marriage, witchcraft, crimes of murder and theft, and inheritance. The author opines that while the marriage institution built some form of bonding among parties to marriages, managing the institution of witchcraft served as an instrument of checks on social vices that would ordinarily be extra legal. In the same token using mechanisms of humiliation, stigmatisation, and sometimes banishment, crimes like murder and theft were also put in check. Further, Agbontaen (1997) and Ugiagbe (2013)3 identify different forms of festivals particularly the Igue annual festival as vehicles of socialisation and social cohesion among the Bini people. Further, scholars like Gannon & Pillai (2013 p.608) associate collectivism, as found in most pre-colonial Nigerian communities, with communalism. And within such collectivistic societies, were often found communal division of labour (Stimson & Sholette, 2004). Such system is sufficiently affirmed by the accounts of Bassey, Ojua, Achibong, & Bassey (2012); Saganuwan (2010); Izugbara & Duru (2006), and Raji, Olumoh & Abejide (2013) who found such communal division of labour among several ethnic groups in Nigeria. For instance, Raji, Olumoh & Abejide (2013) note that iron smelting was mostly associated with communities in pre-colonial Ilorin, such that other communities proximal to them patronised their expertise.

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Various accounts link many traditional governance structures of non-Bini-speaking ethnic groups in Edo State and groups in Delta State like Urhobos, Isokos, Itsekiris and most of the Igbos, plus Yorubaland to Bini traditions. See for instance “Localism, Colonialism in Nigeria’s Nascent Democracy: Any Congruence Toward nation Building?” by Christopher Isike (2010) in Luc Sindjoun ed. “The Coming African Hour: Dialectics of Opportunities and Constraints” p. 272. Also see “Benin under British Administration: The Impact of Colonial Rule on an African Kingdom 1897-1938” by P.A. Igbafe (1980). 3

See edoworld.net: www.edoworld.net/benin_kingdom.html

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Keshi (2015) for instance notes that ―perhaps most distinct was the ethnic, tribal or community division of labour in traditional phytopharmacy and medicine. Just as there were those known for orthopaedics, others were known for obstetrics, yet others for spiritual therapies. The work of Muazu & Kaita (2008) adequately demonstrates this argument. The authors show culture-bound patterns in the identification and choice of herbal remedies. They note that among the Fulani of Northern Nigeria, five distinct compound products containing ingredients from eight different plants were used in the traditional treatment of epilepsy. These according to the authors included Securidaca Longipedunculata family (Polygalaceae);

Mitragyna Inermis family (Rubiaceae); Diospyros Mespiliformis family (Ebanaceae) and Parkia Clappertonianna Keay family (Leguminosae). Others were Celtis

Integrifolia family (Ulmaceae); Combretum Hypopilium family (Combretaceae); Centaurea Praecox family (Asteraceae) and Acacia Seyal family (Mimosaceae). Giving fillip to above argument are the accounts of Saganuwan (2010), and Izugbara & Duru (2006). Saganuwan (2010) observes that the traditional Fulani were known to travel far and wide to other ethnic regions to teach them about their remedial plants for the treatment of epileptic conditions, elephantiasis, dropsy and heart conditions. Though the fact of the Fulani travelling to impact their knowledge may have been due to their nomadic culture, the account of Izugbara & Duru (2006) gives a clearer picture of practices of trans-ethnic ethno-medicine. They interviewed 22 traditional healers taken from different local government areas in Abia State of Eastern Nigeria and found testimonies of age-long practices where native doctors travelled to other lands to seek knowledge of particular plants, rocks, animal fluids and their healing properties.‖ Like other groups in Nigeria the same spiritualism nurtured social relations among the Ibibio of the Deep South. Charles‘ (2005) account suggests that the social relations that did bind the people together was based on some form of divine trinity which sustained healthy relations through special recognition accorded three institutions namely that of the grandchild (Ayeyin), that of the in-law (Ukod) and lastly that of the blood brotherhood (Imaan). The author establishes a healthy long chain of oneness that connected households, families and communities through the

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sanctity of the ‗grandchild‘ institution. Charles (2005) observes that the grandchild was a symbol that unified all those who had matrilineal ties with the grandchild. The longer the lineage that sometimes cut through communities and lands far and wide, the larger the oneness. Besides, there was a sort of court of morals the people accorded this institution. In effect it was customary for quarrels, disputes, disagreements between individuals and even communities could be resolved with the intervention of the grandchild. In like manner, the Ukod, as the in-law institution was called, played a vital role in unifying the people. The author‘s account also demonstrates that the institution of the Ukod kept people who had relationships based on marriage in line. The author points out that even in the event of a quarrel, disagreement or a fight, it was forbidden for families of people bound by wedlock relationships to use weapons. When any persons went afoul this custom, Abasi

Ukod, as the corresponding god was called, was appeased in no small measure. The Imaan institution was that which established oneness among communities through blood oath treaties. By the mixing if small quantities of blood from representatives of all sides in the accord, communities or groups were bound together such that they were forbidden to fight. Charles (2005) posits that persons within the Imaan union treated one another with utmost respect and human dignity and there was no contemplation of plotting evil against anyone in the brotherhood. In fact Ebong, (1995) aptly opines that all about the character of the Ibibio social relations was subsumed in peace and harmony and in the collective good. He captures it succinctly: ―Both the ancestral and deistic worlds of the Ibibio are conceived in terms of order, discipline, decorum, peace and harmony. They are ‗so controlled that only form and order prevail‘ ... and it is this ‗form and order,‘ the beauty of the traditional cosmos, which the Ibibio are constantly trying to duplicate and emulate through the medium of their dramatic arts.‖ Offiong (1997) demonstrates extensively that the total belief on the mbiam as oaths were called, made these institutions and of course that of elders scared in terms of conflict resolution. On such collectivism within some cultures, Bernstein (2015 p.478) argues that for such cultures, giving examples with traditional Nigeria and Japan, people have a 16

high sense of self worth. The reverence given traditional institutions among groups in Nigeria was informed by innate beliefs that these leaders were chosen by ancestors, the gods or God Almighty Himself. The main import of this is in the legitimacy which the people freely accorded these traditional institutions of governance. Where there were absolute monarchies, communities the belief system as ordained by the gods, helped maintain the people‘s acceptance of their leaders‘ moral right to hold power. And these leaders often kept the faith. Where any such leader stepped out of line, the gods, usually through the chief priests, had ways of removing or sanctioning them. In the same token ruling houses or families were duly recognised. These were often either by primogeniture, quasi-primogeniture, by dynasties or by some form of seniority in chieftaincy cults woven in gerontocracies. Apart from such legitimacy which municipal governance structures enjoyed, it also helped foster inter-community harmony among peoples of pre-colonial Nigeria. In spite of these accounts of inter-community harmony, there were fierce conflicts that existed among pre-colonial Nigerian communities. Among the Hausa-Fulani, and all the other ethnic groups of Northern Nigeria, there were the Uthman Dan Fodio campaigns, those of Queen Amina, the campaigns of the Songhai Empire, those of Kanem-Bornu, among others. In Igboland, the fiercest battles were those between the Aro and the Ibibio which lasted 90 years, from 1630 to 1720, resulting in the emergence of the Aro Kingdom (Akpeninor, 2013 p.70). Besides there were pockets of inter village wars that dotted the entire landscape of these territories. But then, the peculiarity of the character and content of these conflicts need be examined. First there were time and space dimensions. The periods of these wars were those of creating and losing empires; when the basic fabrics of the modern states in Africa were being formed. The second, a more direct point was that those wars were fought for legitimate reasons of territorial profits and control of merchandise. The communal character of social and economic relations necessitated that military campaigns were for the common good of the collective, be it for a place of abode or for farm lands; for fish ponds, and for trade routes, or for all put together. Of the Aro-Ibibio battles, Morgan (1955) posits that it was a war of survival for the people of Aro who needed a homeland of their own, a thesis corroborated by Arua (1981).

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Though some of those battles were motivated by the Aro slave economy (Oriji, 2003 pp.121-131), trading in slaves at that time was legitimate. Among the Yoruba, there were equally battles of even fiercer proportions. By the mid nineteenth century, for example, the Oyo Empire had assembled a large standing army headquartered in Ibadan (Sklar,2004 p.285). The author opines that this army intermittently clashed with their southern neighbours the Ijebu and the Egba for control of the trade route to Lagos. Similarly, after the Oyo Empire fell, observes Lliffle (2005 p. 71), Ibadan began to nurse the ambition of its own territorial expansion for the ultimate control of trade and taxes, particularly after the woeful initial campaign of its rival the Ijaye. This sparked the brutal sixteen-year Kiriji Wars which began in 1877. Adesoji (2005) finds the same causalities for the conflicts between pre-colonial Ife and Modakeke, Oyo and Akinmorin, Ogbomosho and Orile-Igbon, and Ifon and Ilobu. In the same vein, the basic objective of the famous battles of the Benin Empire were to build and sustain the integrity of what was then one of the super powers in Africa. Such campaigns were for territories, the collection of tributes and taxes for the state (Tedheke, 2007). The same went for the Sundiata campaigns of the Songhai Empire, down to the inter-ethnic wars. In the same token the fierce skirmishes that are today known as the Benin massacre was to regain the glory of a people and a reputable empire threatened by territory-seeking colonialists. Perhaps most notable was the legendary Ekumeku war of resistance among the Igbo in today‘s Delta State, which according to the account of Ohadike (1991) was the single longest armed resistance against British rule in West Africa, having lasted 28 years (1886-1914)4 and one of the fiercest known to the British Empire. In fact the Ekumeku campaigns were the last vestiges of real resistance in Nigeria against the colonialists. It was after its fall in 1914 that the modern Nigerian State was created. The Ekumeku resistance was so resolute, so total, and so comradely, that some accounts claim the famous Mau Mau campaigns of colonial Kenya (1948-1960), got their inspiration from the Ekumeku wars.

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The Ekumeku wars were first against the Royal Niger Company (1886-1900) and from 1900-1914 against the British Crown.

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Thus far, we have examined some of the socio-political structures that were evolving among groups in Nigeria. Similar patterns were equally found in virtually all the over 371 ethnic groups in Nigeria, albeit with different degrees of variance, yet communities were run and were developing at their own different paces and trajectories. It is important to observe that these systems were in place and functioned progressively in spite of the huge distortions that were caused by the slave trade from 1444 when the first consignment of slaves were taken by the Portuguese from the slave coast which is most of modern Nigeria‘s coastline. Equally trade, commerce and rudimentary structures of industry were in place, in such a way that evolution into modern statehood would have been a matter of seamless social dialectics. For instance, an Arochukwu nation was evolving and was beginning to acquire the paraphernalia of state, yet it was founded largely on grounds of the slave trade. Nwokeji (1999) for instance observes that in the emerging Aro kingdom, agricultural activities had heightened with a corresponding growth at a time when the transatlantic slave route was closed and the slave merchants had to locally retain hitherto export-bound slaves. Apart from the fact that more food was needed to feed the slaves, there were surplus hands to engage in agricultural activities, and consequently a corresponding expansion in agricultural activities. As undesirable as slavery is, the point is that nations, particularly the United States and most of Europe had been built on slave labour. Thus the relevance of this brief analogy is that the Aro society was evolving in a particular trajectory, just as those of the Berom, Egba, Igala, or Gwari were evolving along different lines of trade, commerce and industry. This was the order of things before colonialism came in 1900, to change the course of history of the peoples of Nigeria. The varried Nigerian cultures reviewed so far show that Nigerians have a history of harmonious living by way or traditions. Even with the various inter-group conflicts that have in recent decades dotted the countries landscape, more recent accounts as Peil (1975) underscore this argument. Peil (1975) sufficiently shows that Nigerians of different ethnic extractions have a long history of harmonious living when they find themselves in the same community. For instance the author observes that even during the civil war, Nigerians of both sides of the divide belonged to the same social

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clubs and societies outside Nigeria and coexisted happily. The author‘s case study of four Nigerian cities gives muscle to this thesis. As the accounts reviewed have shown, even the course of cultural anthropology among Nigerian communities, before colonialism, would show that acculturation across cultures happened seamlessly even with communities that were conquered. For example, the Fulani conquest of the aboriginal Hausa ethnic group of Northern Nigeria had the former acquiring the Hausa language rather than impose the Fulfude or Fulani language on the ―conquered‖. In a similar token, aspects of the Bini culture were widely and seamlessly acquired by many other ethnic groups in Nigeria without any force of conquest, nor any form of debasement of the people who so adopted the Bini culture traits. In addition even where they were monarchs, the engine of the political machines that governed communities in pre-colonial Nigeria were manned by productive individuals; person who directly tilled the soil, who directly controlled trade and commerce, not by a class of interlopers who found themselves in possession of bogus civil service structures that are far removed from the aspirations of the people. In effect, with the right diagnosis; the right prognosis, and the moral will among Nigerians to adopt an appropriate and workable political arrangement, Nigerians can coexist in harmony and as such, enable the right environment for the people to walk away from a self-reinforcing uncertainty. And underdevelopment.

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